Pope Francis advanced the sainthood causes of 10 men and women, including the martyrdom of Justo Takayama Ukon, a 17th-century Japanese samurai who died shortly after he was exiled to the Philippines for being Catholic, Catholic News Service reported.

Takayama was said to have abandoned his status to dedicate himself to his Christian faith.

During a meeting Jan. 21 with Cardinal Angelo Amato, prefect of the Congregation for Saints’ Causes, the pope also signed a decree recognizing a miracle attributed to Blessed Jose Sanchez del Rio, a 14-year-old Mexican boy martyred for refusing to renounce his faith during the Cristero War of the 1920s.

The miracle in the cause of Blessed Sanchez prepares the way for his canonization. Final approval, and a date or dates for the ceremonies, will be at a consistory with Pope Francis and cardinals in Rome.

The High Representative for Foreign Affairs/Vice-President of the European Commission Federica Mogherini and Commissioner for European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu and Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator Ambassador Volkan Bozkır issued this statement following the EU-Turkey High Level Political Dialogue meeting held in Ankara on 25 January 2016.

The meeting of EU Heads of State or Government with Turkey on 29 November 2015 was a turning point in creating a new momentum in relations,including through a re-energized accession process. It recognized the importance of overcoming together the common challenges ahead as key partners and strategic allies in our region. To this end, today’s High Level Political Dialogue is an essential element of our overall framework of dialogue and cooperation. It provided us with the opportunity to discuss issues high on both of our agendas in a comprehensive manner and that will feed into the preparation of the next EU-Turkey Summit.

Accession negotiations remain the cornerstone of EU-Turkey relations. Based on the agreement to revitalize the accession process and following the opening of Chapter 17 on Economic and Monetary Policy on 14 December 2015, progress in the preparatory work by the Commission and the European External Action Service towards the opening of further chapters was reviewed.The commitment to complete this preparatory work on both sides in the first quarter of 2016 with a view to ensure the opening of these chapters was reiterated. In this regard, preparatory work could also subsequently begin on further chapters. The Turkish side attaches importance to close cooperation with the Commission in this respect.

The Turkish Government convened the Reform Action Group on 11 December 2015 and reiterated its determination to continue with the political reform process, including the reforms in the area of the rule of law and fundamental rights.Both sides underscore their commitmentto take the necessary steps with a view to completing visa-liberalization for Turkish citizens to the Schengen area by October 2016 subject to the fulfillment of the requirements of the Visa Liberalization Roadmap benchmarks vis-à-vis all participating Member States and the implementation of the Readmission Agreement, in the light of the presentation of the second progress report by the Commission by early March 2016.

Turkey and the EU believe that there is a need to exert huge effort to address the refugee crisis and irregular migration. They discussed the implementation of the Joint Action Plan which was activated at the 29 November EU-Turkey Summit. Measures by Turkey to further improve the socio-economic situation of Syrians under temporary protection, such as the adoption of legislation on granting them legal access to the labor market, were welcomed. Turkey exerts outstanding efforts so far to accommodate the more than two and a half million Syrians currently in Turkey. The need to achieve further results in stemming the influx of irregular migrants and in fighting criminal smuggling networks was underlined. Turkey and the EU agreed to step up their cooperation to reinforce the interception capacity of the Turkish Coast Guard and acknowledged the importance of maintaining a system of coordinated reporting on migration and refugee flows.

The EU confirmed its commitment to expand significantly its overall financial support by creating a EUR 3 billion Refugee Facility for Turkey. The need to finalize and swiftly move forward the implementation of the Refugee Facility in cooperation with Turkey, in line with the needs assessment, was underlined. Turkey and the EU underlined the need to cooperate on setting up resettlement programs and schemes in a spirit of burden sharing as indicated in the Action Plan and the EU-Turkey Summit Declaration.

Energy is a topic of key interest in EU-Turkey relations. Turkey stands out as a crucial partner for EU’s energy security and energy diversification. Both sides welcome the ongoing preparations for the High Level Energy Dialogue Meeting to be held on 28 January in Turkey and for the first High Level Economic Dialogue Meeting currently planned for April 2016.

Turkey and the EU underlined the need to continue making progress towards the upgrading of the Customs Union so as to enable formal negotiations to be launched by the end of 2016.

Turkey and the EU also exchanged views on the situation in Syria, Iraq and in Libya. Regarding a comprehensive and sustainable solution to the Syrian conflict, Turkey and the EU stressed the urgent need to reinitiate the political process leading to a peaceful, inclusive and genuine political transition. They reaffirmed our engagement with the political process on the basis of the Geneva Communique as expressed in the Vienna Statements and endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2254 and reiterated our support for all the efforts towards achieving such political solution.

The EU welcomes Turkey’s important contributions to the EU operations and missions.

Turkey and the EU stand united against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and condemn the heinous terrorist attacks which have claimed innocent lives in Turkey, the Member States of the European Union, as well as in many other parts of the world. The fight against terrorism was recognized as a priority at the Turkey-EU Summit on 29 November, and they confirmed again their resolve to step up our efforts in this regard, and to work together to tackle the threat posed by DEASH. In this regard, EU welcomes Turkey’s decision to appoint a liaison officer to EUROPOL.

The EU also continues to be committed to fight against the presence in Europe of the PKK which is on the EU terrorist list with a view to preventing PKK terrorist attacks. The EU stressed the importance of an urgent return to the solution process and attaches the utmost importance to achieving a peaceful and sustainable solution for the benefit of all the people of Turkey.

Both sides welcomed the ongoing settlement talks in Cyprus and agreed that they will continue to give full and resolute support to the efforts of UN Secretary General’s Special Adviser on Cyprus Mr. Espen Barth Eide towards achieving a comprehensive settlement.

Believing that the accession process constitutes the backbone of the relations, Turkey and the EU reiterated their determination to advance their comprehensive agenda to ensure that this fresh impetus yields concrete results.

Finally, the EU and Turkey agreed on a joint work plan for the next six months in order to maintain the new momentum and start the necessary preparations by holding a High-Level Political Dialogue prior to the second Turkey-EU Summit.

(EurActiv) — EU foreign affairs chief Federica Mogherini on Monday expressed confidence Turkey would soon receive a package of €3 billion for mainly Syrian refugees, despite a delay of almost two months since the funds were agreed.

Mogherini, leading a high level delegation to Ankara for talks with the Turkish leadership, said discussions were ongoing on the disbursement of the funds but played down reports they were being held up by disagreements.

The financial aid is the centrepiece of a deal agreed with Ankara on 29 November for the EU to step up support for Syrian and other refugees in Turkey in exchange for the Turkish authorities cutting the illegal flow of migrants to Europe.

“The talks are ongoing. I am very much confident that the amount that was decided will be there in a reasonable time,” Mogherini said after talks with Turkish ministers in Ankara.

Media reports have suggested that Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, in particular, was blocking the disbursement of the funds to Turkey.

But Mogherini said she wanted to play down “this dramatic approach” over the issue, emphasizing that the funds were “not pocket money”.

“We are doing the preparatory work for spending this money in an appropriate way. Because again it’s not pocket money, it’s money that goes to projects,” she said.

“The Commission is carrying out all the assessments of the needs and projects,” Mogherini said.

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu sought to also urge calm over the delay, saying: “We don’t take it personally.”

“But any delay is affecting daily life of the refugees, schooling and medical needs,” he added.

Turkey is currently playing host to at least 2.2 million refugees from the almost five year conflict in Syria and has repeatedly complained that the West failed to provide adequate financial help.

But Brussels now wants to encourage Turkey to keep the refugees inside its territory, after hundreds of thousands of migrants crossed into the EU in 2015, creating tensions in EU societies.

The November deal also gave new momentum to Turkey’s years-long push to become a member of the EU, which had long been held by disputes over Cyprus and human rights.

Mogherini, along with Enlargement Commissioner Johannes Hahn and Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid Christos Stylianides, are later due to hold talks with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

EU officials have expressed disappointment the November deal has not led to a noticeable reduction in the numbers of migrants crossing the Aegean Sea from Turkey, with boats still arriving on the Greek islands daily, despite the winter weather.

An Opportunity for India to show case Capacity, Capability and Intent of a Strong Vibrant emerging Maritime Nation in the 21st Century

By Commdore RS Vasan IN (Retd)*

The IFR 2016 will indeed be a grand spectacle as more than one hundred ships from the navies of over fifty countries will participate in this exercise that is carried out every five years. The event which in the initial years was mostly limited to the participation of ships from the Indian Navy, Indian Coast Guard and the merchant navy transformed in to an international event with a major maritime event conducted in 2001 under the initiative of then Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Susheel Kumar. The marching of the naval officers and sailors from ships around the world along the marine drive in Mumbai and the presence of many ships from around the world signaled a new era in maritime diplomacy. The intentions of a maritime India to occupy center stage in both regional and global missions by using the Indian Navy as an instrument of national policy were explicit.

As the participants of the IFR then witnessed scores of indigenous ships of the Indian Navy, it was evident that the Indian Navy was in the process of transforming from a buyer’s navy to a builders navy. The process was a prerequisite to assuming greater regional leadership role and responsibilities. This did not escape the attention of the participant nations and motivated them to engage with India at many levels. It is not to be forgotten that this initiative was taken under the leadership of Admiral Susheel Kumar who succeeded Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat. Admiral Bhagwat was relieved of his duties as CNS on 30 December 1998 by the NDA Government under certain debatable circumstances. The Navy’s morale which was dented had to be built up brick by brick and the IFR of 2001 from that point of view provided a launching pad for the navy which was fast becoming a Blue water Navy. The theme ‘Bridges of Friendship’ was very well received and created an environment that facilitated the process of integration of a regional navy in to a global matrix.

While both the Indian Navy and the Indian Coast Guard have conducted the Fleet Reviews on the east coast (The very first Indian Coast Guard Fleet Review by the Raksha Mantri was conducted off the east coast when the author was the Regional Commander of the Indian Coast Guard, Region East); this is the first time that an international fleet review of this scale is being conducted in the Bay of Bengal. By design this also complements the look East policy of the Government of India. It also adds value to other maritime initiatives such as the biannual Milan (which is established as an initiative for meeting of the naval minds in Port Blair), the Indian Ocean Symposium (IONS) which is now a well-established forum amongs Navies of not just the Indian Ocean but also the rest of the world.

By all expectations, China will be a first time participant in the Indian Fleet Review. From the point of view of PLA-Navy; it signals its intention to be a part of the global initiatives in the Indian Ocean in any form. The anti-piracy patrols by PLA-N units which are still underway off the coast of Somalia since 2008 provided ample opportunity to the Chinese Navy to assert its intention to be part of the international mechanisms to combat piracy.

Both Indian Navy and Chinese Navy worked shoulder to shoulder in warding off this threat though India was concerned about the presence of another extra regional player in its traditional back yard. The visit of the Chinese submarines both conventional and nuclear last year again caused ripples in Delhi. There are no doubts that India and China will jostle for power and influence in the Indian Ocean Region. While India does have geography on its side, the surplus funds that can be channeled for initiatives such as the Maritime Silk Road and the One Belt One Road will change the strategic Maritimescape of Indian Ocean Region. The IFR also comes at a time when there are great initiatives being taken by China in Asia, Africa and Europe in terms of connectivity. The fact that it plans to build a naval base in Djibouti and has huge investments in the maritime sector in Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, Pakistan are of concern to India which appears to have conceded strategic space to China in its areas of influence.

The presence of INS Vikramaditya and nuclear submarines of Indian Navy would send a message to the observers about the might of the Indian Navy that can be brought to bear as and when required in areas of interest. The P8i surveillance aircraft that would fly past will also generate interest in the capability of this newly acquired platform that will be able to locate and track submarines and other surface assets of extra regional powers in the Indian Ocean. The visiting navies of the world who would have done their homework would have noticed that the Indian Navy is now net centric warfare capable as a result of plenty of indigenous efforts.

Coming back to the IFR 2016, the tradition as for as the Royal Navy is concerned itself is more than seven decades old. The Indian Navy has inherited many of the traditions and practices from the Royal Indian Navy and has added its own local flavor. The President of India by virtue of being the Supreme Commander of the Armed forces has been reviewing the fleet invariably before he or she demits office during the tenure of five years as the President. It is a mega event by any standards and even the state Government has committed more than 83 crores in beautifying the city of Vizag which houses the Eastern Naval Command and important maintenance facilities of the Navy. It is also the base for the nuclear submarines of the Indian Navy including strategic assets.

All the arrangements have been reviewed at the level of the Raksha Mantri and the Navy and Nation are geared up for this event in the first week of February that will showcase the prowess of the Indian Navy. A successful conclusion of the IFR will reinforce the position of Indian Navy as a professional arm that can be used as a powerful instrument of national policy both in war and peace.

The action of the Indian Navy particularly after the spectacular missile attacks on ships and oil tank farms Karachi in 1971 and the role of the only Asian carrier Vikrant at that time in enforcing a blockade off then East Pakistan indicated how it is important to possess and use a strong navy for furthering national objectives. The fact that the Indian Navy was not used at all during the war in 1965 therefore comes as a surprise. The role of Indian Navy during the Tsunami of 2004, evacuation of Indian Nationals from war torn areas, providing of relief and succor to the flood and cyclone affected victims on many occasions and similar acts have brought to fore the strength of the Indian Navy that has proved its mettle.

The Mumbai terror attack in November 2008 changed the way maritime threats were perceived and brought about a paradigm shift in the maritime security architecture (MSA). The Indian Navy was placed at the apex of the MSA and made responsible for both coastal and oceanic security. Without going in to the details, suffice to say that the entire gamut of maritime threats and response mechanisms have undergone a sea change.

It is not out of place to recollect that it was the Indian Navy that first brought out a National Maritime Doctrine in 2004 revised it in 2007, 2009 and has now updated the document last year. Even in terms of indigenization, the Indian Navy is way ahead of its sister services having embarked on indigenization in the late 60s. The first indigenous frigate Nilgiri and the follow ons have provided the nation with options for ship building in both PSUs and private yards. The fact that Indian Navy was able to even design a carrier and is building it in the Cochin Shipyard Limited is a tribute to the leadership, the naval designers and in-house capability to produce war ships of different size. The design of stealth ships such as the Shivalik and the large destroyers such as the INS Kochi, construction of Corvettes, and the completion of the Naval off Shore Vessels are praiseworthy. The most notable feature of the Indian Navys’s indigenization process is in terms of the addition of INS Arihant which provides that strategic deterrence capability that eluded India for many decades. The construction of improved versions of Arihant and also the Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC) are logical conclusion to the aspirations of a blue water navy that has both regional and global roles. However, the dwindling strength of conventional submarines has been a source of great concern to the planners in Delhi. There are some recent efforts to ensure that this serious deficiency is overcome both by accelerating the Scorpene production and also embarking on the indigenous production of project 75A submarines for which more than 60,000 crores has been earmarked.

The shape and size of the Indian Navy is a formidable one as India moves in to the next century. With geography and a growing economy on its side, Indian Navy will continue to complement the ambitions of a maritime India. A powerful Navy will promote maritime safety and security in the Indian Ocean. As a guarantor of net security provider at sea, safeguarding the global commons, maritime interests and the Sea Lines of Communications which are the life lines and arteries of global trade and commerce will be a top priority for the Indian Navy.

India is conscious of the fact that there are rich dividends in forging strategic alliance with other likeminded nations on a case to case basis while retaining its strategic autonomy. The tri-lateral treaty with Sri Lanka and Maldives, Exercise Malabar or other such exercises are all measures to ensure that the maritime domain remains manageable and Indian Navy is in a position to control the happenings in areas of interest. The maritime engagement with Mauritius, Seychelles, Mombasa, Oman and other maritime nations are all significant in ensuring that there is seamless integration of maritime domain and all the maritime nations in the region are under one umbrella to work in unison to serve the interests of the century of the seas. The IFR will be a keenly watched event around the world and the navies who are part of this Indian initiative will carry back cherished memories from this mega event. From the point of Indian Navy it will again provide an opportunity to take the initiative from “Building Bridges of Friendship” in 2001 to an architecture that is “United through Oceans” in 2016 and beyond.

*Director C3S and Head Strategy and Security Studies CAS

Saudi Arabia’s latest moves that precipitated the recent escalation in Sunni-Shiite sectarian tension in the Middle East are indicative of its sense of vulnerability about its mounting challenges as Iran normalises relations with the international community.

By Saleena Saleem*

Saudi Arabia’s execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, a Saudi Shiite cleric has predictably sparked off a quick series of events that resulted in the kingdom severing its diplomatic and commercial ties with Iran. This openly hostile political stand-off between Saudi Arabia and Iran is, in a way, a culmination of decades of tacit rivalry for regional influence and dominance since Iran’s 1979 revolution.

Saudi Arabia has enough reasons to not escalate Sunni-Shiite tensions. Its long-standing ally, the United States, is focused on neutralising the ISIS threat by pushing for regional consensus on Syria. The Saudis’ latest moves complicate US efforts and risk its displeasure. Not only does Saudi Arabia face security issues from violent extremism, ISIS’ Caliphate project with its alternate form of Islamic government threatens the legitimacy of Saudi rule.

Saudi Arabia’s Challenges

Iran too has reason to minimise sectarian tension; the focus is on normalising relations with the international community and positioning itself as a reliable partner for regional stability. Iran also has upcoming domestic elections in February. With international criticism levelled at Saudi Arabia now, its moves may appear as a miscalculation, especially in light of Iran’s comparatively muted response that has been viewed as “responsible” in certain Western quarters. However, the heightened Sunni-Shia tension is likely an intended outcome of the Saudis’ deliberate strategy aimed at containing Iran’s growing influence.

Saudi Arabia faces several challenges in the economic, social and political spheres, which may impact its regional influence. The power vacuum created by the US withdrawal from Iraq, the Sunni-Shiite civil war in Iraq, and the bloody fall-outs from the Arab uprisings in Syria, Libya and Yemen have deepened the Saudi-Iran struggle for regional hegemony. Financing proxy wars have been costly for both countries with the steep decline in the oil prices amid a global economic slowdown – oil production accounts for 80% of Saudi’s GDP compared to Iran at 23% – but it has impacted Saudi far more than Iran because Saudi spends more on arms acquisitions, domestic energy subsidies (13% of its GDP), aid to allies like Egypt and Pakistan, and funding of Muslim communities abroad.

The International Monetary Fund predicts that Riyadh will exhaust its foreign exchange reserves by 2020, unless spending is drastically reduced, or oil prices increase. In lieu of the latter happening, Saudi Arabia has already shelved domestic infrastructure projects and announced plans to cut domestic subsidies, implement taxes and privatise certain sectors. Much has been said about Riyadh’s yet unaccomplished short-term strategy of maintaining high oil production as an effort to drive shale oil competitors from the market. However, in light of what we know now, the simplest motivation – to get needed money into the coffers now – is also plausible.

Riyadh’s Youth-driven Pressure for Change

The second Saudi challenge is youth-driven societal change pressures. The majority of its population are young (70% are below 30 years) and dependent on state employment (two-thirds work in the public sector). Over the past decade, Saudi Arabia has funded students for overseas tertiary education, many of whom graduate and return with Western degrees. The Internet penetration rate in Saudi Arabia is now over 65%, and social media usage has substantially increased. These developments, coupled with the Arab Spring’s underlying message of reform, have contributed to a push back against certain traditional Saudi norms; there is more internal debate than before.

The Saudi government has managed to check this youth-driven pressure for change with a mixture of harsh penalties (for example, arresting bloggers) and increasing religious appeal to the still largely conservative Saudi society. However, the government may face difficulties in managing the youthful populace, should its proposed subsidy cuts, new taxes and privatisation drive lead to increased competition for jobs and cost of living, with a consequent reduction in the quality of life young Saudis are accustomed to. The House of Saud’s survival is contingent on retaining the support of this large segment of its populace.

In the political sphere, Riyadh has to contend with the potential that the US could now view Iran as a more beneficial ally. The US is already engaging with Iran in implicit ways: collaboration with Shia groups against ISIS; and supporting Iran’s participation in the peace talks on Syria. Additionally, the lifting of sanctions on Iran with the nuclear deal implementation, the unfreezing of overseas assets, and normalization of trade allows Iran to benefit at a time when Saudi Arabia is struggling economically.

Saudi Emphasis on Sunni Identity

Saudi Arabia has always viewed Shia Iran’s ability to sway Arabs as a risk because Sunni-Shia religious differences are not inherently confrontational. Even recently, the Arab street took immense pride in Iranian-backed Shia Hezbollah’s survival against Israel’s military might during the 2006 Lebanon war, in contrast to Gulf leaders who were critical of Hezbollah. The ideological risk has been successfully managed by the House of Saud’s association with the Wahhabi religious establishment, which is critical of Shia practices. Domestically, Wahhabi ulama (religious scholars) reign over the socio-religious sphere, which explains the Saudi public’s support for al-Nimr’s execution.

With its latest moves that heighten the Sunni-Shia divide, Saudi is rallying for political support by emphasising a common Sunni identity. The quick show of solidarity by Sunni-led regional countries, even by non-Arab Turkey, suggests that Saudi Arabia’s framing of the threat posed by Iran’s growing influence has traction. Can the Saudis achieve the same with the broader Sunni Muslim world? At the political level, there is hesitance, even from allies like Pakistan and Malaysia.

However, political hesitance may not be representative of the grassroots’ mood. Majority of the non-Arab Muslims are Sunni, and the Saudi King is widely acknowledged as the Protector of the Two Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina. Should Saudi-Iran tensions exacerbate, can Saudi Arabia also count on its non-Arab Sunni supporters, banking on decades of soft power influence via its Wahhabi-funded educational and religious institutes around the Muslim world? An independent Malaysian pollster recently noted that 30-40% of Muslim survey respondents in Malaysia, and who are far removed from the upheavals in the Middle East, expressed support for fighting against Shias.

Seen in this light, Saudi Arabia’s heightening of a common Sunni identity today is an implicit signal to the West that it cannot afford to ignore Saudi Arabia in any re-configuring of power in the Middle East.

*Saleena Saleem is an Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Europol launched Monday the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) at the informal meeting of the justice and home affairs ministers in Amsterdam. The ECTC will address issues like foreign fighters and share information regarding terrorist financing, online propaganda and arms trafficking.

Europe is facing its most serious terrorist threat in 10 years, which combined with the growing number of foreign fighters, this is a new challenge for EU member states.

“The ECTC will enhance operational coordination and information-sharing between law enforcement agencies,” said the Dutch Minister of Security and Justice, Ard van der Steur, at the start of the meeting. “This is necessary to fight organised crime, terrorist networks and foreign fighters.”

How ECTC is organized

The ECTC, which is part of the Europol organization, will be led by the Spaniard Manuel Navarrete Paniagua. He currently has a staff of 39, plus five seconded experts. They will work with other operational centers within Europol.

Europol plays a central role in the European response to terrorist threats. For example, after the Paris attacks Europol assigned up to 60 officers to support the French and Belgian investigations in Taskforce Fraternité, which resulted in over 1,600 leads regarding suspect financial transactions.

Financial investigations are an effective instrument in tackling organized crime and terrorism and one of the priorities of the Netherlands’ EU Presidency.

By P. R. Kumaraswamy*

One week is too long a time in the Middle East and it is difficult, even dangerous, to be an optimist. The choice, therefore, is between the uncertain status quo and an unpredictable nightmare. With that as caveat, one can visualize five short-to-medium term challenges.

1. Even after five years, it is too early to write off the Arab Spring and the Arab yearning for change has not run its course. While lacking an overarching roadmap, individual Arab countries will have to evolve a model that reflects and suits their social and demographic specificity. No country can influence or determine the appropriate model for another.
2. The declining American influence in the region will continue with no other country or group of countries being in a position to provide an alternate leadership. Some external powers will try to carve out spheres of influence without dominating the entire region.
3. Religious extremism and sectarian tensions are here to stay and political violence would continue to undermine the stability, territorial integrity and in some cases even viability of the state.
4. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is important but an immediate resolution is unlikely because both sides lack wisdom, foresight and political will. Moreover, it is not the core problem facing the region, and Arab and non-Arab countries have far more serious problems to worry about than the statelessness of the Palestinians.
5. Oil prices will continue to be low and this will affect both big and smaller energy players. The entry of post-sanctions Iran will exert further pressure on prices. The low oil price will also affect the search for non-hydrocarbon energy alternatives.

Areas of Cooperation for India

It is too early for India to get involved in any regional security arrangement as it would have to answer two basic questions; security for whom? And against whom? Most regimes feel threatened internally and any involvement would entail India taking sides between rival factions.

In the broader sense, ISIS, religious extremism and indoctrination, terror financing and cyber security would be the prime areas of cooperation. In recent years, Israel dominated India’s security cooperation. Now, fighting ISIS entails enhanced cooperation with countries like Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Religious extremism poses an existential threat to these countries and cooperating with them makes good common sense for India.

Expatriates and energy components are the strengths of India’s engagement with the Persian Gulf Region. But they are also its weaknesses and prevent India from fully exploiting its potential. Trade figures are misleading and economic engagement is largely confined to energy imports. During 2014-15, for example, energy made up more than 40 per cent of India’s total trade with the Persian Gulf region. Indeed, oil imports make up over 90 per cent of India’s imports from Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. In the case of Yemen it is close to 99 per cent. Likewise, India is more than the maids, drivers, shopkeepers and assistants that an ordinary Arab encounters on a daily basis.

While non-official collaborations are important, to be meaningful and effective India’s engagement with the region will have to be primarily political. There are no alternatives to G2G engagements, especially in the Middle East where leaders continue to play a dominant role.

Fortunately, India now has an External Affair Minister for whom foreign policy is her only priority. Contrary to initial media speculations, she has been handling the portfolio fairly well. Since June 2014, she has travelled to 31 countries, including Bahrain, UAE, Oman, Egypt, Palestine and Israel.

India’s Engagement Strategy

Narendra Modi does not want to be a one-term prime minister. His domestic as well as foreign policy agenda is economy. Therefore, the size of the economy or population is less important for him than the size of that country’s commitment to India. The UAE is a case in point. Modi would therefore prioritize countries of the region depending upon their contribution to India’s economic growth and development.

When it comes to the Middle East and its problems, India is a disinterested power and not an indifferent one. At the same time, despite temptations, suggestions and friendly invitations, India would desist from any intervention, involvement or even mediation in any of the conflicts and tensions in the region. Over the years, its political engagement with the Middle East has been limited and it would have to reverse this trend and increase high-level contacts, exchanges and interactions. It will have to diversify its engagement and add economic content.

India will have to recognize the security dilemmas of its interlocutors. For example, Saudi Arabia is an economic power but in military terms its security concerns and fears are not different from those of small states. This is reflected in its approach towards a number of regional developments. Thus, even when disagreeing with its depiction of Iran and its ambitions in the region, India will have to recognize Saudi concerns vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic.

If India is serious about cooperation, then it should use the terminology commonly used by the countries of the region, namely, Middle East and not the Indo-centric term, West Asia.

Is India a model?

Despite the temptations, India should avoid projecting itself as a model for the turbulent Middle East. Democracy and plurality presuppose an innate willingness to not impose one’s views and values upon others. Just as one is willing to learn from the experiences and wisdom of other individuals and nations, one should also leave it to others to learn and unlearn from the Indian experience.

These views were presented during a panel discussion at the IDSA’s Second West Asia Conference titled Ideology, Politics and New Security Challenges in West Asia, held on 19-20 January 2016.

*Professor P. R. Kumaraswamy teaches contemporary Middle East at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/cooperation-with-the-middle-east_prkumaraswamy_210116

Lundin Petroleum said Monday that its wholly owned subsidiary Lundin Malaysia has completed the Bambazon exploration well in Block SB307/SB308, offshore East Malaysia.

The Bambazon well encountered approximately 15 metres of net logged reservoir pay with oil shows over three main reservoir intervals and the well has been plugged and abandoned and will be expensed in the first quarter of 2016, the company said.

According to Lundin, Bambazon was drilled with the West Prospero jack-up rig to a total depth of approximately 1,380 metres.

Lundin Malaysia holds 85 percent working interest in SB 307/308. Partners are PETRONAS Carigali Sdn Bhd with a 15 percent working interest. Lundin Malaysia operates six blocks in Malaysia, namely PM307, PM319, PM308A, PM328, SB303 and SB307/308.

The terrorist attacks in Paris and Jakarta and the recent arrest of ISIS-leaning Bangladeshi nationals in Singapore clearly highlights the enduring pervasiveness of the ISIS ideological threat. Reclaiming Islamic intellectual traditions will be critical to deal with the threat.

By Mohamed Bin Ali*

Increasingly, ISIS terror attacks are commanding the centre stage of global politics and international relations. This concept of terror in the name of Islam has overwhelmed the perceptions of Islam in many ways.

A root cause of Islamist terrorism is the current intellectual crisis in the Muslim world. Returning to the Islamic intellectual traditions will be critical to counter ISIS narratives and extremist ideas in general.

Islamic Intellectual Traditions

Islamic intellectual tradition is fundamentally based on what the religion enjoins as true knowledge. The pursuit of knowledge is a central message of Islam. This body of knowledge is not static but Muslims are guided to distinguish between false and true knowledge. In Islam, knowledge consists of three pillars: the divine verses (Quran), authentic Hadith (Prophetic Traditions) and prescriptions rightly deduced from the two. Other than these, all else is superfluous. Hence, Muslims are encouraged to study the basics of their religion (Quran and Hadith) first, as these will then serve as the guiding light for all forms of other derived knowledge.

Another significant feature of the Islamic intellectual traditions is their holistic nature: the pursuit of knowledge must go hand-in-hand with the development of one’s character. A student who seeks knowledge but neglects the development of his or her moral values and normative behaviour (summed up as adab and akhlaq) risks deviating from the path of religion, using the religious knowledge for less noble worldly gain.

This holistic pursuit of knowledge was the standard practice for the early Muslims. A classic example is the group of Muslims who dedicated themselves to the study, preservation and application of the teachings of Prophet Muhammad (Ahl-Hadith). Considering themselves guardians of the authentic preservation of the Prophet’s traditions for many generations of Muslims to come, they understood the importance of cultivating an unadulterated and accurate mode of perception and understanding.

Fallacies of ISIS Ideology

ISIS ideology is defined as a religious doctrine which advocates literalistic interpretations of the sacred texts of Islam and the Shariah laws. The followers of ISIS approached the need to “purge” the religion of non-Islamic influences by advocating a return to the way of life of the Prophet and the early Muslims. Islamic law and Islamic state become the prerequisites to realise their ambitions. This earned them the label Islamic fundamentalists, in parallel with the same meaning of the term with reference to Christianity.

Yet, ironically, though ISIS claim to reject “anything Western”, their thought processes and methodologies betray a pervasive influence of Western thought and its leading concepts and ideology. For instance, by suggesting force, that is “seizure of power” to achieve their goals of an Islamic society, ISIS are employing an ideology that is closer to fascism than to Islam.

In their fervour to return to a ‘pure’ interpretation of the religion, ISIS profess a strict adherence to the Quran and Hadith while strongly rejecting any kind of rationalist orientation present in a wide variety of Islamic intellectual teachings. By closing the avenues for analysis, deliberation and debate, they cut themselves off from the rich tradition of past Muslim scholars.

Distortion of Jihad

ISIS followers do not adhere to the classical prescriptions for addressing jihad and war. Their ideology largely rests upon the centrality of armed jihad to achieve their aims. Hence, armed jihad becomes the means to expand the territories of Islam and Muslim control to realise Islamic ideals. To justify their resort to violence, they define jihad as fighting alone.

ISIS ideology is at odds with nearly all Islamic religious thought. Firstly, ISIS ideologues are often non-religious authorities, thus they exhibit very limited religious knowledge compared to the Muslim scholars of the past: their writings are deprived of the legalistic arguments of scholars of the past, they fail to differentiate between schools of Islamic law or propose solutions for all potential situations.

This was the case with the so-called father of jihadism, Sayid Qutb, who pursued a secular education, rather than any form of religious training. The same can be said of Osama bin Laden, who did not receive any formal training as a religious scholar and Ayman al-Zawahiri who was a medical doctor by training.

Secondly, their arguments are couched in dramatic language targeted at provoking emotions and demanding actions by emphasising the moral justifications and the underlying ethical values of the rules, rather the detailed elaboration of those rules. They also have the tendency to quote selective portions of the Quranic verses to justify their arguments. For example, ISIS legitimises the killing civilians as acts of self-defence and rightful revenge for the killing of innocents in Palestine, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere.

This was because though there are authentic prophetic Hadith forbidding the killing of children and women, ISIS claim that there were other writings which allowed it, while selectively quoting the Quran for justification. Take this verse for example: “And if you punish (your enemy, O You believers in the Oneness of God), then punish them with the like of that with which you were afflicted”. What ISIS failed to add was the verse which ended with, “but if you endure patiently, verily, it is better for As-Sabirin (the Patient Ones).”)

Return to Islamic Intellectual Traditions

In attempting to prescribe solutions to the problem of ISIS ideology and extremism in Islam, some suggest that the only way for Muslims to counter extremism is by rejecting religiosity and embracing secular, liberal values. Yet, given that the problem is not Islam per se but an aberration to the faith, the most logical path for Muslims to take is to return to the true Islamic teachings and tradition, which effectively means understanding and becoming better practising Muslims.

The drive to prevail over ISIS’ ideological threat must begin with an accurate understanding of the threat. The religion of Islam is undergoing a significant revolution due to the pervasive ideological pressures. The extremists consist of people who draw upon a long tradition of extreme intolerance that does not distinguish politics from religion and distorts both. Extremists believe that their immoral acts of violence are moral and that they are on the right path to God. An enhanced understanding through increased debates and open dialogue about the nature of religious extremists will better assist policy makers to deal with those issues.

Muslims urgently need to reclaim their intellectual traditions so that they can make Islam relevant in today’s world. In this respect, creating institutions of authority and credible Muslim scholars for guidance and enlightenment is paramount. Muslim leaders should also continue to upgrade their knowledge and be equally versatile in both religious and contemporary issues in the rapidly changing world. This is especially critical as Muslims become better-educated, more widely traveled and more exposed to the divergent views on many issues pertaining to Islam and its practical application in everyday life.

*Mohamed Bin Ali is Assistant Professor with the Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is also a counsellor with the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG).

A proposed emergency measure to import 70,000 tonnes of olive oil from Tunisia duty free, to help boost the struggling Tunisian economy, hit not least by terrorist attacks of 2015, was backed by the EP Trade Committee on Monday. To meet the concerns of the EU olive oil producers, they nonetheless inserted an amendment that allows the measure to be reviewed and corrected mid-way, should it harm the EU economy.

MEPs backed the European Commission’s proposed exceptional measure by 31 votes to 7, with 1 abstention.

The terrorist attacks of March 18, 2015 in Tunis and June 26, 2015 in Sousse hit the Tunisian economy very hard at a time when it was already facing serious difficulties.

The olive oil sector indirectly employs more than a million people, accounting for one-fifth of jobs in the country’s agricultural industry. Olive oil is Tunisia’s main agricultural export

“At a time when Tunisia is facing very serious problems, our vote gives the right signal: that the EU stands alongside Tunisians and that we intend to exercise solidarity in a tangible way,” said rapporteur Marielle de Sarnez (ALDE, FR) after the vote.

“I know that for colleagues from some countries, the question of olive oil is a sensitive one. I want to reassure them that the amendment we adopted provides that, if after a year we realize that there is indeed a problem, the Commission may then take steps to rectify the imbalance,” she added.

If the full Parliament follows the trade MEPs’ recommendation, a two-year temporary zero-duty tariff quota of 35,000 tonnes per year (70,000 tonnes in total) for EU olive oil imports from Tunisia will be available from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2017. It will however apply without increasing the overall volume of imports from Tunisia (the EU will discount duties from the olive oil Tunisia is already exporting to the EU).

Trade MEPs added an additional provision on mid-term assessment, asking the Commission to assess the impact on the EU olive oil market at mid-term after the measure’s entry into force, and take corrective measures, should the balance of the EU market be disturbed.

The search for potential solutions to the migrant crisis remains one of the main objectives of the European Union which continues to welcome a huge number of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa.

The discussion about the EU’s ability to cope with so many newcomers broke out again after the New Year’s Eve attacks in Cologne and other European cities, where women were assaulted by foreigners on the night of 1 January 2016.

The party of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who for months has defended her open doors policy and humanism principles, has already lost about 40% of the electorate who voted for it in 2013 according to a poll published by the Forsa research institute.

Meanwhile, Germany’s President Joachim Gauck called the migrant crisis the major challenge in the history of the European Union.

“Not all migrants have taken on board all European fundamental convictions. This is true in particular of some people who come from or whose families come from Muslim-majority countries, in relations to their views on, for example, the role of women, tolerance, the role of religion or our judicial system,” he said in his speech at the economic forum in Davos, Switzerland.

Anxiety provoked by the Cologne attacks has spread to the whole territory of the European Union as similar offenses on New Year’s Eve also occurred in Sweden, Finland, Austria, Switzerland and other countries.

In this regard, the Austrian authorities have decided to temporarily suspend the Schengen agreement and intensify the inspection of all persons entering the country. Previously, border controls were reintroduced in Norway, Sweden and Denmark.

Commenting on the complicated situation around series of migrant sex attacks, Paula Bieler, member of Swedish Parliament and spokesperson for the Sweden Democrats on gender equality and integration policies, called the assaults devastating for the society.

“Sexual assaults, harassment and rape have unfortunately always existed and are probably impossible to completely eradicate, but in Sweden we have very strong, fundamental values that state every woman’s right to her own body and sexuality. Sex crimes are loathed, sex criminals are looked at with disgust – even amongst other criminals. […]Whereas we now have groups of young men apparently thinking this is a perfectly normal way to treat young women in public. It’s devastating,” she said in an interview with “PenzaNews” agency.

According to the politician, the events will, of course, once again rise the debate about whereas cultural differences matter or not.

“For me it is unacceptable to say that it is a problem related to all men rather than some men, after all most men I’ve met would react against this behavior, never participate in it. Hopefully we who stand up for our values, including gender equality, will gain support as the importance of these questions becomes painfully visible,” Paula Bieler said.

In her opinion, the authorities have taken few real measures to prevent this kind of crime so far.

“Some have discussed more education about women’s rights, some have more specifically pointed out the need to educate immigrants and some have spoken about zero tolerance and deportations of sex criminals. We have spoken about all these things, as well as more resources to the police, security cameras at places where it is deemed extra needed and so forth,” the spokesperson noted stressing that there is still much to be done.

However, Europe has a long way to go to get rid of these problems, she said.

“Hopefully it won’t be too long before real, strong actions will be taken. Most probably, however, it will take time. Sweden is a country of very strong bureaucracy, long investigations and timely discussions before big changes are made,” she added.

At the same time Irmgard Kopetzky from Cologne rape crisis center does not agree with media reports about the growth of crimes against sexual integrity.

“In our rape crisis center we do not really observe a rising number of sex attacks by migrants – in fact, nothing has changed very much since I started doing rape crisis work 20 years ago. Women all over the world have always been harassed and assaulted by men in many different ways and no one really cared. They usually have no one who takes their feelings serious, they do not report it to the police and they often are blamed for having done something to provoke the assault – i.e. be in the wrong place, wear the wrong clothes, do something wrong, don’t do anything to stop it in time,” she said.

According to her, the only “new” thing about New Year’s Eve is that there were so many assaults in one place by so many perpetrators and that most of the women went to report it to the police which, in her opinion, is great, because it makes this kind of violence visible.

In turn, Ulla Jelpke, member of German Parliament and domestic affairs spokesperson for the Die Linke party, also noted that there is no reliable figure that clearly proves whether there is an increasing number of sexual assaults by migrants in Germany.

“Sexual violence against women is, unfortunately, not a new phenomenon, especially at major events. In other major events such as the Munich Oktoberfest, it comes every year to a variety of sexual assaults, including rape. The perpetrators are here both German as well as foreigners. Luckily, the gruesome incidents in the New Year’s Eve in Cologne are not the norm. Rather, criminal gangs here seem to have used sexual assault as a means to deliberately deprive women. To this extent this has not occurred in others places of Germany. Therefore I warn against hasty conclusions and generalizations. Because it is a fact that among migrants there are not more criminal than among Germans,” she said stressing that sexual violence against women must be banned and punished no matter what nationality the perpetrators are.

At the same time, according to the politician, right and extreme right-wing parties and groups engage the Cologne incidents now to stir up public opinion against refugees and migrants.

“Also many people who have so far supported the admission of refugees and have maintained a corresponding welcoming culture, now come into doubt. And left, green and social democratic politicians are under pressure in the refugee issue by the public mood,” she added.

Ulla Jelpke also expressed dissatisfaction with the German police respond in accordance with the attacks.

“There is no proper explanation yet why the police did not adequately respond to the massive sexual assaults in New Year’s Eve in Cologne and why not enough officers were deployed at the main station,” she noted.

According to her, the federal government is now planning further restrictions on the right to asylum and tougher laws to deport migrants.

“However, the right of asylum is a fundamental right in the constitution and not just a right of hospitality. A person who is delinquent in Germany, should also be brought to account for his crime here in this county,” the deputy stressed.

Moreover, she expressed fears about massive propaganda against refugees and immigrants and an increase in right-wing extremist attacks.

“The Federal Government supports such a xenophobic climate, when it uses now the Cologne events to call for tougher laws and other restrictions on the right to asylum, rather than implement the existing laws consistently. The existing laws are perfectly adequate,” Ulla Jelpke said.

Meanwhile, Susi Dennison, co-director of European Power program at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), noted that the New Year’s Eve criminal attacks in Cologne and other cities brought additional challenges to the political complexity of handling the refuge crisis in Europe.

In her opinion, the news that those arrested are refugees of North African origin, strengthened doubts of governments across the EU which were already skeptical about Europe’s capacity to absorb and integrate the numbers of refugee arrivals.

“In response Angela Merkel and senior members of her government have made clear that criminal acts will meet with zero tolerance whoever they are committed by: whether by refugees, migrants or anyone else,” the expert added.

In turn, John Laughland, director of studies at the Institute of Democracy and Cooperation in France, said that the attacks became the logical consequence of the open doors policy.

“It’s the inevitable result of a lot of young men in large groups who’ve arrived in Europe and who regard European women as available because they are not veiled. The problem is extremely serious. It confirms what many people have feared about and it shocked people very deeply. Moreover, the scandal is continuing – there are new revelations all the time. So it has a negative effect on the political climate in the EU,” the analyst noted.

Commenting on the police attempts to hide the facts of sexual harassment by migrants, he did not rule out that they feared accusations of racism or fascism.

“In the past the police has probably found such information to be very sensitive,” he said stressing, however, that such kind of tolerance cannot be put on the first place in the current situation.

According to him, many European countries face the problem that the police is covering up information.

“It is a very serious problem which is the result of many decades of political correctness. I’d say that backlash in public opinion will be very violent as a result,” the expert said.

In his opinion, it is difficult to predict further developments around this very negative situation.

“The most important and major measure would be to close the border to these various countries and to prevent the flow of refugees. Right now there are many thousands of refugees coming in every single day. European society cannot sustain such levels of immigration. The levels of immigration are already very high in Europe. And we have enough problems already – without new arrivals,” John Laughland concluded.

By J Nastranis

The Central Asian Republic of Kazakhstan is widely acknowledged as an unrelenting champion of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The country’s latest accomplishment is the resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly along with the Universal Declaration on the Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World.

President Nursultan Nazarbayev proposed such a Declaration at the first Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April 2010. The Declaration adopted on December 7, 2015 is based on the draft submitted by Kazakhstan in October 2015. It was co-sponsored by 35 countries, and received support from 133 countries.

However, considering that 23 countries voted against it and 28 abstained, underlines, as Foreign Minister Erlan Idrissov wrote in a recent article, “the campaign must continue”.

The General Assembly Resolution “invites States, agencies and organizations of the United Nations system and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to disseminate the Declaration and to promote its implementation”.

The Resolution requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its seventy-third session in 2018 a report on the implementation of the Declaration, and include it in the provisional agenda under the item “General and complete disarmament”, a sub-item entitled “Universal Declaration on the Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World”.

According to observers, the Resolution crowns Kazakhstan’s persistent efforts to usher in a nuclear weapons free world, which started with the historic closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in 1991.

As the then Ambassador-at-Large of the Kazakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs Barlybai Sadykov said in an interview with The Astana Times: “It was the first case of closing a nuclear test site in the history of the world at the will of the people. After the closing of the Semipalatinsk test site, other major test sites in Nevada, Novaya Zemlya, Lop Nor and Moruroa fell silent.”

By April 1995, the Central Asian country had transferred all of its Soviet-era nuclear weapons to the Russian Federation. Kazakhstan earlier had 1,410 Soviet strategic nuclear warheads placed on its territory and an undisclosed number of tactical nuclear weapons.

As part of its persistent efforts for a world free of nuclear weapons, Kazakhstan initiated a UN General Assembly resolution calling for an International Day Against Nuclear Tests, inaugurated in 2010, in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The CTBT is one of the key elements of international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

As co-chairs, Kazakh Foreign Minister Erlan Idrissov and his counterpart from Japan Fumio Kishida addressed the 9th Ministerial-level Conference on Facilitating the Entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on September 29, 2015 at the United Nations headquarters in New York.

The Conference, also known as the Article XIV Conference in accordance with the relevant Treaty article, adopted a Final Declaration, which affirms, “that a universal and effectively verifiable Treaty constitutes a fundamental instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation”.

The ATOM (Abolish Testing. Our Mission) Project is another significant initiative the Kazakhstan President launched with a view to continuing the policy commitment to achieve global nuclear disarmament. It embodies an international campaign designed to provide information about the threats and consequences of nuclear weapons testing.

The project aims to involve civil society, non-governmental and youth organizations in the struggle to end the testing of nuclear weapons, promotes the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and, finally, a world free of nuclear weapons.

In yet another substantial move at the initiative of President Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan has made a significant contribution to the establishment of a Central Asian zone free of nuclear weapons. Since the signing of the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (CANWFZ) in 2006 in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan has been making practical efforts for the institutionalization of the treaty.

As chair of the CANWFZ treaty for 2012-2014, Kazakhstan held meetings with the countries of the “nuclear five”, discussing the conditions of signing the protocol. On May 6, 2014 in New York, the P5 signed the protocol to the treaty on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in Central Asia.

Under the protocol, the nuclear-weapon states have provided “negative security assurances” and committed themselves not to use nuclear weapons against CANWFZ and threaten countries that are parties to the CANWFZ treaty. After the ratification of the protocol by the parliaments of the signatory countries, these commitments will be of a legal nature.

The CANWFZ is the latest nuclear weapons free zone treaty, joining the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Treaty of Rarotonga, South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, the Treaty of Bangkok, Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, and the Treaty of Pelindaba, African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty.

While the five nuclear weapon free zones are an important step towards nuclear disarmament they do not suffice. With this in view, the Universal Declaration on the Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World adopted in December 2015 stresses the need “for effective measures of nuclear disarmament”, which have the highest priority.

The Declaration calls upon “all nuclear-weapon-possessing States to eliminate all types of their nuclear weapons and in the meantime diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and avoid activities that hamper the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons”.

The Declaration reiterates that each article of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is binding on its States parties at all times and in all circumstances and call upon the nuclear-weapon States to implement their obligations under the Treaty and commitments made at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences.

The Declaration adds: “We reaffirm our determination to implement nuclear disarmament commitments and obligations and to advance additional measures to strengthen the rule of law in disarmament, including the negotiation and adoption of a global, non discriminatory, multilateral, legally binding instrument for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.”

This is particularly important because countries such as India have refused to sign the NPT stating that it is “discriminatory” because it the P5 have refused to take adequate steps toward nuclear disarmament as require by treaty.

The trust placed in Kazakhstan’s commitment to non-proliferation and a world free of nuclear weapons was confirmed in August 2015 when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) signed an agreement with the Central Asian country to set up the IAEA Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) Bank in Oskemen, Kazakhstan.

“The IAEA LEU Bank, operated by Kazakhstan, will be a physical reserve of LEU available for eligible IAEA Member States. It will host a reserve of LEU, the basic ingredient of nuclear fuel, and act as a supplier of last resort for Member States in case they cannot obtain LEU on the global commercial market or otherwise. It will not disrupt the commercial market,” according to the Vienna-based agency.

Israelis on Sunday harshly criticized the firing of local hero David Blatt as coach of the NBA’s Cleveland Cavaliers, calling him the victim of superstar LeBron James’s influence over the team.

One sports commentator even compared Israelis’ hate of James to their hate of Islamist movement Hamas, while insulting and racist comments written in Hebrew littered his Instagram account.

The 2014 hiring of Blatt, an Israeli citizen who led powerhouse Maccabi Tel Aviv to a European title, gave Israelis a jolt of pride. When the Cavaliers played in last year’s NBA finals, many stayed up late to watch the games.

But a rift between Blatt and James, the Cavaliers’ star player who many rank among the greatest ever, reportedly led to his downfall, with the team announcing Friday that they were firing him despite having one of the league’s best records.

“LeBron James is now the most hated person in Israel,” Sharon Davidovitch, a sports journalist for Israeli news site Ynet and Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper, told AFP.

He said the decision to move on from Blatt was correct since the players and coach apparently did not get along, but noted that Israeli fans were taking the decision hard.

“It’s a little bit joking and a little bit true: These days I can only compare the Israeli hate for LeBron James to the hate for Hamas,” he said, speaking of the Palestinian Islamist movement that runs the Gaza Strip.

Israeli newspapers gave the firing front-page treatment on Sunday.

One said “Goliath eliminates David,” referring to James and Blatt.

A cartoon on the back cover of Yedioth Ahronoth showed Blatt walking away from the locker room with a box of belongings as James uncorks champagne behind his back.

The news even drew reactions from US Ambassador to Israel Dan Shapiro and Israeli Culture and Sport Minister Miri Regev.

Shapiro wrote on his Facebook page that “I don’t really understand the Cavs’ decision to fire David Blatt after all his success. But I congratulate him, a wonderful man and a talented coach, on all his accomplishments, and wish him well in the future.”

Regev said “you should know that there’s a whole country here that’s behind you, that loves and supports you.”
Basketball is the second most-popular sport in Israel after football, but Israelis rarely have success in the NBA, the world’s biggest basketball league.

When the Cavaliers advanced to the NBA finals last season in Blatt’s first year as coach, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called to congratulate him. They eventually lost to the ascendant Golden State Warriors and their star Steph Curry.

Blatt was not always so lauded in Israel, where he was for a time seen by some as an outsider since he was born in the United States.

He relocated to the country more than three decades ago, volunteered on a kibbutz, performed his mandatory military service and married an Israeli woman. Sceptical Israelis embraced him as a coach after his success on the court.

Blatt also had success as a coach in Russia and was named Euroleague coach of the year.

But there were apparently troubles from the start in Cleveland, with US media reports saying James did not respect Blatt. LeBron prefers coaches and players who are managed by Klutch Sports, his own agency.

The rift appeared to play out in public at times, with James admitting to overriding his coach and calling his own plays.

Still, his firing came as a shock both in Israel and the US, as the Cavaliers led their Eastern Conference with a 30-11 record at the time.

Cavaliers general manager David Griffin said he was “measuring more than wins and losses.”

“I’m focusing on a bigger picture and I’m really trying to decide — are we working toward a championship, are we building a championship culture?” he said.

James denied any involvement and said he was “caught off guard” by the move, followed by “What, I play for the Cavs now?”

According to Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity, all bodies in a vacuum regardless of their properties are accelerated by the Earth’s gravity at the same rate. This principle of equivalence applies to stones, feathers and atoms alike. Under the conditions of microgravity very long and precise measurements can be carried out to determine whether different atoms of different mass actually “fall equally fast”.

To test this, precision measurements in space with cold atoms, potassium and rubidium are suitable candidates. In preparation for the measurements two experiments were conducted at the same time onboard a sounding rocket launched from Kiruna, Sweden, on January 23. Preliminary analysis of the data shows that the campaign was successful.

The Humboldt Universität zu Berlin (HU) and the Ferdinand-Braun-Institut, Leibniz-Institut fuer Hoechstfre-quenztechnik (FBH) tested modern laser technologies within the framework of the projects KALEXUS and FOKUS. The demanding technology demonstrators lay the foundations for the precision tests of the equivalence principle with so-called potassium and rubidium atom interferometers, as well as for further experiments aiming at tests of Einstein’s theory of relativity.

Researchers are hoping that eventually these experiments will provide the information needed to address one of the greatest challenges of modern physics: The unification of gravity with three other fundamental interactions into one comprehensive theory.

Laser experiments with potassium and rubidium atoms: KALEXUS and FOKUS

A stable laser system for the manipulation of potassium atoms was set up in the project KALEXUS under the guidance of the Optical Metrology group at HU. The centerpiece consists of two micro integrated semiconductor laser modules developed by FBH. In KALEXUS the wavelength of these laser modules is matched to an atomic transition of potassium.

During the six-minute period of microgravity the experiment automatically stabilizes the wave-length of both lasers.

In addition, the laser system can autonomously switch back and forth between the laser sources during flight. After all, such experiments are not easy to repeat, and scientists cannot take corrective action during the flight. Moreover, the measurements may not be compromised if one of the lasers should fail.

Another laser module designed by FBH and assembled by HU took part in the FOKUS campaign, which is managed by Menlo Systems. A laser was stabilized to an atomic transition of rubidium in order to demonstrate the technological maturity of corresponding technology for subsequent drop tests of atoms under microgravity conditions.

The laser system also allows for clock comparisons. Here, the frequency of an “optical oscillator”, the laser, is compared to the frequency of a quartz oscillator that “ticks” in the radio frequency range, like a modern wristwatch.

The general theory of relativity presumes that the “ticking” of all clocks is affected by gravity in the same way, regardless of how these clocks are implemented physically and technically. An initial test in April 2015 confirmed the suitability of such “atomic clocks” and of the laser systems required to test the general theory of relativity in space. The goal is now to confirm the initial results after some technical improvements have been applied to the system.

Two applications of technology in direct comparison

The two experiments use different types of lasers from the FBH. This allows a comparison of the different laser technologies for the application scenario. The centerpiece of the FOKUS module is a DFB (Distributed Feedback) laser, which emits light in a narrow frequency or wavelength range at 780 nm. This spectrally narrow bandwidth is one of the key requirements for the laser module, which is used for the spectroscopy of rubidium atoms and thus for precision measurements.

KALEXUS uses an ECDL concept (Extended Cavity Diode Laser), which thanks to an external grating, provides an even narrower linewidth. The laser is optimized for spectroscopic measurements with potassium atoms and emits at a wavelength of 767 nm. However, the external grating makes it potentially more prone to malfunction – as opposed to the monolithic structure of the FOKUS laser.

Ultimately, the palm-sized modules have to withstand the mechanical loads during rocket launch with accelerations of up to 15 times the acceleration of gravity and have to function trouble-free in space.

By Mark E. Vinson and John Caldwell*

During the summer of 2014, three overlapping crises involving violent nonstate actors (VNSAs) with missile technologies captured the world’s attention.1 First, for 50 days in July and August, Israel engaged in a major conflict with Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other VNSAs that fired more than 4,500 rockets and mortars from the Gaza Strip at Israel.2

The second crisis occurred on July 17, 2014, when Malaysian Airlines flight MH-17, a civilian airliner carrying 298 people, was shot down at cruising altitude by an advanced surface-to-air missile (SAM) while transiting territory controlled by Ukrainian separatist rebels.3 U.S. intelligence officials believe the airliner was shot down by pro-Russian rebels using an advanced Russian SA-11 missile system.4

The third crisis seemed to erupt in the spring and summer of 2014, when the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) seized territory and captured advanced weapons as it attacked across large stretches of Iraq and Syria. Among the weapons ISIL reportedly captured and used were shoulder-launched SAMs, also known as man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).5 ISIL claims to have used MANPADS to shoot down an Iraqi military helicopter.6 ISIL’s possession of MANPADS threatens low-flying coalition aircraft as well as aircraft at Baghdad International Airport.7

As indicated by these crises, the availability of advanced missile technologies—particularly precision-guided missiles—to VNSAs can be a game changer in their warfighting capabilities against nation-states if they use the weapons to offset their air superiority disadvantages with stand-off attack capabilities. This may be attributed in part to a general absence of enforceable control of the proliferation of missile technologies to nonstate actors. Counterproliferation is a term most commonly associated with the international conventions for the control of weapons of mass destruction, specifically nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. However, without the control of international laws or the legitimacy and accountability constraints of state governments, VNSAs have gained access to an array of missile technologies that grant state-like capabilities to threaten significant death and destruction.

Ominous View from Israel

Israel may be unique in terms of the magnitude of the rocket and missile threats from its VNSA adversaries, but these threats could be a leading indicator of emerging threats not only to the United States but to any nation-state. Despite substantial differences in their security requirements, the United States and Israel share many interests and military challenges. Both are threatened as a result of the proliferation of missile technologies to VNSAs, and both are in persistent conflicts with VNSAs. As such, the U.S. military should carefully consider Israel’s threats and responses to these threats for implications to the future development of joint force capabilities to counter irregular threats.

Israel’s 2014 Gaza conflict is the latest in a series of conflicts featuring VNSAs firing large numbers of rockets, mortars, and missiles into its territory. For decades, the country has been attacked by a hostile array of VNSAs using a growing assortment of such weapons.8 According to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) blog, prior to the start of the latest conflict, Gaza-based militants had fired more than 15,200 rockets at Israel since 2001.9 Although Gaza VNSAs may be a more active threat, Hizballah, a VNSA operating from Lebanon, is a substantially greater one. In July 2006, Hizballah escalated its campaign against Israel with a cross-border ambush of an IDF patrol. With Israel’s strong military response, the situation quickly intensified. Before a ceasefire was secured 33 days later, Hizballah had fired nearly 4,000 rockets and missiles into Israel.10 Since 2006, there have been little more than threats exchanged, but Israeli intelligence estimates that Hizballah has used the lull in fighting to amass an estimated 100,000 rockets (although some estimates are as high as 150,000).11 The quantity of missiles and rockets that Hizballah possesses prompted the IDF’s chief of operations to declare that Hizballah’s arsenal is “similar to any national army’s.”12

In response to these missile threats, Israel has worked closely with the United States to develop and evolve air and missile defense capabilities to help protect its homeland and strategic assets.13 During the Gulf War in 1991, the United States supported Israel with Patriot missile defense batteries to help protect it from Iraqi Scud missiles.14 Since then, Israel has partnered with the United States to develop a multitiered missile defense system that contains active defense systems, including the Iron Dome mobile air defense system, as well as early warning/passive defense and counterstrike capabilities.15 While the U.S. homeland has not been attacked by VNSAs employing rockets or missiles, the United States anticipates that an enemy will use such capabilities to contest deployment of military forces to operational areas and their freedom to operate within those areas.16 Furthermore, with the proliferation of portable and advanced missile technologies, the United States must anticipate and adapt its joint forces to be able to address the range of regional and global threats, including those to its homeland, strategic assets, and allies, as well as to its military bases, ports, lines of communication, choke points, and operational areas.

Although Israel may be unique in the magnitude of the threat of VNSAs with missile technologies, it also may provide the United States and its partners with a valuable glimpse into the future. This article first explores the threats and associated operational issues likely to emerge as missile technologies are proliferated to VNSAs. Second, it identifies the joint force capabilities that the U.S. military may require to address these threats.

An Expanding Threat

The U.S. National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2030 noted that the proliferation of “standoff missiles will increase the capacity of nonstate actors” and that the availability of “precision-guided weapons would allow critical infrastructures to be put at risk by many more potential adversaries.”17 As evidenced by the military capabilities of Hizballah, Hamas, ISIL, Ukrainian separatist militias, and the many other VNSAs around the world, the increasing availability of advanced missile technologies, coupled with improvements in their capabilities, is significantly expanding the threat to Israel, the United States, and other partner states, both regionally and globally.

The global arms trade is big business. According to a 2012 Congressional Research Service report, more than $71.5 billion in arms transfer agreements were made in 2011 to developing countries alone.18 Besides the direct transfer of missiles, proliferation can enable VNSAs to manufacture or modify missile capabilities by providing precursor, dual-use materials and the “know-how” to fabricate rockets. VNSAs can obtain the materials and the knowledge to make their own rockets or can forge alliances with state sponsors and transnational criminal elements to obtain and smuggle weapons. In March 2014, IDF special forces intercepted a ship in the Red Sea carrying an Iranian arms shipment headed for the Gaza Strip and recovered several dozen Syrian M-302 medium-range rockets (surface-to-surface, 100-kilometer range) hidden in shipping containers.19

Inadequate Arms Control

The United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) entered into force on December 24, 2014, with the intention of reducing the illicit arms trade by promoting “accountability and transparency by state parties concerning transfers of conventional arms.”20 Although the ATT is a step toward preventing the proliferation of arms to bad actors, arms control regimes are currently inadequate to address the proliferation of missile technologies to VNSAs.21 So far, 130 states have signed the treaty, and 61 have ratified it.22 However, the power of the ATT relies on the compliance of signatories. More specific to missile technologies, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), established in 1987, now includes 34 countries. As with the ATT, the MTCR relies on signatory countries adhering to export control guidelines to preclude the proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. The ATT and MTCR may help cooperative states control the legal arms trade, but they are unlikely to dissuade the illegal sale or transfer of arms to VNSAs.

When VNSAs Obtain Improved Missile Technologies

The availability of improved missile technologies allows VNSAs to develop missiles and rockets with greater range, lethality, and precision, and in increased quantities. Perhaps the most significant improvement so far is in range. Increased range extends the risks, and fear, to a greater proportion of the population. With each major conflict since 2008, Hamas has obtained longer-range rockets, extending the risk to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem in 2012 and to most of Israel in 2014.23 Improved precision will be a game changer, enabling VNSAs to target specific high-value civilian or military facilities, and increasing requirements (and competition) for active defense systems such as Iron Dome for their dedicated protection. Greater VNSA missile capabilities will also increase the need for additional passive defense capabilities, such as shelters and early warning, and more effective integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) attack operations.

In conflict regions, VNSA missile capabilities could deny deploying forces access to ports and challenge their freedom of action in the area of operations. Perhaps most significantly, adversary VNSAs could use MANPADS, advanced SAMs, and cruise missiles to contest U.S. and Israeli air and maritime superiority. Hizballah in Lebanon already possesses such capabilities. According to Major General Ya’acov Amidror, former national security advisor to the prime minister of Israel, in addition to an arsenal of “some 150,000 missiles and rockets, several thousand of which have a range that cover the entire State of Israel . . . Hizballah also has long-range anti-ship missiles, anti-aircraft missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and modern anti-tank missiles.”24 Degraded air support would seriously affect joint force operations that rely on air superiority for close air support, attack helicopter operations, air-mobility operations, IAMD attack operations, and surveillance by low-flying unmanned aircraft systems and other reconnaissance platforms.

Cruise missiles also significantly threaten maritime operations because their low trajectory challenges timely detection and effective defense. During the 2006 Second Lebanon War, Hizballah fired a Chinese-made, Iranian-supplied C-802 surface-to-sea antiship cruise missile at the INS Hanit, an Israeli Sa’ar 5-class corvette patrolling the Lebanese coast 16 kilometers from the shore.25 The missile struck the corvette, killing four sailors and severely damaging the ship.26 In the future, VNSAs might use cruise missiles in the global commons to contest U.S. power projection capabilities and joint force maritime access to forward areas of operations, affecting deployment and sustainment efforts. VNSAs such as Hizballah, Hamas, and ISIL are already using advanced antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) to challenge friendly force freedom of maneuver.27 The convergence of cyber and electronic warfare capabilities in conjunction with VNSA missile attacks could further exacerbate challenges to joint force air and maritime superiority.

VNSAs can also obtain large numbers of rockets and missiles, creating a stand-off capability to attack friendly forces or other high-value targets as well as the capacity to sustain a high volume of attacks. During the 31 days of fighting between Hizballah and Israel in 2006, Hizballah fired an average of approximately 130 rockets per day.28 Even without high accuracy, large quantities of low-cost rockets can challenge missile defense battle management capabilities, particularly when fired in barrages. Limited active defense capabilities could be stretched to protect military capabilities, critical infrastructure, and population centers, increasing one’s reliance on passive defense, attack operations, and IAMD battle management capabilities. While Hizballah and Hamas rockets have increased in quantity and range, they have generally lacked a high degree of accuracy.29 As a result, the IDF has not had to fire as many of its limited numbers of missile defense interceptors. When VNSAs improve on their accuracy or obtain guided missiles, the IAMD protection challenge will increase tremendously.

Israel is a small country surrounded by well-armed VNSAs that have repeatedly attacked it. With the notable exception of the September 11 attacks, the United States homeland historically has been protected from such threats by both oceans and friendly neighbors. However, with VNSAs having increased access to relatively small, portable missile systems (notably MANPADS and ATGMs), the risk that these organizations could develop expeditionary capabilities to expand the battlefield beyond the primary conflict region is growing. Individuals or small teams of terrorists with MANPADS and ATGMs could target airports and seaports in the homeland and at intermediate staging/transit facilities around the world, expanding and complicating IAMD resource allocation and protection considerations. The impact of these actions would not only affect friendly force power projection capabilities, but it could also have a major global economic effect if commercial shipping and air transport are affected.

Ultimately, the proliferation of missiles and related technologies expands the capability of VNSAs to attack vital U.S. interests and to contest U.S. freedom of action globally, thereby increasing the risk of missile attacks both on the battlefield and on the homeland.

Challenges and Capabilities

Although VNSAs have directly threatened Israel’s homeland with rocket and missile attacks for decades, the United States, as a global power, faces a different set of challenges for countering these threats. Perhaps the greatest challenge for the United States is to adequately understand the nonstate actors around the world that might threaten U.S. vital interests. Traditional intelligence capabilities are challenged to understand the complex relationships of VNSAs and their networks. First, it is difficult to gain the necessary cultural understanding to appreciate the dynamic connections between the many global, regional, and local VNSAs, proxy actors, state sponsors, and transnational criminal organizations. In Gaza, even when Hamas was the acknowledged governmental authority, other militant organizations opposed to Israel, such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Resistance Committees, the Army of Islam, Tawhid wal’ Jihad, and Jund Ansar Allah, all pursued their own goals and in many cases acted independently of Hamas.30 Second, many of these groups are organized around political, social, and military wings and operate in small cells dispersed among the population. Without a detailed mapping of the target population, it is difficult to gain intelligence on these organizations or to separate their true intent and capabilities from rhetoric.31 VNSAs are not constrained by the laws or norms of states and will frequently use social media to obfuscate the facts. Ideology-based VNSAs may not have easily identifiable or targetable centers of gravity. Adding to the complexity of intelligence operations are the temporary alliances VNSAs form with other organizations and states to achieve complementary short-term objectives. When multiple extremist groups are operating in a confined battlespace, motives and attribution of VNSA missile attacks could be difficult to determine.

Rebalance Offensive and Defensive Capabilities

As the proliferation of missile technologies to VNSAs increases, the balance of offensive and defensive capabilities required to enable preventive and protective IAMD operations may need to shift. The availability of missile technologies to VNSAs and the development of American and Israeli IAMD capabilities might produce new operational and campaign-level requirements for both offensive and defensive IAMD capabilities. This challenge was revealed in November 2012 by the IDF’s successful employment of the Iron Dome missile defense system during Operation Pillar of Defense. Although Hamas, PIJ, and other VNSAs fired more than 1,500 rockets and mortars at Israel from Gaza and the Sinai, Israeli officials reported that Iron Dome shot down almost 90 percent of the rockets it engaged.32 Additionally, Israel’s civil defense system of early warning and shelters passively protected its civilian population.33 As a result, only three Israeli civilians were killed during the conflict.34 Concurrently, the Israeli air force attacked more than 1,500 targets in Gaza.35 Ultimately, the success of Israel’s IAMD efforts removed the need and justification for an IDF ground attack into Gaza.36

Successful missile defense operations buy valuable time both operationally and strategically. Operationally, they protect key assets while offensive military capabilities are mobilized, deployed, and employed. Strategically, they reduce public pressure on senior political and military decisionmakers. A successful missile defense effort may also reduce the need and justification for ground attacks. If IAMD capabilities prevent friendly casualties, then the option of conducting a ground attack, which carries with it both the greater likelihood of heavy damage to infrastructure and the potential for increased civilian and friendly military casualties, may not be justifiable domestically or internationally. Finally, effective IAMD may help deter missile attacks by changing the VNSA leader’s cost-benefit decision calculus.37

Countering VNSAs in Urban Areas

VNSAs are also adapting defensively to U.S. and Israeli asymmetric advantages of air superiority, precision engagement, and surveillance/reconnaissance. They are concealing and protecting their missile and command and control capabilities underground among the civilian population in urban areas. VNSAs have used expendable launchers to reduce firing crew exposure and to complicate the friendly force’s attack operations decision calculus. By embedding their missile capabilities in urban areas, they try to deter friendly attack operations.

A related issue is the use by VNSAs of civilians as human shields, which can have both a tactical defensive effect and a strategic offensive effect. Defensively, VNSAs can store missiles in schools, religious sites, and other sensitive facilities to prevent friendly attack. However, an offensive strategic effect is achieved if the VNSA can “bait” an attack on missile capabilities at sensitive locations and cause collateral civilian destruction and casualties. News and social media accounts of civilian casualties, whether accurate or not, could strategically influence domestic and international support and legitimacy.

Measuring Progress and Success

Finally, it is difficult to measure progress and success in missile warfare with VNSAs. At the operational and strategic levels, Israel has found that missile warfare with VNSAs lacks a decisive endstate. VNSAs must only show resistance (for example, by periodically firing rockets) and survive attacks to claim victory. Israel has largely measured its strategic success by the length of calm (that is, the period of deterrence) between major conflicts with VNSAs.

Although there are a number of useful tactical and technical metrics of performance for missile defense (for example, the number of rocket attacks per day or the number of civilian casualties), these metrics do not add up to indicate operational or strategic success. A higher level of success might be indicated by a change in the way VNSAs conduct their attacks. For example, Israel’s enemies have evolved their primary concept of operations over the years from maneuver warfare (through 1973) to suicide attacks (Second Intifada) and then to missile attacks. If IAMD is successful, then VNSAs will need to adapt, either by seeking a different approach or perhaps by reinterpreting their strategic intent sufficiently to enable a peace agreement. Ultimately, strategic success may not be measured in terms of quantitative offensive or defensive metrics, but rather by the gain or loss of international influence and legitimacy achieved as a result of the holistic efforts of each combatant.

Strategic and Operational Implications for the United States

Broaden IAMD Strategy with “Left of Launch” Focus. The proliferation of missiles and related technologies to VNSAs has significantly extended the threat of attack on U.S. interests well beyond distant battlefields. In light of such ubiquitous VNSA-based threats, the U.S. military should broaden its IAMD strategy and expand its global IAMD coverage requirements to include its homeland bases and deployment infrastructure, worldwide deployment, and logistics lines of communication (including choke points, ports, and staging/logistic bases). Because missile proliferation cannot be prevented, the United States should pursue multinational IAMD cooperatives to share the costs of a regional capability and the value of collective security from a common threat. Such cooperatives should coordinate international and regionally tailored collective IAMD strategies with a main effort focused on preventing VNSAs from obtaining and using missile technologies. Such efforts, collectively known as “left of launch” efforts, should include strengthened counterproliferation, expanded international and regional IAMD security cooperation, more balanced and integrated air and missile defense capabilities, a wider scope of vulnerability assessments, and adaptation to VNSAs’ use of human shields.

Strengthen Arms Control Regimes. As the global leader in the value of arms transfer agreements (77.7 percent of all such agreements in 2011), the United States should lead international efforts to strengthen arms control regimes to reduce or limit the proliferation of missiles and related technologies to VNSAs.38 Such efforts will require greater international cooperation and enforcement mechanisms to reduce smuggling and dissuade violator nations.

Expand Security Cooperation Partnerships. Even with improved arms control, VNSAs will continue to obtain and use missile technologies to terrorize populations and to offset their conventional military disadvantages against states. Therefore, the United States should expand its efforts to develop international and regional security cooperation partnerships for IAMD against common VNSA threats. The Joint IAMD Vision 2020 identifies pursuing policies to leverage partner capabilities as one of its six IAMD imperatives.39 Specifically, it seeks to build partnerships and establish multilateral agreements to develop “an integrated defensive network of interoperable IAMD systems” that can “leverage cost-sharing and help spread the burden among willing participants.”40 Such an approach should pursue the cooperation of international stakeholders and regional states with common security interests to dissuade, deter, and, if necessary, preempt or respond to VNSA air and missile threats. Perhaps the most valuable cooperation among international stakeholders and regional partners would be sharing relevant intelligence. In regions where VNSAs have obtained ballistic and cruise missiles, cooperative states should ensure the interoperability and integration of their IAMD battle management systems (for example, command, control, communications, intelligence) and conduct multinational exercises to develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures for their integrated employment. Each nation’s IAMD personnel should be trained and ready to plan and employ their capabilities in support of joint and multinational operations. Finally, the U.S. military should address the development and management of personnel capable of manning joint and multinational IAMD positions at all levels.

Increase Integration and Cooperation Among Government Organizations. Within the U.S. Government, there are overlapping authorities and responsibilities among military, law enforcement, and intelligence organizations that also require closer cooperation and better integration. For example, VNSAs use transnational criminal organizations to smuggle missile technologies. Detecting and preventing such smuggling operations at home and abroad could cross organizational boundaries and authorities of all three types of organizations. Therefore, these organizations should jointly examine this cross-functional issue to develop policies and authorities that close vulnerable seams and improve coordination. Further, the counterproliferation capabilities of these organizations should be interoperable and integrated.

Enable Balanced Capabilities to Counter VNSAs with Missile Technologies. Effective missile defense capabilities must be balanced and integrated with offensive capabilities to suppress or destroy VNSA attack capabilities, seize the initiative, and mitigate the operational risks of adaptive adversaries. Achieving the right balance may require trade-off analyses of joint force capabilities using the context of planning scenarios that include the extended VNSA missile threats. Beyond integrating specific IAMD capabilities, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), information operations, cyberspace, and electronic warfare capabilities should be integrated with IAMD planning and employment.

Conduct Wide-Ranging Vulnerability Assessments. Increased missile capabilities by violent groups that profess the intent and capability to attack the United States and its global interests will pose a more widespread threat. Such a threat will necessitate wide-ranging vulnerability assessments to ensure key infrastructure and deployment lines of communication are protected. Overseas base security agreements should be reviewed and revised based on the global and unpredictable nature of some VNSA threats. Force protection postures should be reviewed for the continental United States, intermediate and forward staging areas, and vulnerable transit/choke points in between. War plans should not assume unopposed movement of forces to the conflict area of operations. IAMD protection must start at the homeland and extend to protect bases, ports, strategic choke points, and lines of communication to the area of operations.

Adapt Operations to Counter VNSAs Embedded in Urban Populations. Finally, the U.S. military must adapt its IAMD attack operations to address the VNSAs’ evolving concept for protecting their missile technologies from preemptive attacks. With a global trend toward urbanization—50 percent of the world’s population lived in cities as of 2008, with this number expected to rise to 75 percent by 2050—it seems more likely that urban warfare will increase.41 Urban infrastructure, underground facilities, and dense populations could quickly overwhelm a U.S. joint force’s capacity. To address the unique challenges in this environment, the joint force must increasingly emphasize the development of ISR, maneuver, and precision engagement capabilities. Increased human intelligence will also be essential. There may be a role for nonlethal weapons, as well as the development of smaller precision-guided munitions capable of being tailored to achieve the desired effects with minimal collateral damage. Finally, international law should be examined concerning VNSA accountability for using human shields.

The proliferation of missiles technologies to VNSAs has expanded the threat of their use well beyond military conflict zones. As a result, the U.S. military should mitigate the risks by broadening its IAMD strategy and extending its global IAMD coverage to protect the military’s capability to deploy and sustain its forces in response to global crises. The focus of the IAMD strategy should be on “left of launch” efforts designed to prevent VNSAs’ missile attacks and to better protect vital U.S. interests.

*About the authors:
Mark E. Vinson and John Caldwell are Adjunct Research Staff Members at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

Source:
This article was published in the Joint Force Quarterly 80, which is published by the National Defense University.

Notes:

1 For this article, missile technologies include short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles; antiship and land-attack cruise missiles; rockets; antitank guided missiles; surface-to-air missiles (including man-portable air defense systems); unmanned aerial systems; and the precursor materials, software, and intellectual property for their manufacture.

2 Alon Ben-David, “No Fatalities in Israel’s Iron Dome Zone,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 1, 2014.

3 “MH17 Malaysia plane crash in Ukraine: What we know,” BBC, September 9, 2014.

4 Ibid.

5 “ISIS fighters seen with advanced antiaircraft missiles,” Al-Arabiya News, October 28, 2014.

6 Kirk Semple and Eric Schmitt, “Missiles of ISIS May Pose Peril for Aircrews in Iraq,” New York Times, October 26, 2014.

7 Ibid.

8 According to the IDF Blog, since 2001, Gaza-based VNSAs have fired more than 15,200 rockets and mortars at Israel. See “Rocket Attacks on Israel from Gaza: Israel under Fire,” available at <www.idfblog.com/facts-figures/rocket-attacks-toward-israel/>. In the north, Palestine Liberation Organization rocket attacks from Lebanon began before the IDF’s Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982. During the 2006 Lebanon war, Hizballah hit Israel with approximately 4,000 rockets. For details, see Uzi Rubin, The Rocket Campaign against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, June 2007, 2, 10. Hizballah’s rocket and missile quantities are based on Israeli intelligence estimates, as cited by Adam Entous, Charles Levinson, and Julian E. Barnes, “Hizballah Upgrades Missile Threat to Israel: Components Said to Have Already Been Moved to Lebanon from Syria,” Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2014.

9 “Rocket Attacks on Israel from Gaza.”

10 Russell W. Glenn, All Glory Is Fleeting: Insights from the Second Lebanon War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012), 6.

11 Entous, Levinson, and Barnes; Ya’acov Amidror, “The Terrorist Defense Force,” Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies Perspectives Paper no. 281, January 13, 2015.

12 “Hizballah’s Arsenal Similar to Any National Army’s,” Arutz Sheva, May 20, 2014.

13 Jewish Virtual Library, “Fact Sheets: Israel’s Missile Defense System,” September 2014, available at <www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/talking/88_missiledefense.html>.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), Version 1.0, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 17, 2012), 8–14.

17 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, December 2012, 60, 64.

18 Richard F. Grimmett and Paul K. Kerr, “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004–2011,” Congressional Research Service, August 24, 2012, 6.

19 Itamar Sharon, “IDF intercepts major Iranian missile shipment to Gaza,” The Times of Israel, March 5, 2014.

20 Daryl G. Kimball, “The Arms Trade Treaty at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, July 2013.

21 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “The Arms Trade Treaty,” available at <www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/>.

22 Ibid.

23 Jim Michaels, “Hamas boosts rocket range, reaching deeper into Israel,” USA Today, July 10, 2014.

24 Amidror.

25 David Eshel, “INS Hanit Suffers Iranian Missile Attack,” Defense Update, July 17, 2006.

26 Ibid.

27 Yasmin Tadjdeh, “Islamic State Militants in Syria Now Have Drone Capabilities,” National Defense Magazine, August 28, 2014.

28 Uzi Rubin, “The Rocket Campaign against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War,” Mideast Security and Policy Studies, no. 71 (June 2007), 10.

29 David A. Fulghum, “Iron Dome Repels Hamas Rockets,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 21, 2012.

30 “Worse Than Hamas? Gaza’s Other Terror Groups,” The Times of Israel, August 15, 2014.

31 Ben Caspit, “Israeli experts: If Europe won’t wiretap, they won’t know,” Al-Monitor, January 13, 2015.

32 International Crisis Group, Israel and Hamas: Fire and Ceasefire in a New Middle East, Middle East Report no. 133, November 22, 2012, 2.

33 Eitan Shamir, “Operation Pillar of Defense: An Initial Strategic and Military Assessment,” Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies Perspectives Paper no. 189, December 4, 2012, 2.

34 Ibid.

35 Israel and Hamas: Fire and Ceasefire in a New Middle East, 2.

36 Ibid., 9.

37 Mark E. Vinson, “An Israeli Approach to Deterring Terrorism: Managing Persistent Conflict through a Violent Dialogue of Military Operations” (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, November 2014).

38 Grimmett and Kerr, 3.

39 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Vision 2020” (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 5, 2013), 5.

40 Ibid.

41 Peter Storey, “Why Urban Warfare Studies Still Matter,” Cicero Magazine, June 24, 2014.

Last month’s elections have been heralded as a victory for peaceful political change in Myanmar. Now the President must make good on his promise to increase political freedoms.

By Aileen Thomson*

Myanmar’s recent elections are a truly historic moment for the country. While elections are only one step on the path toward democracy, the people of Myanmar were able for the first time in decades to freely express their desire for change and their repudiation of military rule based on fear, divisions and hate.

It is worth pausing to remember the courage and sacrifice that led to this day and stand up for those who are currently imprisoned for expressing their opinions and seeking other democratic reforms. Behind the ongoing transition to democracy are thousands of activists, monks and others who have sacrificed their freedom, health, education, family life, careers, citizenship and, all too often, their lives, so that one day the people could freely elect a government, so that farmers may safely make a living off the land, and so that children and youth may have access to quality education.

The paraphernalia of the National League for Democracy (NLD) blanketed the country in red during the election campaign, and many observers commented that such a display of support for Aung San Suu Kyi and her party would have been unthinkable five years ago. Yet while the NLD is no longer banned and wearing its logo is no longer cause for arrest, all is not safe for political activists.

There are still dozens of activists on trial or serving prison sentences for peacefully fighting for the same ideals of democracy, education and equality. Wearing a t-shirt will no longer get you arrested, but sharing a photo on Facebook may.

President Thein Sein has earned praise for his acceptance of the election results and his expressed commitment to work with the NLD on national reconciliation. To put this commitment into practice and demonstrate that there is no longer any repression of those seeking democracy and human rights, he must complete the reforms he started when he first ordered the release of political prisoners shortly after taking office and keep the promise he made in December 2013 to the country and the international community to free political prisoners by the end of the year. This would mean that all those in detention for exercising their rights to free speech and peaceful assembly must be released immediately, and charges dropped against those facing trial for such activities.

After these historic elections, an official acknowledgement of the sacrifices and contributions of former and current political prisoners, as well as of the harms inflicted during their detention, would go a long way towards building further trust in the transition and a more inclusive society. It would be an essential step towards national reconciliation and would open the door for participation by the full breadth of the democracy movement.

*Aileen Thomson is the head of the ICTJ office in Myanmar.

This article was originally published by Insight on Conflict and is available by clicking here.

US Democrat senators have called for immediate funding of a gun violence research agenda at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

Joining a group of Democratic senators and renowned national researchers, US Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Oregon) noted how a 1996 Republican appropriations rider prohibiting federal funds from being used to advocate or promote gun control has been misconstrued as a ban on funding scientific research into the causes of gun violence.

“The discussion around gun violence in this country is far too often untethered from the facts,” Wyden said. “This anti-research, anti-knowledge agenda defies common sense. It’s time to approach gun violence like the true public health crisis it is and fund research into gun violence.”

According to the Democrat Senators, the author of the original rider, former Representative Jay Dickey (R-Ark.) now supports funding CDC gun-violence research and has stated that the 20-year-old rider should not stand in the way. Earlier this month, Senator Wyden and 17 senators called on Appropriations Committee leadership to hold a hearing on funding for gun violence research at the CDC.

A delegation of gun violence researchers joined the lawmakers at the U.S. Capitol last week, sharing their stories about conducting research on an issue without access to the kind of federal resources that colleagues who work on cancer, heart disease, AIDS/HIV and other diseases have. One researcher, Dr. Garen Wintemute, reported having invested $1.3 million of his own earnings to conduct his research.

The Democrat Senators said that due to a ban on federal funding for gun violence research that almost halted entirely gun violence research, policymakers, health care practitioners, researchers, and others lack comprehensive, scientific information about the causes and characteristics of gun violence, or the best strategies to prevent future tragedies. President Obama lifted the 17-year ban in 2013, but there is no money appropriated in the federal budget to conduct research at the CDC.

According to Garen J. Wintemute, M.D., M.P.H, Director, Violence Prevention Research Program, University of California at Davis, “Policymakers need sound scientific evidence to tackle tough problems. Without research, that evidence won’t be available. We should address firearm violence the same way we address cancer, heart disease, and other major health problems–with a systematic research effort that leads to evidence-based solutions.”

In the same vein, Jeffrey W. Swanson, PhD, MA, Professor, Duke University School of Medicine, said, “Mass shootings are horrifying, but every single day in our country more than 90 people die as the result of a gun shot. We need an investment in research to match the size and complexity of the problem.”

Over and above being a massive energy resource, shale gas has the potential to boost business development within communities, establish black industrialists, create employment and develop specialized skills and the youth.

“Currently South Africa is a net importer of energy sources such as crude oil, refined petroleum products and natural gas. It is estimated that the Karoo shale gas resources would mean South Africa has the 5th largest reserves, estimated at 485 trillion cubic feet (Tcf),” according to South Africa’s Minister for Mineral Resources, Mosebenzi Zwane.

“We however take a conservative view of a 30 TcF economically recoverable resource, which is equivalent to 30 times the size of the Mossgas plants,” Zwane recently said.

Zwane said for many years the country has been reliant largely on a single source of energy.

“We have taken a decision to diversify our energy basket in our pursuit to provide not only cost-competitive energy security, but also significantly reduce the carbon footprint and drive our industrialization and beneficiation program to grow the economy inclusively in order to create a critical mass of employment, among others,” Zwane said.

Zwane made the comments last week when speaking during a community imbizo in Cradock, in the Eastern Cape.

“It is my firm belief that the excitement we have about the discovery of this resource needs to be shared and also enjoyed by communities,” Zwane said, adding, “In this regard my department has devised a promotional programme through which the public and especially communities that are close to the proposed development are educated and informed about these developments.”

“This will ensure that communities are kept up to date about the exploration method and benefits that can be realised from the exploitation of shale gas and informed about the mechanisms and instruments that seek to augment existing laws for the protection of water resources and for the protection of the environment,” said Zwane.

Zwane said the decision to develop shale gas was not taken in a vacuum.

It is intended to co-exist with other priority programs of government, such as food security and the national astronomy program.

“We have also taken measures to ensure the farming community benefits from the development of shale gas, whilst the astronomy programme, such as the Square Kilometre Array (SKA) would not be affected through such development,” said the Minister.

On the discovery of the shale gas prospect a few years ago, the government started processing applications for development of the resources. However a moratorium was placed on processing applications and any further receipt of applications when concerns were raised by stakeholders.

A team of experts was assembled made up of government and other experts to undertake a socio-economic and environment assessment of shale gas development.

The study was completed and published for all to have access to its findings. It made specific recommendations, which were adopted by Cabinet and implemented.

Key among these recommendations was the establishment of an inter-departmental task team to develop appropriate regulations to mitigate the risk of negative environmental impact, including contamination of water.

The Minister said the regulations represent a measure taken by government in addressing the public’s legitimate concerns and have been designed to ensure that all aspects of the assessment, conceptualization, actual extraction of the resources and post extraction factors are considered and sufficiently provided for, especially the protection of the environment and water resources.

“The government, based on the balance of available scientific evidence, took a decision to proceed with the development of shale gas in the Karoo formation of South Africa,” Zwane said.

Spain’s acting Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy said in a recent press briefing that he will maintain his candidature for Prime Minister, but that he still does not have sufficient support to be invested.

According to a Spanish government press release, following a week of talks initiated by His Majesty, King Felipe VI, Rajoy turned down an offer by the King to form a new government.

In the press statement, Rajoy confirmed that the King offered him the opportunity to stand at the investiture session as candidate for Prime Minister.

“I thanked him for this gesture and the deference he showed towards me, but I told him that I am not in a position at this time to stand for the investiture because not only do I not have a majority of votes to back me but that, furthermore, I have an absolute majority of accredited votes against me: 180 MPs at least,” Rajoy said.

“I don’t not have the votes at this time, and hence, it makes no sense for me to go there for the sole purpose of the two-month deadline starting to tick down as established by the Constitution,” Rajoy said.

By Mohammed Rasooldeen

Saudi Arabia’s drive to diversify its economy would offset the fall in oil prices, said Khalid Al-Falih, Saudi Aramco’s chairman, Monday.

Speaking during a panel discussion at the 9th Global Competitiveness Forum which started in Riyadh on Sunday, Al-Falih said: “Despite the fall in oil prices, the Kingdom’s economy has reported 5 percent growth and will continue to grow over the next 50 years.”

Al-Falih said the government has been working to diversify sources of income and the current trend is on innovation and creativity, and creating a knowledge-based economy.

He said the country has great investment opportunities in information technology, health care, tourism, financial services and telecommunications. In addition, the Kingdom plans to introduce new technology into its manufacturing sector, including training Saudis for highly specialized positions.

Al-Falih said that Aramco has reduced expenses, as was the case with other companies, because of the fall in crude prices. However, the company is to offer a basket of petroleum products to the market, and allow investors to take part ownership of Aramco. This would provide further income and boost business confidence, he said.

Saudi Aramco, which supplies all of Saudi Arabia’s crude oil, pumped more than 10 million barrels a day in each of the last 10 months as it sought to assert its role as the world’s lowest-cost producer.

The company pumped 10.25 million barrels a day in December, adding to a global supply glut that pushed benchmark Brent crude prices down 35 percent last year and a further 14 percent this month.

With regard to the provision of health care services, Al-Falih said the ministry is working to increase private sector participation, with plans to double this over the next five years.

The others who were in the panel included Commerce and Industry Minister Tawfiq Al-Rabiah, US Ambassador Joseph Westphal and Deborah L. Wince-Smith, president of the Council on Competitiveness.

Al-Rabiah said the government is working to streamline and facilitate private sector services and make use of modern technology in electronic trading. It is also encouraging corporate mergers and acquisitions to make the Kingdom more competitive.

He said some companies that do not have operations here have misconceptions about investing in the Kingdom. The ministry was working to clarify the situation. The promising sectors in the country included telecommunications, information technology and financial services, he said.

Wince-Smith said that Saudi Arabia has a great deal of potential, which should be harnessed for the benefit of the country’s people.