By Firoz Osman*

The phenomenon of “Islamic State” (Daesh) has surfaced once again following sensational the media reporting of the arrest of four South African Muslims under their country’s anti-terror laws; there is an obvious attempts to instil a climate of fear in our communities. Just as Al-Qaeda was used to scare populations worldwide and provide governments with the excuse to deprive their citizens of civil liberties, frequent warnings by the USA and its allies of imminent attacks by Daesh/”Islamic State” seek to create paranoia and unease.

There is little doubt that Daesh is an infinitely more potent force than Al-Qaeda ever was. It emerged after the US-led invasion, occupation and devastation of Iraq, wherein a sectarian government was installed after Saddam Hussein’s ouster. The Americans used a classic divide and rule ploy, pitting Sunni against Shia in fratricide previously non-existent in Iraq.

The dissolution of the ruling Baath Party led to a million unemployed Sunnis, amongst whom were 400,000 highly-trained military personnel. Joining forces with Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a powerful insurgency developed, attacking both the occupation forces and the government.

Many regional and global powers got embroiled in the ensuing anarchy by financing, training and arming militias ready to do their bidding. Battles were fought between the different militias under various pretexts, usually based upon the sectarian divide and manipulated by their paymasters in foreign capitals.

Under the leadership of Abu Baker Al-Baghdadi, AQI linked up with the Syrian insurgents to form the so-called “Islamic State” — Daesh — controlling an area covering nearly half of Syria and a third of Iraq. The group took over oil and gas fields, giving it access to an income of $3 million per day.

Daesh also captured advanced weaponry — including artillery, rockets, tanks and armoured vehicles — in their battlefield victories against Syrian and Iraqi government forces. The extremists turned into a renegade, independent entity.

This entity has formed a government with its own currency, police and intelligence agencies, radio and television stations, newspapers and magazines. From a movement ostensibly established to confront an imperial invasion, Daesh has metamorphosed into a cult-like deviant sect with fanatical followers creating a climate of fear.

With Russia and Iran entering the fray on the side of Syria’s Bashar Assad, in opposition to the Turkish, Saudi Arabian, Israeli and Western alliance, a quick resolution to the conflict looks impossible. Hundreds of proxy militias have created a conundrum for their regional backers. Israel remains the only unscathed regional entity to-date, and its occupation of Palestine fuels the conflicts burning across the Middle East.

Whilst the US may not have actually created Daesh, it bears the major responsibility for the toxic combination of a bitter population and sectarianism. The AQI transformed into Daesh, which is now more or less a gang of mercenaries brutalising, butchering and annihilating Shia, Sunnis and Christians alike.

Daesh uses its skill with information technology to rule the 9 million people within the territory it controls by fear; Muslims around the world are lured to the deviant cause it espouses. It has broadcast gruesome images of beheadings, the burning alive of captives in cages and other medieval punishments, terrifying both its adversaries and ideological opponents.

However, as revealed by veteran journalist Abdel Bari Atwan, Daesh has also used social media expertly to recruit thousands of adherents to “spread its ideology and literature to more than a billion and a half Muslims around the world by using these media in recruitment and terrorising enemies.”

Furthermore, there are specialised units producing documentaries and propaganda produced and disseminated by an electronic army both within and beyond the “Islamic State”. Daesh is alleged to control more than 50,000 accounts on twitter issuing more than 100,000 messages every; there are also believed to be tens of thousands of accounts on Facebook, WhatsApp and other social media.

Such an orchestrated media blitz to recruit volunteers is bound to find some fertile ground given the remorseless onslaught by the West and Israel, and their invasion, occupation and destabilisation of Muslim lands from Palestine to Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Mali and Syria. That list is not exhaustive.

Muslims have been the victims of oppression, humiliation, torture, starvation, murder and gross abuse of human rights for decades by the West and Western-backed despots, tyrants and illegitimate leaders. The Muslim world is frustrated at its inability to protect innocent and defenceless women and children who are pulverised almost daily under indiscriminate attacks by Israelis, Americans and Europeans or their proxies.

In the midst of the current mayhem and anarchy created by the West — which has killed community leaders, engineered coups and entrenched a sectarian divide — the opportunities are many for bogus outfits such as “Islamic State” to emerge and claim to be confronting the occupiers.

Daesh has been clever enough to dress up its rhetoric and video clips with Arabic phrases such as jihad, caliphate, Islam and so on, thus appealing to and ensnaring Muslims agonising over the pathetic plight of too many of their co-religionists. When some of those Muslims seek to provide humanitarian aid to their fellows in desperate need, it is unfair and just plain wrong to call them “terrorists”.

Daesh has been a disaster for the image of Islam and Muslims around the world, and a boon for the Islamophobes. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of reasonable people are fully aware that the self-styled “Islamic State” is merely a group of deviant mercenaries, whose victims are mainly Muslims and whose actions violate the fundamental tenets of Islam.

*Dr. Firoz Osman is an executive member of the Media Review Network in South Africa.

China has firmly rejected and denounced the July 2016 award by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague on the arbitration initiated by the Philippines on its dispute with China over the South China Sea. China’s state-owned Global Times described the award as an “illegal verdict” which was “more radical and shameless than many people had ever expected,” and Chinese President Xi Jinping reaffirmed the long-standing Chinese government position that China would not accept any claim or action based on the award, which it sees as an unjust infringement of its sovereignty.1 As Graham Allison reminds us, China’s reaction to the unfavorable PCA arbitral award is not unusual for a great power:

“No permanent member of the UN Security Council has ever complied with a ruling by the PCA on an issue involving the Law of the Sea. In fact, none of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council have ever accepted any international court’s ruling when (in their view) it infringed their sovereignty or national security interests.”2

China’s Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin reiterated his accusation that the PCA tribunal was biased against China, and suggested that then-president of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea Shunji Yanai, who had nominated four of the five arbitrators after China refused to participate in the arbitration process, was “unfriendly to China” and had exercised undue influence over the tribunal during its arbitration proceedings. However, some observers have argued that China did not fully appreciate the implications of its choice not to participate in the arbitration process. Not only did it give up its right to appoint the arbitrators, it also gave up its right to present its legal arguments and evidence to the tribunal and to the international audience of the arbitration proceedings.3 More significantly, China did not appear to have anticipated that the PCA arbitral award would invalidate its historic claims to the South China Sea as mapped by the nine-dash line, or that the arbitrators would find that these historical claims had been superseded the moment China ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.4 As Zheng Wang points out:

“When China took part in negotiating the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) from 1973 to 1982, the Chinese decided to stand with the Third World countries and supported the demand for a 200 nm Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The Chinese diplomats at that time totally forgot about the South China Sea and the nine-dash line. They put ideology above national interests and failed to realize that the 200 nm EEZ would bring unthinkable contradictions to China’s claims in the South China Sea, as the neighboring countries’ EEZs would overlap with the nine-dash line.”5

In lieu of engaging in legal proceedings at the PCA tribunal, China instead sought to “change the facts on the water” with its “audacious programme of land reclamation and militarization of atolls.”6 While the Chinese government has since claimed that the island reclamation works had been “carefully designed … to minimize ecological effect,” marine biologists have identified significant ecological damage to the South China Sea caused by these unprecedented construction projects, and the PCA tribunal, in its arbitral award, found the “damage to coral reefs and other fragile ecosystems” to be a “violation of China’s obligation, under UNCLOS, to preserve and protect marine habitats.”7

While the PCA lacks an institutional enforcement mechanism for its arbitral awards, international pressure can encourage implementation of these awards.8 The PCA award in the Philippines v. China arbitration case is likely to be followed with intensified US military activity in the South China Sea to enforce freedom of navigation in the contested waters.9 The Philippines is also coordinating with the US, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia to organize joint patrols in the South China Sea, and is working with countries like India to obtain the naval hardware needed for such patrols.10 In addition, France has called for joint EU naval patrols of the South China Sea to ensure freedom of navigation for European shipping in the contested waters.11

Apart from concerns over possible clashes between these naval vessels and those of the Chinese navy and coast guard, analysts have also highlighted the paramilitary role of China’s long-distance fishing fleet as an irregular maritime militia that has helped advance China’s claims in the South China Sea, sometimes even through the use of force. Vietnamese fishermen, for example, have reportedly had their fishing vessels rammed or sunk in the contested waters around the Paracel Islands. Analysts predict other claimant states to the South China Sea will follow China’s example and militarize their fishing fleets. Vietnam, for example, has been developing a maritime militia since 2009. The increased presence of militarized fishing vessels in the South China Sea increases the chances of the breakout of an armed conflict in the contested waters.12

In its arbitral award to the Philippines, the PCA tribunal ruled that the territorial sea extending 12 nautical miles around the Scarborough Shoal is a common fishing ground for Filipino fishermen and fishermen of other nationalities—including the Chinese—and that the use of force to prevent any country’s fishermen from the use of this common fishing ground would be a violation of their traditional fishing rights. The PCA tribunal also found Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, and Reed Bank to be low-tide features located within the EEZ of the Philippines.13 Experts note that Vietnam should expect a similar award for its claims in the Spratly and Paracel Islands should it follow the example of the Philippines and file for arbitration.14 As Paul Reichler, the Philippines’ lead counsel at the PCA arbitration proceedings, has noted, while the arbitral award is only legally binding on China and the Philippines, it also has legal implications for the other claimant states in the South China Sea dispute, especially Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia.15

In the meantime, impacts continue to accrue on China’s international reputation as countries like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Fiji, India, Poland, and Slovenia publicly deny claims published in the Chinese state media that they support China’s position on the South China Sea arbitration.16 Diplomatic tensions arising from the South China Sea dispute have also led to China-ASEAN relations to sink to their “lowest point in years,” as was illustrated by the contentious June 2016 special meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in Kunming, when they reportedly rejected a consensus statement that had been prepared for them by the Chinese government, and then attempted but failed to issue their own consensus statement expressing the region’s concern over the deterioration of the South China Sea dispute. As the Financial Times notes, similar tensions between China and the ASEAN nations in 2010 allowed the Obama administration to implement the US military “pivot” to Asia, with the Southeast Asian littoral states in particular welcoming the increased US presence in the South China Sea.17

Within the ASEAN regional grouping, Cambodia and Laos have lobbied the other ASEAN members on behalf of China.18 It is likely that Cambodia will expect a further deepening in economic cooperation with China in exchange for further advocacy efforts in ASEAN on behalf of China.19 Indeed, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen recently announced at the Asia-Europe Summit in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia that Cambodia is the beneficiary of 600 million USD in additional aid from China.20 The Laotian government is likely to expect not just an increase in Chinese aid, but also a more favorable financing package from China for the construction of the Kunming-Vientiane high speed rail line, China’s showpiece project in Southeast Asia for its Silk Road Economic Belt development plan.21 The commencement of construction in Laos of this rail project had been delayed because of disagreements between China and Laos over the financing of the project.22

In the case of the Singapore-Kuala Lumpur high speed rail line, the Singaporean government reportedly favors the Japanese and European bids, while the Malaysian government reportedly favors the Chinese bid.23 However, as Malaysia is one of the claimant states in the South China Sea dispute, its perception of China’s reaction to the PCA arbitral award could become a political risk factor affecting its decision on China’s high-speed rail bid. Likewise, dissatisfaction with China’s reaction to the PCA arbitral award could pose a political risk to China’s efforts to secure infrastructure construction projects in Indonesia under its 21st Century Maritime Silk Road development plan. China and Indonesia had earlier considered cooperating on a range of energy, industrial, and transportation infrastructure construction projects under the Maritime Silk Road framework, including the development of seaports, airports, and special economic zones.24 However, in the weeks before the PCA tribunal’s arbitral award, the Indonesian government suddenly announced its award of medium-speed rail and port development projects to Japan.25 Should China wish to continue pursuing its vision of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road in Indonesia, it will have to work to ensure that Indonesia’s turn to Japan is temporary, and that future infrastructure projects will be awarded to China.

In the case of the Philippines, the recently-elected Duterte administration has indicated its willingness to reopen negotiations with China over joint exploration of resources in the South China Sea. However, President Duterte has also indicated that he will not be open to deals which could weaken Philippine sovereignty. The PCA arbitral award further reduces the possibility that any “horse-trading” over South China Sea assets between China and the Philippines could happen.26

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Notes:
1 Kor Kian Beng, “China President Xi dismisses Hague arbitration on South China Sea but says ‘committed to peace,’” Straits Times, July 12, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/china-dismisses-hague-ruling-maintains-sovereignty-over-south-china-sea. “Arbitration award more shameless than worst prediction,” Global Times, July 12, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/993855.shtml. Euan Graham, “The Bolt from The Hague,” The Interpreter, July 13, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/07/13/The-Bolt-from-The-Hague1.aspx.

2 Graham Allison, “Of Course China, Like All Great Powers, Will Ignore an International Legal Verdict,” The Diplomat, July 11, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/of-course-china-like-all-great-powers-will-ignore-an-international-legal-verdict/.

3 Chun Han Wong, “Beijing Lashes Out at South China Sea Tribunal—and the People on It,” Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/07/13/beijing-lashes-out-at-south-china-sea-tribunal-and-the-people-on-it/. Liu Zhen, “Questions of neutrality: China takes aim at judges in South China Sea case,” South China Morning Post, July 11, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1988119/questions-neutrality-china-takes-aim-judges-south-china. Jiangyu Wang, “National Interests, International Law, and China’s Position on the South China Sea Disputes,” IPP Review, April 6, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://ippreview.com/index.php/Home/Blog/single/id/93.html. Zheng Wang, “What China Can Learn From the South China Sea Case,” The Diplomat, July 14, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/what-china-can-learn-from-the-south-china-sea-case/.

4 Graham, “Bolt from The Hague.” Zhen Liu, “What’s China’s ‘nine-dash line’ and why has it created so much tension in the South China Sea?” South China Morning Post, July 12, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1988596/whats-chinas-nine-dash-line-and-why-has-it-created-so.

5 Wang, “What China Can Learn.”

6 Sonya Sceats, “China’s Fury Over South China Sea Belies Its Legal Insecurities,” July 4, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/chinas-fury-over-south-china-sea-belies-its-legal-insecurities.

7 Graham, “Bolt from The Hague.” Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Beijing Calls South China Sea Island Reclamation a ‘Green Project,’” Foreign Policy, May 26, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/26/china-calls-south-china-sea-island-reclamation-a-green-project-spratly-islands/. Shannon Van Sant, “Marine Biologists: Artificial Islands Devastating South China Sea Ecosystems,” VOA, January 28, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.voanews.com/content/south-china-sea-island-building-environmental-damage/3166256.html.

8 Paterno Esmaquel II, “PH vs China: Which countries support Beijing?” Rappler, July 12, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/139167-west-philippine-sea-countries-support-china.

9 David Larter, “South China Sea ruling bolsters tougher U.S. stance,” Navy Times, July 13, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.navytimes.com/story/military/2016/07/12/south-china-sea-ruling-bolsters-tougher-us-stance/86986924/.

10 Carla Babb, “US Announces Joint Patrols With Philippines in South China Sea,” VOA, April 14, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.voanews.com/content/us-announces-joint-patrols-with-philippines/3285277.html. Manuel Mogato, “Philippines, Vietnam to explore joint patrols in South China Sea – sources,” Reuters, April 13, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-philippines-vietnam-idUSKCN0XA0N2. Saifulbahri Ismail, “Indonesia considering South China Sea patrols with Malaysia, Philippines: Military chief,” Channel NewsAsia, May 19, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/indonesia-considering/2799990.html. “India Assisting Philippines in Getting Warship to Patrol South China Sea,” Sputnik, July 14, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://sputniknews.com/asia/20160714/1042983309/south-china-sea-india.html.

11 Yo-Jung Chen, “South China Sea: The French Are Coming,” The Diplomat, July 14, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/south-china-sea-the-french-are-coming/.

12 Andrew Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Countering China’s Third Sea Force: Unmask Maritime Militia before They’re Used Again,” The National Interest, July 6, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/countering-chinas-third-sea-force-unmask-maritime-militia-16860. Ben Kerkvliet, “Vietnamese fishermen versus China,” New Mandala, July 6, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.newmandala.org/vietnamese-fishermen-versus-china/. Steve Mollman, “When China’s far-flung fishing fleet trespasses in other nations’ waters, Beijing has its back,” Quartz, April 4, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://qz.com/653928/when-chinas-far-flung-fishing-fleet-trespasses-in-other-nations-waters-beijing-has-its-back/. “Why China Is Arming Its Fishing Fleet,” Stratfor, June 16, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/why-china-arming-its-fishing-fleet.

13 Carmela Fonbuena, “Hague ruling: Filipinos, Chinese may fish in Scarborough,” Rappler, July 13, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.rappler.com/nation/139544-philippines-china-arbitration-scarborough-fishing-ground.

14 Santiago Saez Moreno, “Advantage Vietnam: The PCA ruling impact on Hanoi-Beijing relations,” The Interpreter, July 14, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/07/14/Advantage-Vietnam-The-PCA-ruling-impact-on-Hanoi-Beijing-relations.aspx.

15 Paterno Esmaquel II, “How to enforce Hague ruling? PH lead counsel explains,” Rappler, July 13, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.rappler.com/nation/139527-how-to-enforce-hague-ruling-ph-lead-counsel-explains.

16 Jeremy Page, “Beijing’s Claims of South China Sea Support May Not Hold Water,” Wall Street Journal, June 17, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/beijings-claims-of-south-china-sea-support-may-not-hold-water-1466138014. Manu Balachandran and Zheping Huang, “China’s state media is wrong to claim India supports Beijing in the South China Sea,” Quartz, July 14, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://qz.com/731553/chinas-state-media-is-wrong-to-claim-india-supports-beijing-in-the-south-china-sea/. Darshana Baruah, “South China Sea ruling: India takes a stand,” The Interpreter, July 15, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/07/15/South-China-Sea-ruling-India-takes-a-stand.aspx. Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim, “Central And Eastern Europe And China’s ‘Belt And Road’: Xi Jinping’s 2016 State Visits To Czech Republic, Serbia And Poland,” Eurasia Review, June 22, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.eurasiareview.com/22062016-central-and-eastern-europe-and-chinas-belt-and-road-xi-jinpings-2016-state-visits-to-czech-republic-serbia-and-poland-analysis/.

17 David Tweed and David Roman, “South China Sea Talks End in Disarray as China Lobbies Laos,” Bloomberg, June 15, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-15/china-s-south-china-sea-meeting-with-asean-ends-in-confusion. Prashanth Parameswaran, “What Really Happened at the ASEAN-China Special Kunming Meeting,” The Diplomat, June 21, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/what-really-happened-at-the-asean-china-special-kunming-meeting/. Tom Mitchell, “China struggles to win friends over South China Sea,” Financial Times, July 13, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a9a60f5e-48c6-11e6-8d68-72e9211e86ab.html.

18 Mitchell, “China struggles.”

19 Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim, “Sino-Cambodian Relations: Recent Economic And Military Cooperation,” Eurasia Review, June 30, 2015, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.eurasiareview.com/30062015-sino-cambodian-relations-recent-economic-and-military-cooperation-analysis/.

20 “Cambodia to receive $600m aid from China in return for international support,” Asian Correspondent, July 15, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, https://asiancorrespondent.com/2016/07/cambodia-to-receive-600-aid-from-china/.

21 Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim, “Laos And The Silk Road Economic Belt,” Eurasia Review, July 30, 2015, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.eurasiareview.com/30072015-laos-and-the-silk-road-economic-belt-analysis/.

22 Brenda Goh and Simon Webb, “On southwestern fringe, China’s Silk Road ambitions face obstacles,” Reuters, June 4, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-infrastructure-asean-insight-idUSKCN0YR010.

23 Nik Martin, “China’s high-speed rail plans for Asia inch closer,” Deutsche Welle, April 27, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.dw.com/en/chinas-high-speed-rail-plans-for-asia-inch-closer/a-19217479.

24 Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim, “China’s ‘Belt and Road’ and Southeast Asia: Challenges and Prospects,” in Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Southeast Asia (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya, 2015), 37.

25 Aditya Budiman, “Indonesia, Japan to go with Jakarta-Surabaya 5-hour Train Project,” Tempo, May 27, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://en.tempo.co/read/news/2016/05/27/056774691/Indonesia-Japan-to-go-with-Jakarta-Surabaya-5-hour-Train-Project. Chandni Vatvani, “Japan, Indonesia could work on port, rail projects: Official,” Channel NewsAsia, May 26, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/japan-indonesia-could/2818630.html.

26 Alvin Cheng-Hin Lim, “The New Philippine Leadership And Prospects For Sino-Philippine Relations,” Eurasia Review, May 23, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.eurasiareview.com/23052016-the-new-philippine-leadership-and-prospects-for-sino-philippine-relations-analysis/. Peter Lee, “Scorched earth ruling on S China Sea,” Asia Times, July 14, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, http://atimes.com/2016/07/scorched-earth-in-south-china-sea/.

By Nick Buffie*

The US Bureau of Labor Statistics released its newest report on the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), the primary measure of consumer inflation. Overall prices rose 0.2 percent in the past month, equivalent to an annual increase of about 2.4 percent.

Prices over the past three months (April, May, and June) are just 1.1 percent higher than from the same three months of 2015. However, “core” inflation — which excludes volatile food and energy prices and therefore tends to be a better predictor of future inflation — is up by 2.2 percent using the same measure. The difference is driven predominantly by a large decrease in energy prices, which have fallen 9.4 percent over the past year. (Food prices are up 0.3 percent.)

This 2.2 percent core inflation rate is basically in line with the Fed’s 2 percent target, though it should be noted that the 2.2 percent rate is driven predominantly by rising shelter costs, which can also be somewhat volatile. Shelter costs are up 3.5 percent relative to June of last year, while the costs of housing at school (consisting largely of college students’ housing) are up 3.1 percent. Excluding food, energy, and shelter, prices are up just 1.4 percent relative to June of last year.

It is also telling that inflation is running above 1.0 percent in just one region of the country. Comparing the most recent three months to the same three months from 2015, prices are up 0.8 percent in the South and Midwest and just 0.9 percent in the Northeast. The overall inflation rate is only pulled up to 1.1 percent thanks to higher inflation in the West, where prices have risen 1.6 percent over the past year. A number of major cities are bordering on deflation, most notably Philadelphia, where prices have risen just 0.1 percent over the past year. Inflation is running at just 0.3 percent in Cleveland and Chicago.

This underscores the fact that low inflation can be just as problematic as deflation — the difference between a 0.3 and a 0.1 percent inflation rate is no different than the difference between a 0.1 and a -0.1 percent inflation rate. The national inflation rate consists of prices averaged across cities and states, so a low inflation rate implies that at least some parts of the country will be experiencing deflation. The fact that inflation is running at less than 1 percent in three out of the four major regions of the country should be worrisome.

In terms of the prices of specific goods and services, the aforementioned 0.3 percent increase in food prices is driven mostly by higher fruit and vegetable prices. Prices for those goods are up 1.3 percent relative to last June, with apples experiencing the most notable rise (9.6 percent). Prices for meat, poultry, fish, and eggs are down 5.0 percent, while prices for dairy and related products are down 2.2 percent. Coffee lovers may be happy to know that coffee prices are also down 2.2 percent.

The decline in energy prices came across the board, though the largest decrease came from fuel oil, for which prices fell 19.6 percent over the last 12 months. Gas prices have fallen 15.4 percent, while utility gas services are down 5.0 percent and electricity costs are down 1.8 percent.

There have also been real changes in apparel costs, though prices have moved differently for men and women. Costs for men’s apparel are down 1.0 percent, while costs for women’s apparel are up 1.7 percent. Parents may be glad to see that infants’ and toddlers’ apparel have dropped 5.3 percent in price. Watches are 6.1 percent more expensive than they were a year ago, while jewelry prices are up 7.0 percent.

The index for goods and services produced by the transportation sector showed a marked decline of 3.7 percent over the last 12 months. The prices of new cars and trucks fell 0.5 percent, while the prices of used ones fell 3.1 percent. Public transportation costs fell 2.3 percent thanks largely to declining air fares, where prices are down 4.7 percent from last year. Intracity transportation costs are up 1.6 percent.

Unsurprisingly, two areas with notable prices increases were education and medical care. The costs of educational goods and services rose 3.0 percent over the past year. College textbooks rose 6.9 percent in price, and even rose 1.4 percent over just the past month (note that this is greater than the overall annual inflation rate). College tuition and fees are up 3.0 percent, and even elementary and high school costs are up 3.4 percent.

Medical care costs have risen 3.6 percent since last June. Medical care commodities (goods) are up 3.2 percent in price, thanks largely to a 4.4 percent increase in the prices of prescription drugs. The costs of nonprescription drugs, by contrast, fell 0.5 percent. Medical care service costs rose 3.8 percent, with the most notable increase in costs coming from inpatient hospital services, where prices rose 5.1 percent. Health insurance costs rose a notably high 7.1 percent.

Core inflation is gradually moving closer to the Fed’s target, though it remains abnormally low by historical standards. And perhaps most disturbingly, inflation is running below 1.0 percent in the vast majority of the country, indicating that low inflation poses a more serious risk to the economy than high inflation.

*Nick Buffie is a Research Associate at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) in Washington, DC.

I’ll save you the guesswork. On July 21, Donald Trump will become the Republican nominee for president of the United States. On July 28, Hillary Clinton will become the Democratic nominee.

Trump’s pending coronation is unsettling many Republican leaders – prompting Republican national chairman, Reince Priebus, to warn them that “if we don’t stick together as a party and stop her, then the only alternative is to get comfortable with the phrase President Hillary Clinton.”

That’s about as enthusiastic an endorsement Trump is likely to get from the Republican establishment.

It’s also unsettling many other Americans, some of whom will be demonstrating in downtown Cleveland to protest the nomination of a man who has gone out of his way to denigrate Latinos, blacks, Muslims and immigrants.

But barring a miracle, Trump will be nominated anyway.

So will Clinton, whose nomination isn’t going down easily with many of Bernie Sanders’s supporters, even after his endorsement of her.

So why have the conventions at all?

First, because they’re perks awarded to people who worked hard for candidates during the primaries — just as top sales reps in companies are awarded trips to national sales conventions. Delegates will have fun and spend money, which hotels and restaurants in downtown Cleveland and Philadelphia will sop up like dry sponges.

They’ll enjoy circulating on the convention floors for five or six hours each night exchanging gossip and business cards, hugging old friends and meeting new ones, and taking selfies.

And they’ll feel important when they hear party leaders, heads of state delegations, members of Congress and occasional celebrities tell them how critical it is to defeat the opposing party in November, how strong their nominee will be, and what makes America great.

Second, the conventions generate prime-time TV infomercials featuring celebrities, heroes and former presidents (Bush 1 and 2 say they won’t appear at the Republican one) and, most importantly, the nominee on the last night.

All will speak about the same three themes, although Trump will talk mainly about himself. These segments will be produced and directed by Hollywood professionals and marketing specialists whose goal is to get the major networks (or at least CNN, Fox News and MSNBC) to project stirring images into the living rooms of swing voters.

The third reason for these conventions will be hidden far away from the delegates and the prime-time performers: It’s to ingratiate the big funders — corporate executives, Wall Street investment bankers, partners in major law firms, top Washington lawyers and lobbyists, and billionaires.

The big funders are undermining our democracy but they’ll have the best views in the house. They’ll fill the skyboxes of the convention centers – just above where the media position their cameras and anchors and high above the din of the delegates. And they’ll feast on shrimp, lobster tails, and caviar.

Each party will try to make these big funders feel like the VIPs they’ve paid to be,letting them shake hands with congressional leaders, Cabinet officers and the nominee’s closest advisers, who will be circulating through the skyboxes like visiting dignitaries. If they’re lucky, the big funders will have a chance to clench the hand of the nominee himself or herself.

The three conventions — for delegates, for prime-time audiences at home and for big funders — will occur simultaneously, but they will occupy different dimensions of reality.

Our two major political parties no longer nominate people to be president. Candidates choose themselves, they run in primaries, and the winners of the primaries become the parties’ nominees.

The parties have instead become giant machines for producing infomercials, raising big money and rewarding top sales reps with big bashes every four years.

That Donald Trump, the most unqualified and divisive person ever to become a major party’s nominee, and Hillary Clinton, among the most qualified yet also among the least trusted ever to become a major party’s nominee, will emerge from the conventions to take each other on in the general election of 2016 is almost beside the point.

By Sunny Makroo

Successive governments in Delhi and Jammu and Kashmir have traditionally invested their back-door diplomatic maneuvering behind the troublemakers and rabble-rousers of the Kashmir valley. The pacifists in India believe that the solution or part solution for Kashmir lies in engineering a coup around those who create the maximum noise that discomforts Delhi such as separatists, rebel groups and hardliners.

The problem with this approach of extending monetary and political dollops to separatists is in the very construct of the perceived ‘core’ solution. The separatists and hardliners know that they need to keep the heat on consistently as it is the only oxygen for their survival and the continued simmering of Kashmir gets them the necessary attention from all-those-that-matter on Kashmir, in Delhi and elsewhere.

The Kashmir desk in Delhi continues to oblige the various factions of Hurriyat Conference to keep the heat in control; however with this crying-baby-gets-milk approach — they have often ignored many other stakeholders in this equation who have far more practical, durable and amicable approach.

There are lot of people in Kashmir, in Pakistan and in India whose kitchen runs on ensuring that Kashmir continues to be on a boil.

Pakistan’s military brass needs Kashmir to highlight the failure of its own civilian government in handling foreign policy and lacking spine to deal with emerging India; whereas Pakistan’s political class needs to ensure that it sends out a message to Rawalpindi and rest of Pakistan that it is more nationalistic than its military.

Pakistan also knows that it cannot internationalize Kashmir as world’s major powers such as US, UK and China have repeatedly asserted that Kashmir is a bilateral issue and by internationalising Kashmir — Pakistan risks getting attention on human right violations in Baluchistan. Therefore Pakistan’s narrative on Kashmir is more inward looking than it seems.

By re-latching to Kashmir; Pakistan is also attempting to shift the axis of India-Pak dialogue to Kashmir; which Modi led government has successfully hinged to terrorism. The NDA government should ensure that it doesn’t let Pakistan shift the narrative to Kashmir from terrorism — a goal post shift that Pakistan is desperate for.

Back home in India, the intellectual curiosity of journalists in Delhi and elsewhere in India is limited to a ready-to-eat narrative which projects Indian Military as aggressor and Kashmiris as underdogs fighting for their human rights — whereas the truth is that the Indian military is fighting a very complex battle in Kashmir.  A battle where barrel is directed at its own citizens, a battle where enemy is not identifiable. A battle where perception and reality both are fogged and interlaced with layers of inconvenient truths and convenient lies.

The armchair activists in India doesn’t do justice to Kashmiris either as they project a voice which is often not the majority voice of Kashmiris. They alienate Kashmir more in the heart and mind space of Indians by projecting the voice of separatists as mainstream; whereas separatists in Kashmir enjoy at best a seasonal and limited support which is evident election after election despite their boycott calls where people come out and vote in resounding numbers.

The reimagined solution

The killing of Burhan Wani is not about The-Burhan-Wani. He is just an opportunity for people with vested interests to address their core constituencies. He is just a medium and a storyboard. Yesterday it was Ashfaq Majeed Wani, today it is Burhan Wani and tomorrow it would be someone else.

While it is understandable that people in Pakistan and separatists in Kashmir have compulsions in keeping the coffin of Burhan Wani open, what is baffling is that Indian media has underplayed another important event. Perhaps for the first time a voice has emerged publically from the Valley which is denouncing the pro-Pakistan, pro-violence position and is inspiring a fresh narrative which is logical, practical and bold.

It is not an ordinary event that a son of a Kashmiri separatist leader, Junaid Qureshi, has come out in open and taken a bold stance of denouncing the methods of separatists at a time when the Valley is highly polarised and peace seems to be an unpopular choice. Junaid is a writer, international human rights activist and a senior leader of the Jammu and Kashmir Democratic Liberation Party.

The solution for Kashmir will emerge from Kashmir and perhaps the solution lies in nurturing thoughts that young Junaids’ have. Policy makers in Delhi need to focus on Junaids of Kashmir than the Burhans, else Kashmir will cover significant distance but zero displacement much like last two decades.

By Prof. B.R. Deepak*

Well over three years since the Philippines initiated arbitration proceedings as regards its maritime jurisdiction in the South China Sea (SCS), The Hague based Permanent Court of Arbitration announced the award of the arbitration on 12 July 2016.

As expected the Tribunal rejected China’s claims as regards its historic rights in the SCS, the status of features in the SCS and the entitlements to maritime areas, and the lawfulness of the Chinese activities in the SCS. In essence it upheld Philippines sovereign rights with respect to sea areas in its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. The Tribunal also considered that recent large scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands by China at seven features in the Spratly Islands since the commencement of the arbitration had aggravated the dispute between the parties.

China has denounced the award as a farce and a trash of paper. The commentators in China agree that the verdict is a huge problem for China, for it is the manifestation of an evolving geopolitical scenario. They see it as a contradiction and conflict between an emerging and an established power. The question they are asking themselves is whether China is prepared to such battle lines or not. Zheng Yongnian, a security analyst believes that the Award could be considered as a watershed in the global geopolitical transition. Rather than viewing this a conflict between the Philippines and China, they have increasingly regarded it as a contest between China and the US which China has accused of deploying 250,000 troops, 5 aircraft careers, 250 naval vessels and more than 1,500 military aircrafts in the Asia-Pacific with an aim to contain China.

China’s knows irrespective of this massive force, the US is not entitled to implement the verdict of the arbitration; therefore, the best possible way for China is to accommodate Philippine fishermen in the vicinity of Huangyang Island. Secondly, China may initiate negotiations with ASEAN countries on fishery industry in the SCS etc. measures which will cool down the conflict to certain extent. If the countries like Philippines and Vietnam do not agree for bilateral negotiations and consultations, China must slap punitive economic sanctions on such countries as the US did to Cuba for over half a century. Secondly, China can turn SCS as a piece of burden on the SCS chessboard which is beneficial for China competition with the US, assert the analysts.

China believes that SCS crisis is not as serious as the deployment of THAAD in the Korean peninsula. The trial is similar to Russia deploying missiles in Cuba in 1962. Other crisis such as Chinese and Japanese fighter jets flying dangerously close over Senkaku/Diaoyu Island, Taiwan firing a missile towards China, and now they contemplating making Itu Aba Island/ Taipingdao accessible to the US army are all the crisis of US making to divert China’s attention away from the THAAD.

How China should be responding to the deployment of THAAD, the Chinese analysts feel that China must slap hard hitting economic sanctions on South Korea, at least with those provinces in South Korea where missiles would be deployed. Meanwhile, Chin must stop Taiwan from inviting the US military ships visiting Itu Aba. China must respond to such crises simultaneously, for if China doesn’t respond to TDAAD deployment appropriately, South Korea will think that China has no problem with it, it is in this context that China must slap fatal economic sanctions on South Korea in shortest possible time. As regards the Ita Abu, China must draw a red line as soon as possible. If this line is crossed, there should be no hesitation in taking over the island by force. China must have a plan and the plan must be made public so that people know about China’s bottom line.

Therefore, the verdict of the arbitration does not mean that it is all over now, contrarily it is the beginning of the contest between major powers. China has a habit of acting slow feels the experts. For example, imagine the outcome, had China acted in the SCS five-six years back. Therefore, China lacks predictive policy research. It is the time that China made its forays into to similar research conducted by the US.

It appears that China is prepared to a protracted contest with the US on a whole range of issues. However, it believes that its rise will not necessarily be a bloody one as there are instances when the transition has been peaceful. Secondly, China is aware of asymmetries in its power projection vis-à-vis the US, therefore, rules out a major conflict with the US. At the same time, it will not be shy of using force if it has got to defend the one China policy; as regards SCS it appears that China is willing to negotiate the common exploration and development of the SCS minus sovereignty.

*The writer is Professor of China Studies at the Centre of Chinese and South Asian Studies, JNU. He could be reached at bdupak@mail.jnu.ac.in.

By Dr Subhash Kapila

Barometric changes in the prevailing state of Russia-China strategic nexus is a significant input for regional and global dynamics. For India such inputs are even more significant for its China foreign policy planning.

Prevailing strategic wisdom postulates that the Russia-China strategic partnership is going strong in response to the geopolitical challenges that the United States poses to Russia in the West and China in the East in Asia Pacific. Russian and Chinese Presidents too were in end-June rhetorically perpetuating this myth when President Putin, paid a flying one-day visit to Beijing to sign more than 30 agreements, mostly economic and scientific.

Related to this visit, two different news-events surfaced, one Chinese and the second Russian which need analysis as they point towards the first visible signs of hair-line cracks in the Russia-China strategic nexus. Debates on the substantive worth of the Russia-China strategic nexus have been ongoing for quite some time.

Two things have held back the full consummation of the Russia-China strategic nexus into a full-fledged Russia –China Military Alliance. The foremost is the “lack of strategic trust” between these two mighty nations arising from their past record of sudden individual swings to the United States. Secondly, and a contemporary evolution is of the growing clash of geopolitical interests in Central Asia between Russia and China.

With the foregoing as the contextual background, one can now attempt to analyse these two recent Chinese and Russian news events which seem to suggest that visible strains are emerging in the Russia-China strategic nexus, more visibly from the Chinese side.

The Chinese Opinion Editorial in The Global Times of July 03 2016contains both direct and implied criticisms of China’s Russian strategic partner in dimensions of their relations ranging from economic and trade relations to the politico-strategic and geopolitical contours which impelled the emergence of this ‘marriage of convenience.

Chinese criticisms reflect complaints that while both sides cheerfully sign a lot of economic and trade contracts and China makes big advance payments to Russia, the Russian side is slow and tardy in implementing the completion of contracts. It further adds that China has gone out of the way to award economic contracts to Russia hoping that this would form the basis of more strong political relations. Implied here also is a call for a rethink of China’s policies in this regard.

Politically, this media piece argues that “Uniting one side to oppose the other side does not secure China’s national interests. China must ponder how to keep its diplomatic independence while conducting global and regional policies.” Significantly, it also asserts that “China should attach importance to joint work with Russia, but cannot overly depend on it (Russia).”

The Global Times elsewhere had earlier reflected that “China and Russia’ strategic partnership was a result of the times, but is totally different from a military alliance such as that between United States and Japan.”

Analysing the above and related posts not quoted here, one thing that strongly emerges is that if “the times change” China can be expected to swing back towards the United States in a repeat of its earlier policy swings. That undermines the substantives’ of the Russia-China strategic nexus as a reckonable factor in global and regional power calculus.

Coming to Central Asia as the most significant growing discord in Russia-China strategic nexus the Chinese Op-Ed complains and is critical of President Putin’s announcement of the proposal to form a ‘Eurasia Economic Partnership’ which besides Russia and Chine also proposes to invite the EEU, India, Pakistan and Iran. The implied criticism ruefully observes that while the United States is reinforcing its presence in the Pacific on China’s doorsteps, Russia is now intending to reinforce its influence in Central Asia.

In sum, analytically it emerges that China is strongly dissatisfied with its strategic partnership with Russia. Since nothing happens in China without official approval at the highest levels, the Global Times Op-Ed needs to be taken as the surfacing of the first visible cracks in the Russia-China strategic nexus.

Evolving geopolitical planetary changes suggest that these hairline cracks can only widen and not lessen as the Chinese economy heads towards stagnation and China begins to call on Russia for re-negotiation of economic deals especially in the energy sector.

Russian President Putin’s statement in Beijing during his June 2016 visit is the second news event which has not lent itself to more detailed analysis. President Putin had called for transforming Russia -China strategic partnership into one of “Comprehensive Partnership & Strategic Collaboration”. President Putin gave an unconvincing spin trying to imply that Russia-China relations had transcended the ‘strategic partnership’ into a more comprehensive relationship. If that be so then why the addition of and separate emphasis on “Strategic Collaboration”? Was it an intended dilution as part of some political signalling to denote a change in the nuances of the Russia-China strategic nexus?

Russian strategic debates also reflect concerns about Russia’s earlier strategic pivot to China. Russian complaints focus on the fact that China does not consider Russia as an effective counterweight to the United States. Russian debates also reflect that no “equitable benefits” have accrued to Russia because of its strategic pivot to China. Disturbing for China would also be a forecast on Russian foreign policy that Central Asia would now replace Syria as the Prime focus in Russian foreign policy focus.

Concluding, one would like to assert that the surfacing of hairline cracks in the Russia-China strategic nexus appears to be a trend-in-the making, and the widening of these cracks depends on the United States capitalising the opportunity by a positive re-set of its Russia policy. The United States needs to recognise as to which is the more bigger threat to US national security interests?

By Matthew Tempest

(EurActiv) — Theresa May, the new British prime minister, said Friday (15 July) that Article 50, triggering Brexit, would not be filed until there was a full “UK approach and objectives” – suggesting Scotland would have a major say.

She made the comments after meeting Scotland’s First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, in Edinburgh – her first trip, domestic or foreign, since becoming PM on Wednesday.

Scotland voted universally to remain in the EU – as did London, Northern Ireland and Gibraltar – but the overall UK voted 52-48 to Leave in the 23 June referendum.

Edinburgh is now keen to find some way of retaining some of the benefits of EU membership, short of the ‘nuclear option’ of forcing a second independence referendum and applying to rejoin.

May told ITV after her meeting with Sturgeon, “I’m willing to listen to options and I’ve been very clear with the first minister today that I want the Scottish government to be fully engaged in our discussions.

“I have already said that I won’t be triggering Article 50 until I think that we have a UK approach and objectives for negotiations – I think it is important that we establish that before we trigger Article 50.”

Sturgeon, ahead of the meeting, had told the press she hoped the PM would “respect how the people in Scotland voted”.

“Theresa May and I hold very different political views and we’ve got perhaps different views on what should happen now in terms of the Brexit vote,” Sturgeon told STV television on Thursday.

“My position is that I respect how people in other parts of the UK voted; I hope the prime minister will respect how people in Scotland voted.”

While 52% of voters across the UK backed leaving the EU, 62% in Scotland opted for Britain to remain in the bloc.

As both the UK and EU head into what all agree are unchartered waters, there are various – highly putatative – options for Scotland, but having a major say in the UK negotiating position, to be decided before Brexit is triggered, may be the most plausible.

May appointed a trio of hardcore Brexiteers, Boris Johnson as foreign secretary, Liam Fox as international trade secretary, David Davis as Brexit minister, this week to negotiate leaving the 28-member bloc.

By that she pleased the right of the Conservative party, and UKIP, while also leaving the option open of blaming them if negotiations go badly.

In heading swiftly to Edinburgh, May was emphasising her strong support for the union and for keeping Sturgeon’s devolved administration involved in the Brexit negotiations, a Downing Street spokesman said.

“I believe with all my heart in the United Kingdom,” May said in a statement Friday.

“This visit to Scotland is my first as prime minister and I’m coming here to show my commitment to preserving this special union.”

Meanwhile, the funeral was held Friday in West Yorkshire of the murdered Labour MP Jo Cox, who was killed during the referendum campaign.

The local man accused of her murder gave his name in court as “Death to traitors, freedom for Britain”.

After Britons’ surprising vote to leave the European Union, the only thing certain about the upcoming months is the uncertainty. How much will the U.K.’s economy be affected? And what about other EU members? What kind of trading relationship will the U.K. have with Europe post-Brexit?

Speaking just a few days after the referendum was held, professor of economics Núria Mas predicts that this uncertainty will probably slow down investment in the U.K. and dampen Britons’ spending. In other words, a recession is looming. Furthermore, the already hard-hit pound “is likely to depreciate even more in the next coming weeks.”

Looking further ahead, the financial sector, which makes up 7 percent of U.K. GDP, stands to suffer if U.K.-based banks lose their financial “passport” allowing them to offer their services across the EU. “This could have quite a substantial negative impact for the City of London,” Mas notes.

Understanding the Push

With financial fallout deemed likely, the popularity of Brexit might seem odd. Fellow professor of economics Pedro Videla offers his view: Brexit was not about the economy, but about democracy. He says: “The startling results of Brexit indicate that voters were swayed not by cool calculations of costs and benefits, but rather by their perception of the European project as a whole.” And their perception was very negative, with Brussels-based leadership seen as “a self-perpetuating elite” and their project as “undemocratic.”

In Videla’s explanation, European leaders fed British discontent by failing to improve the current economic landscape, failing to resolve the situation in Greece (“we don’t know if they’ll allow Greece to go bankrupt this summer,” he notes), and failing to adequately address the migrant crisis.

Possible Exit Scenarios

Part of the cause for so much uncertainty is that even Brexiteers don’t know what the secession will look like. What exit models are there? And how might they shape the future relationship between the U.K. and the EU?

Professor Núria Mas warns that the future greatly depends on the negotiations that will officially start once the U.K. invokes Article 50 of the Lisbon treaty — a required step to leave the union. Article 50 provisions are vague, but one concrete detail is that negotiators have two years to conclude with new arrangements — “unless the European Council . . . unanimously decides to extend this period.”

Mas and Videla look to agreements that the EU currently has with other countries as possible models.

EEA?

One alternative might be signing on to the European Economic Area (EEA), like Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. But, as Pedro Videla notes: “the EEA members are obligated to contribute to the EU budget, accept the freedom of movement of EU nationals, and observe all of the EU’s single-market regulations while having no say in them. Brexiteers will naturally hate these stipulations and ask, ‘What was the point of the referendum?'”

In addition, Videla remarks that joining the EEA with favorable terms to the U.K. won’t be easy, as that would “send a negative signal to countries that might be toying with the idea of leaving, as well as EU regions interested in gaining independence.”

Other Models

Switzerland offers another model, as part of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), which bilaterally negotiates access to the EU’s single market on a sector-by-sector basis. Turkey, meanwhile, is part of the EU Customs Union, which entails tariffs on exports to the EU in sectors such as services. Canada has an agreement with the EU that gradually eliminates tariffs on most exports — but, crucially, leaves out financial services. Then there’s Mexico or South Korea, which have free trade agreements that allow unfettered access to the EU internal market for goods — but not services.

If none of these models satisfies both parties, the U.K. might have to settle for membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). “This would free the U.K. from following the EU standards and regulation, but it will imply that it is out of the single market,” Mas explains. With WTO membership, most exports are afforded low rates, but exceptions include car parts (a key U.K. export), agriculture and services.

For Mas, the most likely scenario is that the U.K. will “end up having some access to the EU single market, but with important exceptions — such as the financial passport.” She believes that the EU would only grant this passport in exchange for the U.K.’s making its own controversial concessions, such as payments to the EU budget or some agreements on labor mobility.

Negotiators should choose their course wisely, as Videla notes leaving the EU “will also be irreversible: the U.K. will not be granted the choice to rejoin.”

A Wider View

Of the remaining 27 EU members, those most affected by Brexit might be Ireland and the Netherlands, whose U.K. trade comes to 11.8 percent and 7.5 percent of their own GDPs, respectively.

In any case, Mas hopes the U.K. and the rest of the EU “keep in mind the goal of trying to find the best possible solution for the long-run welfare for the population.”

That may take a good long time.

Whatever happens as a result of the UK’s referendum on EU membership, those in British politics, and in the British Civil Service, now face an enormous task. This column suggests how their hard work might actually lead to an outcome in which the UK remains a member of the EU. It describes a four-part action plan for those who would like to see this possibility kept open.

By David Vines*

This column takes seriously the possibility that Britain might end up remaining as a member of the European Union.

Whatever happens, those in British politics, and in the British Civil Service, now face an enormous task. In this column I suggest how their hard work might actually lead to an outcome in which we remain a member of the EU. And I describe an action plan, with four parts, for those who would like to see this possibility kept open.

It is important to first understand how we got here. The referendum vote was not a vote against the EU. It was two fingers up to London; a vote against the post-Thatcher, post-Blair economic settlement in this country, in which inequality of outcomes, and inequality of opportunity, have widened radically. Since the Global Crisis in 2008, the macroeconomic policy response in the UK – austerity – has inflicted significant costs on those who are not well off and who did not cause the Crisis, whilst the rich who caused the Crisis have got off scot-free. Labour market deregulation had already increased the vulnerability of these people; as had the concentration of opportunity in the London growth triangle. In the austere world in which these less-well-off people have found themselves, there has been stiff competition for work from skilled, adventurous and entrepreneurial migrants from Eastern Europe. These migrants have seemed like a threat – and they have been a threat. The Leave vote was, I think, a consequence of this fact.

The four parts of my remain-in-the EU action plan are as follows: adopting a New Deal in macroeconomic policymaking; developing labour-market regulations within Britain and managing migration in a way consistent with the European Principle concerning the free movement of labour; discovering how we might negotiate with the other members of the EU to achieve things which both they want and we want; and putting in front of the British people a package of reforms which satisfies the demands of those who voted Leave.

A New Deal in macroeconomic policymaking: The end of austerity

First of all, we can and should set out on a ‘New Deal’ in domestic macroeconomic policymaking

On entering office in 1933, President Roosevelt set out his New Deal which he used to fight the Great Depression. For example, the Tennessee Valley Authority was set up so as to make economic development possible in a region particularly affected by the depression. This New Deal was a Keynesian project – spend more public money – but the focus was on projects which would give a sense of collective purpose; it was coupled with many reforms which strengthened that purpose. Roosevelt’s political action offered all citizens the chance of solving their problems by acting together. In 1945 the Labour government offered a similar vision in the UK, unifying around the Beveridge Welfare State and the NHS. At the same time, in Australia (where I am from) the great Post-war Reconstruction Project put more than half a million people from the military back to work within two years, a huge number for that small country, along with many immigrants, and a large number of refugees. They set building a new country for all of them.

Something similar, on such a grand scale, is now needed in this country.

This kind of action has been prevented – up to now – by the macroeconomic policy of fiscal austerity. But, with a new government in place, that policy is now dead.

Even before the now-sacked Chancellor, George Osborne, was removed he randomly abandoned the centrepiece of his own strategy when he gave up his target to restore government finances to a surplus by 2020. In his speech he said that, given the effects of the referendum vote, the government had to be “realistic about achieving a surplus by the end of the decade”. His action really can be described as ‘random’, since ‘being realistic’ was the only reason that he was able to offer for his action. But ‘being realistic’ is not a reason. And, anyway, he is now gone.

In this new world, we have to ask how quickly is it ‘realistic’ to return the fiscal position to one of surplus? To find an answer to this question requires finding an answer to the more focused question: How big a public debt is acceptable? Of course, as Martin Wolf and many others have said, when real interest rates are negative, carrying out infrastructure investment has very little cost, and more public expenditure creates assets – whether they be roads, airports, schools or hospitals, which can be set against the public debt which is created. Nevertheless, there are limits. How much is too much? It is clear to me that there is room for more debt in the British economy, notwithstanding the scary tales told by Reinhart and Rogoff in their book This Time is Different. But this is a topic should be studied, but which has not been properly studied for this country. The absence of such a study is a scandal. Someone like Simon Wren Lewis here in Oxford could do it very well.

But what sort of a New Deal do we want?

The Northern Powerhouse is one example of what could be done. This project really could boost economic growth in the north of England, particularly in the core cities of Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, Sheffield and Newcastle. By doing so it would provide a focus for growth away from London and the south-east. Such a project would make a difference to all manner of small and medium-sized enterprises in the north; these firms would no longer need to look 200 miles south for infrastructure support.

Around the country there are many other such possibilities, especially in regions where economic prospects are at their most bleak: in Devon and Cornwall, in the Welsh valleys, and in the far north east just below the Scottish border. A random example of what could be done is fixing the A1 from Newcastle to Edinburgh; this would mean that there is a second divided highway connecting Scotland with England in addition to the always-clogged M6. There are many other examples; many, many houses – and schools – are needed, and can and should be built away from London.

The cuts to public services in these regions have been savage and have very significantly increased the sense of alienation from London. These can – and should – be reversed. And the education system needs to provide better opportunities for underprivileged young people in these areas, so as to provide a way out from dependency on welfare benefits; this would hold out a carrot, rather than relying on the stick of cuts to benefits which is all that has been happening up to now. Many young people in these areas – even if they are well-enough trained – literally cannot afford to go south in search of valuable work. And when they get there they find skilled immigrants out-competing them in job queues

One way of thinking about what might be possible would be to extend the Barnett formula, which is used to allocate public expenditure to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, to a number of disadvantaged regions within England.

But how should we to move to the best set of public-infrastructure projects? Which projects to choose? How to create the sense of a New Deal?

Australian experience may provide an answer this question. The Hawke-Keating labour government in Australia in the 1980s and early 1990s – a government now revered for its radicalism – called a National Economic Summit in Canberra at the beginning of its time in office. At this conference the great and the good got together with a range of people, both big and small, and together this crowd achieved something of a consensus on national economic policymaking. The meeting certainly engendered a common sense of public purpose. This Australian example might be one which is worth copying.

The possibility of imposing restrictions on the free movement of labour

Second, we need a better understanding of how changing the treatment of migration in this country might, nevertheless, make it possible to avoid a conflict with the EU’s principle of the free movement of labour. Since continued access to the Single European Market is conditional upon respect for the principle, this understanding is important.

Free movement of workers is a fundamental principle of the EU; it is enshrined in Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and developed by EU secondary legislation and the case law of the Court of Justice. Citizens of countries in the EU are entitled to: look for a job in another EU country, work there without needing a work permit, reside there for that purpose, stay there even after employment has finished, and enjoy equal treatment with nationals in access to employment, working conditions and all other social and tax advantages.

Nevertheless, things could have been different looking backwards. First of all, had the UK government put austerity aside and borrowed in 2010 at very low interest rates to build housing, schools, hospitals and roads, mainly away from the London triangle, we could have much more easily accommodated the many migrants who were coming here. Second, we could have maintained restrictions on the movement of labour of the kind which other European nations maintained in relation to new member states. Transitional arrangements have applied in most of the EU’s enlargements and most recently applied in the case of last two Accession Treaties of 2003 and 2005. These measures allowed member states to restrict temporarily the right of workers from the countries that had just joined the EU to move freely to another member state to work, and could have been on place on the UK until 2011. The outcome of these two policies, taken together, would have been a more rapid recovery – as demand was boosted. Yet there would have been somewhat fewer immigrants and a much greater sense of opportunity for underprivileged domestic residents. And with such an alignment of policies in place there would have been a much warmer welcome for those migrants who did still come here. This approach to policy could have been, and should have been, coupled with the much earlier imposition of the national living wage in such a way as to rule out the large-scale hiring of imported labour, by large-scale labour subcontractors, at very low wages, which we have witnessed ever since the accession of the new member states, actions which have effectively undercut working conditions at the lower end of the labour market. If this had been done, many of the bad outcomes described at the beginning of this document could have been avoided.

Will we be able be able to do something like this in the future, either whilst negotiating the UK’s relationship with the EU from outside, or whilst remaining within the EU? This does not seem impossible. There is already a safeguard clause in the Treaty which authorises a member state to re-introduce restrictions on the free movement of labour, as a defensive measure, in the context of a “serious labour market disturbance”. An example is the restriction which Spain was permitted to introduce in 2011, in relation to workers from Romania. The existence of such a safeguard clause in the Treaty serves to move the principle of freedom of movement from an absolute right to a conditional right, dependent on particular circumstances, the exercise of which becomes subject to discretion.  The question then becomes one of whether such discretion might become possible, having regard to UK circumstances, in the future. There is not yet a clear answer to that question.

Any change in this direction will not be easy to bring about. Some European economists are already discussing the idea of managed migration. For example, some economists floated such ideas at the ECB’s annual Jackson Hole-like conference in Sintra, near Lisbon, a little over two weeks ago. But, it does seem that opposition would be strong. It appears that the current unmanaged EU migration policy may well be a kind of political equilibrium that it would now be hard to change. Any attempt to bring about such a change would be running against two kinds of opposition. The countries of central and eastern EU would feel cheated, since the opportunity to work abroad has become a central aspiration of so many of their citizens’ ambitions. And those in the EU15 would be likely to oppose any change in free labour mobility as a matter of principle, since this freedom was enshrined in the original treaty of Rome and has never – until now – been questioned. Notwithstanding all of what has just been said, I think that a movement in this direction within Europe is inevitable. I discuss this point further below.

Understanding the needs of our European partners

Third, we need to realise that the great European Project is now in grave danger and that our European partners need our help.

A German passion for implementing rules, coupled with a French determination to centralise power in Brussels, has led to an increasingly disagreeable political process within Europe, and to dwindling support for the European Project. This puts at risk the continued cooperation within Europe not just on the economic issues being discussed in this column, but also on foreign policy, on judicial issues, and on security and defence. That cooperation has been has painstakingly created, in 75 years of extraordinarily important work, and is now at risk.

I saw this danger at first hand very recently when I spent three days at the ECB conference in Sintra. At the meeting, senior Portuguese European Parliamentarians described to me how oppressive German ‘leadership’ has become for countries like Portugal, especially when accompanied by erratic support from France, and to people like them. They said to me that British officials, and politicians, have been of great assistance to Parliamentarians from countries like Portugal, and to the objectives of their southern European countries, in this difficult environment. We are now in danger of betraying these people.

There are three key issues at stake, even when confining the discussion to cooperation on economic matters.

The first of the great European economic projects, European Monetary Union, is under severe threat – as we all know. Much effort will be necessary, over the next ten years, to create an EMU which works properly – and indeed to prevent EMU from collapsing. That will require Europe to find a form of banking union, a form of fiscal insurance, and a new set of rules for macroeconomic policymaking, which taken together adequately spread throughout the Eurozone the costs that EMU membership currently imposes on countries in the southern European periphery. I myself have written extensively about the grave mistakes which have been perpetrated in the mismanagement of Europe’s monetary union, about the risks which this mismanagement is imposing on the global economic system (both in Britain and further afield), and about how this mismanagement can be fixed. Many other economists have written about this, too. There is much to sort out here, all of which is of direct concern to Britain.

The second of the great European economic projects – the free movement of labour – is also under severe pressure, not just in the UK but in the EU. I believe that this project will also will need to be amended in relation to the other 27 members of the EU and not just in Britain, over the next ten years. Many analysts in Europe, not just in Britain, are already carefully considering how this might be done, including through changes in the kinds of exemptions described above, or through labour market regulations. It is clear that visa-free travel and fast passport lines will remain for the movement of persons. But I think it inevitable that automatic rights to work and settle will come to be constrained. Likewise, I think that the sensitive issues of control over welfare and benefits, over the provision of health services, and over the issue of asylum will all end up being partly returned to national control. Done properly, a reformed EU will still see significant exchanges of people for travel, work, and study. But I think that it will need to satisfy – and will satisfy – a desire to retain some national political control over these flows. I described above how strong the opposition to this kind of change might be. Nevertheless, I think that it will happen. Here too there is much to sort out of direct relevance for Britain.

This third great European economic project – the Single Market – is not under immediate threat. But it is incomplete. The extension of the Single Market from goods to services is a challenging task, one which will bring great rewards to British service providers, as and when it happens. But this will only happen if this extension is done properly. There is much heavy lifting to be done here too.

Many thoughtful people in Europe are now thinking about what to do next. The Five Presidents Report, published last year, sets out a view about one possible way forward, a view which, in my view, is profoundly mistaken because it sees the centralisation of European power as the only way forward. Debate over that report – especially as it concerns the three issues which I have raised above – will be of very great importance for Europe’s future, and for Britain’s future.

This is a discussion in which British engagement is crucial, not just for Britain but for all of the other 27 members of the European Union. There have been times in the past when Britain has been insufficiently concerned with Europe: in the run up to the Napoleonic Wars, Britain was preoccupied with its Empire; immediately before WWI, Britain was preoccupied with Northern Ireland. The consequence, in both of these cases, was not a good outcome. It is imperative for Europe that Britain remain engaged with the future design, and reform, of the EU.

Achieving a more satisfactory outcome whilst still remaining within the EU

Finally, we need to understand that the three points which I have made above, when taken together, might actually point to a way forward in which Britain remains a member of the EU.

My argument in support of this claim has four steps which I now set out in order.

First, I believe that a rush to trigger of Article 50, without a clear plan, and without implicit agreement about this plan from the rest of Europe, would be a disaster. Gus O’Donnell assured us, ten days ago, that it is within the power of the UK’s highly-trained and professional Civil Service to ensure that any such rush is avoided, and that the necessary planning is done carefully and professionally, in a measured manner.

Second, it is my considered view that such careful planning will lead to a realisation that, if we leave the EU, we will endanger our membership of the Single Market and yet not obtain a satisfactory outcome about the movement of labour. That is to say, I think that any Brexit negotiations, even when pursued carefully, will point towards to an outcome which makes this country very much worse than it is now. It seems unlikely that having decided to leave the EU, the UK would want to get into an EEA agreement which is far worse for the UK then EU membership. And the Swiss arrangement is deadly. So the only remaining option is a Canadian-type FTA or another kind of FTA, with no free labour mobility and no passporting for financial services. Such an outcome would basically be a free trade area in goods (minus agriculture) and a partial free trade area in services (without access for finance or access to European rulemaking). This does not look attractive to me, and I doubt that it will be attractive to the British people.  I think that there is a very real danger of regret and acrimony at the end of any such negotiations, even if they are undertaken seriously and carefully, when those who voted Leave come to see that actually leaving the EU would cause very serious damage to their own economic and political future.

Third, as a result of the previous two steps, I believe that those in the centre ground of British politics, and those in the British Civil Service, now need to develop a set of plans for the kind of negotiated outcome they would like which might keep this country within the EU and give a better outcome for the country than leaving. But I also think that any such plans will need to respect the objectives of those who voted for us to Leave, objectives which arise out of the circumstances that I described at the beginning of this note.

Fourth, in order to keep alive the possibility of such a Remain outcome, I believe that Article 50 should not be triggered until it is clear that there is a promise that the outcome of negotiations is put to a referendum, alongside a well-thought through alternative plan of what might happen if the country stayed a member of the EU. Otherwise there should be a parliamentary election on this question.

Any offer to the British public about the possibility of remaining within the EU – designed in part to appeal to those who voted Leave – will need to combine four things.

1. It will need to offer hope for the future in the form of a New Deal in macroeconomic policymaking, built around a scheme of public works, and a commitment to abandon the policy of austerity, in the way which I have described above.
2. It will need to involve a set of reforms to the domestic labour market, and to the rules about migration, which limits the damage which unimpeded free movement of labour undoubtedly causes to those who are less well off in the country.
3. It will need to be made much clearer to the British public – in a way which has not happened up until now – just how much the future of people in Britain depends on the preservation and strengthening of the Single Market within Europe, with Britain as a leading member engaged in that strengthening.
4. Finally it will need to be made clear that Britain will not join EMU. I have not mentioned this point up to now, but it does seem that many who voted Leave did so out of the fear, not sufficiently dismissed by the Remain team, that Britain would be somehow be sucked into the monetary union. It will also need to be made clear and that Britain will play a part in helping ensure that Europe finally manages macroeconomic policymaking within the Eurozone, in a way which is better for the Eurozone, for Britain, and for the rest of the world.

Such a way forward could, with skill and care, be properly presented to those within Britain who voted Leave as addressing their concerns.

Such a way forward could also be presented to other European countries as helping them to solve some of their concerns, which I have identified above, rather than just solving our own. In particular, it will be necessary to establish an outcome in which reforms to labour-market regulation in the UK, and to the management of migration, can be made to sit alongside the EU principle about the free movement of labour, as and when that that principle is renegotiated within Europe, as it undoubtedly will be.

Preparing such an alternative plan will require very skilful leadership. But I believe that we need such a plan and that we are more than able to create it.

About the authors:
* David Vines, Professor of Economics and Fellow of Balliol College, University of Oxford; CEPR Research Fellow

FOR ME, France is the land of liberty.

When I was just 10 years old, I fled with my family from Nazi Germany to France, on our way to Palestine. We were afraid of being detained at the border. When our train crossed the Rhine, leaving Germany behind us and entering France, I breathed deeply. From tyranny to liberty, from hell to paradise.

I never forgot this feeling. Whenever I visited France, it came back to me.

I remembered it again this week, when I saw a much-toted TV “investigative report” on “Anti-Semitism in France”. It was a pile of propaganda nonsense.

“ANTI-SEMITISM IN France” is now all the rage in Israel. A huge propaganda effort is invested in this campaign. The aim is to induce French Jews to come to Israel, to “make aliyah” (an atrocious corruption of Hebrew).

Jews in France, according to “investigative reports” are faced with a terrible danger. They can expect a second holocaust any moment. They are attacked in the streets. They are afraid to wear kippahs in public. For their children’s sake, they must come to Israel. In a hurry. Now!

When I started watching the TV story more closely, I noticed one peculiarity: almost all the male Jews interviewed wore a kippah. Strange. I hardly ever met a kippah-wearing French Jew.

Then I noticed another peculiarity: it seemed to me that all the Jewish interviewees looked North African. In particular, Algerian.

Also, all the violent incidents mentioned were caused by Muslims. They did not take place on the Avenue des Champs-Élysées , but in the banlieues, where poor North African Muslims live crowded together with poor North African Jews.

Why are these incidents happening? Why there? And what have they got to do with French anti-Semitism?

WHEN I hear about “French anti-Semitism”, I see in my imagination the long tradition of Christian France’s aversion to Jews. Even after the French Revolution, which liberated the Jews too, there was a lot of anti-Semitism in France. One has only to recall the Dreyfus affair at the end of the 19th century, when a French Jewish army officer was falsely accused of being a German spy and sent to Devil’s Island in French Guiana. Masses of Frenchmen marched along the Champs-Élysées, shouting “Death to the Jews!” One spectator was a Jewish journalist from Vienna, named Theodor Herzl, who drew the conclusion that all the Jews must leave Europe and establish a state of their own in Palestine. Zionism was born.

This kind of Christian anti-Semitism, emanating (I believe) from the New Testament story about the death of Jesus, always existed in France, as it did in most other Christian countries. Since the Holocaust, it has become a fringe phenomenon. I believe that this is so in France, too.

THE MUSLIM-JEWISH animosity which is now being played out in the Paris banlieues is something entirely different, and has nothing to do with anti-Semites. It so happens that both sides are Semites.

It started in Algeria a long time ago. The French conquered the country and settled there in large numbers. Then they did something rather clever: they conferred French citizenship on the local Jews, but not on the Muslims, who constituted the vast majority. As the ancient Romans used to say: “Divide et Impera”.

When the Algerian War of Independence broke out (in 1954), the Jews, being proud French citizens, sided with the oppressor against the oppressed.

More than that. When the French army showed signs of wanting to leave, the settlers set up an underground military organization, the OAS, to terrorize the Muslims. The local Jews were involved. Gradually, the French settlers started to return to France, and the Jews remained, the OAS then becoming almost a Jewish organization.

I was somehow involved. The Algerian liberation organization, the FLN, feeling that victory was near, was very concerned that the Jews would leave Algeria. Since the Jews played a large role in Algerian economic and intellectual life, the FLN leaders feared that such an exodus would be a great loss to the emerging state.

They approached me with the request to set up an organization in Israel to support Algerian independence. When I set up the Israeli Council for Algerian Independence, they asked us to publish material in Hebrew, which they translated into French and distributed among the Jews.

To no avail. In the end, Charles de Gaulle set a date for the French army’s withdrawal, more than a million French settlers fled almost overnight to France, and with them practically all the Jews.

Algerian Jews did not come to Israel. They were too well integrated in French culture. Moroccan and Tunisian Jews split: the educated went to France, all the others came here.

What is happening now is the continuation of that Algerian conflict on French soil. The hatred that once ruled the streets of Algiers and Oran is being fought out in the streets of Paris and Marseilles.

Tragic? Indeed. Sad? Certainly. Anti-Semitism – not at all. It has nothing to do with this old European scourge.

TO GET a real picture one has to compare the number of Muslim acts of violence against Jews in France with the number of Christian French acts of violence against Muslims.

I have seen no such statistics, probably because France insists that there is no difference between Frenchmen and women of all colors, creeds and races.

However, I would confidently bet that incidents against Muslims vastly outnumber incidents against Jews.

French neo-Fascism, led by the very able Marine Le Pen, is entirely centered on hatred of the Muslims, while doing everything possible to flatter the Jews. Some Jews are even active in her party. She admires us, she loves us, she even threw her own father out because he could not restrain himself from uttering phrases that reflected some residual anti-Semitism.

SO WHERE is the present scare of French anti-Semitism coming from?

Ah, there are several good reasons.

Basically, Zionism and anti-Semitism are twins. It is modern European anti-Semitism that created modern Zionism. As mentioned, Herzl turned into a Zionist when he saw the (French) anti-Semites. My family came to Palestine because of (German) anti-Semitism. So, more or less, did all the Israeli Jews.

One could say that if anti-Semitism did not exist, the Zionists would have had to invent it.

According to Zionist ideology, the State of Israel exists as a refuge for persecuted Jews. Wherever Jews in the world are in distress, we save them and bring them here. (Never mind that Israel is perhaps the least safe place for Jews in the world.)

When anti-Semitism is too weak to do the job, we must help it along, as we did in Iraq in 1952, when we planted bombs in synagogues to encourage Jews to leave and come here.

Seems that just now there is a dearth of anti-Semitism. Russian Jews don’t come anymore, nor do American ones. So France must fill the gap.

There is also a more cynical explanation. Israel has built an elaborate apparatus for bringing Jews here. There are immigration officers in Israeli embassies. There is the Jewish Agency, a worldwide organization devoted mainly to bringing Jews to Israel. What would happen to all this host of emissaries, organizers, bureaucrats, political appointees and such if there were no Jews aspiring to come here and kiss the ground on arrival?

Fortunately there is this “wave of anti-Semitism” in France, and everybody is fully occupied. Politicians make speeches, journalists produce emotional “investigative” series, the Zionist soul is stirring, Zionism is in full swing. Planes full of kippah-wearing Jews arrive. Hallelujah!

WHAT HAPPENS to all these immigrants “making aliyah” once they come here.?

That is a good question. Some bureaucrats are charged with dealing with them. We have an entire ministry devoted to “immigrant absorption”. (It is arguably the least desired job for a politician, a kind of parking space until something better comes along.)

Once the new immigrants are here, many devoted Zionists seem to lose interest in them. Practically all immigrants from Islamic countries since the birth of the state, they and their descendants, now complain of having been discriminated against.

The problem is now at the center of a lively debate. A committee led by a blind Oriental poet has just issued a vast report, demanding that all history books be rewritten to make place for Oriental Jewish politicians, rabbis, artists and writers, on a basis of parity with Jews of European descent.

Semi-official estimates are that about 30% of the new “French” immigrants will eventually return to France. That seems to be accepted as normal.

But if 70% remain with us, that is a net gain. Bienvenue, mes amis!

Movement in and out of the Incirlik airbase in southern Turkey has been closed by local military authorities. The NATO base stores US tactical nuclear weapons.

“Local authorities are denying movements on to and off of Incirlik Air Base. The power there has also been cut,” the US consulate in Adana said in a message.

“Please avoid the air base until normal operations have been restored,” it added. No further details were provided.

According to CNN, airspace over the area has also been closed and power to the facility has been cut.

The closure of the airspace has reportedly led to a halt in US air strikes against Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL). CNN was told by sources that the Turkish authorities did make an exception for US aircraft that had already been deployed on missions before the airspace was shut and allowed them to land at the base.

The air space will be closed until Turkish authorities gain full control over the situation in the region following the coup attempt, Turkish officials told the US, adding that they want to make sure that all elements of the Turkish air force are under the control of pro-government forces, as some warplanes and helicopters were used by rebels overnight.

After the anti-coup operations at the Incirlik base are completed, Turkey will continue its aerial operations against Islamic State within the US-led coalition, the Turkish foreign minister said, as reported by Reuters.

According to earlier reports, there were soldiers at the base involved in the coup attempt who have already been arrested.

The US will continue to cooperate with Turkey in its fight against Islamic State (IS, former ISIS/ISIL), US Secretary of State John Kerry said during his visit to Luxemburg.

US cooperation with Turkey within NATO, as well as in operations in Syria, has not been affected by the coup attempt, Kerry said, adding that the cooperation “continues as before.”

Meanwhile, US Central Command (CENTCOM) is now adjusting its operations against Islamic State (IS, former ISIS/ISIL) to account for the lockdown at Incirlik airbase, TASS reports, citing sources in Pentagon.

US controlled faction

Ankara mayor Melih Gocek stated the officer who shot down the Russian fighter jet was arrested as one of the coup organizers. “We have not realeased this information yet, however, this is a fact, it is this faction (the coup plotters) who ruined our relations with Russia. It’s obvious who they worked for” stated Gocek for CNN Turk.

Meanwhile, the Turkish Government indirectly pointed his finger to the US and the man behind the coup (Fetula Gulen), stating: “I do not see any country that would stand behind this man, this leader of the terrorist gang, especially after last night. The country that would stand behind this man is no friend to Turkey. It would even be a hostile act against Turkey,” Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım told reporters on Saturday, as Turkey was recovering from overnight violence.

By Jim Garamone

US President Barack Obama received a briefing Saturday from his national security team on the situation in Turkey following a coup attempt, White House officials said.

The president reiterated to his national security team that the United States will continue its unwavering support for Turkey’s democratically elected government, officials said in a statement.

Work with Counterparts

Obama instructed the team to continue to work with Turkish counterparts to maintain the safety and well-being of diplomatic missions and personnel, U.S. service members and their dependents, White House officials said.

“While we have no indications as of yet that Americans were killed or injured in the violence,” the White House statement said, “the president and his team lamented the loss of life and registered the vital need for all parties in Turkey to act within the rule of law and to avoid actions that would lead to further violence or instability.”

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said all NATO personnel and units in Turkey “are safe and secure.” Turkey is a member of the NATO alliance.

Turkish officials have stopped all flights into and out of Incirlik Air Base in the southwestern part of the nation. U.S. and coalition aircraft fly missions against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant from the base. Defense Department officials continue their efforts to fully account for all DoD personnel in Turkey, Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook said.

All Safe and Secure

“All indications at this time are that everyone is safe and secure,” Cook said today in a statement. “We will continue to take the necessary steps to ensure the safety and security of our service members, our civilians, their families and our facilities.”

The Turkish government has closed its airspace to military aircraft, including to coalition aircraft operating out of Incirlik at part of Operation Inherent Resolve. “U.S. officials are working with the Turks to resume air operations there as soon as possible,” Cook said. In the meantime, he added, U.S. Central Command is adjusting and will use other facilities in the region to launch sorties.

“U.S. facilities at Incirlik are operating on internal power sources, and a loss of commercial power to the base has not affected base operations,” Cook said.

161 people were killed and more than 1,400 injured across Turkey during Friday night’s coup attempt, Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim said Saturday.

In a night he called a “black stain on Turkish democracy”, Yildirim also confirmed some 2,839 soldiers, including high-ranking officers, have been arrested following the attempt.

According to Turkey’s acting military chief of staff, Umit Dundar, 104 of the fatalities were “coup plotters.”

He added that others killed in clashes included 41 police officers, two soldiers and 47 civilians. The attempted coup was quashed by those who “sided with democracy and the rule of law”, Dundar said. “The people have taken to the streets and voiced their support for democracy,” he said.

“Turkey displayed a historic cooperation between the government and the people. The nation will never forget this betrayal.”

Friday night’s coup attempt saw tanks open fire near parliament buildings and military planes flying low over head, as Turkish soldiers took to the streets declaring martial law.

However, the coup was quickly repressed, with Turkish President Erdogan insisting his elected government remained in charge.

Original article

A new study found a six-fold increase in the age-adjusted prevalence of any sleep disorder diagnosis over an 11-year period among U.S. veterans. The largest increases were identified in patients with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), other mental disorders, or combat experience. Results also show that the prevalence of PTSD tripled during the study period.

In a sample of more than 9.7 million U.S. veterans, the age-adjusted prevalence of sleep disorders increased from less than 1 percent in 2000 to nearly 6 percent in 2010. Sleep apnea was the most common sleep disorder diagnosis (47 percent) followed by insomnia (26 percent). Veterans with cardiovascular disease, cancer, or other chronic diseases also experienced higher rates of sleep disorder diagnoses relative to those without comorbid conditions.

Study results are published in the July issue of the journal Sleep.

“Veterans with PTSD had a very high sleep disorder prevalence of 16 percent, the highest among the various health conditions or other population characteristics that we examined,” said Principal Investigator and senior author James Burch, PhD, Associate Professor in the Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics in the Arnold School of Public Health at the University of South Carolina. “Because of the way this study was designed, this does not prove that PTSD caused the increase in sleep disorder diagnoses,” noted Burch, who also is a Health Science Specialist at the WJB Dorn Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Columbia, South Carolina. “However, we recently completed a follow-up study, soon to be submitted for publication, that examined this issue in detail. In that study, a pre-existing history of PTSD was associated with an increased odds of sleep disorder onset.”

According to the American Academy of Sleep Medicine, sleep apnea is a sleep-related breathing disorder characterized by abnormalities of respiration during sleep. The most common form of sleep apnea is obstructive sleep apnea, which is characterized by repetitive episodes of complete or partial upper airway obstruction occurring during sleep. Insomnia involves a frequent and persistent difficulty initiating or maintaining sleep that results in general sleep dissatisfaction and daytime impairment.

The study population consisted of all U.S. veterans seeking care in the Veterans Health Administration system between FY2000 and FY2010. Of the total sample of 9,786,778 veterans, 93 percent were men, and 751,502 were diagnosed with at least one sleep disorder.

The current Zika epidemic in Latin America is likely to burn itself out within three years, according to new research.

The findings, from scientists at Imperial College London, also conclude that the epidemic cannot be contained with existing control measures. The team, who published their findings in the journal Science, predict the next large-scale epidemic is unlikely to emerge for at least another ten years – although there is a possibility of smaller outbreaks in this time.

Professor Neil Ferguson, lead author of the research from the School of Public Health at Imperial, explained: “This study uses all available data to provide an understanding of how the disease will unfold – and allows us to gauge the threat in the imminent future. Our analysis suggests that Zika spread is not containable, but that the epidemic will burn itself out within 2-3 years.”

In the study, Professor Ferguson and colleagues from the Medical Research Council Centre for Outbreak Analysis and Modelling at Imperial, collated all existing data for Zika transmission across Latin America. The team then used this information, alongside data on similar viruses such as dengue, to build a mathematical model to represent the current epidemic, and future waves of transmission.

Using this model, the team calculated the current epidemic would end within two to three years, due to the fact people are unlikely to be infected with Zika twice.

Professor Ferguson explained: “The current explosive epidemic will burn itself out due to a phenomenon called herd immunity. Because the virus is unable to infect the same person twice – thanks to the immune system generating antibodies to kill it – the epidemic reaches a stage where there are too few people left to infect for transmission to be sustained.

Using our model, we predict large-scale transmission will not restart for at least another ten years – until there is a new generation in the population who have not been exposed to the Zika virus. This mirrors other epidemics, such as chikungunia – a similar virus to Zika – where we have seen explosive epidemics followed by long periods with few new cases. ”

The Zika virus is carried by the Aedes aegypti mosquito, but the team cautioned any large-scale government programmes to target the mosquitoes may have limited impact. “The virus is very similar to the dengue virus, and transmitted by the same mosquito. But previous experience with dengue has shown controlling spread to be incredibly difficult. Also, efforts to contain the epidemic would have needed to have been implemented much earlier in the current Zika epidemic to have a major effect – but by the time we realised the scale of the problem it was too late. ”

He added any efforts to slow spread of the virus may in fact prolong the current epidemic: “Slowing transmission between people means the population will take longer to reach the level of herd immunity needed for transmission to stop. It might also mean that the window between epidemics – which we predict may be over a decade – could actually get shorter.”

And while the potential end of the epidemic is no doubt positive, it does raise issues for vaccine development, adds Professor Ferguson: “If our projections are correct, cases will have dropped substantially by the end of next year, if not sooner. This means by the time we have vaccines ready to be tested, there may not be enough cases of Zika in the community to test if the vaccine works.”

He suggests one option may be to recruit ‘sleeper sites’ for vaccine trials across the globe. These centres would obtain, in advance, the lengthy legal and ethical approval needed for a trial. Then if there is a Zika outbreak in its area, a centre would be ready to begin a vaccine trial straight away.

However, Professor Ferguson highlighted there are still many questions to answer about Zika – and therefore many caveats to making predictions: “In a worst case scenario Zika would become endemic in Latin America in the long-term, which would mean smaller, frequent outbreaks. A key issue is we don’t understand why the Zika virus affected Latin America in such an explosive way. One possibility is climate may have in some way aided spread of the virus, as spread coincided with an El Nino event. Genetic mutation of the virus might also have played a role, although early data currently give limited support for this hypothesis.”

Professor Ferguson added that previous exposure to dengue might also have played an important role in the current Zika epidemic. Some research, including recent studies from an Imperial team, has suggested prior dengue exposure may amplify Zika infection in a person.

“This is an effect called Antibody Dependent Enhancement and is of significant concern. It is too early to say whether dengue exposure affects the risk of getting Zika or the clinical consequences of infection, but this needs to be urgently examined in future research. We also need to understand why South East Asia, which also has high rates of dengue, has not experienced a similar Zika outbreak.”

He added more research is urgently needed. “One research priority is to fully understand the extent of Zika transmission, and what proportion of people in Latin America – and across the globe have been infected. To do this we need to assess past exposure to Zika by testing blood from representative samples of at-risk populations for the presence of antibodies to the virus. We and other groups are working on such studies at the moment.”

“There are currently more questions surrounding Zika than answers – and only through a coordinated global research effort will we find the answers we desperately need.”

Without knowing much about the identity of the Turkish coup leaders, it is fairly certain that irrespective of their likely failed attempt, they have delivered a stunning blow to the presidency of Mr. Erdogan, who must now reckon with deep fissures within the country’s armed forces, which has a long tradition of political interventions.

The crisis set off by the coup on July 15 will likely reverberate for sometime, irrespective of Erdogan’s attempt to downplay it. But, for an embattled president who had to resort to social media to get his message to the population out, whose presidential palace was attacked, the success of his supporters to defeat the coup-makers is bound to be tarnished by the inevitable realization that Erdogan is in serious trouble and must initiate serious changes if he wants to survive in the future.

Having consolidated power and reduced the office of prime minister to a mere prop for presidency, Erdogan must surely be jolted by the surprise coup that has led to bloodshed and considerable chaos in Turkey’s capital as well as Istanbul. For a man who has championed the cause of regime change in neighboring Syria for the past five years, with absolutely no success save the mass refugees and the import of Syrian chaos inside his own country, Erdogan may be politically humbled by the coup that must have enjoyed serious support from the army’s and police’s rank and file in order to be orchestrated at such level. If he manages to subdue the coup-makers, Erdogan will be undoubtedly indebted to a wing of the military brass, who will press him on important national issues. In other words, a Faustian bargain is probable, which will manifest itself over time rather than immediately.

A big question is, of course, what kind of adjustments Erdogan and his ruling party will make for the sake of stability and political continuity?

Chances are that Erdogan will lean in favor of more inclusionary politics, by reaching out to the political opposition more than ever before, to consolidate his counter-coup gains. With respect to the burning foreign policy issues, this event will likely prompt Erdogan toward greater moderation on Syria, which has been fed up with Turkey’s massive interference in Syria’s internal affairs.

Ankara needs to reach a modus vivendi with Damascus, which is in the interests of both countries that are suffering from terrorism. In turn, this would mean a less Saudi-dependent Turkey, which must acknowledge the huge mistake of becoming somewhat Saudi-centric and following the Saudi’s destructive script on Syria. A de-Saudification of Turkish foreign policy orientation may be in the offing now that the pro-Saudi forces are facing serous backlashes in Russian and Iran-backed Syria.

Already, Erdogan has begun the initial steps, by trying to mend relations with Russia, which annually sends some five million of its inhabitants to Turkey as foreign tourists. Yet, to be really meaningful, the new thaw in Russia-Turkey ties would have to tap into the existing sources for unity of action with respect to Syria. Only then can Turkey legitimately claim that it is free from the rotten influence of radical jihadists, who are on the run in several parts of Iraq and Syria. Incredibly, such huge changes in Turkey may well come about due to the depth of Turkish democracy, put visibly on display in the mass counter-coup rallies throughout Turkey. All is well that ends well, and perhaps, this was a timely wake up call to Erdogan to stop the destructive policies and reach for brand new ones in the region and beyond.

The Northeast Pacific’s largest marine heatwave on record was at least in part caused by El Niño climate patterns. And unusually warm water events in that ocean could potentially become more frequent with rising levels of greenhouse gases.

That’s the findings of a new study by researchers from Georgia Institute of Technology and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. They linked the 2014-2015 marine heatwave – often referred to as the “warm blob” – to weather patterns that started in late 2013. The heatwave caused marine animals to stray far outside of their normal habitats, disrupting ecosystems and leading to massive die-offs of seabirds, whales and sea lions.

The study, which was published July 11 in journal Nature Climate Change, was sponsored by the National Science Foundation.

“We had two and a half years of consistent warming, which translated to a record harmful algal bloom in 2015 and prolonged stress on the ecosystem,” said Emanuele Di Lorenzo, a professor in Georgia Tech’s School of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences. “What we do in the study is ask whether this type of activity is going to become more frequent with greenhouse gases rising.”

The researchers traced the origin of the marine heat wave to a few months during late 2013 and early 2014, when a ridge of high pressure led to much weaker winds that normally bring cold Artic air over the North Pacific. That allowed ocean temperatures to rise a few degrees above average.

Then, in mid-2014 the tropical weather pattern El Niño intensified the warming throughout the Pacific. The warm temperatures lingered through the end of the year, and by 2015 the region of warm water had expanded to the West Coast, where algal blooms closed fisheries for clams and Dungeness crab.

“The bottom line is that El Niño had a hand in this even though we’re talking about very long-distance influences,” said Nate Mantua, a research scientist at NOAA Fisheries’ Southwest Fisheries Science Center and a coauthor of the study.

The researchers used climate model simulations to show the connection between increasing greenhouse gas concentrations and the impact on the ocean water temperatures. The study found that these extreme weather events could become more frequent and pronounced as the climate warms.

“This multi-year event caused extensive impacts on marine life,” Di Lorenzo said. “For example, some salmon populations have life cycles of three years, so the marine heatwave has brought a poor feeding, growth and survival environment in the ocean for multiple generations. Events like this contribute to reducing species diversity.”

And the effects of the “warm blob” could linger.

“Some of these effects are still ongoing and not fully understood because of the prolonged character of the ocean heatwave,” Di Lorenzo said. “Whether these multi-year climate extremes will become more frequent under greenhouse forcing is a key question for scientists, resource managers and society.”

Just as France was breathing a sigh of relief and celebrating its national holiday, Bastille Day, after an incident-free Euro 2016 football tournament, terror struck in the city of Nice. A French citizen of Tunisian descent drove a large white lorry to deliberately ram crowds at Nice’s Promenade des Anglais. Zig-zagging for almost 2 kms, the driver killed as many as 84 people and left scores injured some of them critically.

This attack on Bastille Day has rocked a nation that was still reeling with the aftermath of attacks in November 2015 in Paris that killed 130 and in January 2016 that killed 17. This is the third large-scale terror attack that France has suffered since Islamist gunmen attacked the offices of the Charlie Hebdo satirical magazine in January last year; just 18 months ago.

French Connection

No terror group has claimed responsibility for the Nice attack so far, but if it turns out to be the handiwork of Islamic extremists, it will earn France, which is already struggling with a kind of uneasy resignation, the uncomfortable sobriquet of Da’esh’s ‘target No.1.’ (Note: Daesh has said that the attacker was one of there own, but not that it was a sponsored attack)

France is now facing a level of terrorist threat that probably surpasses that of any of its European neighbours. A large numbers of young French men have joined the ranks of the Islamic State (IS), even as French jets conduct bombing raids against the IS in Iraq and Syria and the French special forces battle Al Qaeda in Maghreb, Africa.

As distinct from the seemingly ‘lone wolf’ attack in Nice, the November attack in Paris was orchestrated by IS’s command structure in Syria and executed by operatives who slipped back into Europe. But the worrying fact is that all the attacks of recent months have seen French citizens (some second-generation migrants) as perpetrators and participants.

France is seen to be struggling with serious social divisions, particularly around the social integration of its migrants, many of them Muslim, who find themselves excluded on underprivileged estates on the outskirts of cities. This social fault-line appears to have become accentuated with the West’s war on Islamist militancy in general and IS in particular.

Andrew Peek, a former US Army intelligence officer and a professor at Pepperdine University feels that besides not doing a good job of integrating its 7% to 9% Muslim, mostly immigrants and descendants of immigrants from its North African empire (in a population of 66 million), France is a cultural target for the Islamist, accentuated by its “hedonistic” celebration of life and liberty. The French are a target for a third reason, as well; they are seen as vulnerable. In September 2014, IS’s main spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, had called on its followers to kill Westerners, “especially the spiteful and filthy French”.

Security Overload

The Nice attack came despite heavy military presence and expanded police powers being imposed under France’s state of emergency declared after the Paris attack in November last year. Under a plan dubbed “Sentinelle”, the French government has deployed heavily armed soldiers to guard 1,395 sites across the country, ranging from tourist spots to Jewish schools. During the Euro2016 concluded a week ago, 90,000 security forces were deployed to protect football fans at ten different venues across the country.

Law enforcement agencies have conducted some 3,600 raids on homes and businesses under state of emergency powers, carrying out searches without prior judicial authorization. About 550 people had been placed under house arrest after being identified as potentially dangerous during the state of emergency, though some of those house arrests have been lifted.

The point here is that given the nature of threat, how much security is sustainable and good enough to keep citizens safe is still questionable. Even during normal circumstances, terrorist suspects in France are seen to have fewer rights than almost anywhere else in the western world. Suspects, who are already stripped of their basic rights and face discrimination, have to further deal with judge-prosecutors who work on their own warrants and detain suspects for several days without charges.

Limits of Intelligence

The fact that the perpetrator of the attack in Nice was a French-Tunisian petty criminal known to the police raises familiar issues of methods of monitoring potential Islamist terrorists. It would also reflect on the capacity constraints of national and local intelligence services struggling to monitor fighters who have returned, not to mention sympathisers and those who have been radicalised in prison or online, without ever leaving the country.

Nice attack underlines a reality security services around the world are struggling to cope with; lone attackers can inflict great harm, especially if they are willing to die. With attack plans and trigger in their minds and virtually no logistics attacks of this nature they are extremely difficult for intelligence services to identify or stop in advance, even with extensive surveillance of electronic communications.

The second cause of concern is the choice of weapon; terrorists can use such a wide range of means to kill people, even if they cannot get hold of guns or explosives. Procurement and movement of guns and explosives is a major indicator intelligence agencies look for to be forewarned.

While the use of a civilian truck in the attack has been seen as some success in denying access to more conventional weaponry to terrorists, it has had no effect on the final outcome, which is loss of innocent lives. Cars have often been used in the past by Palestinians to kill Israelis. In France too there have been precedents; vehicles were used to ride down pedestrians in much smaller attacks in Dijon and in Nantes in 2014.

The Nice attack also highlights the uncomfortable gaps in France’s surveillance net, which has been bolstered in the last two years by some very intrusive legislations, to enhance powers of its intelligence services, police and prosecutors to monitor potential jihadists .

What Next

The initial responses from Paris point to a familiar cycle/spiral of events. As flags were lowered to half-staff in Nice and in Paris, the French President Hollande extended the state of emergency which had been imposed after the November terror attack with much deliberation, by another three months. The state of emergency was due to be lifted by the end of this month.

Besides continuing the state of emergency and the Operation Sentinel with 10,000 soldiers on deployment, Hollande is calling up “operational reserves”, those who have served in the past to help police, particularly at France’s borders. The country is also bolstering its presence in Iraq and Syria, where military advisers would be on the ground to help Iraqis take back the IS stronghold of Mosul. The French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle is expected to sail out to the Middle East once more to support the current wave of anti-terrorist operations.

There are other more complex and troubling manifestations. The recent attacks have stirred up further public discontent over migration and open borders, fuelling the limited but very real rise of the hard-line Right Wing (Marine le Pen’s National Front). With French presidential elections due in April and May next year, France is staring at some turbulent time ahead.

*Monish Gulati is Associate Director (Strategic Affairs) of the Society for Policy Studies, New Delhi. He can be reached at: mgulati@spsindia.in. This article was published at South Asia Monitor

On Thursday, the bishops of California announced their support of a state ballot measure that would end the use of capital punishment in the state, replacing it with life in prison without possibility of parole.

“Our commitment to halt the practice of capital punishment is rooted both in the Catholic faith and our pastoral experience,” the bishops said in their July 14 statement in support of Proposition 62.

The message also states the bishops’ opposition to another ballot measure, Proposition 66, which is intended to expedite executions in California by limiting appeals.

“All life is sacred … just as Jesus Christ taught us and demonstrated repeatedly throughout His ministry. This focus on the preciousness of human life is fundamental to Christianity,” they wrote. “Jesus makes clear that to love God we must love our neighbor.”

Each person “holds an inherent worth derived from being created in God’s own image” and thus “each of us has a duty to love this divine image imprinted on every person,” the bishops recalled.

“Our support to end the use of the death penalty is also rooted in our unshakeable resolve to accompany and support all victims of crime. They suffer the very painful consequences of criminal acts,” the bishops acknowledged, while adding that “Their enduring anguish is not addressed by the state-sanctioned perpetuation of the culture of death.”

“As we pray with them and mourn with them we must also stress that the current use of the death penalty does not promote healing. It only brings more violence to a world that has too much violence already. We will continue to promote responsibility, rehabilitation and restoration for everyone impacted by the criminal justice system.”

In addition to ending the death penalty in California, Proposition 62 would requires that those convicted of murder and sentenced to life without possibility of parole must work while in prison and pay restitution to victims.

The ballot measure would apply retroactively to those already sentenced to death in California. The state currently has 747 persons on the condemned inmate list, more than any other state.

According to the California Department of State, Proposition 62 would save state and local governments “potentially around $150 million annually within a few years due to the elimination of the death penalty.”

The bishops wrote that capital punishment “has repeatedly been shown to be severely and irrevocably flawed in its application. In the long – but absolutely necessary – process of ensuring an innocent person is not put to death, we have seen many accused persons being exonerated as new forms of forensic investigation have enabled us to better scrutinize evidence.”

“The high cost of implementing the death penalty has diverted resources from more constructive and beneficial programs both for rehabilitation and restoration of victims and offenders. Finally, repeated research has demonstrated that the death penalty is applied inconsistently along racial, economic and geographical lines,” they noted.

Among Proposition 62’s supporters is Beth Webb, whose sister was killed in a mass shooting in 2011. At a recent event supporting the measure, she said that “Neither me nor my mom will find closure in the death of another human being … Yes on 62 will relieve our families and let us heal.”

The death penalty has been in place in California since 1977, when the state legislature re-adopted the practice. The following year, voters approved a proposition reaffirming its use, and the 1978 statute is that under which the state currently operates.

Since 1978, 13 inmates have been executed in California. Two more California inmates were executed in other states. The most recent execution in the state occurred in January 2006.

In 2012, state voters disapproved a ballot measure similar to Proposition 62. That measure, rejected by 52 percent of voters, would also have replaced the death penalty with life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

Another supporter of Proposition 62 is Ron Briggs, a former supervisor of El Dorado County. His family was instrumental in the 1978 ballot measure reaffirming capital punishment. In a July 7 opinion piece for the Sacramento Bee, he wrote that “I now feel compelled to admit the policy is destructive to our great state. What we didn’t know then is that the death penalty would become an industry that benefits only attorneys and criminals, and no one else.”

“Don’t get me wrong – I’m still as tough on crime as I’ve ever been. I firmly believe those who committed the most heinous acts should do the hardest of time and never again see the light of day. But it’s time to face facts: the ultimate punishment has become the ultimate failed government program,” Briggs stated.

The competing death penalty ballot measure, Proposition 66, is meant to hasten the process. It would impose time limits on death penalty reviews, and would also require that death row inmates work and pay restitution to victims.

Proposition 66 also says that “When necessary to remove a substantial backlog in appointment of counsel for capital cases, the Supreme Court shall require attorneys who are qualified for appointment to the most serious non-capital appeals and who meet the qualifications for capital appeals to accept appointment in capital cases as a condition for remaining on the court’s appointment list.”

According to the California Department of State, this “Requires appointed attorneys who take noncapital appeals to accept death penalty appeals.”

The California state department also estimates that “Increased state costs that could be in the tens of millions of dollars annually for several years related to direct appeals and habeas corpus proceedings, with the fiscal impact on such costs being unknown in the longer run. Potential state correctional savings that could be in the tens of millions of dollars annually.”

California’s bishops wrote that they oppose Proposition 66 because “The search for a fair and humane execution process and protocol has failed for decades. Any rush to streamline that process will inevitably result in the execution of more innocent people. Neither the proponents nor the opponents of the death penalty wish this result.”

Briggs called Proposition 66 “a sloppy initiative that will make things worse.” He added that “Every attempt to fix the death penalty over the past 40 years has only made it slower and more expensive, wasting resources on criminals, attorneys and a bloated bureaucracy.”

California voters will decide on the death penalty measures later this year. Other topics among the state’s 17 ballot measures include the legalization of marijuana and health requirements involving the performers and producers of pornographic films.

The bishops of California concluded their statement saying that “In November – the concluding month of the Year of Mercy – Californians have the opportunity to embrace both justice and mercy (cf. Ps. 85.11) in their voting.”

“We strongly urge all voters to prayerfully consider support for Proposition 62 and opposition to Proposition 66.”