“De mortuis nil nisi bene” is commonly translated in English with “Speak no ill of the dead”. The headlines of German obituaries on Shimon Peres outbid themselves in adulation. President Obama, however, outbid even the Germans. He praised Peres without irony as “a champion of peace. […] As Americans, we are indebted to him”, he said. He even got metaphysical: “A light has gone out, but the hope he gave us will burn forever.” The US president should have really known better, that even “Peace Angel” Peres was only interested in peace with the Palestinians on Israeli conditions, namely, their subjugation under an Israeli peace diktat. Obama’s hypocrisy was topped off by Israel’s Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu, who had fought fiercely against the “peace policy” of Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres.

Two Germans, former Germany’s President Christian Wulff and Charlotte Knobloch, former President of the Central Council of Jewry in Germany, outbid even the general adulation of Peres. Christian Wulff wrote: “[Peres] outshone his time, with his empathy, his great heart, his philanthropy and his courage, his apparently unshakeable belief that Good is possible. Shimon Peres has shown what the world so desperately needs and what it simultaneously so sorely lacks.” Ms. Knobloch said: “He was a symbol of the Zionist dream”, undoubtedly believing that she was thereby praising the deceased. This “dream” had however turned out to be a nightmare for the Palestinians. Peres’ entire political life was, according to her, a “struggle for peace”.

Was he really a “smart bearer of hope, a tireless reconciler”? It seems that such delusions characterize the public image of a politician, the reality of which he had created on the ground had nothing, absolutely nothing, to do with such eulogies. I need not dwell here upon the assessments of the official political class, as they are drafted in the same vein.

Peres’ career is well known to everybody: He drew his nimbus as a confidant of David Ben-Gurion; he was the main initiator of the Israeli nuclear program, friend of German CSU leader Franz Josef Strauss; he spent two stints as Israel’s Prime Minister; he held almost every government post, crowning his long career as “President of the State of Israel”. He was not elected to this function by the population but by the Israeli parliament, the Knesset. In each election, Peres always came out second. He was nicknamed by the public the “eternal loser”. An important reason for that, is that Israelis deeply distrusted him.

Without much ado, it can be said that he has served the Zionist entity until the last breath. This is not be equated with the cause of peace with the Palestinians. His image in the West has always been that of a “liberal” or a “good Israeli”. Less known is the fact, that Peres was a Zionist hardliner who managed to garb his ideas in the rhetoric of the so-called “Zionist Left”. His vision was not different than that of Ariel Sharon or Netanyahu, but he knew how to present it in a less confrontational manner, designed for a Western audience. On this point, the contrived visions of Peres resemble political obituaries of political leaders in the US and Germany.

In Peres’ various political positions, he always supported the colonization of the occupied territories. After his “partner in peace”, Premier Minister Yitzhak Rabin, was assassinated in November 1995 by Yigal Amir, a Jewish right-wing extremist, Peres followed Rabin in the Premiership. Peres had never served in the Israeli military, hence, in the May’s election of 1996, opposing Netanyahu, he tried to make a showing of a “strong” leader by, inter alia, authorizing Operation “Grapes of Wrath” against the Hezbollah movement in Lebanon. In that operation Israel’s army bombed the UN base at Qana. In this attack, 106 Lebanese were killed and an equal number was injured. As usual, the Peres government “regretted” the massacre. Despite playing the strongman, Peres lost the elections for Netanyahu.

Ten years earlier, in 1985, Peres as the then serving Prime Minister of Israel, was responsible for an act of aggression against Tunisia that killed 75 Tunisians and Palestinians. According to international law, Israel’s aggression violated “the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or (was) in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations”, wrote Elias Davidsson, a native of Palestine, as far back as 1993.1 As there existed no international enforcement mechanism at the time, which would allow “the arrest, trial and punishment of criminals such as Mr. Peres”, Davidsson urged “authorities of civilized nations to refuse any official dealings with persons for which there is prima facie evidence of implication in such crimes”, including Shimon Peres.

Shimon Peres received together with Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat the Nobel Peace Prize for the so-called Oslo peace process, which brought only havoc and desperation upon the Palestinian people. It’s not unusual in our world that former terrorists such as Menachem Begin or war criminals such as Henry Kissinger will be bestowed with this distinction. Immediately after taking office, Barack Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, i.e. before he reneged on his promise to close Guantánamo and started extra-judicial executions around the world.

In obituaries, only good and beautiful things are written about the deceased. May mine only serve to complete the picture of a man who authentically personified Zionism.

In Madrid, on Wednesday morning, officers of the General Commissariat of Intelligence of the Spanish National Police Force arrested four Jihadis – three Moroccans and one Argentinean – under instructions from Section One of the Criminal Division of the Spanish National High Court, which issued the arrest warrant.

After they were initially arrested in June 2014, the four arrested individuals had been conditionally released while awaiting a court ruling. It was determined that the dismantled cell they formed part of sent 11 Jihadi fighters from Morocco and Spain to conflict zones to join the ranks of Al Qaeda in Syria and Iraq.

The four individuals, who had been conditionally released while awaiting a court ruling, were previously arrested within the framework of an operation by the General Commissariat of Intelligence conducted on June 16, 2014.

That operation dismantled a network of international connections aimed at financing, recruiting, radicalizing, indoctrinating and sending combatants to join the ranks of Jihadi terrorist organizations associated with Al Qaeda. Their organization was perfectly structured, developed and consolidated, and was referred to by the terrorist cell members themselves as the “Al-Andalus Brigade”.

It was revealed that this terrorist group had sent at least 11 Jihadi fighters to conflict zones from Morocco and Spain.

Furthermore, it was verified that these Jihadi fighters joined factions of Al Qaeda in Syria and Iraq, there being evidence to show that their final destination was the terrorist organization Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), into which these combatants would have been fully integrated to carry out any activity assigned to them by the organization, mainly aimed at taking part in terrorist attacks and operations.

Ban Ki-Moon’s second term as the Secretary General of the United Nations is ending this December. He was the most ideal man for the job as far as the United States and its allies are concerned.

Of course, there will always be other Ban Ki-Moons. In fact, the man himself was a modified version of his predecessor, Kofi Annan.

The unspoken, but unmistakable rule about UN Secretary Generals is that they must come across as affable enough so as not to be the cause of international controversies, but also flexible enough to accommodate the US disproportionate influence over the United Nations, particularly the Security Council.

At the end of their terms, the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of these Secretaries has been largely determined by their willingness to play by the aforementioned rule: Boutros Boutros-Ghali had his fallout with the US, as Kurt Waldheim also did. But both Annan and Ban learned their lessons well and followed the script to the end of their terms.

It would be utterly unfair to pin the blame for the UN’s unmitigated failure to solve world conflicts or obtain any real global achievement on a single individual. But Ban was particularly ‘good’ at this job. It would be quite a challenge to produce another with his exact qualities.

His admonishment of Israel, for example, can come across as strong-worded and makes for a good media quote, yet his inaction to confront Israel’s illegal violations of numerous Resolutions passed by the very UN he headed, is unmatched.

Even his purportedly strong words of censure were often cleverly coded, which, ultimately, meant very little.

When Israel carried out its longest and most devastating war on Gaza in the summer of 2014, a large number of international law experts and civil society organizations signed a letter accusing the UN chief of failing to clearly condemn Israel’s unlawful action in the Occupied Territories, its targeting of civilian homes, and even the bombing of UN facilities, which killed and wounded hundreds.

The signatories included former UN Special Rapporteur, Richard Falk, who, along with the others, called on Ban to either stand for justice or resign. He did neither.

The signatories criticized him, specifically, about Israeli shelling of a school managed by the UN agency for Palestinian refugees (UNRWA), in which ten civilians were killed.

In his ‘condemnation’ of the Israeli attack earlier, Ban even failed to mention Israel by name as the attacker, and called on ‘both parties’ to provide protection for Palestinian civilians and UN staff.

“Your statements have been either misleading, because they endorse and further Israeli false versions of facts, or contrary to the provisions established by international law and to the interests of its defenders, or because your words justify Israel’s violations and crimes,” they wrote.

And they were right. This is Ban Ki-Moon’s signature policy – his ability to sidestep having to criticize Israel so cleverly (and, of course, the US and others) when that criticism could have, when needed most, at least given a pause to those who violate international law at will.

Considering this, many have perceived Ban’s farewell speech at the 71st session of the UN General Assembly on September 15 as a departure from his old reserved self. It was understood that it was the end of his term, and he was ready to show some backbone, however belatedly. Sadly, this was not the case.

“It pains me that this past decade has been lost to peace. Ten years lost to illegal settlement expansion. Ten years lost to intra-Palestinian divide, growing polarization and hopelessness,” he surmised, as if both parties – the occupied and the military occupier – were equally responsible for the bloodshed and that Palestinians are equally blamed for their own military Occupation by Israel.

“This is madness,” he exclaimed. “Replacing a two-state solution with a one-state construct would spell doom: denying Palestinians their freedom and rightful future, and pushing Israel further from its vision of a Jewish democracy towards greater global isolation.”

But again, no solid commitment either way. Who is ‘replacing a two-state solution?’ and why would a ‘one state reality’ – which incidentally happened to be the most humane and logical solution to the conflict – ‘spell doom’? And why is Ban so keen on the ethnic status of Israel’s ‘Jewish democracy’ vision, considering that it was Israel’s demographic obsession that pushed Palestinians to live under military Occupation or live under perpetual racial discrimination in Israel itself?

The fact is that there is more to Ban’s muddled language than a UN chief who is desperately trying to find the balance in his words, so that he may end his mission without registering any serious controversies, or raise the ire of Israel and the US.

(Incidentally, Israeli Ambassador to the UN, Danny Danon, still ranted against the UN chief for calling Israel’s illegal Jewish settlements ‘illegal’ in his address. Other Israeli commentators raged against him for being a ‘liar’. Strange that even repeating old, irrefutable facts is still a cause of anger in Israel.)

Yet again, this is not the matter of the choice for words. A WikiLeaks document from August 2014 is an excellent case in point.

According to the document released by WikiLeaks, Ban collaborated secretly with the US to undermine a report issued by the UN’s own Board of Inquiry’s report on Israeli bombing of UN schools in Gaza during the war of December 2008 – January 2009.

‘Collaborated’ is actually a soft reference to that event, where Susan Rice – then the White House National Security Adviser – called on him repeatedly to bury the report, not to bring it to the Council for discussion and, eventually, to remove the strongly-phrased recommendations of ‘deeper’ and ‘impartial’ investigations into the bombing of the UN facilities.

When Ban explained to Rice that he was constrained by the fact that the Board of Inquiry is an independent body, she told him to provide a cover letter that practically disowns the recommendations as ones that “exceeded the scope of the terms of reference and (that) no further action is needed.”

Ban Ki-Moon obliged.

When the UN chief is gone, he will be missed – but certainly not by Palestinians in Gaza or refugees in Syria, or war victims in Afghanistan. But by the likes of Susan Rice, whose job was made very easy, when all she needed to do was merely instruct the chief of the largest international organization on earth to do exactly as she wished; and, for him, to gladly do so.

In his last visit to Palestine in June, Ban Ki-Moon told distraught Gazans that the “UN will always be with you.”

As tens of thousands there still stand on the rubble of their own homes, denied freedom to move or rebuild, Ban Ki-Moon’s statement is as forgettable as the man’s legacy at the United Nations.

By Dr. S. Chandrasekharan

In the over frenzied atmosphere post Uri attack in Kashmir, the media as well as the analysts have been freely discussing ways to punish Pakistan.   Options that should be left to the Army, the Intelligence agencies and the Ministry of External Affairs are being openly discussed with pros and cons and even recommendations are being made!

One of the issues that has come up for punishing Pakistan is a review of the Indus Water Treaty that has stood the test of time and in the past has survived despite wars, near wars, acts of terrorism and other conflicts between the two countries.

Following the Uri attack, suddenly a large number of Indus Treaty Experts have emerged and while most of them have recommended only review some have even suggested out right cancellation.

There are reports that a formal exercise is being under taken at the highest level to review the treaty.  Three issues come to my mind.

One- The treaty though facilitated by the World Bank, the latter is not a Guarantor to the treaty. Yet any unilateral amendment will bring in international criticism.

Two- India has not made any infrastructure ready to divert or reduce the waters of the three western rivers- the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab. This should have been done more as a deterrence and is much more lethal than a nuclear one.

Three- Being totally dependent on glacial waters, the availability of water from the western rivers in Pakistan is already reaching critical proportions.  Any further reduction will mostly affect the lower riparian States like Sindh and Balochistan whose people are already suffering discrimination and oppression. Of late India has openly taken up their cause.

A paper written by me on the treaty in 2010 is being reproduced in full for the benefit of the readers.

The Indus Water Treaty- Its Dynamics and Reverberations

By Dr. S. Chandrasekharan

As late as February 13 this year, many members of Pakistan National Assembly expressed great concern over the alleged violation of the Indus Water treaty by India in building dams across rivers meant for Pakistan and warned of a possible war between the two countries over this issue.

These threats of war are nothing new to India.  Even before the treaty of 1960, late Suhrawardy as Prime Minister of Pakistan threatened that Pakistan will go to war on the sharing of waters of the Indus.  These threats have been repeated periodically and so regularly by people at the political, military, bureaucratic and technical levels that these threats have lost their meaning now.  At one point, one of the influential editors of the Urdu press Majeed Nizami of Pakistan went one step further and threatened that Pakistan will have to go for a nuclear war over the river waters issue.

It should be conceded that the Indus Water Treaty has survived despite wars, near wars, acts of terrorism and other conflicts that have bedevilled the relations between India and Pakistan.  This has been, as much acknowledged by many of the saner voices from Pakistan too.

In April 2008, Pakistan’s Indus Water Commissioner, Jamaat Ali Shah in a frank interview conceded that the water projects undertaken by India do not contravene the provisions of the Indus water treaty of 1960.  He said that “in compliance with IWT, India has not so far constructed any storage dam on the Indus, the Chenab and the Jhelum rivers ( rivers allotted to Pakistan for full use).  The Hydro electric projects India is developing are the run of the river waters, projects which India is permitted to pursue according to the treaty.”

Yet many in Pakistan at very senior levels have been whipping up frenzy among the people of Pakistan that “India is stealing the waters of Pakistan”.

Since 2004-2005 when the opposition to Bagilhar Project came out into the open, there has been a continuous attempt on the part of Pakistan to push India to renegotiate the Indus Water treaty.

This would mean going back to sharing of waters during the lean season and other extraneous factors and also to ignore the enormous changes that have taken place on both sides of the border in the last fifty years. This would also mean rewarding Pakistan for its failure to manage its scarce and life giving waters to optimum use.

Unfortunately, some Indian scholars without understanding the past history of negotiations with Pakistan have supported the idea.  One of the senior analysts of India is said to have opined that “in negotiating an Indus Water Treaty 2, would be a huge Confidence Building Measure as it would engage both countries in a regional economic integration process.” A pious hope but an unrealistic one.

The Indus Water Treaty is unique in one respect.  Unlike many of the international agreements which are based on the equitable distribution of waters of the rivers along with other conditions, the Indus Water Treaty is based on the distribution of the rivers and not the waters.

This unique division of rivers rather than the waters has eliminated the very hassles and conflict that would have followed had equitable distribution of water been based on current usage, historical use, past and potential use etc. People who advocate a revision of the treaty including some influential ones in India should realise the trap that India will be getting into.

Briefly, the Indus Water treaty, having discarded the joint development plan for developing the Indus Basin as suggested by some international bodies, allotted the three western rivers of the Indus basin- the Indus, the Chenab and the Jhelum to Pakistan and the three eastern rivers Sutlej, Beas and Ravi to India.  The Treaty in its Annexures acknowledged certain rights and privileges for agricultural use of Pakistan drawing water from eastern rivers and similarly India drawing water for similar reasons from the three western rivers.

The treaty permitted India to draw water from the western rivers for irrigation up to 642,000 acres that is in addition to another entitlement to irrigate 701,000 acres.  India has so far not made full use of its rights to draw this quantity of water from the western rivers.  These allocations were made based on the water flows and usage as existed on April 1960.

While India is not permitted to build dams for water storage purposes (for consumptive uses) on the western rivers passing through India, it is allowed to make limited use of waters including run of the river hydroelectric power projects.  The Bagilhar project, the Kishenganga project as well as Tulbull (Wular) that come in this category are all being opposed by Pakistan on the narrow definition as to what it means by storage.

Pakistan disputed the Indian contention that Bagilhar project was a run of the river project and that the storage called pondage was necessary to meet the fluctuations in the discharge of the turbines and claimed that the water will ultimately go to Pakistan.  Since talks over a long period remained unsuccessful, the World Bank intervened though it made it clear that it was not a guarantor of the treaty.

A neutral expert was appointed by the World Bank.   The neutral expert Professor Lafitte of Switzerland while delivering the verdict, rejected most of Pakistan’s objections but did call for minor design changes including the reduction of the dam’s height by 1.5 metres.  The expert did not object to the right of India to construct dams for storage purposes purely for technical reasons for the efficiency of the turbines and did not even call the project as a dispute between the two countries but as “differences.”

The Tulbul project similarly envisages a barrage to be built at the mouth of Wular lake to increase the flow of water in the Jhelum during the dry season to make it navigable.  The other disputed project, is the dam across Kishenganga River to Wular lake for generation of hydro electric power.  The contention of India has been that in both cases the waters will ultimately go to Pakistan.

In the case of Kishenganga Project, Pakistan also has objected to the storage of water on the Neelum river on the principle of “prior appropriation” though the project on the Pakistan side the Neelum- Jhelum power plant downstream had not then started.

In all the projects objected to, Pakistan has brought in a new dimension to the dispute on security and strategic considerations which are strictly outside the ambit of the Indus treaty.  The reasoning goes thus-   by regulating the waters of the Chenab and the Jhelum, India has the capability in times of war to regulate the flow of waters to its strategic advantage.

There is no doubt that Pakistan will be facing increasing water shortages in the days to come leading to prolonged drought in many of its regions.  The reasons are many but some of these are Pakistan’s own doing.  The availability of water even now has reached critical proportions.

1. Global warming over a period of time has depleted the flow of water in the Indus(the major supplier) which depends mostly on glacial runoffs.
2.  As in other Himalayan regions like the Kosi in Nepal, the rivers carry very heavy sediments that result in silting the dams and barrages thus reducing the availability of water for cultivation.  Proper and periodic maintenance have ben lacking.
3. The canals that feed the irrigated lands are not lined resulting in seepage and loss of water.
4. There is mismanagement in use of water by using antiquated techniques and heavy cropping of water intensive varieties of farm products. Optimum crop rotations have not been done extensively as it should have been done to save water.
5. No serious effort has been made to improve the storage for intensive seasons like Kharif.
6. Dwindling water flow has also been affecting power generation.
7. The discharge of fresh water into the Arabian sea has dwindled considerably ( less than 10 MAF) which has resulted in  the sea water  pushing further into the estuaries and beyond, making water in those areas unfit for cultivation.

Just as in India, there are many water disputes among the four provinces in Pakistan, but there, it is one- Punjab against the other three and Punjab happens to be the upper riparian.

There is a larger political dimension to the whole problem of the river water distribution between Pakistan and India.  To Pakistan the Kashmir issue is irrevocably linked to the Indus water treaty as the headwaters of all the rivers of Pakistan and meant for Pakistan flow through Kashmir and India happens to be the upper riparian state. The fear exists that India could manipulate the waters to starve Pakistan.

From the Indian point of view, Pakistan need not fear if the Indus Water treaty is implemented both in letter and spirit.   What is needed is a constructive approach from Pakistan and India should also respond constructively on a crisis that is reaching a very critical stage in Pakistan.  Some analysts feel that the “waters issue” may take precedence over Kashmir.

If one were to interpret the spirit of the Indus Water treaty and not the letter, there has to be some give and take from both sides.  It needs a conducive environment and mutual trust that are scarce commodities in the relations between India and Pakistan.

Nuclear power is projected to continue expanding globally in the coming years, even as the pace of growth slows amid competition from low fossil fuel prices and renewable energy sources, according to a recent IAEA study.

Each year in Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates for the Period up to 2050, the IAEA presents its projections of the world’s nuclear power generating capacity. The publication is now in its 36th edition.

“Nuclear energy, in the long run, will continue to play an important role in the world’s energy mix,” said IAEA Deputy Director General Mikhail Chudakov, Head of the Department of Nuclear Energy. “With populations and demand for electricity growing, nuclear power can help ensure reliable and secure energy supplies while reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In other words, nuclear power can help lift millions of people out of energy poverty while also combatting climate change.”

The new projections indicate a slowing in nuclear power growth, in keeping with the trend since the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident. Nuclear power generating capacity is projected to expand by between 1.9% and 56% by 2030, compared with the previous estimate of between 2.4% and 68% from last year. Uncertainty related to energy policy, licence renewals, shutdowns and future constructions accounts for the wide range. The projections from 2030 to 2050 involve greater degrees of uncertainty.

Developed by world experts who gather each spring at the IAEA, the projections take into account developments through April 2016. The low case, designed to produce “conservative but plausible” estimates, assumes a continuation of current market, technology and resource trends with few changes to policies affecting nuclear power. The high case assumes current rates of economic and electricity demand growth, particularly in Asia, will continue. It also envisages a bigger role for nuclear power in assisting Member States on meeting their commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions under last year’s Paris Agreement on climate change.

Over the short term, several factors are weighing on the growth prospects of nuclear power. These factors include low prices for natural gas, falling costs for renewables, lack of market signals for low-carbon energy, and a sluggish global economy. Heightened safety requirements introduced after the Fukushima accident and the deployment of next generation technologies with advanced safety systems have also contributed to delays.

Reactor Retirements

The world’s nuclear reactor fleet is also ageing, with more than half of the 450 reactors currently in operation over 30 years old. While the low projections show only modest capacity growth, the need to replace scores of old reactors means that “total new capacity constructed will be much greater than the apparent net increase,” according to the report. “The low case, which essentially shows no increase in the installed capacity, assumes some 150 GW(e) of new capacity built over the next 15 years.”

According to the projections, the world’s nuclear power generating capacity is seen expanding to 390.2 GW(e) by 2030 in the low case from 382.9 GW(e) last year, while in the high case it’s projected to rise to 598.2 GW(e). One gigawatt is equal to one billion watts of electrical power.

The Far East will see the biggest expansion, especially in China and the Republic of Korea. In the low case, capacity in that region is seen growing to 132.2 GW(e) by 2030 from the current 93.8 GW(e). In the high case, capacity is projected to expand to 215.5 GW(e).

India is leading the expansion in the Middle East and South Asia, where capacity is seen at 27.7 GW(e) by 2030 in the low case from 6.9 GW(e) in 2015, rising to 47.7 GW(e) in the high case.

Eastern Europe presents a mixed picture. The region includes Russia, with seven reactors under construction, as well as Belarus, which is building its first two units. The low case estimates regional capacity at 49.9 GW(e) by 2030, down slightly from the current 50.5 GW(e), while capacity increases to 75.7 GW(e) in the high case.

Western Europe risks the biggest decline. With Germany phasing out nuclear power in response to the Fukushima accident, the low projections reflect a decrease in regional capacity to 77 GW(e) by 2030 from the current 112.1 GW(e). The high projections show a decline to 111.8 GW(e).

North American capacity is also seen falling in the low case to 92.5 GW(e) by 2030 from the current 112.7 GW(e). The high case estimates an increase to 126 GW(e).

By Dr. S. Chandrasekharan

According to the Constitution, the Nepal government will have to complete elections to the local bodies, regional and the national levels by 21 January 2018.

Accordingly, the former Oli Government made an unrealistic calendar for all the three elections spread over 2017 to meet the dead line. As was the style of former PM Oli, besides making big pronouncements nothing was done at the ground level to proceed with the plan.

The local bodies in Nepal have been defunct since July 2002 and there has been virtually no administration in the interior villages ever since the Maoist insurgency began. It was hoped that once the insurgency was over, government’s writ will quickly be established by holding the local bodies elections. But it was not to be. Every attempt to conduct the elections had been thwarted by one party or the other so far. First it was the Maoists who wanted to retain their influence in the interior and later by other parties who wanted postponement on some grounds or other.

But now the new constitution ( one year has just passed with no progress!) has mandated that all the elections will have to be completed before the deadline of January 2018.

The Local Body Restructuring Commission that was formed to delineate the local bodies and recommend to the government had almost completed its study and was about to submit its report. The recommendation was to have 565 local bodies and the Commission had said that this figure was based on the basis of “constitutional spirit, demography, distribution and access to services provided as also those related to collection of revenue.”

This body consisted of non partisan and wise members who had done a painstaking study of the issues before finalising the recommendations.

Even before the announcement of the report, some of the political bodies were up in arms against the number. The Madhesis wanted the number to relate to the proportion of population while others wanted to increase the number to 900 or more. There were some wise people who called for status quo and wanted the elections to the expedited based on the current configuration as any change would only delay the elections.

The three major parties- the Nepali Congress, the UML and the Maoists decided suddenly on 25th of this month to change the terms of reference at this late stage. The Madhesi groups were not consulted as has been the habit of the three major parties.

Of the new terms of reference- one was a directive to keep the existing “Ilakas” (area clusters) in tact and add on the VCs where necessary. Another was to give priority to convenience and accessibility while delineating the local units.

This would involve reverting back almost to what was in place since 25 years ago when there were 927 Ilakas. The present modified proposal would come to about 900 local units.

This proposal of the three major main parties has been strongly opposed by the Madhesi groups particularly the TMDP, RPP (N) and most importantly by the Commission (LLRC) itself.

It is being made out that the decision of the three main parties and the direction given to the Commission formed under the Constitution are unconstitutional. This is not a correct legal provision. Provision for forming the LLRC comes under the transitional provisions and are only to help the government to take a view and proceed with the elections.

While it is perfectly acceptable for the government to make new terms of reference or even to reject the recommendations, what would happen now is that even the first phase of the three tier elections- local, provincial and national is going to be delayed and the dead line of January 21 2018 cannot be met.

The second is the habit of the three major parties to ignore the Madhesis totally in deciding on the future of the country as a whole. This will only further alienate the Madhesis who are already feeling left out in the whole issue of constitution making.

One good point that has emerged however is that the UML is now talking to the other two parties- the NC and the Maoists and it is hoped that with the present unity they will be able to come out with an acceptable formula for the delineation of Madhesi Province or Provinces.

Bombs, domestic and foreign, are defining the nature of politics in the United States, the European Union and among radical Islamist groups and individuals. The scale and scope of bomb-politics varies with the practioner.

‘Wholesale bombers’ are state actors, who engage in large-scale, long-term bombing designed to destroy adversary governments or movements. ‘Retail bombers’ are groups or individuals engaging in small-scale, sporadic bombings, designed to provoked fear and secure symbolic outcomes.

Apart from planned bombings, there are improvised bombings committed by deranged individuals who engage in suicide attacks without any political backing or coherent purpose.

In this paper we will focus on the nature of ‘wholesale’ and ‘retail’ bombings, their frequency, political consequences and long-term impact on global political power.

Bombing as Everyday Events

The US and EU are the world’s foremost practitioners of ‘wholesale bombing’. They engage in serial attacks against multiple countries without declaring war or introducing their own citizen ground troops. They specialize in indiscriminant attacks on civilian populations – unarmed women, children, elders and non-combatant males. In other words, for the ‘wholesale bombers’, unleashing terror on societies is an everyday event.

The US and EU practice ‘total war’ from the skies, not sparing a single sphere of everyday, civilian life. They bomb neighborhoods, markets, vital infrastructure, factories, schools and health facilities. The result of their daily, ‘ordinary’ bombing is the total erasure of the very structures necessary for civilized existence, leading to mass dispossession and the forced migration of millions in search of safety.

It is not surprising that the refugees seek safety in the countries that have destroyed their means of normal existence. The wholesale bombers of the US-EU do not bomb their own cities and citizens – and so millions of the dispossessed are desperate to get in.

Wholesale bomb policies have emerged because prolonged ground wars in the targeted countries evoke strong domestic opposition from their citizens unwilling to accept casualties among US and EU soldiers. Wholesale bombing draws less domestic opposition because the bombers suffer few losses.

At the same time, while mass aerial bombing reduces the political risks of casualties at home, it expands and deepens violent hostility abroad. The mass flight of refugees to US-EU population centers allows the entry of violent combatants who will bring their own version of the total war strategies to the homes of their invaders.

Secular resistance has generally targeted enemy soldiers, whether they are imperial invaders or jihadi mercenaries. Their targets are more focused on the military. But faced with the politics of long-distance, wholesale bombing, the secular opposition becomes ineffective. When the ’secular opposition’ diminishes, ethno-religious combatants troops emerge.

The Islamists have taken command of the resistance, adopting their tactics to the imperial policy of total serial wars.

Retail Bomb-Warfare

Lacking an air force, Islamist terrorists engage in ground wars to counter imperial air wars. Their response to drone warfare, is hand-made improvised bombs, killing hundreds of civilians. Their victims may be decapitated with hand-held swords, rather than computer-controlled missiles. They capture hostile population, committing pillage, torture and rapine, rather than bomb from a distance, to dispossess and drive into exile.

‘Retail bomb’ terrorists are generally decentralized and may be recruited overseas. Their bombs are crude and indiscriminant. But like the wholesale bombers, they target population centers and seek to provoke panic and despair among the civilian population.

Islamist ‘retail bombers’ seek to expand their range by attacking the home countries of ‘wholesale bombers’ – the US and Europe. These attacks are exclusively for propaganda and do not constitute any threat to strategic imperial military targets. They expose the vulnerability of their enemies’ civilian population.

While imperial bombers and Islamists bombers have been at war against each other, they have also served as allies of convenience. Several recent examples come to mind.

US-EU ‘wholesale bombing’ campaigns against Libya, Syria and Yemen worked in tandem with Islamist mercenary ground fighters. ‘Wholesale bombers’ devastated the infrastructure and military installations of the governments of Syria and Libya in support of advancing Islamist ground troops. In other words, ‘wholesale bombings’ are not sufficient to achieve targeted ‘regime change’, thus the resort to terrorist ‘retail bombers’ and jihadi ‘head choppers’ to advance on regional and local targets.

The most blatant recent example of the convergence of imperial wholesale bombers in support of Islamist retail bombers and terrorists was the September 17, 2016 US-EU attack on a Syrian military installation, killing and wounding almost two hundred Syrian soldiers who had been engaged in combat against ISIS terrorists. While Washington claimed that the hours-long aerial bombardment of Syrian government soldiers was a ‘mistake’, it allowed the jihadi ‘retail bombers’ to take the offensive and overrun the base. Acting as air-support for ISIS, the US Pentagon effective shut down any possibility for peace negotiations and sabotaged a fragile ceasefire. This was a major victory for Washington’s politics of permanent wholesale bombing and ‘regime change’.

Just as the US launched its propaganda and wholesale bombing attack against the Syrian government, an improvised ‘retail bombing campaign’ was launched in the US – in Manhattan and New Jersey! The latest series of retail bombing attacks in the US led to three dozen, mostly minor, injuries, while the brutal US wholesale bombing of Syrian troops killed over 62 government soldiers and wounded many more. The political impact and consequences of wholesale and retail terror bombings in both regions was highly significant. The US had no more right to launch an air attack on Syrian government troops engaged in defending their country, than the US-based retail terrorist (an Afghan-American) had in planting improvised bombs in US cities. Both actions are illegal.

Political Consequences of Bombing Warfare

The US-ISIS coordinated bombing of Syrian soldiers has set the stage for all-out warfare. Peace talks were violently sabotaged by the Obama Administration. Syria and Russia now face the combined forces of ISIS, Turkey and the US with no hope for a negotiated solution. The battle for control of Aleppo will intensify. Russian negotiators have failed to check their cynical American ‘allies’ in their much-ballyhooed ‘war on terror’. They have no choice but to continue to supply air cover for their Syrian government allies.

The US has embraced the Turkish invasion of Syria, betraying both their Kurdish allies and some element among their ISIS partners. Bombing continues to be Washington’s main option in the Middle East.

The recent retail terror bombing in the US has the predicted consequence – a mass media whipped into a frenzy of fear mongering. New York City is further militarized. The face of the ‘enemy’ (a young Afghan-American, whose own father had tried to turn over to the FBI for his jihadi connections) is on a hundred million TV screens continuously. The electoral campaign salivates in anticipation of a terror war for whoever wins the presidency. Blind fear rather than concrete economic demands take the place of political debate.

Immigrants, Muslims and terrorists replace Wall Street tax evaders, profiteers and speculators as the villains in a country mired in economic and social crises. Economic policies, which have created mass insecurity and misery, are obscured by the militarist rhetoric.

Militarism, war and wholesale bombing replace the incremental advances in improving peaceful productive relations with Cuba and Iran.

The politics of bombing, as a strategy and way-of-life affects domestic and foreign policy . . . even as the vast majority of American voters look for alternatives, for jobs, housing, and education and seek to live without fear and threats.

Wholesale wars lead to retail wars. Overseas bombs lead to bombs at home. Invasions and occupations provoke outrage and retaliation. The answer is not to do unto others what you don’t want done on yourself.

Sergey Kirienko, director general of Russia’s Rosatom, has signed agreements with Cuba, Finland, Jordan and Tunisia this week, covering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, training and the early notification of nuclear accidents. The agreements were signed on the side of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s 60th General Conference in Vienna.

An intergovernmental agreement signed with Jose Fidel Santana, Cuba’s vice minister of science, technology and the environment, provides the legal basis for further bilateral cooperation between Cuba and Russia in a wide range of areas, Rosatom said. These include nuclear medicine and radiation technology; the training of nuclear specialists; fundamental and applied research; and the management of radioactive waste.

A similar agreement was signed on 26 September with Salim Khalbous, Tunisia’s minister of higher education and scientific research. This includes, among other areas, assistance in the development of Tunisian nuclear infrastructure in compliance with international recommendations; the design and construction of nuclear power and research reactors, as well as desalination plants and particle accelerators; uranium exploration and mining; research into Tunisia’s mineral resources for use in the nuclear industry; nuclear fuel cycle services for nuclear power plants and research reactors.

A memorandum on education and training was signed with Khaled Toukan, chairman of the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission. Areas of cooperation will include exchange programs for students and academics in nuclear-related subjects, internships, summer schools, Olympiads, the development of educational materials, manuals and workshops, as well as joint nuclear research and development programs.

Petteri Tiippana, director general of Finland’s Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) signed a protocol “on practical measures” for the January 1995 intergovernmental agreement between Finland and Russia on early notification of nuclear accidents and exchange of information on nuclear facilities.

The protocol covers nuclear power plants, propulsion reactors, fresh and used nuclear fuel storage, research reactors and other nuclear facilities that are under construction or which already exist in Finland and are within a 300 kilometres of the border with Russia.

The document also specifies the procedure for exchange of information on various aspects of nuclear and radiation safety, envisages regular joint training and consultation between STUK and Rosatom “as the bodies authorized to fulfil commitments of their states” under the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident of 26 September 1986.

Researched and written by World Nuclear News

Senators Jeff Merkley, Elizabeth Warren and Bob Menendez on Thursday formally called on the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to investigate whether Wells Fargo and senior officials violated laws by misleading investors and firing whistleblowers while the bank oversaw the creation of millions of unauthorized, fraudulent accounts.

“After regulators discovered this widespread problem, Wells Fargo conducted an analysis that revealed that employees may have opened as many as 1.5 million checking accounts and obtained as many as 565,000 credit cards without customer authorization. Those fraudulent accounts cost customers millions in fees. These facts – as well as testimony from Mr. Stumpf before the Senate Banking Committee on September 20, 2016 – justify an investigation into at least three types of securities law violations,” the Senators wrote in a letter to SEC Chair Mary Jo White.

Last week, Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf testified under oath before the Senate Banking Committee, of which Merkley, Warren and Menendez are members. At the hearing, Stumpf told Senators that he knew of problems with fake accounts by 2013, but the bank never disclosed this information to investors until Wells Fargo settled with federal regulators earlier this month. Additionally, numerous media reports in the last week contain accounts of employees who tried to act as whistleblowers by reporting the misconduct being fired shortly thereafter.

Noting that Wells Fargo’s actons are already under review by the U.S. Department of Justice, state Attorney General’s offices, and the US. Department of Labor, among others, the Senators concluded, “The SEC should join in these efforts to ensure that Wells Fargo and its senior executives are held accountable for a massive, years-long fraud that hurt thousands of customers and potentially cost investors billions of dollars.”

Specifically, the Senators requested SEC investigations into whether the bank violated the law in three separate areas:

1. Whether Wells Fargo executives violated the internal controls provision of Sarbanes-Oxley by signing off on inaccurate financial reporting;

2. Whether Wells Fargo committed securities fraud by failing to disclose problems with fake accounts at the same time as they were promoting their high account-creation numbers as a reason to invest in Wells Fargo;

3. Whether Wells Fargo violated whistleblower protection laws by firing employees after they tried to report misconduct.

For terrorist outfits like Al Qaeda and ISIS, low oil prices are counter-productive. These organizations, much like Venezuela, depend mostly on oil for their revenues that ultimately fund their weapons. There is, therefore, a need for them to attack oil infrastructure to freeze production and engineer a price rise.

By Ashay Abbhi*

Oil prices fell through the roof. Unrelenting oil glut. Exporters in shambles. Rejoicing end consumers. But there is more to oil price volatility than meets the eye. Let’s call it Oil Jihad.

The physical security of the world’s source of energy security has been undermined since the Arab Spring and exacerbated since the birth of ISIS, leaving 80% of the world’s crude vulnerable. Groups like ISIS, Al Qaeda and Niger Delta Avengers are fighting for control of oil rich territories in Iraq and Syria to fund terror through back-end trading. In attacking oil infrastructure, there is a grander scheme of choking production and national revenues until such time as prices sky rocket and a black market is established.

But, is there more to what motivates these extremist outfits? Could energy terrorism have deeper roots? Are their motives restricted to only destabilization of government revenues and/or taking control of the oil reserves? Or are the distraught oil-economies looking at it as a desperate measure to engineer an eventual price rise?

Recent attacks and the motivation

2016 has, so far, witnessed major attacks on the North Africa and Middle East facilities of large corporations like Chevron and Shell that have, for the last many decades, influenced major economies. In March, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has claimed responsibility for the rocket attack on the Salah Gas Plant run by British Petroleum, Statoil and the Algerian National Oil Company, Sonarach in Algeria. Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) attacked Chevron’s Okan offshore platform in the Niger Delta in May. The organization has carried out several other attacks on the Nigerian oil and gas assets as a means to disrupt the oil-export based economy. Chevron suffered another blow on the same facility just a week later, despite having shut down due to the previous attack. This time they targeted the wellhead. These attacks have cut Chevron’s production from the region by 600,000 to 1.4 million Barrels per Day (bpd). The attack was followed by another in July when NDA destroyed the Nembe 1, 2, 3 and Tebedaba pipelines in Nigeria. These attacks have, as predicted, severely affected the country’s export commitments.

Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited declared force majeure following an attack on its 250,000bpd Forcados Export Terminal claimed by the Niger Delta Avengers.

July witnessed another attack by NDA. This time it was ExxonMobil subsidiary Qua Iboe. Its largest export pipeline in Nigeria that transported nearly 50,000 barrels daily was attacked and forced to close as the company declared force majeure. ExxonMobil and the government initially denied the attack. NDA has also issued a warning for more attacks and has asked all oil workers and foreigners to leave the facilities.

Taking a step beyond Al Qaeda and NDA, ISIS has created a simultaneous reign of terror by not only blowing up the oil and gas assets, but also controlling those that it didn’t blow up. Iraq has been a target of pipeline attacks for more than a decade. From its seized assets, ISIS produces nearly 50,000 bpd in Iraq and Syria, selling oil domestically and internationally to unidentified buyers through a trade route that enters from Turkey at a highly discounted price of anything from $10 to $35 per barrel. While the US has attacked ISIS-owned oil facilities, it has not damaged them enough for the organization to stop bringing in the oil money that runs into the range of $500 million annually.

For terrorist outfits like Al Qaeda and ISIS, low oil prices are counter-productive. These organizations, much like Venezuela, depend mostly on oil for their revenues that ultimately fund their weapons. There is, therefore, a need for them to attack oil infrastructure to freeze production and engineer a price rise. Also, with production losses and export delays, ISIS expects to create more customers and a larger market share that would translate into more revenues.

Hitting where it hurts

Lack of infrastructural security has often been criticized as it significantly hampers production, transportation, exports and revenues. Pipelines are more vulnerable since they run for longer distances through remote unmanned areas. This dearth of safety and security is considerably exploited by terrorists to create a dent in the national income. On the one hand, attacking infrastructure certainly stuns the governments and corporations into freezing production, thereby threatening the export contracts and weakening the country economically. Nigeria has lost nearly 1 million bpd of oil due to the terrorist attacks, containing its total output to only 1.1 million bpd, severely restricting exports and revenue. Attacks in the Delta have crippled the Nigerian economy and provided legs to Boko Haram by weakening Abuja’s resources to fight the terror group. On the other hand, frozen production means restricted supply and consequently, increasing prices.

Since the Arab Spring the threat of rebellion has unsettled the all-comfortable monarchs, even nudging the mammoth of the Middle East, Saudi Arabia. So far, while the Kingdom has seen some recent low-intensity attack, its oil assets have remained impregnable. Riyadh has refused to cut production to preserve its market share, but rapid depletion of strategic reserves may eventually weaken the spirits. Slowing down the tap could mean losing the cap, its ability to single handedly influence market price, lose market share and eventually threaten the money, muscle and existence of the Royal Family. The fall of the House of Saud would also mean less oil-money to fund Sunni terror outfits to fight interests of Shia Iran that is only growing stronger. With sanctions and trade barriers lifted post US-Iran deal, Tehran has begun pumping serious oil into the market, adding 3.6 million bpd to the glut. A Shi’ite state, the newfound oil money in Iran will find itself in the coffers of the Shia extremists, all in the name of fighting the holy war against the “infidels”. There are concerns that this new money in Iran could help it fund Shia extremists, that could further destroy oil assets in Sunni majority countries and bring the oil-terror saga full circle.

Remember those attacks on large oil companies? Revenue generated in 2015 by US oil and gas companies was down to nearly $860 million from $1,337 million in 2014; a steep drop of over 35.6% year on year. The only way to recover these losses and post a stronger 2016 and onwards is by increasing the oil prices. These attacks on oil and gas infrastructure intend to do just that. More attacks, lower supply, higher price. But only if demand remains the same or increases. This ‘only’ is the answer to why we haven’t seen this theory work out as well for the terroconomists (economists studying terror or economics studied terrorists, that link barrel of oil to barrel of the gun).

Falling oil demand due to the slowing Chinese economy and the world going green has held prices back. It may not be a stretch to say that the increasingly greening of economies and climate change efforts could be doing more damage to the oil-paid terror surge than US air strikes in Iraq. The IEA estimates that renewable energy will grow from a 22% share of global power generation in 2013 to 26% in 2020, with nearly 700 gigawatts of new installed capacity being added. This will offset power generation from oil and gas plants, eventually releasing the demand pressure that would force the market to keep the price levels low. The only way to counter this is to manufacture a supply deficiency and a demand surplus to increase the prices, a feat that oil terrorism has the potential to master.

Oil Jihad has given a new angle to the great geopolitical game of energy, as it moves from being a war for assets to include a war on assets as well. Attacks on infrastructural assets of commodities as sensitive as oil and gas, have long-term destabilising effects than short term gains. It has become another strategic weapon by funding terror organizations to carry on these attacks in the hope that prices will rise to sustainable levels once again. With the motive in place, conjecture points its oily fingers at countries that have been economically ravaged by the low oil prices.

A new can of worms?

The nature of this form of terrorism is that it is very likely stemming from the countries that are expected to fight against such outfits. Russia, despite being on the brink of recession, has waged a war against ISIS to support Assad. The US – still fighting a war against Al Qaeda – has sought to destroy the oil and gas assets of ISIS, the effectiveness of which is still debatable. These measures have weakened the outfits but not enough to deter them from either stopping production or from attacking infrastructure in other countries. Nigeria is yet to tackle NDA or Boko Haram and hasn’t been successful at either, much to the chagrin of companies like Chevron and Exxon Mobil that operate there. It remains to be seen how these anti-terror forces that are themselves reeling with the ill-effects of low oil prices, the attacks by which is expected to increase the prices and generate larger revenues for them. Is renewable energy the anti-dote to Oil Jihad and other resource conflicts? Would keeping the oil prices low deter the terrorists from sabotaging oil assets and output? How will the catch-22 situation in front of countries such as the US and Russia play out in the great game of geopolitics of energy besides making it more interesting?

*Ashay Abbhi is based out of India. An analyst in the field of contemporary energy issues, Ashay’s interests also lie in nuanced issues of war and conflict. With his specialisation in tow, Ashay has explored different angles of energy sector, one of which includes the comprehension of the geopolitics of energy.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of TransConflict.

In the first half of 2016, the United States exported 4.7 million barrels per day (b/d) of petroleum products—almost 10 times the crude oil export volume—an increase of 500,000 b/d over the first half of 2015. While U.S. exports of distillate and gasoline increased by 50,000 b/d and nearly 140,000 b/d, respectively, propane exports increased by more than 230,000 b/d (Figure 1).

Propane is now the second-largest U.S. petroleum product export, surpassing motor gasoline. While total U.S. petroleum product exports grew, export destinations remained largely unchanged.

Mexico, Canada, and the Netherlands received the greatest volumes of U.S. petroleum products in the first half of 2016, importing 775,000 b/d, 579,000 b/d, and 271,000 b/d, respectively. Exports to these nations were, respectively, 129,000 b/d, 67,000 b/d, and 66,000 b/d above their level in first half of 2015.

Distillate exports, the largest component of U.S. petroleum product exports for many years, averaged 1.2 million b/d in the first half 2016, an increase of 50,000 b/d from the first half 2015. Central and South America accounted for the largest share of U.S. distillate exports, averaging over 620,000 b/d in the first half of 2016, up more than 30,000 b/d from the first half of 2015 (Figure 2). Chile remained the region’s largest importer of U.S. distillate in the first half 2016, averaging over 106,000 b/d. The largest single destination overall for U.S. distillate exports was Mexico, which averaged 147,000 b/d in the first half of 2016, an increase of 3,000 b/d over the first half of 2015. Despite a well-supplied distillate market in Asia, U.S. exports to Singapore increased to 15,000 b/d in the first half of 2016, up from 11,500 b/d in the first half of 2015.

U.S. propane exports increased from 562,000 b/d in the first half of 2015 to 793,000 b/d in the first half 2016. Exports to Asia and Oceania accounted for 94% of this growth (Figure 3). Japan imported the most U.S. propane at 159,000 b/d in the first half of 2016, an increase of 111,000 b/d from 48,000 b/d in the first half 2015. Exports to Panama, however, fell from 41,000 b/d in the first half 2015 to 7,000 b/d in the first half 2016.

The large increases in exports to Japan and decreases in exports to Panama could be a result of reduced ship-to-ship transfer activity, following narrower price differentials between the U.S. and Asia. Some of the propane exports from the United States that undergo ship-to-ship transfers will cite the location of the transfer and not the final destination of the propane. This often results in larger-than-actual export numbers for the countries where the ship-to-ship transfers take place and in less-than-actual numbers for some final destinations. For example, export data involving ship-to-ship transfers may show Panama as the destination of a propane export cargo eventually destined for Japan or other countries in Asia.

Gasoline exports increased 138,000 b/d in the first half of 2016 compared with the first half of 2015. North America (Canada and Mexico) accounts for the majority of the growth with an increase of 92,000 b/d (Figure 4). Mexico represents the largest single recipient of U.S. gasoline exports at 363,000 b/d, up from 283,000 b/d in the first half of 2015. As part of its energy sector reformspassed in 2013, Mexico liberalized the country’s energy sector, allowing market participants other than state company Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX). In January 2016, as part of the liberalization process, Mexico began to allow companies besides PEMEX to import fuels, resulting in increased exports from nearby refineries along the U.S. Gulf Coast. Canada is the second-largest recipient of U.S. gasoline at 66,000 b/d in the first half of 2016, up from 55,000 b/d in the first half of 2015.

Despite growth in the total volume of U.S. petroleum product exports, their regional distribution has not changed significantly from 2005 to 2015. In 2015, over 60% of exports remained within the Western Hemisphere, down only modestly from approximately 65% in 2005. North America’s share of total U.S. exports is down nine percentage points, while Central and South America’s share is up six percentage points. Exports to other global regions remained steady, with every region’s share of U.S. exports staying within two percentage points of their 2005 share.

Readers who follow EIA’s export data will likely know that the agency recently made significant improvements in its estimates of weekly export data by using near-real-time export data obtained from U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The recent changes in the weekly export data do not affect the monthly data cited in this article, which reflect official trade statistics published by the U.S. Census Bureau.

U.S. average regular gasoline retail and diesel fuel prices decrease

The U.S. average regular gasoline retail price dropped slightly to $2.22 per gallon, down 10 cents from the same time last year. The Rocky Mountain price dropped two cents to $2.25 per gallon, the Midwest price dropped one cent to $2.14 per gallon, and the Gulf Coast price dropped less than a penny to $1.96 per gallon. The East Coast price rose one cent to $2.20 per gallon, while the West Coast price rose only modestly, remaining at $2.65 per gallon.

The U.S. average diesel fuel price fell one cent from a week ago to $2.38 per gallon, down nine cents from the same time last year. The Rocky Mountain price fell two cents to $2.47 per gallon. The West Coast, Midwest, and Gulf Coast prices fell one cent each to $2.64 per gallon, $2.36 per gallon, and $2.23 per gallon, respectively. The East Coast price remained virtually unchanged at $2.39 per gallon.

Propane inventories gain

U.S. propane stocks increased by 1.5 million barrels last week to 103.3 million barrels as of September 23, 2016, 4.5 million barrels (4.6%) higher than a year ago. Gulf Coast and East Coast inventories increased by 1.7 and 0.2 million barrels, respectively, while Midwest and Rocky Mountain/West Coast inventories decreased by 0.3 and 0.1 million barrels, respectively. Propylene non-fuel-use inventories represented 2.7% of total propane inventories.

The United States welcomes the interim report of the Joint Investigation Team on the shoot down of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, said US State Department spokesperson John Kirby.

According to Kirby, “The Team’s interim findings corroborate Secretary Kerry’s statement in the days following the tragedy that MH17 was shot down by a BUK surface-to-air missile fired from Russian-backed, separatist-controlled territory in eastern Ukraine.”

Kirby noted the team found also that the BUK launcher was transported from Russia to separatist-controlled territory in Ukraine before the incident, and returned to Russia after the launcher was used to shoot down MH17.

“While nothing can take away the grief of those who lost loved ones on that tragic day, this announcement is another step toward bringing to justice those responsible for this outrageous attack,” Kirby said, adding that “The United States will continue to work with the Joint Investigation Team in its investigation. We call on other states that are in a position to assist to cooperate fully so those responsible are held accountable.”

By Clint Watts*

(FPRI) — Today, Islamic State foreign fighters bleeding out of Iraq and Syria power an unprecedented wave of directed attacks on three continents inspiring cascading waves of inspired violence from distant supporters scattered around the world. With that having been said, the good times for the Islamic State ended in 2016.  Their decline has come as fast as their rise and points to yet another shift in global jihad. The jihadi landscape, in only three years, has transformed from the unipolar world of al Qaeda to a bipolar competition between the al Qaeda and Islamic State networks to a multipolar jihadi ecosystem with dozens of groups holding varying degrees of allegiance and affinity for their extremist forefathers. Al Qaeda and the Islamic State now represent two big players in a sea of militancy filled with many competing currents. As seen in Figure 10 below, the world of jihad has never been so vast, dispersed, and diluted.

As always, there are a few notes on the al Qaeda versus Islamic State chart as of September 2016 (see Figure 10). I generally don’t like organizational charts for describing jihadi terrorist groups. I’ve been to too many military briefings where organizational charts have been pushed as command and control diagrams. Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and their affiliates largely represent swarming collaborative relationships rather than a directed, top-down hierarchy synonymous of Western military constructs.

In the chart, circle size represents an imperfect estimate of a group’s relative size compared to other groups.  Larger circles equal bigger groups, smaller circles denote lesser-sized groups and I can only make circles down to a certain size before the writing becomes illegible.  More overlap between circles represents my estimate of greater communication and coordination between the groups. Sometimes I couldn’t overlap groups as much as I’d like due to space limitations and this being a two- rather than a preferred three-dimensional rendering. I’ve inserted dashed circles for what I anticipate to be emerging Islamic State affiliates or new jihadi groups of no particular leaning. I could probably list a dozen other names in the chart but to prevent excessive cluttering I’ve stopped with these names. (Many thanks go to Will McCants for insights on ISIS affiliates, J.M Berger as always for his social media prowess and Aaron Zelin, particularly this year, for further refining my perspective on the emergence of fractures.) For past estimates of  al Qaeda versus the Islamic State, see depictions from February 2014, March 2014, and April 2015.

What’s changed in two-and-a-half years? What should we think of jihad’s winding path?

Remarkable Speed Of Change. The most remarkable aspect of jihad’s last five years has been the speed with which things have changed. The end of the Afghan Mujahideen to al Qaeda’s zenith on September 11, 2001 took a decade. Al Qaeda’s downward spiral in Iraq began in 2008 and the Islamic State’s rise began in 2013 –i.e., half the time of the previous generation. ISIS broke from al Qaeda and overtook them in roughly eighteen months and has now receded dramatically in nearly the same amount of time–a rise and fall occurring in a little over three years. Each foreign fighter mobilization and outflow over the last thirty years has been larger and faster than the one before it. Advances in communication and transportation have made each generation’s radicalization, recruitment and mobilization easier and subsequently faster. This trend, should it continue, points to a new wave of jihad arising fairly quickly.

Volume Of Fighters And Groups. The Syrian conflict generated the largest foreign fighter wave in history. Despite the Islamic State’s reckless consumption of its foreign manpower, today and through the near-term, there will be more jihadi foreign fighters scattered around the world than at any point in history. Compared to previous generations of jihadis, survivors of Syria and Iraq’s battlefields will be better trained, more experienced, better connected physically and virtually, and have greater opportunities amongst numerous weak and failing states. The world should prepare for, and expect, years of jihadi violence emanating from this most recent foreign fighter mobilization.

Don’t mistake dispersion for strength. Scary maps showing the spread of jihad have been a favorite scare tactic of governments and the counterterrorism punditry for a decade. Similar to al Qaeda’s transition to affiliates beginning around 2004, the Islamic State’s members, supporters and re-branded followers have now spread from Morocco to the Philippines. Unmet jihadi dispersion can equate to resilience, but should not be confused with strength. With the exception of a declining emirate in Libya and challenged affiliates in Yemen and Afghanistan, the Islamic State’s affiliates operate largely as small terrorist groups working to establish their base of operations and local popular support. Likewise, al Qaeda’s affiliates have yet to regain their previous heights–e.g., al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) of 2011, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) of 2012, and al Shabaab of 2013. Affiliates of either stripe, as of yet, lack the projection power and global appeal of their headquarters. Don’t make what are mostly molehills into mountains just yet; this is particularly the case when there remain sufficient unconventional warfare methods to encourage their destructive competition.

Scale of jihad matters more than it’s spread. Dispersion should bring concern when one or more affiliates begin to scale in size. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) during al Qaeda Central’s decline (2009 – 2012) and the Islamic State since taking Mosul demonstrate what Clauset and Gleditsch revealed in their study “The Developmental Dynamics of Terrorist Organizations” that the larger a terrorist group grows the greater number, pace and size of terrorist attacks they can execute.

Al Qaeda’s growth from 1993 to 2001 allowed them to increase the pace, complexity, and lethality of their plots. The swelling of the Islamic State’s ranks and the grabbing of turf in Syria and Iraq enabled the creation of operational space for developing external operations branches and the manpower to reach Western targets. Their growth brought the recent unprecedented violence of their Ramadan offensive–i.e., directed and networked attacks every day in a new country creating a wave of cascading terrorism perpetrated by inspired followers. The lesson for the West: ignoring jihadi group growth will lead to a terrorism cancer nearly impossible to rein in.

Fracturing and Competition. Despite recent fear mongering over the Islamic State’s rise or al Qaeda’s comeback, the global jihad as a whole has more fracturing and infighting than any time in its history. The Islamic State versus al Qaeda rivalry remains but is likely secondary to the generational and resource competition occurring across many affiliates. Splinters have erupted in Jabhat al-Nusra/Fateh al-Sham (Syria), Boko Haram (Nigeria), al Shabaab (Somalia), and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU – AFPAK) in just the past few months. Characterizations of global jihad as unipolar or even bipolar should be met with skepticism–the sands have never shifted so much or so quickly. Remember, jihadis are violent young men, routinely narcissistic, highly egotistical, often jealous of each other, and particularly rash. Analysts should beware imprinting order on what is largely chaos.

What might we think of today’s jihadi terrorism landscape moving forward? 

The al Qaeda versus Islamic State debate is nothing more than a silly DC Beltway sideshow. Three years ago, pundits and analysts widely refuted the notion of an al Qaeda break up. Two years ago, I participated in a debate regarding “al Qaeda’s grand strategy” while the Islamic State was overtaking their terrorist forefathers by seizing Mosul and declaring a caliphate. Despite these analytical surprises, similar prophesying about jihad’s future direction has returned. Some analysts again trumpet a resurgent al Qaeda, a claim made by an analyst every year since the 9/11 attacks, or they have begun parallel theorizing about the Islamic State’s grand strategy. Luckily for pundits, no one keeps score in the counterterrorism fear factory where production is rewarded over performance.

The “al Qaeda versus Islamic State” dichotomy is a hollow paradigm, reflective of analytical status quo bias from those unable or unwilling to envision a future of jihadism different from what has been seen in the past. While “al Qaeda” or “ISIS” may be convenient for communicating media narratives, today’s vast jihadi landscape cannot be accurately characterized by the names of two groups who are past their primes and that have, at best, limited ability to control their adherents. However, this paradigm will continue in the near term because….

Right now, we know less, proportionally, about what’s going on in jihad than anytime since September 11, 2001. Never have counterterrorism analysts and pundits had so much to cover and so little time and ability to do so. Today, jihadi ranks have expanded widely across three continents and they communicate in dozens of languages. With the exception of a couple of open source outlets and academic think tanks, no one can track the endless string of al Qaeda and Islamic State “Number 2’s” killed by airstrikes. The rapid, successive deaths of leaders in nearly all jihadi groups worldwide has created a chaotic jihadi stew where younger, more violent emerging leaders strike out seeking to raise both their own stature and that of their group locally.

Successfully anticipating jihad’s divergence will require tens or even hundreds of analysts equipped with advanced degrees, language skills, and field experience tapped into a blend of human and technical sources. Luckily, we have that! It’s called the U.S. intelligence community. Moving forward, Western intelligence services will be positioned to put together the global picture.

Jihadis have gone local and academics and analysts should as well. To understand jihad’s local flavor moving forward, look to journalists (like here and here) and academics (here’s one) doing true field research, in-person interviews and reporting rather than those relying heavily on social media personas of dubious access and reliability.

Connections Mean Less, Intentions Mean More. A decade ago, and even in recent years, al Qaeda connections were used to characterize perpetrators or groups. But terrorist connections mean little in the wake of the Islamic State’s rise and the unending battle in Syria. Tens of thousands of foreign fighters from Africa through Asia have fought with al Qaeda last decade or the Islamic State this decade. Every Arab male between 18 and 26 years of age is now more likely than not to have a connection in some form to a person that fought with either or both terrorist group. Even recent inspired terrorist plots lacking any physical connection to al Qaeda or the Islamic State have surfaced links to both groups (here and here). Moving forward, analyses must wade past connections to examine the intentions of jihadis and their groups. Do they seek to target the West? If not, then add them to the long list of those needing monitoring but too numerous to thoroughly vet simply because “they are connected to a guy on Twitter who is connected to a guy who might be in the Islamic State”.

The next five years of jihad will look more like the 1990s than the 2000s. Figure 10 demonstrates the diffusion of jihad. I can’t properly account for all of the groups rising and falling, shifting between networks while paving their own local agendas. With the Islamic State’s decline, and al Qaeda’s limited reach, emerging groups powered by returning foreign fighters will converge and diverge largely based on regional and local forces. Instead of the al Qaeda versus Islamic State paradigm currently being put forth, the multipolar jihadi landscape of the 1990s leading to al Qaeda’s rise provides a more appropriate historical framework for anticipating future jihadi manifestations.

Prior to the September 11 attacks, many different Sunni terrorist groups with or without connections to al Qaeda pursued their own agendas competing for recruits, resources and influence amongst many different countries. This setting appears more reflective of the diffuse set of jihadis pursuing a range of ideological positions and local agendas in the near-term. Those groups that scale the largest and the quickest amongst this chaotic stew will be of the greatest concern moving forward.

Final Note

Unless something changes, Figure 10, will be my last al Qaeda versus Islamic State bubble chart. Surely my comments above have pointed to my own hypocrisy and underlying belief–there are too many actors, locations and competing interests to characterize jihad in a simple bipolar chart. Last decades’ theorizing should remind us how unlikely anyone will be to accurately estimate where, when, and how jihad’s next wave will emerge. Rather than focus on groups and fighters, it will be long-run forces that forge where jihad will revive and thrive next. Rest assured, after the Islamic State’s foreign fighter mobilization their surviving legions will unleash violence again somewhere soon.

Al Qaeda versus the Islamic State: a short video

Watch this short movie to see how the al Qaeda versus Islamic State estimates have changed in the past two-and-a-half years.

About the author:
Clint Watts is a Robert A. Fox Fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Program on the Middle East as well as a Senior Fellow with its Program on National Security. He serves the President of Miburo Solutions, Inc. Watts’ research focuses on analyzing transnational threat groups operating in local environments on a global scale. Before starting Miburo Solutions, he served as a U.S. Army infantry officer, a FBI Special Agent on a Joint Terrorism Task Force, and as the Executive Officer of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (CTC).

Source:
This article was published by FPRI

A new Pew Research Center survey on religious liberty found that the public is split on the question of whether businesses that provide wedding services should be able to refuse same-sex couples if the owner has religious objections: 48% are in agreement and 49% are not. Catholics believe, by a margin of 54% to 43%, that businesses should be required to provide services to gay couples.

Other surveys provide a different outcome. Does this mean the Pew survey is flawed? No. It means that the wording of the question strongly influences the respondent’s answer. What also matters is whether self-identification is an accurate measure of reality.

For example, last December an AP and NORC Center for Public Affairs Research survey found that 82% of Americans said religious liberty protections were important to Christians. Similarly, 8 in 10 Americans said that it was very or extremely important for people like themselves to be allowed to practice their religion freely.

So when Americans are asked about their support for religious liberty in general—when there is no competing value they are asked to weigh—their commitment shines through. But in the real world, there is usually a conflict between rights.

Last fall, the Catholic League commissioned Kellyanne Conway of The Polling Company to survey Catholics on a range of issues, one of them being religious liberty. Catholics were asked, “Do you agree or disagree that private businesses with religious objections should be forced to provide services that violate their beliefs?” By a margin of 63% to 30%, they opposed compelling private businesses to provide services that violate their religious beliefs.

What about when the question is narrowed to wedding-related businesses? It makes no difference: 62% say it is mostly unfair and 29% say it is fair.

How can these differences be explained? Americans prize religious liberty but they also support equal treatment. When these values conflict, much depends on whether the respondent is being asked to defend government coercion or support equal treatment: the former is not popular, but the latter is.

In the Catholic League survey, we disaggregated on the basis of several criteria, among them being ideology. For example, when respondents were asked about whether businesses should be required to provide health coverage that violates their religious beliefs, Catholics in general took the side of the owner. There was one segment that favored coercion: they were identified as being the most liberal Catholics in the sample.

We know from other surveys that the most liberal Catholics are also the most likely to be non-practicing. Yet the Pew survey treated them as equals—no attempt was made to distinguish them from others. Therefore, it is likely that if non-practicing Catholics were factored out of the Pew survey, Catholics would appear less liberal on this issue.

Should non-practicing Catholics be included in samples of the Catholic population? Should Americans who identify themselves as vegetarian be included in a survey of vegetarians even if they occasionally eat steaks or hot dogs? It depends on whether self-identification is seen as a satisfactory measure of reality. To put it another way, if a man has male genitals, is he a woman because he says he is?

Postmodern sages who think truth is a myth are entitled to live in their world of make believe, but they are not entitled to our respect. Reality may be interpreted differently, but not all interpretations are equally valid.

Thanks to the rather low profile of the negotiations, the EU and Canada have been able to successfully conclude The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), which is now slated to be formally signed on October 18. The process would then move from EU institutions onto EU national parliaments, which have to ratify it unanimously. However, don’t let this apparent calm fool you: CETA is by no means a tame free trade agreement to be pored over by lawyers and their ilk. On the contrary, the deal has received considerable flack from environmental groups and consumer organizations who likened it to a “wolf in sheep’s clothing” and accused the EU of forcing the most controversial aspects of the now-dead TTIP through the backdoor.

Indeed, while the 1598-page agreement is a hefty read even for the most seasoned lawyer, the main problem of the deal is the controversial Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism that led to the original shelving of the TTIP. The special court where private companies can challenge unwanted national legislation survived, and received a cosmetic makeover for CETA – it is now called the Investment Court System (ICS).

While ICS makes a pretense at greater transparency with the addition of an appeals courts, the same pro-corporate bias that incensed the European public about TTIP is still there: the secrecy of the tribunals, the supremacy of their decisions over national law, and the continued ability for foreign investors to sue European governments for damages resulting from a change in the regulatory environment.

Besides the ethically dubious right to sue governments for passing laws in the public interest, there is also the fact that no such privilege is extended to citizens who are affected by the operations of a private company. Given that Europe and Canada have some of the best legal systems in the world, this begs the question: why do corporations need their own special tribunals to hear their cases? Some have pointed out that arbiters, who are nominated by the parties and are handsomely remunerated for each case, have an interest to find in favor of the litigant as a way of locking in more contracts in the future. What’s more, the fact that arbiters are usually corporate lawyers, taking turns between hearing cases and defending litigators is an even more glaring conflict of interest.

And it’s not just activists who are riled up by the wider implications of the ICS. Germany’s biggest association of public judges and prosecutors, representing some 15,000 judges condemned the ICS mechanism on the grounds that it doesn’t “meet the minimum standards for judicial office”. Similarly, the European Association of Judges expressed “serious reservations” about the EU’s competence to even establish such a court system in the first place.

Never mind the standard defense put forward by private companies – that it safeguards their assets in third countries and leads to greater investment and jobs – the fact is that ISDS leads to “regulatory chill” by forcing policymakers to think twice before passing stricter regulations, whether environmental or fiscal. Even if the ICS is billed as a new and improved system, the evidence is shaky.

ICS will do nothing, for instance, to stop the likes of Vattenfall, the Swedish nuclear energy company from suing the German government as it is doing now for promising to phase out nuclear energy by 2022, even though this decision was taken by a democratic government in the interests of its citizen’s health and safety. Were Germany to lose the suit, Berlin would have to shell out nearly $5 billion of taxpayer money to compensate the company. And although the German government is also fighting lawsuits from domestic energy companies for the same reason, it is only Vattenfall who has the right to make its case using this arbitration method. This unjustly preferential treatment of foreign companies will still be a factor under the new ICS.

What’s more, the replacement of ISDS with the ICS is not going to stop the kind of unscrupulous litigation seen in the case of Veolia versus Lithuania, where the former is claiming $100 million in damages after Vilnius decided against renewing a contract with the French company. Investigators found that Veolia deceitfully overcharged customers for years, generating an unlawful profit of  €24 million between 2012 and 2015 by including consultancy services and other unrelated operation in the prices charged consumers for heating. And instead of paying fines, Veolia could stand to make even more money thanks to the legal remedies offered by ISDS.

And if anyone thought that CETA is harmless because it excludes American companies from the deal and stops them from suing European countries, they would be sorely mistaken. American companies would still be able to initiate litigation through their Canadian subsidiaries. There is precedent for this too after Lone Pine Resources, a Canadian company, sued its own government through an American subsidiary for calling for a moratorium on fracking in Quebec.

Let it be stated clearly: opposition to TTIP and CETA does not equal opposition to trade. Europeans don’t need to be convinced that free trade is a win-win for all involved. This understanding forms the very basis of the common market. However, freer trade is not an objective in and of itself for Europeans. Unlike the US, Europe is asking for quality trade, that is, trade that respects Europe’s environmental standards, labor rights, public health care, and social safety net. This is the purpose of regulation, to serve the public interest. Trade treaties like CETA are devised to serve private interests, and mechanisms like ICS are only going to further institutionalize corporate rapaciousness. It is not too late for it to be stopped.

*Carrie Winters is a British environmental research officer currently residing in Singapore with extensive knowledge of the Southeast Asia region.

Saudi Arabia has expressed “great concern” and warned of “serious unintended consequences”, following the US Congress’s decision to overrule President Obama and push through a law allowing legal action against the kingdom over the September 11 attacks.

Some analysts have speculated that Riyadh could retaliate by curbing trade with the US or restricting cooperation on security, a crucial relationship for US efforts in Arab conflicts.

The Saudi riyal fell against the US dollar in the forward foreign exchange market on Thursday after the bill was passed, prompting a drop in dollar demand in Riyadh.

The law grants an exception to the legal principle of sovereign immunity in cases of “terrorism” on US soil, clearing the way for lawsuits by the families of victims of the attacks seeking damages from the Saudi government.

Riyadh denies longstanding suspicions that it backed the hijackers who attacked the United States in 2001. Fifteen of the 19 hijackers were Saudi nationals.

Original article

Since the last IEA in-depth review in 2009, Turkey has made significant progress in reforming its energy sector. Completing the reforms will allow Turkey to tap into its renewable and energy efficiency potentials, latest IEA report says.

With rising energy demand, increasing oil and gas imports, and an energy mix largely relying on fossil fuels, Turkey has a unique opportunity to tap into renewable energies, save energy and diversify its fuel mix, according to the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) latest survey of Turkey’s energy policies.

In its review, Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Turkey 2016 Review, the IEA called on the government to swiftly adopt an energy efficiency programme and create a one-stop-shop for the deployment of renewable energy in the country.

Turkey’s energy sector has attracted substantial interest in the investor’s community thanks to privatisation and electricity market reforms. The country should continue down this path and reform its energy markets. During the last decade, electricity market reforms have advanced. The liberalisation and privatisation of electricity generation and distribution triggered a private investment boom (generating capacity doubled between 2007 and 2014) and secured energy access for its population.

“To attract more investments, the liberalisation of the energy markets needs to progress further,” said Fatih Birol, the IEA Executive Director.

The report highlighted three avenues for reform: strengthening the independence of the system operators and regulatory authorities; abolishing market distortions in favour of market pricing; and continuing to invest in more flexible and modern gas and electricity infrastructure. These pillars are critical for securing stable and reliable electrical power supplies and ensuring sustainable economic growth, and ensuring much needed diversification, according to the IEA.

Turkey has a unique geographical location and is an important energy player in its region. The country’s regional integration is advancing, thanks to the construction of the Transanatolian Natural Gas Pipeline and the connection to the European electricity grid (ENTSO-E) with the Turkish Transmission System Operator for Electricity (TEİAŞ) becoming an observer of ENTSO-E. “Turkey’s contribution is vital for regional and European energy security,” Dr. Birol said.

With the drop in gas prices and the rise in the global LNG trade, the IEA also sees an important opportunity for Turkey to reform its natural gas market. Natural gas accounts for 40% of Turkey’s electricity generation; and gas demand has more than doubled in one decade, outpacing electricity growth. The review highlights the need for competition, diversification and investments in the gas infrastructure, given Turkey’s proximity to major resources and private sector interest.

One major issue to be addressed, however, is the country’s high import dependency on oil and gas and the fast increase in carbon dioxide emissions, which have more than doubled since 1990. Commendably, Turkey has for the first time set an emission reduction goal.

However, the plan to double coal-fired electricity supply by 2019 will require further investment in clean coal technologies and the swift refurbishment of old plants to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and curb air pollution in Turkey. “With more energy efficiency and renewable energy, cleaner coal and nuclear can be part of a secure and low carbon mix, but the legal frameworks must be put in place to ensure high standards of environmental performance and safety,” said Dr. Birol.

The report encourages the government to build on the Vision 2023 and set out a longer term energy policy agenda up to 2030 to guide private energy investments. Clear and long-term targets for renewables and energy efficiency, faster permitting procedures and enhanced grid integration rules can ensure long-term sustainable economic growth in Turkey.

You may need to cancel your weekend plans. Apparently, a rare ‘black moon’ is set to appear on Friday, and is, according to some, a sign that the end of the world is nigh.

The black moon will cloak the Western Hemisphere in darkness on Friday and could be linked to the apocalypse.

Conspiracy theorists are worried that after a “ring of fire” solar eclipse was witnessed on September 1, during which the moon lined up with the Earth and the sun above Africa, and now a black moon only weeks later, this could mean we’re done for.

The primary source for this thinking is the Bible’s numerous references to the moon, sun and stars, particularly Luke 21:25-26, which states “there shall be signs in the sun, and in the moon, and in the stars” which will result in “men’s hearts failing them for fear.”

One anonymous Facebook user noted how these are “signs are letting us know that Jesus is soon coming,” according to the Express. “We are approaching the end of our world and the end of life on Earth for all human being. Every day, we have to come closer to our savior Jesus Christ. For none can escape for what is coming for the Earth,” the conspiracy theorist wrote.

A black moon occurs when two new moons happen in one month, with the second moon basically invisible as the illuminated side is facing away from Earth. A blue moon is the opposite, when two full moons happen in the same month.

The last black moon happened in March 2014 and it won’t happen again in the Western Hemisphere until July 2019.

Whether this black moon is a sign that the end is nigh or not, the dark sky on September 30 will make for excellent stargazing conditions.

By Angshuman Choudhury*

On 29 September 2016, the Indian Army’s Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) announced that India had conducted overnight pre-emptive ‘surgical strikes’ against terrorist targets along its Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan. Immediately afterwards, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif rebuffed the claims, stating that the Pakistan Army faced unprovoked small arms firing from the Indian side, following which it responded symmetrically, losing two of its soldiers. This sudden escalation of tensions comes ten days after the terror attack in Uri, Jammu & Kashmir, India.

In light of the limited details provided by the DGMO and the disjointed media narrative, it would be useful to discuss the feasibility of a cross-LoC counter-insurgency operation for the Indian armed forces.

Several media reports claim that the targets were located 500 metres to 2 kilometres inside Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), in four sectors beyond the LoC. However, what is known from the DGMO’s statement is that the Indian Army hit specific militant positions or ‘launchpads’ that were placed ‘along’ the LoC. Thus, it remains unclear whether the Indian forces did in fact enter territory controlled by Pakistan or simply fired from the back foot. If it was indeed a ‘surgical strike’ then strategic cross-LoC force deployment becomes inevitable so as to maintain precision, stealth, and overall strike efficacy.

A surgical strike across the LoC by the Special Forces would demand both detailed planning and substantial pre-assault surveillance and reconnaissance. The critical targets and their immediate surroundings would have had to be pinpointed and assessed before the operation. It would be essential to determine optimal points for approach, a viable exit strategy, Pakistani military positions and locations of other non-critical infrastructure. This would have to be done to ensure maximum precision and stealth – especially in a non-conventional conflict theatre featuring an obscure mix of state and sub-state aggressors.

Given the non-uniformity and hostility of the terrain along the four sectors, reconnaissance for an offensive operation becomes a challenging and time-consuming task. Ideally, such a situation would warrant a strategic fusion of human intelligence (HUMINT), communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and unmanned aerial reconnaissance. A surgical strike based on uncorroborated or un-specific intelligence would make the operation vulnerable to easy detection and subsequent retaliation by belligerents. Yet, the qualitative nature and degree of India’s intelligence-gathering approach remains unknown.

Some reports suggest the use of helicopters and paratroopers in the operation – components that further broaden the planning process. While usage of helicopters for airdrop of paratroopers ‘at’ the LoC is a possibility, any offensive air assault design inside POK would have had to factor in the Pakistan Army’s air defence capabilities. In this regard, the assumption that India would use attack helicopters – most likely Mi-17s or Mi-35s – is improbable, even for airdrops. These helicopters are very loud; nullifying the stealth advantage crucial for a night-time surprise assault. But, if it did so, it could imply that reconnaissance was strong enough to keep the close air support component of the operation outside the range of Pakistan’s air defence systems.

Additionally, the scarce details provided by the DGMO indicate limited operational deployment (assuming the surgical strike did happen). The categorical statement that the Indian Army has no plans to carry out similar strikes in the near future implies that India does not want any serious escalation of conflict across the border. The strike was a one-time, highly specific counter-terrorist operation within India’s ‘strategic restraint’ doctrine and is not intended to trigger a broader mobilisation of troops on either side of the LoC. Simultaneously, it is aimed at displaying India’s capability to hit specific targets in and around the LoC at will. Contrary to what many analysts have argued, this surgical strike does not seem to fall within India’s ‘Cold Start’ doctrine.

Despite numerous comparisons being made to 2015’s counter-insurgency operation across the India-Myanmar border against NSCN (K)-led insurgents, the political and strategic context of the India-Pakistan LoC remains distinctive. In Myanmar, India had the support – or at least the assured neutrality – of the foreign government. The hot pursuit operation was even reportedly based on intelligence inputs provided by Myanmar’s military. This is not the case in India’s western frontier, where New Delhi would have had to rely on unilateral intelligence covering both militant and military positions inside POK. Furthermore, unlike POK, force deployment is heavily limited in Myanmar’s north-western sector, permitting a more comprehensive assault design.

At this point, it is difficult to determine the nature of targets India might have hit. The DGMO said that along with the terrorists, Indian forces also inflicted “massive casualties” to “those providing support” to primary terrorist targets. The details of these secondary targets remain unclear. Moreover, despite the affirmative statements made by both governments, the body count on either side is still doubtful. Neither army would want to divulge details that could galvanise public opinion and force either India or Pakistan into a war footing.

Thus, although the public announcement of a covert surgical strike at the LoC by the Indian Army is a significant development in itself, the scale of the operation remains dubious. The most critical of all the sketchy details available in the public domain is whether the Indian forces actually crossed the LoC – something New Delhi has not claimed to have attempted in decades. The Indian government is expected to divulge more details in the coming days, which would correspondingly shape the future threat scenario along the volatile India-Pakistan border in Kashmir and elsewhere.

* Angshuman Choudhury
Researcher, SEARP, IPCS
Email: angshuman.choudhury@ipcs.org

By John R. Haines*

You, sir, have the honor of adding a new vice to the military catalogue and the reason, perhaps, why the  invention was reserved for you is because no general  before was mean enough even to think of it.”    – Thomas Paine to General William Howe, March 1778

“An ounce of deception is worth a 240-pound tackle.” – Princeton Coach Jake McCandless

(FPRI) — Deception “is a two-faced problem.”[1] That aphorism—worthy of Yogi Berra—is instead from a now-declassified Central Intelligence Agency monograph written in the early 1970s. One must be capable of deception, its authors wrote, and at the same time, understand “what the enemy’s deception capabilities may be and what deception he may be practicing at the moment.”[2]

The intent of Russian strategic deception (strategicheskaya maskirovka) is to alter a target population’s perception of reality in the interest of advancing some strategic objective or set of objectives. One Russian deception technique is disinformation (dezinformatsiya), which includes intentionally misrepresenting events. [3]

Strategic deception has been on full display in Ukraine. In March 2014, the Polish news portal Gazeta reported that Vladimir Zhirinovsky, deputy chairman of Russia’s State Duma,[4] called for Poland, Hungary and Romania to join with Russia in partitioning Ukraine.[5] “[N]ow is the time to take back the land,” Mr. Zhirinovsky said, referring to Ukraine’s Lutsk, Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Rivne regions as rightly belonging to Poland, along with its Zakarpattia (to Hungary) and Chernivtsi (to Romania) regions. A few days later, Kresy[6]—a rightwing Polish news portal—republished an earlier report from the Russian tabloid Komsomol’skaya Pravda in which Mr. Zhirinovsky forcefully disavowed the Polish Foreign Ministry’s claim that he repeated these demands in an official letter. Mr. Zhirinovsky insisted his message was this:

It was the idea that perhaps the Polish people might want to hold a referendum in the regions bordering Ukraine and express their view on the question of annexing territories that historically belonged to them . . . By the way, Romania has many times raised the issue of returning the Chernivtsi region, and Hungarians have from time to time raised the question of Transcarpathia and Uzhgorod, where the people speak Hungarian . . . [7]

Photographs are potent disinformation instruments, especially when used to reinforce a larger disinformation narrative. An image can lend credibility to a wholly fictitious narrative. This photograph below was published on the Russian language news portal Lenta under the headline “Gagauzi ask Poroshenko for an autonomous territory within the Odessa region” (Gagauzy poprosili Poroshenko o sozdanii avtonomii v Odesskoy oblasti).[8]

Photograph of Petro Poroshenko used as a part of Russia’s disinformation narrative (Source: Lenta.ru)

The image here (right)—the location is not Ukraine but neighboring Moldova (it is the People’s Assembly building in Comrat)—is of no consequence other than to validate a fabricated disinformation narrative. The Lenta report—and similar ones published the same day in Vzglyad[9] and Korrespondent[10]—claimed ethnic Gagauzi were demanding an autonomous enclave in Ukraine, echoing earlier purported demands[11] (also false) by ethnic Bulgarians and Romanians. It was part of a larger Russian disinformation narrative (discussed in detail below) alleging that Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko acceded to Crimean Tatar demands for an autonomous enclave in Ukraine’s Kherson region. The disinformation narrative was designed to support Russia’s objective of a federal Ukraine, one in which pro-Russia eastern Ukraine was largely autonomous of the central government in Kyiv.

Another favored Russian tactic is to alter a photograph in some way, say, to isolate one ethnic group or to provoke inter-ethnic friction. Such a forged photograph was used to advance Mr. Zhirinovsky’s revanche appeal in Ukraine’s western borderlands. Several months after his inflammatory suggestion to partition Ukraine, Kresy published this photograph of an actual pro-Ukraine rally in Wroclaw.[12] The banner’s wording had been altered to read “Stepan Bandera—Cursed Soldier:”

An example of a photograph doctored by Russia in an attempt to anger a specific ethnic group (Source: Niezależna.pl)

The phrase “Cursed Soldiers” (Żołnierz Wykelty) refers to post-war anti-communist resistance fighters. As Katri Pynnöniemi & András Rácz wrote in their excellent study of Russian deception in Ukraine, “The application of the term, with its implication of heroic status, to the leader of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which carried out the mass murder of the Polish population in Western Ukraine in 1943-1944, would be seen as sacrilegious in Poland.”[13]

Original photograph of the rally before being doctored by Kresy (Source: Niezależna.pl)

The photograph (right) —Niezależna.pl captured a screenshot from the Kresy Facebook page before it was hastily removed[14]—was a forgery, clearly intended to provoke Polish backlash. Here is the genuine photograph in which the banner reads, “Without a free Ukraine there is no free Poland.”

There is Polish territory that Germany may consider historically belongs to them, just as Poland itself does in Ukraine, and Russia does in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine.[16]

The Russian news portal Russkaya vesna (which itself has been accused of publishing doctored photographs[17]) republished Mr. Koloko’s Kresny commentary under the headline “Putin knows more about historic Polish lands than the Poles.”[18]

British Hybrid Warfare against America

Amidst the American War for Independence, the British unleashed what might today be called a hybrid warfare attack. Their method, wrote Murray Teigh Bloom, “consisted of the preparation and distribution of actual counterfeits of the American paper money . . . and the issuance of propaganda as to the excellent quality and enormous quantity of counterfeits in circulation.” Was it effective? Benjamin Franklin certainly thought so:

[It] operated considerably by depreciating the whole mass, first, by the vast additional quantity, and next by the uncertainty in distinguishing the true from the false; and the depreciation was a loss to all and the ruin of many.[19]

The British employed a simple method to insulate themselves from this effect: no Continental currency, whether genuine or counterfeit, was permitted to circulate in areas occupied by British forces. They were not, however, above using counterfeit currency in the ordinary course of business. The departure of British troops following their surrender at Saratoga in October 1777 was delayed because of a dispute over British use of counterfeit Continental currency to purchase provisions for American prisoners held at the fort.

Modern history is replete with similar examples. Nazi Germany’s Unternehmen Bernhard—named for its operational leader, SS Sturmbannführer Bernhard Krüger—sought to destabilize the British economy with counterfeit currency. A team of counterfeiters selected from inmates at the Sachsenhausen concentration camp (and later, Auschwitz) produced some £134 million in forged banknotes. When the first Bernhard banknotes surfaced in England in September 1942, they were of such high quality that the Bank of England judged them to be genuine.

Just as currency counterfeiting is a longstanding tool of economic warfare, so, too, forged documents are integral to intelligence and counterintelligence operations. The simplest are forged passports[20] and identification documents (like those produced by Bernhard and its predecessor, Andreas). For the Soviet Union, the emphasis on clandestine and deep-cover activities made documentation a matter of prime importance. Soviet foreign intelligence devoted much effort to document forgery starting in the early 1930s when they operated documentation units in Moscow, Berlin, and the United States.[21]

Beyond that, more sophisticated forged and false documents were a central instrument of Soviet psychological warfare operations. These sometimes involved the use of an isolated document. In July 1958, Czechoslovakia’s 2-Správa[22] forged an entire issue of the exile newspaper Czech Word (České slovo) and mailed it to the newspaper’s five thousand subscribers (an estimated one-tenth of which were later smuggled into Czechoslovakia and circulated covertly). The forged issue announced the newspaper was ceasing publication because its editors were disillusioned with the West. The false story was propagated first by quoting it in the official Czech Community Party (Komunistická strana Československa or KSČ) newspaper Rudé právo and in Party newspapers in Austria and Luxembourg. It subsequently was reprinted as far afield as Chicago’s Czech American National Alliance newspaper Free Czechoslovakia (Svobodné Československo), which tended to follow the KSČ propaganda line.[23] The scheme exemplified the isolated use of a false document, in one rather breathless description, as “sniper shots at individual important targets.”[24]

The United States is no stranger to trafficking in counterfeit and false documents. Consider this from a now-declassified 1943 secret directive signed by William J. Donavan:

The Office of Strategic Services is responsible for the execution of all forms of morale subversion by diverse means including. . . False rumors, ‘freedom stations’, false leaflets and false documents. . . [25]

Deception, Destruction, Disruption

“Our friends in Moscow call it
‘dezinformatsiya.’ Our enemies in America
call it ‘active measures,’ and I, dear friends,
call it ‘my favorite pastime.’”[26]
                                                  – Colonel Rolf Wagenbreth

Deception using counterfeit currency or forged documents can serve two objectives. One is economic gain derived from passing counterfeit currency or selling forged documents. It is an obvious, but nonetheless significant motivator. A lucrative trade in false identification papers and passports thrives in Europe today, thanks in no small part to the influx of hundreds of thousands of undocumented persons and organized crime networks with readymade solutions.[27]

The second objective is not economic, but instead, political. The effect may be destructive—devastating the economy through an influx of counterfeit currency—or disruptive—discrediting émigré opposition groups through false information and forged documents. Or it may be both. Beyond its hyperinflationary effect, counterfeit currency’s mechanism is clear: if the forger makes it known that some currency in circulation is counterfeit, then the authenticity of all currency is called into question. The effect is likewise when one intersperses false text into the body of an otherwise genuine document, or when a false document is interspersed in a batch of genuine ones. Even a practiced eye may find it challenging to separate the true from the false with certainty.

A highly effective disruption method is to use genuine text or documents to mask false text or documents. The objective of interspersing false text or documents within genuine text or document batches is to make the adulterated appear credible.

[T]he USSR is not engaged constantly in an active, positive deception program designed totally to mislead us as to its intentions and objectives. To do so would be counterproductive to its own interests, and moreover would undermine the effectiveness of a positive deception program when it would be important that we accept it. A prerequisite for effective deception is to establish some degree of credibility.[28] [Emphasis added]

Another variation is to insert ostensibly false text to adulterate—and so intentionally discredit—an otherwise genuine document (or likewise, an ostensibly false document into a batch of genuine documents). Such actions are covert rather than clandestine since a clandestine action, if properly conducted, remains totally concealed, which would in this instance be self-defeating.

False information—especially in the form of fraudulent “official” documents and papers—is a potent disruptor. Just as the belief that some currency may be counterfeit undercuts faith in all currency, so, too, the belief that some documents (or some parts of some documents) are forgeries intentionally and effectively corrodes the credibility of all similar documents. This effect can be more debilitating when the target is intelligence professionals rather than lay readers.

Alertness to deception presumably prompts a more careful and systematic review of the evidence. But anticipation of deception also leads the analyst to be more skeptical of all of the evidence, and to the extent that evidence is deemed unreliable, the analyst’s preconceptions must play a greater role in determining which evidence to believe. This leads to a paradox: The more alert we are to deception, the more likely we are to be deceived.[29]

Disruption entails a greater degree of freedom in counterintelligence operations than mere deception. Ostensible forgeries interspersed within a larger document batch are a well-honed technique. Circulating fake and fraudulent documents, or causing false information to be published in legitimate outlets, is useful to provoke others to come forward to challenge the information or to amplify it.  The same applies to fake or quasi-fake organizations.

The Fraudulent Instruments of Information War

“It being the instrument with which we
combatted our enemies, they resolved to
deprive us of the use of it; and the most
effective means they could contrive was to
counterfeit it.”
                                                  -Benjamin Franklin[30]

“The free flow of information . . . the public’s right to know is essential to a country of, by and for the people.”[31] That fundamentally American postulate maintains that information has an instrumental value—an informed electorate—as well as a non-instrumental one. Information is instrumental because it enables a desired end, which in this case is self-governance. Its non-instrumental value derives from its instrumental one. Most Americans prefer democratic processes to non-democratic ones irrespective whether the same end might be achievable with the latter as with the former. Put another way, democracy has intrinsic value, or as John Dewey wrote, it “is a way of personal life.”[32] The political philosopher Elizabeth Anderson summarized it this way: “Even if a dictatorship could give them what they wanted, as the government of Singapore claims it does for its subjects, democratic citizens would prefer to govern themselves.”[33]

That Russian President Vladimir Putin sees it differently is no surprise. Consider this observation made during an October 2014 teleconference:

With the rapid development of electronic media, this domain has assumed great importance and become, perhaps, a formidable weapon with which to manipulate public opinion. Intense information warfare has become a sign of the times, as some nations attempt to establish a monopoly on the truth and to use it to their advantage. . . [34]

It is the perspective that electronic media are means with which to model information in the interest of some social purpose. A Kremlin spokesperson put it this way some years ago:

When the nation mobilizes to achieve some task, that imposes obligations on everyone including the media.[35]

To Mr. Putin, electronic media—acting as an information-vector—is an instrument to control access to information and to determine content. Russian intelligence agencies possess robust means of doing so, from the notorious SORM (Sistema Operativno-Rozysknykh Meropriyatiy) Internet and telecommunications surveillance programs to the Roskomnadzor[36] registries of banned websites (known as the Yedinyy reyestr zapreshchonnykh saytov) and banned information (Yedinyy reyestr saytov s zapreshchonnoy informatsiyey).

The fundamental conflict is whether information is an instrument to inform, or alternately, to influence. Mr. Putin clearly subscribes to the latter. One effective means of exerting influence is what Robert Entman calls framing. He defines that process as “selecting and highlighting some facet of events or issues, and making connections among them so at to promote a certain interpretation.”[37] It is the idea that redefining a situation changes it. One writer uses this illustration:

If Guamians see the return of the US military to their island in 1945 as ‘reoccupation’ rather than ‘liberation’; if they begin to see Japan not as an old enemy of the past but also as one of the big powers behind their present militarization. . . [38]

The use of fake stories is a well-honed tool of Russian disinformation.[39] United States Ambassador John B. Emerson put it this way at a 2015 Berlin conference on the subject:

[T]he Russian government, and the media that it controls, are trying to prevent the publication of information that doesn’t conform to Russia’s aims, and are manipulating the presentation of information to cloak Russia’s actions. The Kremlin’s disinformation campaign goes far beyond controlling its own media. It is aimed at nothing less than presenting a parallel version of reality and disseminating it as if it were news. The Kremlin’s goal is to make people question the value of media at all; to reject the idea of an absolute truth; and to persuade the public that ‘reality’ is relative.[40]

A subgroup of particular interest here is the use of fraudulent electronic documents including e-mails. Adapting Franklin’s aphorism, if electronic information—disseminated via the Internet—is “the instrument with which we confront our enemies,” then false information—in particular, dezinformatsiya electronic documents—exploits the intended instrumental role in order to deceive. The deception need not be long lived to be effective, as a 1983 State Department circular made clear:

Many forgeries aim at the media. Although the fabricators are aware that once a document appears in print the supposed author will deny its authenticity, the Soviets calculate that a denial will never entirely offset the damage from news stories based on the forgery.[41]

The ease and rapidity with which fraudulent electronic documents can be disseminated directly via the Internet make them potent dezinformatsiya instruments. Especially when part of a larger false narrative, fraudulent electronic documents impose a pattern on experience. That is to say, fraudulent electronic documents frame a preexisting narrative that describes observed events. The practice of selectively intertwining fraudulent electronic documents within a narrative explains why such documents—even plainly dubious ones—are such effective instruments of deception. The analogy to counterfeit currency is this. Once the public believes counterfeit banknotes are circulating, two effects will manifest simultaneously. One is that persons disinclined to accept any given banknote as valid will reject all as counterfeit (including genuine ones), stopping economic activity in its tracks. The other is that persons willing to accept a given banknote as valid become unwitting agents in perpetuating the fraud and enable its hyperinflationary impact. This dual effect is why a determined currency counterfeiter can wreak such calamitous economic and social destruction.

Looked at from another perspective, if counterfeit banknotes are known to be in circulation, then it is probable (that is to say, the chance is greater than zero but less than fully certain) that any batch contains both counterfeit and genuine ones. Absent knowing for a fact which is so for a given banknote, both propositions are true at the same time—the banknote can be said (with apologies to Schrödinger) to be counterfeit and at the same time genuine since both are at some level probable and neither is known in the instance to be true (genuine) or false (fraudulent). Therein lies the disruptive effect of making known that counterfeit Continental currency is circulating. It is likewise for information: if one is aware that some information is fraudulent then all information in the moment is fraudulent (including genuine information). Likewise, if one is aware that some information is genuine, then all information in the moment is genuine (including fraudulent information). The practice of counterintelligence exploits this abnegating symmetric quality by purposefully interspersing select information into a social narrative, either to discredit an otherwise valid narrative (by interweaving patently false information) or to validate a fraudulent one (by interweaving genuine documents). There are no absolutes here; everything becomes relative.

A fraudulent electronic document will cause some to reject all documents in a batch because any one may be fraudulent, while others accept the fraudulent document as valid and so perpetuate the fraud. The former destroys confidence in all information, while the other disrupts by circulating fraudulent information. A patently fraudulent electronic document interspersed into an otherwise factual narrative can effectively discredit the narrative. So, too, a fraudulent document can bolster a false narrative by validating it—making it appear valid.

Ukraine in the Crosshairs

The levels of guilefulness at any given point in
time between any two contemporary entities
are apt to be asymmetric.[42]

Let us move from the abstract to the concrete. What appears below is purportedly the text of one electronic document in a hacked e-mail chain. It appears on its face to be a draft decree by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko. A self-declared hacktivist group known as CyberBerkut[43] claimed credit for obtaining the e-mail chain and posted it online in April 2016. The text of the electronic document authorizes the establishment of an autonomous ethnic enclave for Crimean Tatars[44] and Meskhetian Turks[45] “on the territories of Crimea and the Kherson region.”[46]

Document released by the hacktivist group CyberBerkut allegedly pertaining to the creation of an autonomous ethnic enclave for Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks.

According to the document’s text, the presidential decree calls for drastic action. It would acknowledge the Kherson region as “the historic center of the Crimean Tatar people” by formally abolishing the Kherson region and transferring its territory to the new autonomous region. It would “rename the city of Kherson as ‘Giray Khan,’” and “allocate land to resettle 500,000 Crimean Tatars and 200,000 Meskhetian Turks” in the former Kherson region.[47]

Pravda drove home the point home by accompanying its report[48]—published under the provocative headline “Poroshenko gives Kherson away to be torn apart and occupied by Turks” (Poroshenko otdayet Kherson na rasterzaniye i zaseleniye turkami)—with a photograph of Mr. Poroshenko with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan:

Photograph of Mr. Poroshenko with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that accompanied the controversial report about the Kherson region (Source: Pradva.ru)

The referenced territories—one a Russian federal subject, and the other, a Ukrainian province[49]—are shown in the map below.

Map of the Kherson region in reference to Ukraine and Russia (Source: Wikipedia)

The content of electronic documents published by CyberBerkut exemplifies a point (made by Alfred North Whitehead[50] in another context) about imposing a pattern on experience. Two years prior to CyberBerkut publishing online the document in question, the Crimean Tatar Kurultai[51] announced that it was abandoning a planned referendum on self-determination. It would instead petition Kyiv to declare “national-territorial autonomy” (natsional’no-territorial’noy avtonomii). Rustam Minnikhanov, the leader of Russia’s Tatarstan Republic, addressed the Kurultai on Mr. Putin’s behalf[52] while Russian officials blocked representatives of the Kyiv government from attending. Some Kurultai delegates attempted without success to amend the autonomy resolution to specify the enclave “will be a part of Ukraine,” with a majority opting to leave unanswered whether it “will be a part of Ukraine or Russia.”[53] It is notable that Crimeans voted overwhelmingly to join the Russian Federation several days before the Kurultai abandoned its planned autonomy referendum.

Fast-forward from April 2014 to May 2016. A leading Ukraine-based Crimean Tatar activist, Lenur Islyamov,[54] claimed the group was proceeding to establish an autonomous ethnic enclave, this time “on the Ukrainian mainland.”[55] He also claimed the Turkish government was actively supporting a newly organized Crimean Tatar militia.[56] This prompted Vladimir Konstantinov, who chairs the Crimea State Council, to declare Turkey’s actions as “yet another ‘stab in the back’” (udar v spinu).[57]

While Mr. Poroshenko’s government supports the principle of Crimean Tatar territorial autonomy, it is conditioned on the enclave lying within the territory of Crimea. The necessary precondition is that Russia must abandon Crimea and recognize Ukrainian sovereignty over the peninsula.

Proclaiming the establishment of national-territorial autonomy for Crimean Tatars gives Kyiv powerful arguments in its dialogue with the international community. Indeed, in this case, it will allow Kyiv to talk not only about restoring territorial integrity and returning to stable borders, but also about restoring the rights of Crimea’s indigenous people.[58]

The incendiary nature of the electronic document posted by CyberBerkut is clear. If genuine, it indicates Mr. Poroshenko was prepared at the time to accede to demands for an autonomous Crimean Tatar enclave within the Kherson Oblast. And if Mr. Islyamov’s claim of Turkish support is credible, it further meant Mr. Poroshenko was prepared to accept Turkey’s direct interposition in his country’s internal affairs, similar to Turkey’s controversial interposition in nearby Bulgaria.[59] Finally, if the document is genuine, it indicates that Mr. Poroshenko was prepared to abandon his longstanding opposition to the principle of autonomous enclaves. This would be significant given the near certainty that Crimean Tatar autonomy would spur other groups to seek the same, and because autonomous enclaves effectively advance Russia’s hoped-for federalization of Ukraine.

For Kyiv, there are certain risks in taking such steps. Proclaiming [Crimean Tatar] national-territorial autonomy in Crimea could serve as an example for other regions where national minorities are densely clustered. First of all, we are talking about the Transcarpathian region [in western Ukraine] with its ethnic Hungarian community. Some political forces in Hungary maintain Transcarpathia is Hungarian territory. Nationalistic myths about Hungarian Ungvár [the Ukrainian city of Uzhhorod] in some ways compare to Russian Krym—nash [literally: “Crimea-ours!”]. So, too, Chernivtsi, with its ethnic Romanian enclaves, where radical politicians in Bucharest sometimes call for revising Soviet era borders.

In the event national-territorial autonomy is declared for Crimean Tatars, ethnic Hungarian and Romanian communities will likely seek the same, [if] Yanukovych’s infamous law on regional languages is any indicator. [. . . ] After its adoption, local governments in some Transcarpathia districts declared Hungarian to be the regional language. And while less widespread, some Bukovina villages, in Chernivtsi and the Rakhiv region of Transcarpathia, declared Romanian and Moldovan to be the regional language.[60]

The broader geopolitical implications of a Balkanized Ukraine—with ethnic enclave-heavy regions dominating the country’s eastern and western borderlands—are significant.

Ethno-Linguistic & Geographic Ukraine (Sources: (left) Eurasian Geopolitics & (right) United States Central Intelligence Agency)

So it is unsurprising that in early August 2016, Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Information Policy Emine Dzhaparov forcefully denounced “the myth that Crimean Tatars are going to establish an autonomous enclave on the territory of Kherson,” calling it “a ‘trump card’ which the occupiers play almost daily through their agents of influence in the Kherson region.”[61] She “noted Crimean Tatars continue to defend their inalienable right to self-determination in the territory of the Crimea as a part of a unified Ukrainian state.” According to Andrey Gordeev—a political ally of Mr. Poroshenko, who appointed him Kherson’s governor in April—”the Russian government wants to ‘drive a wedge’ between Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians by spreading false information about ethnic conflicts . . . and the creation of an autonomous Crimean Tatar enclave within the Kherson region.”[62]

Russian media relentlessly worked the narrative about an imminent Crimean Tatar enclave. It sought to link Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar leaders to terrorism and to revanchist Turkish territorial ambitions in the northern Black Sea, contemporaneous with CyberBerkut’s release of the purported hacked email chain. “With the active support of Turkey,[63] Crimean Tatars asked Ukraine to allocate land for a Crimean Tatar enclave.” So claimed the Russian tabloid Moskovskiy Komsomolets, asserting in January 2016 that the enclave would become “a base for an ‘Islamic Battalion.’”

They plan to turn the Kherson region’s Heniches’k[64] district into a military base and to establish a volunteer battalion. . . . Crimean Tatars will form the battalion’s core but it will be open to other nationalities. And there is strong suspicion these ‘other nationalities’—in other words, mercenaries from other countries—will account for most of the battalion. So says the vice-premier of the Crimean government Ruslan Balbec,[65] according to whom the battalion’s backbone will be made up of members of the Turkish radical nationalist ‘Grey Wolves’[66] who fled Syria via Turkey, as well as ISIS militants from North Africa and others. Turkey does not even attempt to hide its intention to fund the battalion. That decision was taken at the highest level, after Crimean Tatar leaders met with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, and the head of the Turkish Foreign Ministry.[67]

In April 2016—the same month in which CyberBerkut posted the hacked email chain—Novostnoy Front reported “Poroshenko Gives Kherson Region to Turks and Crimean Tatars.”[68] Later that month, it published a “dispassionate analysis [of] the Crimean Tatar autonomous territory in the Kherson region.”

From a legal point of view, the Constitution of Ukraine does not provide for the creation of these autonomous entities. . . . Talk in the country’s southeast about federalization always evokes hysterical opposition. ‘Ukraine—a unitary state’ is one of their main slogans. As the saying goes, when you can’t, if someone important really wants to, then you can. . . “

Crimean Tatar leaders in Ukraine created a militant unit—the ‘Crimea’ battalion—based in the Kherson’s Heniches’k district. They see it as the embryonic armed force of their autonomous territory. In order to justify its presence, they conducted a terrorist attack on 14 April in the Heniches’k district. As a result, one person died and four were injured. The authorities and media claimed the next day that the perpetrators were ‘Russian agents’. That version is unlikely. It is more likely the terrorist act’s authors were leaders of the blockade of the Crimea. . . They have the most to gain from the April attack.

Russia’s foreign enemies may consider an autonomous Crimean Tatar enclave in the Kherson region as a tool to exert military-political and economic pressure on Crimea. [. . . ] From the perspective of Crimean Tatar leaders and within some Turkish circles, [Crimean Tatar autonomy or statehood] is a necessary prerequisite to an historic rematch to capture Russia’s Black Sea territories.[69]

Nasha versiya added that “Poroshenko is going to settle 200,000 Meskhetian Turks in the Kherson region who, ‘are unable to return to their historic homeland’ in Uzbekistan.”[70]

Decrying “the tentacles of Turkish ‘soft power’” (Shchupal’tsa turetskoy «myagkoy sily») and “the ‘green light’ for Turkish colonists” («Zelonyy svet» dlya tyurkskikh kolonistov), Russian media aggressively worked the anti-Turkish aspect of the narrative. Take for example Svobodnaya Pressa, which declared “Kherson Khanate for Sultan Erdoğan:”

The appearance within the Kherson region of a Turkish enclave under the protection of Ankara is hard to imagine, but things are moving in that direction. In the towns and villages of the southern Ukrainian region, graffiti have already appeared in Turkish and Arabic saying ‘Kherson is a Turkish Land’, ‘The Ottoman Empire is reborn’, and ‘The Caliphate begins here’. And you never know what will happen if [Turkish President Recep] Tayyip Erdoğan flies in and mouths the phrase ‘Kherson belongs to Turkey’, just as a few years ago, while visiting the city of Prizren, he said, ‘Kosovo is Turkey and Turkey is Kosovo’. [. . . ]

A main argument advanced by Russian leaders for the military operation in Syria was to destroy the terrorist plague before it reached our country. But now, right under Russia’s nose in the Kherson steppes, Turkey with the complicity of Ukraine’s rulers have created a hotbed of terrorism and militant Russophobia under the guise of Crimean Tatar autonomy. This cancer will not resolve itself. Sooner or later, it will have to be removed surgically.[71]

Immediately before CyberBerkut posted the hacked email chain, Russian media were actively building a narrative about a Turkish-led Islamist vanguard—with connections to Chechen separatism—establishing a foothold in the Kherson region and conspiring with Kyiv to provoke Russian intervention:

The Majlis came under the Turkish intelligence service’s full control back in the 1990s . . . as a tool to balance Russian influence in Crimea. [. . . ] Another important instrument of Turkish influence in addition to the Majlis is Hizb ut-Tahrir,[72] which first appeared in Crimea in the late 1990s. . . . ‘Tahrir’ went through its baptism of fire in Syria and other hot spots in the Arab world. They gained combat experience, were tempered in battle, and strengthened ties with their ‘brothers’ and ‘mentors’. Various estimates put the number of ‘Tahrir’ in Crimea before the Maidan as two or three thousand, to as many as seven or eight thousand trained fighters, a considerable force. . .

By strengthening cooperation with the Turkish secret services, Tatar radicals have become the Turkish vanguard in Ukraine. . . the Kherson region is destined to be ‘fodder’ for a Turkish Black Sea enclave, and possibly a ‘sacrificial lamb’ to force the confrontation in Ukraine to continue, especially if a genuine reconciliation emerges in Donbas. . . . [I]t is not difficult to predict their ultimate goal—to provoke a Russian military response and cyber attacks (informatsionnyye ataki) ‘Putin-Kherson’ style. And for Ukrainians, their country is more and more like a ‘besieged fortress’ as it strengthens its information and propaganda weapons. After all, without a real or imagined war, the Kyiv government is doomed, and it is by war alone that [Mr. Poroshenko] can remain in power.[73]

One purpose of this extended recitation is to make the point that forged electronic documents are not so much intended to stand on their own, but instead are part of a densely woven and complex narrative. For Ukrainian leaders simply to disavow the e-mail chain is of little value since the purported presidential decree is consistent with widely held perceptions of events on the ground. That is as to say, it imposes a pattern—Kyiv acceding to the establishment of an autonomous enclave for Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks within the Kherson region—on experience. The direct involvement of other NATO member-states inside Ukraine is an important element in that broader narrative and a constant theme of Russian media. For example, “Western [sometimes appearing as “foreign”] military instructors were preparing a series of provocations in the Donbass.”[74] That report also acted to validate CyberBerkut (at least to Ukrainians open to believing it) since readers could relate the content of the documents—purportedly acquired in separate CyberBerkut hack[75]—to the visible presence of foreign military personnel.

One published report of the hacked email chain deserves special attention. The reliably pro-government Russian tabloid Komsomolskaya Pravda wrote this:

The first impression on reading this document is that it is a pure forgery, or as it is now fashionable to say, a fake. But if you take into account the level of the political mentality among Ukraine’s leaders today, it may be that it is not all that farfetched.[76]

Komsomolskaya Pravda positions the questionable presidential declaration as a figurative brick in a wall and not in the earlier phrase, as a “sniper shot.”[77] It allows a skeptical reader to question the document’s authenticity while at the same time driving home the point that Ukraine’s increasingly unstable political climate—and Crimea’s “blockade” by Islamist “militants” (aktivisty)—may worsen conditions and conspire to cause the country to fracture:

The worst Poroshenko might expect is that the [Crimean Tatar] battalion will support him if things get very rough, out of gratitude. But it’s not clear this hope is destined to come true. Since that scenario presumes an outbreak of serious turmoil in Kyiv, the former Kherson region may not want to be an autonomous territory for Crimean Tatars but instead, to declare itself an independent republic or to become an autonomous region within Turkey.

Like their Soviet predecessors, Russian intelligence agencies constantly engage in “active measures” (aktivinyye meropriatia) of deception purveying false and misleading information with the intent to influence the opinions or actions of individuals and governments and to weaken opponents.[78] From at least the time the Committee for State Security (Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti or “KGB”) established its Department D[79] in 1959—where “D” stood for dezinformatsiya—Russian intelligence services have had conducted active programs to defame and discredit its adversaries’ governments.[80] As a 1965 Central Intelligence Agency report noted, “One of the preferred instruments utilized by the Soviets to disseminate disinformation is the forged document. . . The principal purpose of such forgeries has been to discredit, to denigrate, [and] ultimate[ly]. . . to isolate.”[81]

And Now, Here

“In the name of state secrecy, the membrane
of personal secrecy around the individual is
stripped away.” [82]

“Secrecy is the membrane separating” state intelligence agencies and the public.[83] Peter Gill describes this dynamic (in a somewhat overcooked but still apt metaphor) as “the Gore Tex state,” which he elaborates as “the ‘rain’ of public inquiry” cannot penetrate in, but that same barrier does “not inhibit the ‘sweat’ of the secret state from penetrating outward . . . in its search for information and its implementation of countering techniques.”[84]

Just recently, MSNBC’s Mika Brzezinski declared on air that for the first time, foreign intelligence agencies are attempting to intervene directly in an American election.[85] That astonishingly uninformed assertion is all the more confounding for the fact that it came from the daughter of Zbigniew Brzezinski, perhaps the leading cold-eyed realist within the American foreign policy establishment.[86] Ms. Brzezinski’s assertion would no doubt surprise intelligence veterans. Consider these excerpts from an earlier period—the 1960 Presidential campaign between Vice President Richard Nixon and Senator John Kennedy.

• “A Soviet official in London acknowledged recently that the current anti-US phase of his country’s policy is planned to last through the American elections and is aimed primarily at weakening world confidence in the United States, and added that Moscow realized such a course involved certain dangers as well as advantages.” [87]
                                                  – Central Intelligence Agency “Current Intelligence Weekly Summary,” 18 August 1960.
• “In a bid for the votes of Americans of Polish origin, Vice President Nixon made a statement in which he promised that if he was elected president, he would consider the present western border of Poland on the Oder-Neisse final. . . . However, AP soon transmitted a statement of the State Department from Washington, which completely refuted the position of Vice President Nixon. . . the United States is of the opinion that the region between the former and the new frontiers is not Polish territory but territory administered by Poland. . . . This confirms the hostile position of the present U.S. Government, and, it is known, Nixon is a member of this government.”[88]
                                                    – TASS, 22 October 1960
• “There is a lot of talk in the United States about the need for change, and there is reason for such talk. The eight years the Republicans have been in power led the country up a blind alley. . . . In spite of loud declarations about longing for peace, the Eisenhower administration has not worked for relaxation but for an intensification of international tension. . . . Vice President Nixon, for instance, asserts without blinking that America’s prestige is greater than ever. His attitude is quite understandable. If he was to admit the contrary, it would mean total bankruptcy for his party. . . Mr. Kennedy accused the government of not being up to the revolutionary changes taking place in the world and failing to side with newly developing nations in their fight for liberty and for raising their living standards and improving their lives. You must agree with Mr. Kennedy’s charges. . . “[89]
  – Radio Moscow 24 October 1960 English language broadcast to the eastern United States.

While the ability to rapidly disseminate disinformation through electronic media and the Internet may amplify its effect, the suggestion something new is happening is nonsensical. Russia and the Soviet Union have long sought to influence American voters through various instruments of disinformation, including the intentional misrepresentation of events and the use of counterfeit documents. Nothing has changed but the medium. It is perhaps worth reflecting on whether Russian efforts today are as perceptible as they are because they are intended to be so, that is, to devalue all information by suggesting that some is false. Whatever it is, it is nothing close by degree to the disruptive disinformation campaign directed at Ukraine. Russian leaders’ sophisticated understanding of social and political factors within Ukraine allow them to stir long simmering antagonisms toward, for example, Turkey or Poland, in an instant.

Then, there is the suggestion that America should respond in kind. It is akin to George Kennan arguing, “We should gather together at once into our hands all the cards we hold and begin to play them to their full value.”[90] Chip Bohlen’s response mutatis mutandis (Dr. Kennan was advocating implicit recognition of a balance of power that acceded to Europe’s partition into zones of influence) is apposite to the suggested American response:

[A]s a practical suggestions they are utterly impossible. Foreign policy of that kind cannot be made in a democracy. Only totalitarian states can make and carry out such policies.[91]

In this instance, perhaps both are correct. The United States has manifest, not abstract, geopolitical interest at stake in the NATO states neighboring Ukraine—to the west, Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, and to the south, Turkey—that are of a greater priority than its interests in Ukraine. Those NATO allies are more convincingly positioned to rebut Russian disinformation targeting its citizens—in particular, the Polish and Turkish examples discussed earlier—than the United States, which has yet to define convincingly its interests in Ukraine. Then, there is Mr. Bohlen’s “Wilsonian” (Henry Kissinger’s characterization[92]) objection. It is at the same time true, following the line of Dr. Kennan’s argument, that the geopolitical interests at stake in Ukraine are not equal for the United States and Russia. “The West,” Dr. Kissinger wrote, “must understand that, to Russia, Ukraine can never be just a foreign country.”[93] At the same time, Mr. Bohlen’s objection rings true. The United States is ill suited to guileful disinformation of the sort of which Russia excels. It seems inarguable that Russian-style raw consequentialism—“For although the act condemns the doer, the end may justify him,”[94] as Machiavelli wrote—is not in the United States’ toolbox, whether one wishes it were so or not.

The translation of all source material is by the author. The essay’s title is from Benjamin Franklin’s 1798 essay “The Retort Courteous.”

About the author:
*John R. Haines is a Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and Executive Director of FPRI’s Princeton Committee. Much of his current research is focused on Russia and its near abroad, with a special interest in nationalist and separatist movements. As a private investor and entrepreneur, he is currently focused on the question of nuclear smuggling and terrorism, and the development of technologies to discover, detect, and characterize concealed fissile material. He is also a Trustee of FPRI.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI.

Notes:
[1] Euan G. Davis & Cynthia M. Grabo (1973). “Strategic Warning and Deception.” Studies in Intelligence. 17:1, 32. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol16no4/pdf/v17i1a05p.pdf. Last accessed 7 September 2016.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Katri Pynnöniemi & András Rácz (2016). “Fog of Falsehood. Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine.” FIAA Report 45. (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs) 16.

[4] The Russian State Duma (Gosudarstvennaya Duma or “Gosduma“) is the Federal Assembly’s lower house.

[5] “Żyrinowski proponuje Polsce udział w rozbiorze Ukrainy. ‘To były polskie ziemie wschodnie’.” Gazeta [published online in Polish 18 March 2014]. http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,114871,15641700,Zyrinowski_proponuje_Polsce_udzial_w_rozbiorze_Ukrainy_.html. Last accessed 15 September 2016.

[6] “Żyrinowski proponuje Polsce rozbiór Ukrainy.” Kresy [published online in Polish 18 March 2014]. http://www.kresy.pl/?szukaj/Władimir+Żyrinowski. Last accessed 15 September 2016. The name Kresy (“Borderlands”) is taken from Kresy Wschodnie, an eastern region of the interwar Second Polish Republic (in Polish, Kresy Wschodnie II Rzeczpospolitej) that was dismembered under the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and its territory partitioned among Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania.

[7] “Vladimir Zhirinovskiy—«KP»: Ne bylo nikakogo predlozheniya o razdele.” Komsomol’skaya Pravda [published online in Russian 24 March 2014]. http://www.kp.ru/daily/26210.5/3095149/. Last accessed 15 September 2016. It is worth noting that published reports claim Russian President Vladimir Putin to Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk in February 2008, “Ukraine is an artificial state, and Lviv is really a Polish city. Why don’t we solve this together?” See: “Putin chciał rozbioru Ukrainy.” Gazeta Wyborcza [published online in Polish 21 October 2014]. http://wyborcza.pl/1,134154,16836073,Putin_chcial_rozbioru_Ukrainy.html?disableRedirects=true. Last accessed 15 September 2016.

[8] “Gagauzy poprosili Poroshenko o sozdanii avtonomii v Odesskoy oblasti.” Lenta.ru [published online in Russian 16 June 2016]. https://lenta.ru/news/2016/07/18/gagauz/. Last accessed 15 September 2016. The article claims that a genuine group known as the “Gagauz Union of Ukraine” had demanded territorial autonomy in a post on the group’s Vkontakte (a Russian Facebook-like portal) page. The Gagauz Union of Ukraine forcefully denied that it ever made such a claim. A detail dissection by StopFake (http://www.stopfake.org/en/fake-ukraine-s-gagauz-minority-demand-autonomy/) established that the Vkontakte page in question was controlled by persons unassociated with the group with well known links to Russian disinformation.

[9] “Gagauzy obratilis’ k Poroshenko s pros’boy o predostavlenii avtonomii.” Vzglyad [published online in Russian 18 July 2016]. http://www.vz.ru/news/2016/7/18/822308.html. Last accessed 15 September 2016.

[10] “Gagauzskaya obshchina Ukrainy khochet referendum o sozdanii avtonomii.” Korrespondent [published online in Russian 18 July 2016]. http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/comunity/3719208-hahauzskaia-obschyna-ukrayny-khochet-referendum-o-sozdanyy-avtonomyy. Last accessed 15 September 2016.

[11] “Bolgary Ukrainy poprosili Poroshenko ob avtonomii.” Vzglyad [published online in Russian 4 July 2016]. http://vz.ru/news/2016/7/4/819613.html. Last accessed 15 September 2016. See also “Bolgarskaya partiya podderzhala sozdaniye avtonomii v Odesskoy oblasti.” Life [published online in Russian 7 July 2016]. https://life.ru/t/новости/874842/bolgharskaia_partiia_poddierzhala_sozdaniie_avtonomii_v_odiesskoi_oblasti. Last accessed 15 September 2016.

[12] Kresy forcefully denied that it had altered the photograph, which it claimed was a screen shot from a Telewizja Republika broadcast. Many commentators rejected this explanation including Główna Założenie, who wrote “But this is a lie and political provocation, because there was an actual banner, and the challenge was to strike at the enemies of Putin and to discredit Television Republic.” [http://naszeblogi.pl/45554-u-prowokatorow-pod-spodnica. Last accessed 15 September 2016]

[13] Pynnöniemi & Rácz (2016), op cit., 258.

[14] “Mistrzowie fotomontażu. Ujawniamy manipulację portalu Kresy.pl.” Niezależna.pl [published in Polish 25 March 2016]. http://niezalezna.pl/53291-mistrzowie-fotomontazu-ujawniamy-manipulacje-portalu-kresypl. Last accessed 15 September 2016.

[15] “Mariusz Max Kolonko o wydarzeniach w Odessie.” Kresy [published online in Polish 6 May 2014]. http://www.kresy.pl/wydarzenia,polityka?zobacz/mariusz-max-kolonko-o-wydareniach-w-odessie-video. Last accessed 15 September 2016.

[16] “Mariusz Max Kolonko: Szkoda, że to Putin musi przypominać o polskości Lwowa i Wilna.” Kresny [published online in Polish 10 April 2015]. http://www.kresy.pl/wydarzenia,spoleczenstwo?zobacz/mariusz-max-kolonko-szkoda-ze-to-putin-musi-przypominac-o-polskosci-lwowa-i-wilna. Last accessed 15 September 2016.

[17] See for example: “Photo Fake by Russkaya Vesna: American Tanks in Antiterrorist Operation Area.” StopFake.org [published online 16 August 2015]. http://www.stopfake.org/en/photo-fake-by-russkaya-vesna-american-tanks-in-antiterrorist-operation-area/. Last accessed 15 September 2016.

[18] “Kresy.pl: Putin znayet ob istoricheskikh pol’skikh zemlyakh bol’she polyakov.” Russkaya vesna [published online in Russian 14 April 2015]. http://rusvesna.su/news/1429038718. Last accessed 15 September 2016.

[19] Benjamin Franklin (1882). The Writings of Benjamin Franklin, Volume II. (London: Benjamin Franklin Stevens) 504.

[20] These include government-issued passports that have been stolen and altered. For an interesting discussion of the place of passports in intelligence operations, see: Stefano Musco & Valter Coralluzzo (2016). “Sneaking Under Cover: Assessing the Relevance of Passports for Intelligence operations.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. 29:3 (Fall 2016) 427-446.

[21] Of these, the Pass-Apparat in Weimar Germany was the largest, with branches in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and the Free City of Danzig. Established during 1919-1920, the Pass-Apparat operated covertly under cover of the Comintern’s Western European Secretariat in Berlin and printing offices operated around Europe.

[22] 2-Správa—its formal name is the 2^nd Directorate of the Federal Interior Ministry (II. správa Federálního ministerstva vnitra or “II. S FMV”)—was the counterintelligence branch of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (Československá socialistická republika or “ČSSR”). From 1953 to 1964, 2-Správa’s was responsible for counterintelligence against external threats. A 1964 reorganization of Czech State Security (Státní bezpečnost “StB”) expanded 2-Správa’s portfolio to include “internal threats” and “protecting the economy” of the ČSSR. 2-Správa reverted to its narrow external counterintelligence role after a July 1974 reorganization of the StB, and then returned to the wider one after an October 1988 reorganization, which remained in place until the StB was dissolved in 1990.

[23] The Ceske Slovo forgery was discussed in a since-declassified (in September 1995) c.1961 paper published in Studies in Intelligence, an internal journal published by the United States Central Intelligence Agency. See: Alma Fryxell (1961). “Psywar By Forgery.” Studies in Intelligence. 5:1, 25-51 at 26.

[24] Ibid., 25.

[25] Joint Chiefs of Staff (1943). “Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive: Functions of the Office of Strategic Services.” JCS 155/11/D SECRET dated 27 October 1943. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01731R003600080004-5.pdf. One archival copy of this document maintained by CIA has an undated handwritten cover noted from General Donavan to Walter Bedell Smith, who was Director of Central Intelligence from 1950-1953. The note reads, “The enclosed may be of help you in dealing with some of your jurisdictional questions.” [sic] See: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R002500050004-8.pdf. Last accessed 5 September 2016.

[26] Cited in Günter Bohnsack & Herbert Brehme (1992). Auftrag: Irreführung: Wie die Stasi Politik im Westen machte (Hamburg: Carlsen) 19. The speaker, Colonel Rolf Wagenbreth, ran Directorate X, (disinformation) of the Staatssicherheitsdienst or East German foreign intelligence service, more commonly known by the portmanteau name Stasi (from Staatssicherheit or “State Security”). He was addressing a group of Directorate X recruits in 1986.

[27] There are many contemporary examples. So-called counterfeiting “workshops” located in the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine produce large quantities of false documents sold through distribution channels in those countries and the Balkans. Some documents are sold online through such portals as dark websites and closed Facebook groups. See for example: “Balkán zaplavily falešné pasy, padělatelé mají dílny i v Česku.” iDNES.cz [published online in Czech 22 December 2015]. http://zpravy.idnes.cz/padelatele-zasobuji-balkan-falesnymi-pasy-nabizeji-je-pres-internet-1go-/zahranicni.aspx?c=A151222_095221_zahranicni_fer. Last accessed 7 September 2016.

A Czech law enforcement task force targeting organized crime concluded a two-year investigation in May by detaining ten persons accused of forging Lithuanian driving licenses and passports, which were sold directly and through intermediaries to undocumented persons “who did not qualify for residency in the European Union.” Five of the detainees are Ukrainian nationals whom Czech authorities identified as member of an organized crime syndicate. The others were identified only as “persons from the former Soviet Union.” See: “Policie zadržela 10 lidí kvůli výrobě falešných pasů pro cizince.” Deník [published online in Czech 31 May 2016]. http://www.denik.cz/z_domova/policie-zadrzela-10-lidi-kvuli-vyrobe-falesnych-pasu-pro-cizince-20160531.html. Last accessed 7 September 2016. See also: “Policie zadržela 10 lidí kvůli výrobě falešných pasů. Cizincům pomáhali do Evropské unie.” Novinky.cz [published online in Czech 31 May 2016]. https://www.novinky.cz/krimi/405080-policie-zadrzela-10-lidi-kvuli-vyrobe-falesnych-pasu-cizincum-pomahali-do-evropske-unie.html. Last accessed 7 September 2016.

[28] USCIA (1973). “Deception,” op cit., 34.

[29] Richard J. Heuer (1981). “Strategic Deception and Counterdeception: A Cognitive Process Approach.” International Studies Quarterly. 25:2 (June 1981).

[30] Benjamin Franklin (1882). The Writings of Benjamin Franklin, Volume II. (London: Benjamin Franklin Stevens) 504.

[31]The speaker was Congressman Martin Stutzman. See: “Info flow crucial to democracy.” Politico [published online 17 June 2013]. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/a-free-flow-of-information-crucial-to-our-democracy-092924#ixzz4JbNsJZFi. Last accessed 7 September 2016.

[32] John Dewey (1939). “Creative Democracy—The Task Before Us.” In John Dewey and the Promise of America. Progressive Education Booklet No. 14. (Columbus, OH: American Education Press, 1939)

[33] Elizabeth Anderson (2009). “Democracy: Instrument vs. non-Instrumental Value.” In Thomas Christiano & John Philip Christma, eds. Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy. (New York: Wiley-Blackwell) 213.

[34] The teleconference with Argentine President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner marked the commencement of television broadcasts in Argentina by the Russian government-controlled Russia Today. “Telekanal Russia Today nachal veshchaniye v Argentine.” Statement by President Vladimir V. Putin [published online in Russian 9 October 2014]. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46762. Last accessed 7 September 2016.

[35] “Kremlin Tells Press to Toe the Line.” The Moscow Times [published online in English 25 January 2000]. www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/tmt/267616.html.

[36] Its formal name is Federal’naya sluzhba po nadzoru v sfere svyazi, informatsionnykh tekhnologiy i massovykh kommunikatsiy or “Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies and Mass Communications.”

[37] Robert M. Entman (2003). “Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House’s Frame After 9/11.” Political Communication. 20:4 (published online 24 June 2010), 417. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10584600390244176. Last accessed 11 September 2016.

[38] C. Douglas Lummis (2013). “Afterword: Defining the Situation.” In Under the Occupation: Resistance and Struggle in a Militarized Asia-Pacific, Daniel Broudy, Peter Simpson & Makato Arakaki, eds. (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing) 274.

[39] See for example: “A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False Stories.” The New York Times [published 28 August 2016]. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/29/world/europe/russia-sweden-disinformation.html?_r=0. Last accessed 11 September 2016.

[40] Ambassador John B. Emerson (2015). “Exposing Russian Disinformation.” Opening remarks at Exposing Russian Disinformation in the 21st Century conference held 25 June 2015. https://de.usembassy.gov/exposing-russian-disinformation/. Last accessed 11 September 2016.

[41] United States State Department (1983). “Soviet Active Measures: Focus on Forgeries.” Foreign Affairs Note (April 1983). https://ia600300.us.archive.org/10/items/USDepartmentOfStateSovietActiveMeasuresFocusOnForgeries/US-Department-of-State-soviet-active-measures-focus-on-forgeries.pdf. Last accessed 11 September 2016.

[42] Barton Whatley (2016). Practise [sic] to Deceive: Learning Curves of Military Deception Planner. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press) xiii.

[43] For more about CyberBerkut, see the author’s February 2015 essay “Russia’s Use of Disinformation in the Ukraine Conflict.” http://www.fpri.org/docs/haines_on_disinformation.pdf.

[44] Crimean Tatars are a Turkic ethnic group some 250,000 of whom lived in Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea prior to its March 2014 annexation by Russia. According to Ukraine’s 2001 national census, Crimean Tatars account for 10.2% of the Crimean population and 0.5% of the Kherson Oblast population, respectively.

[45] Meskhetian Turks are a Turkic ethnic group that originated in southwest Georgia and lived there until forceably dispersed by Stalin in the 1940s. An estimated 3000 Meskhetian Turks lived in eastern Ukraine’s Donbass region prior to the onset of hostilities there in April 2014.

[46] “Poroshenko darit Khersonskuyu oblast’ turkam i krymskim tataram.” Document posted by CyberBerkut 1 April 2015.

[47] The referenced “Giray Khan” is to the Geraylar dynasty that reeigned in the Crimean Khanate until its annexation by Russia in 1783.

[48] ” SMI: Poroshenko otdayet Kherson na rasterzaniye i zaseleniye turkami.” Pravda [published online in Russian 7 April 2016]. http://www.pravda.ru/news/world/07-04-2016/1297607-kiberberkut-0/. Last accessed 13 September 2016.

[49] The Republic of Crimea is a federal subject of the Russian Federation geographically located on the Crimean Peninsula on territory annexed by Russia is March 2014. The Kherson Oblast also known as Khersonshchyna is a Ukrainian province or oblast that borders Crimea to the north.

[50] The quote is from Alfred North Whitehead (1954). Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead as recorded by & Lucien Price. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company) 225.

[51] The Crimean Tatar Kurultai is an elected representative council that is the highest political authority of the Crimean Tatar nation. It is comprised of delegates who are elected every five years. The Kurultai elects a 33-member Mejlis, which functions like an executive council.

[52] “Krymskiye tatary otkazalis’ ot referenduma v pol’zu avtonomii.” Rosbalt [published online in Russian 29 Match 2014]. http://www.rosbalt.ru/russia/2014/03/29/1250179.html. Last accessed 11 September 2016.

[53] “Vneocherednaya sessiya Kurultaya krymskotatarskogo naroda pokazala, s kem budet stroit’ svoye budushcheye korennoy narod Kryma. Nakanune perekhoda poluostrova na moskovskoye vremya, krymskiye tatary nameknuli, chto teper’ oni ne proch’ sveryat’ chasy po Kremlyu.” LB.ua [published online in Russian 31 March 2014]. http://lb.ua/news/2014/03/31/261325_krimskie_tatari_sblizhayutsya_rossiey.html. Last accessed 11 September 2016.

[54] Mr. Islyamov was formerly the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Crimea and a principal organizer of the economic blockade of Crimea—first called for in September 2015 by the Crimean Tatar Mejlis—after Crimea’s March 2014 annexation by Russia. Mr. Islyamov owns ATR, a Crimean Tatar oriented television channel that began broadcasting from Kyiv in June 2015, relocating from Crimea after it was denied a broadcast license by the Russian telecommunications regulator Roskomnadzor. In December 2015, Mr. Islyamov announced that he was forming a militia battalion named after the Crimean Tatar political activist and first president of the short-lived (December 1917-January 1918) independent Crimean People’s Republic, Noman Çelebicihan. On 21 January 2016, Crimean state prosecutor Natalia Poklonskaya announced that Mr. Islyamov’s name had been added to the Russian Federation’s “most wanted” list by the Federal Security Service—commonly known as the “FSB” for its Russian transliterated name, Federal’naya sluzhba bezopasnosti— after the FSB initiated a criminal case against him and others “over the establishment of an illegal armed formation in the Kherson Region.” [http://tass.ru/en/politics/851392].

[55] “Krymskiye tatary sformiruyut pravitel’stvo na materikovoy Ukraine—Islyamov.” Gazeta.ua [published online in Russian 20 May 2016]. http://gazeta.ua/ru/articles/regions/_krymskie-tatary-sformiruyut-pravitelstvo-na-materikovoj-ukraine-islyamov/699406. Last accessed 11 September 2016.

[56] “Lenur Islyamov: ‘Ukrainskiye oligarkhi prodolzhayut rabotat’ v Krymu v obkhod sanktsiy’.” Odesskiy krizisnyy media tsentr [published online in Russian 27 December 2015]. http://www.odcrisis.org/lenur-islyamov-ukrainskie-oligarxi-prodolzhayut-rabotat-v-krymu-v-obxod-sankcij/. Last accessed 11 September 2016. The interview was covered extensively in the Russian media. See for example, “Turkey is trying to re-play the Crimean Tatar card.” “Turtsiya vnov’ pytayetsya razygrat’ krymsko-tatarskuyu kartu.” Vzglyad [published online in Russian 26 December 2015]. http://vz.ru/politics/2015/12/26/786102.html. Last accessed 11 September 2016.

[57] “Islyamov: Minoborony Turtsii okazhet pomoshch’ organizatoram blokady Kryma.” RIA-Novosti [published online in Russian 26 December 2015]. https://ria.ru/world/20151226/1349312841.html. Last accessed 11 September 2016.

[58] “Shcho potribno znaty pro avtonomiyu dlya krymsʹkykh tatar.” Espreso TV [published online in Ukrainian 25 May 2016]. http://espreso.tv/article/2016/05/25/avtonomiya_dlya_zvilnennya_krymu. Last accessed 12 September 2016. Espreso TV is an Internet television station based in Kyiv perhaps known outside Ukraine for broadcasting the Euromaidan protests in late 2013 and early 2014.

[59] For more on Turkish involvement in Bulgaria’s internal affairs, see the author’s “The Suffocating Symbiosis: Russia Seeks Trojan Horses Inside Fractious Bulgaria’s Political Corral.” http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/08/suffocating-symbiosis-russia-seeks-trojan-horses-inside-fractious-bulgarias-political-corral/.

[60] Espreso TV (25 May 2016), op cit.

[61] “Emine Dzhaparova: «Predostavleniye vozmozhnosti realizatsii prava krymskotatarskogo naroda na samoopredeleniye—test dlya Ukrainy na demokratiyu».” Ministerstvo informatsiynoyi polityky [published online in Russian 8 August 2016]. http://mip.gov.ua/ru/news/1379.html. Last accessed 12 September 2016.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Reports in Moskovskiy Komsomolets and elsewhere were able to capitalize on a December 2015 report published in the Ukrainian weekly newspaper Korrespondent in which Lenur Islyamov said the Turkish Defense Ministry “has already started providing military assistance to the newly-created Crimean Tatar battalion ‘Noman Çelebicihan’. See: “Tatary khotyat Kherson. Posledstviya blokady Kryma.” Korrespondent [published online in Russian 28 December 2015]. http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3608812-tatary-khotiat-kherson-posledstvyia-blokady-kryma. Last accessed 12 September 2016.

[64] Heniches’k (sometimes spelled Genichesk) is a port city on the Sea of Azov just north of the Kherson-Crimea border.

[65] Mr. Ruslan Balbec is Vice Premier of the Crimean Republic of the Russian Federation.

[66] Formally named Ülkü Ocakları, the Grey Wolves (Bozkurtlar) is a Turkish ultra-nationalist organization and the unofficial militant arm of the far right Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi or “MHP”). Alparslan Türkeş founded both the National Action Party (in 1969) and the Grey Wolves. The Sputnik news agency (part of the Russian government-controlled news agency Rossiya Segodnya) called the Grey Wolves “the Turkish Frankenstein.” [https://sputniknews.com/politics/20151211/1031604883/turkish-grey-wolves-cold-war-era-paramilitary-group-gladio-cia-bozkurtlar.html]

[67] “Krymskiye tatary pri podderzhke Turtsii poprosili avtonomiyu na Ukraine. Na granitse s Krymom planiruyut postroit’ bazu dlya islamskogo batal’ona.” Moskovskiy Komsomolets [published online in Russian 19 January 2016]. http://www.mk.ru/politics/2016/01/19/krymskie-tatary-pri-podderzhke-turcii-poprosili-avtonomiyu-na-ukraine.html. Last accessed 12 September 2016.

[68] “Kiberberkut: Poroshenko Darit Khersonskuyu Oblast’ Turkam i Krymskim Tataram.” Novostnoy Front [published online in Russian 4 April 2016]. http://news-front.info/2016/04/04/kiberberkut-poroshenko-darit-xersonskuyu-oblast-turkam-i-krymskim-tataram/. Last accessed 12 September 2016.

[69] “«Krymsko-Tatarskoy Avtonomii» v Khersonskoy Oblasti Bez Emotsiy.” Novostnoy Front [published online in Russian 24 April 2016]. http://news-front.info/2016/04/26/o-krymsko-tatarskoj-avtonomii-v-xersonskoj-oblasti-bez-emocij/. Last accessed 12 September 2016.

[70] “Khersonskuyu oblast’ daryat krymskim tataram i turkam.” Nasha versiya [published online in Russian 5 April 2016]. https://versia.ru/pyotr-poroshenko-podpisal-ukaz-o-pereselenii-na-xersonshhinu-milliona-musulman. Last accessed 12 September 2016.

[71] “Khersonskoye khanstvo dlya sultana Erdogana.” Svobodnaya Pressa [published online in Russian 31 May 2016]. http://svpressa.ru/world/article/149702/. Last accessed 12 September 2016.

[72] Hizb ut-Tahrir (“Party of Liberation”) is a transnational Islamic religious-political organization with a presence over twenty countries. It seeks the creation of an Islamic caliphate in Central Asia. According to the Russian Federal Security Service aka “FSB” (Federal’naya sluzhba bezopasnosti), Hizb ut-Tahrir has links to Chechen separatists the radical Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. In February 2003, the Russian Supreme Court added Hizb ut-Tahrir (and 14 other groups) to a list of banned terrorist organizations.

[73] “Pochemu krymskiye tatary otvernulis’ ot Turtsii Erdogana.” POLITRUSSIA [published online in Russian 25 February 2016]. http://politrussia.com/society/pochemu-krymskie-tatary-660/. Last accessed 13 September 2016. The editor of POLITIRUSSIA, Ruslan Ostashko, is a frequently-quoted defender of Kremlin policies.

[74] “Imena zapadnykh instruktorov na Ukraine raskryl ‘Kiberberkut’.”Pravda [published online in Russian 13 April 2015]. http://www.pravda.ru/news/world/formerussr/ukraine/13-04-2015/1256209-cgaker-0/. Last accessed 13 September 2016. According to the report, “the military instructors are citizens of Poland, Estonia, Finland, Turkey, Norway, Latvia, France, Denmark, Austria, Finland, Germany and other countries. The greatest number of experts sent to Ukraine from the United States.”

[75] “KiberBerkut: USA budut postavlyat’ oruzhiye Kiyevu cherez chastnyye kompanii.” Pravda [published online in Russian 28 February 2015]. http://www.pravda.ru/news/world/formerussr/ukraine/28-02-2015/1250519-kiberberkut-0/. Last accessed 14 September 2016.

[76] “Khersonshchina ili Khan-Gireyshchina?.” Komsomolskaya Pravda [published online in Russian 6 April 2016]. http://www.kp.ru/daily/26513/3382569/. Last accessed 14 September 2016.

[77] Fryxell (1961), op cit., 26.

[78] Thomas Boghardt (2009). “Soviet Bloc Intelligence and its AIDS Disinformation Campaign.” Studies in Intelligence. 54:4 (December 2009) 2. These active measures consist of traditional disinformation techniques as the use of forgeries and rumors (so-called “black propaganda”) as well as agents of influence.

[79] Department D of the KGB’s First Chief Directorate was subsequently re-designated Department A, where the “A” stood for Aktivnyye as in Aktivnyye meropriyatiya or “Active Measures”.

[80] United States Central Intelligence Agency (1965). “The Soviet and Communist Bloc Defamation Campaign.” Internal report dated September 1965, 1. Author’s copy.

[81] Ibid., 19-20.

[82] Hugh Gusterson (1997). Nuclear Rites: A Weapons Laboratory at the End of the Cold War. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press) 84.

[83] Katherine Verdery (2014). Secrets and Truth: Ethnography in the Archive of Romania’s Secret Police. (Budapest: Central European University Press) 80.

[84] Peter Gill (1994). Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State. (New York: Frank Cass) 80.

[85] Ms. Brzezinski made the statement during the 15 September 2016 broadcast of “Morning Joe” on MSNBC.

[86] Dr. Brzezinski is no stranger himself to Russian disinformation efforts. In March 2016, the Russian language YouTube channel Velichayshiye tayny kosmosa (“Great mystery of the cosmos”) accused him—as part of the “secret cabal of Anglo-Saxon led global elites”—of pursuing a centuries-old effort to divide Russia into separate republics (ironically, exactly what Russia’s “federalization” effort seeks today to do to Ukraine). See: Velichayshiye tayny kosmosa YouTube broadcast published 26 March 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XSYhIVdpl6Q. Last accessed 15 September 2016.

[87] United States Central Intelligence Agency (1960).  “Current Intelligence Weekly Summary” (18 August 1960) 3-4. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0002967359.pdf. Last accessed 15 September 2016.

[88] United States Central Intelligence Agency (1960). Special Memorandum. Foreign Comment on Republican and Democratic Tickets. No. 6—3 November 1960, 3-4. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R000900040022-7.pdf

[89] Ibid., 16-17. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R000900040022-7.pdf. Last accessed 15 September 2016.

[90] From a 26 January 1945 letter to Chip Bohlen, who was acting as President Roosevelt’s Russian interpreter at the Yalta talks. Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis (2011). George F. Kennan: An American Life. (New York: Penguin Press) 98.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Henry Kissinger (2014a). World Order. (New York: Penguin Press) 284.

[93] Henry Kissinger (2014b). “To settle the Ukraine crisis, start at the end.” The Washington Post Op-Ed [published online 5 March 2014]. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html?utm_term=.26940dfe6439. Last accessed 16 September 2016.

[94] From The Discourses, I. 9. Niccolo Machiavelli (1970). The Discourses, Bernard Crick, Ed. (Hammondworth, UK: Penguin Books) 132. He wrote in a similar vein elsewhere, “In judging policies we should consider the results that have been achieved through them rather than the means by which they have been executed.” Count Carlo Sforza (1942). The Living Thoughts of Machiavelli. (London: Cassell) 85.