If you call the cops on someone whose behavior is worrying you, just know that your call may lead to the cops killing or seriously injuring that person.

Sitharath Sam learned this lesson Sunday after she called the police on her boyfriend of ten years. Sam is reported at KNXV-TV to have called the cops when her boyfriend Sean Mould, who had been heavily drinking, refused to leave her home. Sam also says Mould neither physically abused her nor threatened her. Tempe, Arizona police arrived at her home and shot Mould, who they say walked toward a cop while holding a pocket knife. Summing up the lesson from the tragic turn of events, Sam states, “I made that one mistake of calling for help; and now he’s dead, and I have to live with it.”

Watch here a KNXV-TV report regarding the killing of Mould:

Mould is among the about three people a day police killed in America in 2015.

Police, in addition, seriously hurt — both physically and psychologically — many more individuals each day.

For example, a December 26 in-depth Sarasota Herald-Tribune article presents the horrific details and gory pictures of what happened in July of 2012 after a Florida mother called the police and informed them that she was concerned that her 18-year-old son Jared Lemay may commit suicide. North Port, Florida cop Michael Dietz, upon finding the son Jared Lemay hiding in a trash can, sicced a police dog on Lemay. Evidence indicates the attack arose from a police department where the exercise of excessive and unwarranted force by police dogs is encouraged. Indeed, fellow police dog handler and current police dog unit leader Keith Bush even texted “COME GET UR BITE” and “I’M GONNA TAKE UR BITE IF U DONT HURRY UP” before Dietz’s dog attacked Lemay. Read the Herald-Tribune special report here.

Instead of reflexively calling 911 in response to a problem, it makes sense to consider seriously the potential benefits and costs of doing so — as well as other options. Calling 911 could be the decision you most regret in your life.

This article was published by the RonPaul Institute.

Contrary to recent headlines — and a talk by actor Arnold Schwarzenegger at the United Nations Paris Climate Change Conference — eating a vegetarian diet could contribute to climate change.

In fact, according to new research from Carnegie Mellon University, following the USDA recommendations to consume more fruits, vegetables, dairy and seafood is more harmful to the environment because those foods have relatively high resource uses and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions per calorie. Published in Environment Systems and Decisions, the study measured the changes in energy use, blue water footprint and GHG emissions associated with U.S. food consumption patterns.

“Eating lettuce is over three times worse in greenhouse gas emissions than eating bacon,” said Paul Fischbeck, professor of social and decisions sciences and engineering and public policy. “Lots of common vegetables require more resources per calorie than you would think. Eggplant, celery and cucumbers look particularly bad when compared to pork or chicken.”

Fischbeck, Michelle Tom, a Ph.D. student in civil and environmental engineering, and Chris Hendrickson, the Hamerschlag University Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering, studied the food supply chain to determine how the obesity epidemic in the U.S. is affecting the environment. Specifically, they examined how growing, processing and transporting food, food sales and service, and household storage and use take a toll on resources in the form of energy use, water use and GHG emissions.

On one hand, the results showed that getting our weight under control and eating fewer calories, has a positive effect on the environment and reduces energy use, water use and GHG emissions from the food supply chain by approximately 9 percent.

However, eating the recommended “healthier” foods — a mix of fruits, vegetables, dairy and seafood — increased the environmental impact in all three categories: Energy use went up by 38 percent, water use by 10 percent and GHG emissions by 6 percent.

“There’s a complex relationship between diet and the environment,” Tom said. “What is good for us health-wise isn’t always what’s best for the environment. That’s important for public officials to know and for them to be cognizant of these tradeoffs as they develop or continue to develop dietary guidelines in the future.”

CMU’s Steinbrenner Institute for Environmental Education and Research and the Colcom Foundation funded this research.

While many rabid fans may have scratched their heads when a 2011 study showed that spoilers could improve story enjoyment, a recent experiment, conducted by researchers Benjamin Johnson (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) and Judith Rosenbaum (Albany State University), shows that narrative spoilers can ruin a story.

Their findings show that spoilers reduce people’s entertainment experiences.

“Our study is the first to show that people’s widespread beliefs about spoilers being harmful are actually well-founded and not a myth,” said Johnson. Furthermore, in a follow-up study, Johnson and Rosenbaum found that the effects of spoilers are actually linked to people’s personality traits. Johnson: “While the worry and anger expressed by many media users about ‘spoilers’ in online discussions or reviews is not completely unfounded, fans should examine themselves before they get worked up about an unexpected spoiler.”

The first study, published in Communication Research last month, tested how 412 university students responded to spoiled and unspoiled short stories. Spoiled stories were rated as less suspenseful and fun. Spoilers also reduced how ‘moving and thought-provoking’ a story was and how much the reader felt immersed into the story’s world. Johnson says that the results were a bit of a surprise.

“We expected spoilers to improve some outcomes, but hurt others. Instead, we saw consistently negative consequences of story spoilers,” he said.

Quick, instinctive thinkers prefer spoiled stories

These findings contradict a study carried out by two researchers in California in 2011 that found spoilers could improve story enjoyment. Johnson and Rosenbaum attribute the competing results to differences in how enjoyment is understood and measured. They have also identified personality traits that lead people to seek out or dislike spoilers (in a publication due next year in Psychology of Popular Media Culture).

In that latest experiment, people’s needs for cognition (enjoying deep thinking) and affect (enjoying emotional experiences) made a difference.

“We found that people who have a low need for cognition prefer their stories to be spoiled, because it makes the plot easier to follow. Meanwhile, people who have a high need for affect enjoy unspoiled stories more, because they desire the thrill of a surprise,” said Rosenbaum.

Throughout history, scholars and researchers have tried to identify the one key reason that people are attracted to religion.

Some have said people seek religion to cope with a fear of death, others call it the basis for morality, and various other theories abound.

But in a new book, a psychologist who has studied human motivation for more than 20 years suggests that all these theories are too narrow. Religion, he says, attracts followers because it satisfies all of the 16 basic desires that humans share.

“It’s not just about fear of death. Religion couldn’t achieve mass acceptance if it only fulfilled one or two basic desires,” said Steven Reiss, a professor emeritus of psychology at The Ohio State University and author of The 16 Strivings for God (Mercer University Press, 2016).

“People are attracted to religion because it provides believers the opportunity to satisfy all their basic desires over and over again. You can’t boil religion down to one essence.”

Reiss’s theory of what attracts people to religion is based on his research in the 1990s on motivation. He and his colleagues surveyed thousands of people and asked them to rate the degree to which they embraced hundreds of different possible goals.

In the end, the researchers identified 16 basic desires that we all share: acceptance, curiosity, eating, family, honor, idealism, independence, order, physical activity, power, romance, saving, social contact, status, tranquility and vengeance.

Reiss then developed a questionnaire, called the Reiss Motivation Profile, that measures how much people value each of these 16 goals. More than 100,000 people have now completed the questionnaire. The research is described in Reiss’s book Who Am I? The 16 Basic Desires that Motivate our Action and Define Our Personalities.

“We all share the same 16 goals, but what makes us different is how much we value each one,” Reiss said.

“How much an individual values each of those 16 desires corresponds closely to what he or she likes and dislikes about religion.”

A key point is that each of the 16 desires motivates personality opposites and those opposites all have to find a home in a successful religion, Reiss said.

For example, there is the desire for social contact. “Religion has to appeal to both introverts and extroverts,” Reiss said. For extroverts, religion offers festivals and teaches that God blesses fellowship. For introverts, religion encourages meditation and private retreats and teaches that God blesses solitude.

Religion even finds ways to deal with the desire for vengeance, Reiss said. While some religions preach of a God of peace and encourage followers to “turn the other cheek,” there is also the other side: the wrath of God and holy wars.

“Religion attracts all kinds, including peacemakers and those who want a vengeful God.”

All religious beliefs and practices are designed to meet one or more of these 16 desires, Reiss explained.

For example, religious rituals fulfill the desire for order. Religious teachings about salvation and forgiveness tap into the basic human need for acceptance. Promises of an afterlife are designed to help people achieve tranquility.

What about atheism? While all people need to fulfill the same basic desires, not everyone will turn to religion to satisfy them, Reiss said. Secular society offers alternatives to fulfill all of the basic desires.

“Religion competes with secular society to meet those 16 needs and can gain or lose popularity based on how well people believe it does compared to secular society,” Reiss said.

One of the basic desires – independence – may separate religious and non-religious people. In a study published in 2000, Reiss found that religious people (the study included mostly Christians) expressed a strong desire for interdependence with others. Those who were not religious, however, showed a stronger need to be self-reliant and independent.

Reiss said one advantage of his theory is that, unlike many other theories of religion, it can be scientifically tested.

“In 16 Strivings for God, I discuss a mystical personality type – the kind of person who would likely find value and meaning in mystical experiences and would be attracted to religion for that reason,” he said.

“We can test that and find out if there really is a mystical personality type.”

While the theory can tell us a lot about the types of people who are attracted to religion and different religious experiences, it cannot say anything about the truth of religious beliefs, Reiss said.

“I’m not trying to answer theological questions about the existence or nature of God,” Reiss said. “What I’m trying to answer is the nature of why people embrace religion and God.”

By Sean Charles Gaines Kern*

Military theory is a primary component of operational art. Early military theorists such as Alfred Thayer Mahan, Giulio Douhet, and B.H. Liddell Hart reasoned about the maritime, air, and land domains respectively, generating frameworks, models, and principles for warfare. Today, these theories help strategists and planners think about, plan for, and generate joint combat power. Unfortunately, no standard military theory for cyberspace operations exists, although elements for such a theory do. If a codified theory for military cyber power existed, it would greatly aid the joint force commander (JFC) in integrating cyberspace operations with joint operations, resulting in expanded combat power.

Although JFCs have many years of practical experience and military education in employing joint forces, they are not as experienced with cyberspace operations.2 There is a lack of shared cyberspace knowledge and an agreed operational approach to link cyberspace missions and actions and place them in the larger context of joint operations.3 Military cyber power theory is the foundation for such knowledge.

The JFC requires a cyberspace component commander who, through education and experience, has developed the requisite expertise to apply military cyber power theory at a level equivalent to his or her peers in the other domains. However, joint doctrine does not describe such a leadership role. Without the equivalent of a joint force cyberspace component commander (JFCCC), it is unlikely that the JFC would be able to effectively integrate cyberspace operations within the construct of joint operations. This results in a perpetual adjunct role for cyberspace operations and suboptimal combat power, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff himself noted as a key operational problem in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020.4

Toward a Preliminary Theory

The most challenging aspect of developing cyber operational art is devising a military theory for cyber power, which is essential for assessing the operational environment and making predictive judgments that will then guide strategy and plan development. By viewing the operational environment through the lens of military cyber power theory, the JFCCC will be in the position to provide his or her best military advice to the JFC, resulting in integrated cyberspace operation and expanded combat power.

A framework advances understanding and provides a basis for reasoning about the current and potential future environment by incorporating a number of elements. The framework identifies and defines key terms and structures discussion by categorizing the elements of the theory. It explains the categorized elements by summarizing relevant events and introducing additional frameworks and models. It allows the members of the cyber community to connect diverse elements of the body of knowledge to comprehensively address key issues. Finally, the predictive nature of the framework will enable the practitioner to anticipate key trends and activities to test the validity of the theory.5 Although Major General Brett Williams called for a theory of cyberspace operations that addresses cyberspace operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, the focus here is at the strategic and operational levels since the JFCCC’s responsibility will be to translate strategic direction into operational plans.

Early cyber power theorists generally identified and defined three key terms: cyberspace, cyber power, and cyber strategy. Under the guise of military cyber power theory, this author offers four additional terms: military cyber power, military cyber strategy, key cyber terrain, and military cyberspaces.

Military cyber power is defined as the application of operational concepts, strategies, and functions that employ cyberspace operations (offensive cyberspace operations [OCO], defensive cyberspace operations [DCO], and Department of Defense [DOD] information network [DODIN] operations) in joint operations to expand combat power for the accomplishment of military objectives and missions.6

Military cyber strategy is defined as the development and employment of operational cyberspace capabilities integrated with other operational domain capabilities to expand combat power and accomplish the military objectives and missions of the JFC. These definitions reflect an emphasis on cyberspace operations mission areas and their contributions to joint operations and joint force combat power.

Given the pervasive and ubiquitous nature of the cyberspace domain and the fact that the military relies heavily on the commercial sector for interconnectivity, the concept of key terrain becomes especially critical in the context of military cyber power theory. Key cyber terrain forms the foundation from which the joint force preserves and projects military cyber power and represents the attack surface that adversaries would likely target. It is defined as any physical, logical, or persona element of the cyber space domain, including commercial services, the disruption, degradation, or destruction of which constricts combat power, affording a marked advantage to either combatant.

Defining cyberspace as a global domain suggests a homogeneity that does not exist in reality. There is not one cyberspace, but many cyberspaces.7 These cyberspaces are in most cases interconnected by privately owned infrastructure. DOD has over 15,000 networks, or cyberspaces, interconnected by commercial infrastructure that the department does not own or control. This has two significant implications. First, unlike in other domains, the joint force is not solely capable of generating its required military cyber power; it relies on commercial services. Second, not all key cyber terrain will be under control of the joint force. For example, there is no current equivalent in cyberspace to the way in which the United States fully militarized its airspace immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Thus, military cyberspaces are defined as networks or enclaves wholly owned and operated by DOD, interconnected by means that are outside the control or direct influence of DOD.

With key terms identified and defined, military cyber power theory must conceptually consider the relationships of these terms as well as other relevant domain characteristics. The JFCCC must consider his or her efforts in the context of the three layers of cyberspace: physical, logical, and persona layers.8 Figure 1 depicts the relationships between the terms (left) and the relation of the cyberspace layers in the context of the overall friendly or adversary attack surface (right).

Based on these relationships, the JFCCC can then conceptualize the weighted effort of the cyberspace operations mission areas. These operations comprise the ways and means for the JFCCC’s cyber strategy and planning. The weighted effort, in priority order, would be DODIN operations, DCO–Internal Defense Measures (DCO-IDM), DCO–Response Actions (DCO-RA), and OCO (see figure 2).

The joint force conducts cyberspace operations, like all joint operations, with the adversary in mind. This leads to a final structured discussion to characterize cyberspace adversaries and conceptualize adversarial operational planning and execution. Ultimately, this discussion gives the JFCCC the framework to assess risks associated with generating combat power.

The JFCCC and staff assess cyberspace adversaries similar to adversaries in other domains in terms of intent and capability. It takes two types of capabilities in the cyberspace domain to conduct cyberspace operations: technical and analytical. Analytical capability refers to the ability to analyze a potential target to identify its critical nodes and vulnerabilities and potentially its connections to other targets. Technical capability refers to knowledge of computer software and hardware, networks, and other relevant technologies.9 The JFCCC can further categorize cyber adversaries as simple, advanced, and complex, based in part on the scope and scale of operations and potential effects achieved.

In addition to being simple, advanced, or complex, military cyber power theory categorizes adversary operations as either opportunistic or targeted. The former is usually cybercrime-related, automated, and rarely attempts to maintain persistent presence. Targeted attacks are oriented against friendly key cyber terrain and are likely to be persistent and stealthy. In targeted attacks, cyber operators may be manually interacting with target systems. These categories are not mutually exclusive, as opportunistic attackers may gain access to high-value systems and in turn seek to sell access to these systems to adversaries seeking targeted access (for example, the nexus of cybercrime and state-sponsored cyber operations). Figure 3 shows the relationships among adversary capability, targeting type, and level of persistence.

Cyberspace adversaries share common strategic and operational concepts with adversaries in other domains, one of which is the concept of a kill chain. Conceptualizing a cyber kill chain enables the JFCCC to understand how the adversary plans and conducts cyber operations. The cyber kill chain depicted in figure 4 provides an excellent framework for the JFCCC to develop the appropriate strategy and corresponding operational plans to mitigate the adversarial threat. The ultimate goal is to detect and defend against the adversary as early as possible in the chain, ideally at or prior to the adversary developing access.

Military Cyber Power Principles

A theory of military cyber power includes principles that would inform the JFCCC’s operational art. The true test of a theory is how well these principles hold over time. The principles examined here are not exhaustive and should serve as a foundation for future expansion of military cyber power theory.

Stealth and Utility. A cyberspace capability is effective as long as it can go undetected and exploit an open vulnerability. If the adversary detects the cyber capability or mitigates the targeted vulnerability, the cyber capability is perishable. These characteristics may drive the timing of cyber operations based on the perceived utility.10

Convergence, Consolidation, and Standardization. In peacetime, efficiency is valued over effectiveness. Core services are converging to Internet Protocol technologies. Smaller bandwidth network interconnections are converging to fewer massive bandwidth interconnections. DOD is consolidating data centers and Internet access points, resulting in streamlined, consolidated service architectures. DOD is also standardizing hardware and software. Convergence, consolidation, and standardization create an efficient, homogenous military cyberspace environment that reduces the DOD attack surface overall and better postures cyber defenders to preserve combat power. However, these efforts reduce system redundancy, limit alternative routes, and increase the number of chokepoints, making it easier for an adversary to identify and target friendly key cyber terrain.

Complexity, Penetration, and Exposure. Systems are becoming increasingly complex by almost every measure. Higher complexity begets a growth in vulnerabilities. Internet penetration is expanding in terms of people and devices connected to cyberspace. People and organizations are integrating an increasing number of services delivered through cyberspace into their daily lives and operations, creating significant cyberspace exposure. Complexity, penetration, and exposure increase the attack surface by creating broader and deeper technical and process vulnerabilities, putting joint combat power at risk.

Primacy of Defense. History shows that militaries are prone to favor offensive operations.11 Yet Colin Gray, Brett Williams, and Martin Libicki argue that DCO, not OCO, should be the JFC’s primary effort in cyberspace. Since the joint force constructs cyberspace, Gray contends that cyberspace operators can repair the damage. Each repair hardens the system against future attacks. Offense can achieve surprise, but response and repair should be routine. Cyberspace defense is difficult, but so is cyberspace offense.12 As systems are hardened, an attacker must exploit multiple vulnerabilities to achieve the same effect as compared to prior attacks that only required a single exploit.13

Speed and Global Reach. Cyberspace exhibits levels of speed and reach uncharacteristic of the other domains. Like other domains, cyberspace operations, especially offensive ones, require significant capability development, planning, reconnaissance, policy, and legal support prior to execution. However, once the JFC decides to act, cyberspace effects can be nearly instantaneous. The global cyberspace domain relegates geography to a subordinate consideration.

Arranging Operations. The Joint Operational Access Concept states that the critical support provided by cyberspace operations generally must commence well in advance of other operations as part of efforts to shape the operational area. Even in the absence of open conflict, operations to gain and maintain cyberspace superiority will be a continuous requirement since freedom of action in cyberspace is critical to all joint operations.14 Chris Demchak offers a cautionary consideration, suggesting that if kinetic operations eventually take place, the United States may see the results of several decades of cyber “preparation of the battlefield,” ranging from tainted supply chains to embedded malware.15

Resilience. Resilience is the ability to continue operations in a degraded cyber environment while mitigating quickly the impact of any attack. Much like the Quick Reaction Force construct in the physical domain, cyberspace operations require robust DCO-IDM capacity oriented in support of friendly key cyber terrain to respond quickly to mitigate the effects of adversarial cyberspace operations. In concert with these DCO-IDM efforts, the total force will need to implement people, process, and technology measures, such as network minimize procedures or increasing bandwidth capacity, to continue to operate in the degraded environment.

Cyber-Physical Interface. To gain efficiencies, critical infrastructure owners and operators have increasingly connected their once-closed systems to the Internet. As a result, industrial control systems and supervisory control and data acquisition systems are increasingly easy to exploit. These systems are the two primary means for cyber adversaries to achieve direct physical effects through cyberspace.

Decision Integrity. Assuring integrity of operational information is essential to maintaining trust and confidence in the quality of decisionmaking, since making decisions based on wrong information could degrade joint combat power. Without a baseline of what is normal, it is impossible to discern if an adversary has made unauthorized changes to operational information. As Charles Barry and Elihu Zimet observe, “The possession of accurate and timely knowledge and the unfettered ability to distribute this as information have always been the sine qua non of warfighting.”16

Speed, Not Secrets. Ninety-eight percent of all information is digitized.17 Adversaries have proved adept at compromising and extracting information from closed networks. In this environment, how long is it reasonable to expect secrecy? The days of having a high degree of confidence that secrets will remain secure are fleeting. Overclassification exacerbates this problem and negatively affects key cyber terrain analysis. The joint force should place value on the ability to make decisions before the adversary compromises key information.

Strategic Attribution. From a strategic perspective, it may be more important to know “Who is to blame?” than “Who did it?”18 This shift in perspective changes focus from technical attribution, which is difficult, to one of assigning responsibility to a nation-state—more pointedly, to national decisionmakers—for either ignoring, abetting, or conducting cyberspace operations against the United States, its allies, and key partners.

Increase Security, Decrease Freedom of Movement. In other domains, increased security usually implies greater freedom of movement and action. This same concept is not true for cyberspace since increased cybersecurity usually restricts options in cyberspace.

Scope and Scale of Effects. The most sophisticated cyber adversaries have the means to create a regional disturbance for a short period or a local disturbance for a sustained period.19 The intelligence functions should continually assess the intent and capabilities of potential adversaries to predict the potential scope and scale of effects.

Increased Reliance on Commercial Services. U.S. Central Command’s March 2014 posture statement noted the command is “heavily reliant on host nation communications infrastructure across the Central Region.”20 Whereas a JFC can easily partition and militarize the other domains into internationally and nationally recognized contiguous operational areas, cyberspace largely exists via private sector Internet service providers connecting national and military network enclaves.21 The JFCCC will have to consider this dynamic when attempting to define his cyber joint operational area.

Perpetual, Ambiguous Conflict. Cyberspace is in a perpetual state of conflict that crosses geographic boundaries. Unlike the other domains where one can physically discern unambiguous threat indications and warning, operations in cyberspace are inherently ambiguous. Ambiguity can make war more or less likely. Timothy Junio suggests this is the case because ambiguity “may lead states to overestimate their potential gains, overestimate their stealth, and/or underestimate their adversary’s skill.”22 Demchak warns that actions by nonstate actors could lead to unintended escalation as one state misinterprets the action or uses it as cover for its own actions.23

Cyber Intelligence. Cyber intelligence—scanning for things that just do not look right by sifting through chatter to discern patterns of intelligence—can become close to police work.24 When DCO operators detect an adversary, it is difficult to assess adversarial intent. Is the adversary conducting reconnaissance, exfiltrating information, or instrumenting the network for a follow-on operation? A JFCCC must be able to assess cyber situational awareness beyond the joint operational area to understand fully the scope and scale of cyber risks to the theater of operations.

Centralized Control, Centralized Execution. Because any point in cyberspace is equidistant to any other, cyber forces are capable of deploying and surging virtually without the required mobilization time and physical proximity to theater operations. This characteristic is a contributing factor to the centralized control, centralized execution model employed by U.S. Cyber Command. This model affects the development of cyberspace experience across the joint force.

Precedence. There are currently no universally accepted norms of behavior in cyberspace. As such, employment of a cyberspace capability may result in a de facto precedence that other nation-states and nonstate actors may use as a barometer for how they may choose to act in cyberspace. Currently, some senior leaders view offensive cyberspace operations as a last resort, restricting the ability to develop cyberspace experience.

Uncertainty. Whereas the physical characteristics of the other domains are well understood and defined, cyberspace is a constantly changing, dynamic domain that is difficult to model due to its ubiquity and complexity. Unlike the precision of kinetic weapons, there is a level of doubt regarding the use of cyber capabilities in terms of understanding what effects cyber forces can achieve in cyberspace and assessing the success of cyberspace operations. This uncertainty is compounded by a lack of cyber experience and education in the senior ranks, thus creating a circle of uncertainty, reluctance to employ, and lost opportunities to gain cyber experience, leading to even greater uncertainty.

The combination of key terms, frameworks, and principles serves as a foundation for an evolving military cyber power theory, which serves as a building block to enhance both the explanatory and predictive power of the JFCCC’s recommendations to the JFC. Application of the theory improves the soundness and timeliness of these recommendations. With expert understanding and application of this preliminary military cyber power theory, the JFCCC will be better prepared to provide the JFC recommendations to integrate cyberspace operations in joint operations to preserve and project joint combat power.

Cyberspace Operations as Combat Power

Practitioners validate military theory through application. A successful military theory expertly applied should result in increased combat power for the practitioner. Given the lack of cyberspace operations experience and education in the joint force, it may be difficult to consider how cyberspace operations could contribute to combat power. It does not help that joint doctrine is silent regarding the direct relationship between cyberspace operations and combat power.

Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines combat power as the total means of destructive and disruptive force that a military unit or formation can apply against an opponent at a given time.25 The two key words are destructive and disruptive. Although JP 3-12(R), Cyberspace Operations, does not refer to combat power, it implies it by describing direct denial effects achieved through cyberspace attack, which include, in part, the ability to destroy and disrupt adversary targets. The primary doctrinal source for combat power is JP 3-0, Joint Operations, in which the JFC is the central focus.

The JFC seeks decisive advantage using all available elements of combat power to seize and maintain the initiative, deny the enemy the opportunity to achieve its objectives, and generate a sense of inevitable failure and defeat in the enemy.26 Joint doctrine leaves the reader with a sense that there is a bias to operations and effects in the physical domains. For example, JP 3-0 discusses the relative combat power that military forces can generate in terms of delivering forces and materiel. It describes the roles of long-range air and sea operations as effective force projection when timely or unencumbered access to the area of operations is not available. It also discusses combat power in the context of mass, maneuver, economy of force, and surprise. Like JP 3-12(R), JP 3-0 does not reference cyberspace operations in relation to combat power, although it does note that cyberspace superiority may enable freedom of action throughout the operational area. There is clearly an opportunity to link cyberspace operations and combat power in joint doctrine.

In addition to doctrinal references to combat power, the Chairman also publishes operational concepts that provide broad visions for how joint forces will operate in response to specific challenges. For example, the Chairman’s Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) calls for cross-domain synergy to overcome emerging antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) challenges. Cross-domain synergy seeks to employ complementary capabilities in different domains such that each enhances the effectiveness and compensates for the vulnerabilities of others.27 To this end, the JOAC specifically addresses the need for greater and more flexible integration of cyberspace operations into the traditional land-sea-air battlespace. It identifies two combat power–related tasks required to gain and maintain access in the face of armed opposition. The first is overcoming the enemy’s A2/AD capabilities through the application of combat power. The second is moving and supporting the necessary combat power over the required distances. Cyberspace operations play a critical role in accomplishing both of these tasks. Fifteen of the 30 capabilities required in the concept are either directly or indirectly associated with the conduct of cyberspace operations, with significant requirements in command and control, intelligence, and fires capabilities. The A2/AD challenge is an excellent operational problem to validate and expand the preliminary military cyber power theory discussed herein.

Conclusion

Stanley Baldwin asserted in 1932 that the “bomber will always get through.” History has shown that he was wrong. However, the adoption of this theoretical airpower perspective did drive acquisition, organization, and doctrine leading into World War II. Cyberspace operations share some similarities with the interwar years. Much remains undetermined about the role of cyberspace operations in joint operations and their impact on joint combat power. Yet there are historic examples, key trends, and operational problems that call for increased attention to the need for a military cyber power theory and, consequently, the need for updates to doctrine, organization, and education to inculcate the military cyber power principles presented here.

The Joint Staff should update doctrine to reflect the growing importance of effectively integrating cyberspace operations in joint operations to expand joint combat power. It should update JP 3-12(R) to reflect the need for a JFCCC and incorporate aspects of the preliminary military cyber power theory presented here. Likewise, the Joint Staff should update JP 3-0’s description of combat power to broaden and deepen the relationship between cyberspace operations and combat power. Moreover, professional military education and advanced studies programs should include military cyber power theory in the curricula and challenge students to conduct research to evolve the theory.

Organizationally, the JFC should designate a JFCCC for most task force operations. However, depending on the forces assigned, it may be difficult for the JFC to identify a JFCCC candidate that has the preponderance of cyber forces and the best means to command and control those cyber forces. Furthermore, organizations that must address A2/AD in their strategies and operational plans should conduct extensive exercises with a heavy emphasis on cyberspace capabilities.

With expert understanding and application of military cyber power theory, the JFCCC is poised to develop strategic and operational recommendations for the JFC to integrate and synchronize cyberspace operations in joint operations and achieve expanded combat power. The need for integrated cyberspace operations and its contribution to joint combat power is clearly illustrated in one of the most significant operational challenges the joint force will likely face in the future, which is gaining and maintaining operational access in the face of enemy A2/AD capabilities.

The Joint Operational Access Concept notes three trends in the operating environment that will likely complicate the challenge of opposed access, one of those being the emergence of cyberspace as an increasingly important and contested domain. The implication is that the JFCCC and his staff are becoming ever more central in assisting the JFC in generating combat power to disrupt, degrade, and defeat enemy A2/AD capabilities. If the joint force is going to be successful in future advanced A2/AD operations, the JFC must fully integrate cyberspace operations into joint operations. A prerequisite for success is the designation of a JFCCC with the requisite professional development, to include expert understanding of and experience applying military cyber power theory.

Source:
This article was published in the Joint Force Quarterly 79 which is published by the National Defense University.

Notes

1. Brett T. Williams, “The Joint Force Commander’s Guide to Cyberspace Operations,” Joint Force Quarterly 73 (2nd Quarter 2014), 12–20.
2. Brett T. Williams, “Ten Propositions Regarding Cyberspace Operations,” Joint Force Quarterly 61 (2nd Quarter 2011), 11–17.
3. Williams, “The Joint Force Commander’s Guide.”
4. Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, September 10, 2012), 7, available at <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/ccjo_jointforce2020.pdf>.
5. Stuart H. Starr, “Toward a Preliminary Theory of Cyberpower,” in Cyberpower and National Security, ed. Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart H. Starr, and Larry K. Wentz (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press/Potomac Books, Inc., 2009), 43–90.
6. Adapted from Elihu Zimet and Charles L. Barry, “Military Service Overview,” in Cyberpower and National Security, 285–308.
7. Colin Gray, Making Strategic Sense of Cyber Power: Why the Sky Is Not Falling (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 2013).
8. Joint Publication (JP) 3-12(R), Cyberspace Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, February 5, 2013).
9. Irving Lachow, “Cyber Terrorism: Menace or Myth?” in Cyberpower and National Security, 437–464.
10. Robert Axelrod and Rumen Iliev, “Timing of Cyber Conflict,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 111, no. 4 (January 28, 2014), available at <www.pnas.org/content/111/4/1298.abstract>.
11. Timothy J. Junio, “How Probable Is Cyber War? Bringing IR Theory Back into the Cyber Conflict Debate,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 1 (February 2013).
12. Gray.
13. Kim Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon (New York: Crown Publishing, 2014).
14. Joint Operational Access Concept (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, January 17, 2012).
15. Peter Dombrowski and Chris C. Demchak, “Cyber War, Cybered Conflict, and the Maritime Domain,” Naval War College Review (April 2014), available at <www.readperiodicals.com/201404/3271362101.html>.
16. Zimet and Barry.
17. Joel Brenner, America the Vulnerable: Inside the New Threat Matrix of Digital Espionage, Crime, and Warfare (New York: Penguin Press, 2011).
18. Jason Healey, Beyond Attribution: Seeking National Responsibility for Cyber Attacks, Issue Brief (Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council, 2011), available at <www.fbiic.gov/public/2012/mar/National_Responsibility_for_CyberAttacks,_2012.pdf>.
19. Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association 2013 Spring Intelligence Symposium, available at <www.afcea.org/events/globalintelforum/13/welcome.asp>.
20. Commander’s Posture Statement (Tampa, FL: U.S. Central Command, March 5, 2014), available at <www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom-en/commanders-posture-statement-en>.
21. Capstone Concept for Joint Operations.
22. Junio, 125–133.
23. Chris Demchak and Peter Dombrowski, “Cyber Westphalia: Asserting State Prerogatives in Cyberspace,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (Special Issue 2013).
24. Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: Sage Press, 2013). This is adapted from Lowenthal’s description of the intelligence challenge posed by terrorism.
25. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, November 15, 2014).
26. JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, August 11, 2011).
27. Joint Operational Access Concept, Version 1.0 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 17, 2012), foreword.

Nearly four decades after their ordeal, US victims of the 1979-1981 Iran Hostage Crisis will become eligible to receive up to $4.4 million each in compensation, thanks to the Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act (Act), a provision Congress passed as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (CAA).

Pro rata payments to these victims and other judgment creditors of state sponsors of terrorism are slated to begin within a year of enactment.

Not much, if any, of the money they will receive is likely to come directly from Iran. Rather, the former hostages and their eligible family members will be entitled to apply for compensation from the United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund (Fund) established by the CAA. The Fund will receive its initial deposit of about $1 billion from the amount forfeited by the French bank, BNP Paribas, SA in 2014 to the US government for sanctions violations.

Future financing will come from all or portions of forfeitures and penalties arising out of new sanctions violations and related offenses. (For an idea of the amounts that may become available for the Fund related to violations of sanctions against Iran, see this chart or this chart, keeping in mind that only half of the proceeds from civil penalties and forfeitures are directed to the Fund.)

Certain Iranian assets at issue in ongoing court actions, including those at issue in the upcoming Supreme Court case Bank Markazi v. Peterson, may find their way into the Fund, but only if judgment creditors in those cases prevail and at least some of them assign their portions of the winnings to the Fund in exchange for the ability to participate in it.

Under the Act, Iran Hostage Crisis victims (or their estates, if they are deceased) will be able to apply for the sum of $10,000 per day of captivity for a “United States person who was held hostage by Iran from November 4, 1979 through January 20, 1981,” or the sum of $600,000 for the spouse or child of such a person, all of whom must be identified as a member of the proposed class in case number 1:00-CV-03110 (D.D.C.). (“United States person” is defined somewhat circularly to include anyone who “is eligible to make a claim under subsection (c)(2)(B) or subsection (c)(2)(C)” (regarding the former hostages and their family members, respectively).)

The history of efforts by or on behalf of the Iran Hostage Crisis victims to receive recompense is recounted in CRS Report 43210, The Iran Hostages: Efforts to Obtain Compensation.

A treaty facilitating relationships between Vatican and Palestine – referred to as a “state” in the text – has entered full force, sealing de-facto recognition of Palestinian statehood by the Holy See.

The Vatican announced Saturday that its “Comprehensive Agreement” with the “State of Palestine” signed in June 2015 has come into full force, in which the Holy See bolstered support for the two-state solution of the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Referring to Palestine as “state” means Vatican has recognized it as an equal partner, thus sealing support for 2012 UN General Assembly resolution granting Palestine a non-member observer status.

“The Holy See and the State of Palestine have notified each other that the procedural requirements for its [the agreement’s] entry into force have been fulfilled, under the terms of Article 30 of the same Agreement,” the Holy See’s said in a statement on Saturday.

The historic 2015 treaty is to secure rights and privileges of the Catholic Church on Palestinian territories in exchange for brokering two-state solution as well as giving more weight to Palestine’s political stance in the world.

It also said to include safeguarding the holy sites in Palestine, equally important for all three Abrahamic religions. In April 2014, a Catholic monastery was vandalized not far from Jerusalem in a hate crime carried out by Israelis. Slogans condemning peace talks with Palestine as well as graffiti disparaging Jesus and Mary were also frequent there recently.

While the entire text is unavailable, the treaty may recognize the 1967 borders as those constituting the Palestinian state, as the two-state solution implies creation of the Palestinian state on territories occupied by Israel during the Six Days War.

Pope Francis is known for calling the Israeli-Palestinian talks to be resumed, though Vatican has provided no detailed political roadmap for reconciliation. In May 2014, Francis visited Bethlehem where he gave a public speech outlining both Israel’s and Palestine’s right to exist. He praised Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas as a “man of peace,” laying the groundwork for the bilateral treaty.

By Santiago Baruh and Miguel Salazar

This year’s election cycle in Venezuela has spurred President Nicolás Maduro’s fierce opposition. With a key two-thirds majority in the country’s National Assembly, the Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) hopes that its feat will lead to a change in Venezuela’s current domestic and economic policies, which have resulted in food shortages and soaring inflation.

Despite the historic nature of Venezuela’s parliamentary elections, the results may not hold much significance for an array of foreign policy initiatives, particularly regarding Caracas’ troubled relationship with Guyana. Under President Maduro, Venezuela has continued to claim control over five-eighths of Guyanese land (the area spanning from the current border to the Essequibo River in Guyana). The dispute between the two countries, dating back to the mid-19th century, was ostensibly resolved in 1899 by a U.S.-created boundary commission, which ruled in favor of then-British Guiana.[1] The current border between Venezuela and Guyana, ratified by the commission, has been the subject of on-and-off confrontations between the two countries’ governments over the past century.

Maduro’s most recent invigoration of Venezuela’s confrontation regarding the region follows a statement by Exxon Mobil, announcing the discovery of oil reserves off the coast of Guyana.[2] But the Venezuelan claim over the territory west of the Essequibo River is one of the few issues of contention that both Maduro’s government and the MUD opposition agree on.[3] Maduro has been criticized for his convenient involvement in two different border disputes only months before the parliamentary elections were to be staged, which was seen as a ploy to raise Venezuelan nationalism.[4] Declining to rally publically against Maduro’s claims, MUD has instead taken a cautious approach to the border dispute, which is seen as a matter of national pride for many Venezuelans. MUD, along with Venezuelan authorities, has consistently opposed Guyana’s calls for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to resolve the dispute.[5]

While the MUD opposition currently holds a qualified majority of seats in Venezuela’s National Assembly, the main role this body will play in foreign policy affairs is the ratification and revision of international treaties. In Venezuela, the president delegates nation’s international agenda to the foreign minister, who determines the overall direction of foreign policy. While the outlook of Venezuela’s foreign affairs may change in years to come, a major shift in the status of the Essequibo dispute is very unlikely.

As Venezuelan-Guyanese relations continue deteriorating, December’s parliamentary elections signal further changes for Venezuela’s Caribbean partners. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has already sided against Venezuela in regards to the border dispute with Guyana.[6] Moreover, MUD’s parliamentary victory may further sour Venezuelan-Caribbean relations through the potential dismantlement or alteration of Petrocaribe—an alliance between Venezuela and many Caribbean countries, including Guyana, under which Venezuela exports cheap oil in exchange for a part-cash, part-loan payment.[7] Some opposition members also have claimed that future changes to dismantle agreements such as Petrocaribe are already under way.[8]

Boasting the upper hand in Venezuela’s National Assembly for the first time in more than a decade, the opposition hopes to reverse as many of Maduro’s domestic and international economic policies as possible. However, the degree of cohesion among the MUD coalition members regarding each specific policy is unknown, as the group has not refined its position on a number of foreign policy issues. As Guyana hopefully awaits a favorable change in tide for its relations with Venezuela, the future remains murky for Georgetown, Caracas, and their Caribbean counterparts.

Santiago Baruh and Miguel Salazar, Research Associates at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs Editor: Mark Miller, Senior Editor at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

[1] “Venezuelan Boundary Dispute, 1895-1899.” U.S. Department of State: Office of the Historian. Web.

[2] http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/world/americas/in-guyana-a-land-dispute-with-venezuela-escalates-over-oil.html

[3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k8BSBFqISL0

[4] http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-11-19/keeping-venezuela-s-elections-democratic

[5] http://www.noticias24.com/venezuela/noticia/268958/la-mud-rechaza-las-declaraciones-de-la-canciller-de-guyana-sobre-el-territorio-esequibo-comunicado/

[6] http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/150406/caricom-supports-guyana-in-border-dispute-with-venezuela

[7] http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/Guyana-and-Venezuela–Let-the-international-court-decide_19121954

[8] http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2015/12/151207_analisis_venezuela_oposicion_elecciones_parlamentarias_amv

Those who advocate ending, instead of reforming, the welfare-warfare state are often accused of being “impractical.” Some of the harshest criticisms come from libertarians who claim that advocates of “purism” forgo opportunities to make real progress toward restoring liberty. These critics fail to grasp the numerous reasons why it is crucial for libertarians to consistently and vigorously advance the purist position.

First, and most important, those who know the truth have a moral obligation to speak the truth. People who understand the need for drastic changes in foreign, domestic, and, especially, monetary policy should not pretend that a little tinkering will fix our problems. Those who do so are just as guilty of lying to the public as is a promise-breaking politician. Attempting to advance liberty by lying is not just immoral; it is also a flawed strategy that is doomed to fail.

The inevitable failure of “reforms” that do not eliminate the market distortions caused by government intervention will be used to discredit both the freedom philosophy and its advocates. The result will be increased support for more welfare, more warfare, and more fiat money. Thus, those who avoid discussing the root causes of our problems, not those they smear as impractical purists, are the ones undermining liberty.

For example, many Obamacare opponents refuse to advocate for true free-market health care. Instead, they propose various forms of “Obamacare lite.” By ceding the premise that government should play a major role in health care, proponents of Obamacare lite strengthen the position of those who say the way to fix Obamacare is by giving government more power. Thus, Obamacare lite supporters are inadvertently advancing the cause of socialized medicine. The only way to ensure that Obamacare is not replaced by something worse is to unapologetically promote true free-market health care.

This is not to suggest libertarians should reject transitional measures. A gradual transition is the best way to achieve liberty without causing massive social and economic disruptions. However, we must only settle for compromises that actually move us in the right direction. So we should reject a compromise budget that “only” increases spending by 80 percent. In contrast, a budget that actually reduces spending by 20 percent would be a positive step forward.

Those who advocate a so-called extreme position can often move the center of political debate closer to the pure libertarian position. This can actually increase the likelihood of taking real, if small, steps toward liberty. More importantly, the best way to ensure that we never achieve real liberty is for libertarians to shy away from making the case for the free society.

Sometimes ideological movements are able to turn yesterday’s “fringe” ideas into today’s “mainstream” position. Just a few years ago it was inconceivable that a significant number of states would legalize medical, and even reactional, marijuana or that a majority of states would have passed laws allowing citizens to openly carry firearms. The success of these issues is not due to sudden changes in public opinion, but to years of hard work by principled advocates and activists.

The ever-growing number of Americans who are joining the liberty movement are not interested in “reforming” the welfare-warfare state. They also have no interest in “fixing” the Federal Reserve via “rules-based” monetary policy. Instead, this movement is dedicated to auditing, then ending, the Fed and stopping the government from trying to run the economy, run the world, and run our lives. If this movement refuses to compromise its principles, we may succeed in restoring a society of liberty, peace, and prosperity in our lifetimes.

This article was published by the RonPaul Institute.

By Yash Tandon*

Lake Naivasha is less than an hour’s drive from Nairobi. At 1,884 meters, it is in a complex geological combination of volcanic rocks and sedimentary deposits. It is fed by the perennial Malewa and Gilgil rivers at the highest elevation of the Rift Valley. When you get there, it is like paradise – or used to be. The first time I went there as a young man was in 1957. I was spellbound by its beauty – lush banks adorned with yellow acacia; in the clean waters you could see thousands of various kinds of fish … and yes, hippos; looking up at the skies you could see thousands of birds, including the pink-plumaged flamingo migrating from Lake Nakuru, and multi-coloured butterflies. The lake provided livelihood to thousands of fisher folk, and water for the farming community.

Some 50 years later, in 2009, I went back to the lake. I was dismayed, in fact depressed. The lake and its surroundings were unrecognisable. I saw roses and giant-sized greenhouses everywhere – but no butterflies, no birds, and practically no fish. All this sacrifice in the name of ‘development’. The lake and its surroundings were transformed into a hellhole. Develop we must, of course, but at what cost?

THE ‘FREE TRADE’ GROWTH ‘MODEL’

This growth model is based on the assumption that ‘the market’ promoted by ‘free trade’ is the most efficient way to allocate world’s resources. Each country must seek to specialise in the production of goods and services in which it is most competitive.

But ‘free trade’ is a fiction. It has never existed even during the much acclaimed British mercantile period in the nineteenth century. The country that first challenged this fiction was the United States soon after its independence from England in 1776. ‘We don’t want to grow cotton and tobacco forever, and import your manufactured products,’ the Americans told the English, ‘we too wish to industrialise.’ Between 1820 and 1870 (within 50 years) the United States put up barriers against imports from England and went through its own industrial revolution.

Africa has been ‘independent’ now for nearly 60 years, and it still exports coffee, cotton and flowers and imports practically everything else – including agricultural products. You can buy frozen chicken legs and baked beans from Europe in the big stores of Nairobi. These massively subsidised products compete against Kenyan producers who are denied subsidies by the rules of the WTO. This is an asymmetrical war between European corporations and Kenyan small farmers. It is the same with the rest of Africa. It is immoral. Under the UN conventions on human rights, it is also illegal.

Some 15 years ago flowers were produced by hundreds of small producers, providing livelihood for thousands in their extended families. Now they are produced by a handful of multinationals. Here is the boast of one of them, Magana Flowers Kenya Ltd:

‘Established in 1994 we have blossomed into Kenya’s largest floricultural ventures. We export approximately twenty four million roses a year to importers in Switzerland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Scandinavia and the United Kingdom, Russia, Japan, Australia and the Middle East. Headquartered in Nairobi, Magana Flowers Kenya Limited employs a highly trained workforce of 600 individuals who facilitate all phases of rose bush growth and development. Staff members foster seedlings, develop strategic planting improvement techniques and monitor plant growth and constantly check for the presence of viruses and insects. The company utilizes the latest pest control and soil management techniques to produce healthy colorful roses that are shipped to importers within 48 hours of being harvested. We additionally develop new variety of roses by conducting research. Orchestrating the production of healthy, vigorous and disease resistant roses, we also carefully develop feeding schedules to determine which plant foods produce the most beautiful and long lasting blooms. This is why we are the home of the best quality cut rose flowers in Africa.’[1]

Into this already very fragile socio-ecological condition, the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) has made questionable investments. AGRA is funded by the Rockefeller and Gates foundations. It claims that it is helping Africa to grow high standard exportable food crops and flowers to help Kenya’s development. It employs certified agro-chemical crops under multi-genome patents.[2]

Those who own the farms in Naivasha as well as middle agencies engaged in buying and selling, shipping, storing, insuring and transporting flowers make enormous profits, but the direct producers – the wage workers – get very little. The multinationals also outsource growing of flowers to small African farmers, where they live off-site in squalid and fragile ecological conditions. They grow buttonhole carnations and red roses for the Valentine’s Day lovers in Europe, but themselves… they live from hand to mouth.

THE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (EPA)

The flower industry was the main reason why Kenya signed the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union in September 2014. Today European social activists are fighting against the US-imposed Transatlantic Trade and Investments Partnership (TTIP). They fear that the TTIP will open the door to US-dominated global corporate takeover of their economies, and undermine their sovereignty.[3] But they do not know that for over forty years (since the signing of the Lomé Convention in 1975) Africa has suffered TTIP-like aggression on Africa. [4]

Kenya signed the EPA in September 2014 under pressure from the Kenyan Flower Council. In an interview, the CEO of KFC, Jane Ngige, defined its ‘mission’ thus: ‘To promote economic, social and political interests of the floriculture industry through active participation in the determination and implementation of policies.’ [5] As of October 2015, KFC had a producer membership of 94 farms, and associate membership of 62 members – these provide farm inputs and allied services representing major cut flower auctions and distributors in UK, Holland, Switzerland, and Germany.

But whilst the Kenya government has surrendered to Europe, the ordinary citizens are fighting back. In 2007, the Kenya Small Scale Farmers Forum (KSSFF) filed a case against their government, arguing that EPAs would put at risk the livelihoods of millions of ordinary farmers. On 30 October, 2013, the High Court of Kenya ruled in KSSFF‘s favour. The court directed the Kenya government to establish a mechanism for involving stakeholders (including small-scale farmers) in the on-going EPA negotiations, and to encourage public debate on this matter.

That was the last heard of the court judgment.

THE WTO IS ABOUT THE ‘EMPIRE OF THE ABSURD’

The flower industry draws water out of Lake Naivasha on an average of approximately 20,000 cubic meters a day. The lake is dying. Officially 130 square kilometres, it shrank in 2006 to about 75 per cent of its 1982 size. The papyrus swamps that were the breeding grounds for fish had almost dried up. Thousands of peasant producers and fisher folk had been alienated from their means of survival. People were facing severe problems of food and water insecurity. Effectively, Kenya exports water to Europe as the water-bearing flowers from Lake Naivasha fly to Amsterdam. If this is not the ‘Empire of the Absurd’, what is?

In 2013 Kenya exported 124,858 tons of flowers valued at around $507m. In 2014 it raked in around $600 million. The WTO congratulated Kenya for finally finding an appropriate niche in ‘global value chain’. Development theory apologists say this is fine; all the Kenya government needs to do now is to tax the rich and distribute the wealth to the poor. Another theatre of the absurd. Who is kidding whom?

The inequality ratio – measured by the so-called Gini coefficient (calculated using consumption expenditure per capita) – is worsening in Kenya. The rich are getting richer, the poor poorer.[6] The statistics do not tell the whole story. Go to Nairobi and witness for yourself the condition of the ‘precariat’ – the proletarianised working classes without life predictability or basic security.

* Yash Tandon is a Ugandan policymaker, political activist, professor, author and public intellectual. His latest book, Trade Is War, was published in June 2015.

END NOTES
[1] http://www.maganaflowers.com/
[2] The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) was created in 2006, born of a strategic partnership between the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and The Rockefeller Foundation to dramatically improve African agriculture, and to do so as rapidly as possible. http://www.agra.org/who-we-are/our-history/
[3] See also: Nidhi Tandon, “On seeds: Controlling the first link in the food-chain”, http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/77809
[4] See my last blog – “Dangers of WTO MC 10: New Round + TTIP + TPP + EPA” http://yashtandon.com/category/blog/
[5] See Yash Tandon, 2005, Trade is War, OR-Books, Chapter 3: “EPAs: Europe’s Trade War on Africa”.
[6] http://kenyaflowercouncil.org/
[7] http://inequalities.sidint.net/kenya/abridged/gini-coefficient/

A powerful 6.7 magnitude earthquake has struck near Imphal, India near the border with Burma, reports the US Geological Survey.

According to some local media reports, at least six people were killed and around 100 injured in the Manipur region, although there are other reports of only four killed and 35 injured.

Tremors were felt in Bihar, Jharkhand and West Bengal, reported local media.

The earthquake occurred 55 kilometers (34 miles) deep and centered 29 kilometers west of Imphal, the capital city of the Manipur state, at 4:35 a.m. local time (6:05 p.m. ET on Sunday), according to the USGS, adding that the earthquake occurred as the result of strike slip faulting in the complex plate boundary region between India and the Eurasia plate in southeast Asia. India’s Meteorological Department said the epicenter of the quake was in Tamenglong region of Manipur state and struck at a depth of 17 kilometers (about 10 miles).

Location of Manipur in India. Source; Wikipedia Commons.

“Focal mechanisms for the event indicate slip occurred on either a right-lateral fault plane dipping moderately to the east-northeast, or on a left-lateral fault dipping steeply to the south-southeast. In the region of the earthquake, the India plate is moving towards the north-northeast with respect to Eurasia at a velocity of approximately 48 mm/yr; the regional plate boundary in eastern India – the Indo-Burmese Arc – is oriented approximately south-southwest-north-northeast,” the USGS said.

The USGS noted that the tectonics of southeast Asia are broadly dominated by the collision of the Indian subcontinent with Eurasia, which causes uplift that produces the highest mountain peaks in the world, including the Himalayan, the Karakoram, the Pamir and the Hindu Kush ranges. In northeast India, the east-west oriented Himalayan Front takes a southward turn towards Burma (Myanmar), and plate boundary deformation is more broadly distributed over a series of reverse and strike-slip structures in the Indo-Burmese Arc system, including the Sagaing, Kabaw and Dauki faults.

The USGS said this earthquake occurred in this region of broad deformation, at a depth of close to 50 km within the lithosphere of the India plate.

Moderate-to-large earthquakes in this region are fairly common; 19 other M 6+ earthquakes have occurred within 250 km of the 2016 event over the preceding century, the USGS said, adding that the largest was a M 8.0 earthquake in 1946, 220 km to the southeast of the 2016 earthquake on the Sagaing Fault. Other nearby damaging events include a M 7.3 earthquake 150 km to the east of the 2016 event in August 1988, which caused several fatalities and dozens of injuries, and a M 6.0 earthquake 90 km to the southwest in December 1984 that caused 20 fatalities and 100 injuries.

Islamic State (Daesh) militants clashed with forces guarding Libya’s al-Sidra oil port on Monday, Reuters reported.

The group has also said it took control of a nearby town, and in an online statement said it also set off a car bomb during the attacks.

Libyan authorities were not immediately available to comment on the clashes or capture of Ben Jawad.

Amid fighting over the past year between rival groups in Libya, Daesh took advantage of the chaos over the fight for the country’s energy reserves. Daesh has captured other cities and attacked oilfields in southern Libya, although it has not taken control of oil refineries as in Syria.

Since 2011 Libya has been divided by separate governments vying for power, one in Tripoli, and the other in eastern Libya.

The port of al-Sidra is protected by the Petrol Facilities Guard, which has backed the internationally recognized government in the east, has also clashed with other forces supporting the same government.

The UN is seeking support for a deal made in Morocco last month to establish a unity government to end the civil war in Libya.

Original article

By Sultan Al-Sughair

Saudi Arabia announced Saturday it had executed 47 prisoners convicted of terrorism charges, including Al-Qaida detainees and a prominent Shiite cleric who rallied violent protests against the government.

The Shiite cleric, Nimr Al-Nimr, had been convicted of committing eight crimes and delivering numerous hostile and fiery speeches since 2002 which led to the death and injury of several police officers.

Al-Nimr’s speeches were a driving force behind the violent protests that broke out in 2011 in Qatif that served third parties, most notably Iran.

He has been delivering regular religious sermons on Fridays at Imam Hussain Mosque in Al-Awamiyah since 2002. Later his sermons took on a political hue. He accused statesmen and security forces of blasphemy and called for public uprising against the state.

In March 2009, he criticized the Saudi authorities and suggested secession of the Shiite regions to form a united Shiite state. During the Shiite-led protest in Bahrain, Al-Nimr demanded the exit of Gulf armies from Bahrain, criticizing the rulers there, and demanding the release of what he called political prisoners.

In October 2011, he accused the Saudi media and state officials of covering up the “tyrannical oppression” of security forces, describing them as riot troops. In addition, he insulted the leaders and officials, objecting to appointments made by the state.

Al-Nimr demanded the formation of an internal religious opposition front to counter action against the Shiite agitation. Also, he called for public uprisings and disobedience, accusing the Kingdom of killing innocent Shiites.

He was detained several times, most recently on July 8, 2012, when he was shot in the leg by police in an exchange of gunfire. He was taken to hospital for treatment.

On Oct. 15, 2014, Al-Nimr was sentenced to death by the Special Criminal Court for his involvement in supporting terrorist cells facing security forces, resulting in the death and injury of security men and dozens of civilians. He was considered as the most dangerous instigator of sedition in the eastern region of the Kingdom.

Nimr Baqr Al-Nimr was born in 1959 in the city of Al-Awamiyah in Qatif province, and studied in his hometown. He traveled to Iran, where he joined the educational Hawza program for about 10 years before heading to Syria.

The cleric’s wife died in 2012 after a bitter struggle with cancer. She was taken to the United State for treatment at government expense.

By Mrinal Kanta Das*

Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres killed a Sarpanch (village level local self- government institution head) Jayaram Khara at Badapadar in Malkangiri District on December 25, 2015. 10 Maoists barged into the house of the Sarpanch, killed him and escaped. It is suspected that he was killed as a suspected ‘Police informer’.

On the same day, elsewhere in the District, the Maoists killed another civilian, Sahadev Badnayak, brother of a former Sarpanch at Raba village. According to sources, a group of around 30 Maoists had abducted Sahadev earlier in the day.

Though these incidents give an impression of insecurity among the civilian population, partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), suggests a contrary narrative. As against 31 civilian fatalities in Left Wing Extremist (LWE) violence through 2014, 2015 recorded 18 such fatalities, a decline of 58 per cent. This was, in fact, the lowest civilian fatality figure recorded in the state since 2007, when it stood at 13. Indeed, the security situation in Odisha has improved dramatically.

In an attempt to strengthen the security grid, Security Forces (SFs) launched increasingly successful offensive operations through 2015. 11 Maoists were killed in the year, as against nine in 2014. In the most recent of such incidents, SFs killed a CPI-Maoist cadre in the Chandiposh Forest area near Rourkela in the Sundargarh District on November 12, 2015. Further, 29 Maoists were arrested in 2015 in addition to 49 in 2014, and 84 in 2013.

There was a transient spike in SF fatalities, with four SF fatalities in two separate incidents in 2015, as against one in 2014. On August 26, 2015, three Border Security Force (BSF) personnel and a civilian were killed in a CPI-Maoist ambush in Malkangiri District. According to the Inspector-in-Charge of the Chitrakonda Police Station, P. Durua, the BSF team was returning by boat after area domination and patrolling exercises in the cut-off area of the Balimela Reservoir. While they were alighting from the boat, a landmine planted by the Maoists went off. It was followed by firing by the Maoists who were hiding nearby.

In total, 33 persons, including 18 civilians, four SF personnel and 11 Maoists, were killed in Odisha through 2015; in comparison to 41 persons, including 31 civilians, one trooper and nine Maoists through 2014, registering a decline of 24 per cent.

There were 14 exchanges of fire between SFs and CPI-Maoist through 2015 in six Districts of the State, in comparison to 25 such incidents in 13 Districts in 2014. Odisha has a total of 30 Districts. In 2015 the Districts that reported exchange of fire incidents included Malkangiri (4), Kalahandi (4), Kandhamal (3), Deogarh (1), Koraput (1), and Angul (1). In 2014 encounters were reported from Koraput (4), Malkangiri (3), Ganjam (3), of which two were with the breakaway Odisha Maobadi Party (OMP), Sundargarh (3), all of which were with the People’s Liberation Front of India (PLFI), Sambalpur (2), Kandhamal (2), Balangir (2), Nabarangpur, Nuapada, Boudh, Angul, Deogarh, and Kalahandi, 1 each.

The biggest positive development of 2015 was the diminishing influence of Maoists in Koraput District. Koraput recorded a single fatality (one trooper) in 2015, as against 14 (10 civilians and four SF personnel) in 2014.

The Maoists were also involved in five explosions in the State: Rayagada (1), Balangir (1), Koraput (1) and Malkangiri (2) Districts; as against six explosions (five in Malkangiri and one in Nuapada) in 2014.

The Maoists in Odisha have been considerably weakened in 2015, as in other theaters of Maoist operation, including Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, and Jharkhand. In October 2015, the Maoists recognised that their Odisha unit had suffered huge losses after Sabyasachi Panda parted ways and created his own outfit in the State. Panda was expelled from the party on August 10, 2012, for ‘ideological reasons’. Later, he formed his own party called the Odisha Maobadi Party (OMP). Afterwards he became the ‘general secretary’ of the Communist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist-Maoist (CPI-MLM). He was arrested on July 17, 2014, in the Ganjam District of Odisha and is now lodged in Berhampur Jail. The Maoists also concede that the surrender of Nachika Linga, the head of the Chasi Mulia Adivasi Sangha (CMAS), a Maoist front organization that had been particularly active in mass movements in 2006-09, impacted particularly adversely on the prospects of the organisation in the State. Linga surrendered on October 28, 2014.

Further, another 135 Maoist cadres surrendered in 2015. 1,787 Maoists (overwhelmingly from CMAS) had surrendered in 2013, followed by 94 such surrenders in 2014.

Nevertheless, residual Maoist capacities and capabilities continue to present a significant challenge in the State. There were three major incidents (each resulting in three or more fatalities) reported in 2015, as against just one in 2014. The Maoists also engineered at least seven arson-related incidents in 2015, in comparison to six in 2014. Further, 10 bandh (total shut down) calls were given by the Maoists in 2015, as against two in 2014, though most of these were unsuccessful. However, there were reports of some ‘successful’ bandhs in the Maoist stronghold of Malkangiri. Thus, during a bandh call given by the Maoists across the Dandakaranya region on November 25, 2015, normal life was paralyzed in the Mathili Block of Malkangiri District.

Fatalities was reported from seven of Odisha’s 30 Districts: Angul, Bolangir, Kalahandi, Kandhamal, Koraput, Malkangiri and Sundergarh – in 2015 in comparison to five Districts – Koraput, Malkangiri, Nuapada, Rayagada and Sundergarh – in 2014. Malkangiri which accounted for 25 of the 33 fatalities (16 civilians, three SFs personnel and six Maoists) recorded in the State in 2015, a staggering 72 per cent of the total, and emerged as one of the most violent LWE-affected Districts in the country, along with Sukma, Bijapur and Dantewada in Chhattisgarh); Gadchiroli in Maharashtra; and Palamu in Jharkhand. These six Districts together contributed 59 per cent of the total fatalities violence in 2015. Fear of the Maoists is endemic across the villages of Malkangiri District. On November 3, 2015, at least 40 families of Kanaguda village under the Kalimela Police Station in Malkangiri District left their homes due to threats and harassment by CPI-Maoist cadres. However, they returned home within three weeks, on November 22.

On August 25, 2015, Odisha Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik expressed concern over Maoist activities, observing, “The position continues to remain challenging in the Districts of Malkangiri, Koraput and Nuapada.”

Further, on February 2, 2015, dispelling the idea that the Maoists are no longer a challenge, the Odisha Government urged Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh to provide two additional battalions of Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) to contain the ultras in Nuapada and Malkangiri Districts.

Despite suffering major losses, the Maoists remain a challenge, particularly in Malkangiri. However, some developments through 2015 have the potential to further undermine the Maoist hold in the District. On April 15, 2015, for instance, the Malkangiri Adivasi Sangha, a tribal organization, raised a voice of protest against the Maoists for abducting eight villagers in the Kartanpalli area of Malkangiri. After a meeting in Malkangiri, the tribal body declared it would resort to retaliation against the Maoists if the eight villagers were not freed immediately and unconditionally. The Maoists released all of them the very next day. Moreover, in September 2015, an estimated 822 Maoists, mostly supporters, militia members and village committee members, surrendered in Malkangiri District, suggesting that the Maoist support base is being rapidly eroded.

The present reverses could well be a turning point in the Maoist movement that has rampaged across Odisha and the so-called ‘Red Corridor’ for years now. This is a time for vigorous efforts for consolidation of the advantage on the part of the state, giving the rebels no opportunity to regroup and revive their movement.

* Mrinal Kanta Das
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

Bahrain and Sudan have announced they are cutting off diplomatic relations with Iran following the storming of Saudi Arabia’s embassy in Tehran, while the United Arab Emirates said it was reducing the number of Iranian diplomats in the country.

Bahrain authorities said they have demanded that Iranian diplomats leave the country within 48 hours.

The decision was announced by Bahraini Media Minister Isa al-Hamadi.

“Bahrain decided to break off diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran and calls upon all members of the mission to leave the kingdom within 48 hours,” Bahrain state news agency BNA said.

The Sudanese Foreign ministry also announced it is cutting diplomatic ties with Iran.

“In response to the barbaric attacks on the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Tehran and its consulate in Mashhad … the government of Sudan announces the immediate severing of ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran,” a Foreign Ministry statement said.

Angry Iranian protesters stormed and set ablaze the Saudi Embassy in Tehran on Saturday night during a rally to condemn Riyadh’s execution of prominent Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr. Nimr was among 47 prisoners beheaded or shot by firing squad across Saudi Arabia on Saturday – the largest number of individuals executed in the Gulf kingdom in a single day since 1980.

The Saudi consulate in the city of Mashhad in northwestern Iran was also attacked by protesters on Saturday, with police intervening after rocks and Molotov cocktails were thrown at the building.

Following the protests, Saudi Arabia cut diplomatic ties with Iran.

Riyadh has stoked the sectarian fires at the start of 2016 with its decision, and carrying out, of the executions of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr and various members of the Shiite community. All in all, 47 were dispatched in a Saudi orgy of state-sanctioned violence, most of whom were al-Qaeda members and associates.

Since his 2012 arrest in the Saudi Arabian eastern province of Qatif, al-Nimr had become something of a talismanic figure, having openly supported mass anti-government demonstrations in the region in 2011 and expressing open sympathy with fellow Shiites. The lot of the Shiite community in that part has been a disgruntled one, giving the cleric ample room to insist on elections and criticism of the ruling al-Saud family.

The Saudi authorities have been left in a pickle as to how to respond. Arrest him for the charges of sedition was considered acceptable but executing him would be another matter. There had been various warnings issued by Tehran about the consequences of doing so, making the issue more incendiary than usual.

Furthermore, executing him alongside various al-Qaeda figures such as Faris al-Shuwail, and those involved in a series of lethal attacks between 2003 and 2006, betrayed a rather distorted perspective. This is not to say that members of al-Saud had no reason to fear him.

For one, the Sheikh was on public record against any violent resolution, which is precisely what made him terrifying to a regime positively addicted to it. Prior to his arrest, Sheikh al-Nimr had told the BBC in a 2011 interview that he called for “the roar of the word against authorities rather than weapons… the weapon of the word is stronger than bullets, because authorities will profit from a battle with weapons.”

He was also suggesting an alternative structure of religious governance. Such views will have undoubtedly been influenced by ten years of religious studies in Tehran and a few in Syria. For al-Nimr, governance should be conducted through a process somewhere between that of a single religious leader (“wilayet al-faqih”) and consultation, a philosophy of “shura al-fuqaha” in which a council of religious leaders hold sway.

Pigeonholing the cleric as firebrand revolutionary or moderate democrat is tempting, though it is very obvious that al-Nimr was far more complex, a creature of religious politics rather than liberal awakening. A sense of his worldview can be gathered in a US cable via WikiLeaks from August 2008. It speaks of his opposition to the “authoritarianism of the reactionary al-Saud regime” and support for “the people” in any conflict with the authorities.

It is also hard to go by his open advocacy for “the right of the Saudi Shi’a community to seek external assistance if it were to become embroiled in a conflict.” This, accompanied by his open encouragement of the Iranian regime and its nuclear ambitions, was always going to niggle the Saudi authorities.

The trial that followed the grandest traditions of display over legal substance, an attempt less to redress strict matters of law as those of political expediency. Eyewitnesses, for one, were not called to testify. The authorities were determined to pot al-Nimr, finding that he had been responsible for “foreign meddling”.

Whatever the supposedly peaceful views of the Sheikh, such historical reactions tend to be of the violent sort. The battles against Riyadh are unlikely to be resolved with a mighty pen over weaker sword. Fearing this exact point, the kingdom deployed hundreds of armoured vehicles to Qatif to quell protests in the aftermath of Saturday’s executions.

The international dimension has also seen similar reactions. The Bahraini village of Abu Saiba witnessed tear gassing from security forces. The result of this bloody venture has been to enrage the Shiite community in the country while antagonising those outside it as well.

Warnings and unfavourable predictions regarding the al-Saud regime have come in a flurry. Former Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri al-Maliki, not necessarily the paragon of accurate crystal ball gazing, has suggested that the move will see the regime in Riyadh collapse.

In a released statement, al-Maliki insisted that his countrymen “strongly condemn these detestable sectarian practices that affirm that the crime of executing Sheikh al-Nimr will topple the Saudi regime as the crime of executing the martyr [Muhammad Baqir] al-Sadr did to Saddam.”

The words of the ever active, some might say iconic figure of the Shi’a cleric politician Muqtada al-Sadr, was bound to carry even more weight. Having resisted US forces during its Iraqi occupation, al-Sadr’s words of condemnation will have purchase in Shiite communities beyond Iraq, including Saudi Arabia itself.

The domino effect continued in other countries with large Shiite representation. Yemen’s Houthi movement have deemed al-Nimr a “holy warrior”. Hezbollah in Lebanon have insisted that the move amounted to an assassination. The Saudi embassy in Tehran was attacked on Saturday with Molotov cocktails, with some of the offices being ransacked.

Politically sharpened eyes were invariably trained on the official Iranian response. They did not have to wait long. The tinderbox had been lit. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards issued an unmistakable response to the execution via a statement carried by the Mehr news agency. “A harsh revenge will strike at the Al Saud in the near future and cause the fall of its pro-terrorist, anti-Islamic regime.”

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei took to Twitter to suggest that, “Doubtlessly, unfairly-spilled blood of oppressed martyr #SheikhNimr will affect rapidly & Divine revenge will seize Saudi politicians.” The religious figure has also gone so far as to suggest that any instrumental difference between the ISIS executioner and his Saudi counterpart is minimal. One is merely “black” as against the other’s “white”.

Teheran summoned the Saudi ambassador to express its condemnation of the execution, a favour which was returned to Riyadh’s Iranian ambassador more or less telling the Iranians to mind their own business.

The response from pro-Saudi governments, notably that of the United States, has been true to form. Since they have been as responsible for stoking sectarian violence in the region as any, public condemnations have been modest.

For them, the concern is less about victims in a mercenary power tussle than strategic balance. “We are particularly concerned that the execution of (al-Nimr) risks,” claimed a meek John Kirby of the US State Department, “exacerbating sectarian tensions at a time when they urgently need to be reduced.”

The move on the part of Riyadh has been one of indifference to consequences. In that sense, the kingdom has shown itself immune to the external world which it has sought to control, with limited success. That said, it has been allowed a degree of impunity – oil, the usual venality of strategic calculations, and the blind eye – have all served to exempt the kingdom from closer inspection.

This execution has proven to be a jolt, but it is unlikely to see the iron rule of the Saudi regime loosened. The most likely scenario here is an intensification of existing proxy confrontations, with more deaths. Reform will be distinctly off the agenda.

By Nijeesh N.*

On December 15, 2015, Assam Rifles (AR) personnel killed a militant of the Khaplang faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K), identified as ‘Lieutenant’ Wangmi Wangdung aka Nyamjan Hasik, during an operation at Langka village under the Nampong Police Station in the Changlang District of Arunachal Pradesh. One AK 56 rifle, three magazines, 105 live rounds of ammunition, hand grenades, an ‘extortion pad’, ration book and some cash were recovered from the possession of the slain militant. According to reports, AR personnel launched the operation following information that a group of 10 to 12 NSCN-K militants were taking shelter in a hideout located in the village. While Wangdung was killed, the others managed to escape under the cover of darkness.

On April 26, 2015, Security Forces (SFs) killed an unidentified militant of the Arunachal Pradesh Depressed People’s Front (APDPF) in the Deban area of Changlang District. SFs also arrested six militants of the group. APDPF was formed in 2014 by some Chakma youths principally to engage in extortion, abduction, and other criminal activities, in the Diyun, Miao and Namsai areas of Changlang and Namsai Districts. The group has approximately 10 to 12 cadres who had undergone armed training in Bangladesh in 2014.

These were the only militant fatalities at the hands of the SFs through 2015. In 2014, SFs killed six militants in four separate incidents.

SFs lost four of their personnel in two separate incidents in 2015. In a major [resulting in three or more fatalities] incident, three Army personnel were killed and another four were wounded in an ambush when cadres of the Isak-Muivah faction of National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) fired on their convoy at Tupi village, along the Khonsa-Longding road, in Tirap District on April 2, 2015. The ambush was carried out by the NSCN-IM to ‘avenge’ the killing and arrests of its cadres by SFs in Arunachal Pradesh. Four NSCN-IM cadres were killed and another four were arrested in the State through 2014. According to the Arunachal Pradesh Police, NSCN-IM militants including self-styled ‘sergeant major’ Ayo Tangkhul, ‘captain’ Kapai aka Singmayo Kapai, ‘lieutenant’ Ami Tangkhul, ‘lieutenant colonel’ Kewang Hassik, ‘major’ Anok Wangsu and ‘sergeant major’ Chenaye Tangkhul aka Ayo, were suspected to have carried out the attack with the help of some local villagers.

In another attack targeting AR personnel, militants carried out an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack at Monmao village, near the India-Myanmar border, in the Changlang District, on February 6, 2015. Two civilian porters working for AR were killed, while nine AR troopers were injured in the blast. One of the injured AR trooper succumbed to his injuries the next day. Later, NSCN-K sources claimed that the attack was a joint operation by the NSCN-K and the Independent faction of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA-I), against the Indian Army.

The SFs also had a lucky escape as two suspected NSCN-K militants, including a Myanmar national, were killed and another was injured, when an IED they were trying to plant exploded accidentally at Wakka, near the Indo-Myanmar border, in Longding District on June 9, 2015. The selection of the spot for planting the IED suggests that the militants had AR personnel and their assets in mind as targets, since an AR outpost is located about eight kilometers away. A live IED, along with a remote control, was recovered from the site of the incident.

Earlier, on June 7, 2015, around 30 to 35 heavily armed NSCN-K militants had opened fire at an AR camp in the Lazu area of Tirap District bordering Myanmar. There was no report of any casualty, as alert AR personnel retaliated immediately and effectively, forcing the militants to flee. Around 70 empty AK-47 cartridges and some unexploded bombs were recovered from the incident site.

Significantly, Arunachal Pradesh had not recorded any SF fatality through 2014. In fact, the last SF fatality dated back to October 25, 2007, when three AR personnel and a civilian were killed and another eight were injured in an ambush carried out by NSCN-IM militants in a remote jungle in the Tirap District.

The State did not witness a single attack targeting civilians through 2015. However, two civilian porters were killed in the February 6 attack targeting AR personnel. In 2014, three civilians had been killed in two separate incidents. In 2014, two civilians were killed in crossfire between AR personnel and militants at Holam village in Khonsa in the Tirap District on January 2, 2014. In the second incident, a trader from Kerala was found dead in a jungle in the Cheputa village in Papum Pare District on September 5, 2014, after he had been abducted a week earlier, on August 27, 2014. These civilian killings were recorded in Arunachal Pradesh after an almost six year gap, since October 25, 2007.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Arunachal Pradesh has recorded a total of 10 insurgency-related fatalities, including two civilians, four SF personnel and four militants, through 2015 (data till December 31), as against nine fatalities (three civilians and six militants) in 2014. Overall security environment in the State thus remained more or less stable. Insurgency in Arunachal peaked in 2001, with 63 fatalities, including 40 civilians, 12 SF personnel and 11 militants.

SFs also arrested a total of 21 militants in 10 separate incidents in 2015, as against 19 such arrests in eight separate incidents in 2014. 11 of the arrested militants belonged to Arunachal Pradesh-based outfits – seven of the APDPF and four of the National Liberation Council of Tani Land (NLCT). Three arrested militants belonged to Nagaland-based outfits – two of NSCN (faction not known) and one of NSCN-IM. One militant belonged to the Assam-based National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB). Affiliations of the remaining six militant’s arrested remained unconfirmed.

According to the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) data, as on September 15, 2015, abductions in the States of the Northeast registered a significant decline in 2015, with Arunachal Pradesh showing a nearly 50 per cent drop in incidents of abduction, from 49 in 2014 to 24 in 2015. NSCN-K was responsible for the maximum number of recorded incidents, followed by NSCN-Khole Kitovi (NSCN-KK).

Arunachal has long remained ‘an island of relative peace’ in India’s troubled Northeast, though it has been affected, for some years, by an ‘overflow’ of violence from neighboring States. Crucially, all the incidents of killing through 2015 were reported from three eastern Districts – Tirap, Changlang and Longding – which border Nagaland and are regarded as sanctuaries by Naga militant outfits NSCN-IM and NSCN-K. Crucially, these three Districts are part of NSCN-IM’s projected State of Nagalim (Greater Nagaland).

Through an order issued on November 4-5, 2015, UMHA further extended the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in 16 Police Stations of Arunachal Pradesh for six months, citing the presence of Naga insurgent groups including NSCN-K, NSCN-KK and the Reformation faction of NSCN (NSCN-R) besides Assam based terror outfits ULFA-I and the IK Songbijit faction of the NDFB (NDFB-IKS), to declare these Districts “disturbed areas” under section 3 of AFSPA. AFSPA was first implemented in these three Districts on September 17, 1991. Significantly, of the five incidents of killing reported in 2015, NSCN-K was responsible for three; while NSCN-IM and APDPF were responsible for one each, clearly demonstrating that the preponderance of violence was coming from neighbouring States. This ‘overflow’ is a major concern.

Assam-based Bodo militant groups also pose a security threat to Arunachal Pradesh, especially along the Arunachal-Assam border. A UMHA notification of March 27, 2015 observed,

a further review of the law and order situation in entire districts in Assam bordering Arunachal Pradesh reveals that areas lying within the police stations in Arunachal Pradesh bordering Assam remain a cause of serious concern… There is presence of NDFB-S, NSCN-IM, NSCN-K, ULFA-I, Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO), Manipur People’s Liberation Front (MPLF) along the Assam-Arunachal Pradesh border. Outfits like Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), United National Liberation Front (UNLF), People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) are helping NDFB-S and ULFA-I and KLO for movement of men, material, infiltration and exfiltration…

Accordingly, AFSPA had been extended to nine new Districts of Arunachal through the notification on March 27. However, on May 5, 2015, the Government changed its decision and AFSPA was lifted from these Districts.

Arunachal Pradesh also faces the problem of the illegal influx and settlement of foreigners, especially the presence of the 53,000 strong Chakma and Hajong refugees that has created a sense of marginalization among indigenous tribes like the Noctes, Wangchow, Khamtis, Singphos and Tsangas in the eastern-most part of Arunachal; while in the western part of the State, Tibetans, Bhutanese and Nepalese are exerting demographic dominance over the indigenous Monpas, Sherdukpens, Akas and Mijis. Further, in central part of the State, there is a floating population of Bangladeshis that has created tension among Nyishi, Adi, Galo, Apatani and Tagin tribes.

Significantly, on September 17, 2015, the Supreme Court (SC) directed the Union Government and the State Government to grant citizenship to Chakma and Hajong refugees within three months. The State Government filed a review petition on October 26, 2015, aggrieved at the SC’s decision. Though the Supreme Court rejected the State Government’s application on November 19, 2015, the Arunachal Pradesh Government has again decided to file a curative petition in respect to the permanent settlement of Chakma and Hajong refugees in the State. On November 23, 2015, Chief Minister Nabam Tuki noted, “We are not against the grant of Indian citizenship to the Chakma, Hajong refugees, but opposed to their permanent settlement in Arunachal Pradesh and the exemption from the Inner Line Permit”.

While Arunachal Pradesh has been relatively free of the widespread insurgencies that have afflicted much of India’s Northeast, patterns of militant overflow and demographic destabilization do create significant security challenges in this sensitive border State, which require enhancement of the capacity and quality of the SFs deployed. According to a report published on April 8, 2015, UMHA had already given an ‘in principle’ nod to raise 16 additional battalions of the Indo Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) Force, of which 8,000 personnel (about eight battalions) would be deployed in the Northeast, mainly in Arunachal Pradesh. Also, between the 2012-13 and 2014-15 fiscal years, Arunachal Pradesh received INR 730 million under the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme to strengthen its Police network. In addition to an unprecedented strengthening of SF capacities in the State, accelerated development initiatives in the fields of infrastructure and economy, are also necessary if a sustainable peace is to be established.

* Nijeesh N.
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

Cairn announced Monday the successful testing of the SNE-2 appraisal well offshore Senegal with positive results. Operations have been safely and successfully completed following drilling, coring, logging and drill-stem testing (DST), Cairn said, adding that the well is now being plugged and abandoned.

Following this first successful appraisal well, resource estimates for the SNE field will be fully revised and announced after the results of the further appraisal activity. Evaluation of the extensive dataset collected is continuing, with preliminary analysis focused on the DST of over a 12 metre (m) interval of high quality pay flowed at a maximum stabilized, but constrained rate of ~8,000bopd on a 48/64” choke, confirming the high deliverability of the principal reservoir unit in the SNE-2 well

DST over a 15m interval (~3.5m net) of relatively low quality “heterolithic” pay flowed at a maximum rate of ~1,000 bopd on a 24/64” choke, confirming that these reservoirs are able to produce at viable rates and thus make a material contribution to resource volumes. Flow was unstable due to the 4.5” DST tubing, Cairn said, adding initial indications confirm the same 32 degree API oil quality as seen in SNE-1

The SNE- 2 well is located in 1,200m water depth and is approximately 100 kilometres (km) offshore in the Sangomar Offshore block, reached the planned total depth (TD) of 2,800m below sea level (TVDSS). The well has been appraising the 2014 discovery of high quality oil in the SNE-1 well, some 3 km to the south.

Cairn Energy Chief Executive Simon Thomson said, “We are delighted with the results of the SNE-2 well and in particular the well tests, which are significant in demonstrating the ability of the reservoirs to flow at commercially viable rates. The results help to confirm the overall scale and extent of the resource base in Senegal and further appraisal activity is expected to lead to future revision of the estimates. We now eagerly look forward to the results of the SNE-3 well.”

By Henriette Jacobsen

(EurActiv) — Denmark will impose temporary border controls at the country’s southern border with Germany, Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen announced at a press conference today (4 January) .

The border controls come after Sweden also introduced ID checks on its borders with Denmark today. According to the Danish premier, these checks increase the risk that a large number of illegal immigrants will be ‘stranded’ in Copenhagen.

“You can say what you want about the Swedish ID controls, but the decision was made,” Rasmussen said at the press briefing. “This is not a happy moment at all,” he declared, adding that the border control at the Danish-German border will be unsystematic and so far be for ten days, but with the possibility of an extention.

Rasmussen said both German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Migration Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos have been notified about the new measure, in order to comply with the EU’s Schengen rules, which abolish border controls.

Denmark is the sixth Schengen member over the past months that has set up border controls within the EU’s internal borders after Norway, Sweden, Germany, France and Austria.

The country fears a higher number of asylum seekers will be the consequence of the Swedish ID checks which take place on Danish soil and prevent those, who are undocumented, from travelling to Sweden.

The border controls at the Danish-German border are meant to discourage asylum seekers from travelling to Denmark in the first place.

On Monday, Danish and Swedish authorities closely followed the traffic situation surrounding the Øresund bridge which connects the two Scandinavian countries and which 30,000 people cross on a daily basis.

While several passengers were not allowed to board a train from Copenhagen Airport to Sweden, Danish broadcaster DR reported that four Swedes were rejected boarding a ferry from Elsinore to Helsingborg.

Sweden made a U-turn with its asylum policies in November, when the country said it would only grant temporary residence permits for refugees, and fulfill the minimum standards under international and EU laws when it comes to dealing with refugees.

In 2015, Sweden accepted 163,000 asylum seekers according to official data, the highest number of an EU member state per capita.

Denmark received 18,505 asylum seekers, while Norway and Finland received 30,101 and 30,625, respectively.

While sane and insane voices exist in every society, it is common knowledge by now that Islamophobes are pretty loud in the West, especially in US. The story of Ahmed, the kid who brought a self-made clock to school, is a case in point. Of course, Islamophobia is not the dominant ideology in USA, as can be seen in the efforts of several good-willed Americans who seek nothing but peace. After all, Ahmed did get support and appreciation from all corners, didn’t he?

However, what happens when such Islamophobic paranoia, even though it might be in the minority, spills out and makes itself visible in stuff that is otherwise not a monopoly of Islam? What happens when one’s bigotry makes him/her feel scared of a language?

Apparently, some Islamophobes in US seem to be scared of the Arabic language.

Islamophobes Dislike Arabic?

Recently, a teacher at a school in Augusta County, Virginia handed out a homework assignment. The homework, part of the Geography curriculum, dealt with world religions. Among other exercises, it included a question asking students to copy Arabic calligraphy (in order to help them understand the complexity of calligraphy in the Arabic language).

The result?

It led to an angry backlash by several parents of students, as they felt it was an attempt to convert their kids to Islam. The school received multiple calls from angry parents, and some even demanded the the concerned teacher should be fired from her job (note that the teacher did not frame the questions herself, but took it from a standard workbook on world religions).

Things kept getting ugly, with more hate-filled calls and messages coming in, and more parents reacting to the incident with threats. All the schools in the county had to be shut down, and then reopened amidst high security. Eventually, the question was eliminated from the workbook.

Thankfully, there were voices of sanity too, and some former students created a Facebook group to defend their geography teacher.

This is not the first time that Islamophobic paranoia in USA resulted in bias against the Arabic language. Back in March 2015, a school near New York City had to apologize for including Arabic as one of the languages during its Foreign Languages Week celebration.

Clearly, Islamophobes would hate anything and everything, including the Arabic language. To help them realize just how poor their logic is, I decided to put together just a small fraction of things for which they should thank the Arabic language and its speakers.

Why Should They Not Hate Arabic?

What has the Arabic language or the Arabic script ever done to anyone? Here is small selection:

• Renowned Christian theologian Thomas Aquinas was influenced by several philosophers — guess which language those philosophers wrote it? Yes, Arabic.
• While the good and bad qualities of Christopher Columbus are surely debatable, it is established beyond doubt that during his voyage to America, Columbus depended heavily on the calculations of al-Farghani. In fact, al-Farghani was one of the first to prove that the earth was spherical, and he wrote all of that in Arabic.
• It is argued that zero first originated in India. However, the circular zero that is in use today comes from the works of Arabic scholars. Don’t like the zero? Good luck dividing XLIV by CLXIV.

Need more? Yes, there is a lot more.

Conclusion

If Islamophobes want to turn their children away from the Arabic language because they feel it is related to Muslims, will they be turning their kids away from Trigonometry, Algebra, Chemistry, Pharmacy and Medicine? Because all of these were, in some way or the other, invented and developed by Muslims.

Quite obviously, paranoia and religious bigotry knows no reason, and is purely illogical. Such ignorance needs to be fixed because, as shown in the references above, Arabic as a language has proven nothing but beneficial for human existence as a whole.