By Luis Navarro*

(FPRI) — Films are among the most visible demonstration of American soft power around the world. The impact of The Godfather, Scarface, and The Magnificent Seven on Georgia are among a few examples of movies that became part of the collective conscious of a nation. Almost all Georgian men, as well as many women, who came of age in the first decade following Georgia’s independence from the Soviet Union, are very familiar with them. Coming at a time when Georgia was struggling with a civil war in addition to rampant crime, corruption, and drug abuse in a failed state, a post-communist economic collapse, the paramilitary Mkhedrioni, and Georgian mobster “thieves in law.” Perhaps, the appeal of those films lay in appearing to romanticize their circumstances. The films’ narrative themes of a strong leader emerging to lead, usurp, or otherwise defeat powerful opponents and achieve success—only to face betrayal which forces these leaders to re-configure themselves in order to either triumph or succumb to fate—could be seen as reflections of the political landscape. The cautionary tales of early opposition leaders, like Merab Kostava and Gia Chanturia as well as former presidents Zviad Gamsukhurdia, Eduard Shevarnadze, and former Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania, may all serve to demonstrate the Georgian experience with the phrase that you either die a hero or live long enough to see yourself become the villain.

In the final days of the 2016 parliamentary elections in Georgia, what remains of Bidzina Ivanishvili’s original Georgian Dream (GD) coalition seeks to assert its claim as the only electoral bloc responsible for making Georgia the crown jewel in the rough and tumble region of the Caucasus and the only one capable of making progress towards formal European membership. The United National Movement (UNM) of Misha Saakashvili counters that not only did it establish this modern, functioning nation-state that emerged at the beginning of the 21st century, but also that the GD seeks to suppress competitive dissent and encourage cultural nativism, which will subvert the nation’s European trajectory in an effort to appease Russia. The 2016 Georgian parliamentary elections on October 8 will likely answer the question of which message will triumph and whether any new political force could emerge as either kingmaker or relevant opposition.

Misha Saakashvili meeting President Obama in 2012

The irony of this election is that neither Ivanishvili nor Saakashvili hold any formal leadership role in either party, yet success or failure of their electoral vehicles will bear their imprimaturs. The indelible role of the billionaire oligarch, Ivanishvili, will continue to define the public perception of reality that, regardless of whoever from GD may hold the offices of Prime Minister, President, or Chairman of Parliament, Ivanishvili’s vision and will are determinative for their national objectives. Meanwhile, Saakashvili’s efforts and UNM’s inability to wage a campaign that isn’t much more than a referendum on his term of office, and his promised return to Georgia makes it all but impossible for them to redefine themselves in any meaningful way in the eyes of the voting public or to achieve a mandate beyond Saakashvili’s physical return, which could certainly be complicated by the fact that he is currently a wanted man in his country of origin, where he is no longer a citizen. The election environment will be judged against the electoral cage match of 2012 that preceded the nation’s first electoral transfer of power, but it is still noteworthy that the outcome may hinge on the winning party having to coalesce with others outside of their electoral bloc in order to govern. This election is dynamic despite GD advantages of incumbency, poorly monitored campaign financing, as well as prosecutorial tactics that suggest more reforms are necessary. But regardless of the outcome, can Georgia begin to transcend zero sum governance in its relationship not only with opposition political parties, but also with media and civil society outside of a partisan frame? Will the use of law enforcement as a political tool be discontinued? Can it surmount the trend in the West of right wing populism which is increasingly aligned with Russian interests? And what impact could any of these challenges pose to Georgia’s future?

Dreamscape

In a March 2016 poll conducted by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), two-thirds of Georgians believed that Bidzina Ivanishvili continued to be a decision maker in the actions of the government, and more than half did not think he should have a role in decision making, officially or otherwise. However, Ivanishvili seems to see himself as a latter day Cincinnatus and styles himself as something of a savior having defeated his nemesis, Saakashvili, in the 2012 parliamentary elections. This had been previously proven almost impossible, especially after failed street demonstrations in 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2011, as well as the 2008 electoral efforts by opposition parties and the Russian invasion. Ivanishvili stayed in office as PM for just the final year of Saakashvili’s presidential term: a so-called period of “cohabitation” with Saakashvili’s tenure the only problem Ivanishvili deemed worthy of his full attention since he resigned in the days between Saakashvili’s departure and the signing of the long sought national objective of an Association Agreement with the European Union in November 2013. Ivanishvili prefers to characterize his departure from office as a selfless act reflecting both his public announcement upon entering into politics and his since declared belief that people should not hold high office for long. His roles in the appointment of his longtime aide de camp, then 31 year-old Irakli Garibashvili, as his successor in 2013 and Ivanishvili’s subsequent replacement of Garibashvili in 2015 with the much more composed, experienced, technocrat and former economy minister, Giorgi Kvirikashvili, as Prime Minister, suggest that Ivanishvili never viewed holding office as necessary to exercising power. This belief is also borne out by Ivanishvili’s claims in recent years that he was the financial underwriter for all of the things he deems, but does not fully specify, as positive aspects of the Rose Revolution and to being more involved in the day-to-day governance advisory of Saakashvili’s regime through his re-election in 2008 than he currently is for Kvirikashvili. What is hard to reconcile with his comments—especially when one reads his October 2011 letter announcing his entry into politics wherein he explicitly lauds then-Minister of Internal Affairs (MIA) Vano Merabishvili for his ability and judgment—is that this would mean that beyond his claim of underwriting the reform of the street police under MIA, Ivanishvili was not moved to distance himself from the ruling UNM government due to concerns over its handling of the 2006 Sandro Girgvliani murder case, the November 2007 street demonstrations, or subsequent takeover of the late oligarch Badri Patarkatsishvili’s Imedi television station. All of these instances involved Vano Merabishvili directly and were criticized by international rights organizations and some Western governments. Instead, Ivanishvili says that it was Saakashvili’s 2008 re-election, which was deemed by many observers as problematic but legitimate, that led Ivanishvili to break with UNM. Perhaps Merabishvili’s refusal to follow Ivanishvili’s directive to secure Saakashvili’s resignation in 2011 contributed to his prosecution.

Since taking over parliament and the government in 2012, the GD has enjoyed significant success in moving the country towards greater integration with the West and has taken steps to reverse some of the most egregious excesses and failures from UNM’s rule from 2003 to 2012, such as halving the prison population through amnesty, beginning to reform the court system, and creating universal health insurance for Georgian citizens. But it has failed to live up to the economic expectations it set given the apocryphal legend of Bidzina Ivanishvili’s generosity to his village of Chorvila, where he is credited with providing a new house to everyone—except the teacher who criticized his school work and failed to acknowledge his potential. As the election approaches, Ivanishvili dominates the media and political landscape once again making clear repeatedly that “his project” is the only chance for Georgia to advance as a nation and that the largest opposition party not only opposes that advance, but also is an existential threat to the fair and peaceful conduct of these elections. This closing argument, part of the zero sum approach to politics that is deeply rooted in Georgia and has been on full display in the United States since 2010, is the narrative that Ivanishvili is pursuing in order to achieve a parliamentary super majority while he seeks to cement Georgia’s transition from one party rule under UNM in 2012 to one party rule under GD in 2016. As the richest man in Georgia, having pushed out his most reliably pro-Western coalition partners and allegedly the grey cardinal of the ruling party, neither he nor his party have given much indication as to what they would do if the voters confer that power upon them.

At a minimum, Ivanishvili’s wealth makes it hard to distinguish between his interests and those of the state. This year, when speaking to the United Nations, Prime Minister Kvirikashvili announced the construction of two new universities omitting that they would be financed not by the state but by Ivanishvili’s Cartu Bank. Ivanishvili’s Panorama Center will transform the landscape and view of downtown Tbilisi, a decision made by a local government agency, not the sakrebulo (city council) and without public input while dismissing demonstrations concerned about the environmental damage that the Panorama will allegedly do to Tbilisi’s landscape. “The Panama Papers” disclosure confirms Transparency International’s (TI) accusations regarding Ivanishvili’s  offshore accounts while Prime Minister, allegedly in violation of law but apparently immune from investigation by law enforcement, and it opens the question of what role those accounts could have played in terms of Ivanishvili’s potential buyback of the Russian-based assets he claimed to sell during the 2012 election. While he has been extensively promoting the Georgian Dream in numerous recent press interviews, Ivanishvili seemed to imply that he may find it necessary to leave Georgia with his financial assets in what he and PM Kvirikashvili insist is the impossible scenario of a UNM victory—once again conflating his own wealth with the nation’s interest.

There are a number of actions that have taken place since 2013 that would serve to effectively counter the UNM argument that Ivanishvili was ever the agent of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Georgia is engaged in discussions around an EU free trade agreement. The Kremlin has publicly taken issue with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) announcing the establishment of a military training center; Georgia remains engaged both in coordinated maneuver exercises and military missions with NATO and the EU. The increasingly likely prospect of a visa free regime further demonstrates that the GD government has moved forward on the consistent aspirations of a two-thirds majority of Georgian citizens who would like to see Georgia become a member of the NATO and the EU.

However, the GD government has experienced setbacks in its efforts to engage Russia in a less outspoken manner than its predecessor. Russia backs the independence of Georgia’s frozen conflict zones in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Prior to GD’s arrival in government, Russia had already failed to withdraw to the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABL) in the post-August (2008) War agreement negotiated by former French President Nicholas Sarkozy. Since GD’s takeover, Russia has still continued to engage in the practice of “creeping occupation” by unilaterally moving the lines from the occupied territory of South Ossetia further into the region of Shida Kartli and drawing the border within meters of both the underground Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan gas pipeline and East-West (S1) highway. As was true under the previous regime, Russian troops continue to take Georgians into custody, and those Georgians occasionally turn up dead along the South Ossetian ABL. A Georgian was murdered, and it was recorded on videotape while he was crossing from Abkhazia while on Georgian territory by security forces stationed in Abkhazia. No serious effort at investigation or prosecution by either Russia, which oversees boundary security, or Abkhazia, operating the forces in which the alleged suspect served, is anticipated, and all of the incidents were met with initially far more muted reactions from Tbilisi than those of civil society and opposition groups.

In winter 2015, Energy Minister, Vice Premier, and former Dinamo Tbilisi and AC Milan soccer star Kakha Kaladze, began secretly negotiating with the Russian conglomerate Gazprom to increase the amount of Georgia’s gas purchase from its current 12% of the market, rather than increasing the supply of gas from Azerbaijan. This negotiation was done without any consistent explanation. When pressed for answers, Kaladze offered multiple explanations. According to the soccer star minister, purchasing gas from Gazprom would allow greater diversification of Georgia’s energy supply. He also claimed that Azerbaijan was failing to meet Georgia’s energy needs; that it would be better to trade the gas that Georgia receives from its transit between Russia and Armenia; and that a one-time cash payment would be preferable. All of these arguments were met with various responses ranging from outrage to derision from the Georgian public, who took to the streets as the Georgia-Gazprom talks took place.

Confusion with arriving at a believable narrative for Kaladze’s actions is understandable given his history. Kaladze played for AC Milan but was on the Georgian national team during its pitch against Italy in September 2009 when he scored two goals against his own Georgian team while serving as its captain. Given the odds of such an occurrence happening in the same game, his more lucrative contract with AC Milan, and his expressed opinion that his friend, former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, was really the one who persuaded Putin to end the August War of 2008 (despite denials at the time by Berlusconi of doing so, and who has since then defended the invasion) are all factors which may give one pause in taking Kaladze at his word or his analysis of matters affecting Georgia. When combined with the alleged continued financial interest of Ivanishvili in Gazprom, all the more so. Kaladze has since given up the Ministry and Vice-Premiership to run as the number two on the GD party list, behind Kvirikashvili.

Two Sides, One Coin

Increasingly, Ivanishvili and GD pronouncements about political pluralism seem to reflect their preference for pro-Russian or anti-Western nationalist messaging as alternatives to their own rather than pro-Western, but anti-GD. Saakashvili’s government pursued a similar line of argument against those who were deemed insufficiently pro-Western to compromise with significantly on issues of political participation, such as the Christian Democratic Movement, while the Republicans, Free Democrats (FD), and New Rights also had activists who experienced harassment, particularly in the regions outside of Tbilisi. GD has continually characterized any dissent to their policies from pro-Western sources as pro-UNM by default, who they fervently believe represent an even greater threat to Georgian democracy than pro-Russian forces. Saakashvili’s approach, predicated on UNMs self-image as a revolutionary movement that is loudly and unwaveringly opposed to Russia (although they did sell most of the nation’s electrical utility infrastructure to Russia) with a punitive mindset against any, which meant all, other parties with any popular support as insufficiently pro-Western. They made no distinction effectively between openly pro-Russian politicians such as former Parliament Chairwoman Nino Burjanadze and former Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli and those who were UNM critics but pro-Western, such as Davit Usupashvili and Irakli Alasania, as well as both Davit Gamkrelidze and Giorgi Targamadze, who were accused by Ivanishvili and others of being false opposition fronts for UNM.

Ivanishvili believes that it will be 2030 before Georgia could be sufficiently European, and after 18 years of single party rule, it wouldn’t be unexpected for GD to lose the governing majority in an election. Since its inception, GD has been willing to join with pro-Russian parties like the Industrialists and then ultra-nationalist National Forum, based upon the rationale that this was necessary to defeat UNM. A critical mass of current GD MPs, such as Budget Committee Chair Tamaz Mechiauri, has been persistently anti-Western in their public statements. Therefore, it is hard to imagine a scenario where having forced out the pro-Western Republicans and Free Democrats (FD) from the GD coalition while retaining the formerly anti-NATO Conservatives, GD would actually refuse to coalesce with Irma Inashvili’s vehemently anti-UNM, anti-Western Alliance of Patriots if it was necessary to achieve a governing majority against UNM. In the lead up to their advocacy for membership at the recent NATO Warsaw Summit and the initial delay over EU visa liberalization, the GD narrative toward Europe has been that these actions were necessary in order to avert the ascension of pro-Russian forces despite polling results showing a consistent popular majority for the nation’s Western foreign policy orientation. The GDs continued indulgence of anti-Western political sentiments within its own party while aiding and abetting a more explicitly anti-Western political opposition may supplement the short term goals of dominance over UNM and other pro-Western parties. It also may provide useful leverage in negotiations with Europe, but GD could ultimately end up subverting their current progress by having set the table for a potentially anti-Western majority in the not too distant future.

Open Letters and Contradictions

In his May 2016 letter, Ivanishvili wrote, “some local representatives of international organizations grew so carried away by this machinery of deception that even their headquarters had a hard time keeping them under control. Things got so out of hand that the leaders of the [United] National Movement, not foreigners, would write reports on the situation in the country. Unfortunately, relapses of this type persist. NDI and International Republican Institute have implemented many important projects for our country, for which all we can do is say thank you. It is also true, however, that in their public opinion surveys these organizations, rather suspiciously, employ local specialists closely associated with the [United] National Movement.”

Public opinion surveys have been a particular burr under Ivanishvili’s GD saddle since 2012 when the GD wrote a letter to then-US Ambassador John Bass requesting that the International Republican Institute (IRI) and NDI stop conducting polling until after the election. Despite the polling from both organizations reflecting the trends leading up to the 2010, 2013, and 2014 elections, Ivanishvili and GD fixated on the NDI poll conducted two months before the 2012 election, a month and a half before the prison scandal, to again claim this polling was operated by the UNM, as they have done with every poll to date.

Ivanishvili and GD seem unable or unwilling to acknowledge: 1) if the intent of international NGO polling was to either mobilize UNM supporters or delude the public into supporting them, then why did the 2013, 2014 or 2016 polling never show UNM ahead; 2) that even the most methodologically sound polling reflects only a snapshot in time, predictions can be made based on their trends, but unforeseen events can always impact electoral outcomes; 3) Ivanishvili’s own wildly inaccurate public predictions of his own or UNM margins, based upon undisclosed poll findings in the 2012, 2013, or 2014 elections, something he remarked upon, without irony, following the outcome of the 2013 presidential election; 4) that the UNM polling firm through the 2012 elections, ACT, conducted exit polls for Imedi TV in the 2014 municipal elections, and the results of which GD leaders embraced before the votes were tallied; 5) that in their public claims about their own polling to discredit international polls, this year and previously, were asserted while refusing to provide even basic information about who conducted the polling or what was its methodology. Ivanishvili said privately to international observers in 2012 that he viewed polling as a psychological tool for manipulating the public, which tells us more about his perspective on the utility of gauging public opinion than anything else.

Ivanishvili also seems to have taken internationally-funded civil society organizations, such as the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) and Transparency International (TI), to task for not rubber stamping GD decisions even going so far as to repeatedly accuse them of being UNM sympathizers, while at the same time, he recruited people directly out of international NGO’s. This seems to confirm a perspective that he either views all NGOs as partisan political fronts, or he has sought to subvert their non-partisan status by cultivating specific individuals within them.

There have also been issues with media freedom and independence under GD’s rule. The inability of the Constitutional Court to render a verdict due to excuses as mundane as non-hospitalized illness and vacations in the Rustavi-2 ownership case prior to the turnover from a majority of UNM appointed judges to GD appointed judges. Repeated and contrary claims of pressure among the now former Chief Justice and other members of the court may further cloud the confidence in whatever verdict is reached. In the Rustavi-2 case, the plaintiff is the brother of a GD MP; the current owner is a former UNM minister; and now a former UNM Defense Minister and independent candidate for majoritarian MP in Gori, Irakli Okruashvili, claims to have new, but so far unsubstantiated, evidence that proves he is the rightful owner. Regardless, the Georgian claim to media freedom will suffer if Rustavi-2 becomes just another GD mouthpiece, albeit through ostensibly commercial, but opaque financial interests just like Imedi TV station was under Saakashvili.

In his May 2016 open letter, Ivanishvili says, “we must fathom that every attempt to push us toward political or religious radicalism, and aggression against a different opinion or way of life, threatens with destruction the fundamentals of our very existence. Therefore, we must exercise special caution and steadfastness when dealing with these issues.”

While some UNM leaders viewed themselves as libertarians who championed advocacy work to achieve greater religious freedom in the predominantly Orthodox Christian nation, they developed a mixed reputation for reforming and deploying law enforcement to crack down on thieves in law, public service corruption, drug abuse (particularly among middle-aged men), as well as drunk driving, seat belt use, and the custom of bride-napping. On the other hand, they funded greater educational opportunities, specifically for ethnic minorities, and provided other religions with the same legal status as the Georgian Christian Orthodox Church. UNM also initiated a dramatic increase in state funding to the Orthodox Church, which has not always supported cultural liberalization efforts intended to enhance Georgia’s EU membership efforts.

On May 17, 2013, International Day against Homophobia, thousands of religious zealots attempted to physically assault fewer than 50 gay rights supporters. Despite a large police presence, which melted away after making a minimal effort to prevent a confrontation between the two groups, the zealots, including some robed priests, sought out the gay rights advocates; smashed the doors and windows of stores which they believed were harboring the gay rights supporters; and then engaged in beating policemen as they tried to prevent the crowd of zealots from destroying a bus which evacuated the remaining gay rights supporters. Despite the assault on police officers, destruction of property, copious amounts of television coverage, and a pronouncement by the Orthodox Bishop, Iacob, lauding leaders of the attack in his church before television cameras, there were practically no consequences for the zealots. Four individuals received only minor fines of 100 lari (less than US$50) and were then acquitted when the use of television footage was denied as evidence in court. The backlash continued in 2014 when Western donors encouraged gay rights activists not to openly observe International Day against Homophobia, and Orthodox Patriarch Ilia II subsequently declared it as Family Day.

Since then, among the positive achievements for GD was the passage of anti-discrimination legislation in 2014, the first of its kind in Georgia, as a significant step towards achieving EU visa liberalization. However, banning gay marriage has become a campaign issue as a result of the benefit seen in its pursuit by those seeking the votes of cultural conservatives. Prime Minister Kvirikashvili has said that he will make it a priority to pass a gay marriage ban after President Giorgi Marghvelashvili denied allowing United Georgia, a new party established in May 2016 by GD MP Tamaz Mechiauri and former GD deputy minister of the diaspora Sandro Bregadze, to place such a constitutional amendment on the ballot. Mechiauri has since withdrawn from running for re-election and has endorsed Ivanishvili and his team. Earlier this year, at the time when negotiations for the GD party list were taking place, Mechiauri was asked what role Ivanishvili played in those negotiations. Mr. Mechiauri responded, “He who pays the piper, calls the tune.”

Banning gay marriage and arguing that allowing gay marriage is the price of EU membership have been among the favorite themes of both the Kremlin and Levan Vasadze, a US-educated millionaire who moved back to Georgia from the UK following the 2012 election. He recently sponsored a gathering of the World Congress of Families, a forum for international right wing groups that are vehemently opposed to reproductive, immigrant, and gay rights. In his keynote address, which preceded similarly themed speeches and workshops, Vasadze railed against the evils of homosexuality and its imposition on Georgian culture from the West and Georgia’s Orthodox brotherhood with Russia. Among the attendees were GD MPs Omar Nishnianidze, Davit Lortkipanidze, and Zakaria Kutsnashvili, the former GD parliamentary faction leader. Kutsnashvili, Vice-Chair of Parliament Manana Kobakhidze, and parliamentary Health Committee chairman Dimitri Khundadze are all on the GD party list or majoritarian candidates for re-election. They are also co-founders of Vasadze’s Demographic Renaissance Foundation, which they established to “save” Georgia from the “demographic disaster predicted by foreign experts.” Ivanishvili publicly supported the organization’s launch in March 2013.

Fire Without a Torch to Pass

Saakashvili has traveled the long way around having exiled himself to avoid prosecution by the GD government for various alleged crimes. He continues to cast himself as the only one strong enough to stand up to Putin’s agenda both in Georgia and now in Ukraine as the Governor of the Odessa Oblast. Having either failed or giving up for the moment on a potential bid for Prime Minister of Ukraine, Saakashvili is now attempting to repeat his performance in the 2013 presidential election in Georgia. Saakashvili’s peripatetic travel and media schedules this year continue to overshadow the far more popular UNM parliamentary leader Davit Bakradze, just as he did in 2013. Having lost his citizenship in a process undertaken by President Marghvelashvili—which may have been more procedurally deliberate but perhaps no less politically-motivated than when Saakashvili’s administration stripped Ivanishvili of Georgian citizenship in 2011—Saakashvili makes online addresses to the UNM faithful at campaign rallies which would seem to violate campaign prohibitions against direct foreign involvement in Georgian elections. He hasn’t expressed a narrative that both consistently atones for the past excesses of UNM and provides a reform-oriented vision of the future. The candidacy of his wife, Sandra Roelofs for the majoritarian seat in the Samegrelo region center of Zugdidi (once held by the Akhalaia family patriarch, who along with his sons, is vilified for their roles in UNM law enforcement controversies) only further serves to underline his imprimatur on the party brand while accentuating the worst aspects of his legacy. Saakashvili has essentially cast the election as a referendum about his return to Georgia by stating it will happen when and if UNM returns to power. Neither Giga Bokeria or the “new faces” of UNM, many of whom were formerly in other governmental roles during the Saakashvili era, have received much public traction beyond the critiques of GD that Saakashvili chooses to articulate.

The outcome of this election could turn on how voters assess the handling of the Georgian economy based on their high expectations from 2012 when the nation’s richest man promised them better days for 2016 based on his own timeline. The Georgian Dream message in the closing days of this election season is one they are hoping Saakashvili may help amplify for them. Audio recordings of his advice to Rustavi-2 owner Nika Gvaramia and UNM leader Giga Bokeria on resisting the station’s possible takeover in November 2015, and in the past few weeks, another set of alleged recordings released on YouTube portray Saakashvili as committed to taking power by any means necessary regardless of the election’s outcome or the potential necessity for coalition building. These audiotapes, combined with his earlier claim that the October election exit poll of Rustavi-2 would be more accurate than the Central Election Commission’s tabulations, put Saakashvili ’s hubris on full display. The GD government has announced a full investigation after tapes of his alleged plans to stage an uprising were leaked. There have been no publicly announced investigative results from the 2015 incident because thus far, there is no indication that either Gvaramia or Bokeria took Saakashvili ’s advice. In this latest incident, the GD government has failed thus far to present any evidence of actual measures being taken by UNM to carry out a coup. Nevertheless, Misha’s on the record rants to the media and his supporters are what understandably provide the most credence to GD’s allegations.

Short of winning an outright majority, it is unclear who UNM would be able to partner with given their history with other party leaders and the declarations of Republicans and Free Democrats of their unwillingness to consider a coalition. There is also a challenge in winning enough majoritarian seats even if UNM were to achieve a plurality among all votes. Control of Parliament could be in doubt until the runoff elections for majoritarian seats at the end of the month, and the 50% vote requirement for those would make the UNM goal of achieving a majority that much more challenging. The necessity of forming a coalition outside of an electoral bloc to achieve a governing majority is unprecedented in Georgian politics, but it is at least one possibility based on publicly available polling data from several months ago. What would happen if UNM gained a plurality of votes nationwide but couldn’t organize a governing coalition?

The Other Players

Davit Usupashvili, the former leader of the Republican Party, was one of two Georgian Dream coalition partners, the other being FD leader Irakli Alasania, who reassured the West in 2012 against claims by the UNM that Ivanishvili was simply an agent of Russian President Vladimir Putin. A co-founder of GYLA and an active opposition leader to Saakashvili’s presidency after initially supporting the Rose Revolution, Usupashvili’s appointment to Chairman of the Parliament demonstrated the potential for mature leadership as a balance to the oligarch’s “L’etat c’est moi” sensibility in his public statements, a personality trait Ivanishvili shares with his nemesis, Saakashvili. However, Usupashvili’s 2013 comment that the Republicans would be the last party to leave the Georgian Dream proved unrealized since the only remaining Georgian Dream electoral bloc ally is Zviad Dzidziguri’s Conservatives. Dzidziguri once sought an audience with Russian MP Vladimir Zhirinovsky in 2010 as a means of improving Georgia-Russia relations, but now supports Georgian membership in EU and NATO.

Tina Khidasheli, a formidable political force within the Republican party in her own right, served as a high profile Minister of Defense for just over a year through the 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit. During that time, she surprised observers in Georgia and abroad with her characteristic boldness in word and deed. She attempted to unilaterally abolish the military draft, which was vehemently opposed by most of the coalition in early 2016. Shortly after her appointment in 2015, she went on an international tour in the lead up to the summit and delivered an ultimatum of sorts to Western audiences by explicitly laying the responsibility upon the West for whether or not it, and presumably the GD government as well, lost ground among Georgians in the 2016 elections if NATO failed to confer membership. This statement implicitly absolved Saakashvili of responsibility for the August War by explicitly stating the refusal of NATO membership at that year’s Bucharest Summit was the only reason for the Russian invasion and continued occupation of the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The omission of Saakashvili ’s responsibility did not echo GD talking points at home, and shortly thereafter, the by-election to fill her vacant MP seat in November 2015 became an area of sharp disagreement between Republicans and Irma Inashvili, who narrowly lost amid accusations of voter fraud which were taken up by anti-Western GD MPs such as Tamaz Mechiauri.

At the Republican Party conference in December 2015, Ivliane Khaindrava, deputy secretary of President Marghvelashvili’s National Security Council, used his address to question the relationship between the party and the coalition based upon the by-election outcome and further questioned why there was, both in the GD government and coalition, separate formal and informal leaders—referring to then-PM Garibashvili and ex-PM Ivanishvili. By the beginning of 2016, it was clear that Republicans would stand for election independently of the coalition. Over the past month, both Usupashvili and MP Tamar Kordzaia have referred to their frustration with Ivanishvili’s informal role in the nation’s governance. Expressing his concern about the potential of the anti-Western Inashvili or former Parliament Chairwoman Nino Burjanadze’s Democratic Movement United Georgia entering Parliament, he advocated a constitutional amendment to codify Georgia’s Western foreign policy aspiration. This desire echoed a similarly failed proposal by UNM in 2013; and this past summer Usupashvili was unable to orchestrate a 3/4 vote of the body due to the lack of a quorum.

The biggest problem for Usupashvili is that, other than UNM’s Giga Bokeria, the Republicans are often seen by Georgians as not sufficiently Georgian by virtue of the perception that they are largely secular as opposed to Orthodox Christian in their beliefs. Despite Usupashvili’s personal popularity and his party’s prominence in the GD government cabinet, earlier public polling found them hovering just under the threshold of a six-member faction.

Since the Parliamentary Chairman’s position would require a new occupant if Republicans neither pass the threshold or join with either UNM or GD, it is possible that Kaladze, a former NGO/GD recruit like Tamar Chugoshvili, or a negotiation with a coalition party leader, such as Inashvili or Burjanadze, may be among those in consideration as Usupashvili’s successor. There is also the question of whether Ivanishvili would choose to anoint a Chairman as he did with Usupashvili or allow a contested vote within a governing majority in order to dispel his grey cardinal image? While Ivanishvili has questioned the respective commitments to Inashvili and Burjanadze to Euro integration, both the current GD list of candidates and their past history of uniting with anti-Western elements to ensure the defeat of UNM is well established enough to be of concern.

The prospects for Irakli Alasania’s Free Democrats are harder to discern. He has always been a popular figure in Georgian politics: the son of a fallen martyr at the Battle of Sokhumi in the 1993 Abkhaz war, a decorated soldier, and Georgia’s telegenic Ambassador to the United Nations during the August War. But he failed to win elections for Mayor of Tbilisi in 2010 and against majoritarian MP Akhalaia in 2012 in large measure due to insufficient organizational and fundraising capacity as well as travel outside of the jurisdictions in which he chose to compete. However, having been denied the chance to be the GD candidate for President in 2013 because he had been so bold as to discuss it within his party leadership rather than ask Ivanishvili and his coalition partners first, this is his first national campaign and may play to his personal attributes better than his previous campaigns. Conventional wisdom is that his party will pass the threshold, and he has publicly ruled out joining UNM.

The most notable new entry and apparent political demise just before the election has come from opera singer and philanthropist Paata Burchuladze’s State of the People (SP) bloc. In November 2015, he announced the formation of the Georgian Development movement with offices in Georgia and the US. Then, an International Republican Institute (IRI) poll in March 2016 showed him in a close third place against UNM and GD before he announced in May 2016 that his party would run in the parliamentary elections. Speculation was rife as to whether he was a Trojan Horse for either Saakashvili or Ivanishvili. His apparent access to undisclosed sources of funding like several other parties including several former UNM MPs who had organized two entities, Girchi (Cone) and New Georgia, and his message of navigating the partisanship of the two major forces by being pro-Western but not unfriendly to Russia seemed to have potential for, at a minimum, crossing the threshold. Ivanishvili had publicly dissuaded Burchuladze from running for President in 2013, but since early on in this election, Ivanishvili has claimed repeatedly that Burchuladze was a stalking horse for UNM. This makes little sense given UNMs greater reliance on public funding and presumably smaller pool of available voters since their 2012 defeat, but there was little hard evidence either way as to whether or not Burchuladze was a stalking horse for others.

When it was announced that Burchuladze and the former UNM MP parties would form an electoral bloc, recriminations abounded. While a few lesser known SP activists quit by citing their refusal to work with former UNM MPs, Burchuladze’s chief spokesperson Giorgi Rukhadze, formerly with Targamadze’s CDM, quit and stated that the former UNM MPs were being funded and directed by Ivanishvili. Then, last week, Burchuladze cast the Cone party out from his electoral list, making the same allegations as Rukhadze. Demonstrating either naiveté or incompetence in his approach to politics, it would seem unlikely for Burchuladze to play a major role in the final election results.

Curtain

Michael Corleone becomes what he swore he would not; has Ivanishvili already become a variant on the “undemocratic” ruler he asserts of Saakashvili? Tony Montana’s megalomania consumes his own cunning and capacity; will Saakashvili’s ambitions in two countries destroy whatever positive legacy he claims for both? Three of the Magnificent Seven live on but only one is able to enjoy the fruits of their victory; who may emerge from any of the parties to inherit that fortune? American films are far from the first or even the most familiar stories for Georgians of larger than life figures who arrive at unanticipated destinies. Since Georgia’s halcyon days of Kings Vakhtang Gorgasali, Davit the Builder, Tamar, and Giorgi the Brilliant, or the more controversial times of King Rusudan, Teimuraz I, and the warlord Giorgi Saakadze, their ultimate fates are as much a function of available choices as any foretold fate. Over the period of time that the United States emerged from the rule of a superpower to gradually asserting itself as a superpower in its own right, Georgia has been engaged in a seemingly never-ending struggle with its northern neighbor: Russia. Perseverance in the course of this journey has been full of twists and turns in order to achieve a considerable measure of success—always involving sacrifice and often the source of great disagreement due to the protagonist’s shortcomings or choices at any particular moment in time. Regardless of which one succeeds in doing so, their contributions will only represent the next stop along Sakartvelo’s great journey.

No matter who wins this election, there are still any number of challenges they face, not the least of which is whether or not there will be further progress in establishing a more independent judiciary as well as a criminal justice system that doesn’t distinguish among political party loyalties. If a party should win a plurality of the votes, but fails to win a majority of parliamentary seats, what steps would political leaders take to ensure more not less confidence in governance that reflects popular will? If governing requires another coalition, can that be fully achieved if either Bidzina Ivanishvili or Misha Saakashvili are perceived as the real powers behind whoever occupies the top roles of government? Can public survey research and civil society be accepted and act outside of allegiance to any one electoral bloc? Will popular support for Georgia’s Western aspirations transcend the momentary political advantage some leaders may garner by coddling right wing Russian aligned nativism?

As political events this year in the United States, United Kingdom, Poland, and Hungary demonstrate, there is no finish line, and there are plenty of opportunities for backsliding regardless of membership in Western alliances. Progress always involves struggle. Georgians will make their choice about who will lead their government on October 8. But the questions of what the government initiates, how well it succeeds, and whether or not that reflects the public’s priorities can only be achieved democratically through continued efforts towards greater government accessibility and transparency with the media and civil society in order for the public to acquire greater participation and thereby ensure accountability.

About the author:
*Luis Navarro served as Senior Resident Director for the National Democratic Institute of International Affairs in Georgia (2009-2014) and as both presidential campaign manager and the last chief of staff for then-United States Senator Joe Biden (2007-2009).

Source:
This article was published by FPRI

(RFE/RL) — Republican U.S. presidential nominee Donald Trump says lewd sexual comments he made about women in a recently released 2005 audio recording were simply “locker-room talk” and that former U.S. President Bill Clinton, who had been accused of sexual misconduct, has done “far worse.”

In his second U.S. presidential debate with Democratic rival Hillary Clinton, Trump said on October 9 that he is “not proud” of the comments in the video released two days earlier but that “the carnage all over the world” is a more pressing issue for the United States. He denied that he had actually committed any of the actions that he bragged about on the tape.

He said that Bill Clinton, his opponent’s husband, had done far worse to women.

“Mine are words and his are action,” Trump said at the debate at Washington University in St. Louis.

Prior to the debate, Trump met with Paula Jones, Kathleen Willey, and Juanita Broaddrick in St. Louis in a bid to deflect attention away from his own conduct and sexual remarks about women.

All three women have accused Bill Clinton, Hillary Clinton’s husband, of unwanted sexual advances. Broaddrick says that Bill Clinton raped her in 1978, but her lawsuit was dismissed and no criminal charges were filed. Clinton denies the allegations.

Hillary Clinton, meanwhile, said during the debate that the video is further evidence that Trump is unfit for the White House.

“He has said the video doesn’t represent who he is but I think it’s clear to anyone who heard it that it represents exactly who he is,” she said in response to Trump.

The release of the video has plunged the Republican Party into crisis, with numerous senior lawmakers and governors in the party publically saying they would not vote for Trump and some calling for the candidate to quit the race.

Trump would be required to resign his nomination in order for party leaders to select a new candidate, but the businessman and former reality TV star has said he does not plan to step aside.

A Reuters-Ipsos showed Clinton leading Trump by five points in the race on October 7, prior to the release of the video later that day.

The town-hall style debate is giving audience members a chance to ask the candidates questions directly.

Nine soldiers and eight civilians were killed in a car bombing in the south-east Turkish province of Hakkari, CNN Turk reported on Sunday, citing the provincial governor.

Twenty-seven people were injured in the attack when the car bomb exploded in front of a checkpoint belonging to the Turkish gendarmerie in the district of Semdinli.

No one immediately claimed responsibility for the attack, but the Turkish army pointed the finger directly at the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

The Turkish army launched an offensive against the PKK last summer after a two-year ceasefire collapsed.

The PKK and its splinter group the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) have since then carried out repeated attacks on the Turkish security forces.

The government has ruled out reviving peace negotiations, with Deputy Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmus tweeting Sunday: “Turkey will never capitulate to terrorist organizations.”

He said the perpetrators of Sunday’s “abominable” attack would be called to account.

Original article

The Russian government has “suspended” a 2013 agreement with the USA on nuclear energy research and development and “terminated” another, signed in 2010, on cooperation in the conversion of Russian research reactors to low-enriched uranium fuel. The decisions were issued in separate documents signed by Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and published on the government’s website on 5 October.

The decisions follow Russian President Vladimir Putin’s order earlier this week to suspend a 2000 agreement with the USA on the disposal of plutonium from their respective nuclear weapons programs.

The 2013 agreement defines areas of scientific and technical cooperation in using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including nuclear security, nuclear power station design, innovative kinds of reactor fuel, the use of nuclear and radiation technologies in medicine and industry, and handling radioactive waste, according to the Russian government statement. It also envisions implementation of joint projects with US specialists that would “further mutually beneficial cooperation in the nuclear energy sphere and help save time and resources in conducting fundamental and applied research in this sphere,” it added.

The statement continued: “The actions taken by the United States related to the introduction of sanctions against Russia have directly affected the areas of cooperation under the Agreement. In April 2014, the Rosatom State Corporation received a letter from the US Department of Energy Bureau at the US Embassy in Moscow citing directives from Washington and announcing the suspension of nuclear energy cooperation in connection with the events in Ukraine.

“This step by the US is a substantial violation of the terms of the Agreement that is designed to expand cooperation in nuclear energy research and development and provide a stable, reliable and predictable foundation for this cooperation.”

This “declaration of US policy” was followed by the cancellation of bilateral meetings and events related to nuclear energy, “which can qualify”, the Russian government said, “as violation of the agreement”.

A Russian law passed in June 1994 on international treaties permits suspension of the agreement, it added.

But the international legal framework of cooperation with the USA “will be preserved”, it said. “Russia will preserve the possibility of resuming cooperation under the Agreement when that is justified by the general context of relations with the United States.”

The agreement signed in December 2010 between Rosatom and the US Department of Energy “provided for the possibility of technical research into the conversion of six Russian research reactors”, the government noted.

“As of February 2016 the Agreement had essentially been met, with work on research reactor conversion capabilities having been completed. The signing of new research contracts is not planned and there have been no meetings of the Russian-American working group set up to coordinate activities under the Agreement since 2014.”

The USA’s role in the introduction of sanctions against Russia, “directly affected” areas of cooperation envisaged in the agreement, according to the statement. “In particular, the United States imposed restrictions on cooperation with Russia in advanced technologies,” it added.

In April 2014 Rosatom “received a letter from the Office of the US Department of Energy at the US Embassy in Moscow, in which, referring to instructions from Washington, reported the suspension of nuclear energy cooperation in connection with the events in Ukraine,” it said.

“In these circumstances, further cooperation with the American side, meaning tolerance of American citizens at Russian nuclear facilities, direct cooperation between Russian and American institutions, and the exchange of information and documentation between them, is impractical,” it said.

The agreement may be terminated by either party within 90 days after the other party provides written notice, it said.

According to a 5 October statement by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding Russia’s decision to terminate the 2010 “implementing agreement” between Rosatom and the DOE, the 2014 suspension by the USA of nuclear cooperation and “other hostile steps and statements”, mean that Russia “can no longer trust Washington in a sphere as sensitive as the modernization and safety of Russian nuclear power plants”.

It added: “If Russia makes the decision to convert particular research reactors to low-enriched nuclear fuel, we will conduct this work independently.”

Researched and written by World Nuclear News

By Jordan Bazak*

The current political and economic turmoil in Venezuela has prompted those who oppose the government to pursue a recall referendum process. A recall referendum is the use of a popular vote to remove a public official before the end of his or her term.[i] The process typically requires an initial petition demonstrating popular demand followed by a vote to determine whether the functionary will continue in office. In Venezuela, the ongoing recall efforts are directed at sitting President Nicólas Maduro.

In recent months, the recall supporters’ largest complaint has been the timeline established by the National Electoral Council (CNE). On May 2, the opposition party, Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (United Democratic Roundtable – MUD), submitted over 2 million names to the CNE as part of their application to initiate the formal process. Early this August, after a difficult validation effort in which many signatures could not be authenticated, the CNE announced that it had confirmed enough names[1] to proceed to the next step: a second petition, which must be signed by 20 percent of registered voters. [ii] [iii] On September 1, hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans took to the streets of Caracas to protest the decision to schedule this petition in late October.[iv] At the current pace, should the petition pass, the recall referendum itself would not take place until next year, at which point it would be too late to hold new elections, ensuring a Chavista presidency through 2018.

While frustrating for the opposition, COHA’s Erika Sato has pointed out that the CNE has the right, and even the responsibility, to set a timeline that ensures a fairly contested and well-administrated referendum.[v] Of larger concern should be potential violations of Article 72 of the 1999 Constitution, which clearly lays out the conditions necessary for a recall. It is vital that the Maduro administration, opposition, and CNE abide by these rules over the coming months. First, the CNE should faithfully interpret “20 percent” as the proportion of all national voters. Second, the opposition must accept defeat should they carry the majority at the referendum but fail to win more votes than Maduro won in 2013.

Recalls in Venezuela and Around the World

Five Western Hemisphere countries have provisions for recall elections at the local and state levels. In Argentina, Cuba, and Peru, citizens can initiate and approve a recall process to remove local and municipal officials, while in Colombia and in 18 U.S. states, governors are also fair game. Only 11 countries in the world have full recall elections—ones that are both initiated and voted on popularly—for national positions and in just two can such processes be used to remove the chief executive: Ecuador and Venezuela.[vi]

The ability to recall all elected officials is a core principle of Venezuela’s democracy. Examples of the recall process in practice include the 2004 failed referendum against Hugo Chavez and 10 recalls against municipal officials in 2007. [vii] The removal process is outlined in Article 72 of the 1999 Constitution, which begins, “All popularly elected positions are revocable.”[viii] The article goes on to specify four necessary conditions for a recall.  Following sections analyze each condition with respect to current proceedings.

Half of the official’s term must have transpired[ix]

To respect the rights of the original voters, public officials can only be removed during the second half of their term. Hence the President, who serves a term of six years, can only be recalled after completing three years in office. President Maduro became interim president on March 5, 2013—after the death of Hugo Chavez— then won a special election on April 14, and is serving out Chavez’s term that began on January 10. It is not clear whether Maduro’s halfway point came this past January, March, or April, but either way he is now eligible for recall.

 At least 20 percent of voters in the corresponding district must solicit the referendum[x]

To initiate the recall vote, at least 20 percent of registered voters must petition for the referendum. In light of the tumultuous 2004 presidential recall, in which the opposition collected the signatures itself, the CNE will organize the petition this year.[xi] The collection has been scheduled for three consecutive days at the end of October.[xii] Some details, however, remain undetermined. One is whether the petition must get 20 percent in each state as well as nationally. Under a national interpretation the petition would need 3.9 million signatures. A state-by-state interpretation would raise the bar much higher.

The same number or more voters must vote in favor of the recall than originally voted for the official[xiii]

At the recall referendum itself, the opposition must secure at least 7,505,338 votes, the number of ballots that Maduro won in 2013.[xiv] In the 2015 parliamentary elections, 71 percent of Venezuelan’s cast valid votes, a turnout comparable to that of the 2004 presidential recall referendum (69 percent). [xv] [xvi] If participation is similar this time around, the recall campaign would need to get 55 percent of the vote, a target they are on track to hit as recent polls show that two-thirds of Venezuelans are in favor of the recall.[xvii] Meeting this condition, however, could become more difficult if turnout is lower than expected.

At least 25 percent of voters must participate in the recall election[xviii]

Venezuela has about 19 million registered voters. This means at least 4.75 million Venezuelans must participate in the recall referendum. In light of recent election turnouts, this figure is likely to be reached.

The Fight over 20 Percent

The next hurdle for the recall campaign is securing the signatures of 20 percent of registered voters on the October petition. Using the national interpretation, the petition would need around 3.9 million signatures to pass.

Given statements made by two rectors of the CNE, however, there is a chance that a state-by-state requirement will also be applied. For the MUD’s application, the CNE demanded signatures from one percent of voters in each of Venezuela’s 24 states. Rectors Socorro Hernandez and Tania D’Amelio recently suggested that the same rules should govern the 20 percent petition.[xix] On August 27, Vice-President of the CNE, Sandra Oblitas, confirmed that, “whether the 20 percent corresponds to the state or national level is on the discussion table.”[xx] Meanwhile, the MUD’s representative to the CNE, Vicente Bello, completely rejected this possibility stating,  “for a governor [the corresponding district] is the state; a mayor, the municipality; and for the President, the entire country.”[xxi] CNE President Tibisay Lucena has remained silent on the issue.

Venezuela’s 1999 Constitution supports Bello’s interpretation.  First, the use of a state-by-state requirement for the application was permissible because rules for this stage are governed by CNE resolutions[2] and not provided for in the Constitution.[xxii] However, Article 72 unequivocally states that the 20 percent petition pertains to registered voters in the “corresponding district,” which, by the CNE’s 2004 interpretation, would be the entire nation. Even the 2007 CNE resolution, which currently governs all current recalls, reiterates the precise language of “corresponding district” found in the Constitution. [xxiii] [xxiv]

Given the 2015 parliamentary election results, a state-by-state interpretation would make things difficult for the recall petition scheduled for October. For instance, in 2015, just 23 percent of registered voters in the poor coastal state of Delta Amacuro cast valid ballots for the MUD (see table below). The MUD also won votes from less than a third of registered voters in Apure, Portuguesa, Sucre, Amazonas, and Guárico. In these states, compiling signatures against Maduro from 20 percent of registered voters will be no easy task. Already some observers are suggesting that the recall campaign concentrate efforts in such places to prepare for the possibility of a state-by-state requirement.[xxv]

So just how much does a state-by-state requirement raise the bar? The petition must be signed by 20 percent of registered voters in the place where it is least popular. Given 2015 election results, this is likely Delta Amacuro. Assume that the petition is only signed by 19.9 percent of registered voters in Delta Amacuro and that the percentage of registered voters who sign the petition in each state is distributed similarly to party preference in the 2015 election. Accordingly, 40 percent of registered voters would sign the petition in the Capital District and 37 percent in the state of Miranda. In total, the petition would get 6.9 million signatures – 36 percent of registered voters and just 600,000 less than the votes needed in the actual recall election – and still fail a state-by-state requirement. Even if the petition were allowed to fall short of 20 percent in five states, it would probably need over 5 million signatures to pass. Thus, as a conservative estimate, a threshold of 20 percent in each state equates to a requirement of 28 percent of registered voters nationwide, higher than virtually every recall petition on earth.

A Losing Majority

Reviewing the constitutional conditions for a recall, there is a possibility that the opposition could win over 50 percent of the vote in the recall election but not more than the 7.5 million ballots that Maduro received in 2013. This becomes more likely the lower the turnout.

One cause of low turnout could a late referendum. According to Article 223 of the 1999 Constitution, if a President is removed within the last 2 year of his or her term, the Vice-President assumes office until the next election cycle.[xxvi] Removal before then sparks a special election to determine who will serve out the term. Since Maduro’s term ends on January 10, 2019, he must be recalled before that date next year to prompt new elections.[xxvii] If held later, opposition turnout may be low, as even a successful recall would only result in current Vice-President Aristóbulo Istúriz taking office.

Another source of low turnout could be an improved economic and political climate at the time of the referendum. Should the government successfully deal with Venezuela’s current malaise by early next year, the recall effort would lose steam.

If turnout is low but the recall campaign still carries a majority, it is conceivable that both sides would claim victory. Nevertheless, the Constitution clearly maintains that Maduro would stay in office.

Conclusion

The CNE is bound by the Constitution when setting the rules for the recall process. With regards to the presidency, the “corresponding district” is arguably intended to mean the entire nation of Venezuela. It was interpreted thusly in the 2004 referendum and there does not appear to be a sound argument for modifying this precedent. Likewise, should a referendum be held in which the opposition carries a majority but falls short of 7.5 million votes, they must humbly concede defeat. In either case, upholding the rules outlined in the Constitution should take precedence over determining who will govern Venezuela for the next two years.

Registered Voters – “¿Cuántos electores votaran en las Elecciones 2015?” – Eleccionesvenezuela.com Valid Votes and Votes for MUD – “Elecciones a la Asamblea Nacional” – Consejo Nacional Electoral

*Jordan Bazak, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

Notes:
[1] One percent of registered voters in each state.

[2] Namely resolution No. 070207-036, which the CNE signed in 2007.

[i] “When Citizens can Recall Elected Officials,” in Direct Democracy: the International IDEA Handbook, 109-123. (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2008). Accessed August 29, 2016. http://www.idea.int/publications/direct_democracy/upload/direct_democracy_handbook_chapter5.pdf

[ii] Erika Sato, “Politicization and Venezuela’s Presidential Recall Referendum Timeline,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, August 12, 2016. Accessed August 29, 2016. http://www.coha.org/politicization-and-venezuelas-presidential-recall-referendum-timeline/

[iii] “Venezuelan campaign for Maduro recall passes first hurdle,” BBC, August 2, 2016. Accessed September 2, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36949875

[iv] “Venezuela protests: Large anti-Maduro march held in Caracas,” BBC, September 2, 2016. Accessed September 2, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37243191

[v] Erika Sato, “Politicization and Venezuela’s Presidential Recall Referendum Timeline,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, August 12, 2016. Accessed August 29, 2016. http://www.coha.org/politicization-and-venezuelas-presidential-recall-referendum-timeline/

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] “Referendos Revocatorios del Mandato – 7 de Octubre de 2007,” Consejo Nacional Electoral, 2007. Accessed September 2, 2016. http://www.cne.gov.ve/web/normativa_electoral/elecciones/2007/referendo_revocatorios/index_principal.php

[viii] Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Gaceta Oficial, December 30, 1999, last updated September 13, 2005. Accessed August 30, 2016. http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/ven1999.html

[ix] Ibid. (Author’s translation)

[x] Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Gaceta Oficial, December 30, 1999, last updated September 13, 2005. Accessed August 30, 2016. http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/ven1999.html

[xi] “Solicitud de Referendo Revocatorio Presidencial,” Consejo Nacional Electoral, August 9, 2016. Accessed August 29, 2016. http://www.cne.gob.ve/web/imagen/publicidad/2016/presentacion.pdf

[xii] Erika Sato, “Politicization and Venezuela’s Presidential Recall Referendum Timeline,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, August 12, 2016. Accessed August 29, 2016. http://www.coha.org/politicization-and-venezuelas-presidential-recall-referendum-timeline/

[xiii] Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Gaceta Oficial, December 30, 1999, last updated September 13, 2005. Accessed August 30, 2016. http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/ven1999.html

[xiv] “Cuanto votos obtuvieron los candidatos en cada estado?” Eleccionesvenezuela. Accessed August 29, 2016. http://www.eleccionesvenezuela.com/informacion-cne-resultados-elecciones-presidenciales-24.html

[xv] “Elecciones a la Asamblea Nacional,” Conjeso Nacional Electoral, last updated January 20, 2016. Accessed August 29, 2016. http://www.cne.gob.ve/resultado_asamblea2015/r/0/reg_000000.html

[xvi] “Boletin Electoral Referendum 15 de Agosto de 2004,” Consejo Nacional Electoral, September 3, 2004. Accessed August 31, 2016. http://www.cne.gob.ve/referendum_presidencial2004/

[xvii] “Venezuela opposition march over referendum delays,” BBC, 27 July, 2016. Accessed September 2, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36903142

[xviii] Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Gaceta Oficial, December 30, 1999, last updated September 13, 2005. Accessed August 30, 2016. http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/ven1999.html

[xix] Alfredo Meza, “La crisis política en Venezuela arrecia en vísperas de una manifestación opositora,” El País (Madrid), August 29, 2016. Accessed August 29, 2016. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2016/08/28/actualidad/1472406883_325031.html

[xx] José Luis Carrillo, “Bello: firmas del 20% deben ser de la circunscripción nacional,” El Tiempo, August 29, 2016. Accessed August 29, 2016. http://eltiempo.com.ve/venezuela/politica/bello-firmas-del-20-deben-ser-de-la-circunscripcion-nacional/227683

[xxi] Ibid.

[xxii] Resolución No. 070207-036, Consejo Nacional Electoral, República Bolivariano de Venezuela, February 7, 2007. Accessed September 5, 2016. http://puzkas.com/normas-para-referendos-revocatorios/

[xxiii] “CNE ratifica los pasos a seguir para activar el Revocatorio,” Sumarium.com, April 29, 2016. Accessed September 2, 2016. http://sumarium.com/cne-ratifica-los-pasos-a-seguir-para-activar-el-revocatorio/

[xxiv] Resolución No. 070207-036, Consejo Nacional Electoral, República Bolivariano de Venezuela, February 7, 2007. Accessed September 5, 2016. http://puzkas.com/normas-para-referendos-revocatorios/

[xxv] Irving Briceno Perez, “MUD debe estar preparada para recaudar el 20% por estados,” Efecto Cocuyo, August 29, 2016.

[xxvi] Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Gaceta Oficial, December 30, 1999, last updated September 13, 2005. Accessed August 30, 2016. http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Venezuela/ven1999.html

[xxvii] Erika Sato, “Politicization and Venezuela’s Presidential Recall Referendum Timeline,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, August 12, 2016. Accessed August 29, 2016. http://www.coha.org/politicization-and-venezuelas-presidential-recall-referendum-timeline/

A new study by Johns Hopkins researchers suggests that a specialized area of the mosquito brain mixes tastes with smells to create unique and preferred flavors. The findings advance the possibility, they say, of identifying a substance that makes “human flavor” repulsive to the malaria-bearing species of the mosquitoes, so instead of feasting on us, they keep the disease to themselves, potentially saving an estimated 450,000 lives a year worldwide.

A report on the research appeared online on Oct. 3 in the journal Nature Communications. Malaria is an infectious parasite disease of humans and animals transmitted by the bite of the female Anopheles gambiae mosquito. In 2015, experts estimate it affected 214 million people, mostly in Africa, despite decades of mosquito eradication and control efforts. There is no malaria vaccine, and although the disease is curable in early stages, treatment is costly and difficult to deliver in places where it is endemic.

“All mosquitoes, including the one that transmits malaria, use their sense of smell to find a host for a blood meal. Our goal is to let the mosquitoes tell us what smells they find repulsive and use those to keep them from biting us,” said Christopher Potter, Ph.D., assistant professor of neuroscience at the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine.

Because smell is essential to mosquito survival, each mosquito has three pairs of “noses” for sensing odors: two antennae, two maxillary palps and two labella. The maxillary palps are thick, fuzzy appendages that protrude from the lower region of the mosquito’s head, more or less parallel to its proboscis, the long, flexible sheath that keeps its “feeding needle” under wraps until needed. At the very tip of the proboscis are the labella, two small regions that contain both “gustatory” neurons that pick up tastes and olfactory neurons for recognizing odorants.

To better understand how An. gambiae mosquitoes that cause malaria receive and process olfactory information from so many sensory regions, Potter’s team wanted to see where olfactory neurons from those regions go to in the brain.

They used a powerful genetic technique — never before accomplished in mosquitoes, according to Potter — to make certain neurons “glow” green. The green glowing label was designed to appear specifically in neurons that receive complex odors through proteins called odorant receptors (ORs), since OR neurons are known to help distinguish humans from other warm-blooded animals in Aedes aegypti mosquitoes, which carry the Zika virus.

“This is the first time researchers managed to specifically target sensory neurons in mosquitoes. Previously, we had to use flies as a proxy for all insects, but now we can directly study the sense of smell in the insects that spread malaria,” said Olena Riabinina, Ph.D., the lead author of the study and a postdoctoral fellow now at the Imperial College London. “We were pleasantly surprised by how well our genetic technique worked and how easy it is now to see the smell-detecting neurons. The ease of identification will definitely simplify our task of studying these neurons in the future.”

As expected, Potter said, the OR neurons from the antennae and maxillary palps went to symmetrical areas of the brain called antennal lobes, just as they do in flies. But Potter was quite surprised when he saw that the OR neurons from the labella went to the so-called subesophageal zone, which, he says, had never before been associated with the sense of smell in any fly or insect; it had only been associated with the sense of taste.

“That finding suggests that perhaps mosquitoes don’t just like our smell, but also our flavor,” says Potter. “It’s likely that the odorants coming off our skin are picked up by the labella and influence the preferred taste of our skin, especially when the mosquito is looking for a place to bite.”

Potter says the finding potentially offers researchers one more way to repel mosquitoes. The antennae and maxillary palps are more specialized for picking up long-range signals, while the labella come into direct contact with our skin. In fact, Potter says, before injecting their needlelike proboscis, mosquitoes use the labella to probe about on a victim’s skin. “We don’t really know why they do that, but we suspect that they’re looking for sensory cues that hint at easy access to a blood vessel,” he said. “This suggests that a combination of repellants could keep mosquitoes from biting us in two ways. One could target the antennal neurons and reduce the likelihood that they come too close, while another could target the labellar neurons and make the mosquitoes turn away in disgust — before sucking our blood — if they got close enough to land on us.”

The two-part genetic system Potter devised to generate the glowing neurons will make it much easier for his and other laboratories to mix and match genetically altered mosquitoes to generate new traits, he says. His group has already created a strain of An. gambiae mosquitoes whose OR neurons glow green upon activation. Scientists can thus see which neurons light up in response to a specific smell.

“Using this method, we hope to find an odorant that is safe and pleasant-smelling for us but strongly repellant to mosquitoes at very low concentrations,” said Potter.

His group was also able to compare the brains of male and female mosquitoes. Since only females use their sense of smell to find humans and males feed only on nectar, it was previously thought that males had just a rudimentary sense of smell. The Potter group found instead that males have the same level of complexity in their brains to detect odors as females but have fewer olfactory neurons. “It appears that males might just have a scaled-down version of a female’s sense of smell. So they can still smell everything a female smells, just not as well,” Potter said.

His group plans to study other types of neurons to better understand how signals from the mosquitoes’ three types of olfactory receptors interact to influence their behavior. For example, why is lactic acid not attractive on its own but highly attractive when mixed with carbon dioxide?

“We’d like to figure out what regions and neurons in the brain lead to this combined effect,” said Potter. “If we can identify them, perhaps we could also stop them from working.”

(Civil.Ge) — The U.S. 6th Fleet command and control ship USS Mount Whitney (LCC 20) arrived in Batumi on Georgia’s Black Sea coast for “a scheduled port visit” on October 12.

The flagship of the 6th Fleet, which is homeported in Gaeta, Italy, entered the Black Sea on October 10 to “enhance maritime security, stability, readiness, and strengthen partnerships with our allies and partners,” according to the U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa

“It is a great opportunity to come into the Black Sea to continue our partnerships with the Black Sea nations, Georgia being one of our best, and we look forward to this port call,” Rear Admiral Daryl L. Caudle, Deputy Commander, U.S. 6th Fleet, said.

This is the fourth port visit to Georgia by the USS Mount Whitney.

It delivered humanitarian aid to the port of Poti in early September 2008, less than a month after Georgia-Russia war; at the time Russian military forces were still maintaining two outposts in the outskirts of Poti. The Mount Whitney also made port visit to Georgia in November, 2013 and then in October, 2014.

Robotics offers huge potential for law enforcement in the face of new challenges and resource constraints. Nonetheless, there are organisational, operational and societal implications that the technology might bring.

By Muhammad Faizal bin Abdul Rahman*

In July 2016, the Dallas Police deployed a bomb disposal robot to deliver an explosive device to neutralise a shooter. The decision to weaponise a non-lethal robot was deemed necessary as other options to subdue the shooter would have resulted in more casualties. The lethal application of robots in law enforcement was reportedly unprecedented. It understandably drew profound interest not dissimilar from the military domain when such technology gained importance for offensive applications.

The operational and ethical issues stemming from the Dallas situation would be of greater relevance to countries afflicted with gun violence. For those with low crime rates, the Dallas incident presages the future of law enforcement where robots could play an integral role across the spectrum of operational functions.

Here Come Robocops

Robotics is increasingly adopted in countries which have embraced emerging technologies for smart cities initiatives, supporting a range of public-facing services including law enforcement. Research in artificial intelligence (AI) by Stanford University noted that improvements in hardware will innovate robots over the next 15 years. The World Economic Forum expects the robotics market to grow at a rate of 17% annually; and robots will be deployed in many areas of works in future.

In Singapore, robots are being piloted in various sectors; Ngee Ann Polytechnic in 2012 collaborated with the Singapore Police Force to develop a prototype Pole Climbing Robot that could deploy surveillance cameras to monitor public order situation in crowded places.

With the exponential pace of advances in AI and Internet of Things (IoT), the robots of tomorrow will be cost-efficient, functionally versatile, and capable of collaborating with human personnel. Organisations could look forward to the technology to overcome their resource constraints and enhance efficiency. Indeed, cost efficiency and functional versatility are the selling points of the latest models of security robots introduced to the market; and there will certainly be other potential benefits yet to be discovered.

The Robotic Adjutant

A feasible approach for technology adoption would be collaboration whereby robots complement human personnel in frontline duties. A paper on ‘Smart Monitoring of Complex Public Scenes: Collaboration between Human Guards, Security Network and Robotic Platforms’ by the US Department of Homeland Security outlines this approach. Robots interact with human personnel in performing two primary duties; patrolling for deterrence and surveillance; and gathering information on threats to support decision-making.

The designs of the latest models of robots in the market appear to affirm this approach. Chinese robotics developer Qihan unveiled ‘Sanbot’ which is capable of performing mobile video surveillance, interfacing with the IoT architecture, and self-recharging for 24/7 operation. American robotics developer Gamma2Robotics unveiled ‘Ramsee’ which is described as ‘ideally suited for overnight dull, dirty and dangerous patrols nobody wants to do’.

Harnessing Robots – Issues and Challenges

Harnessing robots in law enforcement brings about challenges and issues including those which may be unintended and unexpected.

At the organisational level, human-machine interface issues need to be addressed given their complex ramifications on the human personnel’s adaptation to new technology, their attitudes and productivity. A different skillset and business process reengineering would ensure proper integration of robots into the organisation.

At the operational level, an appreciation of the social context and attitudes of people when robots are present is necessary for frontline deployment of robots; lest they hamper rather than support their human partners. For example, research (i.e. “mObi” robot) in this area by New-York based Cornell University hitherto observes that robot guards have to be paired with a human for there to be any discernible deterrent effects; as long as the capability of robots is strictly surveillance rather than interventionist.

Even if the robots are unarmed or limited to non-lethal weapons, issues of supervisory and legal accountability with impact on public trust could arise if there is unexpected injury to the public resulting from non-lethal intervention (such as cardiac arrest when tasered) or technical glitches (such as driverless car accident) with the robots.

At the societal level, a calibrated implementation of robots which factors in grassroots feedback could address the concern of technology isolating the users from the community. Robots, although non-human, could in fact support community policing by enhancing service touchpoints. A precedent is the automation of neighbourhood police posts in Singapore where fully automated e-kiosks free police officers from desk duties for them to spend more time fighting crime.

The use of robots at service touchpoints however could give rise to concerns over privacy breaches. This must be addressed from the cybersecurity and operational angles given the robots’ mobile surveillance capabilities. These may be seen as more creeping compared to static CCTV cameras, and collection of personal data in its interactions with the community. The plausible risks from cyberattacks that compromise robots include personal data theft, and commandeering of the robots for launching malicious attacks and surveillance.

Additional Considerations for the Future

The nature of crime and public security will evolve as growing urbanisation introduces changes to the demography, landscape and socio-economic character of cities. Police forces will need to reshape their technical tools (such as. surveillance and community outreach) and protocols to sustain an adequate police-to-population ratio, efficient incident response, and public trust. These need to be considered as they grapple with imminent manpower constraints and new operational challenges.

Embracing robotics for staffing needs would be a strategic imperative for forward-thinking police forces as they seek to sustain their operational efficacy. While a fully autonomous ‘Robocop’ with a mind of its own and enforcement capabilities is likely to remain in the realm of popular culture in the foreseeable future, the role of robots in law enforcement is a certainty given the increasing pace of automation among police forces and growing pervasiveness of the technology in the public landscape.

Therefore, the evaluation of cutting edge robots and research on technical, cost and cybersecurity implications are needed. Proper integration of robots into the organisation will also require changes in organisational culture, strategies and processes. The organisational, operational and societal challenges associated with technology amid an evolving urban operating environment demand these.

*Muhammad Faizal bin Abdul Rahman is a Research Fellow with the Homeland Defence Programme at the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), a unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and his Sri Lankan counterpart Maithripala Sirisena in a meeting in Bangkok on Monday discussed ways to further strengthen bilateral relations and mutual cooperation between the two countries. The meeting was held on the sidelines of the 2nd Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) summit.

President Sirisena stressed the importance of the relations with Iran, and appreciated Tehran’s role in the establishment of peace and stability in the region and Sri Lanka.

“Iran and Sri Lanka have always had good relations and there is no impediment to the development of the two countries’ ties,” President Rouhani said. Noting that Tehran and Colombo enjoy common views on many regional and international issues, he said that the Iranian companies are ready to participate in implementing the development plans in Sri Lanka.

President Sirisena stressed the importance of the relations with Iran, and appreciated Tehran’s role in the establishment of peace and stability in the region and Sri Lanka.

Iran and Sri Lanka have had official diplomatic relations since 1961.

Currently, two Iranian companies are working on two important projects of dam construction and rural electricity in Sri Lanka.

The Iranian president expressed the hope that the two countries’ economic ties would further broaden and the two governments’ all-out relations in line with their national and regional interests.

For the second time in four days, the guided missile destroyer USS Mason responded Wednesday to an incoming missile threat while conducting routine operations in international waters off the Red Sea coast of Yemen, Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook said.

At about 6 p.m. local time Wednesday — 11 a.m. EDT — the ship detected at least one missile that officials assess originated from Houthi-controlled territory near Hudaydah, Yemen, Cook said in a statement. The ship employed defensive countermeasures, and the missile did not reach USS Mason, he added.

“There was no damage to the ship or its crew,” Cook said. “USS Mason will continue its operations. Those who threaten our forces should know that U.S. commanders retain the right to defend their ships, and we will respond to this threat at the appropriate time and in the appropriate manner.”

Homeported in Norfolk, Virginia, USS Mason is deployed as part of the Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group.

Full participation of thousands of small tuna fishers in fishery improvement projects require specific capabilities, like firm and collective capabilities for organising and marketing their fish. Fishers who don’t have these capabilities are less likely to participate in projects to improve sustainability, Frazen Tolentino-Zondervan and colleagues from Wageningen University & Research demonstrate in a paper published in PLoS ONE Wednesday.

Fishery improvement projects led by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the retailers are an attempt to support mostly small scale fishermen to comply with eco-label requirements like those of Marine Stewardship Council (MSC). Retailers in the Netherlands and other western markets have committed to only selling fish with this or equivalent eco-labels by 2018. But retailers have also struggled to meet this target because of a lack of fish products, like tuna, that are MSC certified.

NGOs and retailers have tried to improve the design of fishery improvements projects to eventually increase the supply of certified fish. A top-down approach attempts to create direct links between importers or retailers in Europe or the US and fishermen, while a bottom up approach focuses on training fishers to meet market requirements and compete on the open market.

“Our results based on a survey on 350 fishers in the Philippines, show that the success of both kinds of fishery improvement projects are dependent on fishers to have specific capabilities, such as firm capabilities (e.g. higher capital) and collective capabilities (e.g. membership to a fisher association), to participate and improve their fishing practices. If these capabilities are ignored or not developed by those running these improvements projects then fishers will not participate,” said the lead researcher of the study Frazen Tolentino-Zondervan.

“If these small scale fishers in a developing country like the Philippines don’t participate in these fishery improvements projects then they won’t move on to MSC certification,” she said.

Putting this into perspective, co-author Simon Bush added: “Given that only 7% of all MSC fisheries are from developing countries and 12% from small scale fisheries globally, understanding these capabilities is key in expanding the global impact of eco-labels”.

The researchers recommend NGOs and retailers not to focus on one fishery improvement strategy. Instead market incentives need to be supplemented with support to fishing communities and local government if these projects are to succeed.

A Special Supplement to the American Journal of Preventive Medicine provides insights into homicides, suicides, and other violence-related fatalities in the US.

Violence-related deaths, including homicides and suicides, are an urgent public health problem, according to Alex E. Crosby, MD, MPH, James A. Mercy, PhD, and Debra Houry, MD, MPH, from the National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA. Their commentary and contributions by other noted experts in the supplement to the November American Journal of Preventive Medicine provide valuable insights into new data from the National Violent Death Reporting System (NVDRS), which can help inform current debates about violence, prevention, and public policy.

Homicides and suicides account for the deaths of more than 160 people every day in the United States. Violence-related injuries claim more than 55,000 people per year. The suicide rate rose for 9 straight years from 2005 to 2014. While homicides have been declining over the long term, estimates of the economic impact stand at $26.4 billion.

The three main goals of the NVDRS are to:

1. Collect detailed information about violent deaths in the U.S., including when, where, and how they occurred

2. Link information from vital statistics (death certificates), coroner/medical examiner reports, and law enforcement reports into the reporting system

3. Provide information to help public health officials, violence prevention groups, law enforcement, and policymakers better understand the problems and guide national, state, and local actions to prevent violent deaths

Creation of the NVDRS was inspired by a 1999 Institute of Medicine report calling for a national fatal intentional injury system as well as efforts from the U.S. Public Health Service’s Surgeon General’s Office and others. Although the NVDRS does not cover all 50 states, it was the first multistate system to provide detailed information on circumstances precipitating violent deaths, the first to link multiple source documents on violence-related deaths to enable more complete understanding of each death, and the first to link multiple deaths that are related to one another (e.g., multiple homicides, multiple suicides, and cases of homicide followed by the suicide of the suspected perpetrator).

Using data from the NVDRS, two contributions to the issue can help inform the current national debate about policing. One article, by Janet M. Blair, PhD, MPH, and colleagues at the Division of Violence Prevention, CDC, examines the details of the 128 law enforcement officers (LEOs) killed between 2003 and 2013.

Key findings showed that 21% of law enforcement officers were killed during an ambush, 19.5% were killed during traffic stops or pursuits, and 15.6% were killed responding to domestic disturbances. 90% of law enforcement officers homicides were committed with a firearm.

According to the authors,  “Systems such as NVDRS are critical to ongoing surveillance of LEO homicides. The current study affords an opportunity to inform policy makers and individuals involved in training federal, tribal, state, and local law enforcement personnel about the circumstances surrounding LEO homicides in order to prevent deaths and serious injuries among this population.”

Sarah DeGue, PhD, and Katherine A. Fowler, PhD, CDC, and Cynthia Calkins, PhD, of the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, analyzed NVDRS data for 812 deaths resulting from the use of lethal force by law enforcement officers while on duty. Key findings showed that while the majority of victims were white (52%), a disproportionate number, compared with the U.S. population, were black (32%), and the fatality rate was 2.8 times higher among blacks than whites.

Most victims were reported to be armed (83%); however, black victims were more likely to be unarmed (14.8%) than white (9.4%) or Hispanic (5.8%) victims. Fatality rates among military veterans/active duty service members were 1.4 times greater than among their civilian counterparts.

DeGue, Fowler, and Calkins discuss in detail how their findings could be applied to many of the current conversations about racial disparities and violence. They concluded, “The current study is one of the first to examine the nature and circumstances of deaths due to the use of lethal force by law enforcement in the U.S. using data from a multistate public health surveillance system. Findings reinforce concerns about racial/ethnic inequities in these cases and identify incident characteristics and scenarios with important implications for prevention.”

They also note that, “Further research is also needed to examine the effectiveness of training programs and policy initiatives aimed at reducing the use of lethal force while maintaining the health and safety of officers and communities.”

The remaining articles in the supplement analyze multiple aspects of suicides, homicides, and other violent deaths using the NVDRS. This supplement will be a valuable resource for public health professionals, law enforcement officials, federal, state, and local governments, and the general public – anyone concerned with violence in society in the US.

Certain symptoms associated with the development of Alzheimer’s disease, including agitation and depression, affect Hispanics more frequently and severely than other ethnicities. The findings, published in the Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience (JNCN), suggest that Alzheimer’s disease manifests itself differently in Hispanic populations.

“Our study shows that the severity and proportion of neuropsychiatric symptoms is significantly higher in a Hispanic group compared to non-Hispanic whites,” said lead researcher Ricardo Salazar, M.D., a geriatric psychiatrist at Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center El Paso (TTUHSC El Paso). “This could have a significant impact on the treatment and understanding of how Alzheimer’s disease progresses in Hispanics.”

Both cognitive and behavioral decline can occur with Alzheimer’s disease. Cognitive signs of the disease include memory loss and problems with orientation and physical functioning. Behavioral, or neuropsychiatric symptoms, include depression, elation, anxiety, hallucinations, delusions and apathy. These neuropsychiatric symptoms have been associated with higher rates of institutionalization and more rapid progression of the disease.

Curious to understand how neuropsychiatric symptoms manifest in Hispanics with dementia, Dr. Salazar and his team gathered data on more than 2,100 individuals in the Texas Alzheimer’s Research and Care Consortium (TARCC) database. Patients profiled in the database are predominantly non-Hispanic whites and Mexican-Americans who have been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease or mild cognitive impairment (MCI), or are otherwise healthy subjects. The team specifically focused on each individual’s Neuropsychiatric Inventory Questionnaire (NPI-Q), an exam used to assess the extent of 12 neuropsychiatric symptoms.

A review of the data showed that during MCI — the intermediate state between healthy cognition and Alzheimer’s disease — all ethnicities were affected equally by neuropsychiatric symptoms. But once the condition had progressed to full-on Alzheimer’s disease, the severity of neuropsychiatric symptoms in Hispanics increased significantly.

Dr. Salazar believes these divergent symptoms may reflect a different disease process in Hispanics.

“When patients have neuropsychiatric symptoms, that signifies deterioration of different areas of the brain,” he explained. “I believe functional imaging studies of the brain may show differences in the locations of amyloid or plaque collection in the brains of Hispanics with Alzheimer’s disease.”

The JNCN study also showed that depression and anxiety were more frequent in healthy Hispanics age 50 years and older than in healthy, non-Hispanic whites of the same age. This corroborates past studies suggesting that depression may be one of the first signs of Alzheimer’s disease.

“Hispanics tend to get Alzheimer’s disease at an earlier age than other [ethnic groups], and our study shows that these neuropsychiatric symptoms of depression and anxiety manifest earlier in them, too,” Dr. Salazar said. “This suggests that depression and anxiety in older Hispanics could be an early warning for Alzheimer’s disease–and that treatment of these symptoms could even delay the disease.”

As a geriatric psychiatrist in an overwhelmingly Hispanic region, Dr. Salazar has witnessed this phenomenon firsthand.

“I am a strong believer that if you use antidepressants to treat MCI that appears with symptoms of depression, you can slow the progression of Alzheimer’s,” he said. “Maybe even avoid full-on progression to the disease.”

Dr. Salazar implores physicians to be aware that depression can mask dementia, particularly in the Hispanic population.

Dr. Salazar admitted the study has limitations. Ethnicity was self-reported by individuals, and there were also fewer Hispanic participants with Alzheimer’s disease than white participants with the disease.

While additional research is clearly needed, Dr. Salazar’s study could be a window to how to better treat — and even prevent — Alzheimer’s disease in this rapidly-growing demographic.

Despite conflicts and instability in parts, Africa’s fast growth and development, at least during the past decade, has attracted external countries mainly from Asian region, European Union (EU) and the United States. In this special interview, David Shinn, an Adjunct Professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs, a former U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso, and previously served as a Director of the Office of East African Affairs in Washington, explains some ways to engage Africa. He further discusses the important institutional differences in each BRICS member countries that impact on the implementation of policies in Africa, whether to compete or cooperate jointly on development infrastructure projects, and finally identifies the tools and tactics some countries use to achieve their respective goals on the continent. Interview excerpts follow:

Q: How unique is East Africa and the Horn for foreign investors and who are the proactive countries there?

David Shinn: This region, especially the Horn of Africa, has more than its share of conflict, which poses a special challenge for foreign investors. The three East African countries—Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda–have been more successful in attracting foreign investment because they have experienced less conflict in recent years and made a special effort to reach out to foreign investors. The investment has come from a variety of countries including the United Kingdom, Netherlands, India, Canada, South Africa, China, United States, Germany, and France. The Horn of Africa is witnessing a growing amount of investment from the Gulf States, but political instability is limiting investor interest. Before the independence of South Sudan, there was considerable investment in Sudan’s oil sector by China, India, and Malaysia.

While that investment remains, it is now shared between Sudan and South Sudan. Conflict in South Sudan has stopped new investment. Somalia and Somaliland attract investment from the Somali diaspora but foreign countries have been reluctant to go into both entities for different reasons. Somalia is not sufficiently stable and Somaliland is not recognized internationally and, therefore, poses legal challenges for potential investors.

While Djibouti and Eritrea are politically stable, their markets are too small to attract significant foreign investment. Of all the countries in the Horn, Ethiopia has in recent years been the recipient of most foreign investment from countries such as China, Turkey, Bangladesh and the Netherlands. Political protests that began last summer are beginning, however, to impact foreign investment. A number of foreign investments were destroyed during the most recent protests concerning a range of grievances. This will discourage others from coming.

Q: China is still leading with investment in infrastructure, but are the United States and European Union competing or cooperating with China?

Shinn: China is the largest builder of infrastructure in Africa today, but this is not foreign direct investment. These are contracts with Chinese state-owned companies financed by loans from Chinese government institutions, the African Development Bank, World Bank, etc. In some cases, the African governments finance the projects. Once the infrastructure project is completed, China almost never has any ownership involvement. Hence, it is not foreign direct investment, but a commercial deal financed by loans that have to be paid back by the African government. Private US and European companies are in a much weaker position to win these contracts because they have less access to financing from their own governments and tend to submit higher bids than Chinese companies. There are exceptions such as the Italian company that is building the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile. In any event, this is an area where the US and European Union compete with China.

There are areas where China, the US, and EU cooperate. All three seek political stability in Africa and cooperate on UN peacekeeping operations, African Union efforts to achieve peace such as in South Sudan, and the anti-piracy campaign in the Gulf of Aden. There is occasional collaboration on aid projects, but there is room for much more, especially in the areas of health and agriculture. All three parties have partnered with Africa to achieve development and they all want to see Africa succeed economically. There is one area of major difference. The US and EU, to varying degrees, encourage open political systems, the rule of law, and free and fair elections in Africa. China is satisfied with whatever form of government exists in a particular African country and has no desire to be critical of any governmental system. African governments prefer the Chinese approach; many African civil society organizations prefer the US and EU approach.

Q: In your view, can Russia (a member of BRICS) make any headway into the region?

Shinn: The short answer is yes and, to some extent, it has. Following the end of the Cold War, Russia pulled back sharply from Africa, although it maintained most of its diplomatic missions there. Serious economic problems in Russia prevented it from reengaging in Africa until relatively recently. There has been an increase in Russian investment in Africa, especially North Africa and several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

There are prospects for greater Russian investment in Africa. Russian trade with Africa has been especially disappointing. In 2014, it exported $9.3 billion to Africa, most to North Africa, and imported $2.8 billion from Africa. This is less trade than Turkey has with Africa. Russia is energy self-sufficient; Africa just does not have much that Russia wants to buy. This situation is not likely to change any time soon. At the political level, Russia has demonstrated minimal high-level interest in Africa. Until it makes a decision to pay more high-level attention to Africa, it is difficult to see greater engagement at the political level. For the time being, Russia is preoccupied with Syria, Ukraine, and relations with China and the US. I doubt that it will be in a position in the foreseeable future to devote much attention to Africa.

Q: What’s the best way for foreign countries to engage Africa?

Shinn: I assume your question about the best way to engage Africa refers to engagement by governments outside Africa. If so, I think the process should be as follows. First, foreign governments should determine what kind of engagement individual African governments prefer. The foreign government must then decide if it is prepared to engage in that manner. If not, it should explain frankly to the African government why not.

If the engagement sought by the African government is the kind of interaction that the foreign government is prepared to do, then both sides should discuss the details. At this point, it is essential that the foreign government not mislead the African government that it can do more than is, in fact, the case. Western governments, compared to statist driven governments, have a handicap because so much Western engagement comes from the private sector, which Western governments do not control. This handicap also applies to a number of non-Western governments.

Q: Now, looking at BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), are there institutional differences in implementing business policies in Africa?

Shinn: There are institutional differences among the BRICS. The private sector is proportionally much more important in India, Brazil, and South Africa than is the case in China and Russia. The state-owned sector of the economy is especially important in the case of China. BRICS’ business practices and the degree to which their governments control business practices vary widely from one member to another.

Unlike many Western countries, however, none of the BRICS attaches political strings to their business engagements although they all, to varying degrees, impose economic conditions. These conditions include, for example, infrastructure loans tied to construction companies from the offering country and contractual arrangements for a percentage of labor from the offering country.

Q: Can BRICS members, say for example Brazil, China or India, compete or cooperate with Russia on development projects in Africa?

Shinn: I believe there are cases where BRICS’ members have already competed for winning contracts in Africa. This has especially been the case between India and China in the petroleum sector. While I don’t know of specific examples involving Russia, I would be surprised if Russia has not competed against another BRICS’ country for winning a contract in Africa. By its very nature, business interaction usually involves competition. At the same time, companies from two different BRICS’ member countries can team up in their effort to win a contract or start a business in Africa.

The area where there is more likely to be cooperation is foreign aid. China and Brazil have been cooperating on agricultural research in Africa. Theoretically, all BRICS’ members, including Russia, could cooperate on a development project financed by two or more BRICS’ members. The BRICS’ New Development Bank has approved its first package of four loans to Brazil, China, South Africa, and India worth some US$811 million. They are all in the field of renewable energy; South Africa received a loan for US$180 million. This is an example of cooperation but, so far, only to the benefit of BRICS’ members.

Q: Do they have strategic differences that make it difficult for a unified approach in Africa?

Shinn: I believe the BRICS have strategic differences that will complicate a unified approach in Africa. Each BRICS’ member country has its own interests in Africa. Each one has a different development model and political system. The size of their respective economies varies enormously from China’s nominal GDP of US$11.4 trillion to Russia’s US$1.1 trillion and South Africa’s US$266 billion. These countries have more differences than they have commonalities. I don’t believe this will result often in unity of action.

In a country long entrenched in a two-party political system, Mike Maturen faces an uphill battle.

He’s the 2016 presidential candidate for the little-known American Solidarity Party, which holds views rooted in Catholic social thought.

But while Maturen’s name won’t even be on the ballot in most states – he’s running a write-in campaign in several locations – he thinks this November is the time for Americans to voice their dissatisfaction with Republicans and Democrats alike, and create a better option.

Founded in 2011 as the Christian Democracy Party USA, the party later changed its name to better reflect its principles of Catholic Social Teaching.

“The party itself is a secular party that is informed by faith,” Maturen says. While its members come from various religious backgrounds, and some with no faith background at all, the party’s platform is based upon three pillars of Catholic social thought: solidarity, subsidiarity and distributism.

The American Solidarity Party does not find that it fits comfortably into “conservative” or “liberal” camps. Its platform is staunchly pro-life, but adds that this conviction must also include opposition to the death penalty, as well as social services for mothers in need. Its beliefs on marriage and religious liberty would be considered conservative, while its views on the environment, health care and immigration would be considered more liberal.

Maturen himself was raised Catholic, but left the Church in college and spent years as an evangelical Protestant and later an evangelical Episcopalian before returning to the Catholic Church in 2002. His story has appeared on the EWTN show, The Journey Home.

A few months ago, the party had just 200 members. Now it has 1200, in all 50 states plus Washington, D.C. and Puerto Rico. That’s still incredibly small by political party standards, but Maturen believes that dissatisfaction over the current election cycle is driving interest in third party candidates.

“(W)e will be a force to be reckoned with in the future,” he says.

CNA spoke to Maturen about the American Solidarity Party and its goal of creating a platform based upon Catholic Social Teaching. His comments are below:

Can you give a brief overview of your basic platform? Would you consider yourself conservative, liberal, or something else?

Politically, I lean to the conservative side, having spent most of my adult years as a conservative Republican. However, after meditating upon my religious faith and my political beliefs, I realized that the two didn’t always match up. I decided to research further what the Church teaches about the various issues our country deals with. It was then that I discovered the richness of Catholic Social Teaching. I began to work to align my politics with my faith. In that process, I discovered the American Solidarity Party. Our platform is based on Catholic Social Teaching. We could best be described as “centrist” as a party…but not centrist by today’s definition… Politically, we would be considered center-right on social issues and center-left on economic issues. We believe in the economic concept of distributism as taught by GK Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc. We also believe in solidarity (we are all in this together) and subsidiarity, which teaches that problems are best solved where they reside – at the most local level possible. Higher levels of government should only intervene if asked, or if necessary. For instance, national security issues are best handled at the Federal level, while education issues are best handled at the local/parental level.

The American Solidarity Party calls itself a “whole life party.” What does that mean, and how does it differ from the two major parties today?

The term “whole life” is a short descriptive of believing in the sanctity and dignity of human life from conception to natural death…the WHOLE life. We subscribe to what is often referred to as a “consistent life ethic.” When describing the positions of the two major parties, I like to use the analogy of a bowling alley. The Republican Party by and large has settled into the extreme right, while the Democrats have largely settled into the extreme left. We call these in bowling “the gutters.” Republicans are pro-life in that they are anti-abortion, but often they forget that life does not end when the umbilical cord is cut. The Democrats only seem to care about the babies AFTER they are born. Until then, they are free to sacrifice the unborn on the altar of convenience. Once the baby is born, the left is very good at providing for their care, with a social safety net, etc. We like to think that we take the best of both parties. We need to ensure that the unborn are protected. I believe that we need to have a constitutional or legal definition of personhood for the unborn. That will ensure their right to life. Once that baby is born, we need to be certain that tools are in place for their proper care, to include medical, social, etc. We also believe that a social safety net for the elderly, impoverished and disabled is a key component to the pro-life stance. Finally, we also believe that part of the consistent life ethic is to oppose euthanasia, assisted suicide, embryonic stem cell research and the death penalty.

Your economic plan involves the distributism model. Can you explain a little more about what this would practically look like?

There really are several ways this can be implemented, either fully or incrementally. The core of distributism is to bring the economic engine closer to home. Rather than having a huge portion of our economy wrapped up in the hands and control of a few major corporations, we believe that it is the small business – the mom and pop shops – that drive the economy best. We would propose to re-write regulations to favor the small businesses and family farms, rather than the major corporations that also just so happen to be the major donors to our government officials. Regulations, taxes, etc all need to be re-thought and revamped.

How would you assess the state of the country right now? What are its most pressing needs?

I think our country is still among the greatest in the world. However, our society has become coarse. The current election cycle and the antics of the two major party candidates is really what is driving the growth of third parties and independents. The vulgarity, coarseness and pure venom of this presidential election is disgusting. Our politics should reflect our national ethic. What is missing today are the qualities of statesmanship and diplomacy. We can no longer have a national discussion without it devolving into insults, lies and mudslinging. While these things have always existed in politics, it has risen to a level never before seen. It is time to change the face of American politics and bring a fresh new perspective. We intend to be a catalyst for that change. Our pressing needs are many and varied. We need to reform immigration. We need to have a healthcare system that is fair and just. We need for taxes to be fair and equitable. We need to ensure that a social safety net is in place to care for those among us who are unable to care for themselves. We need to replace our current culture of death with a culture of life. We can do this by guaranteeing the right to life for ALL human beings, born and unborn. We believe in a hope for a future of peace, following the Just War theory. We also believe that we need to care for our shared home, the earth.

After economic issues, terrorism is the topic that ranks highest in voter concern this election. What is your plan to deal with ISIS?

ISIS is a tough pill to swallow. Our constant intervention in the affairs of other countries has led, at least partially, to the creation of ISIS. We do not believe in preemptive strikes. However, we do believe in a secure nation. If attacked, we will defend ourselves, and do so with force. We also need to use diplomacy to reduce the conditions that allow for ISIS to exist. Working with the leadership of the countries where ISIS lives and works, we can help to reduce this threat to not just the United States, but to nations in every corner of the world…and we can do so without interventionism and foreign entanglements, which the Founding Fathers warned us about.

Have you seen growth in your party over this past year?

Yes. We really only got started at gaining ballot access in July. We have grown from a handful of members in a few states to members in all 50 states plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia. We have caught the attention of media, large and small…including mentions in publications from Ireland, Italy and the UK. While still comparatively small, we will be a force to be reckoned with in the future.

What would you say to voters who are disillusioned by their choices in this election?

There is a better way. Don’t be stuck in the rut of the two party system. Voting for the lesser of two evils is STILL voting for evil, and only perpetuates the mindset that has gotten us to this point in our political history. The only wasted vote is a vote that is not cast. Do not listen to the apologists of the two-party system that a vote for a minor party candidate is a vote for Hillary, or a vote for Donald. These things are simply not true. A vote for Mike Maturen is a vote for Mike Maturen. The American Solidarity Party offers people of goodwill an opportunity to vote with a clear conscience. Take advantage of that opportunity, and help us to reshape the face of American politics.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has trolled Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton during a CNN interview, telling host Christiane Amanpour that the US presidential campaign was full of “p*ssies”.

“There are so many p*ssies around your presidential campaign on both sides that I prefer not to comment,” Lavrov answered when Amanpour asked him about Trump’s “Pussy Riot moment.”

Lavrov pre-empted his answer by saying “I don’t know if I would sound indecent,” before the comment left Amanpour laughing hysterically.

Amanpour, wife of James Rubin, former US assistant secretary of state for public affairs in the Bill Clinton administration, was interviewing Lavrov for CNN’s nightly global affairs program.

Yesterday, I stopped short of asking Hillary Clinton to fire John Podesta, her campaign chairman. In light of the latest Wikileaks revelations, she has no choice but to cut all ties with this man. The man is hell bent on creating mutiny in the Catholic Church and must therefore be fired.

We have long known that George Soros is the single most influential donor to dissident, and anti-Catholic, organizations. Now we know from Wikileaks what I long have suspected: John Podesta has been the most influential point man running offense for Soros. Together, they have sought to manipulate public opinion against the Catholic Church.

In 2012, Sandy Newman, founder of the left-wing group, Voices for Progress, asked Podesta for advice on how best to “plant the seeds of the revolution.” The revolution he sought was an attempt to sunder the Catholic Church. Newman, who is Jewish, confessed that he was a rookie at trying to subvert the Catholic Church. But he was determined to do so.

“There needs to be a Catholic Spring,” Newman told Podesta, “in which Catholics themselves demand the end of a middle ages dictatorship and the beginning of a little democracy and respect for gender equality in the Catholic Church.”

Podesta not only endorsed the plan to create a revolution within the Catholic Church—he boasted that he had been working on this for years. “We created Catholics in Alliance for the Common Good to organize for a moment like this,” he said. “Likewise Catholics United. Like most Spring movements, I think this one will have be bottom up.” He recommended that Kathleen Kennedy Townsend be consulted on this effort.

The evidence is indisputable: Both of these groups, Catholics in Alliance and Catholics United, were created by Podesta, and funded by Soros, for the express purpose of staging a revolt within the Catholic Church. In 2008, Archbishop Charles Chaput, then of Denver and now of Philadelphia, accused both entities of doing a “disservice” to the Catholic Church.

Catholics in Alliance is known for sponsoring dissident Catholics, including priests, to give talks around the nation. Catholics United was the force behind a contrived effort by the IRS to go after me in 2008. The latter story is illuminating.

On October 23, 2008, I appeared on CNN to discuss the George Soros connection to Catholics United. Before I went on, Chris Korzen of Catholics United contacted CNN in an effort to have me booted. Fortunately, he was so stupid as to share with a producer a lengthy document (it was leaked to me) detailing how unfair I had been to Barack Obama, especially noting his rabid support for abortion.

I say Korzen was stupid because when the IRS contacted me the next month, right around Thanksgiving, I recognized the complaint: it was basically the same as the one that Korzen’s lawyers had sent to CNN. (The IRS probe finally ended without penalties.)

See the connection: Podesta creates Catholics United; Soros funds Catholics United; and Catholics United sponsors an IRS complaint against me (after trying to get me kicked off CNN). Their attempt to intimidate me was a monumental failure, but the fact that they tried is what counts.

Podesta’s recommendation that Kathleen Kennedy Townsend be consulted as a source to create havoc in the Catholic Church was a good one. On March 29, 2012, I quoted her saying that the Catholic Church’s teachings “encourage bigotry and harm.”

Any Catholic who thinks that the Podesta-Soros connection is just another activist alliance is kidding himself. They are creating and funding a campaign to promote a revolution in the Catholic Church.

Contact: press@hillaryclinton.com

By Asanga Abeyagoonasekera*

“The sailor cannot see the North —but knows then needle can.” – Emily Dickinson, in a letter to a mentor, TW Higginson, seeking an honest evaluation of her talent (1862)

The young soldiers and Tamilians who sacrificed their lives to a cause that was created by a previous generation perhaps did not know the underlying politics of why they had to fight. The younger generation has taken a burden passed to them by certain political leaders that they have not seen nor heard. At the Apartheid Museum in Johannesburg, South Africa, one could study the past life during the apartheid period and understand what had gone wrong. Photographs of racial discrimination such as separate walk ways for transport to the most horrific pictures is exhibited. What if Sri Lanka had a museum to educate our younger generation of the mistakes done during the past such as the burning of the Jaffna Library, the bombing by the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE) at the Central Bank, and the several other atrocities?

The modern world is at the fourth industrial revolution. Our lives, however, still revolve around the slogans of old and ideas of the yesteryears. A white officer shooting an African American and many other incidents around the world are still heard of and looked at from a racial bias view because most of us are wired in that way due to the environment we live.

The recent “Eluga Tamil” (Arise Tamils) demonstrations will not do any good for the younger generation and the Sri Lankan nation at large. This slogan, which was used and given much hype by the Chief Minister of the Northern Province, CV Wigneswaran, is a lie to elevate his position for his own benefit and not that of the entire society or the nation. How does a rising of one ethnic group help another at a time when the nation is going through reconciliation in a mode for ethnic harmony? The very same slogan was used in the past by Chelvanayakam and Amirthalingam, which was neither helpful to the community they represented nor the nation. The 76-year-old CV Wigneswaran, a former judge of the Supreme Court, needs to get an honest evaluation of his conduct before he utters such words.

The Race Implicit Association Test (IAT) (bit.ly/TtkoCZ)is a good test to examine how biased we are towards our own race and how we see others. As a nation, we Sri Lankans have been living with these biases for a long time. According to Mahzarine Banaji and Anthony Greenwald, we all have hidden biases, and the phenomenon is called “blindspot.” Blindspot is the metaphor for the section of the mind that houses hidden biases. For example, the IAT test gets you to mark pleasant words and African American children’s faces on one side and unpleasant words with European American children faces on another side which gives us results to understand the biases we do not see clearly by ourselves. The association of words association to race, such as hatred, grief, agony etc. could be more with the faces of African American children than those of European American children.

A progressive society would look at words and deeds towards ethnic and religious harmony and not the other way. “Eluga Tamil” definitely does not look at the correct path. Good people are those of us who strive to align our behaviour with our intentions. Well intentioned people should not speak of a rise of one ethnic group but the rise of a common identity, a Sri Lankan identity. This is the new identity President Maithripala Sirisena wishes to establish with his new vision.

Stereotyping – i.e. associating a group with an attribute – is another area. Assuming that all Tamils want Eelam is one of them. The first scientific research on stereotypes was published in 1933 by Princeton psychologists Daniel Katz and Kenneth Braly. They found that one could identify a group with an attribute that could evolve over time into a different attribute. The 1933 stereotype of African Americans did not include associating the word ‘athletic’; but modern studies would do so prominently. ‘Scientific’ and ‘technical’ were not part of 1930s stereotype of Chinese origin people but almost certainly appear in modern day stereotypes. A race with one set of attributes could evolve to be different one with societal changes over time. Certain issues of the world have unfortunately remained static and have not evolved in a positive direction even after brutal battles. For instance, India and Pakistan are still lost in the past trying to figure out the difference between borders and frontiers.

Indian columnist Dr. Miniya Chatterji rightly points out in assessing the situation of recent military attacks of India and Pakistan, that “The reality is that we have placed ourselves in a conundrum of our own making. Political institutions were made by us to grant us order in society so that we can be busy ourselves with more instinctual activities.” It is important all South Asian leaders refer to this statement and establish order before launching whatever the political vision.

Views expressed here are personal and do not reflect those of the Government of Sri Lanka or the Institute of National Security Studies (INSS).

* Asanga Abeyagoonasekera
Director General, Institute of National Security Studies (INSS), Sri Lanka

By John R. Haines*

Arguments to the effect that all violence . . . is evil . . .  amount to a philosophy worthy of Quakers and the old maids of the Salvation Army. — Leon Trotsky (1918)

(FPRI) — On 3 October, the Russian government announced that legislation was introduced into the State Duma[1] to suspend a 2000 agreement with the United States for the disposition of equal quantities of weapon-grade plutonium[2] from their respective stockpiles.[3] President Vladimir Putin designated Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ryabkov (who often speaks for the Russian Foreign Ministry on nuclear disarmament matters) to represent him as the Federal Assembly (Federalnoye Sobraniye) deliberates the legislation.[4]

Mr. Putin was referring to the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), which Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov signed in August 2000.[5] The PMDA commits the United States and Russia each to dispose of no less than 34 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium from their respective military stockpiles, which is sufficient material for some 17,000 nuclear warheads. The PMDA inter alia gave substance to a 1998 joint statement in which the United States and Russia affirmed their intention to dispose of weapon-grade plutonium stocks and to convert the material into forms unsuitable for nuclear weapons.[6] In April 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov signed the Plutonium Disposition Protocol. The 2010 Protocol updated the then decade-old PMDA to address several implementation-related matters, including delineating a preferred disposal method, United States financial support for Russia’s disposal program, and bilateral inspection rights.

The declared intent of the PMDA and the 2010 Protocol was twofold: to reduce the risk of nuclear theft and terrorism; and to ensure that any effort to reverse nuclear arms reductions would be technically difficult and economically costly. As a practical matter, however, they promised little with respect to reducing the absolute risk of nuclear theft since the agreements applied to weapon-grade plutonium that was already stored in highly secured sites. Weapon-grade plutonium earmarked for disposition at the Mayak[7] Fissile Material Storage Facility in Ozersk[8] (built with United States assistance and operated by Russia’s Rosatom[9]) included some 25 metric tons already in secured storage there. The remainder was stored in secure vaults at Rosotom’s Siberian Chemical Combine[10] in Seversk and the Mining and Chemical Combine in Zheleznogorsk.[11] Consolidating material at Mayak from existing secure storage sites there as well as from Seversk and Zheleznogorsk would do little to nothing to reduce the already negligible risk that the material would be subject to theft or diversion. Moreover, the material in question represents only about a quarter of Russia’s inventory of weapon-grade plutonium (estimated at 128 metric tons ±8 mt[12]), so its effect on “mak[ing] arms control irreversible . . . ” [13] is questionable.

Here is an image[14] of the transmittal document from Sergei Naryshkin,[15] speaker of the Duma, submitting the draft legislation and related documents:

Document submitted by Sergei Naryshkin

In seeking Duma authority to suspend[16] the 2000 PMDA (and by extension, the 2010 Protocol), Mr. Putin declared, “In the period since the Agreement and the Protocol entered into force, the United States has taken a number of steps that have led to radical change in the realm of strategic security.”

Under the pretext of the crisis in Ukraine, the United States escalated its military presence in Eastern Europe, including in states that joined NATO after 2000—the year that the Agreement was concluded. In 2015, six new advanced command and control centers were established in Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Estonia. Their main task is to ensure a rapid operational response in the event of a decision to project significant NATO force into Eastern Europe. United States armed force units deployed in the Baltics to increase the number of airfields for NATO aircraft. In Ukraine, United States instructors provide training to “Right Sector” militants, whose activities are banned in Russia.[17]

Mr. Putin also accused the United States of unilaterally adopting a disposition method that does not conform to the 2010 Protocol.[18]

“In addition to actions aimed at changing the military-strategic balance,” said Mr. Putin, “the United States had undertaken steps to undermine the economy of the Russian Federation and to violate the rights of Russian citizens.” He cited objections to the Magnitsky Act of 2012 and the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014,[19] both of which impose punitive sanctions on Russian citizens and entities.

Right Sector flag

Of all the grievances elaborated by Mr. Putin, one is puzzling—alleged United States support for the Ukrainian ultranationalist group known as Right Sector (Pravyi Sektor).[20]

The sole reference to Right Sector is found in the explanatory note to the draft federal law in the context of discussing the NATO buildup in the Baltics and Eastern Europe. It is not, however, one the explicit conditions (articulated in Article 2 of the draft federal law) that must be satisfied before Russia will consent to return the PMDA and the 2010 Protocol into effect.[21] Mr. Putin’s Right Sector grievance is this: the United States is actuating a direct threat to Russia’s internal security by supporting (which in the specific case of Right Sector, the United States vigorously denies) Ukrainian paramilitary forces. That internal threat is sharpest today with regard to Crimea, the former Ukrainian territory that Russia annexed in March 2014. The Russian government attributed “attempted terrorist attacks” (popytku teraktov) there in August to agents of the Chief Directorate of Intelligence of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry (Holovne upravlinnya rozvidky Ministerstva oborony Ukrayiny or “HOR-MUA”).[22] It claimed in late September that Right Sector is acting “with the tacit approval and support of the Ukrainian leadership” (olchalivomu odobreniyu i pooshchreniyu rukovodstva Ukrainy).[23] The purported threat to Russia’s internal security represented by Right Sector and other Ukrainian paramilitaries is the complement to the external threat that is the object of another of Mr. Putin’s stated grievances. It is NATO’s January 2015 decision to establish six forward command centers—three in the Baltics states and three in eastern frontline member-states—and a 5000-troop strong spearhead force (“Very High Readiness Joint Task Force”), the declared ambition of which is to counter Russian aggression in Ukraine.[24]

The Russian Supreme Court in November 2014 banned Right Sector as an extremist organization. In early March 2014, Russia’s main federal investigative agency known as Sledkom (a portmanteau word derived from Sledstvennyi komitet Rossiyskoy Federatsii) accused Right Sector leader Dmytro Yarosh of “public appeals to commit acts of terrorism” for allegedly posting a statement on Right Sector’s VKontakte or “VK” (a Facebook-like Russian social networking site) page urging Chechen separatist leader Doku Umarov[25] to join Ukraine’s fight against Russia. The message was republished by the Interfax news agency:

Many Ukrainians took up arms to support the liberation struggle of the Chechen people and the other people of the Caucasus. Now is the time for you to support Ukraine! As Right Sector’s leader, I encourage you to intensify your fight. Russia is not so strong as it seems. You now have a unique opportunity to win. Take advantage of this opportunity![26]

The text was accompanied by photographs of unidentified uniformed men, which the Russian government-controlled RT speculated included Mr. Yarosh “since he was one of several Ukrainians who participated in fighting Russian troops in Chechnya during the First Chechen War.”[27] Right Sector spokesperson Artyom Skoropadsk[28] denied the accusation claiming that the group’s VK page had been hacked.[29] Another Russian news portal (the owner of which is reputed to have close ties to Mr. Putin[30]) reported Right Sector’s claim but disputed its veracity.

Right Sector, which just a day earlier confirmed its reference to Doku Umarov was accurate, disowned him in less than a day . . . [31]

In late April, Russia’s Prosecutor General Yury Chaika submitted a report to the Federation Council (Sovet Federatsii)[32] formally accusing Right Sector supporters of using VK to organize mass riots with the intent of fomenting a coup d’etat in Russia.[33] Right Sector spokesperson Artyom Skoropadsk denied the accusation and claimed Russian authorities had long since blocked its access to VK and other social media portals.

In late September, Sledkom filed a criminal case against five current and former members of Right Sector.[34] It charged Dmytro Yarosh,[35] Andriy Tarasenko,[36] Andrey Stempitskogo, Valery Voronov, and Artyom Skoropadsky, respectively.

[I]n the period from 2014 to the present, the extremist organization’s leaders and activists engaged continuously in the systematic planning and execution of criminal acts against the Russian Federation, its citizens and diplomatic missions in Ukraine, as well as Russian-speaking non-combatants. The Department stressed that criminal actions by Yarosh, Tarasenko, Stempitskiy, Voronov, and Skoropadskiy continue to enjoy the tacit approval and support of the Ukrainian leadership.[37]

The Ukrainian Internet television station Espreso reported that Mr. Yarosh greeted news of the indictment, which was announced on his 45^th birthday, with a post on his Facebook page: “The best greetings from the eternal enemy . . . Death to the Russian Federation!”[38]

Several days later, the Russian Interior Ministry announced it was looking for the leader of Right Sector’s Kyiv branch, Igor Mazur, who it suspected had been in the Moscow area since early 2016 for the purposes of “engaging in recruiting activists to organize riots in Moscow” and “preparing acts of sabotage in Russia.”[39] Mr. Mazur reportedly[40] was associated with another ultranationalist group, the Ukrainian National Assembly-Ukrainian People’s Self-Defence (Ukrayinsʹka Natsionalʹna Asambleya-Ukrayinsʹka Narodna Samooborona) known by its transliterated Ukrainian acronym, UNA-UNSO, which merged with Right Sector in May 2014.[41]

These events seem less consequential than the other factors Mr. Putin cited in his decision to seek legislative authority to withdraw from the PMDA and the 2010 Protocol. The Kremlin has long accused Washington of supporting Ukrainian paramilitaries including but not limited to Right Sector. So why did the Kremlin explicitly cite American military training to Right Sector paramilitary forces?[42]

Recall that the FSB on 10 August 2016 announced that it interrupted a terrorist plot near the town of Armyansk, located in northern Crimea, targeting infrastructure sites in Crimea.[43] The FSB attributed the plot to the Ukrainian Defense Ministry’s Main Intelligence Directorate, which issued a rapid categorical denial. The story was picked up quickly by Russian media: a headline on Russia’s REN TV website declared, “Ukrainian terrorists want to flood Crimea’s beaches with blood.”[44] Mr. Putin was explicit though more temperate:

I believe that it is obvious to everyone that the authorities currently in charge in Kyiv are not looking for ways to solve problems through negotiations, but have moved instead to terrorism. This is a very disturbing thing. [ . . . ] Of course, in the circumstances a Normandy format meeting makes no sense. It seems that those who seized and continue to hold power in Kyiv have shifted to terrorism rather than seeking tradeoffs . . . instead of looking for a peaceful settlement.[45]

While the facts surrounding the 10 August incident remain ambiguous—Russia maintains steadfastly that Ukrainian agents provocateurs were behind the plot, while Ukraine maintains with equal vigor that it was a Russian false flag operation—it is true that Ukrainian ultranationalists have long threatened to use force to suppress so-called Crimean “separatism.”

Any attempt to break Ukraine’s territorial integrity will be harshly punished. If the government isn’t capable, Right Sector will form a “friendship train” like we did in the ’90s and go to Crimea. Then the rats will flee when our column enters Sevastopol.[46]

Igor Mosiychuk (Source: 112 Ukraina screenshot )

The speaker in this instance is the Ukrainian paramilitary figure and parliamentarian Igor Mosiychuk[47] (see picture right) who made the remark in September 2014.

Russian authorities have made similar allegations against Crimean Tatar leaders who oppose Crimea’s annexation. In April 2016, for example, RIA-Novosti—the Russian-language news agency operated by the Ministry of Communications and Mass Media (Ministerstvo svyazi i massovykh kommunikatsiy Rossiyskoy Federatsii)—reported that Mustafa Cemil posted a statement on his Facebook page in which he said that a “suicide battalion” (batal’one smertnikov) had been deployed to Ukraine’s Kherson region to supplement Ukraine’s State Border Guard Service (Derzhavna Prykordonna Sluzhba Ukrayiny or “DPSU”). Mr. Cemil, a Crimean Tatar, is a Ukrainian parliamentarian associated with the political party Petro Poroshenko Bloc “Solidarity” (Blok Petra Poroshenka «Solidarnist’»).[48] In a now familiar pattern, subsequent reports in Russian media portals embellished the RIA-Novosti one, suggesting, for example, that the Asker [literally, a Turkish warrior] and the Noman Çelebicihan[49] (Batalʹyoni Nomana Chelebidzhykhana) Crimean Tatar paramilitary battalions were prepared “to invade the peninsula, if necessary.”[50] As with Right Sector, Russian media reports have alleged the Crimean Tatar paramilitaries also pose a threat to the Kyiv government. According to a 25 September report in Delovaya Gazeta, two deserters captured by Russian authorities “confessed” that the Noman Çelebicihan Battalion “is prepared to blackmail the Kyiv authorities by threatening to sabotage Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Station [in southeastern Ukraine] and the Kakhovka reservoir [in the northern Kherson region].”[51] The same report alleges that the Noman Çelebicihan Battalion is actively collaborating with the Azov Regiment (the former paramilitary group now part of Ukraine’s National Guard) and Right Sector.

Returning to Right Sector, all this begs the question whether there is any basis for claiming that it intends to prosecute an irregular campaign inside Crimea. That possibility does not exclude a more widely held alternate belief: that Russian authorities are using a purported threat posed by Right Sector and likeminded paramilitaries as a straw man. They have raised alarms since mid-August about an imminent provocation along Crimea’s border with Ukraine’s Kherson region, where not coincidentally, Russian authorities have prosecuted an aggressive soft power campaign,[52] both directly and through disinformation (dezinformatsiya) proxies.[53]

Dmytro Yarosh (left) and Elena Belozerskaya (right)

If Russian authorities have some credible basis for believing Right Sector (either itself or as a placeholder for other paramilitaries) poses a bona fide threat, it might explain (at least in part) an apparent non sequitur: why Right Sector merited mention in the context of a bilateral dispute with the United States over the disposition of weapon-grade plutonium. There is an intriguing coincidence between that mention and an interview published on 27 September in the Belorussian news portal Tut (“Here”), which received wide attention in Russian and Ukrainian media outlets if little or no coverage elsewhere.[54] The interview is with Elena Belozerskaya, a popular Right Sector combatant and blogger who appears to the right in an undated photograph with Dmytro Yarosh.

“Ukrainian nationalists, including me, are not against the Russian people and not against Russia,” said Ms. Belozerskaya.

We are for the independence of Ukraine—both from Russia, and from other countries, including the European Union. We believe Ukraine has unlimited possibilities and opportunities to become a strong and independent state.[55]

That is the full extent of any accommodating rhetoric. She continued that in Dnepropetrovsk and Odessa, “Unlike the demoralized police and army, we acted unhesitatingly and harshly. Some of the most active ‘Vatnikov’[56] are gone forever, and the rest fled.”[57] As to the multilateral Minsk process to resolve the conflict in eastern Ukraine, she said:

It cannot and should not be observed. The war between Russia and us is a long-standing conflict, one that doesn’t have a peaceful, non-violent solution. By force of arms alone, we’ll find out whether Ukraine is able to exist as a strong sovereign state, or whether it is an integral part of the Russian Empire.[58]

And then there is the matter of Crimea:

Why didn’t we fight in Crimea? We just didn’t have enough time—it was the start of the Donbass fighting. When Right Sector went into the Donbass, we didn’t immediately begin fighting at full strength, so there were only small skirmishes because it took a long time to equip our fighters. When we win in the Donbass, we’ll take up Crimea. Many of us are ready to start a guerilla war there.[59]

It should be said that Mr. Putin is not the only one keeping his eye on Right Sector. In early October, there were multiple reports of clashes with Ukrainian government forces. Right Sector also has an increasingly visible presence in western Ukraine’s Transcarpathia region—an area bordering Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland, with a sizeable ethnic Hungarian population—whereby according to at least one account, it operates as the “pocket army”[60] (kyshenʹkovoyu armiyeyu) of the oligarch Viktor Baloha, who has admitted openly to funding the group.[61]

“The ability to get to the verge without getting into the
war is the necessary art. If you cannot master it, you
inevitably get into war. If you try to run away from it, if
you are scared to go to the brink, you are lost.”
                            -John Foster Dulles (1956)

The United States steadfastly denies that it is training or arming Right Sector paramilitary forces. Some former paramilitaries like the Azov Brigade have been brought under the Ukrainian National Guard command structure—not, however, the estimated 5000-strong Right Sector paramilitary force—and have been seconded to bolster National Guard forces, notably in the area of the Crimean isthmus. The United States openly provides training to National Guard units and to its affiliated paramilitaries.

Mr. Putin’s reference to Right Sector as a reason to suspend the PMDA and the 2010 Protocol seems a non sequitur. So we turn, for perspective, to accounts published by two manifestly pro-Russian news portals, Russkaya Pravda[62] and Svobodnaya Pressa,[63] for remarks made last year by Yuri Butusov, a Ukrainian journalist and military affairs commentator, and editor-in-chief of the news portal Tsenzor.net (www.censor.net.ua).[64] The tenor is captured by the expressive headline in Russkaya Pravda—”A Second Afghanistan” (Vtoroy Afganistan).

This will be a local war of low intensity, its forms disguised or hidden, which will strike blows against specific points . . . You don’t need to amass an army and attack somewhere. One simply has to act effectively along the contact line in order to strike at the enemy. It should be like Afghanistan. The Soviet Union unquestionably held all the key positions but regularly suffered losses. And those losses were huge for the country, for despite their small number, they were unacceptable from an economic and political point of view.[65]

“Our main task,” Mr. Butusov added, “is to make for the occupation of Donbass and Crimea a very expensive luxury for Russia.”[66]  An unsympathetic summary of Mr. Butusov’s commentary by Svobodnaya Pressa concluded, “After ‘cleansing’ the Donbass, Ukraine will begin to attack Crimea.”[67] Svobodnaya Pressa said the following in an accompanying commentary:

What does [Butusov] mean? What does this look like in practice? Wouldn’t attempting to unleash a “pocket war” on Russian territory quickly come to an end in Kyiv? [ . . . ] Butsunov’s statement recognizes explicitly that Ukraine has become a terrorist state, one that intends to employ terrorist methods broadly—against its people, against Crimea, and against Russia. Moscow has long understood the necessity of answering all such statements, which threaten terrorist activities on the territory of the Russian Federation. So why aren’t they given sufficient consideration? After all, you can learn how Washington reacts to similar threats and statements, and adopt its methods.[68]

So what are we to make of this? A couple of observations seem warranted. First, Mr. Putin may now take more seriously the threat of an irregular conflict directed against the territory of Crimea waged by a (relative to what Russian-backed forces faced early in the Donbass conflict) a well-trained and armed paramilitary force. The Kremlin’s intent in electing to fall back on the Right Sector bogeyman may be to warn Kyiv (and Washington) of the danger of unloosing forces over which it has tenuous control. Second, Mr. Putin has clearly cast Right Sector (and by extension, Ukrainian paramilitaries as a whole) as little more than a United States proxy force, one effect of which is to threaten to escalate a (at present) low-grade conflict along the Crimea-Kherson frontier to a much higher geopolitical plane.

It is worth reiterating that Mr. Putin’s public statement about Right Sector in the context of the PMDA and the 2010 Protocol are not reflected in any of the formal documents submitted to the Duma. It is, as a matter of fact, the only articulated reason that is omitted from the documents. So it seems reasonable to conclude that his emphatic point about American support for Right Sector was meant to signal something else.

An admittedly and not wholly controversial observation is that the United States indicated it would not comply with the PMDA and especially, the 2010 Protocol, long before Mr. Putin emphatically suspended its effect. This has to do with the cost to implement the MOX disposition method that the United States agreed to employ. A September 2016 United States Energy Department report concluded, “Based on this 2016 updated PB analysis, the TPC for the MFFF project is estimated at $17.17B with a projected completion date of 2048.”[69] In plain English, that means the Savannah River MOX facility will cost an estimated $17.17 Billion (four times the original cost estimate) by the time it is completed thirty-two years from now in the year 2048. The Obama Administration sought Russian consent—which Mr. Putin declined to give—to replace the agreed-to MOX disposition method with an alternate one—immobilization [see fn(18)]—and ultimately to bury the material at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico (which has been closed since February 2014 due to a radiation leak caused by a drum of nuclear waste that ruptured underground).[70]

While unaccommodating, Mr. Putin’s refusal is hardly tantamount to “nuclear blackmail,” as claimed by such commentators as Russian political scientist Andrei Piontkovsky, writing on the Ukrainian website Apostrophe. Mr. Piontkovsky reaches a plausible conclusion—the PMDA and the 2010 Protocol are more important for what they symbolize than for what they achieve—but his reasoning is flawed. It is, after all, the United States that so far has failed to fulfill its disposition commitment, not Russia.[71]

By itself, the question of plutonium is not very important for both the Americans and Russians . . . But the emphatic rejection of the agreement is of great psychological importance. It’s part of nuclear blackmail by Russia, not so much directed at American leaders and nuclear weapons experts who understands what is happening here, but of Western society as a whole. Because after all, when the public thinks about plutonium, it immediately remembers that it has something to do with nuclear weapons . . . And now, the ‘Putin-channelers” will say, “Putin is a madman, he has nuclear weapons, so let’s not offend him or to drive him into a corner. Let’s give in, and maybe give him Ukraine . . . [72]

With all due respect, Mr. Piontkovsky’s point about the PMDA’s “great psychological importance” simply does not follow from a histrionic imagined conversation about appeasing Mr. Putin.

The Obama Administration erred when it ignored Vladimir Ulyanov’s dictum (usually misattributed to Lenin) that everything is connected to everything else. How it did so in today’s contentious atmosphere is a mystery. Kenneth Waltz elaborated Ulyanov’s dictum as “In reality, everything is connected to everything else and one domain cannot be separated from others,”[73] continuing that “Interdependence usually suggests little more than that. The thought may be the beginning of wisdom, but not its end.”[74]

Here is one such connection. In April 2010, President Obama and then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a bilateral arms control agreement known as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty or “New START.” Both countries agreed, among other things, to reduce their number of nuclear warheads by February 2018 to no more than 1550 warheads each. Since New START went into effect in February 2011, however, Russia has increased its number of deployed warheads by 259, increasing its strategic arsenal from 1537 warheads to 1796 warheads, or 246 warheads above the February 2018 New START limit.[75] This leaves the disparity in deployed strategic warheads (429 warheads) at its highest point since New START entered into force in February 2011.[76]

There are two explanations for the increase in the number of Russian warheads. The first is that it is a temporary anomaly, one that reflects Russia’s deployment of new Borei-class [NATO Reporting Name: Dolgorukiy] ballistic missile submarines. In September 2016, the third Borei-class SSBN (of an expected total of eight) deployed to the Rybachiy Nuclear Submarine Base on the Kamchatka Peninsula. The second explanation is that Russia is signaling that it may not intend to comply with the New START limits. The practical effect of Russian non-compliance with the New START warhead cap is likely negligible according to a now-declassified May 2012 United States Defense Department report:

Russian deployment of additional strategic warheads . . . even if significantly above the New START Treaty limits, would have little to no effect on the U.S. assured second-strike capabilities that underwrite our strategic deterrence posture. The Russian Federation, therefore, would not be able to achieve a militarily significant advantage by any plausible expansion of its strategic nuclear forces . . . [77]

The political effect could be significant, however, which begs the question why the Obama administration elected to take on the risk associated with unilaterally reframing its plutonium disposition commitment? The Russian journalist Yulia Latynina elaborated this risk in a recent Novaya Gazeta commentary:

Obama really offended the Russians by closing the [Savannah River MOX] plant, though not deliberately. Obama’s decision unwittingly demonstrated that the Russian “radioactive dust” simply was not taken into account, and is not seen as a threat. It is hard to imagine that at the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States would have talked about warheads in economics terms and regretted any sum of money spent on the destruction of 34 tons of weapon-grade plutonium. In those days, nuclear parity agreements cost dearly . . . As for the military aspect of the problem, the [New] Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty says Russia and the United States can only have 1550 warheads each. Whether she retains [the weapon-grade plutonium slated for disposition] or uses it as fuel for fast breeder reactors has little direct relevance for international security, that is, until such time as Russia uses it as a pretext for leaving [New] START.[78]

Benignant American intentions notwithstanding, one must take into account Mr. Putin’s perception of crescive United States encroachment in Russia’s borderlands and a United States-trained paramilitary force in Ukraine (with its legacy of highly distasteful, extremist political associations). This is especially important in the context of the United States seeking to change the heretofore agreed to disposition method to one that Russian experts criticize as disqualifyingly impermanent. If the Obama administration expected Mr. Putin to defer without asking for something in return, it was naive in the extreme. A less charitable view is that it used the expected Russian refusal as a pretense to evade implementing the disposition method to which it earlier agreed.

The inherent danger is that United States’ actions are interpreted to place legacy arms control agreements lower on the geopolitical priority scale than its pursuit of a rump neo-containment doctrine against Russia. Much the same accusation has been leveled at, for example, the Obama administration’s decision to deploy the “Aegis Ashore” ballistic missile defense system on the western Black Sea,[79] which it rationalized unconvincingly as countering the Iranian ballistic missile threat to Europe. Mr. Putin responded in late September 2016 by deploying Russia’s upgraded Yars road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile system to Tver, a Russian region immediately east of Lithuania.

Suspending plutonium disposition will likely have no practical effect one way or the other on the risk of nuclear theft and terrorism. Important symbolism aside, that risk was unaffected by shifting a fraction of Russia’s stockpile of weapon-grade plutonium from one secure site to another. It will, however, affect another consideration, viz., to ensure that any effort to reverse nuclear arms reductions would be technically difficult and economically costly. It is indeed paradoxical that in the end, what derailed the agreement was that the disposition method to which the United States was bound turned out to be technically too difficult and economically too costly, at least from an American perspective. This is not to say that Russia, at some level, was not pleased with the contrast between on the one hand, Russia’s demonstrated technical hand, and on the other, the United States’ inability (or more fairly, its unwillingness) to implement the MOX disposition method. In early 2016, Russia’s state-owned Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation connected Unit 4 of its Beloyarsk nuclear plant—which uses MOX fuel—to the grid.[80]

One important lesson is that the Obama administration cannot, try though it will, unilaterally isolate one domain of its relations with Mr. Putin from all other domains of that relationship any more than any previous administration has succeeded in doing so. The Russian government-operated domestic news agency RIA-Novosti published a commentary by Rostislav Ishchenko titled “Putin’s Ultimatum” (Ul’timatum Putina) immediately after Mr. Putin acted. Mr. Ishchenko begins by asking rhetorically, “Why is Russia only reacting now, even though it has known for several years that the United States is not fulfilling its part of the deal?”[81]

Putin intentionally and deliberately humiliated the United States by demonstrating that it is possible to speak in a manner even tougher than the one to which the United States is accustomed when addressing the rest of the world [ . . . ] Here is the point: Moscow seized the initiative and upped the ante by escalating the confrontation. Unlike America, Russia did not threaten war. It simply demonstrated that it is capable of a tough political and economic response, one that in the event of further inappropriate behavior by the United States can, instead of realizing Obama’s dream, produce the opposite: to tear Washington’s economic and monetary systems to shreds [ . . . ] Russia’s actions have seriously undermined the international prestige of the United States by showing the whole world it can be beaten with its own weapons [ . . . ] The United States has to make a choice, because the longer Washington pretends that nothing has happened, the more of its vassals (it calls them allies, but they are dependents in reality) will bluntly and openly reject American vanity, and flock to the promise of a new global order.[82]

“The geopolitical reality,” he concludes, “will never be the same. The world has already changed.”[83]

So how does Right Sector fit into this? That question is best answered with another: what are the United States’ geostrategic interests in Ukraine, and how do they relate to its actions on the ground there today? We have a policy on Ukraine, to be sure. But “policy is nothing in itself,” Clausewitz wrote, “it is simply a trustee . . .”[84] He meant policy as the purpose for which war is waged—in his words, the “goals aris[ing] out of the political relation of the two antagonists to each other.”[85] A pithier and more helpful lens was offered by Clausewitz’s contemporary, August Otto Rühle von Lilienstern:

There is a Why? and a What For?, a purpose and a cause at the bottom of every war . . . The individual operations have military purposes; the war as a whole always has a final political purpose.[86]

So what are our why and what in Ukraine? One has to wonder when one reads the Jerusalem Post headline earlier this year, “US lifts ban on funding ‘neo-Nazi’ Ukrainian militia.”[87] Is there some enigmatic political purpose worth the cost paid in lost prestige and a bilateral arms control agreement?  Russia scholar Stephen F. Cohen plausibly suggests what our why and what may indeed be:

[T]he “Ukrainian Project” to sever Ukraine’s centuries-long ties to Russia originated in Washington, and it is there we witness a last attempt to salvage the project and Poroshenko . . . But as Ukraine descends deeper into social, political, and economic crisis, saving Poroshenko may no longer be possible. Indeed, he seems to think his salvation is a renewed war by Kiev against the rebel provinces, one that might regain him Western support but also lead to all-out war with Russia.

Mr. Putin’s flare regarding the odious Right Sector ought to provoke reconsideration as to whether our purpose and our cause there is worth the cost we will surely have to pay.

The translation of all source material is by the author.

About the author:
*John R. Haines is a Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and Executive Director of FPRI’s Princeton Committee. Much of his current research is focused on Russia and its near abroad, with a special interest in nationalist and separatist movements. As a private investor and entrepreneur, he is currently focused on the question of nuclear smuggling and terrorism, and the development of technologies to discover, detect, and characterize concealed fissile material. He is also a Trustee of FPRI.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI

Notes:
[1] The Russian State Duma (Gosudarstvennaya Duma also known by the portmanteau word “Gosduma“) is the Federal Assembly’s lower house.

[2] Weapon-grade (as distinguished from reactor-grade) plutonium is plutonium that is usable in nuclear weapons. Its composition is predominantly the radioisotope Pu-239 (a decay product of U-239) with low (<7 percent) concentrations of the radioisotope Pu-240 (which can cause a weapon to pre-detonate because of its high rate of spontaneous fission, which produces a substantial neutron flux).

[3] See: Prezident Rossii (2016).V Gosdumu vnesen proyekt zakona o priostanovlenii deystviya soglasheniya mezhdu Rossiyey i SSHA ob utilizatsii plutoniya (3 oktyabrya 2016). http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/53009. Last accessed 4 October 2016. This document is a statement by the President of Russia published 3 October 2016 titled “A bill is introduced in the State Duma to suspend the agreement between Russia and the United States on Plutonium Disposition.

[4] On the same day, the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) and other media outlets quoted a Sputnik interview with Mr. Ryabkov, in which he warned of “a very sharp conceptual disagreement” between Russia and the United States over the Syrian crisis. See: “Ryabkov: Russia Received No Notification of Terminating Russian-US Agreement on Syria.” SANA [published online 3 October 2016]. http://sana.sy/en/?p=89516. Last accessed 4 October 2016. See also: “Russia, US at Stage of ‘Very Sharp Conceptual Disagreement’ Over Syria. Sputnik [published online 3 October 2016]. https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/20161003/1045940797/russia-us-syria-ryabkov.html. Last accessed 4 October 2016.

[5] Formally, “Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated As No Longer Required For Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation.” http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/18557.pdf. Last accessed 4 October 2016.

[6] Formally, “The Joint Statement of Principles for Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes,” signed by the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation on 2 September 1998. http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity-archive.org/Official%20Documents/Nonproliferation%20and%20Threat%20Reduction%20Agreements/1998/puletter1.html and http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity-archive.org/Official%20Documents/Nonproliferation%20and%20Threat%20Reduction%20Agreements/1998/puletter2.html. Last accessed 4 October 2016. The PMDA provided for the material’s disposition by irradiating it as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in nuclear reactors or by any other method that may be agreed by the parties in writing.

[7] The Mayak Production Association (Proizvodstvennoye ob”yedineniye “Mayak”) is one of Russia’s oldest and largest nuclear facilities, having produced components for the Soviet Union’s first nuclear device, the RSD-1, which was detonated in August 1949. Starting in 1994, a joint executive group managed construction of the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility, the USD 412 million cost of which was split between the two countries. Construction was completed in December 2003 and it began accepting fissile materials in 2006, after the United States and Russian governments resolved multiple disagreements on transparency, access, and liability. The facility’s planned lifetime is 100 years, and it is built to resist an airplane crash, earthquakes, and floods.

[8] Ozersk is a closed city in Russia’s Chelyabinsk Oblast, a region in the Southern Urals bordering Kazakhstan. It is a so-called “closed city”—the formal designation is a “closed administrative-territorial formation” (zakrytoye administrativno-territorial’noye obrazovaniye)—known informally by its Russian transliterated acronym, ZATO. There are two other closed cities in the Chelyabinsk Oblast involved in the Russian (and before that, the Soviet) nuclear program, Snezhinsk and Tryokhgorny.

[9] Known formally as “The State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom” (Gosudarstvennaya korporatsiya po atomnoy energii «Rosatom»), Rosatom was established in 2008 as the central holding company for Russia’s nuclear energy complex. It is a so-called “state corporation” (Gosudarstvennaya korporatsiya) created under Russian federal law and wholly owned by the Russian government. Rosatom is the successor to a federal agency, which earlier consolidated the activities of several ministries. It operates some 288 enterprises and scientific institutions across Russia’s nuclear energy complex.

[10] The Siberian Chemical Combine (Sibirskiy khimicheskiy kombinat) also known by its transliterated Russian acronym SkHK is located in Seversk (formerly Tomsk-7) in southeastern Siberia’s Tomsk Oblast. SkHK commenced operations in 1953, and for much of its life produced plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and fabricated warhead components. Intelligence experts believe all weapons-related production activities at SkHK have ceased. Its current activities are believed to be uranium feedstock and enriched uranium production; the conversion and storage of fissile materials; and thermal and electric power production.

[11] The Mining and Chemical Combine (Gorno-khimicheskogo kombinata) formerly known as Combine 815 is located in Zheleznogorsk (formerly Krasnoyarsk-26) in Krasnoyarsk Krai, a Russian federal subject at Russia’s geographic center that runs almost the full north-south span of the country. Also known by its transliterated Russian acronym GKhK, it was the Soviet Union’s third plutonium production facility when it was established in 1953. While no longer involved in any weapon-related activity, there are reports of a possible new storage facility at GKhK, possibly in the underground facility that housed its plutonium production reactors.

[12] The 128 metric ton figure is the sum of Russia’s estimated 88mt military stockpile, 6mt of excess military material, and the 34mt subject to disposition under the PMDA. The estimate is subject to variance of ±8mt. See: International Panel on Fissile Materials (2015). “Global Fissile Material Report 2015. Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpiles and Production,” 25. http://fissilematerials.org/library/gfmr15.pdf. Last accessed 4 October 2016.

[13] United States State Department (2010). “2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement Fact Sheet.” Office of the Spokesman (13 April 2010). http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/04/140097.htm. Last accessed 4 October 2016.

[14] http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/addwork/scans.nsf/ID/C4294ACB989FB546432580410044CB71/$File/1186208-6_03102016_1186208-6.PDF?OpenElement. Last accessed 6 October 2016.

[15] In late September, Mr. Putin appointed Mr. Naryshkin to the additional post of Director of the Federal Security Service (Federal’naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii “) better known by its transliterated Russian acronym FSB.

[16] In his communication to the Duma, Mr. Putin states “The effect of the Agreement and the Protocol to the Agreement can be resumed after the United States eliminates the causes, which led to a radical change in the circumstances that existed on the date that the Ageement entered into force…”

[17] Prezident Rossii (2016), op cit.

[18] The 2010 Protocol binds the United States to use a disposition method in which weapon-grade plutonium is mixed with low-enriched uranium to make fuel (known as mixed-oxide fuel or “MOX”) for use in commercial nuclear power reactors. MOX meets the PMDA’s spent fuel standard once it is irradiated in a reactor. In 2002, the United States Energy Department abandoned (in favor of MOX) an alternate method known as immobilization. It involves incorporating plutonium into a corrosion-resistant ceramic matrix, and then encasing the immobilized plutonium in glass along with other highly radioactive nuclear wastes. The Energy Department’s Savannah River Site’s Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility in South Carolina has been plagued with delays and cost overruns, leading President Obama to order its closure and to shift disposition to the immobilization method at a Department of Energy facility in New Mexico. Russia, however, has declined to consent to the change.

[19] “The Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012” provides inter alia for the imposition of sanctions and travel restrictions on Russian citizens deemed responsible for the 2009 death of Sergei Magnitsky, a lawyer for Hermitage Capital who was investigating suspected tax fraud by Russian officials. Mr. Magnitsky was imprisoned in a Moscow pre-trial detention center on charges of tax fraud at the time of his death in November 2009. President Obama signed it into law on 14 December 2012, and in April 2013 the United States Government sanctioned 18 Russian citizens under the Act. Another five Russian citizens were sanctioned in February 2016.

The Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 declares,” it is U.S. policy to assist the government of Ukraine in restoring its sovereignty and territorial integrity in order to deter the government of the Russian Federation from further destabilizing and invading Ukraine and other independent countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.” President Obama signed the Act into law on 18 December 2014. It requires the President to impose sanctions on foreign persons deemed to be engaged in certain activities related to Russia’s defense industry, and authorizes (but does not require) the President to sanction foreign persons who make what are called “significant investments” in certain Russian oil projects. See: https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/2828/text. Last accessed 4 October 2016.

[20] Right Sector is a Ukrainian ultranationalist political party organized in November 2013 as a union of several far-right nationalist movements.  In deference to a legal prohibition against political parties maintaining paramilitary forces, its paramilitary arm is known formally as the Ukrainian Volunteer Corps aka “DUK-Right Sector” for its transliterated Ukrainian acronym (from Dobrovolʹchyy Ukrayinsʹkyy korpus). Many Right Sector battalions have resisted integration into Ukraine’s overall command structure, as territorial defense battalions subordinate to the Defense Ministry; as National Guard units subordinate to the Interior Ministry; or as so-called special purpose units subordinate to the Interior Ministry.

[21] Article 2 articulates three conditions to the PMDA and the 2010 Protocol coming back into effect. They address: (1) reducing NATO troop levels and bases to their September 2000 levels; (2) abolition of the Magnitsky Act and all sanctions imposed by the United States on Russia, and on Russian citizens and entities, as well as the payment of damages to Russia for losses incurred under the sanction regime; and (3) the submission by the United States of a plan for permanent plutonium disposition that conforms to the PMDA and the 2010 Protocol.

[22] “Otvetom na «popytku teraktov» v Krymu mozhet stat’ obostreniye v Donbasse.” Verdomosti [published online in Russian 14 August 2016]. http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2016/08/15/652929-otvetom-popitku-teraktov-krimu-mozhet-obostrenie-donbasse. Last accessed 11 October 2016.

[23] “Dmitriy Yarosh stal figurantom yeshche odnogo ugolovnogo dela v Rossii.” Verdomosti [published online in Russian 30 September 2016]. http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2016/09/30/659174-yarosh-ugolovnogo-dela. Last accessed 11 October 2016.

[24] At NATO’s September 2014 Wales Summit, the alliance agreed to create a spearhead within the NATO Response Force designated the “Very High Readiness Joint Task Force.” As envisioned, the VJTF—a land component supported by air, maritime and Special Operations Force elements—would be deployed at very short notice particularly along NATO’s periphery. United States Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland said in January 2015, “[W]e have to keep our security commitments to each other. . .  All must contribute to NATO’s new Spearhead Force which will allow us to speed forces to trouble spots, and we must install command and control centers in all six frontline states as soon as possible. NATO is a defensive alliance: our goal is deterrence of aggression; but if that fails, we must be ready.” [http://translations.state.gov/st/english/texttrans/2015/01/20150127313219.html#ixzz4M9n5xchH ‘. Last accessed 4 October 2016] The alliance formally agreed at its July 2016 Warsaw Summit to deploy four battalions totaling 3 to 4 thousand troops in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, all of which earlier requested a permanent NATO presence. The VJTF will have bases ready but will not, however, be permanently based. It will be drawn on a rotating basis from the existing 13,000-strong NATO Response Force.

[25] Doku Umarov was a longtime leader of the Islamist insurgency in Russia’s North Caucasus region. He eventually became emir of the self-proclaimed Islamic Caucasus Emirate, an al Qaeda-linked group that operates in southern Russia. Mr. Umarov claimed responsibility for a number of mass attacks against civilian targets inside Russia. His death was reported on 18 March 2014 by the Caucasus Emirate-associated Islamist website Kavkaz Center,

[26] “Lider “Pravogo sektora” poprosil Doku Umarova o podderzhke.” Interfax [published online in Russian 1 March 2014]. http://www.interfax.ru/world/362075. Last accessed 4 October 2016.

[27] “SMI: Lider ukrainskogo «Pravogo sektora» poprosil pomoshchi u Doku Umarova.” RT [published online in Russian 1 March 2014]. https://russian.rt.com/article/23421. Last accessed 4 October 2014.

[28] Artyom Skoropadsk (his first name appears as Artem in Ukrainian) is a well-known spokesperson for Right Sector. He was widely quoted in July 2016 when he threatened marchers in a Kyiv LGBT parade. Asked whether Right Sector would use physical force, he responded, “Our goal is to block the march, and that’s the way it goes.” See: “Pravyy sektor ne otritsayet primeneniye fizicheskoy sily k uchastnikam LGBT-marsha v Kiyeve.” Ukraí̈ns’kí Novini [published online in Russian 8 June 2016]. . Last accessed 4 October 2016. He did the same in July 2016 when the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate organized a procession, which he called “absolutely anti-Ukrainian.” See: “Titushki s ikonami: v Pravom sektore otsenili krestnyy khod UPTS MP.” Obozrevatel’ [published online in Russian 11 June 2016]. http://obozrevatel.com/politics/41629-novyij-podvid-titushek-s-ikonami-v-pravom-sektore-otsenili-krestnyij-hod-upts-mp.htm. Last accessed 4 October 2016] In July 2015, he predicted a coup in Ukraine, telling the Voice of America, “If there’s a new revolution, Ukraine’s President Poroshenko and his teammates won’t be able to make it out of the country the way the previous president [pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych] did. They can’t expect anything other than an execution in some dark vault, carried out by a group of young officers of Ukraine’s army and National Guard.” [http://www.voanews.com/a/ukraine-nationalists-say-country-headed-for-coup/2860024.html. Last accessed 4 October 2016.]

[29] “Pravyy sektor otkrestilsya ot obrashcheniya k Doku Umarovu.” Lenta [published online in Russian 2 March 2014]. https://lenta.ru/news/2014/03/02/hacked/. Last accessed 4 October 2016.

[30] “Kremlin Helps Media Moguls Expand.” The Moscow Times [published online 21 October 2013]. https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/kremlin-helps-media-moguls-expand-28748. Last accessed 4 October 2016.

[31] “Pravyy sektor ispugalsya i oproverg obrashcheniye Dmitriya Yarosha k Umarovu.” Life [published online in Russian 2 March 2014]. https://life.ru/t/новости/128214. Last accessed 4 October 2016.

[32] The Prosecutor General of Russia (General’nyy Prokuror Rossiyskoy Federatsii) heads the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation (General’naya prokuratura Rossiyskoy Federatsii). She or he is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Federation Council (Sovet Federatsii), the Federal Assembly’s upper house.

[33] “Chayka zayavil o popytkakh «Pravogo sektora» sovershit’ gosperevorot v Rossii.” RBC.ru [published online in Russian 26 April 2016]. http://www.rbc.ru/politics/26/04/2016/571f23389a79472f32363ae6. Last accessed 4 October 2016. RBc.ru is an information portal operated by the Moscow-based media group RBC Information Systems (RBK Informatsionnyye sistemy).

[34] “Ugolovnyye dela, rassleduyemyye upravleniyem po rassledovaniyu prestupleniy, svyazannykh s primeneniyem zapreshchennykh sredstv i metodov vedeniya voyny.” Sledcom.ru [published online in Russian 30 September 2016]. The translated title reads “The criminal cases investigated by the Department for the Investigation of Crimes related to the use of prohibited means and methods of warfare.” The document was published on the official website of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation http://sledcom.ru/news/item/1070177. Last accessed 4 October 2016.

[35] Dmytro Yarosh led Right Sector until November 2015, when he resigned and was appointed as an adviser to the Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) reporting to Viktor Muzhenko, Chief of the General Staff.

[36] Andriy Tarasenko was elected Right Sector’s chairman in March 2016 following the resignation of Dmytro Yarosh. He previously served as a member of Right Sector’s five-member central office.

[37] “SKR vozbudil ugolovnoye delo protiv rukovoditeley Pravogo sektora.” Life [published online in Russian 30 September 2016]. https://life.ru/t/новости/910496/skr_vozbudil_ugholovnoie_dielo_protiv_rukovoditieliei_pravogho_siektora. Last accessed 5 October 2016.

[38] “Naykrashche pryvitannya vid voroha, – imenynnyk Yarosh pro “kryminalʹnu spravu” u Rosiyi.” Espreso.tv [published online in Ukrainian 30 September 2016]. http://espreso.tv/news/2016/09/30/naykrasche_pryvitannya_vid_voroga_imenynnyk_yarosh_pro_quotkryminalnu_spravuquot_u_rosiyi. Last accessed 7 October 2016.

[39] “MVD razyskivayet lidera “Pravogo sektora” Kiyeva za podgotovku besporyadkov v RF.” Life [published online in Russian 4 October 2016]. https://life.ru/t/новости/912128/mvd_razyskivaiet_lidiera_pravogho_siektora_kiieva_za_podghotovku_biesporiadkov_v_rf. Last accessed 5 October 2016. Mr. Mazor was reported to be accompanied by two Ukrainian lawyers, identified as Alexander Zolotukhin and Nikolai Beller. Mr. Zolotukhin was a combatant in eastern Ukraine with the Aidar Battalion (24-y batalʹyon terytorialʹnoyi oborony «Aydar»), a so-called “territorial defense battalion” (Batalʹyóny terytoriálʹnoyi oboróny) attached to Ukraine’s Defense Ministry. He appeared in this YouTube video:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aD63B6PYikM. Last accessed 5 October 2016. Mr. Zolotukhin founded Soyuza veteranov antiterrora “Svat”, which is an organization of pro-Ukraine veterans of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Mr. Beller is better known in Ukraine as the blogger “Donetsk Fascist” (Fashik Donetskiy)

[40] “V Rossii nashli novykh ‘ukrainskikh diversantov’. Kto oni?” Strana [published online in Ukrainian 4 October 2016]. http://strana.ua/articles/rassledovania/34543-rossiya-nashla-novyh-diversantov-v-ukraine-kto-oni.html. Last accessed 5 October 2016.

[41] The UNA-UNSO was founded in 1990. A November 2008 unclassified United States State Department memorandum on “Ukraine’s Main Extremist Groups” [https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08KYIV2323_a.html] said this about the UNA-UNSO:

“Originally a coalition of nationalist groups that venerated Mussolini, it declared itself a political party in 1991.  In response to the August 1991 anti-Gorbachev coup attempt, the organization formed a paramilitary wing – the Ukrainian People’s Self Defense Organization (UNSO).  UNSO fighters were reported to have participated in the 1992 Moldova-Transnistria conflict against Moldovan forces, the 1993 Georgia-Abkhazia war on the side of Georgia, the 1995 conflict in Chechnya on the side of the Chechyens, and in the 1999 Kosovo conflict on the side of the Serbs.

The organization first registered as a political party in 1994 and was subsequently deregistered in 1995 for its radicalism.  It was reregistered in 1997.  UNA-UNSO has limited representation on local councils in western Ukraine and received 16,379 votes in the March 2006 Rada elections. It was involved in the “Ukraine without Kuchma” movement in 2000-2001 and 18 of its members were arrested for violent clashes with police, including Andriy Skhil, who later left the party and is now an MP with the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc. UNA-UNSO supported Yushchenko in the 2004 elections.

[42] It is worth noting that in a February 2016 interview, Ukraine’s Judge Advocate General Anatoly Matios labeled Right Sector “an illegal armed group.” See: “Anatoliy Matios: DUK «Pravyy sektor» ye nezakonnym ozbroyenym formuvannyam.” U-A Reporter [published online in Ukrainian 1 February 2016]. http://ua-reporter.com/novosti/187596. Last accessed 6 October 2016.

[43] Now the former Right Sector leader, Dmytro Yarosh posted a statement on his Facebook page in which he wrote that the FSB’s accusation against the Ukrainian intelligence service recalls “the beginning of the Second World War and the ‘capture’ of the radio station in Gleiwitz by the Poles.” The reference is to a false flag incident that occurred on 31 August 1939, in which Waffen-SS soldiers in Polish uniforms attacked the German radio station Sender Gleiwitz in Gleiwitz (now Gliwice), a town located in what was then Germany’s Upper Silesia region. The incident was one of several staged provocations along the German-Polish border that were used as pretext for the German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939.

[44] “Ukrainskiye terroristy khoteli zalit’ krov’yu plyazhi Kryma.” REN TV [published online in Russian 11 August 2016]. http://ren.tv/novosti/2016-08-11/ukrainskie-terroristy-hoteli-zalit-krovyu-plyazhi-kryma. Last accessed 6 October 2016. REN TV is one of Russia’s largest private television channels.

[45] “POLNYY OTCHET: ETO podtverditsya, UKRAINA khunty spetsagenty stolknoveniyem na granitse s FSB.” Tribunal [published online in Russian 11 August 2016]. http://tribunal-today.ru/news/polnyy-otchet-eto-podtverditsya-ukraina-khunty-spetsagenty-stolknoveniem-na-granitse-s-fsb-rossii-fs/. Last accessed 6 October 2016.

[46] “Pravyy sektor otpravit v Krym «poyezd druzhby.” Lenta [published online in Russian 25 February 2014]. https://lenta.ru/news/2014/02/25/crimea/. Last accessed 6 October 2016.

[47] Igor Mosiychuk is a well-known Ukrainian ultranationalist. He began in the 1990s as a UNA-UNSO member [see fn(41)], which in early 1992 organized the so-called “friendship train,” which involved sending some 500 UNSO militiamen to southern Ukraine (especially Odessa and Kherson) and Crimea for the purpose of suppressing separatist sentiment. After the UNA-UNSO’s collapse in 1998, Mr. Mosiychuk joined the openly neo-Nazi Social-National Party of Ukraine (Sotsial-natsionalʹna partiya Ukrayiny), which in February 2004 changed its name to the “All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda” (Vseukrayinske obyednannia “Svoboda”) better known as “Svoboda” (“Freedom”). In 2011, he joined Svoboda’s central committee and became its acting press secretary. In January 2014, he was convicted as one of three so-called “Vasilokovsky terrorists,” who were arrested in August 2011 on terrorism and weapons charges for conspiring to destroy the Lenin monument in Vasylkiv (in central Ukraine’s Kyiv Oblast). He and his codefendants were released by prison in late February 2014 when Ukraine’s parliament (known as the Verkhovna Rada) issued a post-Euromaidan general amnesty to 23 persons identified as “political prisoners.” Several weeks later, in April 2014, Mr. Mosiychuk joined the newly formed Azov Battalion, which along with other paramilitaries formed in response to Ukraine’s Acting Minister of Internal Affairs Arsen Avakov’s call for a 15,000-strong force. He became an Azov deputy commander responsible for press relations. In October 2014, he was elected to Ukraine’s parliament (known as the Verkhovna Rada) for the Radical Party of Oleg Lyashko (Radykalʹna Partiya Oleha Lyashka), and was elected deputy chair of the parliamentary committee on law enforcement.

[48] “Dzhemilev zayavil o “batal’one smertnikov” na granitse s Krymom.” RIA-Novosti [published online in Russian 10 April 2016]. https://ria.ru/world/20160409/1406473768.html. Last accessed 7 October 2016.

[49] The Turkish Government has denied reports that it helped to organize the Noman Çelebicihan Battalion. According to Russian media reports, a spokesperson for the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Tanju Bilgicha, said in a written statement, “Information about Turkish support for the formation of the Crimean Tatar battalion does not correspond to reality.” See: “Ankara oprovergla soobshcheniya o pomoshchi Turtsii v sozdanii krymsko-tatarskogo batal’ona.” Delovaya Gazeta [published online in Russian 29 December 2015]. http://vz.ru/news/2015/12/29/786556.html. Last accessed 7 October 2016. The battalion is named after Noman Çelebicihan, a Crimean Tatar and the first President of the short-lived (December 1917-January 1918) independent Crimean People’s Republic, who was executed by Bolshevik forces in Sevastopol in January 1918.

[50] “Mustafa Dzhemilev: «Batal’on smertnikov» mozhet vtorgnut’sya v Krym.” Vogne Broda [published online in Russian 10 April 2016]. http://vognebroda.net/mustafa-dzhemilev-batalon-smertnikov-mozhet-vtorgnutsya-v-krym. Last accessed 7 October 2016.

[51] “Begletsy iz «batal’ona Islyamova» rasskazali o planakh protiv Kryma i Kiyeva.” Delovaya Gazeta [published online in Russian 24 September 2016]. http://vz.ru/news/2016/9/24/834472.htm. Last accessed 7 October 2016.

[52] This is discussed in the author’s recent essay “Distinguishing the True from the False: Fakes & Forgeries in Russia’s Information War Against Ukraine.” http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/09/distinguishing-true-false-fakes-forgeries-russias-information-war-ukraine/.

[53] A frequently cited example of the latter is Aleksey Zhuravko, a former Ukrainian parliamentarian, who is a tireless social media poster. He warned in an 10 August post on his VK page [https://vk.com/avzhuravko?w=wall329801318_3605%2Fall] that Ukrainian authorities were “preparing a serious provocation on the border with Crimea” and had concentrated forces “in the area of the Crimean isthmus” that included “Right Sector, Azov, Asker, and the Wolves.” The latter is a reference to the Turkish ultranationalist group known as the Grey Wolves (formally, Ülkü Ocakları and informally, Bozkurtlar), which is the unofficial militant wing of Turkey’s far right Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi or “MHP”). The Sputnik news agency (part of the Russian government-controlled news agency Rossiya Segodnya) called the Grey Wolves “the Turkish Frankenstein.” [https://sputniknews.com/politics/20151211/1031604883/turkish-grey-wolves-cold-war-era-paramilitary-group-gladio-cia-bozkurtlar.html]

[54] “Puteshestviye na voynu. Yelena Belozerskaya. Noveyshaya istoriya ukrainskogo natsionalizma.” Tut.by [published online in Russian 27 September 2016]. http://news.tut.by/society/512220.html. Last accesseded 5 October 2016. Some of the media outlets that picked up the story are well-known media cutouts. For example, the Kharkov News Agency (Novostnogo Agentstva Khar’kova) published a summary of the longer Tut article under the headline “Right Sector threatens to start a guerilla war in Crimea” [http://nahnews.org/934195-pravyj-sektor-ugrozhaet-nachat-partizanskuyu-vojnu-v-krymu/. Last accessed 6 October 2016] Its name notwithstanding, the Kharkov (the Russian transliteration) News Agency is domiciled in St. Petersburg, Russia, not Ukraine’s Kharkiv (the Ukrainian transliteration) region located on the country’s northeast border with Russia, and bordering Ukraine’s contested Donbass region (Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts).

[55] Ibid.

[56] The idiom Vatnikov means a Russian patriot or nationalist. Its literal meaning is the padded field jacket issued to Soviet soldiers during the Second World War

[57] Ibid. The report in the Russian news portal Moskovskiy Komsomolets added “Kharkov” for good measure, although Ms. Belozerskaya did not. “Natsistka iz Pravogo sektora priznalas’ v massovom ubiystve mirnykh grazhdan. Yeye memuary mogut stat’ dokazatel’stvom dlya ugolovnogo dela.”  Moskovskiy Komsomolets [published online in Russian 30 September 2016]. http://www.mk.ru/politics/2016/09/30/nacistka-iz-pravogo-sektora-priznalas-v-massovom-ubiystve-mirnykh-grazhdan.html. Last accessed 6 October 2016.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

[60] “Pravyy sektor na Zakarpatti.” 24tv.ua [published online in Ukrainian 6 October 2016].

[61] “Baloga priznalsya, chto pomogal “Pravomu sektoru”. RBK-UKRAÍ̈NA [published online in Russian 23 July 2015]. https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/baloga-priznalsya-pomogal-pravomu-sektoru-1437658776.html. Last accessed 7 October 2016. http://24tv.ua/praviy_sektor_na_zakarpatti__buv_kishenkovoyu_armiyeyu_mistsevogo_oligarha__moskal_n734698. Last accessed 7 October 2016].

[62] “Vtoroy Afganistan: Ukraina khochet razgromit’ Donbass i uzhe mechtayet o napadenii na Krym.” Russkaya Pravda [published online in Russian 5 September 2015]. http://ruspravda.info/Vtoroy-Afganistan-Ukraina-hochet-razgromit-Donbass-i-uzhe-mechtaet-o-napadenii-na-Krim-14903.html. Last accessed 7 October 2016.

[63] “Ukraina khochet razgromit’ Donbass i uzhe mechtayet o napadenii na Krym.” Svobodnaya Pressa [published online in Russian 5 September 2015]. http://svpressa.ru/politic/article/131126/. Last accessed 7 October 2016.

[64] “Voyennaya kampaniya Rossii na vostoke Ukrainy provalilas’. Putin pytayetsya politicheskim putem legalizovat’ Krym v obmen na ustupki na Donbasse.” http://censor.net.ua/video_news/355180/voennaya_kampaniya_rossii_na_vostoke_ukrainy_provalilas_putin_pytaetsya_politicheskim_putem_legalizovat. Tsenzor.net [published online in Russian 10 July 2015]. Last accessed 7 October 2016. Mr. Butusov’s video commentary [in Russian] can be accessed at the link provided above.

[65] Svobodnaya Pressa (5 September 2015), op cit.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Ibid. The report published in Svobodnaya Pressa included a colloquy with Viktor Shapinov, who is associated with the Marxist (and notably pro-Russian) group in Ukraine, Association “Struggle” (Ob’yednannia “Boroťba).

[69] United States Energy Department (2016). “2016 Updated Performance Baseline for the

Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site: Overview of DOE’s 2016 Updated Performance Baseline with a Comparison to the Contractor’s Estimates and Data.” https://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/2016_updated_performance_baseline_for_mox.pdf. Last accessed 7 October 2016.

[70] https://www.publicintegrity.org/2016/10/03/20294/us-russian-deal-dispose-tons-nuclear-weapons-fuel-officially-torn-moscow. Last accessed 7 October 2016.

[71] Andrei Piontkovsky (2016). “Otchayaniye Putina: vazhnyy moment, na kotoryy ne vse poka obratili vnimaniye.” Apostrophe [published online in Russian 5 October 2016]. http://apostrophe.ua/article/world/2016-10-05/otchayanie-putina-vazhnyj-moment-na-kotoryj-ne-vse-poka-obratili-vnimanie/7599. Last accessed 7 October 2016.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Kenneth N. Waltz (1979). Theory of International Politics. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company) 8.

[74] Ibid., 157.

[75] United States State Department (2016). New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms. Fact Sheet (1 October 2016). http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/262836.pdf. Last accessed 12 October 2016.

[76] Federation of American Scientists (2016). “New START Data Shows Russian Warhead Increase Before Expected Decrease.” [published online 3 October 2016]. https://fas.org/blogs/security/2016/10/new-start-data-2016/. Last accessed 12 October 2016.

[77] United States Defense Department (2012). “Report on the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation Pursuant to Section 1240 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012,” 7. http://fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/DOD2012_RussianNukes.pdf. Last accessed 12 October 2016.

[78] “Obama obidel Rossiyu, pokazav, chto kolichestvo nashikh boyegolovok uzhe nikogo ne volnuyet.” Novaya Gazeta [published online in Russian 6 October 2016]. https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2016/10/06/70084-obidnyy-plutoniy. Last accessed 12 October 2016.

[79] At Naval Support Facility Deveselu, Romania, on the site of a former Soviet airbase. This system is discussed in greater detail in the author’s July 2016 essay, “If the Atlantic Ocean is the New Black Sea, What’s the Black Sea? Aegis Ashore and the Black Sea Region’s Changing Security Dynamic.” [http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/07/atlantic-ocean-new-black-sea-whats-black-sea-aegis-ashore-black-sea-regions-changing-security-dynamic/]

[80] “Russian Fast Reactor Connected to the Grid.” Power Magazine [published online 1 February 2016]. http://www.powermag.com/russian-fast-reactor-connected-grid/. Last accessed 8 October 2016.

[81] “Ul’timatum Putina.” RIA-Novosti [published online in Russian 5 October 2016]. https://ria.ru/analytics/20161005/1478493459.html. Last accessed 8 October 2016.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Carl von Clausewitz (1976). On War. (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 606

[85] Von Clausewitz (1984). Two Letters on Strategy. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College) 129.

[86] Otto August Ruhle von Lilienstern  (1817). Handbuch für den Offizier zur Belehrung im Frieden und zum Gebranch in Felde, Vol. II (Berlin: G. Reimer) 8. Cited in Beatrice Heuser (2002). Reading Clausewitz. (London: Pimlico) 30.

[87] Jeruselum Post [published online 18 January 2016]. http://www.jpost.com/Diaspora/US-lifts-ban-on-funding-neo-Nazi-Ukrainian-militia-441884. Last accessed 8 October 2016.

By Cécile Barbière

(EurActiv) — The EU and South America’s Mercosur bloc could strike a free trade deal within two years, according to Argentina’s Commerce Secretary Miguel Braun. After Brexit, Mercosur would be open to a separate trade deal with the UK.

Trade negotiations between the EU and Mercosur nations are still on track, despite the UK’s decision to leave the bloc and uncertainty over the future of the EU’s other major trade agreements – TTIP and CETA.

After the EU and Mercosur exchanged offers last May on opening up markets, representatives of Mercosur and the EU are meeting again this week in Brussels to continue the discussion on the free trade agreement.

“Mercosur has moved to improve its offer on the table and we are optimistic that we can work towards a better deal,” explained Argentine Commerce Secretary Miguel Braun during a visit to Brussels (12 October).

Dormant negotiations since 2004

The four active members of Mercosur ( Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay) started the trade negotiations with the EU in 1999, but talks have been delayed multiple times and been completely dormant since 2004.

After 12 years, negotiations were restarted last May, when the EU and the Mercosur exchanged first market access offers. But the first offers were described as not sufficient and needed to be scaled-up.

Asked about the potential impact of Brexit on the negotiations, Miguel Braun responded that “the UK is still part of the EU, and we are still negotiating with all the EU”.

“But of course (Brexit), would reduce the size of the market, there are some challenges to be addressed,” the Secretary of State said. “At the same time we are open to discuss future potential trade deals with the UK,” he added.

After years of deadlock in the negotiations, the Argentine is hoping the trade deal could be agreed soon. “In terms of negotiations, we are optimistic, we can move forward on a good path, maybe one or two years.”

Braun’s optimism was more cautious regarding the ratification process. “The second step, the ratification, is more uncertain”, in terms of timing, he admitted. “Other deals that the EU is making are giving us interesting information about the timing, the political scenarios, but that doesn’t change the deal we think is best for the EU and Mercosur.”

Regarding the situation of other trade deals, like TTIP with the USA and CETA with Canada, Argentina’s representative remains optimistic. “Mercosur is negotiating the deal that we believe is the best for Mercosur and the EU independently of the other undertakings and we can’t really speculate on how quickly other trade deals of the EU will come through,” he added.

Mercosur new trade deal appetite

Revitalisation of the trade discussions between Mercosur and the EU has been a result of the four Latin countries’ new appetite for trade deals. With recent changes in the Brazilian government, “we are more synchronised regarding foreign relations of Mercosur, nowadays compared to the situation of last year for instance”, added Daniel Raimondi, Under Secretary for Economic Integration in the Americas and Mercosur within the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Argentina.

Election of the pro-business government of Mauricio Macri in Argentina last year also contributed to setting up the Mercosur /EU trade deal as a new political priority for the South American bloc.

“There is now a core agreement that Mercosur has to negotiate significant trade deals,” explained Braun, citing Canada and Korea as examples.