The first ever measurement of the temperature of electrons in a nanoelectronic device a few thousandths of a degree above absolute zero was demonstrated in a joint research project performed by VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd, Lancaster University, and Aivon Ltd. The team managed to make the electrons in a circuit on a silicon chip colder than had previously been achieved.

Although it has long been possible to cool samples of bulk metals even below 1 millikelvin, it has proved very difficult to transfer this temperature to electrons in small electronic devices, mainly because the interaction between the conducting electrons and the crystal lattice becomes extremely weak at low temperatures. By combining state-of-the-art micro and nanofabrication and pioneering measurement approaches the research team realized ultralow electron temperatures reaching 3.7 millikelvin in a nanoelectronic electron tunnelling device. A scientific article on the subject was published in Nature Communications on 27 January 2016.

Dr Rich Haley, Head of Ultra Low Temperature Physics at Lancaster, said, “This is a notable achievement in that the team has finally broken through the 4 millikelvin barrier, which has been the record in such structures for over 15 years.”

This breakthrough paves the way towards sub-millikelvin nanoelectronic circuits and is another step on the way to develop new quantum technologies including quantum computers and sensors. Quantum technologies use quantum mechanical effects to outperform any possible technology based only on classical physics. In general, many high sensitivity magnetic field sensors and radiation detectors require low temperatures simply to reduce detrimental thermal noise.

This work marks the creation of a key enabling technology which will facilitate R&D in nanoscience, solid-state physics, materials science and quantum technologies. The demonstrated nanoelectronic device is a so-called primary thermometer, i.e., a thermometer which requires no calibration. This makes the technology very attractive for low temperature instrumentation applications and metrology.

The breakthrough was made possible by bringing together internationally-leading groups and experts each of whom have their own track record of achievements in the fields of nanotechnologies and high performance sensors (VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd), custom low-noise electronics (Aivon Ltd, Finland) and ultralow temperature refrigeration and device characterization (Ultra Low Temperature Physics group and Quantum Technology Centre at Lancaster).

Dr Mika Prunnila, Nanoelectronics Research Team Leader at VTT, said, “Creating a new measurement tool for calibration-free thermometry is a big step forward. This is an important device for quantum machines which need the low temperature environment in order to work and the device is available right now for benchmarking different systems.”

VTT is looking into possibilities together with BlueFors Cryogenics to commercialise the primary thermometer component.

Dr Jon Prance of the Lancaster Quantum Technology Centre said, “Not only have we measured the coldest ever nanoelectronics temperature, but we have also demonstrated techniques which open the door to even lower temperatures.”

Planet Earth’s oceans and lands will be buried by increasing layers of plastic waste by the mid-century due to human activity, according to research led by the University of Leicester.

A new study, which has been published in the journal Anthropocene, examines the evidence that we now live in the Anthropocene, an epoch where humans dominate the Earth’s surface geology, and suggests that the surface of the planet is being noticeably altered by the production of long-lasting man-made materials, resulting in us entering an ‘Age of Plastic’.

Jan Zalasiewicz, Professor of Palaeobiology from the University of Leicester’s Department of Geology explained: “Plastics were more or less unknown to our grandparents, when they were children. But now, they are indispensible to our lives. They’re everywhere – wrapping our food, being containers for our water and milk, providing cartons for eggs and yoghourt and chocolate, keeping our medicines sterile. They now make up most of the clothes that we wear, too.

According to Zalasiewicz, “Plastics are also pretty well everywhere on Earth, from mountain tops to the deep ocean floor – and can be fossilized into the far future. We now make almost a billion tons of the stuff every three years. If all the plastic made in the last few decades was clingfilm, there would be enough to put a layer around the whole Earth. With current trends of production, there will be the equivalent of several more such layers by mid-century.”

The study suggests that plastics have such a long-lasting impact on the planet’s geology because they are inert and hard to degrade. As a result, when plastics litter the landscape they become a part of the soil, often ending up in the sea and being consumed by and killing plankton, fish and seabirds.

Plastics can travel thousands of miles, caught up in the ‘great oceanic garbage patches’, or eventually being washed up on distant beaches. Plastics can eventually sink to the sea floor, to become a part of the strata of the future.

The rise of plastics since the mid-20th century, both as a material element of modern life and as a growing environmental pollutant, has been widely described. Their distribution in both the terrestrial and marine realms suggests that they are a key geological indicator of the Anthropocene, as a distinctive stratal component.

Professor Zalasiewicz added that, “Plastics will continue to be input into the sedimentary cycle over coming millennia as temporary stores – landfill sites – are eroded. Plastics already enable fine time resolution within Anthropocene deposits via the development of their different types and via the artefacts, known as ‘technofossils’, they are moulded into, and many of these may have long-term preservation potential when buried in strata.

“Once buried, being so hard-wearing, plastics have a good chance to be fossilized – and leave a signal of the ultimate convenience material for many million years into the future. The age of plastic may really last for ages,” Zalasiewicz said.

The study was carried out by an international team of scientists including the University of Leicester’s Professors Jan Zalasiewicz and Mark Williams and PhD student Yasmin Yonan from the Department of Geology and field archaeologist Dr Matt Edgeworth who is an Honorary Visiting Research Fellow from the School of Archaeology and Ancient History.

According to Dr Edgeworth, “It may seem odd to think of plastics as archaeological and geological materials because they are so new, but we increasingly find them as inclusions in recent strata. Plastics make excellent stratigraphic markers.”

In 2016 the Anthropocene Working Group led by Professor Jan Zalasiewicz will gather more evidence on the Anthropocene, which will help inform recommendations on whether this new time unit should be formalized and, if so, how it might be defined and characterized.

Colin Waters from the British Geological Survey, a co-author in the study, added that, “We have become accustomed to living amongst plastic refuse, but it is the ‘unseen’ contribution of plastic microbeads from cosmetics and toothpaste or the artificial fibres washed from our clothes that are increasingly accumulating on sea and lake beds and perhaps have the greatest potential for leaving a lasting legacy in the geological record.”

By S. Binodkumar Singh*

The peace that was attained after a bloody war that terminated in the comprehensive defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009 has been sustained through 2015 in Sri Lanka. Not a single incident of killing was recorded in 2015, a trend evident since November 2009, barring one incident on April 11, 2014, in which a Security Forces (SFs) team that launched a cordon and search operation in the forest area of Padaviya in Anuradhapura District was fired upon by the LTTE militants hiding in the forest and in retaliatory fire three armed local LTTE leaders were killed by the team.

Remarkably, the positive development commenced with the dramatic turnaround of a political fortune in the island nation. Pallewatte Gamaralalage Maithripala Yapa Sirisena, leader of the New Democratic Front (NDF), a conglomeration of several political formations opposing the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA), including the main opposition United National Party (UNP) emerged victorious in a keenly contested Presidential Election held on January 8, 2015. Sirisena secured 6,217,162 votes (51.28 per cent) against 5,768,090 votes (47.58 per cent) polled by Mahinda Rajapaksa, the incumbent President and candidate of the UPFA. Sirisena took oath as the Seventh Elected Executive President of the country on January 9, 2015.

Later, in the Parliamentary Elections held on August 17, 2015, voters gave a fractured mandate, with none of the parties securing a simple majority. UNP, led by incumbent Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, secured 106 seats, falling seven short of simple majority in a 225-memebr House; the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) secured just 95 seats. The main Tamil political party, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) won 16 seats; and the main Marxist party, Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) won six. However, following a historic agreement on August 20, 2015, between UNP and the SLFP to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), the incumbent Prime Minister Wickremesinghe on August 21, 2015, took oath as the 26th Prime Minister of the island nation.

In another development, which is expected to have a far reaching impact on the reconciliation process President Sirisena on December 20, 2015, made a surprise visit to internally displaced persons (IDPs) camp in Konapulam of Jaffna District. Promising to provide land to settle the IDPs, the President on January 3, 2016, said “It is an ambitious target, but I will see that all the internally displaced people are given land to build homes. For many people the main issue was lack of land and that is something we will resolve in the next six months.” Further, on January 20, 2016, the President issued instructions to relevant officials to complete the resettlement of 44,015 remaining IDPs including 5732 members of 1688 displaced families living in displaced camps and 38,283 members of 11,073 displaced families living with their relatives in the Northern Province within six months.

Separately, although the talks on reconciliation between the TNA and the Government stalled since January 27, 2012, are yet to begin by the new Government, TNA was recognized as the Main Opposition and its leader Sampanthan was designated as Opposition Leader on September 3, 2015. Happy with the recognition, TNA spokesman M. A. Sumanthiran on September 4, 2015, stated “We will talk to the Government straightaway with a view to resolving the long outstanding matter.” Also welcoming Colombo’s decision to co-sponsor a draft resolution (A/HRC/30/L.29) that was tabled at the 30th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva, the TNA in a statement on September 25, 2015, declared, “we are of the view that the draft provides a constructive starting point for what will inevitably be a long road to reconciliation.”

Meanwhile, presenting a resolution in the Parliament to set up a Constitutional Assembly (CA) to begin the process of formulating a new Constitution which will replace the Constitution adopted in 1978, Prime Minister Wickremesinghe on January 9, 2016, said “We will have the whole Parliament formulating the Constitution unlike the previous instances when the Constitutions were drafted outside Parliament.” Further, in a nationally televised Pongal (Tamil Harvest Festival) ceremony, on January 15, 2016, the Prime Minister said “we are ready to devolve power (to minority Tamils) and protect democracy. The Constitutional Assembly will discuss with all, including (Tamil-dominated) provincial councils to have a new Constitution. We will do that in a transparent manner.”

Similarly, President Maithripala Sirisena participating at the Thai Pongal ceremony held on January 18, 2016, in the Hindu College in Kalutara District, said “Building of the peace and reconciliation among the people in the country cannot be done only through enacting laws and adopting a new constitution. It can only be done through the religious philosophy. Therefore, I request every religious leader to come forward to take forward the program commenced by the government to build the peace and brotherhood by alleviating the fear and suspicion among every community in the country.”

Indeed, the developments through 2015 and early 2016 suggest greater stabilization and reinforce prospects for an enduring peace in Sri Lanka. However, challenges remain as the drafting of a new Constitution offers both a challenge and an opportunity to address the grievances of a long, twisted and violent history. The proposed Constitutional text must be placed before the public for their scrutiny and constructive views obtained and incorporated into the final text. The Constitution makers must be flexible in this regard and not stick to their own rigid decisions.

The new Constitution will govern the people of the island nation for quite some time in the foreseeable future as the present Constitution has lasted for nearly 38 years. It must not be rushed through, but sufficient time must be allocated for the public views to be taken. Lest the whole edifice will come crumbling down destroying the very foundations of Rule of Law thereby bringing misery and instability to the people in the beautiful pearl of the Indian Ocean.

*Dr. S. Binodkumar Singh is a Research Associate at the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi. He can be reached at: editor@spsindia.in

By Dusica Tomovic

The government of Milo Djukanovic has survived a no-confidence vote in parliament following a marathon three-day parliamentary debate.

A plot to unseat Milo Djukanovic as Prime Minister of Montenegro failed to gain enough votes in parliament on Wednesday night, after 42 of a total of 81 MPs voted against the motion of no-confidence – which Djakanovic himself had called.

The smallest opposition party, Positive Montenegro, which has been getting closer to Djukanovic’s Democratic Party of Socialists, DPS, voted in favour of the embattled PM and provided his government with enough votes to survive.

Last December, Positive voted in favour of several controversial government proposals, which led to accusations from the rest of the opposition that they were bidding for a place in a new government.

In exchange for their support, Djukanovic said he was ready to offer five seats in the cabinet to the opposition representatives.

He said he understood that there were important issues with the voters’ list and the misuse of the state resources during the elections, and was therefore ready to offer the opposition the interior, labour, agriculture and finance ministries, as well as the post of deputy prime minister.

In his address to parliament, Djukanovic compared Montenegro’s economic growth favourably to other countries in the region, saying that the country was doing much better than other former Yugoslav countries.

“Montenegro is a stable state in multi-ethnic harmony and we have shown that we are able to defend ourselves from self-destruction. Montenegro is not in crisis,” the Prime Minister said.

The vote on Wednesday ended the almost two-decade-old ruling alliance of Djukanovic’s Democratic Party of Socialists, DPS, and the Social Democrats, SDP, led by the speaker of parliament, Ranko Krivokapic.

The SDP voted against the government together with the opposition parties, following a heated debate in parliament on Monday between the ruling coalition partners, each of which charged the other with responsibility for the political crisis, with electoral fraud and with the break-up of their 18-year alliance.

The three-day session was marked by allegations about political corruption and vote buying and about who opposed Montenegro’s independence and had close relations with former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic in the Nineties.

The two parties also accused each other of overseeing bad privatisations and the sale of much of the country’s coastline to Russians.

The sharpest words were exchanged between the two once close allies, Djukanovic and Krivokapic.

Djukanovic, who has held power since 1991, said the SDP’s decision to support the no-confidence motion brought an impossible situation to an end.

“It is clear that after this session there will be no more room for those who are accustomed to being in power and in opposition at the same time,” Djuknovic said, “more specifically, being in power for all the benefits that this status brings them and, in parallel, giving clumsily disguised support to those who undermine the government, not taking into account the detrimental effects on the national interests of Montenegro,” Djukanovic added, referring to Krivokapic’s party.

In the past two years, the SDP has increasingly criticized the government’s performance on reforming the judiciary and over the state of media freedom.

Djukanovic called on parliament to take a vote of confidence in his government on December 19, 2015.

The veteran Prime Minister, who has been either president or premier since 1991, has accused the opposition of trying to block the country from joining NATO, also saying that Russia stands behind the recent street protests.

As Wednesday’s parliamentary session got underway, several hundred opposition supporters, led by the strongest opposition alliance, the Democratic Front, rallied outside the parliament, chanting that the government was a “disgrace to Montenegro”.

The Front has been boycotting parliament for months and its MPs did not attend the parliament session. The right-wing alliance, composed mostly of pro-Serbian parties, has been staging protests in the capital, Podgorica, since last September, calling on Djukanovic to resign.

The current government, which was elected in December 2012, is composed of the DPS, the SDP, and three ethnic minority parties. An election is planned for autumn 2016 but the exact date has not yet been agreed.

Pakistan’s information technology industry was pretty nascent five years ago, with the concept of ‘online business’ alien talk to many. There were a mere eight internet users per 100 people and of a total 100 million cellular service subscribers, only 14.4 million were using mobile internet.

But the country has come a long way from that and a thriving technology industry is not only winning the trust of consumers, but also attracting international attention.

Though slowly, the idea of taking the business online is becoming an evident realisation and companies are scrambling to develop online platforms that help their businesses grow. Consumers are taking to the idea and ease of shopping online, although there remains a massive room for improvement (and hence window of opportunity) in the quality of services up on offer.

Still the country’s tech scene has its knights. Companies like Rozee.com, Pakwheels.com and Zameen.com have not only made a name for themselves for being the pioneers in their respective fields, they have also upped the antes time and again by reinvigorating their portals and providing improved facilities to their users over and over again.

Redirection

Though start-ups in Pakistan have been on and about their tasks for several years now, it was 2015 that really put them on the venture-capital-funding map. In 2014, Pakistani start-ups managed to raise a mere $4 million, but the funding jumped to $23 million in 2015. Despite the fact many firms who secured funding chose not to disclose their numbers, the collective $23 million still represented close to 600% increase in investment.

Analysing the prevalent trends, the buzz and hype around online businesses, one can expect a bright future for Pakistan’s technology industry and international companies and investors have started noticing the advancement.

Collective efforts

Efforts of The Punjab Information Technology Board (PITB) have also been quite instrumental in Pakistan’s technology industry’s growth in 2015. Apart from raising awareness regarding the uses of IT among the public and automation of the Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education and the Citizen Feedback Monitoring Program, PITB also laid strong foundations for tech-entrepreneurship by establishing Plan9, the largest technology incubator in Pakistan distinguished by its zero-equity model.

Since its inception in 2012, Plan9 has graduated 66 start-ups, created roughly 500 jobs and over $2 million in funding. Commenting on Pakistani start-ups, Blackbox.vc Founder & CEO Fadi Bishara said Pakistani start-ups were more hard-core tech than Silicon Valley start-ups.

Currently, academic institutions are also playing a supportive role in increasing awareness about online entrepreneurship. LUMS Centre of Entrepreneurship, Information Technology University and National University of Computer and Emerging Sciences are now offering courses on entrepreneurship. While these courses are merely theoretical, they provide students with the much needed confidence to pursue unexplored professions.

With Pakistan’s technology sector becoming more vibrant than ever, one can expect the current year to be bring even gladder tidings for the country’s tech-preneurs, as well as the start-ups mushrooming across the country. Here’s to another year of change and progress.

*Sualiha Nazar is a freelance journalist who also contributes in The Diplomat and The Foreign Policy.

The Democratic contest has repeatedly been characterized as a choice between Hillary Clinton’s “pragmatism” and Bernie Sanders’s “idealism” – with the not-so-subtle message that realists choose pragmatism over idealism.

But this way of framing the choice ignores the biggest reality of all: the unprecedented, and increasing, concentration of income, wealth and power at the very top, combined with declining real incomes for most and persistent poverty for the bottom fifth.

The real choice isn’t “pragmatism” or “idealism.” It’s either allowing these trends to worsen, or reversing them. Inequality has reached levels last seen in the era of the “robber barons” in the 1890s. The only truly pragmatic way of reversing this state of affairs is through a “political revolution” that mobilizes millions of Americans.

Is such a mobilization possible? One pundit recently warned Democrats that change happens incrementally, by accepting half loaves as being better than none. That may be true, but the full loaf has to be large and bold enough in the first place to make the half loaf meaningful. And not even a half loaf is possible unless or until America wrests back power from the executives of large corporations, Wall Street bankers and billionaires who now control the bakery.

I’ve been in and around Washington for almost 50 years, including a stint in the cabinet, and I’ve learned that real change happens only when a substantial share of the American public is mobilized, organized, energized and determined to make it happen. That’s more the case now than ever.

The other day Bill Clinton attacked Sanders’s proposal for a single-payer health plan as unfeasible and a “recipe for gridlock.” But these days, nothing of any significance is politically feasible and every bold idea is a recipe for gridlock. This election is about changing the parameters of what’s feasible and ending the choke hold of big money on our political system. In other words, it’s about power – whether the very wealthy who now have it will keep it, or whether average Americans will get some as well.

How badly is political power concentrated in America among the very wealthy? A study published in the fall of 2014 by two of America’s most respected political scientists, Princeton professor Martin Gilens and Northwestern’s Benjamin Page, suggests it’s extremely concentrated.

Gilens and Page undertook a detailed analysis of 1,799 policy issues, seeking to determine the relative influence on them of economic elites, business groups, mass-based interest groups and average citizens. Their conclusion was dramatic: “The preferences of the average American appear to have only a minuscule, near-zero, statistically nonsignificant impact upon public policy.” Instead, Gilens and Page found that lawmakers respond almost exclusively to the moneyed interests – those with the most lobbying prowess and deepest pockets to bankroll campaigns.

I find it particularly sobering that Gilens and Page’s data came from the period 1981 to 2002. That was before the Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens United opinion, which opened the floodgates to big money in politics, and before the explosion of Super Pacs and secretive “dark money” whose sources do not have to be disclosed by campaigns. It stands to reason that if average Americans had a “near-zero” impact on public policy then, the influence of average Americans is now zero.

Most Americans don’t need a detailed empirical study to convince them of this. They feel disenfranchised, and angry toward a political-economic system that seems rigged against them. This was confirmed for me a few months ago when I was on book tour in America’s heartland, and kept hearing from people who said they were trying to make up their minds in the upcoming election between supporting Bernie Sanders or Donald Trump.

At first I was incredulous. After all, Sanders and Trump are at opposite ends of the political spectrum. It was only after several discussions that I began to understand the connection. Most of these people said they were incensed by “crony capitalism,” by which they meant political payoffs by big corporations and Wall Street banks that result in special favors such as the Wall Street bailout of 2008.

They wanted to close tax loopholes for the rich, such as the special “carried interest” tax break for hedge-fund and private-equity partners. They wanted to reduce the market power of pharmaceutical companies and big health insurers, which they thought resulted in exorbitant prices. They were angry about trade treaties that they characterized as selling-out American workers while rewarding corporate executives and big investors.

Somewhere in all this I came to see what’s fueling the passions of voters in the 2016 election. If you happen to be one of the tens of millions of Americans who are working harder than ever but getting nowhere, and you feel the system is rigged against you and in favor of the rich and powerful, you will go in one of two directions.

Either you will be attracted to an authoritarian bigot who promises to make America great again by keeping out people different from you and recreating high-paying jobs in America. Someone who sounds like he won’t let anything or anybody stand in his way, and who’s so rich he can’t be bought off.

Or you’ll be attracted to a political activist who tells it like it is, who has lived by his convictions for 50 years, who won’t take a dime of money from big corporations or Wall Street or the very rich, and who is leading a grass-roots “political revolution” to regain control over our democracy and economy. In other words, you will be enticed either by a would-be dictator who promises to bring power back to the people, or by a movement leader who asks you to join together with others to bring power back to the people.

Of the two, I would prefer the latter. But what about the “pragmatic” Hillary Clinton? I have worked closely with her and have nothing but respect for her. In my view, she’s clearly the most qualified candidate for president of the political system we now have.

But the political system we now have is profoundly broken. Bernie Sanders is the most qualified candidate to create the political system we should have because he’s leading a political movement for change.

By John R. Haines*

“Don’t criticize what you don’t understand, son.” — Elvis Presley

Asked about Russia’s Syrian intervention, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper acerbically turned on President Vladimir Putin, whom he and others seem to regard as Geopolitical Russia incarnate. “What his long term plan is, I’m not sure he has one. I think he is kind of winging this day to day,” Mr. Clapper said, adding that Mr. Putin is “very impulsive and opportunistic.”^[1] Former ambassador Michael McFaul likewise wrote in a jeering New York Times op-ed, “Mr. Putin is adept at short-term tactical responses to setbacks, but less talented at long-term strategy.”^[2]

Responding to the caustic appraisal of these two respected figures requires an argument with several parts. One of these parts — delineating the contours of Russian geopolitical objectives in Syria — is best evinced by the facts on the ground.

“The Russian military has established a number of bases in the Alawite heartland, preserved the Black Sea fleet’s access to the Syrian port of Tartus, and now has the ability to project power throughout the Eastern Mediterranean. More broadly, Russia has also succeeding in cementing a military relationship with the leading Shiite powers in the Middle East — namely Iran, Iraq, Hezbollah and the rump Assad regime. The parties established two command centers — one in Baghdad and one in Damascus — and now constitute a potentially formidable Middle Eastern axis. For the first time since Egyptian President Anwar Sadat booted Soviet forces from Egypt in 1973, Russia is firmly ensconced in the Middle East.”^[3]

Another rebuts the claim that Russia lacks a coherent counterinsurgency strategy in the battlespace. It is the focus of this essay. One hastens to clarify that this essay is no apologia for Mr. Putin or Russia’s actions in the wider Syrian conflict. It does, however, depart sharply — and crediting Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin’s colorful phrase^[4] — from the all too common “monkey with a hand grenade” critique of Mr. Putin’s prosecution of the Syrian counterinsurgency.

The Lessons of Chechnya

The contemporary Russian understanding of counterinsurgency is highly informed by Russia’s experience in the Caucasus after the Soviet Union’s dissolution in the 1990s. Russia’s perspective on the battlespace of the broader Levant — Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon — is decidedly non-Westphalian.^[5] It largely discards its contextualizing borders, boundaries, and notions of state-sovereignty for purposes of counterinsurgency as socio-culturally ill-suited to the territory.

Today’s conflict in the Levant against antigovernment insurgent and transnational jihadist groups bears notable similarities to the Chechen conflict of the 1990s. The unrecognized Chechen government partially controlled large swaths of Chechen territory in 1991-1994 and again in 1996-1999, even while Moscow retained its hold on such regions as northern Chechnya. The conflict increasingly was influenced by the Islamization of Chechen demands, and an interconnection with transnational jihadist networks. Russia’s counterinsurgency during and following the 1996-1999 phase of the conflict followed a divide-and-conquer strategy that emphasized seeking allies from among its former enemies.

Russia succeeded in fundamentally “Chechenizing” the eponymous conflict. It exploited fissures within the insurgency between Islamists, who aspired to a wider Caucasian Islamic state, and Chechen nationalists like the Kadyrov and Yamadayev clans, to which Arab Salafists’ rising influence in Chechnya was abhorrent. The much larger (some ten times) Kadyrovtsy (those loyal to Kadyrov) eventually dominated the Chechen nationalists as Russia successfully split the insurgents. This diluted its anti-Russian orientation, and redirected Islamist insurgents against newly emerged power structures connected with the Kadyrovtsy.^[6]

Then as now, Mr. Putin drew criticism for responding opportunistically in a way that was said to favor the short-term tactical over the long-term strategic.

“At present the federal center and the Kremlin do not have any power in the region. Kadyrov’s clan has real power, which is being used in its own interests. In a long-term perspective such a system cannot be stable and effective. […] Kadyrov’s system of administration in Chechnya is highly vulnerable and unstable, but from Moscow’s point of view this is not important: today the Kremlin does not control the situation and tomorrow, if something happens to Kadyrov’s clan, the Kremlin will not be able to control the situation either.”^[7]

The Kadyrovtsy remain in control, and Belkovskiy’s decade-old fears have not manifested. Alexander Dugin claims Chechenization was instrumental in cementing Mr. Putin’s broader political authority:

“Putin was promoted by the Atlanticists, liberals, and pro-Western oligarchs. His ‘patriotism’ was initially intended to be controlled and merely a front. […] The scriptwriters proposed to use Chechnya, which had previously played an important part in the Atlanticist project of Russian disintegration. This part of the plan worked as planned…The disintegration of the country and the separation of Chechnya were prevented. This is how Putin was legitimized.”^[8]

Russian Strategy and Non-Linear Warfare

One is unlikely to grasp Russian counterinsurgency strategy in the Syrian battlespace (or for that matter, the broader Levant) without first understanding the uniquely Russian neologism, non-linear war. That term (perhaps unsurprisingly) was coined by Vladislav Surkov — also credited for designing Mr. Putin’s earlier counterinsurgency strategy in Chechnya — in the 2014 short story, “Without Sky,” which he published under his nom de plume, Natan Dubovitsky.^[9] He describes “the first non-linear war” as supplanting “primitive wars” between two nations, or between coalitions of allies fighting “two on two, or three on one”; in non-linear war, it is “all on all.” Nations are rarely engaged, but instead cities and regions dominate the non-linear battlespace. They form opportunistic coalitions, and just as quickly dissolve them to form new ones, sometimes midstream. The battle — non-linear warfare’s “acute phase” — is but one element of warfare, and “not necessarily the most important one.”

Russia’s Syrian strategy derives from its understanding of non-linear warfare. It does not set out to retake Syrian national territory in its entirety. Rather, it pursues the twinned endpoints of a secure Alawi enclave^[10] in western Syria — one, like South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transdniestria, it can control through dependence upon Russian patronage — and finding Syrian Kadyrovtsy among the region’s Kurdish clans to secure the area along Syria’s northern border with Turkey.^[11]

The footprint of this strategy is clear in the region. In mid-January Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan accused Russia of targeting ethnic Turkmen in northwest Syria’s Bayırbucak region in Russia’s effort to establish a “boutique” quasi-state in northwest Syrian Latakia province. He claimed in a speech to ambassadors at the Presidential Palace in Ankara:

“Russia is not in the fight against Daesh, it is not giving a struggle against Daesh. On the contrary, Russia is currently preparing a place for itself with efforts to form a boutique Syrian state in Latakia and surrounding region and is continuously striking our Turkmen brothers.”^[12]

Western Kurdistan. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Mr. Erdoğan accused Russia of supporting Syrian airstrikes intended to clear ethnic Turkmens from the Bayirbucak region, claiming so far that some 40,000 people have been displaced to safe zones around Idlib and Latakia. A Turkish proxy force known variably as the Suriye Türkmen Ordusu (“Syrian Turkmen Army”) or Suriye Türkmen Tugayları (“Syrian Turkmen Brigades”) — the military wing of the political Suriye Türkmen Meclisi, (“Syrian Turkmen Assembly”) — is active in Latakia’s Bayırbucak region.^[13] Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova categorically rejected President Erdoğan’s accusation, stating “They are inventing, I can’t think of a different verb here, and disseminating various conspiracy theories about some true reasons of Russia (presence) in Syria.”^[14]

The Three Cantons of Western Kurdistan: Source: Wikimedia

Russia may find its Syrian Kadyrovtsy in the Kurdish Rojavayê Kurdistanê region of northern Syria, also known as “Western Kurdistan” or simply “Rojova.” Three noncontiguous enclaves there — the cantons of Cizre, Kobane, and Afrin — declared autonomy in January 2014. The Kurdish opposition political party Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (“Democratic Union Party”) controls the three cantons. It is affiliated politically with the larger Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (“Kurdistan Workers Party) commonly referred to by its Kurdish acronym, PKK.^[15] The PYD’s armed wing, the Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (variably the “People’s Protection Units” or “People’s Defense Units”), functions as a defense force for Rojava and is deeply engaged in combat operations against ISIS on five front lines across northern Syria.

There are many signs of Russian-YPG cooperation within the northern Syrian battlespace. Turkey’s semi-official Anadolu news agency reported that Russian aircraft are providing support for YPG ground forces.^[16] At the same time, YPG Commander Huseyin Kocer said that while Russian airstrikes were dealing a “a very serious blow” to ISIS, “the Turkish military has instead been attacking Kurdish areas.”^[17] The PYD intends to open a diplomatic mission in Russia according to an October 2015 Kommersant report.^[18] Russia declared the PYD “legitimate representatives of the Syrian opposition, with which Russian authorities intend to engage in dialogue in an effort to resolve the situation in this part of Syria.”^[19]

How might this play out? For the answer to that question, we return to Russia’s counterinsurgency campaign in Chechnya. There, Russian regular armed forces were supplemented by loyal paramilitary units — the composition of which included many boeviki or former insurgents who fought against the pro-Russian Chechen federal government during the battle phase (August 1999-May 2000) of the Second Chechen War — to engage Islamist insurgents on Chechen territory during the war’s insurgency phase (June 2000-April 2009).^[20]

Four pro-Russian paramilitaries were built around Chechen clan structures.^[21] The Kadyrovtsy aligned with the Russian Interior Ministry (aka the MVD, the acronym of the Russian transliteration Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del). The Yamadaevtsy comprised the Vostok (“East”) special battalion of the Russian Army’s Main Intelligence Directorate (aka the GRU, the acronym of the Russian transliteration Glavnoye razvedyvatel’noye upravleniye). The Kakiyevsky comprised the GRU’s Zapad (“West”) special battalion; it was the only paramilitary formation in which former boeviki did not comprise a majority, as the Kakiyevsky were aligned with the pro-Russian side since the conflict’s outbreak in 1992. The Baysarovtsy transformed over time from a praetorian guard into the Gorets (“Mountaineers”) special battalion of the Russian Federal Security Service (aka the FSB, the acronym of the Russian transliteration Federal’naya sluzhba bezopasnosti). The pro-Russian Chechen paramilitaries never comprised an especially large force — informed estimates suggest its ranks never exceeded 4000, and some suggest a number closer to 3000.^[22] Nonetheless the paramilitaries were highly effective (if often, brutally so) during the counterinsurgency phase of Russian operations in Chechnya.^[23]

Russia openly admitted in October 2015 that it is coordinating operations in Syria with Kurdish forces, which it claims to be arming through the Iraqi central government.^[24] Indigenous forces have, of course, frequently been deployed to assist in fighting insurgencies: there is, as Russia’s experience in Chechnya confirms, nothing new to this. In the Syrian battlespace, however, it also serves to correct the asymmetry that favors insurgents over stronger incumbents, which is the formers ability to leverage violent mobilization^[25] — for example, retaliating against an inhospitable local population — and support structures. Russia confronted this asymmetry in the First Chechen War (December 1994-August 1996) when it prevailed in the conflict’s conventional phase but not in the ensuing insurgency phase. Thus when conventional warfare broke out again in 1999, Russia mobilized the Kadyrovtsy, and used the Chechen clan code of retaliation as a basis to mobilize against the insurgents, erasing the asymmetry the insurgents heretofore enjoyed.^[26]

One challenge is that the forces in opposition to President Bashar al-Assad’s Ba’athist/Alawite Syria are (likely unintentionally) emulating Russian strategy during the First Chechen War.^[27] Russia learned that conflict’s lessons well: the empowerment of small-unit combat groups; a penchant for a nonlinear view of the battlespace; developing a robust capability to disseminate functional information to combat units; and a high degree of tactical decentralization of authority.^[28] The networked nature of Kurdish society, like Chechen society, is well suited for the nonlinear conflict in Syria.

Whether Russia’s counterinsurgency strategy can succeed in the Syrian battlespace remains to be seen, but irrespective it is preposterous to suggest Russia is guided solely by impulsive opportunism. It distracts from the more fundamental question whether a strategy that was orientated toward preserving Chechnya’s geographical integrity (and its attachment to Russia) can succeed in an environment in which Syria seems more likely to fractionate into rump statelets — a Ba’athist/Alawite Syria, a Sunni Syria, and a trans-border Kurdistan — with the very real possibility it might provoke a Sunni-Shi’a partitioning in neighboring Iraq.

Many Western critics of Mr. Putin see fit to animadvert at length about the deficiencies of Russia’s strategy in eastern Ukraine, overlooking the plain fact that Russia has largely succeeded in accomplishing a set of objectives there. It has created conditions under which Ukraine’s hoped-for accession to European Union and NATO membership is unlikely to proceed further; its proxy force established and enforces a geographic buffer into which Russian armed forces can move at will; it can destabilize the post-Maidan regime in Kyev at will; and it moved the Minsk process into what are now effectively bilateral Russian-Ukrainian discussions. That critics have consistently misjudged the importance Russia attaches to these objectives is evident in their continuing bewilderment over the cost, in short-term economic and diplomatic terms, that Mr. Putin has been willing to pay to achieve them, as well as the generalized failure of Western sanctions to influence Russian conduct except at the margin.

Mordant pronouncements about the shortcomings of Russian strategy in Syria (or indeed, whether Mr. Putin’s government even has one) more likely reflect a failure of analysis or understanding than insight. Given what is to some (the author included) the apparent incoherence of the United States’ strategy in the Syrian battlespace, perhaps a more reflective attitude is in order. Russia may indeed find its Syrian Kadyrovtsy. A Ba’athist/Alawite enclave may take form in Latakia, along with a Kurdish Rojova rump state in northern Syria. If so, the least of the United States’ concerns will be whether or not Mr. Putin has a coherent long-term strategy in Syria, because it will be evident that we do not.

The translation of all source material is by the author unless otherwise noted.

About the author:
*John R. Haines is a Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and Executive Director of FPRI’s Princeton Committee. Much of his current research is focused on Russia and its near abroad, with a special interest in nationalist and separatist movements. As a private investor and entrepreneur, he is currently focused on the question of nuclear smuggling and terrorism, and the development of technologies to discover, detect, and characterize concealed fissile material. He is also a Trustee of FPRI.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI

Notes:
[1] “James Clapper: Vladimir Putin in Syria is ‘winging this’.” CNN [published online 30 October 2015]. http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/29/politics/james-clapper-russia-syria-wingin…. Last accessed 13 January 2015.

One day recently, the New York Times, following Donald Trump’s lead, ran two articles that demonized China—although the elite newspaper did so much more subtly than the crudities of “the Donald.” One article talked about how China, through its trade with and investment in Iran, had allowed Iran to survive Western economic sanctions and now had the advantage over Western companies now that most such measures had been lifted. The article stated that China, to fuel its rapid economic growth, was thirsty for the cheaper oil from Iran (discounted to sell during the sanctions regime) and is also interested in a “silk road” strategy to extend its economic influence westward. The other article reported that the economies of poor African countries, whose exports of raw materials to the growing Chinese economy had allowed them to begin to grow out of poverty, were now crashing because of China’s slowing growth. As usual, both of the Times’ articles had a subtle odor unfavorable to China.

In U.S. foreign policy, the luxury of being probably the most intrinsically secure great power in human history—with large ocean moats, nuclear weapons, weak and friendly neighbors that make the probability of an attack from another great power extremely rare—has allowed the U.S. government and its citizens to be rather sanctimonious in telling other countries that they should improve themselves. In China’s case, the United States has repeatedly and publicly told China that it needs to improve its human rights record and has regarded China’s “economic penetration” of the developing world with suspicion. U.S. government broaching of the uncomfortable subject of the circumstances of dissidents with authoritarian regimes, such as China, is fine as long it is done behind closed doors. As Jimmy Carter found out during his presidency, publicly scolding such countries about human rights usually leads to a backlash that only harms the dissidents.

Both of the New York Times articles, as with many other U.S. media outlets, subtly demonize all China’s economic activities in the third world. They do so with few other countries, but do so with China because they are already gearing up for China to be the next rival superpower. Thus, all of China’s activities, including overseas trade and investment, must be regarded as trying to garner pernicious “influence” in the developing world. However, “economic penetration” (note the scary language), unlike military penetration is not a zero sum game. Economic transactions are mutually beneficial at both ends of the transaction. Thus, Chinese economic activities, even by state-owned enterprises, are much less scary than Soviet military stoking of armed communist rebellions in the developing world during the Cold War, which didn’t help the developing country or the United States.

In the aforementioned article on the economic penetration of Iran, the Chinese economic lifeline to Iran during the period of economic sanctions probably merely indicates that sanctions are being given too much credit for Iran’s agreement to limit its nuclear weapons. Economic sanctions, even multilateral ones, are often easy to evade, and there are elevated profits to be made in doing so. As for the economies of developing countries sagging because of China’s slowing growth, China undoubtedly would like to rectify this situation. And China should hardly be blamed for raising the standard of living in such countries in the first place by importing their raw materials. When China’s economy comes out of its slump (if you can call a remaining growth rate of more than five percent a slump), the economies of these developing countries also likely will rebound.

But what of China’s grabbing oil in the developing world? Doesn’t that harm the United States and its oil consumers by raising prices. In a study, the U.S. Energy Department said no, declaring that such Chinese activities were neutral to the U.S. petroleum market. In fact, because a worldwide market for oil exists, if anything, Chinese state-owned oil companies exploring for oil in the developing world—many times in places where private Western companies don’t find it profitable to do so—brings more oil onto the world market and may be a de facto subsidy for U.S. and other consumers of oil.

And what about China’s territorial claims in the East China and South China Seas at the expense of Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam and other countries in those regions? Although related to oil and natural resources on the seabed, these disputes are mainly nationalistic. One would never know it from American media reports, but other countries besides China have also reclaimed land on remote islands there to support their nationalist claims. Instead, of inserting itself further into this petty regional squabbling by deliberately sending U.S. warships into the contested areas, the United States should stay out of such faraway bickering that doesn’t affect America’s vital interests. U.S. meddling in such purely regional quarrels, however, could lead to an unnecessary and inadvertent nuclear confrontation with China.

Demonizing China, however subtly, by the U.S. media and government could lead to an unnecessary Cold War with that nation. For a long time, China prioritized economic growth over military power, but its military is now predictably growing as it gets richer–however, the powerful U.S. military is still light years ahead of its Chinese counterpart. In addition, a vast ocean separates China and the United States; the British took advantage of a similar oceanic security buffer in the nineteenth century to allow the United States, then a rival, to peacefully rise as a great power. The United States has the luxury of doing the same with China.

This article appeared at  Huffington Post and reprinted with permission.

Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi came under fire on Tuesdayafter ancient nude statues in Rome’s Capitoline Museum were covered up to avoid any possible offence to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani who is visiting the country.

Italy and Iran will sign up to €17 billion of business deals during the two day visit of the Iranian delegation which began on Monday (25 January), but Italian opposition leaders and commentators said Renzi had gone too far to please his guest.

Politicians on the left and right said not only had Renzi made almost no reference to Iran’s human rights record during a joint news conference, but had also “surrendered” Italy’s cultural identity by hiding the nude statues of women.

“Respect for other cultures cannot and must not mean negating our own,” said Luca Squeri, a lawmaker in former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s centre-right Forza Italia party. “This isn’t respect, it’s cancelling out differences and it’s a kind of surrender.”

At Iran’s request, Italy also kept wine off the menu at a ceremonial dinner on Monday evening.

Northern League deputy Barbara Saltamartini said covering the statues with white panels was an “act of submission,” while the party’s leader Matteo Salvini wrote on his Facebook page that it was “crazy”.

Gianluca Peciola, of the Left, Ecology and Freedom party, called on Renzi to explain “a disgraceful decision which is a mortification of art and culture as universal values”.

The 41-year-old Renzi met with similar criticism last year when he covered up nude pictures in the renaissance town hall of Florence, the city where he used to be mayor, on the occasion of a visit by the crown prince of the United Arab Emirates.

By Bhaskar Roy*

Between November 16 and December 01, 2015, Singapore authorities detained 27 Bangladeshi construction workers on charges of conspiring to carry out terrorist attacks on another country – Bangladesh, not Singapore.

This was recently disclosed by Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs. Of the 27 workers 26 were deported to Bangladesh after informing the Bangladeshi authorities. One worker is undergoing a jail sentence in Singapore for trying to leave the country illegally.

According to the MHA, the 26 were members of a close religious study group that subscribed to extremist ideology and studied the writings of radical leader Anwar-al-Awlaki, who was connected with the al-Qaeda. The MHA also stated that the Internal Security Department (ISD) of Singapore recovered a “significant amount” of radical and jihadi-related material such as books and videos containing footage of children being trained in jihadi camps. Additionally, documents with graphic images and instruction detailing how to conduct “silent killings’’ using different methods were recovered. Incidentally, the recent killing of secular bloggers in Bangladesh were done silently, using knives and machetes, not bombs or guns.

The ISD investigations revealed that this group sent monetary donations to groups in Bangladesh believed to be engaged in extremism. The group was trying to recruit other Bangladeshi workers to wage armed jihad against the government of Bangladesh. Their approach was similar to extremist Sunni terrorists, committed to killing other Muslims like the Shias and Ahmedias.

It is somewhat strange that the Bangladeshi authorities reacted only on January 21, after the Singapore MHA came out with the incident through a press release on January 20. The Dhaka Metropolitan Police Joint Commissioner Monirul Islam said in his statement that 14 of the group had been arrested, that none of them were linked to the Islamic State (IS) or al-Qaeda, but were connected to the Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), headed by Mufti Jashimuddin Rehmani. They were also supporters of the war criminal, Delwar Hossain Sayedee, leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI).

Under the conditions of Islamic threat that Bangladesh is currently facing, the police chief’s statement was anodyne, to say the least. He made no mention of the other 12 deportees from Singapore, whether they were in detention, being interrogated, or still being investigated.

The ABT appeared in Bangladesh in 2007 as Jama’atul Muslimeen, funded by several NGOs. When the Bangladeshi authorities clamped down on foreign funding, it ceased its activities. It reappeared in 2013 with renewed strength, changing its name to Ansarullah Bangla Team. It became clear that the organization adopted itself as a front for al-Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent (AQIS).Bangladeshi counter-terrorism has also ascertained that the ABT is supported by elements connected to JEI supporters and has closer connection with the Islamic Chhatra Shibir (ICS), the students’ wing of the JEI. If supported by the JEI, the ABT would not lack in funding as the JEI has legitimate and sub-legitimate earnings through its enterprises, and receives unregistered donations from its members and supporters.

The expose` of the Singapore module suggests that it may be receiving funding from its members and supporters in the Middle East and Saudi Arabia, where a large number of Bangladeshis work in blue-collared jobs. Many of them in the past have contributed to other extremist Islamic organizations, most notably the Jamatul Mujahidin Bangladesh (JMB) and others. This is one channel of funding that the Bangladesh government has found difficult to choke, since such fundings do not necessarily come through bank transfers but through workers coming home for holidays or after their job contracts end, and through hawala transaction. Not deterred by the Singapore deportation, the ABT recently sent a letter to the Press Club at Natore, Bangladesh, threatening to assassinate the Bangladesh Minister of State for ICT, Zunaid Ahmed Palak, who is from Natore, and 21 others, including two local members of parliament also from Natore. The letter stated that another list of targets would be released soon. The local police believe the letter was sent to create panic, but the matter was being investigated seriously. The ABT was banned officially by the Bangladesh government in May, 2015, after a series of attacks and assassination of atheist bloggers between 2013 and 2015 and a bank heist in April 2015.

Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina had promised that her top priority was eradication of terrorism, and she kept her promise. But in the last one year at least, she has been overwhelmed. In 2011, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HUT), an insidious Islamic organization which took birth in 1952 in Jerusalem, and wants to establish an Islamic caliphate, tried to oust her and her government. Other attempts were made on her life in a conspiracy between elements of the BNP and the Islamic terrorist group HUJI, which has links with Pakistan’s ISI. She, her government and her country are consistently threatened by the JMB, which has support from the BNP and JEI. To top it all, she had political challenges but succeeded in transforming her country, which Henry Kissinger had labelled “a basket case,” to a nation with the highest human development indicators in South Asia.

What she requires is unstinted support from neighbours and western powers who have tried to play “good boys’’ with Bangladeshi Islamic extremists and destructive political parties who are still opposed to the independence of Bangladesh in 1971.The trial of the 1971 war criminals, who indulged in mass rape and killing during the Liberation War on behalf of the Pakistani army, is being seen by the successors of the anti independence groups as an existential threat,

On the one hand, it appears that Bangladesh may be emerging as a battle ground between the IS and al-Qaeda. The IS has adopted the JMB as their ideological compatriots in Bangladesh, and rejected the JEI. On the other hand, the JEI elements appear to have aligned with the al-Qaeda with whom they appear to have a shared ideology.

The JMB has already infiltrated parts of neighbouring India as the Burdwan (W.Bengal) blasts revealed. Simultaneously, the Ansar-ut-Tawhid fi Bilal al-Hind (AUT), an IS front in South Asia, is taking roots in India as recent arrests and investigations by Indian counter-terrorism agencies have revealed. These developments cannot be dealt with in terms of vote bank politics in both India and Bangladesh.

Finally, the deportees from Singapore may not have plotted any action in the country itself. But Singapore will be negligent if it does not take this development seriously. This city state is tiny compared to other countries. The dream of a caliphate of both IS and al-Qaeda includes South East Asia. Islamic terrorism is spreading like wild fire, as the recent bombings in Jakarta exemplify. Malaysia is also very much on the screen, as are parts of the Philippines. Reports are available that the Indian Ocean state of Maldives has been affected by extreme Islamic ideology which has been metamorphosing there for some years and may be becoming more acute.

Having said the above, Bangladesh and India are in the cross-hairs of deadly Islamic extremism.

*The writer is a Delhi-based strategic analyst. He can be reached at email grouchohart@yahoo.com

By Tushar Ranjan Mohanty*

Shocking memories of the gruesome attack on December 16, 2014, at the Army Public School (APS) Peshawar were revived when terrorists stormed the Bacha Khan University in the Charsadda District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) on January 20, 2016, killing at least 21 persons and causing injuries to another 35. The victims included 17 students, two gardeners, a caretaker and a professor. The attack ended with all the four attackers shot dead after a three hour operation. Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG), Mardan Range, Mohammad Saeed Wazir, who led the operation, declared, “Our cops fought bravely to shoot dead all the four attackers one by one. They were wearing suicide jackets but none of them could succeed in blowing himself up.” The mastermind of the APS Peshawar attack, Khalifa Umar Mansoor aka Aurangzeb, of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)’s Geedar faction claimed the attack through a post on his Facebook page. However, the ‘central spokesperson’ of the TTP, Muhammad Khorasani, denied any involvement stating, “The TTP and its amir Maulana Fazalullah have nothing to do with the attack.” The TTP has three prominent factions – Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), the Geedar faction and the Mehsud faction (also known as Sajna faction). The parent TTP is led by Mullah Fazlullah.

A day earlier, on January 19, 2016, a TTP suicide bomber targeted the tribal Khasadar (locally raised security formations selected from each tribe) force at the Karkhano checkpost, the entry-point to Peshawar from the Khyber Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and killed 12 persons, including a journalist, Mehboob Shah Afridi, while 39 others sustained injuries. Afridi, president of the Tribal Union of Journalists, Khyber Agency chapter, was talking to the Line Officer Nawab Shah at the time of the attack.

In the latest of a series of attacks on Security Force (SF) personnel, unidentified terrorists shot dead two personnel of the Police Elite Force Unit in the Rasheed Ghari area of Peshawar on January 22. Superintendent of Police (SP) Imtiaz disclosed that the Policemen were trained in the use of security scanners. The motorcycle-riding assailants escaped from the site of the attack.

According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database, KP has recorded at least 27 terrorism-related fatalities, including 21 civilians, four terrorists and two SF personnel, in the first 22 days of the current year, 2016. During the same period of the preceding year the Province had recorded 18 such fatalities, including eight civilians, eight terrorists and two SF personnel, indicating a definite increase in the level of terrorist violence.

While the trend in 2016 is nascent, it conforms to the trajectory established over the preceding six months, as compared to the first six months of 2015. While total fatalities stood at 119 (63 civilians, 23 SF personnel, 33 terrorists) between January and June 2015, they increased to 149 (54 civilians, 53 SF personnel, 42 terrorists) between July and December 2015. Significantly, the two major incidents of January 2016 followed the December 29, 2015, attack in which a suicide bomber had blown himself up at the gate of National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) office located on the Link Road in Mardan town, killing 26 people and injuring 50. The blast took place at a time when the office was crowded, with people lining up to apply for Computerised National Identity Cards (CNICs). The JuA, a TTP splinter, claimed responsibility for the attack.

It will clearly be a major challenge in 2016 to sustain the declining trend of fatalities recorded in the Province since 2014 on an year on year basis. Terrorism-related fatalities recorded a sharp decline from 617 fatalities (406 civilians, 108 SF personnel and 103 terrorists) in 2014, to 268 fatalities, including 117 civilians, 76 SF personnel and 75 terrorists, in 2015. This was the lowest number of such fatalities recorded in the Province since the formation of TTP in 2007. At its peak in 2009, terrorism in the Province had accounted for 5,497 fatalities (1,229 civilians, 471 SF personnel, 3,797 terrorists).

Other parameters of violence also saw a drop. The Province recorded six suicide attacks resulting in 63 fatalities and 113 injured through 2015, as against nine such attacks recorded in 2014, resulting in 196 fatalities and 260 injured. KP also saw 19 major attacks (each resulting in three or more fatalities) causing 133 deaths in 2015, as against 49 major attacks accounting for 436 deaths in 2014. The number of explosions and resulting fatalities stood at 40 and 77 respectively through 2015, as against 109 and 354, respectively, in 2014. Violent incidents in 2015 were reported from 21 of the 26 Districts in the Province. In 2014, violent incidents were reported from 22 Districts. The number of sectarian attacks decreased from nine in 2014 to five in 2015, though the resultant fatalities increased to 28 in 2015 from 18 in 2014. As in 2014, Peshawar, the provincial capital, remained the worst affected District through 2015, recording 74 terrorism-related incidents, in which 99 people were killed and another 91 were injured.

Nevertheless, the attack on January 20, 2016, clearly demonstrates that the terrorists retain capacities to execute significant attacks at will. Moreover, through 2015, the number of terrorists neutralized in the Province stood at 75, the lowest since 2006, when it was 27. However, an assessment on the implementation of the National Action Plan (NAP), undertaken in the wake of the Peshawar APS attack, which was released on November 11, 2015, stated that SFs in the Province have made over 10,000 arrests, 22,000 detentions and 508 search and strike operations from December 17, 2014 to October 31, 2015. However, the rise in extortion activities and the recent incidents of killing in the Province raise doubts over the quality and impact of such arrests and detentions.

In the interim, the Government has sought repeatedly to buy peace with the terrorists, and SF operations have slowed down in the Province. Expectedly, the terrorists are using this phase of relative peace to regroup and regain their strength, with rampant extortion to shore up their war chest. The worrisome growth of extortion activities in the Province in general and in provincial capital Peshawar in particular is a matter of concern. Peshawar has emerged as a second extortion capital, after Karachi, in recent times. According to Peshawar Police data released on November 14, 2015, as many as 58 cases of extortion had been reported under separate Police Stations falling under three Police Circles over the preceding 10 months. Of these, 38 were reported in the Peshawar Cantonment Circle; 14 in Peshawar City Circle; and six in the Peshawar Rural Circle. An unnamed Police official, on the condition of anonymity, is reported to have stated that the actual incidence would likely be much higher, because most victims don’t contact the Police out of fear. Data collected from the Central Police Office, Peshawar, puts the annual average of extortion cases registered during years 2011, 2012, and 2013, at 30 per year. 13 cases of extortion were registered in 2011; 21 in 2012; 56 in 2013. The figure rose abruptly to 285 cases in the first three quarters of 2014.

In another worrying development, the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant [ISIL, later, the Islamic State (IS) or Daesh] appears to be making inroads in the already volatile region. Pamphlets and hate materials were recovered and suspected persons linked with the outfit were arrested through 2015. On May 15, 2015, Police arrested two suspects during a raid for allegedly circulating Daesh literature in the Nauthia area of Peshawar. Similarly, on July 2, 2015, Police arrested three suspected terrorists said to be inspired by the Islamic State from the Shamshadu Bazaar area of Peshawar. Inspector General of Police (IGP), KP, Nasir Khan Durrani conceded, “IS’s presence in Pakistan is not a new phenomenon, members who belonged to the outlawed TTP have switched sides in some cases. It is wrong to say IS does not have a presence in KP.”

Meanwhile, Islamabad has demonstrated extraordinary ambivalence towards ending the menace of terrorism. According to a January 23, 2016, report, the Federal Government has failed to respond to the KP Government’s request for a PKR 66.280 billion special security package for the Province, made on March 24, 2015. Concerned officials told the media, on January 22, 2016, that the KP Government had written again to the Federal Finance Ministry on December 31, 2015, reminding it of the Province’s financial needs for security. No response had been received.

Worse, instead of working for the de-weaponisation of society, the Government appears to be promoting the menace of a gun culture. On January 14, 2015, in a bizarre response to the Peshawar APS attack, the KP Government granted male teachers permission to carry licensed weapons in school. Media reports on April 19, 2015, quoting the statistical documents submitted by the Provincial Home and Tribal Affairs Department to the Provincial Assembly, disclosed that licenses for around 161,441 prohibited bore weapons had been issued since May 2013. According to documents submitted, Bannu District topped the list with around 66,000 licences issued. When contacted, Bannu Deputy Commissioner Mohammad Ayaz Khan stated, on April 19, 2015, that the issuance of 66,000 licences in the District during the preceding two years was astonishing: “I doubt this figure. Let me check it because I don’t believe that licences would have been issued in such a large number.”

Against the Government’s lackadaisical approach, the terrorists continue to issue new threats. Following the December 29, 2015, attack targeting NADRA, JuA ‘spokesman’, Ehsanullah Ehsan, had warned, “NADRA is an integral part of the State and any such targets that directly or indirectly work for the State will be our target.” Most recently, on January 22, 2016, releasing a video showing four attackers involved in January 20, 2016, University attack, Umar Mansoor warned, “Now we will not kill the soldier in his cantonment, the lawyer in the court or the politician in Parliament but in the places where they are prepared, the schools, the universities, the colleges that lay their foundation. With the mercy of god, our attacks on all universities and schools will continue.”

The Bacha Khan University attack has once again underscored Pakistan’s enormous vulnerabilities, particularly to soft target attacks, as well as the capacity and intent of terrorist formations to inflict harm on the country’s social and political fabric. The state is yet to demonstrate the will and the capacity to wipe out terrorism, and state agencies remain deeply embroiled with a range of terrorist factions operating across international borders. Widespread weaponisation of non-state actors and active collusion of state agencies have created an environment in which terrorism – including domestic groups that have gone rogue and target the state itself – flourishes. The transient rise and fall of trends in domestic terrorist violence are yet to alter the fundamental and perverse realities of Pakistan.

* Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

By Nijeesh N.*

As Assam recorded the lowest insurgency-related fatalities in 2015, since 1992, hopes of a lasting peace were regenerated. Nevertheless, enduring challenges have scuttled such hopes in the past, and many of these remain unaddressed. Significantly, the trend of overall fatalities has remained erratic in the State, recording a sustained decline between 2010 and 2012 (158 in 2010; 94 in 2011 and 91 in 2012); escalated in 2013 to 101; and took Assam to the status of the worst-affected State in India, with 305 fatalities in 2014.

According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) insurgency-related violence accounted for a total of 59 deaths, including 48 militants, 10 civilians and one Security Force (SF) trooper through 2015. In comparison, 2014 had recorded 305 killings, including 184 civilians, 116 militants and five SF personnel. Prior to this, the lowest insurgency-related fatalities in the State stood at 91 (55 militants, 32 civilians, four SF personnel) in 2012. At the peak of insurgency, Assam had recorded 783 fatalities (531 civilians, 180 militants, 72 SF personnel) in 1998.

In 2016, there have been just two fatalities – one civilian and a militant – in the State, till date. A cadre of the National Santhal Liberation Army (NSLA), an Adivasi (aboriginal tribal people) militant group, identified as Ram Kishku aka Ram Hembrom, was killed in an encounter with Assam Police near Grahampur under Srirampur Police outpost in the Gossaigaon Subdivision of Kokrajhar District on January 13, 2016. Earlier on January 1, 2016, in a clash that took place inside the Sudempuri Camp in Kokrajhar District, where surrendered National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) cadres have been kept, one Darendra Basumatary was killed and another militant, Aninda, was injured, when the accused, Rakesh Brahma, opened fire at them after a fight. Police subsequently arrested Rakesh Brahma along with his weapon. The trio had surrendered in 2006.

Crucially, the number of civilians killed through 2015 (at 10) was the lowest since 1992. Earlier, the lowest figure in this category was 32 in 2012. The civilian population in the State thus appears to be more secure than it has been for nearly a quarter of a century – the single most significant achievement of the year.

Similarly, with just one SF trooper killed in 2015, this was also the lowest SF fatality since 1992. In 2014, SF fatalities stood at five; the highest number of SF fatalities were recorded way back in 1996, when 87 personnel had been killed fighting the insurgents.

48 militants were killed through 2015, as against 116 through 2014. The fall in this category coincided with overall decline in total fatalities, and can mainly be ascribed to the fact the SF operations have forced the militants to scale down their activities in the State, even as the progressive splintering of the principal militant formations has undermined their operational capacities. Significantly, 2015 saw the best SF/militant kill ratio recorded in the State, at 1:48. At the peak of insurgency, in 1996, the ratio stood at 1:0.7.

Most militant formations operating in Assam continued to suffer losses in 2015. Of the 48 militants killed, the I.K. Songbijit faction of the NDFB (NDFB-IKS) lost the largest number in clashes with SFs, 23; followed by Karbi People’s Liberation Tigers (KPLT), 11; the Action faction of Dima Halim Daogah (DHD-A), two; Jabinkhe Naiso Boshom (JNB), two; the Original faction of the United Democratic Liberation Front (UDLF-O), two. One cadre each of the Independent faction of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA-I), Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA), Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO), Dima Hasao National Army (DHNA) and United Peoples Liberation Front (UPLF) were also killed. Group affiliation of the remaining three militants killed was not specified. The prominent militants killed included, DHD-A ‘chairman and commander-in-chief’, Sibu Kemprai and a founding member of the group, Nigam Phonglo. Of 10 civilian killings, ULFA-I was responsible for five and NDFB-IKS for two. The remaining three killings in this category remained unattributed. NDFB-IKS was responsible for the lone SF killing in 2015.

SFs arrested 602 militants of different outfits during 2015. These included 234 belonging to NDFB-IKS; followed by KPLT, 58; ULFA-I, 37; NSLA, 22; Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), 20; Muslim Tiger Force of Assam (MTFA), 19; CPI-Maoist, 19; GNLA, 18; United People’s Liberation Army (UPLA), 11; and Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA), 10. 405 militants had been arrested through 2014.

On August 14, 2015, SFs arrested 12 KPLT militants, including its self-styled ‘chairman’ Sarmung Timung, from the forested area of East Karbi Anglong in Karbi Anglong District. After the operation, Defence Public Relations Officer (PRO), Lieutenant Colonel Suneet Newton stated, “This operation has practically put an end to KPLT in East Karbi Anglong.”

Similarly, following the killing of the NSLA militant in the January 13, 2016, encounter in Kokrajhar District, Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) Inspector General of Police (IGP), L.R. Bishnoi asserted that, with the elimination of NSLA militant Ram Hembrom, the area would be peaceful to a great extent, as most disruptive activities were carried out under his command. He said the total strength of the NSLA was around 40, of which 22 were arrested in 2015, four were killed in different encounters and the remaining cadres were involved in criminal activities.

Notably, SFs had launched ‘Operation All Out’ to flush out militants after the NDFB-IKS militants massacred over 69 Adivasis on December 23, 2014. The operation, in which Indian Air Force, Army, Paramilitary Forces and State Police work together, is still on.

Meanwhile, other parameters of violence, including major incidents, Districts affected by violence, killing of non-locals, etc., recorded sharp declines as well.

As against 18 major incidents (each involving three or more fatalities) resulting in 181 deaths recorded in 2014, 2015 saw just two such incidents, accounting for six deaths. Further, the number of Districts from where the fatalities were reported stood at 13 in 2015 as compared to 19 in 2014, out of a total of 32 Districts in the State (including five new Districts created in 2015; Biswanath Chariali, Hojai, West Karbi Anglong, Charaideu and South Salmara-Mankachar). The Districts from where killings were reported in 2015 were Karbi Anglong (12), Kokrajhar (12), Dima Hasao (9), Chirang (6), Sonitpur (5), Dhubri (2), Karimganj (2), Sivasagar (2), Tinsukia (2), Udalguri (2), Darrang (1), Goalpara (1), and Lakhimpur (1). In 2015, five non-locals were killed as against eight such deaths recorded in 2014. However, the number of attacks on non-locals increased from three in 2014 to four in 2015. ULFA-I was responsible for all the four attacks against non-locals in 2015. No such attacks had been reported through 2012 and 2013. Also, the number of explosions decreased from 20 in 2014 to just six in 2015, and resultant fatalities reduced from eight in 2014 to two in 2015.

Reported incidents of abduction and extortion by militants also fell during the year 2015. According to Assam Police records, there were 5,192 cases of abductions registered in the State in 2015 (data till October); as against 5,378 cases in 2014. The data further shows that there were 1,157 extortion-related cases registered in 2015 (data till October); as against 1,357 in 2014. Though most of the abductions were carried out by criminals, the Home Department records did not rule out the role of militant outfits of the region in some of the incidents.

The process of talks with some militants group also continued through 2015. In a major development, on November 11, 2015, Bangladesh handed over the ‘general secretary’ of the undivided ULFA, Golap Baruah aka Anup Chetia, and two of his prison mates who were arrested along with him in Bangladesh in 1997, to Indian Security Agencies. Soon thereafter, Chetia was brought to India, and was placed under arrest in connection with various cases of extortion, abduction, murder and attempt to murder. He was released on bail on December 24, 2015, and has made a commitment to participate in ongoing talks between ULFA-I and the Government. Seven leaders of the Pro-Talks faction of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA-PTF), including Anup Chetia and ‘chairman’ Arabinda Rajkhowa, met interlocutor P.C. Haldar at the Border Security Force (BSF) camp in Patgaon in Guwahati on January 21, 2016, and discussed issues concerning the ongoing talks with the Centre. After the meeting, Rajkhowa said that Chetia’s inclusion would give a fresh impetus to the talks and a solution would soon be worked out with the Government.

13 militant groups are currently under Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreements with the Government, and another four groups – Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT), United People’s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS), Dilip Nunisa faction of Dima Halim Daogah (DHD-N) and Jewel Garlosa faction of DHD (DHD-J) – have signed Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) agreements with the Government. However, no new SoOs or MoSs were signed in 2015.

Despite these broad gains, the State continues to face challenges from various insurgent groups. Then Director General of Police (DGP) Khagen Sarma in his farewell speech on November 30, 2015, observed,

Militancy might be on the decline in the State but it was far from over. Though agreements have been signed with four militant groups and 13 others are in talks with the Government, some breakaway factions of these groups, which are yet to join the peace process, remain a worry for the security forces…

Again, on December 26, 2015, he had noted “Assam has religious fundamentalists and that has generated a lot of interest in the ISIS. Hits in the Internet photos of ISIS are very high in Assam.”

Raising similar concerns, the new DGP of Assam, Mukesh Sahay, stated on November 30, 2015,

We cannot lower our guards or sit back and relax. Militancy can rise from the ashes and we have to come up to meet the challenges. Militancy may have declined but it has the potential to reignite. We have to be constantly on alert and formulate our response to any situation.

Echoing these views, Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi observed, on November 6, 2015, “Islamic outfits, Maoists and all other insurgent organizations are trying to create trouble in the State, but we are vigilant, containing insurgency is the single-most (important) achievement of my three terms in office but there are several forces trying to destabilise the State and its development.”

Indeed, State Parliamentary Affairs Minister Rockybul Hussain on December 8, 2015, had informed the State Assembly, that eight militant groups – ULFA-I, NDFB-IKS, KPLT, KLO, CPI-Maoist, MULTA, JMB and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) – were presently active in Assam. Among these, NDFB-IKS and ULFA-I dominated insurgent activities in the State in 2015.

Reports also indicate that ULFA-I, NDFB-IKS, KLO and the Khaplang faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K) had jointly formed the United National Liberation Front of Western South East Asia (UNLFWSEA), a common front of militant groups in India’s Northeast region. Different ethnic armed groups (EAGs) continued with efforts to engage in disruptive activities and had formed this united platform – UNLFWSEA; they were also developing a nexus with transnational jihadi groups and Maoists, increasing the threat potential in the State.

The entrenched dangers of Islamist terrorism continued to haunt the State through 2015. According to a May 21, 2015, report, a JMB militant, Lal Mohammed aka Ibrahim, who was arrested on April 18, 2015, by Jharkhand Police, revealed to his interrogators that his group’s sabotage plans in Assam were intended to counter Bodo aggression. According to a report dated, September 20, 2015, the Guwahati Police also warned that some Islamic terror groups had started recruiting Muslim youth in the Bodoland Districts of Chirang, Kokrajhar and Baksa, with the intention of triggering fresh violence during the run-up to the 2016 State Assembly elections. Notably, two modules of JMB detected in the State were in the Barpeta and Nalbari Districts, situated close to the Bodoland Territorial Area Districts (BTAD). The JMB modules were exposed in the countrywide crackdown in the aftermath of the October 2, 2014 Burdwan blasts.

Worryingly, on September 16, 2015, Police and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) neutralized a jihadi training camp and arrested three suspected extremists, identified as Minarul Islam, Bodiul Zamal Sekh, and Zohorul Haque from the Daukhanagar area under the Dhaligaon Police Station of Chirang District. According to the Police, at least nine persons from Barpeta, Bongaigaon, Baksa, Nalbari and Kokrajhar were undergoing training at the residence of a man identified as Iman Ali. Subsequently, on September 18, 2015, Police recovered eight handmade AK Rifles and two handmade INSAS Rifles from the backyard of the house of another person, Mohammad Sayed Mia, allegedly associated with the training camp. Though exact information about the group behind the training camp is yet to come to light, unconfirmed sources from the Police disclosed that the Islamic extremist MULTA was the brain behind the training camp. Intelligence Bureau (IB) reports also suggest that JMB uses MULTA as the umbrella organization of various jihadi elements in Assam to carry out organizational activities, including collecting money, and imparting basic motivation and training to youth who are willing to join.

Further, according to an October, 8, 2015, report, the Maoists continue to struggle to gain a foothold in the Northeast and they are tapping a ‘wide’ range of allies’, including rhino poachers in Kaziranga and the major militant groups operating in the region, including the Isak-Muivah faction of NSCN (NSCN-IM). Another report published on October 20, 2015, claimed that the Maoists were making fresh recruitments, particularly targeting youth aged 12 years and above, as they were running short of manpower in Assam. The seven Upper Assam Districts of Dhemaji, Jorhat, Lakhimpur, Dibrugarh, Tinsukia, Sivasagar and Golaghat, with Districts bordering the neighbouring Hill States, are believed to be vulnerable to Maoist mobilization, while the belt along the Brahmaputra River is also thought to be susceptible. Though arms’ training of recruits is largely located outside Assam, political mobilization imparted to them in Upper Assam itself.

While the Central Forces with the help of the State Police have succeeded in minimizing the threat from insurgency, neutralizing the remaining challenges to establish a lasting peace will require a significant strengthening of the State Police Forces, as well as concerted efforts on the developmental and administration fronts. The Assam Government has introduced the Centre’s ‘SMART [Strict and Sensitive, Modern and Mobile, Alert and Accountable, Reliable and Responsive, Techno savvy and Trained] Police’ initiative, to make the Police more responsive, tech savvy, physically fit, alert with a modern outlook and scientific temper. However, manpower in the Police Force continues to remain low. According to Assam Police records, 12,805 posts out of the 64,988 sanctioned posts in the Police Department are vacant. This included 26 posts of Indian Police Service (IPS) out of total 135 sanctioned. The Assam Police Department issued an official notification for recruitment to 2,564 posts in various categories in December 2015.

Though levels of violence have come down considerably, extremist undercurrents and the nexus between ethnic militants, Islamic jihadists and Maoists create enduring vulnerabilities. The presence of pan-Islamist terrorist networks, combined with the porous border with Bangladesh, and Maoist ambitions in the region, add fuel to ongoing ethnic insurgencies in the region. Former DGP Khagen Sarma noted that “ethnic and other militants come and immediately unleash their violence. Religious fundamentalists prepare and take a long time to commit crime.” It is within this context of both immediate and long term threats that the State must fashion its policies and align its capacities of response.

* Nijeesh N.
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

Saudi Arabia, one year after King Salman acceded to the throne and nine months after appointing his favourite – young and inexperienced – son, Mohammed bin Salman Deputy Crown Prince (DCP), is grappling with not merely an increasingly relentless power struggle, compounded by an unprecedented devastating plunge in oil prices, but far more ominously the ruinous implications of a highly aggressive foreign policy that has ultimately led to a full-blown costly yet futile war against the Houthi-rebels in Yemen, and has increasingly fuelled proxy sectarian wars in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon.

The Saudi regime has made no secret that the overarching goal of its newly adopted muscular foreign policy, which is aggressively spearheaded by Mohammed bin Salman, is to counter what it perceives as Iran’s growing yet highly perilous influence.

Surprisingly, however, the German Foreign Intelligence BND publically acknowledged, on Dec. 2, that Saudi Arabia at the behest of Mohammed bin Salman — who is striving to become the next King — is increasingly shifting to an impulsive and interventionist foreign policy, swiftly turning Riyadh into a major destabilising force in the Middle East.

Amid the mounting fear of further terrorist atrocities in European cities by the Islamic State, following the Nov. 13 Paris terrorist attacks, the German Vice-Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel, on Dec 6, scathingly scolded the Saudi regime for funding extremists in the West and around the world by building and funding radical Wahhabi Mosques. The Head of the SPD group in the German Parliament Thomas Oppermann, went even further, forcefully emphasizing that Wahhabism the formal religion of Saudi Arabia has offered a comprehensive ideology for ISIL and Al Qaeda.

Although the German Government rapidly scrambled to distance itself from the report, however, the BND’s assessment has unquestionably gained added weight by Mohammed bin Salman’s highly impulsive declaration, on Dec. 15, of forming a 34-nation anti-terror Islamic military coalition – which strikingly resembles the Saudi-led Arab coalition in Yemen in terms of its starkly anti-Shia sectarian nature and the way it was introduced by MbS in March 2015 – without consulting the overwhelming majority of countries mentioned. Mohammed bin Salman’s highly controversial declaration came, a day after Obama’s call – at the U.S. National Security Council – on Saudi Arabia to focus more on confronting ISIL rather than on Yemen.

Saudi Arabia ushered out 2015 with 157 executions, breaking all records since 1995. It herald the beginning of 2016 by executing a record number of 47 people, sending out a chillingly barbarous message to the people of Saudi Arabia: All those who dare to defy, oppose or merely demand an end to Riyadh’s dictatorship, whether through terrorism like Al Qaida and ISIL or via peaceful nonviolent protests like Shiekh Nimr Baqir Al-Nimr – who was undeniably the driving force behind the 2011 popular uprising, clamouring for democracy and an end to virulently sectarian discrimination against the Shia – would beyond doubt have their heads chopped off and their dead bodies crucified as they would at the hands of ISIL. But, even more menacingly is the inescapable reality that such monstrous punishments are issued, in both Saudi Arabia and under ISIL rule, by religious courts adhering to the extremist hard-line Wahhabi Salafi idiology, propagated and exported by Saudi Arabia’s government-funded Wahhabi Salafi Religious Establishment.

The Saudi regime’s highly unusual step of executing a prominent religious leader like Al-Nimr was deliberately intended to spark spontaneous outrage and thereby provoke an uncalculated retaliation, from above all Iran. Hence, effectively turning Riyadh into the main victim of the crisis. As such, the storming of the Saudi embassy in Tehran was music to the Saudi ears, prompting it, on Jan 3, to cut off not only diplomatic and economic ties, but more significantly to the Saudi regime, preventing its Shia citizens from travelling to Iran.

As Salman acceded to the throne, on Jan 23, after the death of his half-brother King Abdullah, he swiftly scrambled to shore up his position by: First, ripping the power base of Abdullah’s son – Metab – apart by dismissing his father’s chief of the Royal Court and his two brothers. Second, elevating Muqrin from DCP to Crown Prince (CP), despite his knowledge that Muqrin was specifically appointed DCP by Abdullah to ensure that he returns the throne to Metab. In essence, Salman’s decision was driven by fear that ousting Muqrin would rock the boat. Third, securing the internal front while also appeasing the U.S. by determining that Mohammed bin Nayef, who is the Interior Minister and also considered U.S.’s most trusted ally, should be the first among the Grandsons of Abdulaziz – usually called Ibn Saud – in line to the throne. Fourth, bolstering his young son’s Mohammed bin Salman power, by appointing him as Defence Minister and Head of the Economic and Development Council.

But as It became increasingly evident that the war unleashed by Mohammed bin Salman, in Mar 2015, in Yemen, which was partly aimed at rapidly propelling him to prominence, was a spectacular failure, and amid Mohammed bin Salman’s profound worries that his father’s – who is in poor health – death would terminate his ambitions. Consequently, on Apr 29, Salman ousted Muqrin, while promoting Mohammed bin Nayef to become CP and defiantly promoting Mohammed bin Salman to DCP.

Yet, paradoxically, Salman’s move has not only irrefutably amplified Mohammed bin Salman’s vulnerability by practically demonstrating that a new king does not have to stick with his predecessor’s choice of DCP, but far more critically, deepening the distrust between Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Nayef and thereby injecting new urgency to Mohammed bin Salman’s strenuous drive to dislodge Mohammed bin Nayef. And although Salman’s highly divisive declaration infuriated the royal family, it was however incontestably, his first formal visit, in early Sept 2015, to the U.S. accompanied by his son Mohammed bin Salman – who was fervently welcomed by Obama and top U.S. officials – that pushed the long-simmering power struggle to perilously destabilising levels, prompting senior members of the royal family, on Sept 28, to uncharacteristically throw caution to the wind, forcefully calling for a palace coup to depose Salman, Mohammed bin Nayef and Mohammed bin Salman.

To make matters worse, this coincided with a double disaster at Mecca, essentially exacerbating an increasingly pervading atmosphere of an inherently incompetent leadership that is conspicuously incapable of adequately managing the hajj pilgrimage, from which it draws its ultimate legitimacy in leading the Islamic world.

Riyadh’s decision to push the sectarian tension to boiling point was internally intended to: First, stave off an internal uprising in the Sunni heartland by trumpeting the patently deceitful myth that Saudi Arabia is still the guardian of Sunni Islam and above all, is heavily engaged in combating an existential threat posed by the Shia, namely Iran.

Second, with tumbling oil prices and an unimaginable budget deficit, compelling Riyadh to raise taxes and also to compensate for its inability to rely heavily – as both King Abdullah during the Arab Spring and King Salman when acceding to the throne – on its most potent weapon to head off and curb popular dissent: vast oil revenue. Third, lending credence to its claims of facing an immensely serious national security threat, enabling Salman and MbS to call into question the very patriotism of those challenging their authority and therefore severely undermine the growing campaign, spearheaded by senior members of the younger generation of the royal family, to replace Salman with his full Sudairi brother, 73-years-old Ahmed.

While externally Riyadh aimed to: First, sabotage, or at the very least, discredit the Nuclear deal signed, on Jul 14, between Iran and the P 5+1, – which Riyadh has tenaciously resisted every inch of the way, insisting that the U.S.’s overriding priority should persistently be isolating and containing Iran – by practically highlighting to the U.S. and its allies that Iran is utterly unreliable. Indeed, the lifting of sanctions imposed on Iran, on Jan 16, was by far the most devastating blow to the Saudi regime.

But, to add insult to injury, even Riyadh’s staunchest allies in the GCC -except Bahrain which was invaded and still occupied by Saudi Arabia since the Arab Spring – and among Arab countries – except Sudan and Djibouti – have fiercely resisted severing diplomatic ties. Second, resurrect Mohammed bin Salman’s 34-nation Islamic alliance – which has so far failed to materialise – and also reviving Mohammed bin Salman’s faltering Arab alliance in Yemen, by employing the highly incendiary sectarian confrontation as the perfect pretext to rally sectarian support for such emphatically anti-Shia coalitions.

Third, critically undermine the painstakingly negotiated Russian-U.S. roadmap, unanimously endorsed, on Dec 18, by UN-Security Council resolution number 2254, explicitly stressing that Syria’s president Bashar Al Assad’s future must be exclusively decided by the Syrian people. In the eyes of Riyadh this clearly marked a severe blow to its implacable campaign to topple Assad. Riyadh’s invitation to Syrian opposition groups, on Dec 8, was designed to thwart resolution 2254, by signalling that it is the one calling the shots by forming, monopolising and incorporating representatives of terrorist organisations within the opposition’s negotiating team. Indeed, Riyadh has consistently been blaming Obama’s administration for its indecisive leadership while also furiously lashing out against the highly effective Russian air-campaign backed up by unflinching Iranian support, which has decisively turned the tide against terrorist organisations like ISIL, Jabhat Al-Nusra (JN) , Ahrar Al-Sham and Jaish Al-Islam, all of which have shamelessly been armed and financed by Saudi Arabia, according to U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s assertion, in Oct 2014.

As ISIL dramatically broadens its strategy, from being a regional to an increasingly international threat, targeting U.S. and European citizens around the world, it is high time for the American people to cast their decisive vote on whether the best way of promoting U.S.’s interests is by covering up Saudi Arabia’s abhorrent record of escalating human rights violations, of exporting its extremist Wahhabi Salafi ideology and bloodthirsty jihadists, of promoting radical preachers of death giving religious legitimacy to grotesque atrocities against Shias, Christians, Jews and moderate Sunnis, of arming and funding ISIS, JN, and Taliban and of spreading tyranny and dictatorship in the Middle East.

The proposed establishment of a Chinese naval base at Djibouti suggests that China is after all developing a normal major navy able to operate far outside its immediate area. Whether this should be seen as alarming will depend on what China does with it.

By Geoffrey Till*

The recent disclosure that the PLA Navy intends to set up a ‘base’ in Djibouti, for operations off Somalia and beyond, has come as something of a surprise, for two reasons. Firstly, until quite recently, the idea of any country setting up a base on foreign soil seemed to have gone out of fashion, because of their cost, their political vulnerability and, normally, their very limited value in situations of serious conflict unless considerable resources are invested in their defence.

Fixed bases which cannot be adequately defended, for whatever reason, become strategic liabilities, just as was Singapore in 1942. For this reason today’s navies – led by the US Navy – have instead invested in ‘sea-basing’ – building a sophisticated fleet of supply ships that increase their capacity to operate independently from the sea.

Places not Bases

Yet, the Russians have built up in Latakia in Syria what looks like and is often called a base, while both the French and the British have done so in Bahrain. But these are not major centres of military power like Singapore was supposed to be; instead they host planning staffs, store fuel and other supplies, offer a chance for ship maintenance and minor repairs and, sometimes provide rest and recuperations for sailors. They are better described as ‘places’ rather than bases.

Nonetheless they enhance a navy’s capacity to operate more cost-effectively but only in situations that are well short of conflict with other navies or military forces. This will almost certainly apply to the new bases that China seems to be building in the South China Sea.

Secondly, the announcement represents a clear departure from Beijing’s previous line that the setting up of foreign bases was an inherently destabilising business that was historically associated with Western-style imperialism and of no interest for a China intent only on the defence of its near seas interests and its own ‘peaceful rise’. Instead, the announcement seems to be simply yet more evidence confirming that China is slowly drifting away from its narrative of maritime exceptionalism and steadily becoming a normal naval power.

In this, it is following the earlier trajectory set by the Soviet Union, which in the 1920s and 1930s rejected classic conceptions of seapower as being technologically obsolete, unsuited to Russia’s strategic needs and ideologically objectionable. And yet when conditions improved under Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, Russia built a fleet that looked more and more like any other major navy, adopted those same classic conceptions (if ‘with Russian characteristics’) and through the negotiations leading up to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea in 1982 its legal assumptions increasingly converged with those of its apparent adversaries.

Far Seas Operations

China’s establishment of shore-based facilities in support of its distant water operations reinforces the impression that we are seeing another example of the same process. Already, observers have noted the growth of the Chinese navy’s capability for ‘far seas’ operations, most obviously with their steady development of carrier aviation and increased investment in multi-mission destroyers and amphibious and logistic supply ships.

Like Russia, China first denounced aircraft carriers for decades but is now building them. The PLA Navy’s deployments into the Indian ocean and beyond, only partly in support of their increasingly effective contribution to the multinational counter-piracy effort off Somalia, points in the same direction.

Their admission of a willingness to engage in ‘reciprocal’ military operations in the EEZs of Japan and the United States and restrained reaction to the recent Subi reef incident even suggest that something of a rethink about some their long-standing legal assumptions may be in process as well. If true, this latter would not be at all surprising, given the traditional interest that great maritime powers have always had in the freedom of the seas.

Even if this transition is taking place, we should expect it to be neither fast nor clear. Like any other country, China has built up its own version of past events and derived from this a narrative that shapes its response to the present and the future. This ‘exceptionalist’ conception of its history is accompanied by a strong sense of its own benign intentions and seems to point merely to the need for a navy designed for strong but narrow conceptions of national self-defence, but for very limited active engagement in the wider world.

Major shifts in such assumptions are uncomfortable and difficult to accomplish – there will be resistance in some quarters, contradictions, confusions and surprises. To outside observers, the changes may well seem imperceptible until it finally becomes clear that the supertanker is indeed on a different course.

A Normal Seapower

But if all this turns out to be true, and China does in effect become a ‘normal seapower’ what would it mean, and how should the rest of the world react? Alongside the obvious similarity with the Soviet case, there is one major difference – namely that China is an active participant and stakeholder in the smooth running of the international sea-based trading system in a way that the Soviet Union, with its faltering and largely autarchic economy was not. Neither, today, is there anything like the ideological rivalry characteristic of the Cold war.

Accordingly the rise of China as a normal maritime power may prove more of an opportunity to be welcomed than a strategic threat to be feared – provided it contributes to the defence of the global system against the many threats it faces. In this it is not so much the steady accretion in China’s capacity to operate out of area that matters but more what Beijing in the end does with it.

*Professor Geoffrey Till is a Visiting Senior Research Fellow with the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School for International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

British Prime Minister David Cameron is all pent up about another crusade, this time about rescuing Muslim women. The latest idea is a £20m language-learning scheme suggesting that a lack of competence in English and extremism are somehow linked. (The PM has obviously not been keeping up with the radical recruits for ISIS.)

Women are the primary focus, with Cameron claiming that 190,000 British Muslim women, or 22 percent, speak little or no English. Muslim men were ever in the background spreading “backward attitudes” and exercising “damaging control” over their female relatives. Such a view prompted Baroness Sayeeda Warsi to make the point that, “Women should have the opportunity to learn English full stop. Why link it to radicalisation/extremism?”

Western advocates from various parts of the political spectrum simply cannot leave them alone. Liberating the down trodden Muslim woman is a condition of Western consciousness, one of those obsessive imperatives that occupies mission and purpose. Cameron’s funding policy provides, as Madeleine Bunting scoffed, “a new twist on an old colonial story.”

From a political perspective, Islamic women make excellent public relations opportunities, equipping the messianically inclined with gendered themes for liberation that can be slotted in for the next invasion, or reform program. They supply the basis for purported change as capably as any lethal weapon.

The US First Lady Laura Bush chose to do exactly that on November 17, 2001. The country was giddy with war fervour a few months after the attacks on US soil by al-Qaeda, and the flag of emancipation had been woven. Taliban-governed Afghanistan was the first choice, obvious only because of some flexible reasoning on the part of the White House. “Because of our recent military gains in much of Afghanistan,” suggested the First Lady, “women are no longer imprisoned in their homes. They can listen to music and teach their daughters without fear of punishment.”

The radio address had one overarching tendency: obliterating concepts, mashing terms. The Taliban and terrorists became, as anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod noted, “a kind of hyphenated monster identity”. And this was not all. Women’s causes were bound together with the broader mission against the Taliban, be it malnutrition, poverty, and ill-health on the one hand, and their employment, schooling and “joys of wearing nail polish” on the other. As Laura Bush explained, “The fight against terrorism is also the fight for the rights and dignity of women.”

This appropriated theme – whether Muslim women need saving – is an old one indeed. It tends to bubble to the surface as a matter of strategic interest rather than genuine concern, though there is little doubt that some people have believed it. When the Taliban was in the US State Department’s good books, and the treasury was readily forking out to the theocratic opium opportunists, down trodden women, segregation, and limited schooling, were of little interest.

Such precedents of manipulation stack the annals of misguided history. Sociologist Marnia Lazreg had also noted that French colonialism made use of women towards such ends. Muslim women were unveiled in choreographed ceremonies, one which took place on May 16, 1958 in Algeria. The event had been organised by French generals steadfastly opposed to the country’s liberation, a spectacle which involved a few thousand local men been taken by bus from nearby villages, and various women set for the unveiling. They were suitable bodies, strategically used and deployed in the broader story about French freedom.

Afghanistan provided a similar battleground five decades later. The US Central Intelligence Agency’s public relations boffins felt that oppressed women in the Islamic faith would provide excellent material for the US-led cause. WikiLeaks, ever useful, provided material to that end. A classified document shows that, when interest in Afghanistan was flagging in 2010 on the part of various contributing countries, notably France and Germany, the motif of oppressed women would come to the rescue. This was particularly the case with France.

The CIA Red Cell memorandum (“Sustaining West European Support for the NATO-led Mission – Why Counting on Apathy Might Not Be Enough”, 11 March 2010), stemming from a section charged by the Director to “provoke out-of-the-box” approaches, is a deliciously cynical piece of advice.

Far from being out-of-the-box, the memorandum is distinctly within it, noting how leaders have used public apathy “to ignore voters” and drive up commitments to the conflict. French and German respondents did not see Afghanistan as necessarily a primary issue; politicians had capitalised, sending more troops and supplies to the ISAF mission. For all that, “Casualties Could Precipitate Backlash.”

The response, then, would be to massage, or “leverage” guilt, noting the “adverse consequences of an ISAF defeat for Afghan civilians” to French (and other European) states. Girl’s education, for instance, “could provoke French indignation, and become a rallying point for France’s largely secular public”.

The authors of the memorandum make the blatant suggestion that, “Afghan women could serve as ideal messengers in humanizing the ISAF role in combating the Taliban because of women’s inability to speak personally and credibly about their experiences under the Taliban, their aspirations for the future, and their fears of a Taliban victory.” Media opportunities would be made available for articulating the cause.

This was bound to smack of imperialist reflection – noble native women, incapable of articulating their plight, used to idealise an invasion against obscurantist forces. It ended up playing out what Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak would suggest during a moment of unusual coherence in her essay “Can the Subaltern Speak’?”: a story of white men saving brown women from brown men.

The common belief that cross-strait relations is headed for instability following the DPP’s election victory is overstated. Although there could be more friction with Beijing, the Taiwan Strait is unlikely to witness a return to previous crisis levels.

By Hoo Tiang Boon and James Char*

The election of Tsai Ing-wen of the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as Taiwan’s new president has aroused a hostile reception from some Mainland Chinese media and led to concerns that cross-strait relations will become fraught once again. Some analysts had also feared that a cross-strait crisis could ensue if Tsai were to be elected.

A closer look at events prior to Tsai and the DDP’s landslide victory over the Kuomintang (KMT) in the presidential and legislative elections, however, will reveal to the contrary: the widespread belief that this could lead to a period of instability seems to have been overstated. While the potential for miscalculation in the Taiwan Strait cannot be discounted and there could be more frictions between a Tsai-led Taipei and Beijing, cross-strait relations is unlikely to return to the acrimonious period of the Chen Shui-bian administration.

A More Politically Sophisticated DPP

For a start, today’s DPP is a considerably different political animal from the party under former president Chen. Under Tsai, the party’s cross-strait policy has evolved, becoming more centrist and ambiguous in its slant. Tsai’s DPP is of course still far less welcoming to China than the KMT, but it has moved away from the brand of pro-independence adventurism that had imperiled cross-strait ties and cost Chen dearly.

There is in fact greater alignment between the DPP and KMT’s basic cross-strait positions than commonly perceived. Tsai’s declaration that she would preserve the “status quo of peace and stability” is in principle not fundamentally different from Ma Ying-jeou’s “Three Nos” policy (no unification, no independence, no use of force). In 2014, the DPP published its mainland policy review which called for the party to “proactively and confidently participate [in cross-strait dialogue]” and pursue cross-strait economic interactions “on the basis of the existing foundation” – exhortations not vastly out of sync with the KMT’s ideas.

The main difference between the DPP and KMT’s positions is the degree of the tilt. The KMT’s notion of the status quo leans Taiwan closer to China (in particular, through greater economic integration); the DPP’s version is more about maintaining Taipei’s distance from Beijing.

Some observers point out that Tsai has yet to explicitly endorse the 1992 Consensus which Beijing has stated is one of the preconditions for cross-strait dialogue. While that is true, the new Taiwanese leader has also not outrightly rejected the 1992 Consensus; she appears to understand that any refutation of the one-China principle will not be tolerated by Beijing.

Breaking Out Of the ‘KMT-CCP Framework’

Tellingly, at a recent speech in Washington, Tsai spoke of the importance of securing the “accumulated outcomes of more than twenty years of negotiations and exchanges” [which apparently includes the 1992 Consensus], in which “these accumulated outcomes will serve as the firm basis of [her] efforts to further the peaceful and stable development of cross-strait relations”.

Admittedly, these could be clever rhetoric meant to reassure international audiences. There is considerable political incentive for the DPP to pursue a more conciliatory position towards China since it would be in its interest to demonstrate to the Taiwanese people that, like the KMT, it too can pursue dialogue with Beijing without compromising the island’s de facto independence.

Indeed, Tsai has spoken of changing the perception that the KMT is the only party capable of managing relations with Beijing, and talked about breaking out from the “KMT-CCP framework” in China-Taiwan relations. Significantly, she has not ruled out the possibility of meeting Xi Jinping once she becomes Taiwan’s president.
China: Distrust and Pragmatism towards the DPP

For China, it remains deeply suspicious of the DPP and Tsai’s longer-term intentions. Mainland observers point out that the DPP has yet to rescind the party’s 2007 Normal Nation Resolution or the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s future, which are premised on the notion of Taiwan as a sovereign entity separate from China. They have also not forgotten Tsai’s role in the crafting of the controversial “Two States Theory”, or her earlier time as the head of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council from 2000-2004 – a period when cross-strait ties were particularly fraught.

But despite these misgivings, the reality is that Beijing has limited policy options vis-à-vis Taipei. Closer economic ties have not translated into Taiwanese political goodwill towards China, while the Chinese political solution of “one country, two systems” has become even more unappealing in democratic Taiwan in the wake of political unrest in Hong Kong.

Only if Taiwan declares formal independence would Xi turn to a military solution. Even then it is a battle he cannot be sure of winning, while a cross-strait war would be sure to jeopardise the gains of three decades of reform and opening-up in China. Moreover, Xi’s overwhelming priority in the next two years before the 19th Party Congress will be to stabilize the Chinese economy and he would not want to be distracted by renewed trouble in the Taiwan Strait, alongside China’s continuing problems in the South China Sea.

This limited policy space means that Beijing can ill-afford not to consider a more open attitude towards the DPP, especially given the latter will dominate Taiwanese politics in the foreseeable future. Interestingly, in the past few years, there have been signs that Beijing is starting to adjust its traditional attitude towards the DPP, quietly allowing some limited or indirect CCP-DPP interactions. Notable DPP figures, such as former premier Frank Hsieh and Tainan city mayor William Lai, have made low-key visits to China. So as long as a Taiwanese leader steers clear of overtly pushing for Taiwanese independence, there will be some room for negotiation with Beijing.

Whither Cross-Strait Relations?

Thus far, Tsai appears to be likely to persist with existing institutional mechanisms to pursue cross-strait relations with China, although the frequency or pace of exchanges may well decline. While the Tsai government will resist moving Taipei closer to Beijing, it will not repeat the previous DPP-led government’s mistake of pursuing Taiwanese independence; it would have too much to lose.

Analogously thus, Tsai will resemble a cold Ma Ying-jeou in overall tenor of the orientation towards China. This situation will not fully satisfy Beijing, but it at least satisfies the bottom-line in Chinese policy to avert Taiwan’s formal independence. We are therefore likely to see calm but colder waters in the Taiwan Strait.

*Hoo Tiang Boon is Assistant Professor and James Char is Research Analyst with the China Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. A version of this article first appeared in the Straits Times.

The FBI and Oregon State Police (OSP) on Wednesday established a series of checkpoints at major roads in and out of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge.

In the hours prior to the checkpoints, several vehicles are known to have left the area, the FBI said, but since the establishment of checkpoints, a total of eight people have left the refuge. Of those, the FBI released five and arrested three.

The FBI said it made probable cause arrests of Duane Leo Ehmer, age 45, of Irrigon, Oregon, and Dylan Wade Anderson, age 34, of Provo, Utah and Jason S. Patrick, age 43, of Bonaire, Georgia.

All were in contact with the FBI, and each chose to turn himself into agents at a checkpoint outside the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge. The arrests were without incident, the FBI said.

Each man faces one federal felony count of conspiracy to impede officers of the United States from discharging their official duties through the use of force, intimidation, or threats, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 372.

As reported, the containment procedure involves a series of checkpoints established along key routes into and out of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge. The FBI said that signs will be posted, and that anyone who moves beyond those signs will be stopped, identified and asked to leave. Non-compliant people will be subject to arrest, the FBI said, adding that anyone coming out of the refuge will have his or her identification confirmed and any associated vehicles searched.

The FBI said that the only people allowed to pass into the checkpoints will be Harney County ranchers who own property in those specific areas. They will be required to show photo ID as they go in and out.

Speaking Wednesday, Greg Bretzing, FBI Special Agent in Charge said that, “the armed occupiers were given ample opportunities to leave peacefully. They were given the opportunity to negotiate. As outsiders to Oregon, they were given the opportunity to return to their homes and have their grievances heard through legal and appropriate means. They chose, instead, to threaten the very America they profess to love with violence, intimidation and criminal acts.”

Bretzing confirmed that eight people were arrested, “and one man died yesterday as we attempted to take him into custody.”

Denmark is likely to further harshen its asylum policies, according to the country’s influential anti-immigration party in a report on Wednesday, following the day when lawmakers passed a controversial bill enabling authorities to confiscate valuables from refugees.

The Danish People’s Party (DPP) reached agreement with Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen’s minority government to weaken social benefits for those granted asylum under the previous center-left coalition, the DPP spokesman on immigration issues Martin Henriksen told AFP.

He expected laws to be passed facilitating the deportation of refugees who have committed crimes.

“We have influenced them in several different areas and we see that as our job,” Henriksen remarked about the government.

“It wouldn’t be the first time that the Danish People’s Party has to work to get curbs (on immigration) through parliament,” he added.

The government announced it did not intend to tighten asylum rules further on Tuesday, when the Danish parliament adopted the reforms which aim to deter refugees from seeking asylum by prolonging family reunifications by three years and enabling authorities to seize refugees’ belongings of values.

“At the moment, no, we do not. We’ve introduced several pieces of legislation to keep the amount of asylum at a manageable level,” Marcus Knuth, Venstre’s spokesman on immigration issues, said.

International condemnation

Some have compared the Danish policy to the confiscation of gold and other valuables belonging to Jews by the Nazis during the Holocaust period.

A satirical sketch in The Guardian depicted Prime Minister Rasmussen as wearing a Nazi-style armband, quoting: “It’s offensive to compare us to the Nazis!”

The cartoon, widely shared by Danish Twitter users, also displayed the ruling Venstre party’s name written in a similar font and style of Carlsberg, accompanied by the tagline “Probably the stupidest political party in the world”, referring to the famous Danish beer brewer’s slogan.

Poul Madsen, editor of Danish tabloid Ekstra Bladet and opponent to the Danish law, responded on Twitter that it was “far out to compare Lokke with Hitler” and suggested the British press to “look at how few refugees they take themselves.”

In protest to the discriminatory bill, Chinese dissident artist and political activist Ai Weiwei terminated his exhibition in Copenhagen on Wednesday, which was due to end mid-April.

In addition, rights groups deplore the new law.

“I think it’s despicable that Denmark and also in a sense Switzerland are moving to seize the last remaining assets of people,” the executive director of Human Rights Watch (HRW) Kenneth Roth commented as he spoke at a news conference in Istanbul.

Pia Prytz Phiri, the regional representative for northern Europe for the refugee agency UNHCR, described the new law as “outrageous and potentially also a violation of international law.”

In a joint statement, EuroMed Rights, the International Federation for Human Rights and the European Association for the defense of Human Rights declared that the law “considerably weakens human rights standards.”

Influential anti-immigrants

The rightwing minority government relies on parliamentary support from the DPP, which became Denmark’s largest rightwing party in last year’s general election, to pass the legislation.

“A lot of the curbs that were adopted yesterday have only been introduced because the Danish People’s Party has pushed for them,” Henriksen said.

“The government initially proposed a package of migration laws that was much smaller than what was passed yesterday,” he continued, remarking that the DPP was the first party in parliament to suggest capitilizing on refugees’ valuables to cover the cost of their stay in asylum centers.

The DPP also formed a resolution, approved by lawmakers last week, pressuring the government to consider the construction of temporary housing barracks outside cities for refugees, comparable to what the country did during the Balkans war in the 1990s.

The DPP considers the plan as a first step towards building state-run camps where refugees would remain without integrating into Danish society.

The government is against the idea.

Original article

By C. S. Kuppuswamy

“Without a lasting peace with ethnic minority groups, who make up around 40 percent of the population, any future administration will have difficulty ensuring a nationwide buy-in for its reform agenda and providing the political stability needed to manage and develop the country’s resource-rich frontiers, where most ethnic groups are located”. — Murray Hiebert and Phuong Nguyen, Asia Sentinel, 22 August 2014.

“Seen in a broader perspective, the entire “peace process” is flawed because the government wants to put the cart before the horse by insisting on an agreement—the one signed on Oct. 15—before any political issues have even been discussed.” — Bertil Lintner, The Irrawaddy, January 11, 2016.

The peace process that was started by the Thein Sein Government in August 2011 has come to a dead end with the conclusion of the five day Union Peace Conference (marking the beginning of a long-sought political dialogue) held at Naypyidaw from 12-16 January, 2016. One of the proposals approved in this conference was that the political dialogue must conclude within the next three to five years.

Vice President Sai Mauk Kham said, in his closing remarks at this Union Peace Conference, that documentation of all discussions throughout the conference will be handed over to the new government when it assumes power (The Irrawaddy – January 18, 2016).

Aung San Suu Kyi was however critical of this peace process and the so called Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) because the pact was not inclusive. She said “now we are ready to lead the peace process, because we have the power invested in the mandate given to us by the people and ethnic minorities” – (Mizzima – 17 January, 2016).

The cooperation of the army is of paramount importance for this peace process to be successful. In this connection it is significant that Gen Tin Maung Win at the end of the peace conference said that “the Tatmadaw was ready and willing to co-operate with Suu Kyi in the continuation of the Peace Process (DVB – 15 January, 2016).

Background

Myanmar has been ravaged by a civil war (perhaps the longest in world history) which has lasted over six decades since independence (1948).

The Panglong Agreement signed on 12 February 1947 between Gen Aung San and the leaders of the Kachin, Shan and the Chin ethnic groups paved the way for independence (1948) and creation of a federal state with the option for ethnic minorities to secede from the union after 10 years from independence.

The agreement was laid to rest along with Aung San (assassinated in July 1947) as the civilian and military governments from 1948 considered a federal set up will disintegrate the nation and hence started marginalising the ethnics and tackling them militarily. This has resulted in this ongoing civil war.

The differences and diversities of the ethnic groups by way of religion, language, ethnicity strength, ideology and the large distances between the areas occupied by these groups have been exploited by the Myanmar Army in attacking them piece-meal and by adopting the strategy of “divide and rule”. Thus the civil war has been kept on a low key over the years.

The approximate demarcation of the areas occupied by the ethnic groups is shown in the map attached at Appendix A to this paper.

Two rounds of bilateral ceasefire agreements between the government and ethnic armed groups, the first between 1989 and1997 and the second during 2011-12 had also brought a temporary lull in the civil war. By these ceasefires, the army has managed to weaken these groups without addressing their demands. Moreover, some of those agreements were broken by the Tatmadaw (Myanmar armed forces) or the rebel groups resulting in the continuation of the civil war till date.

It was only in June 2013, the Thein Sein Government decided upon having a nationwide (multilateral) ceasefire agreement. Though such an agreement was signed in October 2015 it cannot be truly called a nationwide ceasefire agreement as the majority of ethnic armed groups including the major ones declined to sign that agreement.

The Government and the Peace Process

The Peace Process began in 2011, when President Thein Sein called upon the ethnic armed groups to hold peace talks initially at the state level and then at the centre. A committee of law-makers managed to get bilateral ceasefire agreements with some groups while U Aung Min, a cabinet minister, with his team concluded some ceasefire agreements with some rebel groups in the eastern part of the country.

In 2012, two committees were formed – the Union Peace-making Central Committee under the leadership of the President and the Union Peace-making work Committee under the leadership of the Vice President. Subsequently these two committees were merged into one with U Aung Min, a cabinet minister, as the Chief Negotiator.

The Myanmar Peace Centre was established in November 2012 (as part of an agreement with the Norway-led Peace Support Donor Group) as a semi-governmental set-up to assist the two government peace committees and to act as the nodal point for all matters pertaining to the peace process.

The Government then gave its framework for the process in an eight-point peace plan which among other things included the proposal for ethnic groups to form political parties to further their demands.

The government also allowed the ethnic groups to have discussions among themselves both within the country and in locations in the neighbouring countries.

The government also reneged on its earlier firm stand to accept the demand of the ethnics for the term “federation” to be included in the draft ceasefire agreement.

After a number of informal and formal rounds of talks between the government and the ethnic armed groups, the first draft of a single-text Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was agreed upon and signed on 31 March 2015 by representatives of the government and ethnic groups. There were a few more rounds of talks on amendments proposed by the ethnic groups to the draft approved in March 2015. Similarly after many postponements of the date for signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), it was eventually signed on 15 October, 2015 amid much fanfare and in the presence of a large gathering which included representatives of political parties and foreign observers. The absence of Aung San Suu Kyi, the main opposition leader, from the signing ceremony was conspicuous.

The list of Ethnic Armed Groups that have signed the agreement and the list of the non-signatories are attached at Appendix B to this paper.

Ethnic Armed Groups

Since the military government took over in 1962, the policy of Burmanisation resulting in open discrimination of ethnic minority groups in matters of culture, education, language and religion has only prolonged the civil war till date.

The ethnic groups have tried time and again to establish an alliance to work for their rights and autonomy but have failed on most occasions. In February 2011 an umbrella group called the United Nationalities Federal Council was formed to represent the ethnic groups which also had differences with the Working Group for Ethnic Coordination (WGEC) in deciding on the modalities for talks with the Government.

Under pressure from the Government the Kachin Independence Organisation, which had not entered into a ceasefire agreement (since the last one was broken in 2011), agreed to become a part of the peace process and attended the talks held at Myitkyina from 08-10 October 2013.

A KIO sponsored four day conference was held at Laiza (KIO HQ) from 30 October to 02 November 2013 which was attended by 18 Armed groups. The salient feature was the formation of a 13 member committee called the “Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT)” for further negotiations with the government.

The next round of talks was held at Myitkyina on 04-05 November 2013 between the government and the NCCT where the ethnic groups presented their 11 point proposal while the government gave out their 15 point proposal for arriving at a nationwide ceasefire.

The ethnic groups had a number follow up meetings (to study the government proposals) of which the ones held at Law Khee Lah from 20-25 January, 2014 and the second from 02-09 June 2015 were significant. In the first meeting the most contentious issues were discussed and their stand communicated to the government. In the second, a negotiating committee called the Senior Delegation for Nationwide Ceasefire Negotiations was constituted which had taken over the responsibilities of the NCCT.

In the conference held at Myanmar Peace Centre, Yangon on 08-09 March, 2014 a joint committee with an equal number of members from the government agencies and the ethnic groups was formed to draft a nationwide ceasefire agreement.

However, differences continued to crop up within the ethnic armed groups in the proposals arrived at, in the modalities of the negotiations, and even in the terminology used in the draft. It is also pertinent to note that the biggest ethnic armed group United Wa State Army (UWSA) and its ally National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) did not even participate in any of these talks.

Finally, only 8 of the 15 Ethnic Armed Groups that were involved in the talks signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement on October 15, 2015. Of the 8 groups that signed the agreement the only important group is the Karen National Union/ Karen National Liberal Army (KNU/KNLA) with an estimated strength of 4000 to 5000 armed soldiers. Of the groups that did not sign the NCA, the significant ones are the UWSA (20-30000 armed soldiers) and the Kachin Independence Organisation (8-10000) soldiers.

Both the government and the Tatmadaw opposed the signing of the NCA by three armed groups as they were involved in fighting with the Tatmadaw in early 2015. They are:

1. Myanmar National Democratic Alliance (Kokang)
2. Ta’ang National Army
3. Arakan Army.

Interestingly the non-signatories of the NCA attended a summit hosted by the United Wa State Army (UWSA) at its HQ Pangshang from 01-03 November 2015 to discuss building cooperation among the non-signatories and plan their strategy to approach the new government which will be in power by March 2016. Some analysts suspected China’s blessings for this meet.

The Armed Forces

In the initial stages, the Army was not cooperating with the government in the peace process. It was involved in regular clashes with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) since June 2011 and continued with the military actions escalating to the use of artillery and air power. Despite orders from the government to stop fighting (in December 2011) the army was involved in skirmishes even while peace talks with the government and the KIA were in progress.

Perhaps for the first time Lt Gen Myint Soe was part of the government delegation in the talks held at Myitkyina in November 2013. At the end of the talks he reportedly said that the Tatmadaw cannot accept the idea of a federal army as proposed by the ethnic groups in the talks. Since then the Army representatives have been attending all the talks held with the ethnic armed groups.

The Army, in the talks with the ethnic groups and in the media, have always been harping on its six point plan. The six points demand that ethnic groups:

• have a “genuine wish” for peace
• keep any promises they make in the peace process
• refrain from exploiting peace agreements
• must not be a burden on the people
• follow the rule of law in Burma
• respect the Burmese military-drafted 2008 Constitution.

“During the negotiations, Burma Army officials maintained that military integration meant disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), while ethnic armed organisations saw the process of integration as security sector reform (SSR) which has wider implications than DDR and includes a whole range of reforms including of the judiciary and the police”. Dr.Sai Oo-The Irrawaddy, July 13, 2015.

C-in-C Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing and his Deputy Vice Senior General Soe Win signed the Nationwide ceasefire Agreement on October 15, 2015 on behalf of the Tatmadaw.

Sr. Gen Min Aung Hlaing in an address to the press council on 25 January 2016, has promised greater transparency throughout the peace process and said that the military was working closely with the government and the parliament to ensure the rule of law and urged the media to remain “positive”.

Conclusion

The signing of a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement is just the first phase and perhaps the easiest of the peace process. The hard part comes when political dialogue is initiated.

President Thein Sein has rushed through this peace process in order to finalise it before November 2015 elections even when a majority of the ethnic groups had not acceded to it.

Some Analysts feel that the peace process is flawed and that the political dialogue or agreement should have preceded the ceasefire and not the other way as it has been done now.

The 2008 Constitution in its present form is the biggest hurdle for the peace process as it stipulates that all armed forces in the union shall be under the command of the defence services, which is unacceptable to the ethnic groups. Besides it precludes a federal structure of the union which is the main demand of the ethnics.

The peace process as and when it fructifies will definitely be a set back for the Tatmadaw as it will reduce its importance. Hence its reluctance in the peace process is understandable.

China was involved (2012- 2013) in hosting the peace talks between KIA and the Myanmar government at Ruili (in Yunnan close to Myanmar border) as well as in sending observers to the talks perhaps to preclude the US from taking this initiative. Prior to signing of the NCA in October 2015 media reports indicated that China has influenced ethnic troops close to its borders, particularly the UWSA not to sign the NCA, though this has been denied by China. For its own strategic interests, China will continue to exert pressure on the Myanmar government through these groups.

Ethnic Armed groups that have not signed the NCA are perhaps hoping that the new government will be more amenable in looking after their interests than the present one.

To carry forward the peace process, the new government has an uphill task in that it has to adopt a fresh strategy and start afresh if it has to lure the non-signatories of the NCA to come into the fold.

As of now the Peace Process has come to a state of hibernation.

Appendix A

Appendix B

Myanmar: Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement

List of Ethnic Armed Groups who signed the agreement:

• Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS)
• Karen National Union (KNU)
• Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA)
• All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF)
• Chin National Front (CNF)
• Pa-Oh National Liberations Organisation (PNLD)
• KNU/KNLA Peace Council
• Arakan Liberation Party (ALP)

List of Ethnic Armed Groups who did not sign the agreement:

• United Wa State Army (UWSA)
• Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA)
• New Mon State Party (NMSP)
• National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) – MONGLA
• National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K)
• Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP)
• Kachin Independence Organisation/Army (KIO/KIA)
• Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)
• Arakan Army (AA)
• Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) – KOKANG
• Lahu Democratic Union (LDU)

Low GDP growth numbers and the tumbling Shanghai Composite are not enough to judge China’s economic management strategy. It is the long-term, structural, and geoeconomic challenges that will determine the country’s economic future.

By Akshay Mathur*

Critics of China have moved into high gear after the country’s low GDP growth numbers were released on January 19 and the Shanghai Composite continued to tumble. Their concerns about economic mismanagement are enhanced by the opaque manner in which China’s economy functions; data is hard to get, and when information is available it does not add up in any meaningful way for assessing the country’s political and economic decision-making.

But based on what is publicly available, two things are clear: one, China’s economy should not be narrowly judged only on the basis of its stock market indices and GDP numbers. Two, a meaningful assessment of China’s future depends on an accurate analysis of its long-term, structural, and geoeconomic challenges. Anything else will be a misinterpretation of the country’s economic management challenges.

In 2015, China’s $10.3 trillion economy achieved 6.9% annual growth—this is not an easy task when the world is still recovering from the trans-Atlantic financial crisis.[i] Even if it is the country’s slowest growth in 20 years, in the process China has become the world’s second largest economy (in nominal terms). And even the most pessimistic estimate of a 4% growth rate means that China is adding $360 billion (or the equivalent of the economy of South Africa) to its GDP every year.

Similarly, stock market indices are only one indicator of the health of the economy.  A 42% drop in the Shanghai Composite—from a peak of 5166.35 (on 11 June 2015) to the current level of 2966.66 (on 18 January 2016)—is clearly substantial.[ii] But, for now, the index is still higher than what it was between 2011 and 2015.

More importantly, the traders on these exchanges are increasingly retail investors—a new class of investors likely to be more impulsive than institutional investors. Foreign investment into the equity markets is limited and controlled through well-managed programmes such as the Qualified Financial Institution Investors (QFII) and the Renminbi QFII. Even experiments such as the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect programme, that enables residents of mainland China to invest in the Hong Kong market and vice versa, limits investments to $40 billion and $48 billion, respectively.[iii]

Therefore, market volatility cannot be attributed to mismanagement of the economy.

What will indeed impact China’s economic trajectory are the threats emanating from the crystallisation of mega-trade agreements between developed countries, internal hurdles to becoming a consumption-led economy, and the lack of promising investment options for the country’s reserves.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment agreement (TTIP) are designed to move geoeconomic heft away from China. Foreign-owned enterprises are responsible for 50% of trade in China, and 40% of China’s exports go to North America and Europe.[iv] China will lose both foreign direct investment and export revenue when the focus of multinationals shifts to TPP/TTIP member countries. The 7% drop in trade in 2015 is a matter of concern for China and the devaluation of the renminbi is an impulsive reaction.

This partly explains why China is pushing for the APEC-led Free-Trade Agreement of the Asia-Pacific. China will be a member, and this will help the country to arrest the shift of trade away from its own shores. It also explains why China is pushing hard for a consensus on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) that includes ASEAN countries along with India, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Japan. The RCEP can help diversify its export market, and restrain ASEAN or India from becoming more potent alternatives to China in the global economy.

The Chinese government is cognisant of the external threats. Its five-year plans envisioning a qualitative shift towards a consumption-led economy is a planned response. But this shift is not easy to make—it takes time to create a society of entrepreneurs and drive consumption. India, for example, has a large segment of small and medium enterprises and yet often fails to support them effectively. For China, reconfiguring government support away from state-owned enterprises, utilising the excess industrial capacity for the domestic economy, diverting labour from manufacturing to services, and re-engineering the real estate-driven revenue model for local governments are huge internal challenges.

Their strategy is working to some extent. Services grew by 8.3% in 2015 and already account for 50% of GDP.[v] Consumption is becoming the main driver of economic growth,  already contributing to 66% of GDP.

There is also the question of how to optimally use reserves. China has  invested $1.2 trillion of its reserves in U.S[vi] treasury securities that should ideally be invested in assets that are safer and high yielding. But better options are not available anywhere else in the world.

It is in this context that China is experimenting with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Silk Road Fund, and the BRICS New Development Bank. These formal, transparent, market-based institutions are experiments to channelise their reserves into assets that provide both financial and diplomatic returns. Global investors looking for transparency in Chinese economic thinking must welcome these new initiatives. So should India, which needs capital for infrastructure investments and prefers a multilateral approach.

Other attempts such as the One Belt One Road initiative are similar experiments to diversify the infrastructure-focused companies, semi-skilled labour force, and investments towards developing economies in Central and South East Asia.

China could also expand its own capital markets so that it can recycle the excess global and domestic savings for its own economic growth, just as the U.S. has done for many years. But that will require further capital account liberalisation and divesting state ownership—and this economic and political challenge in the short-term may bring the very volatility that is scaring away investors today.

So while mismanagement of the Shanghai stock exchange is tarnishing China’s reputation as a market economy and requires a review, it is the macroeconomic challenges that China will have to overcome to cement its economic future.

About the author:
*Akshay Mathur is the Director of Research and Geoeconomics Fellow at Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.

Source:
This article was published by the Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.

References:
[i] National Bureau of Statistics of China, “Press Release: China’s Economy Realized a Moderate but Stable and Sound Growth in 2015”, 19 January 2016, <http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201601/t20160119_1306072.html>

[ii] “Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index”, Bloomberg Business, <http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/SHCOMP:IND>

[iii] “Shanghai Hong Kong Stock Connect”, China Stock Markets Web, <http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/csm/chinaConnect.asp?LangCode=en

[iv] Lombardi, Domenico and Hongying Wang (eds.), Enter the Dragon: China in the International Financial System, Centre for International Governance Innovation, Waterloo, 2015

[v] National Bureau of Statistics of China, “Press Release: China’s Economy Realized a Moderate but Stable and Sound Growth in 2015”, 19 January 2016, <http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201601/t20160119_1306072.html>

[vi] “Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities”, Treasury International Capital (TIC) System Database, <http://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/mfh.txt>