By Joseph Braude*

In the Arab world as well as the West, the discussion of yesterday’s execution of Saudi Shi’ite cleric Nimr al-Nimr has been strident: Sunni Gulf states applaud the action as a step forward in the struggle against terrorism, Iran and Arab Shi’ites condemn it as part of a war on their sect, and in the West, Nimr has mostly been cast as a nonviolent opposition leader, unjustly imprisoned and wrongfully killed.

For clarity’s sake, here is some information from Saudi sources whom I regard as reliable, including one who maintained a personal friendship with Sheikh Nimr for over a decade, which speaks to the context in which the decision to execute him was made.

In the 1980s and early ‘90s, Nimr al-Nimr was a leadership figure in “Hezbollah al-Hejaz,” an avowedly Khomeinist armed group established in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province and active in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain. In sermons and other public statements, Nimr declared the three Sunni ruling dynasties to be illegitimate, and called for taking up arms against their governments. It was a period of lethal confrontation between the movement’s activists and Saudi security forces, a predictably asymmetric conflict claiming lives on both sides. Many of the group’s fighters, and Nimr himself, fled to Iran.

In 1992, Riyadh established a truce with Hezbollah al-Hejaz, on the basis of amnesty for members who renounced the movement, forswore ties to Iran, and declared their loyalty to the Saudi state. Among the many returnees from Iran was Nimr al-Nimr: He rejected the terms of amnesty, but temporarily toned down his rhetoric.

By 2009, however, he had returned to openly advocating for “the military option,” calling in a sermon for secession from the government in Riyadh. The remarks followed a confrontation between Shi’ite protestors and Saudi police at a cemetery containing the graves of venerated Shi’ites in the holy city of Mecca. After delivering the sermon, Nimr went into hiding.

He resurfaced in 2011 in the Eastern Province during the period of the Arab spring demonstrations. At a time when some of the area’s Shi’ite leaders counseled peaceful protest and others called for taking up arms, Nimr joined the latter camp, and was seen publicly with youth who threw molotov cocktails and fired at security forces. In the final incident which came to the public’s attention, in the course of a further armed confrontation, he was seen in a car with armed youth as they fired at Saudi police.

The Saudi government contends that throughout his years as an activist, in addition to inciting violence, he played a role in organizing it, though it has not made evidence available to the public. From the standpoint of the interior ministry, Nimr is simply the Shi’ite equivalent of Sunni members of ISIS and Al-Qaeda whom they believe to have blood on their hands, a number of whom were also executed yesterday. Whatever the case might be, the interior ministry did apply the same policy toward Nimr’s family which it accords the relatives of Sunni jihadists — by tending to their most urgent needs during the period of his imprisonment: His wife, stricken with cancer, was flown to a New York hospital for care, where she stayed for nine months at the government’s expense. Within the context of Saudi political culture, this measure can be understood as part of an effort to stem a cycle of vengeance, reassure the prisoner that no ill will is harbored toward his loved ones, and ultimately “reacquire” the family as loyal subjects. Nimr’s sons declined to visit their father in prison during his incarceration.

About the author:
Joseph Braude, a Senior Fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Program on the Middle East, is a Middle East scholar and author whose research appears in print and on air, in Arabic as well as English. He studied in the departments of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations at Yale and Near Eastern Studies at Princeton. He developed his Arabic to broadcast quality through years of living and working in the Gulf states and North Africa, and added fluency in Farsi to his knowledge of Persian literature as a graduate student at the University of Tehran.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI.

By Sinisa Jakov Marusic

The Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project – a network of investigative centres, media outlets and journalists – has handed Montenegro’s Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic a far-from-flattering New Year’s award.

Its annual poll saw the long-standing Montenegrin strongman narrowly beat the wife and children of Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev for the “award” of “Person of the Year in Organized Crime”.

Another Balkan leader, Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, came third.

“We see this as a lifetime achievement award,” OCCRP’s editor and co-founder, Drew Sullivan, said.

“Nobody outside of [Russian President Vladimir] Putin has run a state that relies so heavily on corruption, organized crime and dirty politics. It is truly and thoroughly rotten to the core,” Sullivan said of Djukanovic’s regime.

Over a political career that has lasted almost three decades, Djukanovic has constantly either been a prime minister or a head of state.

“While he casts himself as a progressive, pro-Western leader who recently helped his country join NATO and is on track to join the European Union, he has built one of the most dedicated kleptocracies and organized crime havens in the world,” the OCCRP maintains.

Nominating Djukanovic this year was Vanja Calovic, director of the Network for Affirmation of NGO Sector, MANS, a civil society organization at loggerheads with the Montenegrin government.

Calling the Prime Minister “the last European dictator”, Calovic said he had “captured our country for his own private interests and turned it into safe haven for criminals. While he, his family and friends enriched themselves, ordinary people suffer from poverty, injustice and lawlessness, while those who dare to talk about the corruption become his targets.”

Finishing a close second and third in the poll respectively were the wife and children of Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev and the Macedonian Prime Minister, Gruevski.

“The relatives of the Azerbaijani president own large chunks of the country’s economy and have worked to plunder the economy at the expense of the people,” the OCCRP says by way of explanation.

As for Prime Minister Gruevski who has run Macedonia for nine years and is accused for a plethora of corrupt affairs, OCCRP mentions only some of them.

“The Macedonian PM has wiretapped opposition parties and journalists, prosecuted political opponents and whitewashed murder investigations,” it says.

Previous winners of the annual OCCRP poll have been Russian President Vladimir Putin, Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev, and the Romanian Parliament.

The OCCRP, founded by Drew Sullivan and Paul Radu in 2006, is a network of 22 investigative reporting organisations funded by the Open Society Foundations, the US Agency for International Development, the Swiss government, the National Endowment for Democracy and other donors.

By Ramesh Jaura

UN Seretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s successor will not be elected by a secret ballot by the 193 member states of the United Nations. But the General Assembly and the Security Council presidents have agreed on a selection process that might mark a watershed.

According to the UN Charter, the Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly following the recommendation of the Security Council. The format agreed by the General Assembly President Mogens Lykketoft and the President of the Security Council Samantha Power does not axe the powers exercised particularly by the Council.

But it responds to mounting public and official pressure from developing country governments to make the selection process of Ban Ki-moon’s successor as transparent and inclusive as possible. Ban’s ten-year term ends on December 31, 2016.

A joint letter by presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council that was sent out to all UN member states on December 15 acknowledges the importance of transparency and inclusivity in the selection process. It also encourages Member States “to consider presenting women, as well as men, as candidates for the position of Secretary-General”. The letter notes “the regional diversity in the selection of previous Secretaries-General”.

Stating that some candidates have already emerged, the letter invites member states presenting candidates to do so in a letter to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council. The two will jointly circulate to all member states, “on an ongoing basis, the names of individuals that have been submitted for consideration”.

In a new development, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council “will offer candidates opportunities for informal dialogues or meetings with the members of their respective bodies…these can take place before the Council begins its selection by the end of July 2016 and may continue throughout the process of selection,” according to the letter.

“The process is started and the wish is that the membership, for the first time in UN history, is included totally in the discussion of the next Secretary-General,” Lykketoft told reporters at the UN headquarters on December 15, adding that in his view “this is a watershed in the way that we are doing things”.

“Until [today], the selection process of the Secretary-General has been very secretive and involving mostly – or only – the permanent five members of the Security Council,” he said, referring to China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Of course, he added, the permanent Security Council members “still have a very strong position in selecting proposals for the General Assembly, but I think if, out of this new process we are now embarking on, comes an imminent candidate supported by a majority of the membership, it will actually give the general membership an increased, de facto power in selecting the Secretary-General”.

Lykketoft explained that the presentation of candidates would also give member states the opportunity to ask questions about their position on UN priorities, such as the Sustainable Development Agenda, peace and security, and other issues.

“But I would also say it would give the opportunity of candidates to answer questions about how should the UN system…possibly be made better to deal with a more holistic view of the world challenges expressed in the Sustainable Development Goals,” he noted, expressing the hope that such consultations would illuminate prospective candidates’ political and organizational priorities.

To a question on the format of such consultations with prospective candidates, Lykketoft said: “We are foreseeing open meetings with the membership of the United Nations, where you gentlemen and ladies of the press can follow the presentations and questions and answers [to and from] the candidates…that is my plan.”

The next Secretary-General will assume the role in January 2017 and will serve a five-year term, which can be renewed by member states for an additional five years.

According to observers, two factors will play an important role in the election of Ban’s successor. Firstly, none of his seven predecessors as Secretary-General were female. Secondly, none of them came from Eastern Europe.

A movement for selecting a female as the next UN chief has been gathering momentum over the years. A staunch supporter of a woman Secretary-General is Bangladesh diplomat Anwarul K. Chowdhury. His initiative in March 2000 as the President of the Security Council led to the adoption of the groundbreaking UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on the role of women in peace and security.

British newspaper, The Guardian, quoted Jean Krasno, a Yale professor and UN expert, saying: “We can’t use the excuse that there aren’t enough qualified women to choose from.”

The Woman Secretary-General campaign she chairs produced a list of outstanding women from all regions, including those from Eastern Europe – with Irina Bokova, the head of UNESCO, and Kristalina Ivanova Georgieva, economist and EU commissioner at the top of the list.

Also on the list are: IMF head Christine Lagarde; the President of Chile and former head of UN Women; current head of the UNDP and former Prime Minister of New Zealand, Helen Clark; the President of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff; current High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European Union’s foreign minister, Federica Mogherini; and the German chancellor Angela Merkel.

AP reports that Islamic State (Daesh( is launching suicide car bomb attacks against the Iraqi military in the fight for Ramadi.

Brig. Gen. Ahmed al-Belawi told AP that Daesh militants sent seven suicide car bombs along the city’s outskirts on Friday. Iraqi forces reported casualities, but have not released the death toll.

Ramadi is the capital of the Anbar province. It has been held by Daesh since May. Iraqi forces launched airstrikes and ground attacks on the city in recent weeks. While Ramadi is considered under Iraqi army control, Daesh militants still hold land outside of the city and are suspected to maintain positions within the city.

Original article

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia carried out 47 executions earlier Saturday, including that of Saudi Shi’ite Cleric Nimr Al-Nimr.

Following the news of the executions, the European Union reiterated its strong opposition to the use of the death penalty in all circumstances, and in particular in cases of mass executions.

Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, said, “The specific case of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr raises serious concerns regarding freedom of expression and the respect of basic civil and political rights, to be safeguarded in all cases, also in the framework of the fight against terrorism.”

According to Mogherini, “This case has also the potential of enflaming further the sectarian tensions that already bring so much damage to the entire region, with dangerous consequences.”

The EU called on the Saudi authorities to promote reconciliation between the different communities in the Kingdom, and all actors to show restraint and responsibility.

Similarly, the executions have drawn the ire of the United States.

“The United States also urges the Government of Saudi Arabia to permit peaceful expression of dissent and to work together with all community leaders to defuse tensions in the wake of these executions,” said John Kirby
Spokesperson for the US Bureau of Public Affairs in a statement.

“We are particularly concerned that the execution of prominent Shia cleric and political activist Nimr al-Nimr risks exacerbating sectarian tensions at a time when they urgently need to be reduced,” Kirby said.

“In this context, we reiterate the need for leaders throughout the region to redouble efforts aimed at de-escalating regional tensions,” Kirby added.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has issued an order calling on the country’s Defense Ministry to expedite efforts for boosting the country’s missile power as reports emerge of US plans for imposing fresh sanctions on Tehran over the issue.

In a decree to Iran’s Defense Minister Brigadier General Hossein Dehqan, Rouhani ordered an acceleration in Iran’s program for production of “various types of missile” needed to improve the country’s defense capabilities.

Rouhani, in his decree to Dehqan, called the purported plan by the White House a measure in line with hostile US policies to “illegally interfere in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s programs for boosting the defense power.”

“In line with the [country’s] ratified defense policies, it is necessary that the program for the production of various types of missiles needed for Iranian Armed Forces continue with more speed and seriousness,” Rouhani said.

The Iranian president also warned that in case the US repeats such “wrong and interventionist” measures, the Iranian Defense Ministry must develop a new plan for expanding the country’s missile capabilities.

Rouhani said that Iran’s missile power, which he described as a means to protect the country’s sovereignty and a major deterrence against terrorism in the Middle East and the world, has never been up for negotiations, including in the nuclear talks with the P5+1 group – the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany – which resulted in the JCPOA in Austria on July 14.

He once again rejected claims that Iran is planning to produce missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, saying that Iran will continue to produce and test ballistic missiles as a “conventional and important” instrument for defending the country.

“It is clear that Iran’s missile program has never been part of the JCPOA, as already acknowledged by US officials,” said Rouhani, stressing that “nuclear weapons have no place in Iran’s defense doctrine; therefore, Iran’s ballistic missiles have not been designed to carry nuclear warheads.”

The Iranian chief executive further said the Islamic Republic would not accept any restrictions on its legitimate right to promote its defense might.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry has also warned the US against imposing any fresh sanctions on international companies and individuals over the Islamic Republic’s ballistic missile program, saying Tehran will respond to such meddlesome measures.

“Such measures are unilateral, arbitrary and illegal and the Islamic Republic of Iran has already served notice to the US government in this regard,” Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hossein Jaberi Ansari, said.

“The Islamic Republic will respond to any meddlesome action against its defense program by strengthening its defense might,” he said.

Jaberi Ansari reiterated that Iran’s missile program is solely for defense purposes and in line with national security interests.

“No measure can deny the Islamic Republic of Iran its legitimate and legal rights to boost its defense might and national security,” he said.

Iran has already said that any fresh sanctions on the country would be a flagrant violation of the JCPOA, whose implementation is expected in January.

By Kristina Kausch*

In February 2015, Freedom House singled out Tunisia as the first Arab world country in four decades to be qualified as ‘free’. In the face of rampant chaos across the Arab world, the international community likes to view Tunisia as a box checked. Nothing could be further from the truth, and indeed this is a dangerous conclusion. Tunisia’s democratic precedent is highly fragile, and its failure would be devastating for Tunisians, stability in North Africa, the legacy of the Arab spring, and the wider morale and hopes of aspiring Arab youth. Tunisia’s transition experience pushes boundaries every day. Tunisia means that change is possible. If this spark is gone, so is hope.

Since the 2011 uprising that led to the ouster of Zine Abidine Ben Ali, debates about Tunisia’s relations with its regional environment have turned. From asking how a successful transition to democracy in Tunisia would yield influence in the broader Arab world, policy communities in- and outside Tunisia now wonder how, conversely, the volatile regional environment may affect Tunisia’s prospects for a durable democratic transition.

Domestically, Tunisia’s transition finds itself at a difficult crossroads. Milestones such as the adoption of a democratic constitution and the first peaceful alternance of power have been achieved, and societal forces have been able to safeguard a consensus-led political reform process throughout a number of governance crises – a significant achievement rightfully honoured with the Nobel Peace Prize. Entering the nitty-gritty second phase of transition, however, Tunisia is stuck with a reform bottleneck, conditioned by elite in-fights, resistance against structural reforms, and unaddressed hinterland failure. A major wave of workers’ strikes and protests is coming up, with a significant disruptive potential. At the same time, three major terrorist attacks in a year – the Tunis Bardo museum shooting on 18 March 2015, at a beach in Sousse on 26 June 2015 and a bus bombing in downtown Tunis on 24 November 2015 – risk upsetting the transition as they cloud the outlook for tourism and investment, shift debates from reform to security, and push the government to clamp down on liberties.

Many regional factors are affecting Tunisia’s transition. The multiple repercussions of the war in Syria and Iraq, including the expansion of Daesh (also known as the Islamic State) to North Africa, and the many indirect effects of regional turmoil on the Tunisian economy via decreasing tourism and investment place further stumbling stones on Tunisia’s path to becoming the Arab world’s first full-fledged democracy. The Paris attacks, Tunisian analysts are certain, will have a direct impact on Tunisia’s economy, and by default, on its transition.

Some of the most immediate security spill over, however, stems from instability in Libya, which, according to Tunisian Prime Minister Habib Essid, is ‘Tunisia’s biggest dilemma’. Permeable borders, militia rule, tribal divisions, contraband and a war economy, the post-Gaddafi arms bazaar, and Libya’s development into North Africa’s hub for Daesh are raising many questions for Tunisian security. Following each of the three major 2015 terrorist attacks, Tunisian commentators were quick to establish the link to training camps and other influences in Libya. Libyans, at the same time, reject responsibility for Tunisia’s security shortcomings. In economic terms, Tunisia is under further strain as the economy of Libya, a major Tunisian trade partner, has collapsed and Libyan migrants flood the country. A slightly more nuanced question that needs addressing, however, is: how much of Tunisia’s ills can really be ascribed to spill over from Libya? Does the Libyan conflict put Tunisia’s transition at risk?

CREEPING EXTREMISM

The role of the Libyan conflict in the surge of mil- itant extremism in Tunisia has many dimensions, including the provision of training, weapons, sources of income through contraband/trafficking, ideological influence, logistical and organisational support, as well as the country’s role as a transit hub for foreign fighters.

Observers have been quick to point to Libya-based militants’ role in arming and training the perpetrators of the three main terrorist attacks that took place in Tunisia in 2015. They also stressed the impact of the Libyan conflict on the surge of militant radicalism across North Africa more broadly. Indeed, 2015 has been the year of Daesh taking a foothold in Tunisia. Daesh has claimed responsibility for all three attacks. Tunisian authorities confirmed that the perpetrators of the Bardo shooting had illegally travelled to Libya in December 2014. Tunisian authorities have long feared security spill over from Libya, and the disclosure of the Libyan link at the Bardo attacks was a wake-up call.

Extremism has been on the rise in Tunisia. The opening of political space after the revolution, combined with lax security, successful recruitment strategies, and the appeal of extremist ideology among disillusioned revolutionary youth allowed (largely non-violent) Salafism to flourish. The most successful Salafist group, Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST) entered an increasing confrontational course with the government as it turned to violence. Following the US Embassy attacks in September 2012 and the assassination in 2013 of Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed Brahmi, two prominent political figures (which the government blamed on AST), the group was declared a terrorist organisation by the then Ennahda-led government. As a result of the forceful clampdown that followed, the group largely disintegrated, and many former AST members fled abroad (including to Syria, Iraq, and Libya) and/or joined other groups, including Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi (KUIN, the Tunisian branch of al- Qaeda), Daesh and Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL). The demise of AST produced a vacuum that Daesh has been able to tap.2

Many signs indicate that Daesh plans to strengthen its footprint in Tunisia. In December 2014, it made its first direct call to Tunisian citizens, taking responsibility for the assassinations of Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed Brahmi and calling Tunisians to arms under the banner of Daesh. In April 2015, a Tunisian member of Daesh in Libya called Tunisians to travel to Libya for training in order to establish and extend the standing of Daesh back in Tunisia. Analysts have warned, therefore, of a mounting competition dynamic between Tunisia’s two main extremist currents – al-Qaeda affiliates on the one hand (in particular KUIN, which has been running an insurgency campaign against Tunisian security forces in Mount Chaambi since December 2012), and Daesh on the other – which may likely result in an escalation of violence involving greater and more spectacular attacks.3

The Libyan connection facilitates the significant potential threat emanating from the return of Tunisian foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. In January 2015, it was estimated that between 1,500-3,000 individuals had gone to fight.4 According to
Tunisian Minister of Interior Lotfi Ben Jeddou, about 80 percent of Tunisian fighters in Syria are members of Daesh. Much has been speculated over the roots of the ‘Tunisian 3000’,5 the highest estimate by country of origin worldwide. Among the reasons mentioned are typically AST’s heavy promotion of jihad, the country’s history of jihadist fighters in Afghanistan, socio-economic factors, but also the training and logistical facili- ties provided via Libya.6 Until recently, Libya was a central North African transit point for foreign fighters to Syria via a direct flight from Benghazi to Istanbul (which has now been cancelled).

Contacts and cooperation between Libyan and Tunisian militants, dating back to the 1980s, have been flourishing since 2011 via the opening of the political space in Tunisia and the establishment of civil strife-torn Libya as a sanctuary for militant fighters from across the region. Local Libyan and Tunisian branches of militant groups including Ansar al-Sharia, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and others have maintained substantial exchanges involving political, ideological, and logistical support including weapons and training, as well as joint trafficking and contraband activity. Early signs that Tunisians trained in Libyan terror camps date back to 2012. Repeated attacks against the Tunisian diplomatic facilities in Libya were claimed to be connected to ASL. According to the Tunisian authorities, up to 1,000 Tunisians are currently fighting or training in Libya.7

However, transnational extremism travels both ways: recent major terrorist attacks in Libya (such as against the Corinthia Hotel and on Tripoli airport) have involved Tunisian nationals, and Tunisian fighters are playing a key role in the expansion of Daesh in Libya. Consequently, Libyans receive Tunisian routine accusations with a stiff lip.

Moreover, while the Libyan militant connection is key, most major terrorist activities in Tunisia prior to the 2015 attacks have been linked not to groups rooted in Libya but to Algeria-based extremist groups, particularly AQIM, which have the experience, skills, and resources to acquire and smuggle weapons and stage operations.8 Tunisia’s major area of insurgency is not at the Libyan but at the Algerian border, where al-Qaeda affiliated militants have been waging a war against the Tunisian authorities since 2012. Despite security cooperation with Algeria (intelligence sharing and joint exercises), this insurgency continues. Increasing competition between al-Qaeda affiliated militants and Daesh-linked militants has increased the odds of terrorist attacks in an attempt to outbid each other.9

CONTRABAND AND BORDER SECURITY

Informal economic activity concentrated along the border areas involves a large number of people including transporters, street vendors, seasonal raders, currency exchangers, wholesalers and Tunisian consumers, for whom this activity ensures access to a large number of goods. Porous borders and contraband networks, however, have provided an ideal habitat for radical militants to flourish in North Africa and the Sahel. Transnational extremist groups such as AQIM have preferred to operate in the desert hinterlands, where they can benefit from connections to historical trade routes and trafficking networks, and exploit governance weakness to successfully entrench themselves with the local tribal structures. Where borders are controlled by militants, smugglers are obliged to cooperate with militants for access, thereby building an alliance between jihadist militancy and (other) organised crime.10 The connections between militias and some traffickers in Southern Libya entails competition with other established trafficking cartels, and therefore significant potential for further conflict and violence.11

The Tunisian authorities have been struggling to find an adequate response to the border challenge. The Tunisian security forces lack both the necessary equipment and the required level of training and professionalism effectively to guard the borders. However, politicians’ mostly reactive calls for stronger border security are not matched by the political will to reform the security sec- tor.12 The challenge is further complicated by the absence of functioning counterpart institutions on the Libyan side, and the high local dependency on illicit economic activity. The significant shortcomings in border management result in an increasing security vacuum that is being exploited by jihadists and contraband cartels.13 The government’s decision to build a wall along the Tunisian-Libyan border – construction of the first part from from Ras Ajdir to Tataouine started in July – appears to be a desperate populist move rather than an effective strategy to keep out weapons and terrorists.

The greatest obstacle to effective border management, however, is the dependency of local communities on informal cross-border trade, which would be wiped out if borders were sealed. Around 40 per cent of the Tunisian economy is
informal, and smuggling and other illicit activities are often the only source of income in Tunisia’s socio-economically marginalised Southern border areas.14 The lack of opportunity and deep-seated socio-economic discontent in the border areas means that cutting-off these opportunities is not possible without providing alternative sources of income, which the Tunisian state is not currently capable of doing. A complete, sudden crackdown of all illicit economic activity in these areas would further undermine, rather than strengthen, people’s security. In order to prevent this, a more differentiated and measured response will have to consider how to disrupt those activities that most benefit militants and organised crime while not suppressing others that maintain a lifeline for the local population.

LIBYAN REFUGEES

The impact of migrants that moved to Tunisia following the outbreak of the Libyan conflict is the subject of much controversy and is closely followed by the local Tunisian media. Estimates from different government sources of the number of Libyan refugees range between 1 million (January 2014) and 2 million (February 2015), equivalent to roughly 10 per cent of Tunisia’s population. While most refugees arrived during the outbreak of violence in 2011, the recent escalation of the conflict in Libya has once more reinforced the flow.

While the Tunisian border with Libya remains open, Libyan borders with Algeria, Egypt, Chad and Niger have been closed. In February 2015, the Tunisian foreign ministry said the Ras Jedir border crossing alone received between 5,000 and 6,000 Libyan refugees a day.15 In March 2015, according to Tunisia’s Foreign Minister Taïeb Baccouche, one-third of Libyan citizens were residing in Tunisia.16

Despite temporary border closures, Libyans are free to enter Tunisia without a visa, and a 1973 agreement grants Libyan nationals a number of privileges in Tunisia, including the right to work and establish businesses.17 They are banned from accessing public schools, however, and need to pay for private tuition as schools opened by the Libyan government in Tunis cannot cover demand. Many Libyan refugees in Tunisia are middle-class, arguably contributing to consumption which, according to one estimate, has been injecting an additional €1 billion into Tunisia’s economy.18 At the same time, Tunisians complain about rising prices for housing, strains on public services and, in particular, Libyan residents’ consumption of subsidized goods. In December 2014, Tunisian Foreign Minister Mongi Hamid asked Libyan authorities to supply oil at cheaper prices, arguing that Tunisia should not buy oil at market prices only for Libyans to ‘use it after it has been subsidized by our government’.19

Tunisian observers also fear an import of Libya’s political tensions and polarisation within the Libyan community in Tunisia (that includes many former Gaddafi sympathisers), which risks carrying the Libyan conflict onto Tunisian soil.

Keen to retain its stated neutrality vis-à-vis the Libyan conflict and ‘in order not to be dragged into the domestic affairs of Libya’, the government has repeatedly called upon Libyan nationals residing in Tunisia ‘not to engage in political activity’ without duly notifying the Tunisian authorities in accordance with Tunisian law.20

MACRO-ECONOMIC IMPACT

While the European Union (EU) absorbs the bulk of Tunisian exports (73 percent in 2014)21, Libya is Tunisia’s most important regional trade partner. Although bilateral trade with Libya makes up only 3.1 per cent of Tunisia’s total foreign trade, alterations of flows have a high impact. The Tunisian and Libyan economies have been complementary, with Tunisia importing oil and gas and exporting consumer goods. According to a 2014 ESCWA study, ‘a correlation analysis of […] Libya and Tunisia over the period 1995-2013 reveals a close relationship between their GDP levels’.22 During the 2009 financial crisis, the dynamism of Tunisian exports towards Libya, boosted by bilateral trade facilitation measures, helped compensate for Tunisian losses on the European market.23 The breakdown of the Libyan economy has hence been a major blow for Tunisia. In 2013 and 2014, Tunisia’s GDP shrunk by around 3.7 and 3.8 per cent respectively, and the renewed escalation of the Libyan crisis in 2015 has further damped hopes for a rapid recovery of the Tunisian economy.

Moreover, Tunisia largely depends on Libyan oil imports. Until recently, Libya was supplying more than 25 percent of Tunisian fuel needs at a preferential price. A bilateral agreement to deliver gas and 650,000 barrels of crude oil to the Tunisian market on a monthly basis, starting from January 2014, is unlikely to be complied with now that Libyan oil output is down to 300,000 barrels per day.

The tourism sector is crucial to the Tunisian economy. In 2010, tourism receipts covered 56 per cent of the trade deficit and provided 19 per cent of foreign exchange earnings. In 2013, the tourism sector’s contribution reached 7.3 percent of GDP, and the wider tourism-related industry accounts for 6.6 percent of employment. The 2015 terrorist attacks have led to a sharp fall in tourism bookings: after the Sousse attack in June, visitor numbers from Britain alone went down by 80-90 percent.24 Before the fall of Gaddafi, around 1.8 million Libyan tourists went to Tunisia each year. In 2011, Libyan tourist arrivals in Tunisia dropped by 30 percent. The increasing number of wealthy Libyan refugees, however, may partly compensate for the loss in regional tourism receipts.25

The halt of remittances from Libya is also having a major impact. In 2012, the World Bank estimated formal and informal remittance flows from Libya to Tunisia to account for 0.56 percent of Tunisia’s GDP. Prior to the Libyan conflict, around 100,000 Tunisians were working in Libya, most of who have returned home. They mostly originate from poor areas of Tunisia, where the income generated in Libya supported large families, and so their return means the loss of remittances – often the only source of income – for particularly vulnerable communities, increasing poverty and heightening the odds for social unrest.26

HOMEMADE DISH, FOREIGN SPICES

The Libyan conflict is exacerbating Tunisia’s domestic problems at a very fragile moment of Tunisia’s transition, but it is by no means the main origin of them. The responsibility for countering and preventing terrorism and radicalisation in Tunisia, securing its borders, fostering economic opportunity within the marginalised rural and border areas and gradually reducing contraband and trafficking lies with the Tunisian authorities.

Libya’s influence in fostering radical militancy in Tunisia is clear, but a number of important nuances need to be drawn. Daesh’s rise in Tunisia, while enabled by the Libyan conflict, has built on Tunisia’s home-grown jihadist militancy, and was enabled by many local factors, including policy failures such as lax security in the aftermath of the revolution and the backfiring of governmental counter-terrorism measures. The Tunisian government’s harsh crackdown on Ansar al-Sharia left an institutional and ideological vacuum that has benefitted Daesh, KUIN and other groups. The government today believes that a conciliatory stance will not dissuade Salafists from radicalisation and blames Ennahda’s failed soft stance on the surge of radical militancy. Aside from endangering hard- earned civil liberties, this uncompromising stance is likely to increase polarisation in a society whose post-revolutionary success has been based on the primacy of consensus.

While routinely warning of the dangers of returning foreign fighters and security spill over from Libya, the Tunisian government has been largely reactive and heavy-handed in its response and measures have included enacting a state of emergency, curfews, border closures, travel restrictions, and widening the power of the security forces.27 Domestic debates in Tunisia over the past year have switched from a reform to a security focus, and the terrorism threat is being successfully exploited by those political actors not interested in structural reforms. In particular, harsh resistances to reforming the security sector – which many consider a precondition for effective national security and border patrol – is
inhibiting the development of a comprehensive national security strategy.28

Despite serious internal challenges, Tunisian politicians routinely blame a variety of domestic difficulties on the Libyan dossier. While many of these concerns are justified, there is a risk that the Libyan conflict becomes the default scapegoat for domestically rooted ills for which Tunisian authorities are reluctant to take responsibility.

At a moment of great fragility for Tunisia’s transition, the radicalisation of jihadist movements is growing at much greater speed than both the political will and the financial means of the Tunisian authorities to address socio-economic problems in the country’s vulnerable border areas.29 Therefore, the international community must assist the Tunisian government even more decisively, including with financial and technical assistance, equipment and technology, and political support, accompanied by pressure for structural reforms (if necessary by making assistance conditional). Regional turmoil in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya takes up the attention of the international community at Tunisia’s expense. Yet regional turmoil makes Tunisia more important, not less. Tunisia’s success in developing into a consolidated, stable democratic precedent in the Arab world may be the most important development in the region today. It requires utmost attention and support.

About the author:
*Kristina Kausch is head of the Middle East pro- gramme at FRIDE.

Source:
This article was published by FRIDE as Policy Brief 214 (PDF)

This Policy Brief belongs to the project ‘Transitions and Geopolitics in the Arab World: links and impli- cations for international actors’, led by FRIDE and HIVOS. We acknowledge the generous support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway. For further information on this project, please contact: Kristina Kausch, FRIDE (kkausch@ fride.org).

Notes:
1. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2015, 28 January 2015, available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world- 2015#.VmqaHl4pU3x
2. C. Petré, ‘Tunisian Salafism: the rise and fall of Ansar al-Sharia’, FRIDE Policy Brief, October 2015.
3. A. Zelin, ‘Between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda in Tunisia’, King’s College ISCR Insight, 11 May 2015.
4. On the total number of Tunisian citizens having fought in Syria and Iraq since the beginning of the conflict, see P. R. Neumann, ‘Foreign fighter
total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s’, ICSR, King’s College, available at:
http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s
5. J. Githens-Mazer, R. Serrano, and T. Dalrymple, ‘The curious case of the Tunisian 3,000’, Open Security, 19 July 2014.
6. Petré 2015, op. cit.
7. A. Zelin, ‘The Tunisian-Libyan Jihadi Connection’, King’s College ICSR Insight, 6 July 2015.
8. M. Kartas, ‘On the edge? Trafficking and insecurity at the Tunisian-Libyan border’, Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies, Geneva, 2013.
9. Zelin, July 2015, op. cit.
10. A. Boukhars, ‘Corridors of Militancy: the Sahel-Sahara border regions’, FRIDE Policy Brief, July 2015.
11. Kartas 2013, op.cit.
12. International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Reform and Security Strategy in Tunisia’, Middle East and North Africa Report 161, 23 July 2015.
13. Ibid.
14. See also International Crisis Group, ‘Tunisia’s Borders: Jihadism and Contraband’, Middle East and North Africa Report 148, 28 November
2013.
15. ‘Tensions in Libya spill over to Tunisia’, Middle East Eye, 12 February 2015.
16. ‘La Tunisie accueille un tiers de la population libyenne, Le Temps, 5 March 2015.
17. O. Karasapan, ‘The impact of Libyan middle-class refugees in Tunisia’, Brookings Institution, 17 March 2015.
18. ‘Des réfugiés libyens très à l’aise dans leurs babouches’, Jeune Afrique, 4 June 2014.
19. Karasapan 2015, op.cit.
20. ‘Tunisian government calls on Libyans not to take part in “political activities” in Tunisia’, Middle East Monitor, 5 November 2014.
21. European Commission, ‘European Union, Trade in goods with Tunisia’, Directorate-General for Trade, 20 October 2015, available at:
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_122002.pdf
22. Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), ‘Situation Brief: the Libyan conflict and its impact on Egypt and Tunisia’,
New York: United Nations, 12 August 2014, available at: http://www.escwa.org.lb/main/docs/EDGDLibyaAug2014.pdf 23. Ibid.
24. C. Stephen, ‘Tourists desert Tunisia after June terror attack’, The Guardian, 25 September 2015.
25. ESCWA 2014, op.cit.
26. Ibid.
27. D. Zizenwine, ‘ISIS Strikes Tunisia. Fighting Terrorism, Losing Democracy’, Foreign Affairs, 7 December 2015. 28. ICG 2015, op cit.
29. M. B. Ayari, ‘Tunisia’s Grand Compromise Faces its Biggest Test’, International Crisis Group, 19 March 2015.

Saudi authorities carried out the largest mass execution in the country since 1980, putting 47 men to death on January 2, 2016. According to the Saudi state news agency, all of the men were convicted on terrorism charges, and most were members of Al Qaeda. The mass execution to begin 2016 follows a 20-year high of 158 executions in 2015.

Among those executed were at least four Saudi Shia men, including Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, a prominent Shia cleric sentenced to death in 2014 after a Saudi court convicted him on a host of vague charges apparently based largely on his peaceful criticism of Saudi officials. The 47 executions were carried out inside prisons across 12 different provinces in Saudi Arabia. In each prison, the men were beheaded except for four that used firing squads, according to Reuters news agency.

portrait of Nimr Baqr al-Nimr an independent Shia cleric in al-Awamiyah, Eastern Province, Saudi Arabia by Abbas Goudarzi, Wikipedia Commons.

“Saudi Arabia had a shameful start to 2016, executing 47 people in a day, after a year with one of the highest execution rates in its recent history,” said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. “The death penalty is never the answer to crimes, and executing prisoners en masse further stains Saudi Arabia’s troubling human rights record.”

Saudi authorities first warned they would carry out a mass execution in late November 2015, when local newspaper Okaz reported that Saudi Arabia would execute 55 men “belonging to Al Qaeda and Awamiyya,” the Shia town in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province from which al-Nimr hailed.

The Saudi Press Agency tied the executed men to a series of Al Qaeda attacks across the country between 2003 and 2004, specifically mentioning coordinated attacks on the Al-Hamra Housing Complex, Vinnell Housing Complex, and Ishbilia Housing Complex in Riyadh in May 2003; attacks on the Arabian Company for Petroleum Investment (APICORP), Petroleum Center Company, and Al-Waha Housing Complex in the Eastern Province city of Khobar in May 2004; the bombing of the Public Traffic Administration in Riyadh in April 2004; bombings targeting the Ministry of Interior headquarters and Emergency Forces building in Riyadh in December 2004; and an attack on the United States Consulate in Jeddah in December 2004.

The announcement did not specify which men were convicted for which crimes, but did note that only four of the 47 were convicted of Hadd (“limit”) crimes for which Islamic law mandates a specific punishment, including the death penalty, while 43 were sentenced to death based on judicial discretion.

The charges against al-Nimr included “breaking allegiance with the ruler,” “inciting sectarian strife,” and supporting rioting and destruction of public property during 2011-2012 protests in Shia-majority towns and cities. The proceedings of Saudi Arabia’s Specialized Criminal Court, which conducted his trial in 13 sessions over a year and a half, raised serious fair trial concerns, including vague charges that do not resemble recognizable crimes and trial sessions held without informing al-Nimr’s legal advocate.

Authorities arrested al-Nimr in June 2012 and held him for eight months before bringing charges, although the Interior Ministry had labeled him an “instigator of discord and rioting” after his arrest. Officials claimed that he resisted arrest and rammed a security force vehicle, leading to a gun battle in which al-Nimr was wounded. Purported photos of the incident released by the local media show the wounded sheikh slumped in the back seat of a car wearing a bloodied white robe. A family member told Human Rights Watch that al-Nimr did not own a gun and that they dispute the claim that he resisted arrest.

Local activists and family members told Human Rights Watch that al-Nimr supported only peaceful protests and eschewed all violent opposition to the government. A 2011 BBC report quoted him as supporting “the roar of the word against authorities rather than weapons … the weapon of the word is stronger than bullets, because authorities will profit from a battle of weapons.” In another video available on YouTube, al-Nimr states, “It is not permitted to use weapons and spread corruption in society.”

Saudi Arabia systematically discriminates against its Shia citizens, who constitute 10 to 15 percent of the population. This discrimination reduces Shias’ access to public education and government employment. They do not receive equal treatment under the justice system and the government impairs their ability to practice their religion freely, rarely providing permission for Shia citizens to build mosques.

Al-Nimr’s 2012 arrest caused demonstrations in Awamiyya, a Shia village in the Qatif district that has been the site of anti-government demonstrations since 2011. Media reported that security forces shot and killed two demonstrators on the evening of al-Nimr’s arrest.

The local activists, who asked not to be named for fear of arrest, said that al-Nimr had a strong following among Shia youth because of his outspoken criticism of government policies and advocacy of greater rights for Shia. In late March 2009, al-Nimr suggested in a Friday sermon that the Shia might consider seceding from Saudi Arabia if the government continued to deny their rights. When security forces tried to detain him, he went into hiding. After his execution, Saudi Arabia deployed security forces to Qatif, maintaining a heavy presence as crowds gathered to protest, according to Middle East Eye, an online news site.

Human Rights Watch has documented longstanding due process violations in Saudi Arabia’s criminal justice system that make it difficult for a defendant to get a fair trial even in capital cases. A Human Rights Watch analysis in September revealed serious due process concerns during four trials of Shia protesters before the Specialized Criminal Court. They include broadly framed charges that do not resemble recognizable crimes, denial of access to lawyers at arrest and during pretrial detention, quick dismissal of allegations of torture without investigation, and admission of confessions that defendants claimed were coerced.

“Saudi Arabia’s execution of a prominent Shia cleric following an unfair trial only adds to the existing sectarian discord and unrest,” Whitson said. “Saudi Arabia’s path to stability in the Eastern Province lies in ending systematic discrimination against Shia citizens, not in executions.”

The Trans-Pacific Partnership is being held up as a model for 21st century trade agreements. This column looks into its implications for Japan. It says that agricultural sectors such as rice and beef won’t be affected as some form of protection will remain. It concludes that while the TPP may help Japan gain access to foreign markets, Japanese agriculture has lost another opportunity for revitalisation.

By Kazuhito Yamashita*

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the ambitious trade agreement between Pacific-Rim countries, was agreed last October. Will Japanese tariffs be eliminated for many food products? The advantage being emphasised is that imported food will be cheaper. Other than the five key items including rice and wheat, items subject to tariff elimination such as oranges and apples have been disclosed, and there are conflicting reports with some claiming that consumers will benefit while others claiming that the agricultural sector will be hit hard.

In regard to agricultural products, if we look at the number of items, 24% is already not subject to tariffs, and the tariffs on 48% of these commodities are less than 20%, so there would not be much of a benefit if the tariffs are reduced to zero. When the quantitative restrictions on oranges were abolished in the past, in addition to countermeasures being implemented, domestic farmers started developing products such as dekopon citrus to differentiate themselves from imported items, so probably only a few farmers feel threatened. Domestically-produced cherries and those imported from the US are completely different products as well.

The price of demanding exceptions

On the other hand, with the exception of beef, all of the five key items are subject to more than a 100% tariff. Rice, wheat, sugar, butter, and skim milk powder may only account for 9% of the number of the items, but they are a big part of the Japanese diet and are also used as ingredients for foodstuffs such as bread and confectionaries. The tariffs on these items will be maintained. The 38.5% tariff on beef will drop to 9%, but that will be 16 years from now.

Since many exceptions were demanded regarding tariff elimination, the US agreed to start reducing its 2.5% tariff on automobiles 15 years down the road and eliminate the tariff completely 25 years from now.

Will there be an impact on agriculture?

In regard to agriculture, there will be hardly any impact, not only for rice for which tariffs will be maintained, but also for beef and pork for which tariffs will be reduced. The opinion of the mass media and some experts that the TPP will have an impact on agriculture is incorrect. In a certain sense, I think Japanese negotiators did a fine job.

What will the impact be on beef and pork?

The current 38.5% tariff on beef will be lowered to 9% over 15 years. But this will have hardly any impact. In 1991, quantitative restrictions were abolished as the transition was made to a tariff-only system, and the tariff was 70%. The current tariff is approximately half of that. However, the approximate 180,000 tons of Japanese beef produced annually prior to deregulation has increased—when it should have decreased—to approximately 230,000 tons.

Furthermore, the value of the yen is 50% less than what it was, making the 38.5% tariff meaningless. The increase in the price of imported beef pushed up the price of domestically produced beef to close to twice of what it was between 2008 and 2012. So, there are still benefits even if the tariff is eliminated.

Over the next 10 years, the 482 yen/kg tariff on inexpensive pork will be lowered to approximately 50 yen/kg and the 4.3% tariff on expensive meat will be eliminated. However, by using the complicated gate price system, importers mix expensive selections with cheaper selections to get the lowest tariff possible on meat imports, so in reality, they are paying only the 4.3% tariff.

What will happen to rice?

The current minimum access (tax-free import limit) for rice is 770,000 tons, but in accordance with demands from the US, 100,000 tons are allowed into the Japanese market as staple. The bidding method is simultaneous buy and sell (SBS). Overseas sellers pair up with Japanese buyers to place bids, and items go to the pair with the largest difference between the buying price (equivalent to wholesale pricing in Japan) and the selling price (price of imported rice into Japan). This spread is the price difference between domestic and overseas markets. If there is a domestic and overseas price difference, there will always be someone to bid. With the exception of 2014, the fill rate of this import limit to date has been 100%.

In 2014, the fill rate was 12% and only 12,000 tons were imported. In particular, during the last bidding in March, even though the government allowed 88,610 tons to be imported, only 216 tons were bid on. The fill rate was 0.2%.

As shown in Figure 1, this is because the domestic and overseas price difference was alleviated.

Figure 1. Rice price comparison

In 2014, the import price of California rice was 12,582 yen/60kg. Since September 2014, the price of Japanese rice has continued to fall and was 11,921 yen/60kg in April 2015. Not only was the domestic and overseas price difference alleviated, but also a complete reversal has occurred. Some trading companies are trying to export Japanese rice to California.

New quotas of 70,000 tons for the US and 8,400 tons for Australia have been introduced as part of the TPP negotiations. But even the current 100,000 ton quota has not being completely utilised, so the addition of a new import quota will remain unfilled and have no effect.

What should Japan have negotiated for?

During the TPP negotiations, even if the rice tariff had been eliminated, it would have had no impact on Japanese rice farming. If Japan’s negotiation policy had been centred on eliminating tariffs for agricultural products, it would not have been that difficult to negotiate for automobiles.

There is a saying in economics that “the tariff is the mother of trusts.” If tariffs are eliminated, acreage reduction policies that raise domestic prices higher than international prices cannot be maintained. As a matter of fact, it will be repealed automatically.

However, since exported rice can be sold at prices higher than domestic prices if there is a reversal of the domestic and overseas price spread, it is not necessary to keep domestic prices lower than international prices by intentionally reducing the amount of acreage. If acreage reduction policies are abolished, domestic rice prices would drop to about 7,500 yen/60kg and a great deal more could be exported. And if exports increase, domestic market supply will decrease, thereby pushing up the price of rice. If the export price is around 12,000 yen/60kg, domestic rice prices will rise to around that level, thereby expanding domestic rice production.

Even if high tariffs are used as protective measures, the domestic market will shrink as a result of a decrease in population. Also, dependency on only the domestic market will lead to the slow death of the agricultural sector. If high-quality Japanese rice can be made more price competitive through the abolishment of acreage reduction policies, not only will tariffs no longer be necessary, but also markets around the world can be developed through exporting. This is the road to revitalising Japanese agriculture.

If rice tariffs could have been eliminated with the TPP, then acreage reduction policies could also have been abolished. Japanese agriculture has lost another opportunity for revitalisation. There are full-time farmers who want rice tariffs to be eliminated. Unfortunately, these opinions were not been reflected in TPP negotiations.

Are there advantages?

Of course there are advantages.

First, Japan will have more access to foreign markets. With the exception of the US automobile tariff, both agricultural and industrial products will receive the benefits of lower tariffs being imposed. We will also see an expansion of convenience stores and bank branches in those countries. The scope of access will increase regarding government procurement for public works, etc. in the US, Australia, Canada, Singapore, Peru, and Chile. And, we will gain new access to other countries.

Second, rules will be created or expanded. Regulations that surpass WTO regulations or those which cover fields not within the scope of the WTO have been implemented. The cumulative rules of origin is one such regulation that is being implemented, covering items that realise a certain amount of added value ratio by totalling all of the added value within the area. Those items which satisfy these rules of origin then are eligible for preferential tariffs under the TPP agreement. These regulations cover the protection of intellectual property rights (such as preventing transactions of forged products), prohibiting demand to transfer technology and local contents by investors, securing the same conditions for competition between state-owned enterprises and overseas enterprises, and reduction/elimination of tariffs.

Third, whereas there are advantages in entering into a free trade agreement, there are also disadvantages to not entering into them. An example of this is the decision by the leaders of Canada and Mexico to participate in the TPP in light of former Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda’s comments about participating in the advance negotiations for the TPP. The larger the TPP is, the more new countries will want to participate. I think we will also see acceleration in the negotiations for free trade agreements between Japan, China, and Korea, and between Japan and the EU.

The TPP is advantageous to Japan as mentioned above, but we were unable to realise an agreement that completely eliminates tariffs, as what was aimed for initially. We did not succeed in creating a 21^st century free trade agreement of which we can be proud.

Editor’s note: This column was reproduced with permission from the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). 

About the author:
* Kazuhito Yamashita, Research director, Canon Institute for Global Studies; Senior fellow, RIETI

Increasing the United States’ export of liquefied natural gas (LNG) above 12 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) would allow the U.S. to continue to provide a competitive advantage for domestic natural-gas-intensive industries relative to their counterparts overseas, according to a new report presented to the U.S. Department of Energy from the Center for Energy Studies at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy and Oxford Economics.

The study, “The Macroeconomic Impact of Increasing U.S. LNG Exports,” was co-authored by Kenneth Medlock, senior director for the Center for Energy Studies.

“The dramatic growth in shale gas production in the United States has presented a number of opportunities and challenges for the U.S. economy,” Medlock said. “To begin, shale gas production has lowered the domestic price of natural gas so that the United States now has among the lowest prices in the world and shifted the U.S. from emerging as a significant importer to a pending exporter of LNG. This has benefitted consumers and led to gains in competitiveness for U.S. manufacturers.

“Low natural gas prices in the United States negatively impact the profitability of domestic upstream activities, which has, in fact, been a primary driver of interest in exporting LNG as suppliers seek new demands in higher-priced markets. While selling natural gas at higher prices on the world market would increase profits for U.S. gas producers, the price gap between the United States and the rest of the world will shrink, thereby eroding some of the benefits that have accrued to U.S. consumers and manufacturers. So the net balance of the gains and losses associated with trade are at the core of the analysis. In sum, the balance is positive for the U.S. economy.”

For the report, the Center for Energy Studies used the Rice World Gas Trade Model to simulate alternative futures to assess natural gas production, demand and, more generally, the international gas market based on a range of projections of U.S. resource endowments. Oxford Economics addressed the macroeconomic impact of the center’s market analysis.

A comprehensive set of scenarios was developed in the analysis – including U.S. natural gas recovery, international and domestic demand, and natural-gas supply opportunities in the rest of the world – to examine the impact on energy markets and the U.S. macroeconomy.

LNG exports are associated with a net increase in domestic natural gas production.

Medlock said the study found that “the majority of the increase in LNG exports is accommodated by expanded domestic production rather than reductions in domestic demand, a result that reflects the very elastic long-run supply curve in North America.”

As exports increase, the spread between U.S. domestic prices and international benchmarks narrows. In every case, greater LNG exports raised domestic prices somewhat and lowered prices internationally. The majority of the price movement (in absolute terms), however, occurs in Asia.

The overall macroeconomic impacts of higher LNG exports are marginally positive, a result that is robust under alternative assumptions. With external demand for U.S. LNG exports at 20 Bcf/d, the impact of increasing exports from 12 Bcf/d is between $7 billion to $20 billion annually from 2026 to 2040 in today’s prices.

Medlock said that the impact from added LNG exports will not be felt until after 2025 due to the large amount of LNG supply that is coming online globally in the next few years. The global market simply cannot accommodate U.S. volumes in excess of 12 Bcf/d before 2025 in any of the scenarios considered. Accordingly, while international demand continues to increase, the market must first work through a large amount of available LNG supply before turning to U.S.-sourced LNG.

The reference case forecasts U.S. LNG exports of around 6.5 Bcf/d as there are abundant, competitive resources around the world that can be delivered to international markets via LNG or pipelines. Higher U.S. LNG exports require a variety of factors that limit the otherwise competitive production of natural gas outside of the U.S. Moreover, those factors must become increasingly restrictive to raise U.S. LNG exports over 12 Bcf/d.

Across all of the scenarios assessed, “the macroeconomic impacts of LNG exports are marginally positive,” Medlock said. “Across the domestic cases, the positive impact of higher U.S. gas production exceeds the negative impacts of higher domestic natural gas prices associated with increased LNG exports. The overall macroeconomic impacts of increasing U.S. LNG exports to 20 Bcf/d from 12 Bcf/d are small, reflecting the small size of the natural gas sector and supporting industries relative to the over $13 trillion U.S. economy.”

Researchers at the University of Minnesota and BioNano Genomics have improved a nanochannel-based form of mapping by using dynamic time-series data to measure the probability distribution, or how much genetic material separates two labels, based on whether the strands are stretched or compressed. They detail their work this week in Biomicrofluidics.

If you already have the sequenced map of an organism’s genome but want to look for structural oddities in a sample, you can check the genomic barcode – a series of distances between known, targeted sites – by cutting a DNA sequence at those sites and examining the distance between the cuts. However, if the original map – obtained through next-generation sequencing involving PCR – contains any amplification biases, there is room for systematic error across studies. To remedy this, researchers at the University of Minnesota and BioNano Genomics have improved a nanochannel-based form of mapping by using dynamic time-series data to measure the probability distribution, or how much genetic material separates two labels, based on whether the strands are stretched or compressed.

“Imagine that two labels on the DNA backbone are connected together by a spring that models the configurational entropy of the DNA between them,” said Kevin Dorfman, a professor in the University of Minnesota’s College of Science & Engineering. “If this was a harmonic spring … then we would expect to see an equal probability of positive and negative displacements about the rest of the length of the spring.”

Rather than this normal curve, however, Dorfman and his colleagues observed greater compression than extension between the labels, and found that the the majority of thermal fluctuations between the labels are short-lived events – information that could help improve the accuracy of genome mapping.

“Such improvements are especially important for complicated samples like cancer, where the cells are heterogeneous, so we need high accuracy to find rare events,” Dorfman said.

Dorfman and his lab have been working with collaborators at San Diego-based BioNano Genomics over the past three years, through grants supported by the National Institutes for Health and National Science Foundation. He and his colleagues detail their work this week in Biomicrofluidics, from AIP Publishing.

A problem the researchers encountered with the traditionally used pulsed field gel electrophoresis method – in which genome maps are constructed by dicing DNA sequences with restriction enzymes – lay in reassembling the maps, as the conventional process sorts the fragments as a function of their size. In the nanochannel method, however the fluorescent labels stay ordered on each chain throughout. This allows the researchers to determine the content of the entire strands from their fluorescent barcodes, without having to reassemble them – removing the reliance on a previously obtained map.

The researchers started by labeling the DNA, which consisted of extracting the genomic DNA from E. coli cells, removing a single nucleotide and piece of the backbone at various targeted locations, and inserting fluorescent nucleotides in their places. Each DNA strand, typically around 300,000 base pairs, was then injected into a 45 nm-wide nanochannel. This forces the molecule to stretch since the bending length scale for DNA, at which it still moves in a rod-like, quantifiable manner, is about 50 nm.

They then imaged the location of the labels using a digital camera. Whereas typical single-molecule studies of DNA in nanochannels report the statistics from dozens of molecules, the researchers’ method involves thousands of molecules, each covered in a flurry of labels – leading to millions of measurements of distances between the labels, which are essential to determining the probability distributions.

Future work for Dorfman and his colleagues includes using these distributions as an input into the genome mapping algorithm. This can be used to assign a confidence that a particular sequence of dots maps to a particular region of the genome, as well to help understand the effect of the knots, folds, and loops of the stretched DNA on genome mapping.

By Ghazanfar Ali Khan

Saudi Arabia on Sunday officially severed ties with Iran over the storming of the Saudi Embassy in Tehran, following the execution of Saudi Shiite cleric Nimr Al-Nimr.

Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir told a news conference Iran’s diplomatic mission and related entities in Saudi Arabia had been given 48 hours to leave. He said Riyadh would not allow Tehran to undermine the Kingdom’s security.

He added that all Saudi diplomats and staff have arrived in the UAE from Iran and are on their way to the Kingdom.

He called Tehran a regional menace for its smuggling of arms and explosives and its previous harboring of Al-Qaeda militants.

In Tehran, angry crowds hurled Molotov cocktails and stormed the Embassy. Fires were seen burning inside the building.

He said the aggressive statements of the Iranian regime encouraged the attacks on Saudi missions, adding that Iran has a history of supporting terrorism, citing its support to the bloody regime of Bashar Assad.

Al-Jubeir said the Kingdom rejects all criticism of the Saudi justice system.

He called on the international community to review Iranian intransigence, stressing that “all options are open for us to deter Iran.”

He added that each Gulf country will decide what measures to be taken to contain Iran.

In response to a reporter’s question Al-Jubeir said the Iranian government is involved in the attacks on the Saudi Embassy, adding that Iranian security were present at the scene yet they never attempted to drive out the protesters.

“In Iraq, we have received assurances from the Iraqi government that it will ensure the safety of our embassy and our diplomats in Baghdad,” Al-Jubeir said.

Earlier, a ministry spokesman accused Iran of sponsoring terror and undermining regional stability.

“The Iranian regime is the last regime in the world that could accuse others of supporting terrorism, considering that (Iran) is a state that sponsors terror, and is condemned by the UN and many countries,” he said in a statement to SPA.

“Iran’s regime has no shame as it rants on human rights matters, even after it executed hundreds of Iranians last year without a clear legal basis,” said the statement.

“Iran’s criticism of the execution of terrorists and its hostile statements are blatant interference in the Kingdom’s internal affairs,” said the statement.

Iran has offered “many Al-Qaeda leaderships safe haven since 2001” in addition to “offering an Iranian passport” to a Saudi suspect involved in 1996 bombings in the Kingdom who was arrested last year, the ministry said.

It criticized Iran’s “flagrant interference in regional countries, including Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon, as well as Syria where it has directly intervened through its Revolutionary Guard and Shiite militia” causing the deaths of tens of thousands of Syrians.

Al-Jubeir postponed his visit to Pakistan Sunday and preferred to stay back to assess the situation and answer those who are siding with terrorists.

A statement to Arab News by Pakistani side said Al-Jubeir, who was due in Islamabad for talks with top-ranking Pakistani officials on Sunday, will now visit Pakistan on Jan. 7.

Ever since its emergence, Pakistan has perceived threats to its core interests and in the perception of many hawkish elements an existential threat from the powerful neighbor – India which only became more pronounced following Pakistan’s partition in 1971 with active Indian involvement in Bangladesh independence movement.

These threat perceptions have been getting stronger in recent years by the rhetoric of ‘Hindutva’ and Akhand Bharat’ from different fringe groups in India and this also raises the possibility of these developments being manipulated by the hawkish elements within Pakistan. This will also feed a perception that is gaining ground that a process of mainstreaming these groups is underway after the government under Modi’s leadership came to power.

India’s concerns, on the other hand, stem from Pakistan’s ability to raise the costs of Indian engagement and inflict serious damage to its interests by indulging in asymmetric war tactics in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Within a lapse of a few days of Modi’s surprise visit to Pakistan, the terror attacks on Indian air base in Pathankot, Punjab, has given rise to suspicions over alleged involvement of Pakistan-based terror groups in the attacks. It has also raised doubts within the Indian strategic community whether the Pakistani government could break free from the hawkish elements and make peace with India.

Nevertheless, people-to-people contacts and bilateral talks must continue to expand the constituency of peace. If France and Germany despite their history of wars could become close trade partners and the Southeast Asian countries could show success in forging close trade ties despite bilateral territorial conflicts, improvement of Indo-Pak ties in socio-economic and cultural areas despite the persistence of contentious politico-security issues should not be an impractical pursuit.

However, if history is any guide, Modi’s economic diplomacy is not likely to convince Pakistan, as things stand now, of its benefits given deep-rooted mistrust of each other’s intentions and geopolitical designs driven by the factors like power asymmetry and fixed and rigid territorial conceptions. The primary concerns are geopolitical which very often give rise to notions of ideological irreconcilability between the two countries.

Historically, Pakistan’s military and the intelligence wing believed radical religious groups could be an asset in addressing its security dilemma posed by India – a much bigger power in terms of size, population and conventional army by making Pakistan more relevant to the American objectives, first, by pushing the Soviets out of Afghanistan and subsequently by bringing closer alignment between its interests and those of Americans in Central Asia. Radical groups were also considered instrumental in waging asymmetrical warfare in Kashmir – the jugular vein of Pakistan – given Indian superiority in conventional warfare.

By describing Kashmir as the jugular vein of Pakistan, a few prominent Pakistani leaders and army officials have underlined the geopolitical importance of Kashmir for Pakistan although they commit themselves to the cause of the freedom struggle in Kashmir. Moreover, Pakistan’s success in offsetting its power imbalance with India is measured in terms of its success in maintaining predominance in Afghanistan and the Central Asian regions.

Following its emergence as a homeland for Indian Muslims to the west of India, Pakistan was privileged to spread its influence towards its north and west at the expense of India due to religious commonality and the removal of the geographical bridge between India and Afghanistan. However, given all the leverages, Pakistan ran into problems with Afghanistan just after its emergence. Pakistan’s strategic concerns began to be defined by its expressed apprehensions on the issue of Pashtunistan and non-recognition of the Durand Line as an international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan by various Afghan rulers.

By strengthening radical Islamism, Pakistan believed that it would not only overcome the demand for Pashtunistan, it could achieve other objectives like keeping Afghanistan and the Central Asian region dependent on its territory for trade and strengthening insurgency in Kashmir. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan provided Pakistan with the required security environment to pursue for a friendly and amenable regime in Afghanistan so that Pashtunistan issue was never raised and got subsumed within the large banner of Islamic identity. Pakistan directed Pashtun hostility to fighting against the Soviet Army under the rubric of political Islam. Because of the cultural affinities of the Sunni Muslim Pashtuns on the either side of the border, and through the influence of Pashtuns in the upper echelons of Pakistan’s army and bureaucracy, Pakistan’s Afghan policy tilted in favour of mujahedeen parties.

It is argued that to defuse Pashtun nationalism and exercise control over Pashtun mujahedeen, Zia discouraged the Afghan nationalists in exile to convene a loya jirga in Pakistan and form a unified command through which weapons could be channelled to fight the Jihad. Moreover, in order to spread its influence into the Soviet Republics of the Central Asian region, Pakistan trained Afghan groups and sent copies of the Koran across the border through them. An organisation named ‘Islamic Union of the Northern Peoples of Afghanistan’ was created in 1988 with purpose of infusing Pakistani influence into the Central Asian landmass more effectively.

The fact that Pashtunistan dominated Afghan foreign policy in the early 1960s despite the little support it enjoyed among the Pashtuns of Pakistan points to its geopolitical character. The demand for Pashtunistan, if conceded, would grant Afghanistan the most desired route to the Indian Ocean. Afghanistan for long has been in the look out of routes to reach out to the world market. However, Pakistan’s policy is to make Afghanistan overly dependent on it for market so that its influence there does not get diluted.

Accordingly, Pakistan has lent support to various radical religious groups to create an overarching Islamic identity displacing ethnic nationalism. Pakistani governments tried to undercut Pashtun nationalism even before the jihad in the 1980s. For example, it was in 1973 that the then Prime Minister Zulifikar Ali Bhutto provided sanctuary to Islamist leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar with a view to undermining the established government in Kabul. Pakistan also tried to create such an identity by propping up the Taliban during the Civil War period in Afghanistan. Later, Al Qaeda’s presence in its territory implicitly offered the Pakistanis the leeway to subsume the ethnic issue of Pashtunistan under the banner of Islamic jihad. It also raised the prospect of spreading jihad into the Central Asian states and that of enhancing the capability of Kashmiri insurgents. The ISI believed that it could effectively manage this new actor on the Afghan scene and maintain its dominant influence over the Taliban. Osama bin Laden’s presence and his eventual death in an American attack in Pakistan confirmed this fact.

The Taliban’s emergence needs to be put within the larger context of changed geopolitics in the Eurasian landmass. Soviet Union disintegrated in the early 1990s and gave way to the emergence of six Central Asian states which were landlocked but rich with natural resources. With the perceived loosening of Indian ties and influence in the region after the dismantlement of its closest partner, Pakistan was eager to extend both trade and political ties to the region. This required stability in Afghanistan ripped apart by Civil War and local rule of the warlords.

Pakistan’s favourite Hekmetyar failed to subdue other ethnic forces in Afghanistan despite making repeated attempts and under these circumstances, the second democratically elected government of Benazir Bhutto, under its Interior Minister General Naseerullah Babur prepared the ground work to utilise the Taliban to bring stability to southern and eastern Afghanistan. He foresaw greater alignment between the American and Pakistani geopolitical interests in Afghanistan in terms of opening of trade routes and forging links with different resource-rich Central Asian states. The fact that the Taliban consisted of many members drawn from the Central Asian states rather than representing exclusively the Pashtun Afghans of the refugee camps in Pakistan point to its fabricated structure to suit Pakistan’s geopolitical interests.

Pakistan’s aspiration for an economic depth against India is palpable in its reluctance to allow its territory being used as a conduit for Indo-Afghan or Indo-Central Asian trade. Pakistan opposed Afghanistan’s membership in SAARC and has always taken advantage of its geo-strategic position in blocking the transfer of goods to its south-east. It has directed its policies to ensure Afghanistan’s dependence on a single entry point into the world through the port of Karachi. Maniappan Kutty, a driver working with the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) project of building the Zaranj-Delaram highway was abducted and subsequently killed in 2005 and Kasula Suryanarayana, an Indian telecommunications engineer in the Zabul Province was killed in April 2006 by the Taliban are some of the examples of Pakistan’s covert designs in nullifying India’s objective of making Afghanistan a land bridge connecting South Asia with Central Asia.

The idea of economic integration of the South and Central Asian regions remains farfetched. Even the success of the Chinese mega initiative ‘One Road One Belt’ in this direction looks murky given continued instability in the Af-Pak region including the Chinese province of Xinjiang and Kashmir. Pakistan has shown enough interest in the Chinese initiative and raised a special security force for the protection of Chinese infrastructure and workers working in Pakistan. It is not surprising that Pakistan sees enormous gains from the project. However, the irony remains that the continuing instability in Pakistan has largely been of its own creation for promotion of its geopolitical interests and address the power asymmetry with India.

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi for Syria Comment

The moniker of “resistance” (muqawama) is common to pro-Assad militias (e.g. The Syrian Resistance and The National Ideological Resistance in Syria): hardly surprising given Syria’s membership of the “resistance” bloc led by Iran. The militia that is the subject of this profile fits into this trend: al-Muqawama al-Wataniya al-Souriya: Liwa Khaybar (“The Syrian National Resistance: Khaybar Brigade”). Unlike the other militias mentioned above though, there is very little information available publicly about this group.

However, I was able to get in touch with the leader of Liwa Khaybar, who calls himself Abu Ja’afar (aka The Scorpion/The Scorpion of Homs). He describes his militia as an auxiliary force for the Syrian army that he founded three years ago (i.e. late 2012-early 2013), but it also so happens that Abu Ja’afar claims to be one of the founders of the National Defence Forces (NDF) branch in Homs. Therefore, Liwa Khaybar and the NDF in Homs emerged at roughly the same time.

Indeed, overlap between some NDF branches and militias is also apparent in the case of Quwat al-Ridha (Syrian Hezbollah) and the Homs NDF, as well as the Damascus NDF and Liwa al-Sayyida Ruqayya, which is affiliated with Iraqi Shi’a militia Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’. That said, it should be made clear that the issue of overlap is different from formal affiliation: that is, these militias are not official divisions of the NDF, unlike (say) Katibat al-Jabal that is part of the Latakia NDF. Rather, particular leaders and individuals may have membership in multiple groups at once.

In middle: Abu Ja’afar. Presumably with members of Liwa Khaybar.

Similar to Quwat al-Ridha, Abu Ja’afar says that most of the members of his group come from Homs, but he denies having links with Quwat al-Ridha, though he says that “perhaps there is some logistical support only.” In terms of numbers and operations, one should be careful not to exaggerate the importance of this force.

While Abu Ja’afar claims thousands of recruits for Liwa Khaybar and operations throughout Syria, he says that until now the group has had some 32 “martyrs” (fallen fighters), including his four brothers.

From recent publicly available information, on 10 October 2015, as Russian airstrikes were underway and regime offensives were launched on multiple fronts throughout northern Syria, the group claimed to be operating in the western Hama countryside (the Sahl al-Ghab area, with the aim of pushing into Idlib province), declaring that “Khirbat al-Naqus and al-Mansura have been liberated, and now the advance is going towards Tel Wasit and after that towards Jisr al-Shughur.” This followed on from some notable posts in the previous month: on 13 September 2015, Liwa Khaybar denied that its leader Abu Ja’afar had been killed, and on 21 September 2015, Abu Ja’afar wrote that “history will record epic battles of heroism that you will see in the next few days in the north of Syria, God willing.” The latter of course refers to the preparations that were being made for offensives to be launched with Russian air support.

Overall, Liwa Khaybar is a minor player in the Syrian conflict but serves as yet another example of militiafication on the Assad regime side.

Following Trump’s logic and his imperative of vigilance, it sounds as though the world — just to be safe — can’t have too many walls.

In Europe the principle of open borders functioning in the Schengen Area is currently in peril.

If, as seems increasingly likely, the presidential election in the U.S. ends up being a contest between Trump and Clinton, it’s possible that Trump just defined the battle line in a useful way.

He obviously wants to use Israel’s wall to justify his own wall plans and he’s assuming that Clinton’s ties to Israel mean she wouldn’t dare question their security measures.

Hillary Clinton said that it is O.K. to ban Muslims from Israel by building a WALL, but not O.K. to do so in the U.S. We must be vigilant!

— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) January 2, 2016

Nevertheless, Israel’s wall has symbolic significance that stretches far beyond the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Ever since the end of the Cold War, there has been a broad consensus that the breakdown of divisions around the world has inherent value and the creation of divisions causes trouble.

While the value of this principle has most often been measured in economic terms and the rewards concentrated in the hands of powerful corporations, the human desire for people to be able to connect seems far greater than the need to stand apart.

Those who want to wall themselves in so they can keep others out are in a minority that perceives itself as embattled.

The walls supposedly designed to make people feel safe also solidify their fears.

The wall is both a metaphor and a literal expression of the conflict between inclusion and exclusion.

Have we reached a point in history where we must now reverse tracks and head back into the past — into a world defined by its rigid divisions? Would not such a world be anything less than a retreat from humanity?

No doubt, in a debate, Clinton would skirt around Israel’s wall — perhaps just by reiterating the official line that it is a temporary measure — but she could not pick a better theme around which to shape her campaign than by presenting herself as someone dedicated to breaking down divisions versus an opponent who is actively divisive.

Am I indulging in an internationalist liberal fantasy?

Perhaps. But however deeply entrenched divisiveness has become, unless we quickly learn how to shake it off, our common fate will be ruin.

When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made his dramatic and surprise visit to Pakistan on December 26, eyebrows were raised all over the world. While Modi’s peace initiative and Nawaz Sharif’s response was applauded by well meaning people, many wondered whether the militants and extremists in Pakistan will allow the peace strategy of Modi and Sharif to succeed.

Therefore, not many were surprised when terrorists attacked the airbase in Pathankot in India on January 2, 2015, a few days after the peace initiative, with the objective of disrupting the peace process. This made the pessimists wonder whether peace process would be possible between India and Pakistan at all at any time now or in the future.

Of course, there are a lot of free wheeling observations in India that there could be difference of opinion between military in Pakistan and political leadership of the country with regard to recently initiated peace move between India and Pakistan. Of course, there was no basis for guessing that Pakistan military could be opposed to the peace initiative. Some elements in India have even said that the Pathankot terrorist act could have been planned by Pakistani military, which is again an unsubstantiated allegation. Of course, it is for the govt of Pakistan to put the record straight.

While the terrorist act has taken place and a few lives have been lost in India and the militants have been killed by the Indian army, the Prime Minister of Pakistan lost no time in condemning the terrorist act and expressing his determination that the peace initiative with India would be pursued. The Chief of Pakistani Army has also reacted and vowed to rid Pakistan from the scourge of terrorism, asserting that “all negative forces” would be scuttled. He also said that all in Pakistan should extend support to the military in eliminating the terrorists.

Now, the question is, after this recent Pathankot terrorist act, where is the peace initiative heading for ? It is totally in the hands of Narendra Modi and Nawaz Sharif to take a long term view about the importance of building peaceful relationship between both the countries for mutual benefit and ensure that the peace process would not fail due to the nefarious acts of the terrorists who do not want peace between both the countries.

The basic and strong factor in favour of the peaceful and progressive relationship between India and Pakistan is the overwhelming view of the citizens of both the countries that the attrition and war between India and Pakistan are counter productive and wasteful and have retarded the progress of both the countries. Whenever opportunities have been given by the politicial leadership of India and Pakistan, the citizens of both the countries have responded with warm feelings towards each other and have cooperated in all spheres without any illwill and with all good will.

Ultimately, to ensure that lasting peace between India and Pakistan would prevail, it is very important that people’s pressure in Pakistan and India should be relentlessly applied on government of both the countries to continue the peace process and take it to the logical end. Such application of people pressure is very much possible in India, where a strong democracy exists. However, one cannot be sure whether the well meaning citizens of Pakistan, who have good understanding of economic and global ground realities, would be able to apply such relentless pressure on Pakistan government, where it is widely believed that the Pakistani military leadership have a strong say in the country’s governance.

However, in the past, we have seen that the people’s pressure and movement have brought around visible changes even in countries under the control of ruthless and dictatorship sort of governments as we have seen in communist Russia, Hungary, Poland and recently in Myanmar.

It is for the citizens of India to create helpful conditions for the Pakistani citizens to create public opinion in favor of India Pakistan peace in Pakistan and support them by reacting to such terrorist acts with caution and understanding. The Indian media which often uses vituperative language while discussing about Pakistan should also review its approach and take a pragmatic and long term view, while distinguishing between the peace moves and the terrorist acts targeting disruption of peace initiatives.

*N. S. Venkataraman, Nandini Voice For the Deprived, nandinivoice.com

What’s at stake this election year? Let me put as directly as I can.

America has succumbed to a vicious cycle in which great wealth translates into political power, which generates even more wealth, and even more power.

This spiral is most apparent is declining tax rates on corporations and on top personal incomes (much in the form of wider tax loopholes), along with a profusion of government bailouts and subsidies (to Wall Street bankers, hedge-fund partners, oil companies, casino tycoons, and giant agribusiness owners, among others).

The vicious cycle of wealth and power is less apparent, but even more significant, in economic rules that now favor the wealthy.

Billionaires like Donald Trump can use bankruptcy to escape debts but average people can’t get relief from burdensome mortgage or student debt payments.

Giant corporations can amass market power without facing antitrust lawsuits (think Internet cable companies, Monsanto, Big Pharma, consolidations of health insurers and of health care corporations, Dow and DuPont, and the growing dominance of Amazon, Apple, and Google, for example).

But average workers have lost the market power that came from joining together in unions.

It’s now easier for Wall Street insiders to profit from confidential information unavailable to small investors.

It’s also easier for giant firms to extend the length of patents and copyrights, thereby pushing up prices on everything from pharmaceuticals to Walt Disney merchandise.

And easier for big corporations to wangle trade treaties that protect their foreign assets but not the jobs or incomes of American workers.

It’s easier for giant military contractors to secure huge appropriations for unnecessary weapons, and to keep the war machine going.

The result of this vicious cycle is a disenfranchisement of most Americans, and a giant upward distribution of income from the middle class and poor to the wealthy and powerful.

Another consequence is growing anger and frustration felt by people who are working harder than ever but getting nowhere, accompanied by deepening cynicism about our democracy.

The way to end this vicious cycle is to reduce the huge accumulations of wealth that fuel it, and get big money out of politics.

But it’s chicken-and-egg problem. How can this be accomplished when wealth and power are compounding at the top?

Only through a political movement such as America had a century ago when progressives reclaimed our economy and democracy from the robber barons of the first Gilded Age.

That was when Wisconsin’s “fighting Bob” La Follette instituted the nation’s first minimum wage law; presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan attacked the big railroads, giant banks, and insurance companies; and President Teddy Roosevelt busted up the giant trusts.

When suffragettes like Susan B. Anthony secured women the right to vote, reformers like Jane Addams got laws protecting children and the public’s health, and organizers like Mary Harris “Mother” Jones spearheaded labor unions.

America enacted a progressive income tax, limited corporate campaign contributions, ensured the safety and purity of food and drugs, and even invented the public high school.

The progressive era welled up in the last decade of the nineteenth century because millions of Americans saw that wealth and power at the top were undermining American democracy and stacking the economic deck. Millions of Americans overcame their cynicism and began to mobilize.

We may have reached that tipping point again.

Both the Occupy Movement and the Tea Party grew out of revulsion at the Wall Street bailout. Consider, more recently, the fight for a higher minimum wage (“Fight for 15”).

Bernie Sander’s presidential campaign is part of this mobilization. (Donald Trump bastardized version draws on the same anger and frustration but has descended into bigotry and xenophobia.)

Surely 2016 is a critical year. But, as the reformers of the Progressive Era understood more than a century ago, no single president or any other politician can accomplish what’s needed because a system caught in the spiral of wealth and power cannot be reformed from within. It can be changed only by a mass movement of citizens pushing from the outside.

So regardless of who wins the presidency in November and which party dominates the next Congress, it is up to the rest of us to continue to organize and mobilize. Real reform will require many years of hard work from millions of us.

As we learned in the last progressive era, this is the only way the vicious cycle of wealth and power can be reversed.

The year 2015 is over. It was a very messy year in the global politics. Will 2016 be plagued by the same types of violence? In a fast paced world that we live today, it is difficult to predict the future. In what follows I shall attempt to review a few cases.

No region was probably more affected by the scourge of war than the Middle East where the Daesh (more commonly known here in the west as the ISIS or ISIL), the terrorist outfit, made significant territorial gains only to see much of such gains evaporate later in the midst of aerial bombardments from the NATO and the Russian forces. Through its religious nuances, no matter how absurd and ludicrous such claims are, it has been able to confuse many ill-informed youths around the globe to attract to its nihilistic causes and become its foot soldiers – both within and outside the territories it controls.

For a peaceful future, Daesh needs to be defeated ideologically, a task, which must be shouldered by Muslim scholars exposing their falsity. If they fail they would see their own territories drenched in blood by sectarian unrests, something that the Daesh likes to see happen.

Millions of Syrians and Iraqis have fled their war-torn countries and taken shelter in Turkey and other neighboring countries. Some of the refugees have also taken shelter in Europe where (with the exception of Germany) they continue to face unkind treatment and barriers towards their settlement. It’s highly likely that Europe and the rest of the world would continue to see such sporadic bursts of refugee influxes in the coming months unless the political conditions inside Syria and Iraq dramatically improve. It goes without saying that Russia’s dropping of bombs and missiles on the opposition targets have strengthened Bashar al-Assad’s hitherto weak bargaining position significantly. It is unlikely that the latter would step down anytime soon unless his main backers convince him to do so. With him in power, there is little chance for any improvement in the affected region.

Down south, Boko Haram, another deadly terrorist group, continues to terrorize millions of people in West Africa, mostly in and around Nigeria. Like the Lord’s Resistance Army, it remains a formidable force that will continue killing and kidnapping the innocent people in vulnerable territories unless fully defeated, which is unlikely to happen any time soon.

The Central African Republic (CAR) had her long-delayed elections last week that probably represent the best hope of reuniting the country, one of the world’s poorest, after three years of ethnic cleansing that has displaced a million of minority Muslims. According to the New York Times, the turnout was heavy among the 1.8 million registered voters, nearly 40 percent of the population. Many of the Muslims, displaced by the genocidal wars by the Christian militias could not vote. More than 400,000 refugees — primarily in neighboring Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Chad — have yet to return.

To this day, the country remains divided: Anti-balaka Christian militias hold territories in the west of the country and small pockets in Bangui, the capital city; the former Seleka rebels (mostly Muslims) control the north and center of the country; and the Lord’s Resistance Army, a brutal Christian terrorist and rebel movement that also operates in the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and Uganda, controls parts of the east. Only the coming days after the election results are declared would show whether or not the government can survive politically under a single flag. Its survival would surely require political compromise and tough choices, which if ignored could only divide the country along ethnic fault lines.

Myanmar (formerly Burma) had her own general election in November in which Suu Kyi’s NLD has come out as the clear winner. Most Muslims were barred from participating in this election. 2015 also saw tens of thousands of Rohingyas to brave the seas and Indian Ocean to seek shelter in Malaysia and Indonesia. It is worth noting that in their desire to leave the Burmese den of unfathomable hatred and intolerance many of these persecuted Rohingyas unfortunately became easy preys to brutal human traffickers. Many Rohingyas have also died in the hands of those criminals.

The President in Myanmar won’t be sworn in until March of 2016. It should be noted that the military-drafted constitution guarantees that unelected military representatives take up 25% of the seats in the Hluttaw and have a veto over constitutional change. Key security ministries (defense, home affairs and border affairs) are selected by the head of the army, not the president, and there can be no change to the constitution without military approval.

As such, while the NLD has won the general election in both the lower and upper houses of the parliament winning respectively 255 (of the 440) and 135 (of the 224) seats, the coming months will show whether or not Suu Kyi would be able to fulfill the dreams of her supporters bringing in a transformational change in this divided country of many races and religions, thus ensuring safety, security and inclusiveness of all. For her to succeed she must be able to domesticate not only the all-powerful military but also the divisive and fascist forces like the Ma Ba Tha, led by skinhead monks, which tried to influence the election at the behest of the regime. Ma Ba Tha, sadly, continues to recruit and organize the racist and bigot populace for terrorizing the already marginalized Muslim minorities. Unless crushed, their criminal activities would only strengthen the divisive forces within the country that are already fighting the military for their legitimate racial, ethnic and religious rights.

One of the most surprising events of the last year was Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s impromptu visit of Pakistan when he met his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif in Lahore on his return trip from Moscow. It was the first visit to Pakistan by an Indian premier in almost 12 years. The tense relations between India and Pakistan, both nuclear-armed nations, have long been a worrisome matter for many area experts and policy makers, who fear that proxy wars between the two countries could flare into a real one.

On his part, Modi had sent mixed signals about Pakistan. He surprised many by inviting Sharif to his swearing-in ceremony last year, but three months later abruptly halted that tentative engagement by canceling high-level talks over Pakistani diplomats’ meeting with separatist leaders from Kashmir.

Under his watch, the lives of minority Muslims and Christians in India have worsened significantly. Muslim and Christian places of worship and business have been attacked, and Muslims killed simply on suspicion of eating or storing beef, and transporting cattle. It is worth noting here that the slaughter of cows is banned in large parts of India but the country exports more beef than any other nation. India produced 43% of the world’s buffalo meat in 2015, the highest of any nation. India is expected to export 2.2 million tons of water buffalo in 2016, up from 2.1 million in 2015. The increase is due to rising demand from the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia. Vietnam and Malaysia are the largest export markets for India, according to the USDA. What is also seldom discussed is the fact that long before the coming of Islam on the Indian sub-continent, beef was widely consumed. According to history professor D.N. Jha, in the Vedic period it was particularly widely consumed.

The fascist Hindutvadi forces, mostly belonging to the Sangh Parivar, want to declare India a vegetarian country. They are trying to distort Indian history along religious lines and are also behind violent attacks against the minorities. Many well-to-do Muslims feel very insecure these days. When Bollywood superstars complained about the growing atmosphere of intolerance in India, they were labeled falsely as anti-India, unpatriotic and pro-Pakistan.

Rather than condemning such attacks and excesses of his party men, Modi has tried to ignore such issues. And yet, he recently signed a treaty with his counterpart in Bangladesh – Sheikh Hasina – which allowed for integration of affected people living in the landlocked enclaves, something that was denied for some 68 years.

This gives me hope against hopelessness. Probably not everything is lost. We can all hope for a better future. In this regards, Modi’s speech in Pakistan is quite memorable.

“There are some who did not want us to be here. There were those who saw sinister designs in our presence here,” Mr. Modi said. “But, we are here because you have faith in us. You know that India is here to contribute, not to compete; to lay the foundations of future, not light the flame of conflict; to rebuild lives, not destroy a nation.”

I would like to believe that Mr. Modi did not speak with a forked tongue and was genuinely sincere and that the course he has taken toward Pakistan and Bangladesh has shifted to embrace engagement, not confrontation.

Let’s hope that 2016 would be a better year than 2015 when our world leaders have learned from their past mistakes to take proper actions that make our world a better place to live together in peace and harmony.

Before people start jumping to conclusions that this article is driven by the fact that Hillary Clinton is a woman, let me be very clear; her gender has nothing to do with it. I do not consider ethnicity or gender a factor when evaluating people for office; I prefer to judge them on the merits of their record, on their integrity and most importantly their character. That said, I would love nothing more than for America to follow in the footsteps of India, Great Britain, Germany, Brazil and Liberia, and elect a woman to the highest office in the land. But it should be based on the best possible candidate for the job, rather than an attempt to make history, as tempting at that may be.

There is no question that Ms. Clinton has both the experience and the smarts to be President. She has served as first lady, been a senator from New York, and a well-respected Secretary of State. Her professional pedigree is not in question. In fact, on this front she is probably better qualified than most of the Republican field put together. However, arrogance from having been in the public eye and on a pedestal for so long should be a question. This is where we should have our first concern with Ms. Clinton. It has to do with a sense of entitlement and a complete disregard for the rules applying to her. The email hoopla is the most recent case in point. In what world does a government servant have the gumption to decide, unilaterally, to not only use personal email while in office but also set-up a private server in their home, a server that nobody in government can access?

I understand that we must respect the privacy of public officials, but we are talking about a government work email account that is meant to be preserved for the public record. Ms. Clinton had no business making this decision. Even more frightening to us should be the sheer arrogance with which she dismissed the issue; it smacked of the old adage of ‘absolute power.’ She had the audacity to suggest that we should all be grateful because she “took the unprecedented step of asking that the State Department make all my work-related emails public for everyone to see.”(Source: Time article). Forgive me if I am not feeling thankful.

Even if she was within the rules, the email example and her handling of it pose fundamental and intractable questions about her clear lack of judgement. More worryingly, it begs the question of what she is hiding. She said at the same press conference that she “turned over some 30,490 emails to the State Department in December”, nearly two years after leaving office. But she also said she “deleted nearly 32,000 others.” (New York Times article).  As a NARA (National Archives and Records Administration) employee told the New Yorker, “Anytime a government official takes it upon themselves to edit their own communications, good government ceases to exist.” Any public servant who is deluded enough to believe that they are responsible enough to ‘police’ themselves surely cannot be trusted with the highest office in the land.

The second concern we should have with Ms. Clinton’s candidacy is her age (same goes for male candidates). She will be in her seventieth year when assumes office, not exactly in the prime of her life. Age is part of a bigger issue we should consider in politics. Why is this, the only profession where we routinely elect people who would otherwise be retired? Would you trust a surgeon or hire a defence lawyer in their seventies? The point is that no matter how fit or healthy a person might be, we all slow down physically and mentally as we get older. These days the only way many senators and congressmen vacate their offices is when they die. Strom Thurmond was eighty-four years old when he was briefly and absurdly second in line for the Presidency in the nineteen-eighties. He went on to serve in the senate until the age of 100, still firmly holding onto his pro-segregation views when he died in 2003. Senator Robert Byrd continued to serve despite years of declining health and routine hospital visits, and finally died in office at the age of ninety-two. It is one thing to serve as a congressman or senator, but the US President’s job is without doubt the toughest in America.

We all saw how quickly and visibly both George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama aged, after taking the oath of office. Based on his behaviour and actions I always suspected Mr. Reagan was senile during most of his second term; we now know that his Alzheimer’s started three years into his first term (Source: The Guardian article). Frankly, the world is a far more complex and fragile place today than it ever was during the cold war. We need fresh thinking, new solutions and bold ideas. We need someone who is hungry and daring, not tired and expecting a coronation. Ask yourself if you really want to put a person who in every other profession would be retiring to take on the most mentally grueling, emotionally draining and physically challenging job in the world?

Then there are the ethics violations and open hypocrisy that should concern us. When Ms. Clinton accepted the position of Secretary of State, the White House was rightly concerned about the millions foreign governments had donated to the Clinton Foundation, and how they might try to use it as leverage to curry favour with the Secretary of State. For this reason Ms. Clinton agreed to sign an ethics agreement which we now know she violated at least one time during her tenure (Source: Washington Post article).

There is good reason why it is illegal for a foreign government to give money to a US political candidate (but Ms. Clinton’s candidacy is unprecedented in this respect, since her husband was President and after leaving office they started a foundation). I have no doubt the Clintons will stop accepting money now that she has decided to run, but it does not change the fact that nations who donated generously over the years will still want collect their dues. It would be naïve to think otherwise.

The Wall Street Journal found in its investigation that “At least 60 companies that lobbied the State Department during her tenure donated a total of more than $26 million to the Clinton Foundation…” (Source: New Yorker article). The Clinton Foundation does an amazing amount of good in the world, and I support and laud their initiatives. But this is not about the foundation’s efforts, but rather about the undue influence and sway donors have over recipients of their largesse and about the dangers of these recipients now occupying the White House; burdened with these obligations.

There is also a great hypocrisy with regards to an issue Ms. Clinton claims to champion: empowering women. It is a great cause and while it is fair to say she has been a great champion, it is equally fair to question her acceptance of money from countries like Saudi Arabia and Brunei that openly abuse and deny women the most basic freedom and rights. I would have greater respect for Ms. Clinton if, on principle, she had refused to accept donations from this small handful of countries where women are less than second class citizens. One other point to consider is that she has also stood by a serial cheater and alleged abuser of women. While her marriage is her personal business, by calling herself a champion for women, it begs the question of whether she is more preach than practice.

We are at a critical and complex time in history. America has never been more divided, and the world is a far more complex place, one where it is hard to distinguish friend from foe. We need someone hungry and energetic enough to grab these challenges by the collar and take them on, not someone who feels the job is their due, and looks more tired than hungry; as Peggy Noonan recently wrote in a Wall Street Journal article. The world needs new ideas and fresh perspectives, not the same old same old.

My first great disappointment with Obama (among a long series that have followed) was that the moment he was elected, on the promise of “change,” he went and appointed a group of washed out Clinton-era advisers and Bush One and Two bureaucrats. This has shown in his administration’s lack of imagination and inability to change the status quo. While Jeb Bush is much younger than Ms. Clinton, there are many of the same issues with him pertaining to dynastic politics (incidentally, he also used private email as Governor of Florida, but did not set up his own server).

We know that Hollywood with its deep pool of talent, resources and money has never managed to deliver a sequel that lives up to the original; so rather than settling for a Clinton or Bush sequel that will never change the narrative, let’s use the vote to script a bold and original story in 2016.

On December 21, 2015, the Republic of Paraguay hosted the 49th Summit of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) with the participation of seven heads of state including: Mauricio Macri (Argentina), Evo Morales (Bolivia), Dilma Rousseff (Brazil), Michelle Bachelet (Chile), Horacio Cartes (Paraguay – MERCOSUR outgoing President Pro-Tempore), Tabaré Vázquez (Uruguay), Moses Nagamootoo (Prime Minister of Guyana) and Delcy Eloína Gómez Rodríguez (Foreign Minister of Venezuela).

In her statement, Chilean President Bachelet underlined that MERCOSUR member countries have ‘common goals that [they] can achieve by embracing active team work and determination.” President Bachelet emphasized that: “very soon we will celebrate the 20th anniversary of the signing of economic integration agreements between MERCOSUR and Chile. In 1996 Chile became the first Associate Member Nation of MERCOSUR. Since then many things have changed, including our position in relation to this commercial alliance, which has always been guided by political dialogue and the strengthening of consensus based on relevance of integration processes.”

In this context, the Chilean head of state noted the role of “Political Dialogue of MERCOSUR” that has made a positive impact in the regional development of public policies, defense of democracies, human rights, social development, migration and appreciation of indigenous cultures. In the same vein, President Bachelet reiterated: “the Economic and Commercial MERCOSUR has brought an impressive impact in South America, and certainly in Chile, 48 percent of the Chilean Foreign Direct Investment, more than US$ 40 billion, is allocated within the MERCOSUR Countries.”

In her statement delivered in Asuncion, the Chilean head of state noted that MERCOSUR is Chile’s fourth commercial partner; it represents an important destination for Santiago’s manufacturing industry, machinery and chemicals as well as value added services. In 2014 Chile exported more than US$ 7 Billion to MERCOSUR Member Countries; this trade block has become Chile’s fourth largest destination of its exported goods in the world; meanwhile, in the same period, services provided by Santiago to the region reached over US$ 1.8 Billion.

President Bachelet highlighted that: “in all these sectors, MERCOSUR has many accomplishments to share, but it has also many awaiting matters, in which we have to continue with a greater commitment. [Chile] has fostered, immediately after our government came to power in March, the dialogue between the Pacific Alliance and MERCOSUR, and will continue to pursue this path, with further determination and energy. We have clearly stated that the Pacific Alliance is not considered a movement that turns its back to the Atlantic coast, indeed we believe that we must explore all possibilities and necessary synergies in order to work together.”

In South America there is applied a variety of socio-economic models in order to ensure a better economic development; political, economic and institutional differences have always been present in this region. However, countries like Chile and Colombia have many positive experiences in the sectors of economic development, poverty alleviation, and development of logistical parks and visionary educational policies that ought to be taken into account by other neighboring developing nations.

It is necessary and indispensable to have a vibrant communication between MERCOSUR and the Pacific Alliance, two regional trade alliances that could bring further progress towards the economic development of countries including: an integrated office for new businesses’ establishment, elimination of commercial barriers and customs cooperation, electronic certification of products, scholarship for students, and citizens’ mobility. After all, the current global order demands a greater regional integration and such efforts must not go in vain; South America cannot afford to stay behind.

In the first six months of 2016, Uruguay’s Tabaré Vazquez will be the President Pro-Tempore of MERCOSUR who is also the current President Pro-Tempore of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). MERCOSUR’s ongoing priorities to be addressed under Vazquez’s leadership are: 1) improvement of intra-regional trade; 2) update of regulations on the external negotiations process 3) strengthening the agenda of cooperation in external relations, beyond the Southern Common Market, particularly foster a close cooperation with the Pacific Alliance and European Union.

Additionally, Uruguay is expected to lead an initiative so that MERCOSUR’s (Ouro Preto Protocol; Decision CMC Nr. 10/92 and Resolution Nr. 35/92) would allow its member countries the right to conduct bilateral treaty negotiations with any other country outside of the regional block, without being obliged to go through MERCOSUR’s review and approval process on every attempt for bilateral trade agreement.

References:
http://www.abc.com.py/internacionales/paraguay-recibe-presidencia-del-mercosur-1388874.html
http://www.gob.cl/2015/12/21/minuto-minuto-mandataria-inicio-participacion-la-xlix-cumbre-del-mercosur/
http://www.elpais.com.uy/informacion/nin-novoa-quiere-mas-libertad.html