Once a remote, uncontrollable region, Shan State in North Myanmar is home to the ‘Wild’ Wa people, who make up 10percent of its population. Nonetheless, with 30,000 active soldiers, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), is prima inter pares in the narcotics production zone of the Golden Triangle and one of the largest rebel armies in the world. Part of the UWSA’s success can be attributed to their skillful diplomacy with state and regional actors, capitalizing on connections gained from their time in the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) to build vital trade and military alliances. In light of political change in the 2015 Myanmar Elections, this article aims to explore ‘foreign’ policy options for the UWSA with the Myanmar Government, the Chinese Government, narcotics groups in Thailand and rebel groups in the Shan State.

By Boh Ze Kai*

In 1968, under pressure from the government, the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) retreated northwards from Central Myanmar to the Shan State, a mountainous region bordering China. In the subsequent years, bolstered by Chinese economic and military support, the CPB consolidated its position, drew its strength from mountain minorities like the Wa and Kokang, and established itself as the kingpin of the Golden Triangle. In 1989, the CPB fractured into smaller groups like the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) and the United Wa State Army (UWSA). These groups morphed into opium cultivation and heroin manufacturing powerhouses, and by the 2000s the UWSA had become the world’s largest narcotics distributor.

Today, the UWSA’s methamphetamine-based narcotics industry is concentrated in factories to its southern exclave (see Figure 1) with a particular emphasis on manufacturing yaba, a caffeine-methamphetamine mixture party drug consumed almost exclusively in Southeast Asia. Drug money has fuelled a narco-military force comparable to the Myanmar Army, the Tatmadaw. The foreign relations of the UWSA are hence dominated by its ideological goals of autonomy and its reliance on narcotics production and distribution.

Relations with Myanmar Government

Figure 1: Map of Shan State with Key Areas of Influence and Trade Routes (Prepared by the author), Red: Main amphetamine distribution routes. Amphetamine labs are concentrated in the southern territory of UWSA. Purple: Ancillary trade and arms smuggling routes used by the UWSA

Peace negotiations lasting over several months saw eight of the fifteen key rebel groups signing the government-led Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in October 2015. A mere trust-building mechanism with broad guidelines on discussions towards a federal state, the NCA is not a comprehensive ceasefire or conflict resolution agreement. While unlikely to achieve peace on its own, it represents a platform for dialogue and a key milestone on the peace process. The notable refusal of the UWSA and other allied large factions to sign the NCA signifies a deep distrust between state and factional actors. In November 2015, the UWSA hosted the a summit at Pangkham, the Shan state’s de facto capital, for factions not party to the NCA. A joint statement expressed solidarity in fighting for an amended constitution, and a commitment to dialogue with the newly elected government[1] with the mutually stated goal of national reconciliation.

Results of the 2015 parliamentary elections has placed power in civilian hands in Myanmar. And this is likely to radically impact the nature of relations between UWSA and the government. The National League of Democracy (NLD) which ran on a platform of peace and national reconciliation, provides an opportunity to nationalist groups to fight for further federalism. The NLD has promised a federal union for ethnic minorities in its election manifesto, while remaining silent on details regarding such a structure. The NLD will probably focus initially on consolidating their power in Myanmarese heartlands. Assigning more autonomy to the restive border regions at least temporarily will relieve government liability during the embittered process of taking over political authority from entrenched institutions.

The Tatmadaw’s insistence that groups adhere to a six-point principle institutionalising the role of the military in political decisions makes assimilation a bitter pill for rebels. Decades of conflict have bred mistrust and enmity between rebel groups and the military and the constitution essentially allows the Tatmadaw to act without civilian oversight. With a quarter of the seats in both the upper and lower house, the Tatmadaw still holds great political authority in Myanmar, employing the implicit threat of a coup d’etat. Dismantling the monolithic grip of the military over Myanmar will be high on the NLD’s agenda, and co-opting rebel militant groups could help restrain its impunity. It is likely that the UWSA will cooperate with any agenda that involves weakening the military, and are natural allies to the NLD’s cause. Nonetheless, while an opportunity to grow at the expense of the Tatmadaw, the UWSA must take care not to fall prey to a ‘divide-and-conquer’ tactic. Expending strength and resources unnecessarily against the Tatmadaw will strengthen the NLD, who may then crush both their power rivals at once.

However, the narcotics trade remains a significant obstacle to UWSA and NLD relations. International entities see the NLD government as a more cooperative partner for drug eradication programmes compared to the USDP and are likely to increase pressure on the government to combat the narcotic barons. Clamping down on the narcotics trade will trigger heated opposition from all rebel groups who use it to fund their operations. Ultimately, strangling narcotics production is contingent on the availability of alternative sources of revenue. UNODC’s efforts in conjunction with foreign state donors to promote coffee, macademia and rice agriculture such as RASC25 in the Wa Region[2], have not made much of an impact in the region. However, regime change may make this option finally viable. A well-executed eradication campaign hence rests on tripartite cooperation between rebel groups to enforce policies, the government to provide frameworks, and international polities to back it with funding and expertise. At the end of the day, despite ideological inclinations, the NLD has shown itself to be a pragmatic political actor when required. The illusion of commitment to combating the narcotics trade is enough for the NLD to relieve international pressure while allowing narco-armies to counterbalance their political rivals in the Tatmadaw until genuine national reconciliation can be achieved.

In the short- to medium- term, the UWSA should leverage on the challenges of the NLD to achieve semi-legal status and expand for the mutually beneficial objectives of combating the military and building a federal union. However, in the long-term, Wa authorities should recognise that disarmament and legitimacy is the best way to achieve sustainable development for their people. Of course, convincing Wa leaders to give up their narcotic gold mine will likely be an uphill struggle.

Relations with China

UWSA’s relations with China are essentially a continuation of the CPB era, when shared ideologies resulted in close military and economic support. Today, Sino-Wa relations are based on shared ideas of mutual security, economic growth and cultural soft power. Chinese investment has been a key driver of economic growth in licit industries and infrastructure in Wa territory. Guangdong-based investors received a UWSA-backed monopoly over Pangkham’s thriving casino[3] while the logging industry and infrastructure development across UWSA territory is supported primarily by Yunnan-based construction companies. China has been providing agricultural funding and expertise to develop 200,000 hectares[4] of substitute crops for opium with a focus on tea, rubber and macademia; almost all of which are exported to China. Large corporations like the Yucheng Group have also been courted for an undisclosed amount of commercial and structural investment. The UWSA has few other sources of investment, and the China’s continued support is critical for non-narcotic growth.

Chinese technological transfer has provided alternative revenue sources. Considering the fact that the large swathe from India to Thailand is replete with armed movements, small arms trade has become a vital industry for the Wa. Chinese factories across the border supply production technology for Type 56 rifles, RPD LMGs and even PMN-type antipersonnel mines. However, factories in the Wa state are capable of producing armaments independently. The scale of production is unknown, but UWSA arms have been found in militant caches from Nagaland to Pattani. A Chinese crackdown in 2008 has also seen Chinese producers move factories of counterfeit consumer products like DVDs and clothing into Mong La[5] (see Figure 1). These illicit industries, while destabilising to region, pose little threat to China and represent a powerful source of revenue without harming cross-border relations.

China’s war on the drugs focuses heavily on heroin, which was trafficked through Wa territory. Under Chinese pressure, the UWSA declared its territories an opium-free zone in 2005. Despite a four percent increase in opium production from 2013 to 2014[6], this has caused the Golden Triangle’s share of the global opiate market to drop to 15 percent in 2014 from 70 percent in 1990[7]. To compensate, the UWSA transformed its southern jungle border with Thailand into a massive methamphetamine factory, dotting the region with labs producing yaba for export to Thailand through the border town of Tachileik and to a lesser extent, crystal meth to China. Opiate consumption as a share of all drug abuse in China has since dropped from 90 percent in 2001 to 50 percent in 2008[8] but amphetamine consumption has risen to compensate for this. Ironically, 90 percent of meth[9] in China today purportedly comes from Myanmar, suggesting that China has merely traded one drug problem for another.

To avoid jeopardizing growing friendships with the Myanmarese government, Chinese political and military support has been overt but deniable. Chinese diplomatic representatives attended UWSA ceremonies in 2009[10], and UWSA high officials continue to request for China to mediate peace negotiations[11]. Alongside small arms, UWSA purportedly own sophisticated materiel such as Chinese Type 96 howitzers, armoured fighting vehicles[12] and even Mil Mi-17 attack helicopters. Acquisition of such heavy equipment implies Ministry of State Security complicity rather than small-scale arms dealing networks.

Funding the UWSA’s various projects necessitates maintaining the methamphetamine trade, as no other source of revenue is likely to be large enough in the long term. However, the continued trend of meth abuse in China is likely to be viewed as a social and security threat in the medium- to long-term. China may be willing to tolerate the UWSA in the short term. Myanmar is a critical link on China’s ambitious ‘One Road-One Belt’ policy, and if trends persist, official relations may outweigh the interests of border ethnic groups. Hence, over time, the UWSA must find a way to shut off narcotic flows towards China to avoid angering their big brother to the North. Instead, the UWSA could pursue flows towards India, where average tablet retail prices of US$12 remain high compared to US$5 in Thailand[13]. These are medium-term solutions at best, and continued Chinese investment is essential to the long-term goal of reversing economic dependence on narcotics.

Relations with Thai Narcotics Groups

Thailand is the largest market for the UWSA’s primarily yaba based narcotics industry. At the same time, it also supplies the chemical inputs. In 2012, the Department of Special Investigations discovered forged air cargo manifests for two billion cold tablets. The main input, pseudoephedrine, is obtained from cold tablets smuggled through Bangkok from Taiwan and South Korea. Yaba has become an entrenched social phenomenon, cutting across social groups from menial laborers to investment bankers, while yaba trafficking in Thailand has become a US$30billion industry[14] of which an estimated 75 percent comes from Myanmar. Typically, pills are smuggled into eastwards into Laos and then southwards into Northern Thailand.(see Figure 1) Thai authorities see the UWSA as a menace to be eradicated, not a legitimate entity to be negotiated with. As both consumer and supplier, the UWSA must counteract Thai eradication policies while strengthening ties to Thai drug barons.

A complex chain of intermediaries links Myanmarese drugs with Thai consumers (see Figure 2). However, UWSA influence is mostly limited to production and trafficking to ethnic Chinese large wholesalers or chao pho, who act as Godfather-figures in a geographically exclusive multi-tier distribution channels that see drugs change hands an average of seven times[15] before reaching consumers. This uneasy peace allows Bangkok to overlook the persecution of these chao pho who command high status and respect in their communities. In 2003, an impassioned War on Drugs by then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra terrorised low-level drug wholesalers and retailers, but left the chao pho and their structures relatively intact. A chief reason is that the chao phoexercise degrees of control over the law enforcement agencies through their extensive networks of political patronage and nakleng underlings which coerce law enforcement and government at every level, placing them effectively above the law[16].

Table 2: Drug Trafficking Process from Myanmar to Thailand[17]

As an indicator of consumption rates, the quantity of methamphetamine pills seized has increased tenfold from 25 million in 2008 to 250 million in 2013[21]. In the face of rising consumption patterns, chao pho rarely engage in turf conflict, choosing instead to compete over new consumers. Nonetheless, the UWSA’s fear of internecine strife between the chao pho may well become a reality once the market becomes saturated. War between the chao pho would disrupt logistics and transportation networks, draw attention to the yaba trade and result in large-scale police crackdowns.

Conflict is an inherent risk to the drug trade, but the UWSA can take measures to restrain and control involved parties. One method that seems to have results is providing a scapegoat in the form of transnational criminal organisations, which gives the government enough positive press to lay off the local and regional actors. An entire special task force has been mobilised in 2015 with the sole intent of targeting foreign criminal gangs[22] and the high profile arrests of American kingpin Joseph Hunt in 2013 and British drug dealer Micheal France in 2014 are contrasted to a conspicuous absence of high-profile Thai crime barons persecuted. The UWSA should pressure the chaopho to support the use of foreign gangs as a distraction through the judicial application of their patronage systems in order to prevent the encroachment of the narcotics trade. However, in the medium-term, the UWSA should aim to integrate itself into a legal political framework under the NLD where it can find internationally recognised refuge and backing for legitimate economic activities.

Relations with other rebel groups in Shan State

Figure 3: Factional Map of Rebel Areas of Influence and Military Garrisons in Shan State (Prepared by the author), Tatmadaw: North-Eastern Command (Lashio) – 30x Battalions; Eastern Command (Taunggyi) – 42x Battalions; Triangle Region Command (Kengtung) – 23x Battalions; Eastern Central Command(Kho Lam) – unknown; Laukkai Regional Operations Command and Wanhseng Regional Operations Command – 8x Battalions

The staunchest allies of the UWSA are its erstwhile CPB comrades (see Introduction): the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) in Mongla and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in Kokang as well as the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N) based in Wan Hai. The network of alliances preserves the validity and efficacy of trade routes across Shan State, enabling the profitable trade in narcotics, jade, timber and rare minerals. Nonetheless, alliances and enmities are fluid and subject to shifting priorities, with self-preservation as the main priority.

‘Alliance’ indicates economic and political solidarity rather than mutual defense. The MNDAA was crushed by the Tatmadaw once in 2009 and most decisively in June 2015, resulting in the loss of the Kokang region (see Figure 3) to the North. In October 2015, the Tatmadaw launched an ongoing offensive against Wan Hai, committing heavy weaponry and large numbers[23]. The UWSA has remained passive in the face of attacks on its allies, likely because they do not represent a large enough strategic threat to its existence or operations. Further, aggrandizing disagreements with the Tatmadaw and jeopardizing the ceasefire after a hard-earned peace deal in 2013 would be a disproportionate sacrifice for the preservation of allies in peripheral territories.

Acknowledging this, the Tatmadaw appears to be engaging in a manner of salami tactics by steadily enveloping the UWSA. Alongside attacks on buffer states and allies, the Tatmadaw has also strengthened military strength throughout the Shan State. In 2011, the Eastern Central Regional Military Command (ECC) was established at a strategic location at Kho Lam blocking UWSA access to the Middle Shan State, the ECC has since engaged in clashes with the SSA-N to secure the west of the UWSA. In addition, the Wanhseng Regional Operations Command was formed in 2011 along the route between Mongla and Tachilek. The build-up of military strength throughout the Shan State is designed to divide the different groups and control important routes. The UWSA is right to stay out of conflict with the Tatmadaw, but should the Tatmadaw be allowed to advance unchecked, the UWSA may soon find itself under siege.

In contrast, the UWSA strongly contested government efforts in 2008 to reclaim control over the town of Mong Pawk in order to maintain its connection to the NDAA in Mongla.[24] The NDAA’s prime location makes it strategically critical for the continued survival of the UWSA. If the Tatmadaw manages to gain control of the Mongla region, it would cut off the manufacturing hub in southern half of the Wa state from the administration in Pangkham, while simultaneously strangling and denying trade routes leading to Laos and Thailand, shutting down financing and ultimately present an existential threat to the UWSA. In order to avoid a similar situation to the MNDAA, arming and fortifying the small3,000 strong army of the NDAA will be a priority for the UWSA. At the same time, the Mongla region has been a powerhouse for economic growth with the construction of the Mongla hydropower dam, retail and tourism centers and large-scale agricultural expansion[25]. A seminar held in August 2015[26] discussed the opening of the Thai border with southern UWSA territory towards Mong Ton to businessmen, indicating a desire to rejuvenate cross-border trade.Furthering legitimate economic links at an administrative level would create a viable economic region along the Thai-Chinese-Laotian-Myanmarese border centred on both licit trade, making national reconciliation a financially viable option.

The Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) has been a rival of the UWSA since 2006,[27]when combined UWSA-Tatmadaw operations resulted in weakened SSA-S influence over South Shan. Since then, low-level conflicts and confrontations have persisted, including a 2012 siege of an SSA-S camp by UWSA in Eastern Shan[28]. On 15 October 2015, the SSA-S was one of eight signatories to the NCA[29], effectively dividing Shan groups into two separate camps. The division should not be overstated as neither are hostile to each other nor is the NCA a binding alliance with the Tatmadaw, but the two factions essentially represent diverging strategies of relations with the government. The size and influence of the UWSA allows it to engage in direct negotiations with the government, and in fact, disadvantages it in group consensus. However, as one of the largest and best equipped among the signatories the relatively small SSA-S can essentially command the combined political will and bargaining power of the eight groups. In order to prevent the Tatmadaw from turning the groups against each other, the UWSA must work to normalise relations with the SSA-S. Talks held in Dec 2012 focussed on opium harvest replacement[30], but negotiations focussing on core issues relating to political, economic or military cooperation will build trust and pave the way for a more united front with regards to achieving autonomy and federation.

The rise of the NLD and their emphasis on national reconciliation makes unity among the rebel groups of the Shan State increasingly important. United, the groups can pursue a wider stance and greater degrees of autonomy for all parties. It is in the interest of the government to fragment the various factions in order to limit the bargaining power of each one. As the largest, richest and most influential faction, the UWSA should work to assume effective leadership over the region in order to maximise political gain in the impending reconciliation process.

Conclusion

The mainstay of any UWSA strategy focuses on preserving economic strength by maintaining the narcotics trade in order to campaign for political autonomy. In the past, the narco-army was capable of holding back government-led offensives, capitalizing on the general state of anarchy in the Shan State to drive the isolated government into a stalemate. However, as its relations with the rest of the world improve, the government in Myanmar will grow stronger and the rise of the NLD would propel the country into the mainstream international community. In light of this, the UWSA risks becoming irrelevant, and devolving into a criminal gang will cause it lose backing in Beijing, rendering it an easy target for annihilation by Thai, Chinese and Myanmarese authorities. Sustaining political capital will rely on maintain economic relevance through links to China and the drug trade in Thailand and political relevance through links to rebel groups and a superior military. A superior strategy would be to pursue legitimate economic and political interests, integrate into the legitimate political society and bargain for autonomy for the Wa people while its political capital runs strong.

About the author:
*Boh Ze Kai is a project intern with Mantraya. This Special Report is a part of Mantraya.org’s “Borderlands” and “Mapping Terror & Insurgents Networks” projects.)

Source:
This article was published by Mantraya

References:
Asia Times. 4 November 2009. Drugs, guns and war in Myanmar. Retrieved from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/KK04Ae02.html. Retrieved on 28 Nov 2015.

Bangkok Post. 4 January 2015. Police target international crime gangs. Retrieved from http://www.bangkokpost.com/archive/police-target-international-crime-gangs/454182. Retrieved on 28 Nov 2015.

Chiangrai Times. Safe Mekong Drug Suppression Operations to be Extended. Retrieved from http://www.chiangraitimes.com/safe-mekong-drug-suppression-operations-to-be-extended.html. Retrieved on28 November 2015.

ChinaNews. 26 May 2015. Yucheng Group Offers Investments to Myanmar’s Wa Group in Support of “One Belt One Road”. Retrieved from http://www.chinanews.com/fortune/2015/05-26/7301519.shtml. Retrieved on 15 Nov 2015.

Chouvy, Pierre-Arnoud and Meissonier, Joel. October 2002. Yaa Baa: Production, traffic et consummation de methamphetamine enAsie du Sud-Est continentale. Bangkok: L’Institut de recherché sur l’Asie du Sud-Est contemporaine (IRASEC). Retrieved on 11 Dec 2015. Source is written in French.

Davis, Anthony. 22 July 2015. Wa army fielding new Chinese artillery, ATGMs. IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly. Retrieved on 8 Nov 2015.

Dinger, Larry. 22 October 2009. Burma: Wa Army Still Opposes Border Guard Force.Wikileaks: Wikileaks cable: 10RANGOON57_a. Retrieved on 8 Nov 2015.

Dinger, Larry. 29 January 2010. Burma: A Heart to Heart with the Wa.Wikileaks: Wikileaks cable: 09RANGOON704_a. Retrieved on 8 Nov 2015.

Fabre, Guilhem. 30 November 2002. Criminal Prosperity: Drug Trafficking, Money Laundering and Financial Crisis after the Cold War. London: Routledge. Retrieved on 28 Nov 2015.

International Narcotics Control Board. 2014. Precursors and chemicals frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. New York: INCB Precursor Annual Report. Retrieved from https://www.incb.org/documents/PRECURSORS/TECHNICAL_REPORTS/2014/PARTITION/ENGLISH/2014PreAR_E-ExtentOfLicitTradeInPrecursors.pdf. Retrieved on 28 Nov 2015.

Ling, Xiao. 5 August 2005. Pangkham Casino Pays 8 Million a Year in Taxes to Wa Government. QQ News. Retrieved from http://news.qq.com/a/20050508/001799.htm. Retrieved on 15 Nov 2015. Source written in Chinese.

Lintner, Bertil and Black, Micheal. 4 March 2009. Merchants of Madnesss: The Methamphetamine Explosion in the Golden Triangle. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Press. Retrieved on 11 Dec 2015.

Myanmar Peace Monitor. May 2014. Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army. Burmese News International. Retrieved from http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/research/monitoring-archive/168-ssa-s. Retrieved on 08 Dec 2015.

National Narcotics Control Commission. 2014. Annual Report on Drug Control in China. Beijing: National Narcotics Control Commission, 2014. Retrieved from http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_52215ca80102uwbt.html. Retrieved on 15 Nov 2015.

Pu’er City Xingying Corporation. Pu’er city Xingying Corporation Offers Assistance to Myanmar’s Panhkham Region Road Construction.Retrieved from http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_5fa28d2a0101pczq.html. Retrieved on 15 Nov 2015. Source written in Chinese.

Radio Free Asia. 21 October 2015. Myanmar Military Clashes with Rebels in Shan State. Retrieved from http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/clashes-10212015163241.html. Retrieved on 07 Dec 2015.

Restoration Council of the Shan States. 8 October 2015. Statement on the Current Peace Process and Restoration Council of Shan State’s Position. Retrieved from http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/images/2015/oct/rcss-released-position-statement-on-nca-eng.pdf. Retrieved on 08 Dec 2015.

Shan Herald Agency for News.20 May 2015.The Panghsang Summit: ExerceptsFrom a Journal. Retrieved from http://english.panglong.org/the-panghsang-summit-excepts-from-a-journal/. Retrieved on 21 Nov 2015.

Shan Herald Agency for News. 19 April 2012. Wa Leader: UWSA able to Defend itself. Retrieved from http://english.panglong.org/wa-leader-uwsa-able-to-defend-itself/. Retrieved on 07 Dec 2015.

Shan Herald Agency for News. 21 August 2015. Chiangmai to hold seminar on opening new border checkpoints. Retrieved from http://english.panglong.org/chiangmai-to-hold-seminar-on-opening-new-border-checkpoints/. Retrieved on 08 Dec 2015.

The Irrawady.July 2006.On Patrol with the Shan State Army. Retrieved from http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=5947&page=1. Retrieved on 22 Nov 2015.

The Irrawady. 30 April 2015. Mongla Rebels say ‘Full Control’ of Region Brings Development.http://www.irrawaddy.org/multimedia-burma/mongla-rebels-say-full-control-of-region-brings-development.html. Retrieved on 07 Dec 2015.

Treerat, Nuolnai; Wannathepsakul, Noppanun and Lewis, Daniel Ray. February 2000. Global Study on Illegal Drugs: The Case of Bangkok, Thailand. Retrieved on 21 Nov 2015.

Weng, Lawi. 5 November 2015. Wa Leader Suggests Chinese Mediation Could Help Halt Conflict in Northern Burma. Yangon: The Irrawaday. Retrieved on 8 Nov 2015. Source written in Chinese.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 8 December 2014. Southeast Asia Opium Survey 2014. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Report on Illicit Crop Monitoring. Retrieved on 10 Dec 2015.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 13 April 2013. Chapter 6: Trafficking of methamphetamines from Myanmar. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Report on Transnational Organised Crime in East-Asia and the Pacific. Retrieved on 15 Nov 2015.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. March 2009. RASC25 – Drug control and development in the Wa Region of the Shan State, Myanmar. Retrieved from http://www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/Projects/1998_01/drug_control.html. Retrieved on 15 Nov 2015.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2015. Trends and Patterns of Amphetamine-type Stimulants and New Psychoactive Substances. Retrieved from https://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/Publications/2015/drugs/ATS_2015_Report_web.pdf

Zhang, Sheldon and Chin, Ko-lin. 2014. A People’s War: China’s Struggle to Contain its Illicit Drug Problem. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. Retrieved on 21 Nov 2015.

End Notes:
[1]Shan Herald Agency for News (2015)

[2]UNODC (2009)

[3]Ling, Xiao (2005)

[4] National Narcotics Control Commission (2014)

[5]United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2014)

[6]United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2014)

[7]United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2014)

[8]Zhang, Sheldon and Chin, Ko-lin (2014)

[9]United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2013)

[10]Dinger, Larry (2010)

[11]Weng, Lawi (2015)

[12]Davis, Anthony (2015)

[13]United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2015)

[14]United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2015)

[15]Treerat, Nualnoi (2000)

* Consensus is divided as to whether or not the drugs are exchanged at the border or in Bangkok. It is likely both types of exchanges are taking place at the same time.

[16]Fabre (2002)

[17]Lintner, Bertil and Black, Micheal (2009) and Chouvy, Pierre-Arnoud et Meissonier, Joel (2002)

[18]Asia Times (2009)

[19]Chiangrai Times (2015)

[20]International Narcotics Control Board (2014)

[21]United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2015)

[22]Bangkok Post (2015)

[23]Radio Free Asia (2015)

[24]Shan Herald Agency for News (2012)

[25]The Irrawady (2015)

[26]Shan Herald Agency for News (2015)

[27]The Irrawady (2006)

[28]Myanmar Peace Monitor (2014)

[29]Restoration Council of the Shan States (2015)

[30]Myanmar Peace Monitor (2014)

By Matthew Tempest and Henriette Jacobsen

(EurActiv) — British Prime Minister David Cameron kept silent Friday on the possibility of an “emergency brake” on EU migration to the UK, ahead of a meeting with the European Commission’s president in Brussels.

Cameron met Jean-Claude Juncker for a “working lunch” of lobster soup and chocolate mousse behind closed doors, before also seeing European Parliament President Martin Schulz in the afternoon.

Both last-minute meetings ahead of the crunch February summit on the UK’s exit referendum negotiations were held in close secrecy, with Cameron arriving without saying a word to the media, and no press conferences scheduled. A trip to Sweden and Denmark had been cancelled to accommodate today’s Brussels meetings.

However, one model believed to be on the table could be the Swiss example. Despite being outside the EU, but within the Schengen free-travel zone, the Swiss have been negotiating with Brussels for the past two years in a bid to limit EU migration to the country, after voting in February 2014 to slash numbers.

With three of Britain’s four negotiating “baskets” seemingly close to some sort of deal, the sticking point remains London’s attempts to limit in-work benefits for EU migrants, to reduce the ‘pull factor’ for EU migrants.

Failing a four year moratorium on such benefits, one plan is to apply for an “emergency brake” on EU numbers – although who would decide, and for how long, an “emergency” existed, is unclear.

An EU source told EurActiv, “The emergency break is an idea that has been floated. It’s a proposal that has been put on the table between those who negotiate. Those who are at the table will discuss it.”

On arriving at the Berlyamont HQ of the EU Commission, Cameron ignored a shouted question of “who pulls the brake?” from journalists.

And now for Tusk, in London

Cameron will now meet Donald Tusk, EU Council President, on Sunday evening in London for further talks, ahead of Tusk tabelling formal written proposals for the 18 February summit on a ‘Brexit’ in Brussels.

That meeting is also, EurActiv believes, taking place without any public briefing, as negotations enter what Downing Street hopes is the final stretch ahead of a possible June referendum.

Before setting off for Brussels, Cameron told the BBC, “I’m encouraged that ideas are coming forward that have some force but we’re not there yet. They are not yet strong enough.”

“It’s encouraging that people like the European Commission are coming forward with new ideas but there’s still a long way to go before we see something that we can actually agree on.

“There’s going to be a lot of hard negotiation, a lot of hard talking but it is encouraging that what I was previously told was impossible is now looking like it is possible,” he said.

“I won’t agree to something unless it has the force and the weight that we need to solve the problems that we have. I’m prepared to be patient,” he added.

The talks with Juncker are set to focus on an emergency “migration brake” that would meet Cameron’s controversial key demand – a four-year wait before workers from other European Union countries in Britain can claim welfare payments.

However, asked by EurActiv who would decide whether an ‘emergency’ existed in the UK, and how long it might last, the EU Commission stonewalled.

Spokesman Margaritas Schinas told EurActiv, “I said moments ago that I was not going to go into the specifics of the aspects of the reported news of the possible, or likely, content, of an agreement which is yet to emerge. Now, if you would like us to take you through the legal science of what is available, my colleagues will certainly be happy to point you to the sources.”

In fact, no such legal briefing materialised.

Cameron has set out four key areas for a deal: EU worker benefits, safeguards against more political integration in the EU, protection of countries that do not use the euro currency — a key issue for the City of London financial district – and the boosting of economic competitiveness.

The Republican National Committee (RNC) was not happy that Ron Paul, who had won second place in Minnesota’s February of 2012 caucuses, ended up with over three-quarters of the state’s delegates to the Republican National Convention. The RNC was not happy with Paul’s delegates’ large wins in other states either.

The rules had allowed an outsider to win. Therefore, the insiders decided the rules needed to be changed. Well, what do you know! Because of the new rules for allotting delegates to the winner on caucus night, the insiders are now fretting that the winning of the state’s delegates by another party outsider — Donald Trump — may be unstoppable in 2016.

The new rules the RNC imposed for the 2016 Republican Party presidential nomination seek to prevent a repeat of the Paul supporters’ success. For Minnesota, Michael Brodkorb of the Minneapolis Star Tribune summarizes a very significant change in the process as follows:

All delegates from Minnesota to the Republican National Convention in 2016 will be elected proportionately and bound to the winners of the presidential preference ballot at Republican precinct caucuses on March 1, 2016 for the first round of balloting.

This rules change is intended to stop a candidate’s supporters from taking action at successive levels of conventions in the state to obtain for their candidate a greater portion of delegates. While this rules change could have stymied Paul’s supporters in 2012, it may benefit Trump’s supporters this year.

The Minnesota caucuses are scheduled for March 1, Super Tuesday. And now the insiders are worried that the new rules for delegate allocation could help Trump win the Minnesota vote for the nomination. Mark Zdechlik gives voice to this concern in his Thursday Minnesota Public Radio report, noting that Trump is relatively popular in the state, generates excitement among potential voters, and could gain greater momentum towards a first place Minnesota finish by doing well in the February primaries and caucuses.

Even if the rules change works out in Trump’s favor, he should beware: The RNC showed Paul’s supporters at the 2012 Republican National Convention that the RNC can and will act — including by bending, breaking, or changing the rules — to keep down an outsider candidate and his supporters.

This article was published by the RonPaul Institute.

By Sandip Kumar Mishra*

On 06 January 2016, North Korea conducted its fourth round of nuclear tests, and there are speculations that it soon going to conduct another rounds of missile tests. Generally, it is understood to be part of North Korea’s reckless behaviour, which hardly has any rational explanation. However, a close observation of Pyongyang’s behaviour over the last few years make it clear that there is a method in its madness. Following the death of its death of its leader Kim Jong-il in 2011, North Korea had to face an increasingly drifting China; and especially after Chinese President Xi Jinping took office, Beijing overtly tried to engage Seoul and placate it from the US alliance system.

China desires to reach out to South Korea in a more substantial way for several reasons. First, Seoul would be a vibrant economic partner for Beijing as both the economies have several complementarities. Second, by forging a ‘trust’ relationship with South Korea, China could have a strategic achievement in the context of its growing contestations with Japan and the US in the regional politics. Third, if Beijing assumes a neutral position vis-a-vis inter-Korean disputes, its regional stature and attractiveness would significantly increase, and that would be quite imperative for China to emerge as the centre of unipolar Asia.

The change in Chinese policy towards the Korean peninsula has been evident, with annual summit meetings between the leaders of Beijing and Seoul from 2013; the signing of Free Trade Agreement; and South Korea becoming one of the founding members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In contrast, there has been hardly any substantial exchange between China and North Korea during this period. The rift in Beijing-Pyongyang relations became obvious when China cooperated with the international community in imposing sanctions on North Korea after its third nuclear test in February 2013; and no meeting between the top leaders of the two countries; and the execution of Chang Sung-thaek, who was considered to be the point person in North Korea to China.

North Korea hardly had any option to deal with this challenge. From Pyongyang’s perspective, there are three important goals that must be pursued in the context of its relations with Beijing. First, the North Korean nuclear and missile programs must not become negotiable as China might try to bargain it for Beijing’s broader foreign policy objectives in the regional politics. Second, China should not be allowed to interfere in the North Korea’s domestic politics or economic reform. Third, Beijing’s growing proximity with Seoul must be stopped and the China-North Korea bilateral must be reverted to the old days. Pursuing all these objectives together appeared to be extremely ambitious and impossible given the meager material and diplomatic capabilities North Korea had.

However, after the fourth round of nuclear tests and the current scenario, it appears that North Korea has been able to achieve most of these goals. By consistently taking a non-compromising position on its nuclear and missile issues, it has almost made its de-nuclearisation non-negotiable. China has probably realised this obvious fact and not keen to get another round of sanctions passed by the UN Security Council. It is the first time that there is no UNSC resolution in sight even after over twenty days of the North Korean nuclear tests. By being adamant to keep its domestic politics autonomous from China, North Korea sends a clear message to Beijing by its many acts that it would not blink in any tug-of-war. By executing Chang Sung-thaek; Kim Jong-un’s refusal to participate in the Victory Day Parade in Beijing; recalling its all-female band Moranbong from Beijing after some disagreements with China; and by carrying out its fourth nuclear test, Pyongyang’s message to Beijing is extremely clear and is probably also heard by China.

Last but not the least, North Korea has successfully made it almost certain that South Korea would join the US’ Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system – South Korean President Park Geun-hye has openly expressed her intention to do so – and resultantly, Seoul’s relations with Beijing would suffer. It would leave China with no choice but to revert to its proximity with North Korea. In fact, there were fierce debates in South Korea on whether it should be satisfied with the Korea Air Missile Defense system, which is effective against low-flying ballistic missiles, or if it should deploy the THAAD, which is effective in high-flying ballistic missiles. In the past two years, North Korean missiles tests have deliberately been conducted to render South Korea insecure. Pyongyang tested its Rodong missiles in March 2014 by firing them vertically, thereby reducing its range of 1000-1500 kilometers to 650 kilometers or less. North Korea also tested its Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile SLBM in May 2015 to push South Korea towards the THAAD.

Thus, so far, Pyongyang has been successful in its foreign policy goals despite the particularly limited resources it possesses. If South Korea joins the THAAD, it would be a success for North Korea. It will be interesting to see whether China and South Korea will be able understand the North Korean design or remain naive in their engagements, resulting in a possible contestation ahead.

* Sandip Kumar Mishra
Assistant Professor, Department of East Asian Studies, Delhi University, and Visiting Fellow, IPCS

The combination of erosion and melting ice caps led to a massive increase in volcanic activity at the end of the last ice age, according to new research. As the climate warmed, the ice caps melted, decreasing the pressure on the Earth’s mantle, leading to an increase in both magma production and volcanic eruptions. The researchers, led by the University of Cambridge, have found that erosion also played a major role in the process, and may have contributed to an increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide levels.

“It’s been established that melting ice caps and volcanic activity are linked – but what we’ve found is that erosion also plays a key role in the cycle,” said Dr Pietro Sternai of Cambridge’s Department of Earth Sciences, the paper’s lead author, who is also a member of Caltech’s Division of Geological and Planetary Science. “Previous attempts to model the huge increase in atmospheric CO2 at the end of the last ice age failed to account for the role of erosion, meaning that CO2 levels may have been seriously underestimated.”

Using numerical simulations, which modelled various different features such as ice caps and glacial erosion rates, Sternai and his colleagues from the University of Geneva and ETH Zurich found that erosion is just as important as melting ice in driving the increase in magma production and subsequent volcanic activity. The results are published in the journal Geophysical Research Letters.

Although the researchers caution not to draw too strong a link between anthropogenic (human-caused) climate change and increased volcanic activity as the timescales are very different, since we now live in a period where the ice caps are being melted by climate change, they say that the same mechanism will likely work at shorter timescales as well.

Over the past million years, the Earth has gone back and forth between ice ages, or glacial periods, and interglacial periods, with each period lasting for roughly 100,000 years. During the interglacial periods, such as the one we live in today, volcanic activity is much higher, as the lack of pressure provided by the ice caps means that volcanoes are freer to erupt. But in the transition from an ice age to an interglacial period, the rates of erosion also increase, especially in mountain ranges where volcanoes tend to cluster.

Glaciers are considered to be the most erosive force on Earth, and as they melt, the ground beneath is eroded by as much as ten centimetres per year, further decreasing the pressure on the volcano and increasing the likelihood of an eruption. A decrease in pressure enhances the production of magma at depth, since rocks held at lower pressure tend to melt at lower temperatures.

When volcanoes erupt, they release more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, creating a cycle that speeds up the warming process. Previous models that attempted to explain the increase in atmospheric CO2 during the end of the last ice age accounted for the role of deglaciation in increasing volcanic activity, but did not account for erosion, meaning that CO2 levels may have been significantly underestimated.

A typical ice age lasting 100,000 years can be characterised into periods of advancing and retreating ice – the ice grows for 80,000 years, but it only takes 20,000 years for that ice to melt.

“There are several factors that contribute to climate warming and cooling trends, and many of them are related to the Earth’s orbital parameters,” said Sternai. “But we know that much faster warming that cooling can’t be caused solely by changes in the Earth’s orbit – it must be, at least to some extent, related to something within the Earth system itself. Erosion, by contributing to unload the Earth’s surface and enhance volcanic CO2 emissions, may be the missing factor required to explain such persistent climate asymmetry.”

There is no chance that the Rio Olympics will be cancelled because of a Zika virus outbreak, Brazil has said, according to BBC News.

The authorities said there was no risk to athletes and spectators – except pregnant women – at the August event.

Earlier, the World Health Organization (WHO) warned a disease linked to Zika posed a global public health emergency requiring a united response. The infection has been linked to cases of microcephaly, in which babies are born with underdeveloped brains.

Experts are worried that the mosquito-borne virus in Latin America is spreading far and fast, with devastating consequences.

“We have to explain to those coming to Brazil, the athletes, that there is zero risk if you are not a pregnant woman,” Reuters quoted President Dilma Rousseff’s chief of staff Jaques Wagner as saying.

President Rousseff earlier authorised health and sanitary inspectors to use force if necessary to gain access to private buildings, as part of the government’s efforts to eradicate breeding grounds for mosquitoes – especially stagnant waters.

Inspectors are now able to call in the police if necessary, and more than 200,000 troops have been deployed to make such inspections.

The Brazilian health ministry says about 25% of the country’s 49 million homes have so far been inspected.

Even in the recent past, the colonial legacy has had a large negative impact on education in the former colonies of both Spain and France, according to a major new study out this week from the University of Bath. By contrast, Britain’s colonial education has not adversely affected schooling in its former colonies, the study found.

The research, published in the prestigious journal Kyklos, reports that, in Spain’s former colonies, the negative impact has been particularly large.

“In these countries, during the 1972-2012 period the colonial legacy has reduced the secondary school enrollment rate by 17 percentage points,” said lead researcher Dr Horst Feldmann from the University of Bath’s Department of Economics.

“In the former French colonies, the reduction has been 10 percentage points,” Feldmann said, adding that, “Additionally, in both groups of countries adults have attained 1.6 fewer years of schooling over the same period.”

“The detrimental effects on females have been even larger, both in former Spanish and former French colonies,” said Dr Feldmann.

The study, which statistically controls for other determinants of schooling, is the first to cover a large number of ex-colonies.

“Particularly, it is the first to cover former colonies of Spain,” said Dr Feldmann.

It includes 17 former Spanish colonies, 23 former French colonies and 36 former British colonies.

Dr Feldmann said, “The results for the former Spanish colonies are especially remarkable, given that Spain’s colonial rule ended almost two centuries ago.”

“The reason for the negative effects is that many characteristics of Spanish colonial education have persisted long after independence. Specifically, Spanish remained the sole, or at least the dominant language of instruction, and educational provision in rural areas as well as for girls and the poor has remained very limited,” said Dr Feldmann.

“The large persistent effects in former French colonies are remarkable too, as most of these countries became independent more than 50 years ago. Here, most features limiting education have persisted after independence as well.”

“These include a high degree of centralisation and government control, a very limited scope for non-governmental organisations to provide education, a neglect of local conditions and parents’ preferences, and the selectivity and elitist nature of the system, which disadvantaged girls in particular. Also, most teaching continued to be in French,” Feldmann said.

“In Britain’s former colonies, many features of its colonial education have persisted too, but these have been mostly benign. Thus it is unsurprising that we did not find negative effects here,” said Dr Feldmann.

“In these countries, there has long been a high degree of autonomy of schools and teachers, educational provision has been relatively well adapted to parents’ preferences and local practices, voluntary organisations have been subsidised and granted a wide scope to engage and compete, and the education of girls has been established early on. Furthermore, instruction has always been in the local vernacular in the first grades, enabling practically all native children to enter school.”

By Husanjot Chahal*

Given the Islamic State’s (IS) interest in expanding into South Asia, and the worrisome interest generated in sections of the Indian citizenry, the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs has rightly termed this threat as a significant “long-term national security concern.”

So far, India has managed to restrict IS recruits from the country to only a handful. To that end, the 09 February 2015 Indian Express report, which stated that the Telangana Police “is dipping into its Naxalite-era experience in surveillance and methods of deterrence to keep a watch on youths who are susceptible to online radicalisation and recruitment by the Iraqi militant group Islamic State,” is noteworthy.

Under this strategy, arrest is not employed as the first option. Instead, measures such as increased vigilance and counseling are used for deterrence; and help is enlisted from parents, relatives, and community elders. This is key, because of Telangana’s track record – according to reports, it is one of the first states to set a model for dealing with IS related cases; and 21 youth – the highest number in any state – have been prevented from leaving for Syria in 2015.

Can the lessons from the Telangana Police’s experience in countering Left Wing Extremism (LWE) – which is considered relatively successful – be harnessed to counter the IS threat?

To examine this, it would be important to look at the strategy adopted in Telangana (formerly part of Andhra Pradesh) to counter LWE. Andhra’s strategy in reducing LWE influence is attributed to military tactics and the success of the Greyhounds commandos. Ancillary developmental measures are often overlooked by most scholars. In fact, by a large measure, and like any other state affected by sub-national conflicts, the strategy it employed to handle LWE cadres, is considered relatively harsh. However, there are several instances where security officials, for ‘Winning Hearts and Minds’, adopted several ‘population centric’ measures that included infrastructure-development schemes and civic action programmes.

This commentary compares and analyses two measures – a) involving parents and community members, and b) counseling – of the many that have reportedly been implemented to counter the IS’s influence in India, and proposes solutions to address shortcomings.

Involving Parents and Community Members
One of the first few reported instances on involving parents to counter LWE influence took place in Karimnagar on 28 July 2000, where a counseling session of parents, and their subsequent appeal published in the local newspaper, lead to four dalam members deciding to quit underground activity.

Several similar initiatives followed, such as prodding the families of the cadres to go on hunger strikes; visits by elected representatives of local parties, revenue officials, civilians and police officials to houses of Maoist cadres, urging the parents to play a part in their surrenders.

In comparison, parents and community elders of youth being radicalised by the IS are involved mostly to keep a watch on suspicious activities and to ensure that the latter do not get brainwashed.

While involving families, it is important to prevent any propensity of isolation from developing, especially amongst women and children. Essentially, families should be able to share their concerns and experiences outside their homes, freely and without fear. Building a community-centric or collaborative approach to policing that truly generates a sentiment of police meekosam (police for you) will be the way forward.

Counseling

Telangana Police officials have echoed New Delhi’s views on the approach to countering the influence of the IS. Reportedly, counseling is being preferred over knee-jerk arrests of radicalised individuals, and also as a deterrent. This is reminiscent of a decade old strategy of advising, organising ‘counseling melas’, and street plays for rural youth and militant cadres to wrest them away from LWE fold.

However, it is important to note that it is not counseling alone that has insulated those susceptible to LWE influence. A combination of counseling and pressure tactics produced results. In the case of IS influence, counseling appears to have played a significant role. Available data reveals that nearly 80 per cent of those reportedly planning to leave for Syria were counseled, and the remainder, arrested.

An important aspect vis-à-vis preferring counseling instead of arrests as a strategy is ensuring prevention of recidivism (counseled individuals returning to extremism). Critics of similar models of counter-radicalism have called such approaches ‘soft’ and ‘dangerous’ due to the probability of recidivism. In fact, some officials have expressed fears of recidivism in surrendered LWE cadres if there is poor implementation, monitoring, and distribution of benefits under the surrender and rehabilitation policy.

Therefore, ensuring that the counseling process fully amends the behaviour of the detainee – via discussion, debate, and correction of misconceived notions of religion that justify radicalism – is required to make this approach effective.

Strengthening probation and aftercare services, providing sufficient opportunities to reintegrate, and ensuring support in finding employment etc. are some initiatives that could reduce chances of recidivism.

The population-centric approach implemented during counter-LWE operations in Telangana may provide an effective way to deal with IS-related radicalisation. Simultaneously, however, it illustrates the imperfect nature of such a complex effort. Its pitfalls – namely fear of isolation, and recidivism – should be borne in mind, for that would help us go a long way in updating our overall approach to counter-radicalisation.

* Husanjot Chahal
Research Officer, IReS, IPCS

International experts and observers began to sum up the preliminary results of the US President Barack Obama’s presidency, which expires in January 2017.

Commenting on Barack Obama’s final State of the Union address to a Joint Session of the US Congress, Edward Lozansky, President and Founder of the American University in Moscow, called it “quite flat and forgettable.”

“Barely one in ten Americans watched the address to the nation which says they have no big hopes for better changes. Of course, Barack Obama had successes but mainly in the domestic policy. Many results have been achieved due to a significant increase in the national debt. The next generation will have to pay off,” the expert said in an interview with “PenzaNews” agency.

In his opinion, foreign policy of the American President has been less successful.

“Except for the Iranian nuclear issue, one cannot speak about any progress. The Middle East is burning in the fire. The war in Iraq and Afghanistan can still be attributed to his predecessor George W. Bush, but Libya, Syria, Yemen and rampant international terrorism are the responsibility of Barack Obama,” he explained.

Steven Schier, Professor of Political Science from Carleton College in Northfield, United States, also stressed that some of the President’s foreign policy assertions produced criticism in the US.

“His claim of a successful Syrian policy in the wake of so many deaths and many thousands of refugees was viewed as questionable by many observers. His historical record will be a mixed one, particularly because of the legacy of his foreign policies, which have not solved pressing global problems,” he noted.

Moreover, from his viewpoint, Barack Obama has failed to find ways to work with the Republican Party, which dominates Congress and most state legislatures.

“Unlike his Democrat predecessor Bill Clinton, he failed to reach out and find common ground, instead preferring to publicly criticize his partisan opposition and contribute to the political polarization in the US,” Steven Schier added.

Barry Burden, Professor of the Department of Political Science, Director at the Elections Research Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison, shared this opinion and noted that President Barack Obama is finishing his second term at a time of intense partisan polarization.

“Some of his failures were due to disagreements with conservative Republicans who won control of Congress in 2010. There has been little bipartisanship since that time. As a result, Barack Obama will also be remembered for going it alone during his second term, taking unilateral action on immigration, guns, and environmental standards,” the expert said.

However, according to him, public views about his presidency are divided.

“Barack Obama has success on several key policies. His signature accomplishment is the Affordable Care Act, which has increased the share of Americans with health insurance. He also helped to mitigate the impact of the Great Recession through stimulus spending and signed into law financial regulations to prevent future banking collapses. He has fallen short in other areas. He was unable to close Gitmo as he promised in his 2008 campaign. Mass shootings have become a regular part of American life with no change in policy. And there has been no major immigration reform. Obama has also expressed regret for growing income inequality during his time in office,” Barry Burden said.

In turn, Bruce Stokes, Associate Fellow at Americas Program in Chatham House, noted that the American people judge their President harshly.

“Just 46% approve of Barack Obama’s handling of his job in the most recent Pew Research Center survey. It is higher than George W. Bush’s rating at a similar time in his presidency, but much lower than Bill Clinton’s at a similar point 7 years into his presidency. The White House would point to Obamacare as his most important domestic initiative, but only 48% approve of his health care reform. His signature international initiative may be the Iran nuclear deal. But 49% of the public disapprove of it,” the expert said.

However, Steve Taylor, Associate Professor at the Department of Government for the American University, praised President’s accomplishments in foreign policy, specifying, in particular, the restoration of diplomatic relations with Cuba.

According to him, there were also advances on the domestic front which allowed, among other things, to increase the availability of healthcare, reduce the unemployment rate and energy costs.

“The President has a very difficult twelve months ahead of him. He is facing a hostile congress and a very conservative US Supreme Court. This can prevent him from advancing his agenda. However, many historians will remember his more productive first two years in office, and that will guarantee at least some positive reviews of his presidency,” the expert said.

Meanwhile, Charles Henry, Professor Emeritus of African American Studies at the University of California at Berkeley, reminded that the state of the country when Barack Obama took office left much to be desired.

“His major victories were a revival of the economy, Obamacare, the push for gay and lesbian rights, environmental protection, a new relationship with Cuba and the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq and Afghanistan,” the analyst noted.

In his opinion, the US President was less successful in closing Guantanamo, reforming Wall Street and punishing economic corruption, and education reform.

“His relationship with Russia was not strong and the relationship with China had pluses and minuses, and he was not successful in improving conditions in Palestine. A major disappointment for me was the acceptance of some of the national surveillance programs launched by Bush. A large part of these failures rests with a hostile Republican Party although Obama must accept some responsibility for not working closely with those in his own party,” Charles Henry added.

In turn, Stephen Skowronek, Professor of Political and Social Science at Yale University, stressed that Barack Obama’s main domestic achievements were concentrated in the first two years of his presidency when his party controlled both houses of Congress.

“Political division, polarization and partisan polarization confounded Barack Obama’s message of unity and change. He was stymied on a number of fronts, from immigration reform, to climate change and gun control. His use of unilateral executive action on these matters is constitutionally controversial, and may be substantially reversed by the Supreme Court. Failure to turn the Arab Spring in a positive direction, an inability to extricate the United States from the quagmire in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the tragedy in Syria mar the record considerably, though how much of this is be laid at the President’s feet is harder to say,” the expert said.

Moreover, in his opinion, the threat of terrorism makes all assumptions regarding the outcome of Barack Obama’s presidency premature.

“But history tends to treat presidents more kindly than the political assessments of their contemporaries, and Barack Obama’s identity as the first Black President will continue to command attention. I think that a lot of that attention will focus on whether and to what extent the racial divide was eased by his elevation to power or exacerbated by it,” Stephen Skowronek noted.

Peverill Squire, Chair in American Political Institutions, Department of Political Science at University of Missouri, also said President’s major victory was changing the healthcare system.

“Even if the Republicans manage to win the White House and keep control of Congress, they will find it very difficult to uproot the significant changes Obamacare has produced in the healthcare industry. The President’s policies also managed to keep the economy from falling into depression; indeed it has largely recovered. Americans are doing better today than they were doing in 2009, although the mood of the country may not reflect that fact,” the analyst explained.

However, from his point of view, Barack Obama was unable to improve the national political climate, leaving many Americans disillusioned with the political process.

“There may not have been much he could have done on this score, certainly he met stiff resistance from congressional Republicans. Not being able to overcome the vast gulf between the two parties meant that the President was unable to reach a grand bargain that might have made changes in entitlements and over the long run improved budget forecasts. I suspect leaders in both parties may come to regret missing that opportunity,” Peverill Squire noted.

Nevertheless, even a lame-duck President is powerful, so congressional Republicans will not be able to push through their policy preferences, he said.

“Thus, the President’s successes in his final year will be in the way of protecting his earlier achievements. Given the presidential and congressional campaigns, no one expects much from either the President or the Congress. In the final analysis, Obama will go down as a President with some major domestic policy victories, but at considerable political cost,” the expert concluded.

Barack Hussein Obama is currently serving as the 44th President of the United States, the first African American to hold the office.

Barack Obama won the US presidential election on 4 November 2008. He gained 338 of the 538 Electoral College votes, exceeding the 270 required.

Barack Obama was sworn in as the President of the United States of America on 20 January 2009.

He was reelected as President in 2012.

Of all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, non-OPEC Oman is most vulnerable to low oil prices. In the 1990s, the sultanate discovered that its oil reserves were substantially smaller than previously thought and Oman’s sovereign wealth fund is a fraction of the size of other GCC nations. At this juncture, Oman—dependent on hydrocarbons for 84 percent of its revenue and roughly half of its GDP—must increase revenue from non-energy sectors. Many Omanis believe that their nation’s vibrant tourism industry can serve as a Plan B, effectively counterbalancing the financial problems stemming from cheap oil.

As oil prices plummeted last year, Oman ran a USD 11.7 billion deficit. To finance the shortfalls in this year’s budget deficit (expected to reach USD 8.6 billion), officials in Muscat have recently approved belt-tightening measures such as raising corporate taxes, deregulating fuel prices, increasing expat visa fees, removing utility subsidies and indefinitely stopping bonuses for public sector employees.

Last month I travelled to Salalah where I met with hotel managers to discuss the country’s tourism industry and their role in the sultanate’s quest to achieve greater economic diversification. One could be forgiven for doubting that the tropical city of Salalah, situated along the Indian Ocean coast in Oman’s southernmost Dhofar governorate, belongs to the same continent, let alone country, as Muscat. Freshwater springs, waterfalls, fruit plantations, flower gardens, palm groves, and quiet beaches attract many tourists each year. Although travelers from Europe (mainly from Germany, Italy, Slovakia and Sweden) occupy the city’s hotels year round, Arab Gulf state nationals escape the scorching summer heat during the monsoon (or khareef) season between June and September to enjoy Salalah’s natural beauty and cooler temperatures.

Cheap oil has severely damaged Muscat’s economy, but it appears to have benefited Salalah’s. In an effort to diversify Oman’s sources of revenue, Omani officials have invested in large infrastructure projects across the Dhofar governorate, including the state-of-the-art Salalah International Airport that opened last year and the Sultanate’s National Railway network. Oman’s leadership views such projects as strategic investments that will pay off in the long run by enabling Salalah’s tourism industry to accommodate a greater number of international visitors.

Despite the proximity to Yemen, Salalah’s hotel managers maintain that there is no link between that country’s crisis and any decline in hotel occupancy. Fortunately for Salalah’s stakeholders, Yemen’s easternmost territory near Oman has remained relatively stable and peaceful. Yet, recognizing the potential threat that spillover from Yemen’s civil war could pose to peace in Salalah, Oman’s military has closed the border. Indeed, the Russian plane crash in Egypt and the Sousse and Bardo Museum attacks in Tunisia underscore the potential for terrorism to damage tourism industries.

Hotel managers worry less about spillover violence than the hesitancy of European tourists to vacation so close to a war zone, where heavily armed extremists have asserted their growing power through violence. To address this issue, Oman’s Ministry of Tourism has stepped up efforts to communicate to Western audiences that the country remains stable, despite the 187-mile border it shares with Yemen.

In addition to political stability, a peaceful and tolerant culture bodes well for the future of Oman’s tourism sector. As one hotel manager succinctly put it, “Oman is not Saudi Arabia.” In 2014 Oman’s Majlis al-Shura, the country’s elected consultative body, proposed legislation to criminalize alcohol. Yet, understanding the disastrous effect such a law could have on tourism, few in the tourism industry took the proposal seriously. One man in Muscat explained that although many Omanis do not drink alcohol (or do so rarely), it is contrary to the ‘Omani style’ to impose such a code on foreigners who hail from different parts of the world and bring their own cultures and traditions to the sultanate.

As a maritime nation that once governed an empire stretching from Pakistan to Tanzania, Oman identifies not only as an Arab and Muslim nation, but also as an Indian Ocean country. The racial, cultural, and religious diversity within the sultanate’s political and economic elite underscores Oman’s deeply rooted tradition of accepting non-Arabs and non-Muslims, who have long played an important role in the nation’s history. Omanis are an outwardly looking people who are proud of their diversity. The absence of sectarian strife, terrorism, and violence waged against Western expatriates and tourists certainly distinguishes Oman from other Middle Eastern countries.

Of course, Oman’s future is naturally uncertain. Experts have considered several scenarios whereby the death of Sultan Qaboos, on the throne since 1970, could trigger a succession crisis and foment political unrest. Yet if Oman can maintain its peace and stability in the post-Qaboos era, there is every reason to expect that tourism in Salalah and other parts of Oman can flourish regardless of low oil prices.

Oman’s economic model, which has depended on oil exports since the 1970s, has transformed the sultanate from the impoverished and isolated backwater it was during the reign of Sultan Qaboos’ father Said bin Taimur into a wealthy GCC member. However, such an economic model is unsustainable as Oman reportedly has only 15 years before its oil reserves go dry. To maintain long-term prosperity, Omanis must use their existing petro-wealth to diversify the economy and acquire more revenue from non-hydrocarbon sectors.

At present, cheap oil has exposed the risks of maintaining an unhealthy dependence on hydrocarbons. China’s economic slowdown, Saudi Arabia’s oil production policy, the reentry of Iranian oil on the global market, and the rise of the United States as a major energy actor have led analysts to predict that oil prices will remain low for at least a few more years. This dynamic does no favors for Oman’s state finances. However, Oman’s vibrant tourism industry has the potential to become the sultanate’s lifeline as the oil crisis poses a host of new challenges.

MENASource, a blog sponsored by the Atlantic Council, originally published this article.

(EurActiv) — Britain and EU institutions have made progress on reforms that would help keep London in the 28-nation bloc, but there was no agreement yet and all member states must accept any eventual deal, the European Commission said on Monday.

Prime Minister David Cameron has promised to reform Britain’s ties to the European Union and hold a public vote on EU membership before the end of 2017. He hopes to reach a reform deal at a summit next month, with a view to holding the referendum as early as possible.

Among the most controversial of his demands is stronger powers to curb immigration, including barring EU immigrants from in-work benefits for at least their first four years in Britain – what some EU officials have come to call a “welfare brake”.

Talks with the chairman of EU leaders, Donald Tusk, did not bring a breakthrough on Sunday night and negotiations continue on Monday with a view to drafting a proposal that could be sent to all EU governments on Tuesday.

European Commission spokesman Margaritis Schinas told a regular news briefing that while there was progress at political and technical level, nothing was agreed until everything was agreed.

“We are not there yet, discussions continue, today at sherpa level involving the Council, the Commision and UK sherpas. The timing is in the hands of President Tusk and Prime Minister Cameron,” Schinas said.

“It is not enough for the Commission and Council lawyers to agree,” he said. “This is a process that is run at 28 (EU countries) and the Commission works for all 28 member states of the union.”

Asked if the Commission has prepared a proposal that would give Britain the right to apply the welfare brake now, but did not share the proposal yet with other EU governments, Schinas said: “Yes, right”. He later made clear this was not an affirmative answer but just an acknowledgement of the question.

Schinas stressed he could give no details of the talks.

“I will not comment on specific issues linked to the negotiation, not least because we work for 28 member states,” he said.

“It would be very unfair for the other 27 member states, that have not seen or discussed anything yet on the many issues that are on the table, for me to offer an opinion in the Commission press room,” Schinas said.

“We are making progress but there’s more work to do in all four areas – more work in some areas than others,” Cameron’s spokesman told reporters.

Cameron’s spokesman hailed as “substantial” signals from the European Commission that it could put forward a proposal to restrict social welfare payments for EU workers for up to four years.

Cameron’s spokesman said it was up to Tusk to decide when to publish the draft proposal, with a European source suggesting there could be “something tomorrow”.

Underlining the challenges ahead, Paris has reportedly threatened to block some of the proposals relating to the euro.

“To French officials, any provisions giving non-euro countries power to indefinitely stall eurozone votes are unacceptable,” the Financial Times reported, saying France would reject any “backdoor veto” for the City of London finance hub.

But Cameron’s spokesman played down the report.

“We’re not seeking to stand in the way of further euro integration,” he said.

“It’s not about the UK being able to veto further eurozone integration, it’s about having clear principles on the way for enforcing it,” he added.

By Linda S. Heard

Daesh is losing ground and income from sales of oil in both Syria and Iraq. Foreign fighters have had their wages cut by half. Under pressure from US-led coalition, Russian and Syrian regime bombs and renewed resistance from local populations, the group is eyeing the area around the oil-rich Libyan city of Sirte as its new “capital.”

Daesh terrorists have succeeded in taking the towns of Bin Jawad and As-Sidr, gateways to the export of oil as well as a key refinery, with relative ease.

The Obama administration, which celebrated the demise of Muammar Qaddafi, and contributed US airpower, military advisers and CIA operatives to ensure his downfall, is said to be so alarmed at the potential of Libya mirroring Syria that, according to a Pentagon spokesman, a range of military options including air strikes are being studied.

The British government is similarly concerned rightly fearing a massive influx of Daesh fighters on the Mediterranean would pose a direct threat to Europe and government officials have hinted Libya could be next on its target list.

US and British Special Forces have been operating within Libya for some time in conjunction with the Libyan Army — or so they claim. But a lawmaker from the internationally-recognized Parliament in Tobruk claims that 20 US soldiers dropped into the country with their vehicles were disarmed by Libyan forces and told to quit Libyan soil. The Pentagon denies this account saying the soldiers were ordered out by a local militia.

Good intentions aside, questions remain as to whether those western countries which helped break a functioning state whose people lived in security and relative prosperity are capable of fixing it and would the various political players, armed militias and tribes that are unable to agree on a common cause welcome their efforts? It’s been proved that airstrikes alone even with the complicity of governments cannot cure the disease that is Daesh; they only setback its ambitions while taking a toll on civilian lives.

Let’s face it. Obama’s regional policies have until now has been an abject failure on just about every score. Why should Libya be any different?

Conflicts rage on in Iraq. Syrians die or starve or flee daily while US-sponsored peace talks struggle to get off the ground. His stances toward post-revolution Egypt have resulted in a loss of American influence over the most-populated Arab nation; his wooing of Iran has rearranged the regional deckchairs in the ayatollahs favor. His promise to dedicate his presidency to the emergence of a Palestinian state during his reach out to the Muslim World made in Cairo University is long forgotten. He now boasts “I am the closest thing to a Jew that ever sat in the Oval Office”.

He has no golden Midas touch. Everything he touches in MENA region turns to dust, so if Libyans view the prospect of US airstrikes with a certain amount of skepticism, who can blame them!

Not only are the US and Europe worried about Daesh dominating a proportion of Libya, so is Egypt, where one of its branches operates within the northern Sinai Peninsula, Algeria that is being threatened and infiltrated and, of course, Tunisia where foreign tourists and security personnel have come under attack.

Egypt has shown willingness to engage proactively against Daesh in Libya but when the Egyptian Air Force answered the group’s beheading of Copts with air strikes, Cairo received only criticism from the White House.

One of the most effective forces within Libya is the Libyan National Army commanded by Gen. Khalifa Haftar who exerts influence over the government in Tobruk and has an excellent relationship with Egyptian authorities.

If there is to be an initiative to erase Daesh from Libya it should be Arab driven and will require ground forces; a step too far for Obama and his European counterparts.

An Algerian-Egyptian-Tunisian military alliance would be preferable to the usual suspects the US, UK and France repeating the same old mistakes in the hope this time there will be a different outcome. As long as the same failed formula is used, there rarely is!

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin met Monday with Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Kirill to congratulate him on the anniversary of his enthronement as head of the Russian Orthodox Church.

At the meeting, Putin thanked the Patriarch for developing the Russian Orthodox Church and for strengthening the unity of Russia’s people and society.

“I understand that the enthronement anniversary is a special event in the lives of people who have devoted themselves to serving the church. It is a day that is out of the ordinary, a special kind of anniversary, and from all my heart, I congratulate you on this occasion and wish you all the very best,” Putin said, according to the Kremlin.

The European Commission has published its Evaluation Report on the Assistance Program for the Spanish Financial Sector, which was implemented between 2012 and 2014. The report highlights the success of the measures implemented and the strong commitment from the Spanish authorities to its execution, according to the Spanish government.

The aim of the report is to evaluate the program in terms of its effectiveness, efficiency and coherence, with the aim of drawing lessons for future European Union programs.

The European Commission report highlights that the goals sought have been achieved and other risks have been averted that could have had negative consequences for the banks and for the Spanish economy as a whole. The indicators analyzed show a clear improvement in relation to solvency, profitability and financing costs of the financial system, while returning credit flows to the real economy.

The assessors also point out that it was the right decision to focus the program and its conditional nature upon the financial sector and avoid the inclusion of measures aimed at fiscal policy and structural reforms.

Furthermore, the report points out that the implementation of measures contained in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) by the Spanish authorities was swift and effective, with the majority of the reforms being undertaken in 2012. This allowed confidence in the Spanish economy and in its financial system to be restored from the very outset of the program.

The document also highlights the commitment made by the Government of Spain to meeting its fiscal targets and the adoption of structural reforms in parallel to the financial assistance program, which has led to the economy entering a virtuous circle, resulting in job creation and economic growth. The reforms implemented led to the recovery of investor confidence in Spain and in the ability of its authorities to correct the macro-economic imbalances.

The Spanish authorities share the conclusions of the report in general and appreciate the European Commission’s acknowledgement of the commitment and efforts made by the government in terms of this program, the Spanish government said.

Spain requested the financial assistance program back in June 2012, endowed with a line of credit of up to 100 billion euros under very advantageous conditions, with the aim of cleaning up and restructuring the Spanish financial system. Of this total, something over 40 billion euros was finally required, of which more than 5.6 billion have already been reimbursed to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), close to 15% of the total.

By Lincoln Clapper

The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has become somewhat of a revelation to the international community over the last several months. Commencing with the desertion from Al-Qaeda, to the self-proclamation of Caliph by its leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, and finally the surge in Iraq and Syria, each move has occurred without a countervailing effort. In order to conceptualize the mentality of ISIS and its motivation, look no further than inside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to examine how its puritanical Wahhabi doctrine has enabled the ideology of ISIS and terrorist groups alike, and will continue to do so for potential Islamic extremist groups in the future.

It’s all too obvious that the theology of ISIS is reciprocal to the Wahhabi religious doctrine that has governed Saudi Arabia from its inception to this very day.

A Brief History of the Deal at the Heart of Saudi Society

Wahhabism refers to the Islamic doctrine founded by Muhammad Ibn’ Abdul-Wahhab. Born in 1703, Abdul-Wahab grew up in Nejd (present-day Saudi Arabia) and was a religious zealot who believed the two most important aspects of religion were, “the Quran and the sword.” As a young teen, he was introduced to the works of Ibn Taymiyyah, an atavistic theologian whose works still resonate in present-day Sunni militant theology. Ibn Taymiyyah’s belief that, “misguided Muslims who do not abide by his interpretation of Shari’ah law should be fought as if they were infidels,” is a foundational principle of Al-Qaeda and ISIS alike. Abdul-Wahhab continued his devotion to the teachings of Ibn Taymiyyah throughout his early adult life and began to travel across Nejd projecting his views on Shi’ite communities. Due to his excessive, puritanical beliefs he was forcibly expelled from the city of Basrah by Shi’ite clerics after they revolted against his teachings and attacked him. His rejection eventually led him back to the place of his birth, Al-‘Uyaynah, where his radicalism started to gain excessive adulation. On one prominent occasion, he arranged for the public execution of a woman who confessed to her adultery, had her tied down, then stoned her to death. As this story disseminated throughout the region a local tribal ruler issued a decree that Abdul-Wahhab had to either be stopped or killed. With his life in jeopardy, Abdul-Wahhab traveled to a small market town called Dir’iyyah, which at the time was under the control of one Muhammad Bin Sa’ud. Little did they realize that the events that followed would set a precedent for the future of the region.

Bin Sa’ud, under the religious conviction that this man was “driven to him by Allah,” struck a deal with Abdul-Wahab in 1744 that remains solidified to this day between the House of Saud and the House of Ash-Shaykh (the descendants of Abdul-Wahab). Abdul-Wahhab and Bin Sa’ud’s army went about waging wars against Muslim and non-Muslim tribes alike across Arabia, spreading Wahhabism as the predominant religion. This bond between Abdul-Wahab and Bin Sa’ud legitimized the use of religion as the instrument for consolidating power and establishing Bin Sa’ud as the ruling family. The alliance forced obedience from the conquered tribes to the House of Saud and their policies, of which Abdul-Wahab strongly encouraged. At that point, Wahhabism became compliantly submissive to the new royal family and continues to be so to this day, evidenced by the 2003 statement from the highest religious authority in Saudi Arabia, Grand Mufti Abdul-Aziz Bin Abdullah Al Ash Shaykh that, “ the rulers should always be obeyed, even if unjust.”

Every Saudi ruler since Bin Sa’ud has followed his predecessor’s domestic policy by ensuring that the religious establishment remains in significant control of public affairs. Present-day Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia is very much like that of the first Saudi state. The religious police, Mutawwa’ah, still roam the streets with sticks enforcing Wahhabism’s strict standards regarding the separating of sexes, women’s dress code, use of alcohol or drugs, and religious observances. Shi’ites are highly discriminated against, any type of political dissent is immediately suppressed on the basis of religious violations, and public beheadings are still routinely used as a type of capital punishment for “sorcery, drug trafficking, and rape.”

The relationship between the ulama (political elite) and muftis (religious authorities) has been honored and respected as the royal family has allowed the appointment of a member of the House of Shaykh to be the Grand Mufti since 1744. The only exception to this was ‘Abdul-‘Aziz Bin ‘Abdullah Bin Baz, better known as Bin Baz.

In 1993, Bin Baz became the first non-member of the House of Shaykh to hold the position, and has since played an instrumental role in the political legitimization for the House of Saud with his obscurantist views of Islam that resembled the early teachings of Abdul-Wahab. It is argued that he is responsible for the religious propagation and extremely radical interpretation of Islam through this viewpoint of Wahhabism. His rulings and fatwas range from: disputing the landing on the moon — the banning of pictures, statues and relics — the banning of prayer behind a man wearing a suit and tie — rejection of the rotation of the earth — the banning of singing and music — banning women from driving — and declaring Muslims who do not believe the stories of the Prophet as infidels. Bin Baz enforced strict dress codes for women, as well as men, forbade people who practiced martial arts from bowing to each other, and continued anti-Shi’ite, anti-Christian, and anti-Semitic propaganda through public statements.

His hostility towards other religions was apparent through his sermons and fatwas: “It is incumbent upon Muslims to take as enemies the infidel Jews and Christians and other polytheists, and to avoid their amiability,” and “(Shi’ites) are the most polytheist, and none of the people of passion are more lying than them, and more remote from monotheism, and their danger on Islam is very great indeed.” This was the same rhetoric and propaganda used during the inception of Al-Qaeda by Bin Laden, and Bin Baz was no different regarding militant legitimization for religious superiority.

Shortly after 9/11 this history became quite relevant to US intelligence analysts. Saudi Arabian credibility was immensely damaged internationally, and officials found themselves backtracking on the theology of their state religion. With eleven of the hijackers having been Saudi citizens, the Saudi regime was put on the defensive. This resulted in a political effort to marginalize the extremism of Al-Qaeda by relieving what they viewed as, “extremist,” Imams from their duties, reforming some of the educational indoctrination, and advocating for the condemnation of terrorist activity worldwide. This was done by the House of Saud to appease their Western allies and keep the lucrative oil relationship intact, but by no means did any radical transformation of the House of Shaykh take place in this process.

Saudi Arabia Back in the Spotlight

The Saudi religion was slowly forgotten by the international community as a correlative issue with Al-Qaeda due to the political focus toward ending the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it has since subtly entered back into the international spotlight since the Syrian civil war outbreak in 2011. With the uprising against Bashar Al-Assad, many Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia in particular, have used the conflict as a proxy war for Sunni vs Shia supremacy by funneling millions of dollars to Wahhabi militant factions to assist in the overthrow. In 2012, Saudi Arabia’s own intelligence chief Bandar Bin Sultan was formally sent to Syria to round up and organize Sunni militants for the opposition movement. Initially, financial support and arms were transferred to Al-Nusra Front, an Al-Qaeda affiliate, and Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), before it formally partitioned itself as ISIS.

The plan for the Saudi-backed AQI to enter Syria became botched when Hezbollah and Iran began funneling cash, arms, and personnel into Syria to combat the overthrow, creating a rift between AQI, Al-Qaeda leadership, and Saudi leadership on a plan of action. The leader of AQI, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, after months of ideological conflict with Al-Qaeda leadership decided to defect, thus creating the present-day Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. What is important in this transformation is the amount of Wahhabi influence on the ideology of Al-Baghdadi and subsequently ISIS. The biographies of Al-Baghdadi and others in ISIS leadership positions show how they’ve absorbed the Wahhabi doctrine and mastered its details. Documents reveal the groups explicitly stated goals of, “establishing the religion and dissemination monotheism, which is the purpose and calling of Islam,” — this is the same rhetoric in Abdul-Wahab’s interpretations of Islam. Their main goal is nothing more than to create a Wahhabi state that is inherently identical to the theology of Abdul-Wahhab, and Al-Baghdadi has resorted to the teachings of Abdul-Wahhab for his arguments to support the means of creating that state.

His stated principles are practically replicas of Wahhabi sources such as “the need to demolish and remove all manifestation of polytheism and prohibits its ways,” and “the need to resort to the law of God through seeking adjudication in the Islamic courts of the Islamic State.” Al-Baghdadi’s process of establishing an Islamic State is conducted in the same manner that Abdul-Wahhab and Ibn Saud used in the 18th century by conquering territory and ruthlessly forcing the conquered to conform or die. ISIS’s brutal tactics of beheading and flogging, the banning of smoking and music, and dress codes enforced on women, along with the continual circulation of Wahhabi books and documents among the schools it controls is extremely reflective of the Wahhabi ideology — these same books and documents being circulated can currently be found in Saudi Arabia.

This all has created a deleterious consequence for the House of Saud. As ISIS has garnered further international publicity and continues to become a security concern for the West and Middle East, it has also created a situation where Saudi Arabia’s image is becoming severely damaged. As more and more investigations delve into the ideology of ISIS and the stark similarities and principles of ISIS and Saudi Arabia are discovered, one may ask why the royal family in Saudi Arabia does not distance itself from the religious establishment as a whole? Herein lies the paradox behind the Saudi state: without the House of Shaykh using the Wahhabi ideology to legitimatize the religious duty of the House of Saud to rule, the royal family will no longer have a substantial claim for political power over the kingdom. Therefore, the House of Saud is constantly oscillating between condemning ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and any other Sunni militant groups that live by the creed of Wahhabism (that is essentially one-in-the-same with the religious authority in Saudi Arabia), appealing to the global community that Saudi Arabia is not a state that supports ISIS’s ideology, and not upsetting the religious Ash-Shaykh establishment in Saudi Arabia. The damage-control mode taken by Saudi Arabia in recent months is evident by their foreign policy actions, with Saudi Arabia now part of the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS.

Yet public opinion of ISIS in the kingdom remains very empathetic. In June 2014, a poll taken in Saudi Arabia showed that 92% believed, “ISIS conforms to the values of Islam and Islamic Law,” and families of sons who have died fighting with ISIS have expressed “joy,” regarding the martyrdom of their child. Saudi intelligence has taken notice of this level of public sympathy (due in part to pressure from the U.S.) especially of the blatant Twitter campaigns showing support for the Islamic State and pleadingly allegiance to Al-Baghdadi. However, as the House of Saud wages its condemnation against ISIS, it is clear that the Wahhabi ideology is firmly cemented in the religious culture of Saudi Arabia casting significant doubt on a change in public opinion.

The danger that ISIS poses for the international community is that it preaches and institutes the same religious teachings of Abdul-Wahhab, carrying aspirations of creating an Islamic state that has been tried for nearly two centuries since the creation of the first Saudi state. Only this time, the group has resources that were never accessible to its predecessors. Firstly, ISIS is effectively using social media campaigns to recruit new members from all over the globe. Secondly, the size of the group (estimates are around 30,000) is large enough to conclude that a small-scale counterinsurgency campaign would not be enough to suppress its progress across the region due to their massive territorial control over northern Syria and parts of Iraq. Thirdly, ISIS controls oil fields that are estimated to be making them $3 million per day on the black market, and the toppling of the Iraqi bank in Mosul gave them an inheritance of nearly $400 million in cash. The continued kidnapping of foreigners and reporters will serve as possible additional funding from European and Asian governments due to their willingness to negotiate with terrorist organizations. ISIS’s financial resources, recruiting tactics, and military strength are all imperative issues facing the international community moving forward.

It is blatant that the state religion in Saudi Arabia has both directly and indirectly led to the formation of ISIS. The Wahhabi ideology taught, enforced, and supported in Saudi Arabia is essentially a mirror image of the religious establishment ISIS is implementing in its attempt to form an Islamic state, with both the House of Shaykh and Al-Baghdadi adhering to the same teachings and theology of Wahhabism. While the conduct of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia is not at the same level of brutality that ISIS displays by leaving beheaded bodies mounted in the streets, enslaving women and girls of different religions, or massacring towns and villages at point-blank range, the fundamental ideas behind the importance of living by the Koran and ruling by the sword still pertain to both sides — this is evidenced by public opinion polls and support for the groups across internet platforms.

As long as the Wahhabi ideology prevails as the religious authority in Saudi Arabia, the potential will always remain for additional Sunni groups to emerge with the same pious philosophies and inclinations as ISIS. The House of Shaykh and House of Saud have deep, intertwined family ties with each other, as members of both houses have married one another over the last two centuries. The House of Saud will most likely never allow the House of Shaykh to lose its religious authority in the Kingdom because of the need for the House of Shaykh to legitimize the power the royal family possesses. If the Saudi Arabian establishment is continually supported and backed by the West, their existence will be incompatible with countering Islamic radicalism. Moving forward, expect to see any rise of religious fanaticism inside the Kingdom suppressed while extremist groups outside of the Kingdom’s grasp, particularly in neighboring countries, continue to emulate the Wahhabi doctrine that Saudi Arabia has lived under since its founding.

This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com

After months of reality-show media coverage of the 2016 presidential campaign, the voting process is thankfully starting. As the voters begin to actually speak, perhaps the coverage will have more actual reality in it.

In recent years, it is no secret that media coverage of elections virtually ignores where the candidates stand on major issues, in favor of the “horse race” involving candidates’ political strategies and tactics, and now has even become merely celebrity gossip. One cynical analyst once said that politics is just Hollywood for ugly people.

So it should be no secret that Donald Trump, one of the kings of “reality” TV, has done much better than anyone ever thought he would. Outsiders in both parties seem to have performed better in this circus, because voters seem to be angry that, for decades, they have been repeatedly promised a fix to Washington’s dysfunction—the most recent billed as “hope and change”—only to see the same old shenanigans continue there.

Similar public frustration with U.S. foreign policy is not reported much in the media—because it does not boost ratings or numbers of subscribers as much as sensational coverage of minor terrorist attacks. Although out of this excessive media-induced fear, a slim majority of Americans want something done militarily about ISIS, the brutal Islamist terrorist group, they don’t want another long Iraq- or Afghanistan-like quagmire in the greater Middle East involving American boots on the ground.

Unfortunately, one cannot eradicate ISIS military without ground forces; using local ground forces is the best option, but in Iraq and Syria, where the ISIS “caliphate” exists, friendly local forces are either unreliable, meager, or virtually non-existent. Attacks from the air—the major thrust of current U.S. policy—inadvertently kill civilians, which enrages the population and likely only creates more terrorists than it kills.

This underlying reluctance of large swaths of the American electorate of both parties to continue such long-standing U.S. meddling in faraway conflicts—which it intuitively, if vaguely, realizes is the major cause of blowback terrorism—is reflected by the better-than-expected standing of anti-establishment candidates, such as Donald Trump and Ted Cruz on the Republican side and Bernie Sanders on the Democratic side.

Although Trump and Cruz have made some over-the-top comments about bombing ISIS into smithereens, in general they are less hawkish than the mainstream candidates, with their traditional Republican jingoistic foreign policy: Marco Rubio, Chris Christie, John Kasich, and Jeb Bush.

Moreover, the pall of George W. Bush’s disastrous Iraq War still hangs over the 2016 election to such an extent that so far, the candidacy of Bush #3—who the at the beginning of the campaign in 2015 the media was trying to anoint as the Republican frontrunner—has done abysmally.

In fact, Trump shows at least some indication of being in the realist (rather than reality-show) foreign policy school by his astute advocacy of outsourcing the Syrian problem to the Russians—after all, when your enemies are fighting each other, let them, while also keeping the Russians busy in a nasty civil war that has “bog” written all over it.

Also, Trump convincingly argues for renegotiating the expensive U.S.-Japan alliance, which for decades has allowed a wealthy country to save resources by allowing the United States to protect it, while throwing those extra resources into competition with U.S. companies and restricting its market to those same companies.

Furthermore, as many foreign policy realists do, Trump has said that U.S. foreign policy should be designed to safeguard only U.S. interests, more narrowly defined—omitting such things as advocacy for human rights, democracy promotion, humanitarian military interventions, and the responsibility to protect people overseas from harm.

He believes correctly that economic engagement with dictatorships has the best chance of opening them politically in the long term. He rejects the neo-conservative doctrine of remodeling countries into shaky democracies by using military force—that is he was against the Iraq War.

Sam Clovis, a retired Air Force colonel and Trump’s chief policy adviser, criticized neo-conservatives who “think you can go out there and in three weeks after Iraq collapses you can create a constitutional democracy over there,” according to journalist Josh Rogin.

Ted Cruz has characterized his foreign policy views as somewhere between the aggressiveness of John McCain and Marco Rubio at one end of the spectrum and the much less interventionist Rand Paul at the other end. For example, Cruz has cogently argued, “The enemy of my enemy is not necessarily my friend. If the Obama administration and the Washington neo-cons succeed in toppling [Bashar al-] Assad, Syria will be handed over to radical Islamic terrorists. ISIS will rule Syria.”

On the left, Bernie Sanders, although not totally dovish, was against the Kosovo War in 1999 and W’s Iraq War. In fact, he trumpets that on the seminal foreign policy issue of our time, he was against the invasion of Iraq and Hillary, always very hawkish, was for it.

Thus, at least a ray of hope exists that America’s exhaustion with the long foreign quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan is casting a long, if barely visible, shadow on the 2016 presidential campaign.

This article was published at Huffington Post and reprinted with permission

The Islamic State militant group has released 16 more Assyrian Christian hostages in Syria, activists working in the region have confirmed, reported Christian Today.

The Assyrian Church of the East Relief Organization said on Jan. 29 that the 16 were released after being held in northeastern Syria since February 2015. Photos posted on Facebook show that at least nine of the freed are children.

The hostages were among more than 200 people abducted from villages along the Khabur River in northern Syria last Feb. 23.

The group that calls themselves the Islamic State undertook raids on a number of Assyrian villages near Tel Hmar, burning churches and forcing hundreds of families to flee.

IS has now released more than 160 captives in total, and A Demand for Action, a campaign group for minorities in the Middle East, previously told Christian Today that the church is working “day and night to make sure all are returned to their families safely.”

By Fatih Karimov

German Linde Group jointly with Japanese MITSUI & CO., LTD. will invest in various Iranian petrochemical projects, Marzieh Shahdaei, the director for projects at Iran’s National Petrochemical Company (NPC) said.

The two companies have offered $4 billion worth of investment for various projects including Damavand Petrochemical Complex, Shahdaei said, Iran’s official IRNA news agency reported Feb. 1.

She further said that both companies are among those who held negotiations with Iran before the removal of the international sanctions and studied Iran’s petrochemical industry.

After implementation of the nuclear deal last month, the companies held further talks with Iran for cooperation, Shahdaei added.

The Damavand petrochemical project worth $4 billion started in 2006-2007 and is divided into three phases. The project is planned to process 610 mcm of natural gas annually.

Once Damavand Petrochemical Complex comes on stream, Iran’s petrochemical output will rise from 60 to 90 million tons per year.

Iran’s petrochemical output hit 44.4 million tons in the past Iranian fiscal year (ended on March 20, 2015), 10 percent more year-on-year.

The shortage of natural gas as feedstock, old production units, and the problem of sanctions, which has dropped exports, have caused petrochemical complexes to work below the actual production capacity in Iran.

The Islamic Republic hopes to realize an output of 120 million tons of petrochemicals by 2020 and 180 million tons by 2025.

By P.D. Rai*

January has been full of negative news starting with terrorist attack on an Indian air base at Pathankot. For a nation hungry for good news Sikkim – a a border state with just over 600,000 people – has provided one. Sikkim has been declared a fully “Organic State” by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. No mean achievement this.

How many states can say this for any public policy carried out in mission mode? This milestone could not have been achieved but for the complete cooperation and coordination of all sections of society.

Sikkim Chief Minister Pawan Chamling is a proud man. Having crafted a shared vision of a “Fully Organic Sikkim” he has managed to provide the political leadership to ensure its timely implementation. Despite loud opposition and noise of many of our farmers, he gradually won over people from all walks of life to back the mission. The tipping point came when the world started discussing the positive impacts of organic farming for clean food security, for soil health and for overall health in general. It works well for combating climate change too.

Today we have to be grateful for the work put in by many. The Ridge Park Floriculture Show is a tremendous piece of art. Many visitors have commented that they have never seen such a floriculture spectacle. I am sure we can fill several coffee table books with the photographs of the flowers exhibited. No participant has spared any effort to make the Sikkim Organic Festival 2016 a grand success. The extent and quantum of orchids on display tells us how deeply energized and involved are many of our floriculturists. I must mention Mrs. Tikamaya Chamling and her family for the amount of effort put in not just presently but over the decades to imbibe a spirit of learning and scientific temper in growing orchids in particular. There are others like Mohan Pradhan, the quintessential ‘Orchid Man’ from Sikkim. Sanjog Raya, an architect, has helped in the three dimensional conceptualization of the Ridge Park super show.
The display in Saramsa Garden is another grand scale. Here the farmers from different parts of Sikkim display their produce, mainly vegetables, a fantastic array of organic farming output. There is an educative exhibition of what goes into the soil that is important. A full display of how soil health and nutrition for the plants. The Department of Agriculture and Horticulture worked tirelessly to present a commendable grand finale to the mission.

There is also a glimpse of value added product exhibits which gives a peek of the potential of value addition. Many young entrepreneurs are needed to take full advantage of Sikkim’s big-bang “Organic State” status.

Now the question is what next?

We need to take a deeper dive into many of the issues presented to us by the mountain specificities. Small and scattered land holdings, irrigation issues and market access were some of the issues flagged. Mountains present other sets of issues which inflate the cost of production. How do we overcome this without subsidy is a very important question?

We cannot lose the momentum and so we have to go back to the drawing board to find high quality innovative solutions to many of these and other questions that will inevitably arise.

We have crafted many great things together. Peace and harmony in a critical border area of India is just one of them. I am sure this has played a vital role in Sikkim’s march to attain “Organic State” status. That is the how we as a society can move forward together. That is also a great sign of progress and a progressive society.

*P.D. Rai is the lone MP from Sikkim in the Indian Parliament. He can be contacted at pdrai8@gmail.com

By Swadesh Roy*

Thousands of investors came to the capital of Bangladesh from different part of the world. After all, it was for the first time that a large scale investors’ summit had been organized in Bangladesh.

During the inaugural session, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, told the participants the story of new era; she said they have all gathered at a place that is seeking to develop itself into a land of investment; a land that can provide rich manpower. In fact, reflecting on the blossoming popular capital of Bangladesh, one of the participating foreign banks, Standard Chartered Bank’s managing director, said at this summit that now 99 percent of his employees are Bangladeshi. A similar statement was made by the Chief Executive of Unilever; one of the biggest multinational companies in Bangladesh.

The focal point of Unilever and the Standard Chartered Bank is precisely the educated, enthusiastic pool of workers that Bangladesh provides. It is undeniable that when seeking to invest, an investor would put his/her money there where it will get the best manpower to manage its operations. Now a pool of almost 60 million manpower is ready to be employed in Bangladesh, making it an investment destination worth a shot.

But this young manpower is not the only attraction for the investors from the participating countries. While it is one of the prime attractions for Scandinavian countries; countries of European Union and even Japan, it is not however, the main attraction for Vietnam or China. They are not suffering from manpower crisis. Bangladesh attracts the attention of population-plenty countries like China and India for the avenues it provides for investment in infrastructural development.

Some economists say that both these countries are investing in Bangladesh for their own interest as the country can serve as an effective transit country, making investment in its infrastructure an essential. However, while both India and China might be eyeing Bangladesh for their vested interest, to have them to invest in this country is one of the most effective steps on the path to industrialization and attracting further investment. Bangladesh needs infrastructure in place to attract more investment.

It is true that China and India will get transit facility from Bangladesh, but this does not mean that Bangladesh will not get any interest or profit by being a transit nation to two of the fastest growing economies in the world. Rather, Bangladesh could perhaps count itself as a geographically blessed country that has both land and river transit with two emerging big economy like China and India. Even Bangladesh can join itself with the Chinese maritime route and the China to Europe land route. Sometimes both are called silk route. Therefore, it is lucrative for the investors to invest in Bangladesh.

Young and energetic manpower, openness to building infrastructure using foreign investment and a desire to connect with the world economy are the main parts of the new story that PM Sheikh Hasina is weaving for Bangladesh. But all the parts of the story are yet to appear as beautiful. There are some parts of the story which still need editing. One of the parts is that the capital of Bangladesh is very much an unplanned city. Sheikh Hasina is trying to make it into a planned city by connecting some new suburb which is under construction. But its future is still unclear. Opinions are available in plenty: some say that it is right path; others say it will convert Dhaka into a concrete jungle.

As they say, Rome was not built overnight, and so is the case with Dhaka. It will get in order soon.

*Swadesh Roy is a writer and columnist and is working as an Executive Editor of Daily Janakantha, Dhaka, Bangladesh. He can be contacted at: swadeshroy@gmail.com