Mariano Rajoy was sworn in as Spain’s Prime Minister by King Felipe VI and in the presence of the acting Minister for Justice, Rafael Catalá, as Commissioner for Oaths, on Monday at Zarzuela Palace.

King Felipe VI signed the appointment of Mariano Rajoy as Prime Minister on Sunday, which was published on Monday, in the Official State Gazette (Spanish acronym: BOE).

Mariano Rajoy swore his oath over a copy of the Spanish Constitution and a copy of the Bible.

The ceremony was also attended by the Speaker of the Lower House of Parliament, Ana Pastor; the Speaker of the Upper House of Parliament, Pío García Escudero; and the Presidents of the Constitutional Court, Francisco Pérez de los Cobos, and the Supreme Court and General Council of the Judiciary (Spanish acronym: CGPJ), Carlos Lesmes.

Sri Lanka’s President Maithripala Sirisena flew to Thailand on Sunday to pay his last respects to Thailand’s late King Bhumibol Adulyadej.

Sirisena placed flowers to pay his last respects to the late King and signed the Book of Condolences.

King Bhumibol, who was the world’s longest reigning monarch, died on October 13 in a hospital in Bangkok at the age of 88 and the Government of Thailand declared a 100-day mourning period in this regard.

Minister Wijedasa Rajapakshe and Sri Lanka’s Ambassador to Thailand, Kshenuka Seneviratne accompanied the President to pay last respect to Thailand’s late King Bhumibol Adulyadej.

After paying last respects to Thailand’s late King, Sirisena returned to the Island yesterday night.

By Harsh V. Pant

Despite the continuing India-Pakistan tensions and a volatile border situation where Pakistani forces continue to violate the ceasefire, Islamabad has decided to take part in the Heart of Asia (HoA) conference on Afghanistan in Amritsar, on 4 December.

The conference aims at speeding up reconstruction in war torn Afghanistan and bringing peace and normalcy to the nation.

Though in India many would be tempted to focus primarily on the visit of the Pakistani delegation, the HoA conference will see participation from around 14 countries — Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and the UAE.

The HoA process, which is being supported by the wider international community, originated under the aegis of the ‘Istanbul Conference’ in November 2011.

This underscored the need for regional cooperation and confidence-building to resolve underlying problems facing Afghanistan and anchoring the state’s development in a regional environment that is stable, economically integrated and conducive to shared prosperity.

India, too, has repeatedly underscored the need for improving connectivity in the region to help Afghanistan harness its trade and transit potential.

But for Pakistan, this participation will largely be about showcasing its positive involvement in the larger regional reconstruction.

For a nation that is now more isolated than it has ever been, it is a foreign policy imperative to underline its positive role in Kabul.

The HoA conference comes at a time when Afghanistan has taken an increasingly hard-line position vis-à-vis Pakistan, and unflinchingly supported the Modi government’s agenda of envisioning regional cooperation in South Asia by marginalising Islamabad.

It was the Afghan government which first suggested that South Asian states should come together to boycott the SAARC summit in Islamabad over Pakistan’s role in “destabilising” the neighbourhood.

In his address to a joint session of Afghanistan’s two houses of parliament earlier this year, Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani had threatened to lodge a formal complaint against Pakistan.

In a departure from his earlier stand, Ghani called on Pakistan to forego attempts to bring the Taliban to negotiations and take military action against the terrorist groups.

Despite Pakistan’s repeated assertions that it would go after Taliban, negotiations have repeatedly been stalled and deadly attacks in Afghanistan have increased with the Taliban carrying out their offensives.

The government in Kabul is also struggling to hold the overdue parliamentary elections this fall, amid the worsening security situation.

American commanders have asked Washington that US troop numbers remain at the current 9,800, and not drop to about 5,500 by the end of the year.

Political tensions are rising with Afghan Vice-President General Abdul Rashid Dostum accusing President Ashraf Ghani of treating him and the Afghan Uzbek minority he represents like the ‘enemy’, issuing veiled threats of violence if the situation doesn’t improve.

Politics

Dostum complained that the government wasn’t providing sufficient security assistance to northern Afghanistan to deal with the Taliban, taking a swipe at senior security officials by saying that, “leadership and management are non-existent.”

Dostum also appeared to issue a challenge to NATO countries, warning them vaguely that “another bomb might explode here, they should be wise.”

Amid all this is Pakistan, which for fear of India has continued to scuttle even those regional initiatives that seem purely commercial.

Its military-intelligence-complex has monopolised the discourse to an extent where Islamabad sees no win-win situations.

Its objective is to ensure that India doesn’t win, even if it means a loss for the entire region.

In that spirit, Pakistan has repeatedly blocked the use of its roads for trade between Afghanistan and India.

This has resulted in growing ill-will for Pakistan in Afghanistan, even as the latter’s relations with India continue to deepen.

Every day that ordinary Afghans lose opportunities for easy, direct trade with India, Pakistan generates more resentment among them.

Initiatives

India’s policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan also needs to evolve with these changing ground realities.

New Delhi has been demanding dismantling of safe havens and terror sanctuaries in the region, besides pressing for deeper engagement of various stakeholders for Kabul’s stability and security.

That is easier said than done. Indian interests are being repeatedly targeted in Afghanistan.

The attack on the Indian consulate in Jalalabad in March this year had been the fourth such assault since 2007.

Other Indian consulates in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif and the one in Kabul have also been attacked.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Afghanistan to inaugurate the new Afghan Parliament and the decision to gift Mi-25 attack helicopters to Afghan forces were meant to underline India’s seriousness to preserve its equities in the troubled neighbourhood.

India has also signed a deal to develop the strategic port of Chabahar in Iran and agreed on a three-nation pact to build a transport-and-trade corridor through Afghanistan that could potentially reduce the time and cost of doing business with Central Asia and Europe.

New Delhi has so far shown an unusual tenacity in its dealings with Kabul.

It now needs to move beyond the binary of economic and military engagement and evolve a comprehensive policy which involves all dimensions of power.

Afghanistan is a tough country, and only those who are willing to fight on multiple fronts will be able to preserve their leverage.

This article originally appeared in Mail Today.

The October attack on a police academy in Quetta that killed 61 cadets and wounded some 170 others, the worst such incident since an assault in December 2014 on a military school in Peshawar, has exacerbated tensions between the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the military, and the country’s intelligence service, the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI).

The attack occurred barely two months after a bombing virtually wiped out Baluchistan’s legal elite and less than two weeks after senior government officials, including Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, clashed with military commanders and intelligence leaders over counterterrorism policy. Sharif and his ministers warned their military and intelligence counterparts that Pakistan risked international isolation if it failed to implement a national counterterrorism action plan adopted in the wake of the attack in Peshawar two years ago. The civilians’ warning included the fact that the military and intelligence service’s selective crackdown on militants puts US$46 billion in Chinese infrastructure investments at risk.

Crucial Chinese Link

Pakistan constitutes a crucial link in China’s One Belt, One Road initiative designed to link the Eurasian land mass through infrastructure, transportation and telecommunications. The Baluch port of Gwadar is key to the maritime and land links China is trying to create that would give it geopolitical advantage, theoretically more secure routes for the import of badly needed resources and export of Chinese goods, and help Beijing develop economically the strategic but restive north-western Chinese province of Xinjiang.

Baluchistan is also crucial because it borders on Iran and constitutes a potential battleground for proxies of Saudi Arabia and Iran in their bitter struggle for regional hegemony. This province is also historically a key territorial conduit for the opposing forces in Afghanistan and their respective insurgency campaigns.

In a blunt statement during the meeting of civilian and military leaders leaked to Dawn newspaper, Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry noted that Pakistan’s closest ally, China continued to block, at the request of the Pakistani military and the ISI, sanctioning by the United Nations of Masood Azhar, a leader of UN-designated Jaish-e-Mohammad, but Beijing was increasingly questioning the wisdom of doing so. Jaish-e-Mohammed has long served as a proxy in Pakistan’s dispute with India over Kashmir.

Azhar was arrested in the aftermath of the Peshawar attack but released in April 2016. Azhar was long held in Indian prison on charges of kidnapping foreigners in Kashmir but was freed in 1999 in exchange for passengers of a hijacked Indian Airlines flight. Jaish-e-Mohammed was responsible for a 2001 attack on the Indian parliament among other incidents. The group was however conspicuously absent from a list of groups, issued earlier this month by the State Bank of Pakistan, whose accounts were frozen as part of the government’s selective crackdown on militants.

Payback Time

Among those accounts was Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the group the government blames for the latest attack in Quetta. A Lashkar spokesman told The Wall Street Journal that the group had aided the Islamic State, which claimed responsibility. Analysts doubt whether the freezing of accounts will have much effect. They note that most of the funds available to militant groups are either not in bank deposits or, if they are, not in accounts belonging to the groups’ leaders.

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is an offshoot of Sipah-e-Sabaha, a Saudi and Pakistani-backed Sunni supremacist, anti-Shiite group. Like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sabaha is banned but is allowed to operate under a different name, Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat. In interviews, Sipah-e-Sabaha leaders said the military and intelligence was advising them in the framework of the national action plan to tone down their inflammatory anti-Shiite language but to maintain their basic policy.

Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat leader Ahmad Ludhyvani, a meticulously dressed Muslim scholar whose accounts are among those blocked, speaking in his headquarters in the city of Jhang, amid protection by Pakistani security forces, noted that Sipah, as the group is still commonly referred to, and Saudi Arabia both opposed Shiite Muslim proselytisation even if Sipah served Pakistani rather than Saudi national interests.

“Some things are natural. It’s like when two Pakistanis meet abroad or someone from Jhang meets another person from Jhang in Karachi. It’s natural to be closest to the people with whom we have similarities… We are the biggest anti-Shiite movement in Pakistan. We don’t see Saudi Arabia interfering in Pakistan,” Ludhyvani said to the author of this Commentary over a lunch of chicken, vegetables and rice.

The freezing of accounts is the latest incentive for Lashkar-e-Jhangvi to strike out. Much of the group’s leadership has been killed in what the government called encounters with security forces and independent analysts assert were executions.

Between A Rock and A Hard Place

The latest Quetta attack was likely also designed to exacerbate the differences between Pakistan’s government and its military and intelligence as well as within Sipah itself between those who favour following the government’s advice to tone down its anti-Shiite language and more militant factions.

The violence in Quetta puts Pakistan’s military and intelligence as well as Saudi Arabia between a rock and hard place. The Pakistani military sees militants as a key part of its anti-India policy while Saudi Arabia finds them useful in its struggle with Iran. Those interests are now bouncing up against both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia’s need to ensure that Chinese interests are not threatened by their various shadow wars as well as their need to distance themselves from assertions of involvement in political violence.

This article was published by RSIS

By Jordy Garcia*

Brazilian President Michel Temer has been trying to take drastic steps to address the economic crisis in Brazil, most recently through the proposed constitutional amendment (PEC) 241. PEC 241, should it pass in the Senate with a two-thirds majority, will cap government expenditures and base subsequent years’ spending on each year’s previous budget—2017’s budget derived from 2016’s—adjusting only for inflation.[i] This cap would last for 20 years, ending in 2037, and future presidents will not be able to modify it without amending the constitution itself.

Temer promotes PEC 241 on the basis of reducing the budget deficit in the hopes that it will allow for an easier repayment of mounting interest on the government’s debt. The broader goal of this amendment is to regain and maintain foreign investors’ confidence with the hope that they will invest into the Brazilian economy and stimulate growth. [ii] This strategy is being pursued to keep inflation under control and avoid a future debt crisis—as opposed to increased government spending and lower interest rates—in order to achieve sustainable growth. [iii]

In Temer’s pursuit of a comprehensive spending cap on government expenses, he appears to be following a similar path set by his predecessor, Dilma Rousseff. She had routinely pushed for targeted cuts in a variety of government programs, including education, contradicting the very platform that Rousseff promised to advance during her 2013 reelection campaign.[iv] Rousseff also backed a proposed cap on pension spending and then vetoed several proposed Congressional spending increases on salaries and pension payments in 2015 with the focus on reigning in government expenditure and gaining investors’ confidence.[v] The difference is that Rousseff was trying to address specific challenges: the education cuts were limited and backed with a focus on reform, and the pension cap addressed the issue of the “pension bomb” that was unsustainable with changing age demographics.[vi] In contrast with Rousseff’s approach, Temer is taking a broad brush and painting across the government, irrespective of the actual problems specific agencies are facing.

Furthermore, the purpose of the constitutional amendment seems to miss the point of why Brazil is facing an economic slowdown. Temer points to the need of regaining investor confidence, surely an important feature in an economy, but does not touch on the fact that domestic consumption has also dropped significantly since 2010.[vii] This article will first expand upon the legal specifics of PEC 241 and discuss the economic conditions that played a significant role in the economic crisis. Then, it will assess key issues that PEC 241 does not address and will inhibit the Brazilian state from addressing in the future.

PEC 241 has five articles (Art.), 101-105, which establish the timeline, agencies affected, the budget definition process, how non-compliance will be dealt with in punitive measures, how it may be altered, and the responsibility of payments. Art. 101 creates the timeline of “twenty financial years” and expands its coverage to “all powers of the Union and federal agencies with administrative autonomy and financial members of the Fiscal Budget and Social Security, the New Tax Regime” which in effect lays claim over the federal and various branches of government.[viii]

Art. 102 goes on to explicitly include the separate branches of government by individually limiting the “total primary expenditure of the Executive, the Judiciary, and the Legislature, including the Court of Audit, the Public Ministry of the Union and the Union Public Defender.”[ix] This effectively encompasses the remaining features of the Brazilian government and puts central government agencies under the expenditure cap. Art. 102 also has several important subscripts, one of which sets the reference point for the 2017 budget, and following budgets, with the “primary expenditure incurred in the 2016 fiscal year adjusted by the variation of the National Consumer Price Index” allowing only for changes in the budget due to inflation.[x]

Subsequently, a subscript states that government primary expenditure cannot exceed the given cap. Another important subscript of article 102 explains that the “President may propose… the adoption of a Provisional Measure… to take affect from the tenth year of operation.”[xi] The Provisional Measure allows the president a means of “correction” on the spending limits PEC 241 creates.

Article 103 focuses on limits for “non-compliance” that can simply be seen as penalties for agencies that did not follow the measures outlined previously.[xii] The effect of these limits stop the affected agency from taking actions that call for cost increases such as pay raises or increased hiring. Art. 104 goes on to reinforce the cost savings focus by stating, “the minimum application of resources… shall provide, in each financial year, the minimum application for the prior year adjusted” for inflation.[xiii] Art. 105 serves to limit the State’s compulsion on payments by stating, “the New Tax regime does not constitute obligation of future payment by the Union.”[xiv] As a whole, these articles constitute the legal basis behind PEC 241.

It is necessary to examine Brazil’s economic downturn in order to assess what issues PEC 241 does not address. In a report by the Center for Economic Policy and Research, Franklin Serrano and Ricardo Summa, both professors from the Institute of Economics at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, show a strong correlation between low nominal interest rates set by the government and consumption-based growth, as Brazilians could pay for goods and services using cheap credit[xv]. The increase in household consumption led to formal sector growth and caused real disposable income to grow: in effect, a virtuous cycle[xvi]. Nominal interest rate and private consumption activity had a strong correlation with economic growth between 2004 and 2010.[xvii] In 2011, the government “adopted some measures to control consumer credit” because inflation was rising.[xviii] This policy change resulted in a significant decrease in growth of private consumption until mid-2012. [xix] To counteract the drop in consumption growth, the Central Bank decreased the nominal interest rate. This policy was enacted in late 2011 and Brazil saw an increase in private consumption levels until 2013. [xx]

So while easy access to credit can be strongly linked to growing consumption, this type of credit-based growth is unsustainable, because high levels of debt eventually restrain additional household purchases. On a macro-level, this is a model of consumption-based growth that depends on households that were previously unable to access to credit to take on debt.[xxi] The problem with Brazil’s credit-based consumption is its dependence on households that were previously unable to take on debt.

Such a growth strategy can only work for so long before a “bubble” forms. The Rousseff Administration took action against the growing credit bubble and attempted to reduce inflation by increasing nominal interest rates and reducing access to credit. The drop in consumption is due to the fact that households either did not have access to credit to make purchases or the increase in interest rates would absorb extra funds and may even have led to defaults on payments. [xxii] A reduction in credit-based consumption in turn led to a drop in aggregate demand in Brazil and started a cycle in which jobs were cut due to lack of demand. Less consumption and fewer tax-paying workers decreased government revenue, which increased the deficit as the government maintained expenditure levels. The concurrent changes in interest rates and credit-based consumption illustrate the importance of credit to recent changes in the Brazilian economy.

This article does not intend to leap to the defense of credit-induced consumption as a way out of the current economic recession, but wants to point out that the recognition of the roots of Brazil’s economic hardships is critical in finding an effective way to manage the economy. The impressive period of growth, in part due to credit-based consumption from 2003 to 2011 helped to pull 40 million Brazilians out of poverty and into a group called “Class C,” an economic grouping with households that earn an income between 1,200 and 5,174 Brazilian reals per month.[xxiii] As the Temer Administration attempts to stabilize the economy it must remember that a significant portion of this poverty reduction regimen was due to a consumption boom that has largely faded. Adopting a policy that limits the government’s ability to supplement consumption in times of recession may put these households’ recent economic gains at risk. PEC 241 does not address how to boost consumption in a sustainable manner, yet the spending cap will continue to limit government expenditures in a contracting economy and potentially constrain future changes to critical services.

For example, PEC 241 ignores the changing age demographics of Brazilian society by putting a cap on spending that will conflict with the need for increasing healthcare costs, requiring cuts to be made somewhere else in the budget or see a drop in the quality of care. PEC 241’s cap on government expenditure would have to accommodate the growing elderly population in Brazil, which is currently a bit over 10 percent of the population.[xxiv] By capping government expenditure, health spending is limited. Brazil will not be able to address the growing population over the age of 60, which is expected to almost double from 2011 to 2031.[xxv] To give further context to this issue, both the youth age group (0-14) and the elderly age group are expected to equal 20 percent of the population in 2027 at which point the size of the elderly age group will exceed the size of the youth for the considerable future.[xxvi] During this transition, the workforce is likely to be reduced in size and be unable to support the aging population. In effect it appears that Temer’s PEC 241 is setting the government up for failure in addressing a major health budgeting issue in the long term.

Another troubling aspect of PEC 241 is that it removes much of the administration’s ability to respond to an evolving economy by capping government expenditure. Given the long-term effects of this amendment, Brazilian policy would be less responsive to major changes in the economy, such as rapid growth or crisis. Creating a cap that cannot be easily adjusted within 20 years means that the Temer Administration is depending on the policy’s effectiveness and restricting the next presidents in their ability to change state policy despite variable economic conditions. PEC 241 could also limit the constitutional balance of power between government branches, as the legislature loses its ability to have significant influence on budget decisions under a constitutionally mandated spending freeze.

In Temer’s pursuit of increased foreign investor confidence and attempt to control fiscal deficits, he is overlooking other key issues within Brazil’s domestic economy, which may prove to be costly, if not for him, then for the Brazilian state and people.

*Jordy Garcia, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

[i] Fagundez , Ingrid, Entenda o que está em jogo (e as polêmicas) com a PEC que limita o gasto público

(BBC Brazil, Oct/10/2016)

http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-37603414

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] Otoni, Luciana; Levin, Asher; Brazil’s Rouseff Announces More Education Spending Cuts (Reuters, Jul/30/2015)

http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-brazil-budget-education-idUKKCN0Q42VC20150730

[v] Paulo, Trevisani; Brazil’s Congress Approves Rouseff’s Veto of Spending Bill (The Wall Street Journal, Nov./18/2015)

http://www.wsj.com/articles/brazils-congress-ratifies-dilma-rousseffs-veto-to-bill-raising-pension-payments-1447870524

Galvao, Arnaldo; Brazil’s Congress Upholds Majority of Rouseff’s Budget Vetoes (Bloomberg, Sep/23/2016)

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-23/brazilian-congress-upholds-majority-of-rousseff-s-budget-vetoes

[vi] Galvao, Arnaldo; Colitt, Raymond; Rousseff Wins Breakthrough on Austerity as Brazil Caps Pensions, (Bloomberg, 5/27/2016)

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-27/rousseff-wins-breakthrough-on-austerity-as-brazil-caps-pensions

[vii] Fargundez

[viii] Proposed Amendment to the Constitution, (Subchefia of Parliamentary Affairs, June 2016)

http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Projetos/PEC/2016/msg329-junho2016.htm

[ix] Ibid.

[x] Ibid.

[xi] Ibid.

[xii] Ibid.

[xiii] Ibid.

[xiv] Ibid.

[xv] Serrano, Franklin. Summa, Ricardo. Aggregate Demand and the Slowdown of Brazillian Economic Growth from 2011-2014 (CEPR, August/2015) P.13

[xvi] ibid.

[xvii] Serrano and Summa P. 1

[xviii] Serrano and Summa P. 16

[xix] Serrano and Summa P. 17 – 18

[xx] Serrano and Summa P. 18

[xxi] Serano and Summa P. 16

[xxii] Serrano and Summa, P. 17

[xxiii] Reid, P. 172

[xxiv] ibid.

[xxv] Reid, P. 273

[xxvi] Gragnolati, Michele; Jorgensen, Ole Hagen; Rocha, Romera; Fruttero, Anna. 2011. Growing old in an older Brazil: Implications of Population Aging on Growth, Poverty, Public Finance, and Service Delivery (World Bank,2011) P.59

EU leaders and the Canadian Prime Minister on Sunday met in Brussels for the 16th EU-Canada summit.

Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, Robert Fico, Prime Minister of Slovakia holding the Council rotating presidency, and Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada signed the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) at the summit.

CETA is being billed as the most comprehensive and progressive trade agreement between the EU and Canada. Itremoves over 99% of tariffs that currently hinder trade between the EU and Canada. It is expected to increase bilateral trade by €12 billion per year, and to generate growth and new jobs on both sides of the Atlantic.

The leaders also signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA). The SPA deepens cooperation between the EU and Canada in fields such as foreign policy, crisis management, security and defence, energy and climate, enhanced mobility and people-to-people exchanges.

They also adopted a joint declaration on the EU-Canada partnership.

Why isn’t the Democratic Party landsliding the worst and cruelest Republican Party in the past 162 years?

Just take a glance at their record votes and you’ll wonder why the Republican representatives don’t just incorporate themselves and be done with any pretense that they are real people.

A brief look at a compilation of Republican votes during the years 2011-2012, when the Republicans controlled the House, demonstrates that they regularly choose Wall Street over Main Street, drug and oil, banking and insurance companies over consumers. And that Republicans want  tiny enforcement budgets against corporate crime to assure that hundreds of billions of your health and other consumer dollars are not recovered from the corporate criminals ($60 billion a year alone in business frauds on Medicare).

Repeatedly, these Republicans, often a unanimous 100% of them, in a bizarre kind of corporate-conditioned response, vote in favor of corporations shipping American jobs overseas rather than voting to protect American workers. This Republican-controlled congress was intent on defending and increasing massive tax breaks for the wealthiest at the expense of the lower income families, attacking Medicare, social security, and other programs assisting elderly Americans, even assaulting women’s health and safety, opposing stronger food safety enforcement and preventing toxic pollution controls while at the same time protecting rapacious student loan companies and keeping victims of mortgage companies and banks defenseless against onslaughts of insurmountable debt accumulation.

They also passed a bill to pay members of Congress during a GOP-led government shutdown, however, while refusing to guarantee that soldiers would get paid during the same shutdown. Moreover, the Republicans have this strange antagonism toward encouraging more people to vote, and assuring that every vote counts.

Go past the façade of the Republican rhetoric praising heroic veterans are their grim votes against protecting veterans from rip-offs as borrowers for their consumer, education and housing needs.

Fast forward to the last two years and you’ll find the same corporatist grip on the House. Fifteen times House Republicans have voted for measures attacking women’s health; blocked all votes on comprehensive immigration reform; gave the back of their hand against children’s well-being; twice voted unanimously against affirming that climate change is real and passed tax cuts of which 99.6 percent go to the richest 1 percent of Americans.  Furthermore, they have voted unanimously against even considering a constitutional amendment to overturn the Supreme Court’s 5-4 Citizen’s United decision that opened the floodgates of big corporate money in elections. They continue to protect secret money in elections and twice voted against even allowing a vote on the Paycheck Fairness Act giving women new tools for equal pay for equal work.

One hundred percent of all House Republicans voted against allowing a vote to let American workers earn just seven job-protected paid sick days each year – less than has been given for years in western-European countries.

So in hock are they to the student loan industry, the Republicans have repeatedly voted against bringing up for a vote the student loan refinancing bill. One hundred percent of House Republicans voted against even bringing up a bill to stop big companies from dumping their U.S. charter and fleeing abroad to avoid paying their fair share of taxes. Lead-poisoned children in Flint, Michigan got the straight-arm by 236 House Republicans. Republicans held zero hearings in 2016 on the president’s 2017 budget – an unheard of breach of legislative duty.

House Republicans in recent years have stupidly cut the IRS budget facilitating $400 billion of uncollected taxes each year, thereby swelling the federal deficit that the GOP is supposed to care about. The Republicans are knowingly complicit in protecting tax evasion.

Worse, these Republicans are complicit in shielding over $330 billion each year in computerized billing fraud. This corporate crime wave estimate comes from the leading expert on billing fraud, Harvard Professor Malcolm Sparrow (author of License to Steal), backed by an earlier report from the Government Accountability Office of the Congress. There simply is too little budget for adequate investigators and prosecutors even when every dollar in enforcement brings about ten dollars in recoveries and fines!

Why doesn’t all of this anti-human record make news? First, these bills are almost always blocked by the Democrats in the Senate. Second, many of these votes by the House Republicans are blocking votes to require on-the-record roll call votes that show each member’s position on a bill. Third, let’s be clear, the media, which has reporters swarming all over Capitol Hill, is not doing its job.

Fourth, there aren’t a tiny fraction of the civically active people back home organized to publicize the votes by their member of Congress. Fifth, the lack of dynamic leadership by Congressional Democrats included being rolled by a Republican strategy to up the GOP’s advantage in the number of gerrymandered districts in 2010 (brilliantly reported in David Daley’s new book, Ratf**ked: The True Story Behind The Secret Plan to Steal America’s Democracy).

In the final analysis, the blame is on the Democratic Party that does not give us a competitive election process over substantive matters uppermost in the minds of the American people. It took strenuous demands by some civic leaders in Washington, D.C. just to get the House Democrats to compile these aforementioned Republican votes and passively release them in a concise form to the public and then only a month before the November elections!  With few exceptions, Democrats astonishingly do not campaign on such a base Republican misery index.

Unfortunately, many Democratic candidates are dialing for the same campaign dollars as their Republican opponents and many Democratic incumbent candidates are ensconced in safe, non-competitive electoral districts (often because of their gerrymandering). Consequently, they don’t make an effort to show the callousness and cruelty of the Republican Party.

For any further explanation of this Democratic Party’s dysfunctional indifference to winning back the House of Representatives, based on the abysmal record of the Republican Party, call in some social psychologists specializing in group machoism.

To see the full list for yourself – see 2012 and 2016.

Lebanon finally has a new president. Lawmakers have thrown their support behind Michel Aoun, a strong Hezbollah ally, to fill the country’s long-vacant presidency.

The parliament convened at noon (1000 GMT) Monday for the voting session in its 46th attempt to elect a head of state.

Aoun was elected after four rounds of voting during the session.

The 81-year-old Christian leader has won the support of two of his greatest rivals: Samir Geagea, leader of the Christian Lebanese Forces, and ex-prime minister, Saad Hariri.

Earlier on October 20, Hariri, the leader Lebanon’s March 14 Alliance and a close ally of Saudi Arabia, voiced support for Aoun, raising hopes for the settlement of a long-running deadlock on Lebanon’s political stage.

He described his surprise endorsement of Aoun as necessary to “protect Lebanon, protect the (political) system, protect the state and protect the Lebanese people.”

Observers view Aoun’s rise to power as a political victory for Hezbollah, which will greatly diminish the Saudi influence in Lebanon’s political arena. The kingdom has been vigorously lobbying to prevent Lebanon’s presidency from being placed in the hands of Hezbollah’s allies.

Following Hariri’s announcement, Thamer al-Sabhan, the new Saudi minister for Persian Gulf affairs, paid a visit to Beirut for talks on the “political developments in Lebanon and the region.”

Sabhan used to serve as the Saudi ambassador to Iraq until recently, but Baghdad asked Riyadh to replace him after the diplomat failed to heed Iraq’s warnings for his interference in the country’s domestic affairs.

According to some Lebanese political sources, Hariri is expected to be appointed as prime minister for the second time.

Analysts say Aoun and Hariri, 46, face a formidable task to win the cross-party support needed to make a new administration a success.

Aoun, the founder of the Free Patriotic Movement, already had the endorsement of Hezbollah.

Last week, Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah called upon all Lebanese political parties to join forces and put a favorable end to the 30-month presidential void in the Arab country.

Nasrallah, who was speaking during a meeting with Aoun, stressed the need for concerted efforts in order to direct the upcoming presidential vote in Lebanon toward a good conclusion.

Lebanon has been without a head of state since 2014, when the term of President Michel Suleiman expired.

The Lebanese parliament has repeatedly failed to elect a president due to the lack of quorum.

Under Lebanon’s power-sharing system, the president must be a Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim and the parliament speaker a Shia Muslim.

Hezbollah has accused Saudi Arabia of thwarting political initiatives and blocking the election of a president in Lebanon.

Late last year, Hariri launched an initiative to nominate Suleiman Tony Frangieh, the leader of the Marada Movement.

His proposal, however, failed amid reservations on the part of Lebanon’s main Christian parties as well as Hezbollah.

Original article

Roger Waters, lead singer for rock music giants Pink Floyd, has lost a multimillion dollar sponsorship deal with American Express (Amex) for expressing support to students showing solidarity with the Palestinian people, Mondoweiss reported.

Waters said: “I’m going to send out all of my most heartfelt love and support to all those young people on the campuses of the universities of California who are standing up for their brothers and sisters in Palestine and supporting the BDS movement.”

The Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement, better known as BDS, is a movement that seeks to apply non-violent, peaceful means of resisting the Israeli occupation of Palestine through the use of grassroots economic measures.

."I'm sending love/support to all young people in campuses in California who are..supporting Palestine/BDS movement"https://t.co/lKzt8dxiIH

— Damanda C_Palestine (@amanda_damanda) October 29, 2016

Waters added that he was supporting these students in their stand for the Palestinian people “in the hope that we may encourage the government of Israel to end the occupation.”

Rather than staying quiet on the issue, Amex then decided to leak the story of the contract cancellation to the New York Post, in what some have deemed a retaliatory measure taken by a finance company against the Pink Floyd frontman.

“Roger is putting on a huge show. The company was asked to sponsor his tour for $4 million, but pulled out because it did not want to be part of his anti-Israel rhetoric,” an Amex spokesman told the New York Post.

Mondoweiss reported that Amex had previously sponsored popstar Beyonce’s performances, including ones which she used as a platform to protest police brutality against African Americans.

However, Amex seem to have an issue with Waters’ support for Palestinian rights.

(MEMO, PC)

By Shahid Javed Burki2

Confidence and uncertainty are two variables that worry all economists when they reflect about the future. Since they are difficult to quantify, they don’t make into their equations and the models they work with. That notwithstanding, both figure prominently when economists reflect on Britain’s future following the Brexit vote? It is not only the United Kingdom that would be affected but also the European Union. In fact there are likely to be consequences for the entire world economy.

How will Brexit play out in the drama the script of which is still being written? The political dust raised by the referendum of June 23 will take time to settle down. Much has already happened. Prime Minister David Cameron has left office and has been succeeded by the new leader of the Conservative party Mrs Theresa May who appears to follow a hard line on Brexit. Boris Johnson, the former mayor of London and a colourful advocate of the exit move from the European Union, decided not to take part in the contest for succession to David Cameron.

The impact of Brexit on party politics in Britain has been quite significant. The Labour Party has been convulsed. The majority of its backbenchers have rebelled against Jeremy Corbyn the party’s leader. They voted against him but were not able to persuade him to resign his position. He has, since, been re-elected. Those who voted for Britain’s exit did not think that they were producing a major earthquake in British politics but that is precisely what has happened. Political uncertainty always has negative economic consequences and that will be the case with the Brexit move.

It is hard not to be pessimistic about the future. The immediate effects of Brexit will flow almost entirely through financial markets. The British pound was hit badly, losing 7.6 percent in two days in its value expressed in American dollars. Major currency pairs just don’t do that. Since 2012, the average daily move in the pound-dollar exchange rate was only 0.35 percent. The two day movements in the rate after the Brexit move was 21 times the historical average – it was indeed an earthquake. Converting the UK national income at the depreciated rate resulted in the country losing to France its ranking as the world’s fifth largest economy, after the United States, China, Japan and Germany. “The world’s central banks, normally the first responders in times of economic distress, are poorly positioned to help,” wrote Neil Irwin in an assessment for The New York Times. “The Bank of England faces an extraordinarily knotty situation. It simultaneously must plan for a possible recession caused by the Brexit uncertainty and for higher inflation because of the drop in the currency and outflow of capital. It can fight one problem but not both at once.”3

Foreign banks with large operations in London are thinking about their future. Even Deutsche Bank, the symbol of German banking but only nominally based in Frankfurt uses London as a base for investment banking and trading. It began to think about moving these operations out of the UK capital. Several American banks are similarly disposed. The extent of their presence in London may change as a result of Brexit. A day before the Brexit vote, Jamie Dimon, chief executive of JP Morgan Chase said that if the vote was in favour of leaving the European Union, up to a quarter of the bank’s 16,000 employees in Britain might need to move. A day after the vote, he warned in a staff memo that “in months to come, we may need to make changes to our European legal entity, structure, and the location of some roles.”

While finance is the first sector likely to be affected, longer-term consequences will flow from what happens to the flows in investment capital. Uncertainty is bound to influence the amount of foreign direct investment that flows into Britain. Before Brexit, Britain was the favoured destination of this type of capital. With Europe having been integrated into one large market, most manufacturing and technology companies based their activities on their read of comparative advantage. For instance, Airbus produces wings in Broughton, a manufacturing town in Britain, and employees 15,000 people in the country plus tens of thousands additional employees working for various suppliers to the aircraft manufacturing company. “This is a lose-lose result for both Britain and Europe,” said Thomas Enders, the Airbus chief executive.4 Most Airbus aircrafts use Rolls Royce engines made by an iconic British company but now owned by Volkswagen. If tariffs were re-imposed as a result of the British planned to exit the European Union, it would not be worthwhile for Airbus to manufacture large parts of its aircrafts in Britain.

The “exiters” seem not have realized how integrated is the European automobile industry. Britain imports more automobile products from Germany than anywhere else. The country’s is Germany’s third largest customer for German exports, after the United States and France. BMW, Mercedes and Volkswagen account for half of the cars sole in Germany. Foreign companies but not only those in Europe have helped keep alive automobile manufacturing in Britain. Mercedes and Rolls Royce are generally regarded iconic British cars but both are owned by Volkswagen. Nissan has pumped close to 4 billion pounds since the 1980s into building a world-class factory in Sunderland in northeast England. In 2015 it produced 475,000 vehicles, about a third of Britain’s total automobile production. About 55 percent of this output was exported to Europe.

All the assessments that have been made to reflect on what Brexit will bring to Britain and Europe, little attention has been given to relations between it and some of its former colonies. For the last several years some of the large Indian companies have acquired assets in Britain. Tata now owns Jaguar and Land Rover cars in Britain. It worked hard to revive both brands that had lost a great deal of the appeal and lustre because of problems with quality. The cars are selling once again in both Europe and the United States. Tata is also Britain’s largest steel producer.

The Indian expatriate community is deeply involved in developing the IT sector in Britain. Many work in Facebook and Google; both have sizeable operations in Britain though for tax reasons they are headquartered in Ireland and the Netherlands. Google employs 1,000 engineers, many Indians and Pakistanis, across Britain working on global products like its search engines and Android operating system.

The main conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that the Brexit move was poorly thought-through. Apart from the adverse consequences in the areas of finance and manufacturing, it will also impact on the supply of manpower to Britain, particularly those with the skills the British educational system and its demographic situation are not producing in the required numbers. The impact on South Asian immigration of Brexit stands in need of urgent attention. South Asia will be affected more than the countries in the European continent or the Middle East since it sends people with different levels of skills. Most of the recent migrants to Britain have been people skilled in finance and technology. Reducing their number will have consequences for South Asia.

Source:
This article was published at ISAS as ISAS Brief No. 451 (PDF)

Notes:
1. Shahid Javed Burki, Two ‘Brexits’ – The First, 70 Years Ago, ISAS Brief No. 440 – 8 July 2016, available at www.isas.nus.edu.sg
2. Mr Shahid Javed Burki is Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore. He can be contacted at sjburki@nus.edu.sg. The author, not ISAS, is liable for the facts cited and opinions expressed in this paper.
3. Neil Irwin, “Points of departure: Sketching what the future holds for Europe and the global economy,” The New York Times, June 25, 2016, pp. B1 and B3.
4. The Jamie Dimon and Thomas Enders quotes are from Jack Ewing, Points of Departure: Companies ponder as Britain exits E.U.,” The New York Times, June 25, 2016, pp. B1 and B3.

By Mary Rezac

The last person hanged for witchcraft in Boston could be considered a Catholic martyr.

In the 1650s, Ann Glover and her family, along with some 50,000 other native Irish people, were enslaved by Englishman Oliver Cromwell during the occupation of Ireland and shipped to the island of Barbados, where they were sold as indentured servants.

What is known of her history is sporadic at best, though she was definitely Irish and definitely Catholic. According to an article in the Boston Globe, even Ann’s real name remains a mystery, as indentured servants were often forced to take the names of their masters.

This a memorial for Goodwife Ann Glover located in North End, Boston, Massachusetts to commemorate Ann Glover as the first Catholic martyr to be killed in Massachusetts. Photo by Jessolsen, Wikipedia Commons.

While in Barbados, Ann’s husband was reportedly killed for refusing to renounce his Catholic faith. By 1680, Ann and her daughter had moved to Boston where Ann worked as a “goodwife” (a housekeeper and nanny) for the John Goodwin family.

Father Robert O’Grady, director of the Boston Catholic Directory for the Archdiocese of Boston, said that after working for the Goodwins for a few years, Ann Glover became sick, and the illness spread to four of the five Goodwin children.

“She was, unsurprisingly, not well-educated, and in working with the family, apparently she got sick at some point and the kids for whom she was primarily responsible caught whatever it was,” Fr. O’Grady told CNA.

A doctor allegedly concluded that “nothing but a hellish Witchcraft could be the origin of these maladies,” and one of the daughters confirmed the claim, saying she fell ill after an argument with Ann.

The infamous Reverend Cotton Mather, a Harvard graduate and one of the main perpetrators of witch trial hysteria at the time, insisted Ann Glover was a witch and brought her to what would be the last witch trial in Boston in 1688.

In the courtroom, Ann refused to speak English and instead answered questions in her native Irish Gaelic. In order to prove she was not a witch, Mather asked Ann to recite the Our Father, which she did, in a mix of Irish Gaelic and Latin because of her lack of education.

“Cotton Mather would have recognized some of it, because of course that would have been part of your studies in those days, you studied classical languages when you were preparing to be a minister, especially Latin and Greek,” Father O’Grady said.

“But because it was kind of mixed in with Irish Gaelic, it was then considered proof that she was possessed because she was mangling the Latin.”

Allegedly, Boston merchant Robert Calef, who knew Ann when she was alive, said she “was a despised, crazy, poor old woman, an Irish Catholic who was tried for afflicting the Goodwin children. Her behavior at her trial was like that of one distracted. They did her cruel. The proof against her was wholly deficient. The jury brought her guilty. She was hung. She died a Catholic.”

Mather convicted Ann of being an “idolatrous Roman Catholick” and a witch, and she hung on Boston Common on November 16, 1688. Today, just a 15 minute walk away, the parish of Our Lady of Victories holds a plaque commemorating her martyrdom, which reads:

“Not far from here on 16 November 1688, Goodwife Ann Glover an elderly Irish widow, was hanged as a witch because she had refused to renounce her Catholic faith. Having been deported from her native Ireland to the Barbados with her husband, who died there because of his own loyalty to the Catholic faith, she came to Boston where she was living for at least six years before she was unjustly condemned to death. This memorial is erected to commemorate “Goody” Glover as the first Catholic martyr in Massachusetts.”

The plaque was placed at the Church on the tercentennial anniversary of her death in 1988 by the Order of Alhambra, a Catholic fraternity whose mission includes commemorating Catholic historical persons, places and events. The Boston City Council also declared November 16 as “Goody Glover Day”, in order to condemn the injustice brought against her.

Ann Glover has not yet been officially declared a martyr by a pope, nor has her cause for canonization been opened to date, partly because her story has faded into obscurity over time, Fr. O’Grady said.

“Part of the dilemma here (too) is that when she was hanged, Catholics were a tiny, minuscule, minority in Boston, so picking up her ‘cause’ was not easy or ‘on top of the list,’” he said.

Ann Glover’s trial also set the tone for the infamous Salem Witch Trials in 1692, during which 19 men and women were hanged for witchcraft, and in which Reverend Cotton Mather and his anti-Catholic prejudices played a major role.

Radicalisation is a phenomenon that has been striking not only in parts of Asia and Africa but also in the heart of Europe. While the number of Muslims in Germany is estimated by 4,7 millions (5,8%), 70% of the almost 900,000 asylum-seekers have arrived in recent years are believed to be Muslims. It is undeniable that there is discrimination in Germany, and it is equally undeniable that more on issues of integration and conflict prevention should be done. Thus, could effective integration processes prevent radicalisation of the Muslim youth in Europe?

In a conference on the Muslim youth in Germany between integration, compartmentalisation and new ways [in German: Muslimische Jugend Zwischen Integration, Abschottung Und Neuen Wegen], a variety of scholars and experts gathered to discuss issues inherent to the participation and self-alienation of Muslim youth in the German society. By large, two main pillars received more attention than any others: The first one is the feasibility of funding Muslim associations in Germany to prevent radicalisation among the youth. The second one is the processes of radicalisation and de-radicalisation of the youth and whether there are any preventive measures.

Deputy head of integration department at the Hessian Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration Claudia Hackhausen says that integration and diversity are crucial for the Hessian government. The government supports a “Welcome Culture” [lit. Willkommenskultur], in which respect, mutual-appreciation, commitment and a sense of responsibility for the overall good are priorities.

Thus, Hessian Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration supports innovative projects such as the Hessian Labour Market Initiative, which adopts a package of measures to integrate refugees into the work market and society. As part of the “Training and Qualification Budget”, funds were raised up to EUR 10.5 million to cover language classes, qualification and training of refugees. Hackhausen adds that the government also exerts efforts to equally support the youth of all backgrounds.

Obviously, the integration of Muslim youth in Germany is very important for the stability of the German society. Susanne Schroeter, a professor at the Geothe University and the director of the Frankfurt Research Centre for Global Islam, highlights the necessity of focusing on concepts of plurality and participation, when approaching the issue of Muslim youth.

On the one hand Muslim youth face several problems such as marginalisation and discrimination, which makes it harder for youngsters from a Muslim background to, for instance, find jobs or apartments. This is more likely to make the youth more sensitive, and hence increase their feeling of being socially disadvantaged.

On the other hand Muslim youth face resistance when trying to fully integrate in the German society. Such resistance namely comes from parents and peers, who warn from losing one’s identity.

There Is No Black or White

Working with the youth poses many challenges and responsibilities. Based on her work with Muslim youth in mosques and Islamic associations in Hesse in Germany, Schroeter elucidates a few cases, in which there is a detectable impact of ultra conservative Salafist thought on the Muslim youth. Youth work in mosques is often “problematic”, Schroeter argues, especially when supported by Islamic associations.

While conservative Salafism is more likely to espouse an extremist interpretation of Islam, in which a narrow-minded worldview is put in place, it is not necessarily inclined to violence.

Nevertheless, such interpretation of Islam, as Schroeter explains, views the world according to two templates: The house of peace [lit. Dar Al-Salam] and the house of war [lit. Dar Al-Harb]. For instance, “Safer Spaces”, a project supposedly directed to the youth and financed by the Federal Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, follows this interpretation to divide the world into not two but three templates: The “house of peace”, the “house of war” and the “house of peace treaty”, where a contractual agreement between two “houses” applies. Germany in this case lies in the “house of peace treaty”. On their website, for instance, Muslims are required to understand that “in a non-Muslim country, to vote or not to vote are both equally bad options”.

“Muslims should try their best to unite and form political blocs in order to exert a significant influence in society,” stated on Saferspaces.de.

As preventive measures concerned, Schroeter argues that change could start at schools. For instance, new subjects or/and workshops to address issues of multiculturalism seem to be necessary for pupils from all backgrounds. Pupils, Schroeter explains, need to learn about the differences not only between Islam and Christianity but also about the differences between atheism, Judaism and Buddhism etc. In other words, pupils need to learn about different worldviews, cultures and traditions.

In Hesse alone there are about 75,000 pupils of a Muslim background.

According to Schroeter, extremism thrives through mosques and worship halls. Therefore, they have to be closely and critically observed. Nevertheless, it is important to note that not all mosques work in this direction as some of them offer significant assistance in relation to topics of tolerance, interreligious dialogue and anti-extremism. Good examples of such efforts could be seen at the Union of Islamic Cultural Centres in Cologne (VIKZ), the Youth Centre in Biebrich and Gerhart Hauptmann school in Wiesbaden.

Whose Mistake Is It?

The largest mosque umbrella organization in Germany, The Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (known as DITIB) has had its ups and downs since its foundation in 1984 in Germany as a branch of Turkish Religious Affairs Directorate. While DITIB remains closely interlinked with the Turkish religious authority Diyanet in terms of finance, staff and organisation, it claims to manage about 900 mosques nationwide.

The umbrella organisation is still under spotlight for claims of among others spreading anti-Semitism, teaching radical Islamism, resisting efforts of integration and keeping a controversial link to the Turkish state. Such résumé has at least raised eyebrows across the years. Consequently scepticism towards DITIB, which directly reflects in the lives of the youth, has become commonplace in Germany.

Schroeter has shared her scepticism and critique of DITIB especially that concerns the Turkish-speaking Imams, the sense of belonging to “the fatherland Turkey” and anti-Semitic sentiment. She also brought to memory the “martyr comic” that was originally published by the Turkish religious authority Diyanet in Turkish, and used by DITIB for the youth in Germany. As an encouragement for the youth, the martyr comic glorifies the concept of dying for god, after which martyrs reach paradise.

Hussein Hamdan, an Islamic scholar at the academy of the Rottenburg-Stuttgart diocese, argues that younger generations are different from the older ones. Today, younger generations ask more questions and demand more answers and engagement. Breaking out of the patronage of older generations, they attempt to found youth associations for education, free time, and sport activities. For instance, The Association of Alewite Youth in Germany (BDAJ), was founded in 1994 and comprises of branches in Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia, Bremen, Hamburg, Berlin, Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony. BDAJ represents the interests of more than 33,000 children, adolescents and young adults until 27. While the association focuses on the Alewite doctrine, it is also committed to promoting a just society and peaceful coexistence, where human rights, equality between women and men, freedom of all faiths, rights of oppressed minorities, critical thinking, democratic participation of Alewite youth, and integration of young people with a migration background, take precedence. As concrete programs, BDAJ offers inter alia educational seminars, panel discussions for the youth, educational field trips, workshops, theatre performances and festivals.

Hamdan argues that this is not the only positive example to draw a differential line between younger and older generations. “While BDAJ started their activities for the youth in 1994, DITIB began their activities for the youth in 2009. This should urge to think,” Hamdan said.

It is worth to note that Alewites increasingly identify themselves as Alewites and not as Muslims.

It is important, Hamdan notes, to pay attention to the positive signs from the Muslim youth, therefore, there must be caution in Germany that the Muslim youth do not pay for the mistakes of older generations.

Radicalisation of the Youth

It is quite obvious that Mulim youth get caught up in religious fundamentalism, and increasingly become entangled in Jihadist ideologies such as that of ISIS.

Ahmad Mansour, a psychologist and a programme director at the European Foundation for Democracy, argues that while radicalisation is a very complex topic and is perceived differently by different people, it is also a process, which does not happen overnight. But why do Muslim youngsters slip into radicalisation?

Young people, Mansour explains, might be unhappy or discontent with their lives, and are constantly looking for alternatives. There are several reasons that could push young Muslims into radicalisation. Perhaps they lack a role model such as a father, regardless of whether the father has abandoned the family, passed away or been unable to find himself in society. Perhaps they have experienced failure at school or a frustrating transition period from school to work. Perhaps they have dealt with a family member’s illness or death. There are cases, in which, a teenager changes hearts because of such a tragic incident in family. Perhaps they have encountered discrimination experiences, in which they may have felt their religion and place of origin were viewed with prejudice. Those who feel they are somehow disconnected from the society develop feelings and unstable personalities that make them susceptible to radicalisation. Such vulnerability could be at its peek in a “time window” of one to two years that starts at the ages between 15 and 17. There are, however, cases where such time window towards radicalisation starts at the ages of 13 or 14.

Salafists fill such gaps with their patriarchal ideology and concepts of the all-knowingly punitive God. Salafism is very well received by these young people and this might be for several reasons: Offering the youth an identity, a sense of belonging, a simple explanation of a complex world, friendships and community. In other words, while Salafism is dangerous; it is also attractive because it presents a regulated, structured world, for which a clear vision, mission and orientation are put forward.

For instance, Mansour illustrates, explaining the war in Syria might need hours to break down its complexity and make sense of it. However, for radical Salafism, it can be explained with a simple statement: “It is a war against Islam”.

Mansour calls for a social and political rethinking process of the phenomenon of radicalisation in order to prevent and combat ideological extremism. It is a process, in which every one in the society should take part.

The Flame of Hope

Perhaps it is true that instead of playing the role of victim in a complex world, it is more fruitful to participate in an inclusive preventive process, in which all do their share in order to live together in a peaceful society.

“This is possible when the people have the will to do so,” said Taoufik Hartit, a national project manager at the Federation of Muslim Scouts in Germany (BMPPD).

Too hopeful?

BMPPD was founded in 2010 and aims to educate and train young people between the ages of seven and 21 in Germany. Following the principles of the Quran as they represent themselves, the BMPPD recognises that dialogue with people of different faith, ethnicity, skin colour, language and nationality as equal partners is indispensible. But are there any concrete signs?

The Muslim scouts organised a project called “The Flame of Hope”, which is intended to help Muslim youth to gain a better understanding of German history and the social responsibility for a peaceful coexistence far from prejudice and ideological frameworks. In this project, a group of Muslim scouts travelled to various cities across Germany from September 2012 to October 2013 to meet with other youth groups of different backgrounds. The goal was inter alia to integrate young people with a migration background in the society in order to strengthen their sense of citizenship.

This should also, Hartit argues, actively involve the youth in building a better future for a diverse and pluralist society.

While asked to describe the current integration processes of Muslim youth in Germany in one word, Hartit said it remains a “virtuous action”. The same question was directed to Susanne Schroeter, Claudia Hackhausen, Ahmad Mansour and a civil police officer and they answered respectively “ambivalent”, “hopeful”, “needs to be brought up-to-date” and “improvable”.

The article appeared in Mashreq Politics and Culture Journal

*The conference was organised by Frankfurt Research Centre for Global Islam at the Excellence Cluster “Normative Orders” at Goethe University under the auspices of the Hessian Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration in the Historical Museum in Frankfurt.

Climate change is happening so quickly that a question mark hangs over whether forests can adapt accordingly without human interference and can continue to perform their various functions such as timber production, protection against natural hazards and providing a recreational space for the public.

In Switzerland, temperatures have already risen by around 1.9°C since the beginning of industrialization. Even keeping global warming down to the 1.5-2°C target set by the Paris Agreement on climate change will yield a further increase of 1-2°C.

For the Swiss forests, this warming trend will involve vegetation zones shifting 500‑700 metres higher in altitude. Thus, in future, broadleaf trees will increasingly thrive in lower-lying mountain forests which are currently dominated by conifers. Rising temperatures and drought levels during the growing season are exerting stress on trees and are increasing the risk of forest fires and exacerbating attacks by harmful organisms. This affects Norway spruce, for example, which is more susceptible to bark beetle infestation in prolonged dry spells. In future, it will be less common at lower elevations, while the conditions will be increasingly favourable to more drought-tolerant species such as the sessile oak.

Foresters and forest owners should already tailor the management of their forests to these future conditions. With a view to ensuring a sound empirical basis for this, in 2009 the Swiss Federal Institute for Forest, Snow and Landscape Research WSL and the Federal Office for the Environment FOEN launched the Forests and Climate Change research program. The results provide a comprehensive overview, unique for Central Europe, of the effects of climate change on trees and on the various functions of forests.

The research results show that while forests can adapt to climate change to a certain extent, they are unlikely to be capable of continuing to perform their functions – so natural-hazard protection, the increasingly vital production of timber as a renewable raw material and energy source or their recreational function – everywhere to the extent we have become used to.

A major disruptive event such as the forest fire that happened above Leuk in the Swiss canton of Valais in the hot summer of 2003 can undermine forests’ natural function of providing protection from natural hazards and can require costly measures such as afforestation and avalanche barriers. It will take decades before the forest’s full protective function is restored there. As a result of climate change, such events may become a more frequent occurrence in future.

To avert the loss of such functions, the research programme devised various management strategies adapted to changing climatic conditions. In particular, they result in a greater increase in the diversity of the tree species. How a forest is affected by climate change and what type of management makes it more able to cope with the new climatic conditions depend decisively on the particularities of the relevant site, especially soil depth, water supply and slope exposure.

These conditions are changing from site to site and must be viewed in the context of the management of the forest. In this way, for example, areas in high-resolution site maps can be shown where the climate-sensitive Norway spruce can continue to thrive. Currently, tree-species recommendations are being examined in forest tests along with the cantonal forestry offices and associations of forest owners and environmental and forestry industry associations.

A Swiss court has ordered the re-opening of an investigation concerning alleged Kazakh government-backed illegal surveillance of a political exile based in the Lake Geneva area.

The Federal Criminal Court in Bellinzona has asked the Attorney General to re-open the investigation into allegations of state-sponsored surveillance and hacking made by Kazakh national Victor Khrapunov. Khrapunov, ex-mayor of Almaty who has been living in Switzerland since 2008, has filed several cases claiming Kazakh government surveillance and harassment – such as installing a covert GPS tracker in his car and hacking into his computer using Trojan Horses and malware.

Khrapunov is accused in his country of diverting millions of dollars of public assets and laundering the funds for his own use. It is a charge Khrapunov claims is politically motivated because of his opposition to the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, the self-proclaimed “leader of the nation” since 1989.

In March, the Attorney General’s Office closed its investigation – which it began in January 2014 – into the complaints, claiming that it couldn’t accurately identify the identity of the perpetrators, apart from the fact that they were mostly likely two British citizens. It also claimed that asking for international assistance would be futile given the political nature of the accusations.

In a decision taken on August 9 and communicated on Monday, the Federal Criminal Court accepted Khrapunov’s appeal to re-open the case and rejected the Attorney General’s arguments for closing the case. The court recommended that the perpetrators’ motives behind the hacking and surveillance be identified. It also pointed out that Khrapunov and his family are still being subjected to such harassment, justifying the need to continue the investigation.

Paul Kammerer committed suicide in 1926 after being accused of fraud in his famous experiments of “inheritance of acquired traits” with the midwife toad. A new study shows how recent advances in molecular epigenetics and re-examination of his descriptions suggest the experiments were actually authentic.

The alleged scientific fraud by Paul Kammerer is perhaps one of the most controversial mysteries in the history of biology. In the early 20th century, he was a famous evolutionary scientist, hailed as a “new Darwin” in the pages of the New York Times. His experiments provided impressive evidence that environmental life experiences could have a direct, inheritable effect on progeny, as maintained by his intellectual predecessor Lamarck, and by Darwin himself.

In one of his most famous experiments, Kammerer had shown how a normally terrestrial species, the midwife toad, could be made to live and mate in water when kept in an artificially heated environment. These modified “water” toads laid eggs that grew into toads with an innate preference to live and mate in water, even when raised in normal, unheated environments. In successive generations of water toads, Kammerer reported that male toads developed nuptial pads on their fingers. These are rough, dark-colored thickenings of skin that are usually absent in midwife toads, but present in other water-loving species, which use them to grasp females during copulation.

Additionally, Kammerer crossed one of his modified “water” males with a normal, untreated land female, obtaining 100% water toads in the first generation, and about ¾ water toads in the second generation. Thus, modified traits were being inherited according to Mendel’s rules of genetics, the same that most of us were taught in high school.

In 1926, fellow scientist G.K. Noble examined a fixed and worn-out specimen of an experimental “water” toad. Noble found that the fingers had been injected with india ink to create an artificial resemblance to nuptial pads. A huge scandal ensued, placing Kammerer’s entire scientific legacy into question. Kammerer committed suicide shortly after, and although he left letters maintaining that his results were authentic, many interpreted the suicide as an admission of guilt.

Thus, Paul Kammerer became a symbol of scientific fraud, as well as a powerful story about the ultimate failure and scientific invalidity of studies in the “inheritance of acquired traits”. This view of Kammerer has continued to be the mainstream opinion, although some voices have defended his innocence. Soviet contemporaries did not accept the fraud accusations, and even made a popular propaganda film, “Salamandra” (1928), that narrated how Kammerer (who was a leftist jew) had been framed by his enemies in the wake of Austrian Nazism. In the 1970’s, the renowned journalist Arthur Koestler wrote a famous book, “The case of the midwife toad” which pointed out several problems with the fraud accusations, including the fact that the specimens had been observed by several experts, who should not have been easily fooled by crude ink injections.

It is no secret that even today, the “inheritance of acquired characteristics” is often treated as an impossibility, supposedly discarded by experiments such as the amputation of the tail of mice during successive generations, which never leads to mice being born without tails. It was argued that no special mechanism existed by which environmental change could directly modify inheritance, and that every apparent case could be ultimately explained by indirect effects of natural selection and conventional genetics. But these views started to change drastically since the 1990’s, along with the progress in techniques to study molecular genetics. These uncovered several molecular mechanisms, such as DNA methylation, that could directly change inheritance in response to the environment. The modern field of epigenetics studies those changes in gene expression that do not involve a mutation, but are nevertheless inherited in absence of the signal or event that initiated the change. During the 21st century, experiments in mice have reported such inheritable modifications, identifying the relevant genes that have been altered by epigenetic mechanisms.

In light of these recent ground-breaking discoveries, a team of scientists from the University of Chile (Alexander Vargas), the Technical University of Munich (Quirin Krabichler) , and Linköping University (Carlos Guerrero-Bosagna) have re-examined Kammerer’s descriptions of the midwife toad experiments, and have published their conclusions yesterday in the Journal of Experimental Zoology. The situation is perhaps analogous to detectives analysing a journal that describes numerous murders in great detail: There are many opportunities to find out whether it fits with reality, or is merely a work of fantasy. If some of the alleged data in Kammerer’s papers were entirely extraordinary, beyond known phenomena or explanatory mechanisms, we should remain cautious. If, in turn, science offers experimental evidence that matches Kammerer’s reports down to specific details, we may consider a greater likelihood of their authenticity.

The team concluded that Kammerer’s descriptions are completely within the realm of possibilities uncovered by modern epigenetics. This in itself is an important alternative to fraud and the alleged impossibility of the experiments. However, they additionally confirmed a very special detail about the experiments: Dominance in hybrid crosses would depend on the sex of the toads, such that if Kammerer now crossed a land male with a water female, the first generation would be 100% land toads, and the next, ¾ land toads. Such switches in dominance according to sex (also known as “parent of origin effects”) have been known to scientists for a long time, but have only recently been understood to result from epigenetic mechanisms. Kammerer and other Lamarckians never placed any importance on this detail, which was mentioned as little more than a curiosity. However, since epigenetic mechanisms produce these effects in several modern experiments, it provides a very specific resemblance, that strongly suggests the authenticity of the midwife toad experiments. There is no good reason why Kammerer would invent such a detail if his descriptions were a mere work of fantasy.

The new in-depth study of Kammerer’s descriptions has also clarified several important details about the experiments, which are shown to favor an epigenetic mechanism over other discussed alternatives. Recent claims that Kammerer would provide changing and unreliable accounts of his experiments are also conclusively discarded by the new study. Gunter Wagner, an evolutionary geneticist and professor at Yale University, calls the new study an “exciting read” and “the most in depth analysis of Paul Kammerer’s primary publications to date, and the only one that has been performed in the light of recent biological knowledge on epigenetics”.

Why did so many of Kammerer’s contemporaries disbelieve the experiments? Most likely, they were conceptually unprepared to understand the results, many of which are puzzling and hard to make sense of without a modern knowledge of epigenetic molecular mechanisms. An especially important contemporary of Kammerer was William Bateson, who coined the word “genetics”. Bateson described the results of Kammerer’s hybrid crosses as “most astounding”, but doubted their reality, arguing that until they were clearly demonstrated and confirmed, “we are absolved from basing broad conclusions on his testimony.”

Indeed, Kammerer had a unique way of thinking for his time. While most of his contemporaries would split into opposite “Mendelian” and “Lamarckian” bands, he combined the experimental principles of both schools of thought. He was also unusual among Lamarckians in that he did not believe that the inheritance of acquired traits was necessarily progressive or beneficial, but could also produce neutral or detrimental traits.

The new paper by Vargas, Krabichler and Guerrero-Bosagna coincides with the very recent publication of a new book in German, “Der Fall Paul Kammerer” (“The case of Paul Kammerer”) by journalist Klaus Taschwer. This book provides abundant new historical data on the strange circumstances surrounding the discovery of the ink-injected nuptial pads, strongly suggesting that Kammerer was indeed framed. Combined with the scientific approach of Vargas et al., there is now more evidence than ever that suggests the authenticity of the midwife toad experiments. Conclusive evidence, however, can only come from renewed experimentation with the midwife toad. New molecular techniques would allow a quick assessment of epigenetic mechanisms, and important advances have already been made that demonstrate epigenetic inheritance and parent of origin effects in other amphibians. To further encourage new research in the midwife toad, Vargas et al have included a model of epigenetic mechanisms that can explain Kammerer’s results through specific assumptions, that can be experimentally tested. Renewed research in the midwife toad may not only give closure to one of the most intriguing mysteries in the history of biology, but it is also likely to generate important scientific advances on how epigenetic mechanisms work in evolution and adaptation.

Modern epigenetics may clear Kammerer’s name, and is already carrying out what is likely to be his unfulfilled contribution to science. In an ironic final paragraph of his paper on hybrid crosses, Kammerer alludes to the fact that Mendel himself was overlooked in his lifetime: “May my work fare better than its great predecessor written by Mendel; may it find its useful application in science and economy before the author’s death and before the passing of many decades!”

By Dr. Matthew Crosston*

The United States spends approximately 42.4 billion USD per year in foreign assistance. While it is easy to point out that 42.4 billion is actually barely 1% of the overall US budget (4.15 TRILLION USD) and use that figure to try to fight conventional wisdom worry that America spends too much helping other people in other lands solve their problems while not trying to solve its own problems, the real-term reality is that 42.4 billion is a lot of money. Anywhere. To anyone.

It might even be surprising to people to learn that of that 42.4 billion, significantly less than half (16.8 billion USD) is allotted to ‘security.’ Fully 60% of the American foreign assistance budget goes to ‘economic and development’ initiatives all over the world. These initiatives run the gamut of well-intentioned policies, from migration and refugee assistance (2.8 b) to development assistance (3 b) to economic support funds (6.1 b) to global health programs (8.6 b). At face value it is difficult to argue with the theory and philosophy of humanitarian outreach underpinning these financial allotments. But if one begins to scratch below the surface of this humanitarian outreach, layers upon layers of illogic and negligence is revealed. At the very least, the methodology for determining recipients and structures in place for financial oversight seem to be deeply troubled.

This article completely avoids analysis of American foreign aid that is security-based, largely for two reasons. First, as cited above, security-based foreign aid, while getting the wolf’s share of media attention and criticism, is actually far less compared to the more universally praised and justified economic and development funds. Second, while some might find this cynical, there is often a common ‘legal kickback’ mechanism in place with American security-based foreign aid that directly supports the American defense industry. For example, under the current agreement between the United States and Israel, the latter can choose to spend as much as 26% of its security aid on weapons and systems produced within Israel. In essence, a quarter of American aid could be utilized as a direct subsidy to build up native Israeli defense industries. A new agreement, however, comes into effect in 2019 where even that small percentage is eliminated and all American security funds have to be spent by Israel on American defense contractors. This means America has begun to shift this aid-as-defense-industry-subsidy for other countries to its own military-industrial complex. It is, ultimately, destined to be a US governmental welfare program for American defense industries. This is not highlighted so much as a criticism (although it is clear many have issues with this practice), as an acknowledgement that even when American security-based foreign aid is mishandled or used in a way that works against American objectives, it is still ultimately connected to a positive economic purpose back to the United States. The benefit might not be as large or as long-term as the aid is meant to engender, but a benefit nonetheless exists for America no matter what emerges politically and militarily on the ground in these other countries.

There is no obvious direct ‘legal kickback’ explicitly benefiting the United States when it comes to its distribution of economic development-based foreign aid. This means it is arguably more important to watch not only how much money is spent but also to whom does the money go? It is in answering this question that some serious questions and misgivings emerge. Below, the top recipients of American ‘economic and development’ foreign assistance aid were juxtaposed against the respective 2015 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. The TI Corruption Perception Index ranks 168 countries around the world, measuring the perceived levels of public sector corruption. As TI itself says, ‘public sector corruption isn’t simply about taxpayer money going missing. Broken institutions and corrupt officials fuel inequality and exploitation – keeping wealth in the hands of the elite few and trapping many more in poverty.’ The TI index has up to now been used for evaluating internal processes within given countries, in terms of how domestic institutions and state governance properly (or improperly) represent and protect its people. What this analysis does is tie the CPI directly into the distribution of American economic development-based foreign aid. The reason for this is simple: if a country scores low in terms of public sector corruption, then it is signaling globally that its domestic institutions are structurally engineered to manipulate received foreign aid, especially if it is geared to internal economic development. Arguably, the distribution of such foreign aid should avoid countries scoring low on Transparency International’s CPI. Unfortunately, when it comes to America, the dominant force in distributing foreign aid, this common sense idea is not in play:

TOP RECIPIENTS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN AID DESIGNATED FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT and CPI rank:

Afghanistan – 166
Pakistan – 117
Ethiopia – 103
Nigeria – 136
Sudan – 165
Kenya – 139 (tied)
Uganda – 139 (tied)
Tanzania – 117 (tied)
Zambia – 76
Mozambique – 112
Ukraine – 130
Democratic Republic of Congo – 147
Malawi – 112
South Sudan – 163
Iraq – 161

It is beyond the scope of this brief analysis to dive into each of the 15 individual cases above. What matters is to note that the AVERAGE Corruption Perception Index ranking of the top American economic development aid recipients is 132 (out of 168). This is horrifyingly low. For those who might be tempted to argue that this makes sense because it is obviously these countries that are in the most need of foreign assistance and guidance, that argument is fatally flawed: when a reminder is given about just what the CPI truly means – structural and institutional prevalence to manipulate, misuse, and exploit opportunities for elite gain – then it is obvious that in these countries all foreign aid inevitably flows through corrupt institutions before having any opportunity to be distributed to the communities most in need. Without strict and relatively oppressive external oversight mechanisms, these monies are de facto destined to be misappropriated or simply brazenly stolen. And studies have long shown the oversight mechanisms in place for the management of American foreign aid is lacking, to be kind.

The unfortunate but unavoidable conclusion is that the majority of American foreign aid, the bulk of which is rarely questioned compared to the more controversial security-based assistance, is currently going to countries structurally engineered at the moment to simply steal it. Perhaps most troubling of all, the current global political environment is focused more prominently on military/security-oriented initiatives and operations. This means it is unlikely any near-term future will witness even an inquiry into constructing a new system for foreign assistance. But a new system is what is desperately needed if the swamp of misguided good intentions is ever going to be drained.

About the author:
*Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science, Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program, and the Miller Chair at Bellevue University

Source:
This article was published by Modern Diplomacy

By Daniel Hughes and Andrew M. Colarik*

Recent analysis of cyber warfare has been dominated by works focused on the challenges and opportunities it presents to the conventional military dominance of the United States. This was aptly demonstrated by the 2015 assessment from the Director of National Intelligence, who named cyber threats as the number one strategic issue facing the United States.1 Conversely, questions regarding cyber weapons acquisition by small states have received little attention. While individually weak, small states are numerous. They comprise over half the membership of the United Nations and remain important to geopolitical considerations.2 Moreover, these states are facing progressively difficult security investment choices as the balance among global security, regional dominance, and national interests is constantly being assessed. An increasingly relevant factor in these choices is the escalating costs of military platforms and perceptions that cyber warfare may provide a cheap and effective offensive capability to exert strategic influence over geopolitical rivals.

This article takes the position that in cyber warfare the balance of power between offense and defense has yet to be determined. Moreover, the indirect and immaterial nature of cyber weapons ensures that they do not alter the fundamental principles of warfare and cannot win military conflicts unaided. Rather, cyber weapons are likely to be most effective when used as a force multiplier and not just as an infrastructure disruption capability. The consideration of cyber dependence—that is, the extent to which a state’s economy, military, and government rely on cyberspace—is also highly relevant to this discussion. Depending on infrastructure resiliency, a strategic technological advantage may become a significant disadvantage in times of conflict. The capacity to amplify conventional military capabilities, exploit vulnerabilities in national infrastructure, and control the cyber conflict space is thus an important aspect for any war-making doctrine. Integrating these capabilities into defense strategies is the driving force in the research and development of cyber weapons.

The Nature of Cyber Warfare

Cyber warfare is increasingly being recognized as the fifth domain of warfare. Its growing importance is suggested by its prominence in national strategy, military doctrine, and significant investments in relevant capabilities. Despite this, a conclusive definition of cyber warfare has yet to emerge.3 For our purposes, such a definition is not required as the critical features of cyber warfare can be summarized in three points. First, cyber warfare involves actions that achieve political or military effect. Second, it involves the use of cyberspace to deliver direct or cascading kinetic effects that have comparable results to traditional military capabilities. Third, it creates results that either cause or are a crucial component of a serious threat to a nation’s security or that are conducted in response to such a threat.4 More specifically, cyber weapons are defined as weaponized cyber warfare capabilities held by those with the expertise and resources required to deliver and deploy them. Thus, it is the intent to possess the skills required to develop and deploy cyber weapons that must be the focus of any national security strategy involving cyber warfare.

Notable theorists have judged that in cyber warfare, offense is dominant.5 Attacks can be launched instantaneously, and there is rapid growth in the number of networks and assets requiring protection. After all, cyberspace is a target-rich environment based on network structures that privilege accessibility over security. Considerable technical and legal difficulties make accurate attribution of cyber attacks, as well as precise and proportionate retaliation, a fraught process.6 There is also the low cost of creating cyber weapons—code is cheap—and any weapon released onto the Internet can be modified to create the basis of new offensive capabilities.7 All of this means that the battlespace is open, accessible, nearly anonymous, and with an entry cost that appears affordable to any nation-state.

Strategies that rely too heavily on offensive dominance in cyber warfare may, however, be premature. Cyber dependence—the extent to which an attacker depends on cyberspace for critical infrastructure—is crucial to the strategic advantages that cyber weapons can provide. Uncertainty rules as the dual-use nature of cyber weapons allows them to be captured, manipulated, and turned against their creators.8 Equally important is the practice of “escalation dominance.”9 As shown by as yet untested U.S. policy, retaliation for a cyber attack may be delivered by more destructive military capabilities.10 And while the speed of a cyber attack may be near instantaneous, preparation for sophisticated cyber attacks is considerable. The Stuxnet attack required the resources of a technologically sophisticated state to provide the expansive espionage, industrial testing, and clandestine delivery that were so vital to its success. The above demonstrates that the true cost of advanced cyber weapons lies not in their creation but in their targeting and deployment, both of which reduce their ability to be redeployed to face future, unforeseen threats.

Cyber weapons are further limited by their lack of physicality. As pieces of computer code, they generate military effect only by exploiting vulnerabilities created by reliance on cyberspace.11 They can attack vulnerable platforms and infrastructures by manipulating computer systems or act as a force multiplier to traditional military assets. This may lead to the disruption and control of the battlespace, as well as to the provision of additional intelligence when payloads are deployed. These effects, however, are always secondary—cyber weapons cannot directly affect the battlefield without a device to act through, nor can they occupy and control territory.

Ultimately, the debate regarding the balance of power in cyber warfare and the relative power of cyber weapons will likely be decided by empirical evidence relating to two factors. The first is the amount of damage caused by the compromise of cyber-dependent platforms. The second will be the extent to which major disruptions to infrastructure erode political willpower and are exploitable by conventional military capabilities. For the moment, however, it is safe to presume that conflicts will not be won in cyberspace alone and that this applies as much to small states as it does to major powers.

Uses of Cyber Weapons by Small States

To be worthy of investment, a cyber weapons arsenal must provide states with political or military advantage over—or at the very least, parity with—their adversaries. To judge whether a small state benefits sufficiently to justify their acquisition, we must understand how these capabilities can be used. A nonexhaustive list of potential cyber weapon uses includes warfighting, coercion, deterrence, and defense diplomacy. As cyber weapons are limited to secondary effects, they currently have restricted uses in warfighting. Their most prominent effect likely will be the disruption and/or manipulation of military command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities and the degradation of civilian support networks. Attacks on civilian infrastructure remain most feasible, and attacks on automated military platforms are possible.12 The effective use of cyber weapons as a coercive tool is constrained by the relative size and cyber dependence of an opponent and carries the risk of weapons acting in unforeseen ways. Both of these dependencies are shared when cyber weapons are used as a deterrent. This is due to the peculiar nature of the cyber domain, where both coercion and deterrence rely on the same aggressive forward reconnaissance of an adversary’s network. This results in the difference between coercion and deterrence being reduced to intent—something difficult to prove. The final potential use of cyber weapons is as a component of defense diplomacy strategy, which focuses on joint interstate military exercises as a means to dispel hostility, build trust, and develop armed forces.13 This could be expanded to encompass cyber exercises conducted by military cyber specialists. Defense diplomacy can act as a deterrent, but it is effective only if relevant military capabilities are both credible and demonstrable.14 The latter is problematic. Advanced cyber weapons are highly classified; caution must therefore be exercised when demonstrating capabilities so that “live” network penetrations are not divulged.

These four capabilities have crucial dependencies, all of which can limit their suitability for deployment in a conflict. First, the conflicting parties must have comparable military power. Disrupting an opponent’s C4ISR will be of little consequence if they still enjoy considerable conventional military superiority despite the successful deployment of cyber weapons. Second, as demonstrated by the principle of cyber dependence, one state’s disruption of another’s cyber infrastructure is effective only if they can defend their own cyber assets or possess the capability to act without these assets with minimal degradation in operational effectiveness. Third, states must have the resources and expertise required to deploy cyber weapons, which increase commensurate with their efficacy. Fourth, cyber weapons rely on aggressive forward reconnaissance into networks of potential adversaries; weapons should be positioned before conflict begins. This creates political and military risk if an opponent discovers and traces a dormant cyber weapon. Finally, all use of cyber weapons is complicated by their inherent unpredictability, which casts doubts over weapon precision and effect. Once unleashed, the course of cyber weapons may be difficult to predict and/or contain.15 Unforeseen results may undermine relationships or spread to neutral states that then take retaliatory action.16 Accordingly, weapon deployment must follow sound strategy against clearly identified adversaries to minimize unforeseen consequences.

A Predictive Framework

What is offered in this section is an analytical framework that may provide a customized evaluation of whether a particular small state should—or will—acquire cyber weapons. In essence, what is being provided is a baseline for a comparative, comprehensive study on a state-by-state basis. The framework itself yields its maximum value when numerous states have been analyzed. This enables potential proliferation patterns to emerge and a clearer picture of the threat landscape to present itself.
The outline of the basic process for analysis is provided in the figure.

Each step is explained by a purpose statement and demonstrated through a case study. The subject of the case study is New Zealand, chosen due to its membership in the Five Eyes intelligence network and because it both self-identifies as and is widely perceived to be a small state.17 Ideally, each step of the framework would be completed by a group representing a variety of perspectives from military forces, government entities, and academic specialties. There is the potential for a much more detailed evaluation than that presented, which has been condensed for brevity.

Step One: Identify Foundational Small-State Characteristics. The purpose is to identify key characteristics of the small state within three categories: quantitative, behavioral, and identity.18 Quantitative refers to measures such as land area, population, and gross domestic product (GDP). Behavioral refers to qualitative metrics concerning the behavior of a state, both domestically and within the international system. Identity refers to qualitative metrics that focus on how a state perceives its own identity. This article proposes that metrics from each category can be freely used by suitably informed analysts to assign a size category to any particular state. This avoids the need for a final definition of a small state. Instead, definition and categorization are achieved through possession of a sufficient number of overlapping characteristics—some quantitative, some behavioral, and some identity based.19 Quantitatively, New Zealand has a small population (approximately 4.5 million), a small GDP (approximately $197 billion), and a small land area.20 It is geographically isolated, bordering no other countries. In the realm of behavior, New Zealand practices an institutionally focused multilateral foreign policy. It is a founding member of the United Nations and was elected to the Security Council for the 2015–2016 term after running on a platform of advocating for other small states. It participates in multiple alliances and takes a special interest in the security of the South Pacific.21 Regarding identity, New Zealand’s self-identity emphasizes the values of fairness, independence, nonaggression, cooperation, and acknowledgment of its status as a small state.22 Its security identity is driven by a lack of perceived threat that allows New Zealand to make security decisions based on principle rather than practicality.23 This was demonstrated by the banning of nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered ships within New Zealand waters, and its subsequent informal exclusion from aspects of the Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty. Despite reduced security, however, domestic opinion strongly supported the anti-nuclear policy that, along with support for nonproliferation and disarmament, has strengthened the pacifistic elements of New Zealand’s national identity.24

Step Two: Identify Resource Availability and Policy Alignment for Cyber Weapon Development, Deployment, and Exploitation. The purpose is to identify how the use of cyber weapons would align with current security and defense policies; whether the small state has the military capabilities to exploit vulnerabilities caused by cyber weapon deployment; and whether the small state has the intelligence and technical resources needed to target, develop, and deploy cyber weapons.

In key New Zealand defense documents, references to cyber primarily mention defense against cyber attacks, with only two references to the application of military force to cyberspace. There is no mention of cyber weapon acquisition. New Zealand’s defense policy has focused on military contributions to a secure New Zealand, a rules-based international order, and a sound global economy. Because the likelihood of direct threats against the country and its closest allies is low, there has been a focus on peacekeeping, disaster relief, affordability, and maritime patrol. New Zealand’s military is small (11,500 personnel, including reservists) with limited offensive capabilities and low funding (just 1.1 percent of GDP). Accordingly, the New Zealand military lacks the ability to exploit vulnerabilities caused by the successful use of cyber weapons.

New Zealand is a member of the Five Eyes intelligence network and thus can access more sophisticated intelligence than most small states. This can be used to increase its ability to target and deploy cyber weapons. It has a modern signals intelligence capability, housed by the civilian Government Communications Security Bureau, which also has responsibility for national cybersecurity. It most likely has the technical capability to adapt existing cyber weapons or develop new ones, particularly if aided by its allies. Due to fiscal constraints, however, any additional funding for cyber weapons will likely have to come from the existing defense budget and thus result in compromises to other capabilities.25

Step Three: Examine Small-State Cyber Dependence. The purpose is to examine the small state’s reliance on cyberspace for its military capabilities and critical infrastructure, as well as its relative cyber dependence when compared to potential geopolitical adversaries.

New Zealand has moderate to high cyber dependence, with increasing reliance on online services and platforms by the government, business sector, and civil society. This dependence will increase. For example, the acquisition of new C4ISR capabilities to increase military adoption of network-centric warfare principles would create new vulnerabilities.26 New Zealand’s cyber dependence is further increased by limited cybersecurity expertise.27 It does not have obvious military opponents, so its relative level of cyber dependence is difficult to calculate.

Step Four: Analyze State Behavior Against Competing Security Models. The purpose is to analyze how state behavior aligns with each competing security model and how cyber weapon acquisition and use may support or detract from this behavior. Cyber weapon arsenals are used to advance political and military objectives. These objectives depend on a state’s behavior and identity, both of which are difficult to quantify. A degree of quantification is possible, however, through the use of conceptual security models. A synthesis of recent small- state security scholarship generates four models: the first focused on alliances, the second on international cooperation, and the third and fourth on identity, differentiated by competing focuses (collaboration and influence, and defensive autonomy).28 The alliance-focused model presents small states with persuasive reasons to acquire cyber weapons. This applies both to balancing behavior (that is, joining an alliance against a threatening state) and bandwagoning (that is, entering into an alliance with a threatening state).29 The additional military resources provided by an alliance present greater opportunities for the exploitation of vulnerabilities caused by cyber weapons. In the event that a cyber weapon unwittingly targets a powerful third party, a small state may be less likely to be subjected to blowback if it is shielded by a strong alliance. Furthermore, cyber weapons may be a reasonably cost-effective contribution to an alliance; a great power could even provide preferential procurement opportunities for a favored ally.

New Zealand maintains a close military alliance with Australia and is a member of the Five Power Defence Arrangements. It also has recently signed cybersecurity agreements with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and United Kingdom.30 The alliances above have focused on security and mutual defense rather than offensive capabilities. New Zealand does, however, have a policy of complementing Australian defense capabilities.31 This could be achieved through the acquisition of cyber weapons, so long as it was closely coordinated and integrated with the Australian military. Thus this model assesses state behavioral alignment as medium/high and cyber weapon support as medium/high.

The international cooperation model assumes that small states can exert influence by strengthening international organizations, encouraging cooperative approaches to security, and creating laws and norms to constrain powerful states.32 Small states acting under this model will favor diplomatic and ideological methods of influence. As such, they are less likely to acquire cyber weapons. Instead, it is more likely that they will try to regulate cyber weapons in a manner similar to the restrictions on biological and chemical weapons or by leading efforts to explicitly incorporate them into the international laws of warfare.

New Zealand usually pursues a multilateral foreign policy approach and is a member of multiple international organizations. It has a long history of championing disarmament and arms control, which conflicts with the acquisition of new categories of offensive weapons. This model assesses state behavioral alignment as high and cyber weapon support as low.

Both of the identity focused models (collaboration and influence versus defensive autonomy) are centered on analysis of a small state’s “security identity.” This develops from perceptions of “past behavior and images and myths linked to it which have been internalized over long periods of time by the political elite and population of the state.”33 This identity can be based around a number of disparate factors such as ongoing security threats, perceptions of national character, and historical consciousness. A state’s security identity can lead it toward a preference for either of the identity focused security models mentioned above.Regarding collaboration and influence, New Zealand’s identity strikes a balance between practicality and principle. It strives to be a moral, fair-minded state that advances what it regards as important values, such as human rights and the rule of law.34 It still wishes, however, to work in a constructive manner that allows it to contribute practical solutions to difficult problems. The acquisition of cyber weapons is unlikely to advance this model. Thus this model assesses state behavioral alignment as medium and cyber weapon support as low.

Despite its multilateral behavior, New Zealand retains some defensive autonomy and takes pride in maintaining independent views on major issues.35 Its isolation and lack of major threats have allowed it to retain a measure of autonomy in its defense policy and to maintain a small military. Its independent and pacifistic nature suggests that cyber weapon acquisition could be controversial. Thus this model assesses state behavioral alignment as medium and cyber weapon support as low/medium.

Step Five: Analyze Benefits, Feasibility, and Risk for Each Category of Cyber Weapon Use. The purpose is to first identify the benefits, feasibility, and risk of acquiring cyber weapons based on each category of potential use, as shown in table 1. Next this information is analyzed against the degree to which cyber weapon use may support different security models, as shown in table 2. This results in a ranking of the benefits, feasibility, and risk of each combination of cyber weapon use and small-state security model. This is followed by an overall recommendation or prediction for cyber weapon acquisition under each security model and category of cyber weapon use.

Step Six: Recommend or Predict Cyber Weapon Acquisition Strategy. The purpose is to summarize key findings, to recommend whether a small state should acquire cyber weapons, and to predict the likelihood of such an acquisition. The key findings are that New Zealand is unlikely to gain significant benefits from the acquisition of cyber weapons. This is due to its limited military capabilities, multilateral foreign approach, extensive participation in international organizations, and pacifistic security identity. Factors that could change this evaluation and increase the benefits of cyber weapon acquisition would include an increased focus on military alliances, the emergence of more obvious threats to New Zealand or its close allies, or a changing security identity.

Therefore, the recommendation/prediction is that New Zealand should not acquire cyber weapons at this time and is unlikely to do so.The framework’s output has considerable utility as a decision support tool. When used by a small state as an input into a strategic decisionmaking process, its output can be incorporated into relevant defense capability and policy documents. If cyber weapon acquisition is recommended, its output could be further used to inform specific strategic, doctrinal, and planning documents. It also provides a basis for potential cyber weapon capabilities to be analyzed under a standard return-on-investment procurement model. This would involve a more detailed analysis of benefits, costs, and risks that would allow fit-for-purpose procurement decisions to be made in a fiscally and operationally prudent manner.

Alternatively, the framework, which is low cost and allows a variety of actors to determine the likelihood of cyber weapon acquisition by small states, could be used as a tool to develop predictive intelligence. Furthermore, when the framework is used on a sufficient number of small states, it could be used as a basis for making broader predictions regarding the proliferation of cyber weapons. This would be particularly effective over geographical areas with a large concentration of small states. For more powerful states, this might indicate opportunities for increased cyber warfare cooperation with geopolitical allies, perhaps even extending to arms sales or defense diplomacy. Conversely, the framework could provide nongovernmental organizations and academics with opportunities to trace cyber weapon proliferation and raise visibility of the phenomenon among international organizations, policymakers, and the general public. These outcomes provide significant benefits to the broad spectrum of actors seeking stability and influence within the international order.

Conclusion

The evolution of the various domains of warfare did not occur overnight. Learning from and leveraging the changing landscapes of war required continuous investigation, reflection, and formative activities to achieve parity, much less dominance, with rivals. Treating cyberspace as the fifth domain of warfare requires a greater understanding of the battlespace than currently exists. This goes well beyond the technological aspects and requires the integration of cyber capabilities and strategies into existing defense doctrines. The framework we have developed has the potential to help guide this process, from strategic decision to procurement and doctrinal and operational integration. Similarly, its predictive potential is significant—any ability to forecast cyber weapon acquisition on a state-by-state basis and thus monitor cyber weapon proliferation would be of substantial geopolitical benefit. We further propose that decisionmakers of large, powerful states must not ignore the strategic impact that small states could have in this domain. We also remind small states that their geopolitical rivals may deploy cyber weapons as a means to advance national interests in this sphere of influence. Therefore, it is our hope that, as a result of clarifying the potential conflict space, future policies might be developed to control the proliferation of cyber weapons.

*About the authors:
Daniel Hughes is a Master’s Candidate with a professional background in Defense and Immigration. Andrew M. Colarik is a Senior Lecturer in the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University, New Zealand.

Source:
This article was published in the Joint Force Quarterly 83, which is published by the National Defense University.

Notes:
1 Senate Armed Services Committee, James R. Clapper, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, February 26, 2015, available at <www.dni.gov/files/documents/Unclassified_2015_ATA_SFR_-_SASC_FINAL.pdf>.

2 United Nations News Centre, “Ban Praises Small State Contribution to Global Peace and Development,” 2015, available at <www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43172#.Vp87nip96Uk>.

3 Paulo Shakarian, Jana Shakarian, and Andrew Ruef, Introduction to Cyber Warfare: A Multidisciplinary Approach (Waltham, MA: Syngress, 2013); Catherine A. Theohary and John W. Rollins, Cyber Warfare and Cyberterrorism: In Brief, R43955 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 27, 2015), available at <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43955.pdf>.

4 Raymond C. Parks and David P. Duggan, “Principles of Cyber Warfare,” IEEE Security and Privacy Magazine 9, no. 5 (September/October 2011), 30; Andrew M. Colarik and Lech J. Janczewski, “Developing a Grand Strategy for Cyber War,” 7th International Conference on Information Assurance & Security, December 2011, 52; Shakarian, Shakarian, and Ruef.

5 Fred Schrier, On Cyber Warfare, Democratic Control of Armed Forces Working Paper No. 7 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2015), available at <www.dcaf.ch/content/download/67316/…/OnCyber warfare-Schreier.pdf>; John Arquilla, “Twenty Years of Cyberwar,” Journal of Military Ethics 12, no. 1 (April 17, 2013), 80–87.

6 Stephen W. Korns and Joshua E. Kastenberg, “Georgia’s Cyber Left Hook,” Parameters 38, no. 4 (Winter 2008–2009).

7 P.W. Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

8 Parks and Duggan, 30.

9 Thomas G. Mahnken, “Cyberwar and Cyber Warfare,” in America’s Cyber Future, ed. Kristin M. Lord and Travis Sharp (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2011), available at <www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_Cyber_Volume%20II_2.pdf>.

10 Department of Defense (DOD), The DOD Cyber Strategy (Washington, DC: DOD, April 2015), available at <www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf>.

11 Joel Carr, “The Misunderstood Acronym: Why Cyber Weapons Aren’t WMD,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69, no. 5 (2013), 32.

12 Sebastian Schutte, “Cooperation Beats Deterrence in Cyberwar,” Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy 18, no. 3 (November 2012), 1–11.

13 Defence Diplomacy, Ministry of Defence Policy Papers Paper No. 1 (London: Ministry of Defence, 1998), available at <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121026065214/http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/BB03F0E7-1F85-4E7B-B7EB-4F0418152932/0/polpaper1_def_dip.pdf>.

14 Andrew T.H. Tan, “Punching Above Its Weight: Singapore’s Armed Forces and Its Contribution to Foreign Policy,” Defence Studies 11, no. 4 (2011), 672–697.

15 David C. Gompert and Martin Libicki, “Waging Cyber War the American Way,” Survival 57, no. 4 (2015), 7–28.

16 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Cyber Power (Cambridge: Harvard Kennedy School, 2010), available at <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/cyber-power.pdf>.

17 Jim McLay, “New Zealand and the United Nations: Small State, Big Challenge,” August 27, 2013, available at <http://nzunsc.govt.nz/docs/Jim-McLay-speech-Small-State-Big%20Challenge-Aug-13.pdf>.

18 Joe Burton, “Small States and Cyber Security: The Case of New Zealand,” Political Science 65, no. 2 (2013), 216–238; Jean-Marc Rickli, “European Small States’ Military Policies After the Cold War: From Territorial to Niche Strategies,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 21, no. 3 (2008), 307–325.

19 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958).

20 Statistics New Zealand, “Index of Key New Zealand Statistics,” available at <www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/snapshots-of-nz/index-key-statistics.aspx#>.

21 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Foreign Relations,” March 2014, available at <http://mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/index.php>.

22 Ibid.

23 New Zealand Defence Force Doctrine, 3rd ed. (Wellington: Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force, June 2012), available at <www.nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public-docs/2012/nzddp_d_3rd_ed.pdf>.

24 Andreas Reitzig, “In Defiance of Nuclear Deterrence: Anti-Nuclear New Zealand After Two Decades,” Medicine, Conflict, and Survival 22, no. 2 (2006), 132–144.

25 Defence White Paper 2010 (Wellington: Ministry of Defence, November 2010), available at <www.nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public-docs/2010/defence_white_paper_2010.pdf>.

26 New Zealand Defence Force Doctrine.

27 Burton, 216–238.

28 Ibid.; Paul Sutton, “The Concept of Small States in the International Political Economy,” The Round Table 100, no. 413 (2011), 141–153.

29 Burton, 216–238.

30 Ibid.

31 Defence Capability Plan (Wellington: Ministry of Defence, June 2014), available at <www.nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public-docs/2014/2014-defence-capability-plan.pdf>.

32 Ibid.

33 Rickli, 307–325.

34 McLay.

35 Ibid.

The recent cancellation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit that was supposed to be held in Islamabad, Pakistan and the natural corollary to the cancellation i.e. demand for isolating Pakistan calls for a serious theoretical understanding of the new world order. The Liberal approach to the study of foreign policy and world order that developed in the 17th century focussed on the liberty of the individuals to enter into a social contract for establishment of rule of law. John Locke’s understanding of the world order was based on this premise of cooperation. Liberals believe that human beings are perfectible and that Democracy is necessary for that perfectibility to develop. However the concept of Democracy has undergone significant paradigmatic changes in the recent years.

Liberals reject the Realist notion of war being a natural phenomenon. So any action from Pakistan according to the liberal approach is an outcome of economic inequalities, and failed bargaining between developed and developing nations for resource accessibility and economic development. An important aspect of Liberalism is the emphasis it lays on the possibilities for cooperation in all fields, military, economic and technological. Liberals identify multinational corporations, non state actors and terrorist groups as central actors on the international stage apart from sovereign nation states. Realists put nation states on the forefront. Liberals focus too much on human beings and their right to enter into contract for rule of law, which by modern definition means or refers to a democratic set up.

With the dragon raising its head and the United States trying to balance South Asia by taking India into confidence as a counterweight to China the entire balance of power is shifting inexorably towards the new bilateral equation between China and the U.S. The very idea of a liberal constitutional set up is to protect individual liberty. Let us replace individuals with states. So the very idea of an organisation like SAARC is to protect the interests of the member states and promote regional cooperation. However with Pakistan’s repeated acts of terror on Indian soil and its relentless proxy war against India the very notion of Liberal democratic set up has turned turtle. Several analysts and policy experts have called for total isolation of Pakistan declaring it a terrorist state. China continues to maintain a diplomatic distance from the issue while in the same instance vetoing Indian interests at various multinational fora. Several other nations have strongly condemned the attacks on Indian soil by Pakistani terrorists. Liberals argue that mutual interests can sustain cooperation in the new world order but proxy wars and terror attacks defeat the very purpose of mutual cooperation.

Neo liberals have no confidence in the logical reasoning of human mind and human progress. Zacher & Mathew opine that neo liberals have not wanted to be branded as idealists as were many inter war liberals, the international events in this (the 20th Century) century including the two world wars and the cold war have made them wary about being too optimistic.

Free trade and western democratic values are the focus points of Neo Liberalism. However given the rise in state sponsored terrorism many have questioned the tenets of Neo Liberalism today. Liberals argue that the world order does not depend on balance of power but on individual interactions between states which is forever in a state of dynamic flux. The concept of security plays a very crucial role here. All the military exercises and pacts we read about in the media emerge from this need to protect individual state interests. Institutions play a key role in establishing peace. Keohane opined that institutions are persistent and connected sets of rules and practices that prescribe roles constrain activity and shape the expectation of the actors. This is ideally what SAARC was crafted for.

David Mitrany argued that greater interdependence in the form of transnational ties between countries could lead to peace. But what do you do when all acts of terror are traced back to one notorious nation? Will Joseph Nye’s functionalism work here? Should we engage in constructive dialogue with a nation that is known for sponsoring terrorism all across the globe? The cancellation of the SAARC summit has given rise to a new set of debates. Liberals have tremendous faith in human reason and rationality of the human mind in resolving international disputes without resorting to coercive means. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s theory of complex interdependence that focuses on transnational actors as important agents of peace and cooperation sidelining the military needs to be studied in great depths. This is especially true in the case of Pakistan, whether the government or the Deep State (a term coined for the stranglehold that its military and intelligence apparatus exerts on any form of government) should be engaged in dialogue; further whether such an engagement would result in any meaningful restoration of peace.

SAARC seems to be losing its relevance in the new liberal world order. Or maybe not. In either case, recent developments clearly lead to a different understanding of cooperation as well as the limits to which it should be extended. Will isolation of states that sponsor terrorism or engage in coercive means to promote their agenda restructure the definition of this cooperation? For all intents and purposes we are talking about India’s well known neighbour.

Reference Reading:
Nye Joseph, Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History

Regular electroacupunture treatment can lower hypertension by increasing the release of a kind of opioid in the brainstem region that controls blood pressure, according researchers with the UCI Susan Samueli Center for Integrative Medicine.

In tests on rats, UCI cardiology researcher Zhi-Ling Guo and colleagues noted that reduced blood pressure lasted for at least three days after electroacupuncture by increasing the gene expression of enkephalins, which one of the three major opioid peptides produced by the body.

Their study, which appears in the Nature’s Scientific Reports, presents the first evidence of the molecular activity behind electroacupunture’s hypertension-lowering benefits.

Last year, the UCI team reported patients treated with acupuncture at certain wrist locations experienced drops in their blood pressure. The present study shows that repetitive electroacupuncture evokes a long-lasting action in lowering blood pressure in hypertension, suggesting that this therapy may be suitable for treating clinical hypertension.

Hypertension affects about one third of the adult population of the world, and its consequences, such as stroke and heart attacks, are enormous public health problems, and the potential advantages of acupuncture over conventional medical therapy include few, if any, of side effects.

A young boy and his mother said they were tortured while detained by police over blasphemy allegations in the Pakistani city of Quetta, said a Christian rights group.

Nine-year old Christian boy Inzam was accused of burning a copy of the Quran, which saw him being arrested and detained along with his mother, Shakil on Oct. 21, says the London-based charity British Pakistani Christians Association.

“The arrests were made without investigation on the testimony of a Muslim witness and was totally in accordance with the draconian blasphemy laws of Pakistan,” said a report on the charity’s website.

“A Muslim witness is given higher authority than non-Muslim testimonies under Shariah law; these are Islamic laws that determine Pakistani law,” the report said.

After four days of lobbying from rights groups and politicians the young boy and her mother were released Oct. 25.

“The mother and child have expressed in no uncertain terms that they had been interrogated and suffered torture during their four day detainment,” said the report. “However despite their treatment they both did not confess to the crime of blasphemy.”

Police said they found no evidence that a copy of the Quran had been burnt, said the report.

Blasphemy against the Quran is punishable with life imprisonment in Pakistan. Church leaders have long charged that the laws are abused for personal gain and that religious extremists are furthering their agenda by abusing blasphemy laws.