New satellite imagery of Burma’s Rakhine State shows 820 newly identified structures destroyed in five different ethnic Rohingya villages between November 10-18, 2016, Human Rights Watch said. The Burmese government should without further delay invite the United Nations to assist in an impartial investigation of the widespread destruction of villages.

The latest images bring the total number of destroyed buildings documented by Human Rights Watch in northern Rakhine State through satellite imagery to 1,250. US Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power, at a November 17 UN Security Council meeting on the deteriorating situation in Rakhine State, called for international observers to be allowed to investigate and for aid groups to have their access restored. After a short visit by diplomats to the area, Yanghee Lee, the UN special rapporteur on Burma, said on November 18, “The security forces must not be given carte blanche to step up their operations under the smokescreen of having allowed access to an international delegation. Urgent action is needed to bring resolution to the situation.”

“These alarming new satellite images confirm that the destruction in Rohingya villages is far greater and in more places than the government has admitted,” said Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “The apparent arson attacks against five Rohingya villages is a matter of grave concern for which the Burmese government needs to investigate and prosecute those responsible. UN participation is crucial for such an investigation to be credible.”

Human Rights Watch identified a total of 820 destroyed buildings in five villages of Maungdaw district from an analysis of very high resolution satellite imagery recorded on November 10, 17, and 18. This damage is in addition to the 430 destroyed buildings Human Rights Watch identified from satellite imagery on November 13. Of the 820 destroyed buildings, 255 were in the village of Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son; 265 in Dar Gyi Zar; 65 in Pwint Hpyu Chaung; 15 in Myaw Taung; and 220 in Wa Peik (in addition to the 100 which were destroyed earlier in the village).

Human Rights Watch also reviewed thermal anomaly data collected by environmental satellite sensors that detected the presence of multiple active fires burning in the village of Pwint Hpyu Chaung on November 12, in Dar Gyi Zar on November 13, and in Yae Khat Chaung Gwa Son on November 13, 14, and 15. Dense tree cover may have concealed a limited number of additional buildings that were destroyed, making it possible that the actual number is higher.

At a press conference on November 15 in response to Human Rights Watch’s November 13 statement, the Burmese government admitted widespread burning but claimed that the total number of buildings destroyed was significantly lower. The government cited helicopter flyovers of the area to arrive at its figures and blamed unspecified “terrorists” for the burnings.

Ringing the freshly elected to congratulate them is the normal course of affairs for world leaders. Donald Trump, as he has done with so much in the political parlour, upended that matter by baffling those who felt adding him to their phonebook would not be required. Being the dangerous fool that he was made out to be, he was surely, in the oft used word of the Clintons and President Barack Obama, “unelectable”.

Having made a bet that the status quo would prevail with Hillary Clinton, Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull paid scant regard to making sure he had Trump’s contact details handy. To do that would have shown acceptance of a black swan theory of US politics.

After November 8, a new state of affairs had come into play. How would this proud ally, and more appropriately servant, of US interests in the Asia-Pacific area and beyond contact the future US President?

The circumstances were pressing, and a delivering agent was sought. Former Australian golfer Greg Norman became the interceding medium, suggesting that golf diplomacy would be the way to go. Fittingly, Australia’s own designated “Great White Shark”, Norman’s career title, would initiate contact with the Black Swan of US presidential politics.

Norman, Australia’s former golfing supremo and well acquainted with Trump, also an avid investor in the golf circuit, had suddenly become politically relevant. The other side of this was equally true: celebrity had become a politicised endeavour. In Trumpland, the value of celebrity as a political asset grows exponentially. The bookish expert, by way of comparison, diminishes.

The incident created a state of exaggerated importance on Turnbull’s part. According to Reuters (Nov 17), “The connection enabled Turnbull to jump the line of world leaders waiting to get the new US leader on the phone, well ahead of larger allies like Britain and Japan, after Trump’s surprise win”.

This turn towards the personal is interesting on one level. Trump’s cabinet and operations will be, as his business relations in the past, highly personalised endeavours, filled with the expected trust, rancour and overwhelming flavour of a dealing boardroom.

To have his ear will be significant; to be his acquaintance far more important than having a swag of degrees from an Ivy League college, or even be a prominent leader of another state. Theory will be avoided like the plague and abstractions deemed incomprehensible.

Turnbull’s response to this elevation of Norman to the unforeseen level of Trump whisperer barely hid the reality of his irrelevance as a politician. This was not Turnbull the politician talking as prime minister, but as a businessman thinking in the terms of a deal. He was, in short, behaving like Trump, channelling, reflecting, and mimicking accordingly.

“In diplomacy and policies, you use lots of networks,” he attempted to explain to the Australian press. “All I can say is we have great networks, great connections and Greg Norman is a great Australian.”[1]

Norman also had the appropriate credentials. He was “a great advocate for strengthening the Australian-American alliance. One of our greatest assets is the more than million Australians who live overseas.”

This is the age of the populist, personal leader, inevitable in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. It had been some time in coming, and Russian President Vladimir Putin, who was one of the first in the modern era to be such, is relevant, less from the perspective of a fanatical patriot than one of a calculating CEO running a board of craving directors who need placating. Deals and networks are everything.

A later addition to this world of charismatic pugilists keen on unsettling directness is President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines, truly a figure after Trump’s code of brazenness. Out with the musty arrangements, long mouldering in the dark closet of assumed alliances shaped less by self-interest and imperial motivation; in with the unchartered, dangerous but independent new.

While catastrophic for such essentials as the rule of law (vide his anti-drug pushing death squads), Duterte has thrown punches at the traditional Manila-Washington relationship, while proving far more accommodating to China.

Academic reasoning and sober analysis fear the rise of such figures, and resort to the clichéd stables of theory about state behaviour, reason and managerial speak. These say little about the personal nature of the enterprise at hand: the charismatic leader has become the new norm of states, a condition that has seized the US with violent approval.

While golfing diplomacy has been a feature, and unstudied aspect of international relations theory, it is high time that it became one. Trumpism does away with the traditional political playbook directed by experts of diplomacy and policy. The only one permitted in this house is Steve Bannon, Trump’s chief strategist.

The policy now is: await the next initiative, the next decision, and ditch the battle plans that might have been cooked up decades ago. Better to play golf, or dine at an appropriate venue to meet contacts. It is a situation both terrifying and fascinating for the deskbound, rendering the chit-chat element of a blinded punditry nigh irrelevant.

Notes:
[1] http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-australia-norman-idUSKBN13C0ED

By Bhaskar Roy*

Despite pundits and punters, Donald J. Trump defeated his Democrat rival Hillary Clinton to the American Presidency on Electoral College votes. He is set to be sworn in as the 45th President of the United States of America on 20th January 2016. If the election for the President and Vice President was through direct votes Clinton would have won. Leave these aside.

No American President in recent history faced so much post-election demonstrations as Trump has, especially from college-educated voters and minorities. Will this hamper the execution of his policies? The Republicans have the White House, the House of Representatives and the Senate. But all Republicans do not necessarily agree with Trump and his radical policies.

Usually, American Presidential candidates use strong terms on popular sentiments to garner support. Bill Clinton during his electoral campaign for his first term called Chinese leaders “the butchers of Tiananmen Square”. It was the early 1990s and Americans were aghast at the bloody crackdown on student demonstrators by the Chinese army at Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in June 1989. But after being elected he went to bed with the Chinese.

Trump ranted against minorities like Muslims and Hispanics/Latinos, promised to deport millions of illegal immigrants, build a wall along the Mexican border and make Mexico pay for it. He has promised to bring back American jobs from China, make American jobs from China and make American allies pay for their defence needs.

Will Trump reverse his threats or, at least, soften them? But he is not a politician. He never served in the administration or the military. He is likely to pack his team with hardliners and cold warriors like James Woolsey and Rudy Giuliani. And if there are clever manipulators in his ‘A’ Team he can make serious mistakes. Trump does not have a clear idea of domestic politics and the racial divide is increasing, with African Americans and other minorities bearing the brunt. On foreign policy he is even more obtuse. What is disconcerting is his character. He can be stubborn, abrasive and non-forgiving even superficially. He tends to get mixed up between “the good, the bad and the ugly”, to quote from a great Hollywood movie from the yester years.

The president-elect has reconfirmed his determination to expel upto three million immigrants involved in crime or illegal entry. In the American lexicon the concept of crime extends to wrongly parking a car, for which the offender can be hand-cuffed and imprisoned.

The USA was the Promised Land where many have gone from across the world. In fact, America has been built by immigrants. A survey of Silicon Valley and institutions of higher learning will prove this point. On the other hand, low-skilled or unskilled workers service low level jobs that white America declines.

Trump’s message is uncomfortable to the world because even the highly skilled or highly educated would find it difficult to enter the US.

If Trump were to actually build a wall (or fence!) at the Mexican border or expel illegal immigrants, he would not only alienate neighbours in the arc of American influence but create a political and strategic void in the immediate neighbourhood. There are other powers who can quickly fill this void and pose a threat to the US. Putting up a wall will cost America immensely.

People in America are nervous of an era of uncertainty: white supremacy, anti-immigration, anti-mainstream media and a force for racial hatred. Happenings in the US will impact the world in various ways and there is a reverse effect.

The greatest threat to the world today is radical Islamic terrorism led by the ISIS (Daesh), the Al Qaeda and the like. There is also the issue of States using terrorism or at least abetting terrorism for political objectives. Will Trump differentiate between the two for American strategic interests or will he deal with terrorism as a whole? The international community has not yet concluded on a single definition of terrorism, as in some cases one country’s terrorism is another country’s asset. Nor has a line been drawn between national liberation wars and terrorism.

Trump is very exercised over terrorism especially that which affects American security both at home and abroad. Here the finger points to the Islamic state and the Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda was the beneficiary of the space created in Iraq by the removal of Saddam Hussain by the US, by creating false intelligence. The US military withdrew from Iraq without completing the task, leaving the country fractured and in turmoil. Former CIA Director George Tenet was made the fall guy. He reveals a lot in his book, “In the Eye of the Storm”.

The Islamic State was born out of Washington’s move for a regime change in Syria. The result is a humanitarian disaster from which the Islamic State gained the most. Certainly Syrian President Assad was dictatorial. That is not the reason for which the US went for a regime change. (In post-war history the US supported many dictators) Assad’s fault was that he was close to Russia. The American aim was to cut Russia’s finger in the Middle East, a replication of what they did in Yugoslavia.

How will the 45th President of the United States address the Islamic State challenge? During his election speeches Trump criticized the Obama administration’s approach. One would agree with him to an extent. There was no clear policy. The Islamic State is losing ground in Iraq and Syria. The new President would have to concede that it is not only the US and its allies including the Syrian opposition army that helped diminish the Islamic State. Those who contributed significantly include Assad, Russia and Iran. Assad and his regime belong to the Alawite Shia denomination and naturally has ideological compatibility with Iran.

Trump would have to discard several of the existing policies in containing and demolishing the Islamic State. To do that, it will have to discard several of his own prejudices. He has shown that he is strongly anti-Iran and will roll back the Iran nuclear deal. This policy has several serious pit falls. US companies will lose business opportunities in Iran. China, Russia and European countries will vie for the pie.

With too much pressure from the US and roll back on the nuclear deal, Iran may go back to uranium enrichment and accelerate its now closed nuclear weapons programme. Trump would not have too many friends and would isolate the US on this issue.

To fight and weaken the Islamic State Trump would have to arrive at a new deal with Assad and President Vladimir Putin. And Iran may have to be accommodated. Post-elections, Trump and Putin have spoken to each other but the details are not known. Trump was very positive about Putin during his election rallies, but he will face hurdles from entrenched anti-USSR policy makers and influencers who are now anti-Russia. These alienators pushed Russia into the arms of the Chinese, much against the hope of Russians (both in the foreign policy establishment and the military-industrial complex) who do not trust China.

How the new American administration will prosecute relations with Russia is a major European question. People like former CIA Chief James Woolsey and former New York mayor Rudi Giuliani are no lovers of Russia. There are several other anti-Russian hardliners who are trying to find important positions in the Trump administration.

The Russia policy will also impact Europe and NATO. The issues of Ukraine and Crimea are hanging tire. If the cost for America’s NATO in Europe is raised then Europe will tailor their Russia policy in a different way. This may ultimately work out as a win-win situation for both sides by reducing tensions by giving Russia its due space. It could give rise to a new global architecture, trilateral in dimension between the US, Russia and China. Beijing is a new avatar and growing, though their current policy is to consolidate in Asia. This may be wishful thinking, but given Trump’s statements things are up in the air. If Trump is thinking about drawing a new ideological and political map he will have to tread very carefully.

With Trump’s sharp focus on international (Islamic) terrorism, Pakistan as a perpetrator and

Afghanistan as a victim, is expected to loom large. International terrorism in many cases have had roots in Pakistan, including recent attacks in the US. Pakistanis worry about a possible shift in US policy towards India and away from Pakistan given an upturn in India-US trade and economic engagement especially in the defence and civil nuclear sectors.

Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric like the campaign proposal to ban all Muslims entering the US and new talk of opening a separate registry for Pakistanis entering the US, are not exactly encouraging thoughts. He will be briefed extensively on the Pakistan-Afghanistan issue and how Pakistan used US aid money to pay the Haqqani network to kill US soldiers in Afghanistan and CIA station agents in Pakistan’s border near Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s reluctance to take action against the Haqqani next work is a sore point in the US administration. So is the Afghan Taliban which has its Shura in Quetta and periodically attacks US interests in Afghanistan, especially US military personnel.

There is a bipartisan view in the US congress which would even go so far as to designate Pakistan as a terrorist state. It is unlikely that the US under Trump will abandon Pakistan. The road to Afghanistan and beyond lies through Pakistan. The US has invested over $ 30 billion in Afghanistan since 2002 and military personnel. Similarly it has invested at least $ 10 billion in Pakistan in civil and military assistance. These may be further pruned and serious pressure mounted on Islamabad and Rawalpindi to be seen to act against terrorists of concern.

The Islamic State claims that they have established themselves in what they call Khorasan or the Af-Pak region. They have also been active, and draw their members from the various terrorist outfits. Host Pakistanis including the Civilian government see the Islamic state as a serious threat. But the ways of the ISI are strange. Will the ISI open a secret channel with the Islamic state for certain objectives? It is too early to say anything, but the possibility cannot be fully ruled out.

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani is feeling increasingly neglected by the US. Ghani burnt his fingers by embracing Pakistan against the sane advice of his cabinet and security chiefs. True to their character the Pakistani military-ISI elements betrayed him. The peace talks with the Afghan Taliban came to naught. What Trump and his team must remember is that the Pakistani military still pursues the idea of Afghanistan as their “strategic depth” and they also largely control the Taliban.

Trump told the Fox News in May that he was in favour of keeping 10,000 US troops in Afghanistan because it was adjacent to Pakistan which has nuclear weapons. His advisors especially in the Pentagon and CIA should study the recent paper on Pakistan’s strategic nuclear and missile industries prepared by Alpha Project of King’s college, London and brief him extensively without holding back facts and softening the contents. This revealing report disclosed on-going Pakistani clandestine activities through front companies to acquire critical nuclear weapons and strategic missile technologies. Chinese entities are also involved in empowering Pakistan in these areas. This is a huge threat to not only India but to the south Asian region as a whole. Unfortunately, the Obama administration went soft on such issues, at least publicly, keeping in view relations with Pakistan, China and other countries from which these technologies were sourced.

India-US relations are unlikely to be rolled back or seriously constricted. Trump did not demonstrate much animosity towards India except for once mentioning India along with China on bringing American jobs back home. This will be a difficult task as it is American businesses that have made investments abroad and will continue to do so. Companies have to generate profit for the US GDP, and create jobs at home. If he pursues this path he may start a trade war. All sides would be hurt.

There is a bipartisan consensus in the US congress to further upgrade political and strategic relations with India. It started taking shape towards the end of Bill Clinton’s administration, firmed up more under George W. Bush and continued during the Obama administration – the India-US nuclear deal, Bush’s personal intervention in India’s favour in the NSG, the Next Step in strategic Partnership (NSSP) and upgraded defence relations including joint exercises and acquisition of military equipment by India from the US. The US has relaxed Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to India.

The India-US Joint Vision in the Indo-Pacific Region and Asia-Pacific is just beginning to take shape. If Trump disrupts this by any means and reason, the US policy in the entire region will be weakened.

New Delhi would have to engage with the Trump administration on Pakistan, Afghanistan, terrorism and the US policy on the Kashmir issue. Intelligence exchange between the two sides have improved, but more remains to be done. The “26/11” Pakistan based and assisted terrorist attack in Mumbai and the James Headley case need to be revisited.

Indian policy makers need not be wary about the President-elect. Under Trump, foreign policy would be more emphatically “America First”. Hence, too much should not be expected on terrorism linked to Pakistan visa-vis India as American interests are linked to Pakistan also. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi should take the earliest opportunity to have a bilateral meet with Trump. Both are strong personalities with highest priority to their respective national interests.

Perhaps, the most complex challenge to the new administration in Washington will come from China. The two countries are the biggest economic powers in the world. They are also engaged in strategic face off periodically. But they are also the biggest trading partners. The official Chinese newspaper The Global Times (November 16) wrote Donald Trump “will be condemned for his reckless, ignorance and incompetence” if he wrecks China trade ties. During his campaign Trump repeatedly attacked China promising to punish Beijing with “defensive” 45 percent tariffs on Chinese imports and to officially declare it a “currency manipulator”. The Global Times also warned that if Trump was to wreck Sino-US trade, a number of US companies would be impaired.

The virulent campaign rhetoric rarely come to play once the election is over and the candidate comes to the position of power. That is when reality check comes in. Yet, Trump came to power through the votes of those who wanted a change in Washington, who saw they were left behind in development. These were the mostly white workers without a college degree who felt they were the perennial losers in every election. He would also have to deliver to them.

Trump and Xi Jinping had cordial talks over the telephone when Xi called to congratulate.

When dealing with China it is not only China. It concerns the Asia-Pacific region starting from Japan, South Korea, North Korea to the ASEAN countries, Australia and the South China Sea. Will Washington agree to Beijing’s position on the status of the South China Sea, a global common, or will they reiterate their current position? China refused to accept the International Arbitration Court’s decision that China’s claim on the Sea was null and void. This sea is a major route for global trade and trade upto US $ 5000 billion passes through these waters unhindered.

Next is USA’s “Asian Pivot”. This has kept China worried. If Trump retracts from this, the resonance will be felt far and wide.

The third issue is Trump’s view that US allies would have to pay more for the American umbrella. He went so far as to say that Japan can develop its own nukes to counter North Korean nuclear threat. Whether Trump will act on these campaign flourishes is hard to say at this moment, but they would be worrying China.

For decades after World War II China welcomed US military presence in the region, especially in Japan and South Korea. One of the reasons was if Japan was set free it would quickly militarise itself. It is said Japan is a screw driver turn away from producing a nuclear bomb. China sees a militarized Japan as a serious threat to its security and national interests in the region.

During the 1971 India-Pakistan war Henry Kissinger had asked China to militarily move against India and in favour of Japan. Mao Zedong declined as he was suspicious that in such a case Japan could do something against China. Beijing harbours the same apprehension today, especially with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe tinkering with Japan’s Post-war Constitution, pressing its involvement in the South China Sea and its partial claimant nations.

China under Xi Jinping today is very different from what it was a decade ago. It is a more powerful China, assertive and aggressive. Xi plans on his ‘China Dream’ very seriously and will not give an inch if he can.

On the other hand both Trump and Xi are seen as hard headed deal makers. Deals would be the watch word.

Trump’s foreign policy is still to unveil. After he sits in the oval office from January 20 next year, listens to daily briefings and reads files, he will understand the enormity of the task. Till then, the world will have to wait and watch. Some, like Pakistan, may also pray.

*The writer is a New Delhi based strategic analyst. He can be reached at e-mail grouchohart@yahoo.com

By Gurmeet Kanwal*

The fragile security environment in Southern Asia is marked by territorial disputes and radical extremism, among other threats and challenges to peace and stability. The security environment has been further vitiated by the proxy war being waged against India (and against Afghanistan) by the Pakistan army and the ISI – the ‘deep state’ – through terrorist organisations like the LeT and the JeM.

While the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks at Mumbai in November 2008 are still to be brought to justice by the authorities in Pakistan, recent terrorist attacks in India have occurred at Gurdaspur, Udhampur, Pathankot, Pampore and Uri. India’s patience had worn thin and the public outcry to punish Pakistan was growing by the day when the Indian army launched surgical strikes across the LoC in September 2016.

In case there is a major terrorist strike in India (on a politically sensitive target, with damage to critical infrastructure and large-scale casualties) with credible evidence of state sponsorship from Pakistan, the Indian government will have no option but to retaliate militarily. Though the Indian response will be carefully calibrated, any military retaliation runs the risk of escalation to a larger conflict with nuclear overtones.

Most Indian analysts believe that there is space for conventional conflict below the nuclear threshold as long as care is taken to avoid crossing Pakistan’s nuclear red lines (space, military, economic and political). Pakistani analysts aver that Pakistan has a low nuclear threshold and that Indian forces ingressing into Pakistani territory will be confronted with tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) to stop their advance and force them to retreat.

It must be noted that the term ‘TNW’ is used in a colloquial sense as it is widely in use. There is no such thing as the ‘tactical’ use of nuclear weapons; their impact is strategic and their consequences are likely to be geo-strategic. Perhaps the term ‘battlefield’ use of nuclear weapons would be preferable.

Pakistan has been developing what it calls ‘full spectrum deterrence’ from the strategic to the tactical, from IRBMs (Shaheen 1, 2 and 3) and nuclear glide bombs delivered by fighter-bomber aircraft, cruise missiles (Babar and Ra’ad) to surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) launched from surface ships. The 60 km range, Hatf-9, Nasr SRBM is claimed to be tipped with a TNW.

India’s ‘credible minimum deterrence’ nuclear doctrine professing a ‘no first use’ posture is predicated on massive retaliation to a nuclear first strike. While the doctrine suffices to deter a first strike on Indian cities due to the certainty of massive retaliation, its efficacy in a contingency resulting in the use of TNWs against Indian troops on Pakistani territory needs to be debated.

After the Pokhran tests of May 1998, a draft nuclear doctrine was prepared by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) headed by K Subrahmanyam. It was handed over to the government on 17 August 1999. The draft doctrine was debated within the government by various stakeholders. After several meetings of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), the government issued a statement on 4 January 2003, spelling out India’s nuclear doctrine and expressing satisfaction with the operationalisation of its nuclear deterrent. The government statement included the following salient features:

• India will build and maintain a credible minimum deterrent; follow a No First Use posture; and, will use nuclear weapons only “in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere”
• It was also affirmed that nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage
• Retaliatory attacks will be authorised only by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority
• Nuclear weapons will not be used against non-nuclear weapon states
• India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons in the event of a major attack against it with biological or chemical weapons
• Continuance of strict controls on export of nuclear and missile-related materials and technologies, participation in FMCT negotiations, continued moratorium on nuclear testing
• Continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world, through global, verifiable and non-discriminatory disarmament.

In the decade and a half since the nuclear doctrine was unveiled by the government, several organisations and individuals have commented on it. Some of them have been critical of the NFU posture. Among them, Bharat Karnad (author of Nuclear Weapons and India’s Security, Macmillan, 2004) has consistently questioned the NFU posture. He has written: “NFU may be useful as political rhetoric and make for stability in situations short of war. But as a serious war-planning predicate, it is a liability. NFU is not in the least credible, because it requires India to first absorb a nuclear attack before responding in kind.”

Former PM Manmohan Singh, while speaking at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, on 2 April 2014, called for a global ‘no first use’ norm. He said, “States possessing nuclear weapons… [must] quickly move to the establishment of a global no-first-use norm…” This was followed by the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) promising in its election manifesto to review India’s nuclear doctrine to “study in detail India’s nuclear doctrine, and revise and update it, to make it relevant to challenges of current times…” and to “maintain a credible minimum deterrent that is in tune with changing geostrategic realities.” Some BJP leaders hinted that the NFU posture would also be reviewed. However, sensing the international criticism that was bound to follow, Narendra Modi, BJP’s PM candidate, emphasised that there would be ‘no compromise’ on no first use. Regardless of election-time rhetoric, it is necessary that important government policies must be reviewed periodically with a view to examining and re-validating their key features.

Criticism of the nuclear doctrine has mainly been centred on the following key issues:

• The NFU posture is likely to result in unacceptably high initial casualties and damage to Indian cities and infrastructure;
• The threat of ‘massive’ retaliation lacks credibility, especially in retaliation to first use of TNWs against Indian forces on the adversary’s own territory;
• Nuclear retaliation for a chemical or biological attack would be illogical, as such attacks could be launched by non-state actors with or without state support;
• And, it would be difficult to determine what constitutes a ‘major’ chemical or biological strike.

Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar said recently that he wondered whether India’s nuclear doctrine should be constrained by a no first use posture. He mentioned the advantages of unpredictability and said, “If a written strategy exists…you are giving away your strength. Why should India bind itself [to no first use]? India is a responsible nuclear power and…[it should suffice to say that] we will not use nuclear weapons irresponsibly.”

The essence of the Defence Minister’s introspection was that ambiguity enhances deterrence. This view has been expressed by several nuclear strategists. However, he emphasised several times that there was no change in India’s nuclear doctrine and that he was expressing a personal view. While he has been criticised, there can be no doubt that fresh thinking is invaluable to the discourse on the subject.

As almost fourteen years have passed since the doctrine was first enunciated, in the debate that followed the Defence Minister’s comments on no first use, several analysts have suggested that the nuclear doctrine needs to be reviewed. In fact, a review should be carried out every five years. The government should initiate the process to review the nuclear doctrine, but the review should not be confined to official circles only. It should include a wider debate with participation by think-tanks and individual analysts. Each facet pertaining to the doctrine must be discussed.

*Gurmeet Kanwal
Distinguished Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi

The FBI reported that hate crimes against Muslims rose in 2015 to their highest levels since the aftermath of the 9/11/01 terrorist attacks. In 2015, there were 257 incidents of anti-Muslim bias compared to 154 incidents in 2014, an increase of 67%.

The total is second only to the surge in anti-Muslim hate crimes following the 9/11/01 terror attacks, when 481 incidents against Muslims were reported in 2001.

Scapegoating (blaming innocent minorities for widespread discontent and anxieties within the majority population) is wide spread in the U. S. A. so there are many different groups of people who are victims of hate crimes; which are not only directed against Muslims.

Jews have a very long history of being scapegoated for the ills of various European states, and are especially aware of the danger of scapegoating as an ill-conceived way of solving problems in the general society.

Thank God the anti-haters are now getting aroused, and that Jews are well represented among those opposing the attempt to scapegoat all Muslims for the sins of a very violent politicized few.

In actual numbers the 257 incidents of anti-Muslim bias were less than 5% of all the total 5,850 reported hate crimes, and only 22 percent of the 1402 anti-religious hate crimes. Of 5,850 incidents:

• 59.2 percent of all victims were targeted because of bias against race or ethnicity;
• 19.7 percent were victimized because of bias against religion; and
• 17.7 percent were targeted because of bias against sexual orientation.

There are lots of hate filled individuals in America; and they have lots of different groups that they hate. Of the 1,402 victims of anti-religious hate crimes:

• 52.1 percent were victims of crimes motivated by anti-Jewish bias.
• 21.9 percent were victims of anti-Islamic (Muslim) bias.
• 4.3 percent were victims of anti-Roman Catholic bias.
• 3.6 percent were victims of anti-Eastern Orthodox Christian bias.
• 3.4 percent were victims of anti-Protestant bias.

Thus more than 11 percent of victims of anti-religious hate crimes are Christians. But since Christians are over 90 percent of the American population; anti-religious hate crimes against Christians are proportionally very rare.

Since the American Jewish population is about triple the size of the American Muslim population, the Muslim proportion of victims is somewhat higher than the Jewish proportion.

The same is true for the higher proportion of Catholic compared to Protestant victims.

Overall, the number of reported hate crimes increased from 5,479 in 2014 to 5,850 last year, and the number of victims to 7,173 (both persons and property). Religious-based hate crimes increased by 23%. Many people expect that hate crime incidents for 2016 will rise by at least 1-2,000.

On the other hand, the Anti-Defamation League, which combats anti-Semitism and other forms of discrimination, saw a 50-fold increase in online donations on the day after the election.

The Council on American-Islamic Relations, a Muslim civil liberties and outreach group, gained more than 500 volunteers in the two days after the election.

The Planned Parenthood Federation of America, which supports women’s reproductive rights, received donations from nearly 200,000 people in the week after the election, about 40 times more than in a typical week, a spokesman said on Wednesday.

And the American Civil Liberties Union, which defends the civil rights of individuals, said on Monday it had received more than $7 million from about 120,000 donations over the five days after the election. During the same period after the 2012 election, the group collected less than $28,000 from 354 donations.

And going well beyond the norm, the Jewish head of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), an anti-bigotry group, has vowed to register as a Muslim if the USA creates a database of Muslim Americans. The idea of a Muslim database arose in November 2015, when Mr Trump told a reporter he would “certainly implement that. Absolutely”.

Jonathan Greenblatt, CEO of the ADL, said: “If one day Muslim Americans will be forced to register their identities, then that is the day that this proud Jew will register as a Muslim”.

Let us all follow the example of Jonathan Greenblatt and the words of Pope Francis who delivered a ringing plea to the world and his own Catholic Church to reject “the virus of polarization and animosity” and the growing temptation to “demonize” those who are different.

As Afghanistan’s national security adviser continues to show his influence in the upper echelon of politics, feudal warlords are attempting to undercut that power, leveling false accusations against the politician.

Hanif Atmar has been in the center of Afghan politics and decision-making at the highest level in post-Taliban era. He served as the Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (2002-2006), Minister of Education (2006-2008) and Interior Minister (2008-2010) during the Karzai administration. He was regarded as “the most competent” anti-corruption cabinet member in Afghanistan by western nations.

Atmar is one of the few technocrats at the highest level who rose to prominence solely through his leadership, management and effective strategy mindedness, while a majority of the rest of his fellow cabinet members were former warlords and had military power. Born in 1968, Atmar was also the youngest cabinet member in the period of 2002-2010.

Days after taking office as president of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani appointed Atmar as his national security adviser. This was one of the initial political appointments made by President Ghani. Even though technically an adviser has no executive authority, Atmar has made his presence felt by leading National Security Council meeting sessions. He is now President Ghani’s go-to person because of his understanding of the domestic, regional and international politics.

In his very first days as national security adviser, Atmar was tasked to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United States on behalf of Afghan government. That showed the elevated trust and reliance of President Ghani on him. His endeavors and opinions matter more than other National Security Council members, even the ones with much more executive authorities.

That has created animosity among other Afghan politicians, especially former warlords and former president Karzai’s loyals, against Atmar. For example, last year when Islamic State’s hostility emerged in Nangarhar besides that of Taliban, they killed many civilians and seized several areas. Zaher Qadeer, deputy speaker of Afghan parliament blamed Atmar for stirring those particular events of violence in eastern Nangarhar.

The reason behind Qadeer’s allegations was Atmar’s opposition to his use of force by his militias against ISIS on his own and beyond Afghan government’s subjection. Qadeer received financial support from Iran in order to thwart ISIS in Nangarhar. Atmar opposed Qadeer’s militia making, rightly so because further inclusion of Iran in Afghan conflict will elevate sectarian tension.

Atmar suggested that all anti-terrorism military operations be taken under the Afghan Security Forces’ supervision. He knew if being let loose, Qadeer could well create a strong militia group of his own besides the existing ones. Militias have historically posed threat to democracy and rule of law to all nations in the phase of post-conflict rehabilitation. Qadeer later reportedly apologized to Atmar during his visit to Nangarhar.

Jamiat-e-Islami, Dr. Abdullah’s political party, too finds it hard to get along with Atmar. Time and again they blamed Atmar for political upheavals and the expansion of havoc to northern Afghanistan. Recently, Jamiat criticized President Ghani and Atmar for gravitating and centralizing power into their own hands. Jamiat also said that Atmar is seeking support from Afghanistan’s international partners to create a presidential guard of 10,000 forces. Even though that is not officially confirmed and still remains a rumor, the presidential guard could well diminish Afghan warlords’ threat to the government and play a force vis-à-vis their militias. After the collapse of Taliban, Afghan warlords and militiamen have constantly challenged rule of law and effective governance. That guard, if formed, could be used to daunt warlords and refrain them from using military force beyond government subjugation.

Last month first vice-president, General Abdul Rashid Dostum’s convoy was attacked in Ghormach district of Faryab province. After narrowly surviving the attack, Dostum held a press conference and accused Atmar for plotting the attack. He also criticized Atmar for usurping authority he is not entitled to. Seeking common ground, Jamiat members took advantage of the opportunity and started supporting Dostum’s stance.

Hoping to decrease President Ghani’s faith in Atmar, a Northern Alliance loyal, Razaq Mamoon wrote an article theorizing a conspiracy that Atmar was recently planning a coup against President Ghani. That theory and other media propaganda were bogus and futile attempts to distance Atmar from the president.

First, this is technically impossible given Atmar’s professional background, he is a firm believer in democracy and institutionalization, and also he does not have any militia or military power that would support disobedience of that sort.

Second, President Ghani has never opposed with him over any national issue. Atmar has shown great temperament towards media and has never showed any angry or sentimental reaction toward the accusations and allegations, he never succumbed to any pressure. After all the media allegations, President Ghani conferred the highest state medal upon Atmar in return for his services to Afghanistan.

Atmar has not only been involved in domestic security policies, he has also proved his effectiveness in the expansion of Afghanistan’s regional and international diplomatic horizon. He was the main actor who helped President Ghani restore NATO’s trust in Afghanistan, after which consequently NATO in Warsaw summit in July of 2016 pledged $4 billion to Afghanistan until 2020. He has also been the major actor behind the peace deal with Gulbudin Hekmatyar, which was signed in September by President Ghani and Hekmatyar.

One thing Atmar’s foes have in common, is their bleak background of warlordism. They know that Atmar is Ghani’s top ally and strategist, and is in pursuit of creating an institution driven government and military, rather than individual driven system. This is the sole reason a majority of former warlords envy Atmar’s proposed policies and actions. They know there is no space for them in an institutionalized government.

*Samim Arif is a Fulbright scholar & studied Master in Journalism and Public Relations at Indiana University Bloomington. He can be reached at samarif@indiana.edu

Luis Martinelli, who has lived and worked in Russia over much of the last dozen years and who is often described in the Russian media as “the chief separatist of all America,” says that he is working closely with Russia’s Anti-Globalist Movement to promote the secession of California from the United States.

“California wants to separate from the US,” he told Kazan’s Real Time portal yesterday, “because we don’t want 49 other states to decide our future.” His movement began two years ago – people then thought “we were insane” — but has gained more supporters since Donald Trump’s election, Martinelli claims (realnoevremya.ru/articles/48513).

He says his allies are now collecting the 700,000 signatures on a petition calling for a referendum next year on California’s secession and that he believes that a majority of Californians will vote to leave the US, although he added that the exact way it will depart remains unclear.

“California has its own culture, history and ideology,” Martinelli continues. “We have our own view on questions of peace and so on. We are different people. We are already another nation. Our governor has said that California is a different nation within the US.” But we have to leave to take control of our own lives, he says.

According to Martinelli, “the majority of Americans think that America is the very best country … but this isn’t true.” It “leads” only in two areas: the US has the largest military and the largest number of people in prison.

He says that neither Trump nor Clinton could be his president because “they are not from California” and Trump is especially offensive to him because he wants to impose changes that Californians don’t approve of. “We must choose our own president for the Republic of California and no longer be involved in US policy.”

The California independence movement has people in California who support it, Martinelli says; and “in Russia we have partners who are ready to support us in our efforts. But we ourselves will be doing this without assistance from Russia.” At the same time, “there is a group in Russia with which we work toward a common goal.”

“We in California understand that the world is multi-polar and that it will not always be under the control of the US. And the Anti-Globalist Movement of Russia shares our views.” That movement has enjoyed Russian government support, but “we are not connected with the Russian authorities and we are not talking with the Kremlin about what we are doing.”

The California secessionists have ties in Russia in the first instance with “Russian citizens who work in the Anti-Globalist Movement of Russia,” Martinelli says.

Asked if he plans to acquire Russian citizenship, the secessionist activist said that his plans include being “a citizen of the Republic of California” because “I do not want to be a citizen of the US. If for some reason things don’t work out, “I do not intend to remain there [in the United States] because I do not want to live under the American flag.”

Real Time’s Lina Sarimova provides the following brief bio sketch of Martinelli. He is the president of the Yes, California movement and a leader of those promoting the independence of California. He is known for changing his positions. In 2004 he supported John Edwards’ candidacy but is now a Republican, and he opposed unisex marriages but now supports them.

In 2009, he moved to St. Petersburg and began work in a university there. In 2014, after returning to California, he began agitating for secession. He has some wealthy supporters in Silicon Valley and has 13,000 followers on Twitter and Facebook. He is married to a Russian woman.

The environmental impact of your Thanksgiving dinner depends on where the meal is prepared.

Carnegie Mellon University researchers calculated the carbon footprint of a typical Thanksgiving feast — roasted turkey stuffed with sausage and apples, green bean casserole and pumpkin pie — for each state. The team based their calculations on the way the meal is cooked (gas versus electric range), the specific state’s predominant power source and how the food is produced in each area.

Thanksgiving’s Carbon Footprint

They found that dinners cooked in Maine and Vermont, states that rely mostly on renewable energy, emit the lowest amounts of carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas that is tied to climate change. States that use coal power, such as Wyoming, West Virginia and Kentucky, have the highest carbon dioxide emissions.

“Food production — how the food is grown or raised — and meal preparation — how the food is cooked — both contribute to the carbon footprint. We broke our dinner down into its separate dishes, and then broke those down into the individual ingredients. For each ingredient, we tracked its carbon emissions from ‘farm-to-fork.’ Production and preparation both contribute about 50 pounds of carbon dioxide, but it varies from state to state and house to house,” said Paul Fischbeck, professor of social and decisions sciences in the Dietrich College of Humanities and Social Sciences.

Further examination showed high variability among similar stove types in different states. For example, cooking a 16-pound turkey in an electric oven in coal-dependent Wyoming emits 32 pounds of carbon dioxide. In Maine, cooking the same turkey in the same oven but with electricity generated primarily from renewable energy releases less than three pounds of carbon dioxide.

Generally, using gas ranges to cook leaves a smaller footprint than electric ranges, but the team found that does not hold true for 11 states whose primary sources for electricity are renewables and nuclear power.

Traveling to celebrate Thanksgiving only worsens the problem.

“Bringing relatives into town can easily double the carbon footprint of the meal,” said Orchi Banerjee, a sophomore majoring in decision science. “American cars emit close to a pound of carbon dioxide per mile traveled. If your guests collectively drive more than 180 miles round trip, it may help the environment if they stayed home and cooked their own meal.”

Flying is a completely different story. Four people who fly 600 miles round trip have a carbon footprint ten times that of an average prepared Thanksgiving meal, before they even sit down at the table.

Fischbeck noted that this does not mean he thinks everyone should stay at home or shouldn’t enjoy a home-cooked meal.

“It is important to keep things in perspective. Yes, the carbon footprint of Thanksgiving is larger than an average meal, but compared to all the environmental lifestyle decisions that American family could make, these are very, very small potatoes,” advised Fischbeck.

“So, eat in moderation, spend time with your friends and family and travel safely, but whatever you do, don’t replace your turkey with roast beef. That could easily double the footprint of your feast,” Fischbeck said.

By Jonathan Power

Trotsky, the one-time close comrade of Lenin, reportedly said, “You may not be interested in war but war is interested in you”.

This is how it seems to have been with President Barack Obama when it comes to his policy towards Russia. Having come to power with President Vladimir Putin open to a closer relationship after the aggressive pushing forward of NATO’s frontier during the time of presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, Obama will leave the presidency with a state of hostility between the Russia and the U.S. that most thought had evaporated once the Cold War ended in 1991.

Now, instead of a life time of peace and cooperation ahead of us, as was widely thought, we have Russia engaged in nuclear sabre rattling and the U.S. expanding the frontier of NATO even further right up to Russia’s border and trying to put the heat on over Russia’s involvement in the upheavals in Ukraine, using economic sanctions.

Some observers talk about war between the West and Russia. Although this could not happen as long as Angela Merkel is Chancellor of Germany and France remains French it may be a “damned close-run thing” (as the Duke of Wellington was supposed to have said after victory over Napoleon at the battle of Waterloo).

It is up to President-elect Donald Trump who has become the Russians’ favourite flavour of the November month to decide if the confrontation is to continue. The Duma, the Russian parliament, burst into cheers on hearing the election result. Trump has said enough in the past to suggest that he regrets Obama’s Russian policies, criticising the Western role in Ukraine and supporting the return of Crimea back to Russia. Putin who has not said very much about Trump is reported to be happy that his American interlocutor will not be the hard-line Hillary Clinton who he never much liked.

Putin, I believe, is not interested in territorial aggrandisement but he is interested in Russia not being threatened.

It goes back to the time of President Boris Yeltsin, the first elected president of Russia, who was taken advantage of time and time again by Clinton, who often drove hard bargains late in the evening when Yeltsin, not always very well, was tired and had drunk too much vodka.

The Soviet Union’s president Mikhail Gorbachev who had been a partner of the West in ending the Cold War believed he had an understanding with President H.W. Bush and the German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher that in return for allowing Germany to be re-united and for a united Germany to be a NATO member there would never be any further expansion of NATO.

Indeed there was serious talk of Russia becoming a NATO member itself and Russia joining the “European House”, as Gorbachev expressed it, as did Putin.

No less than Clinton’s Secretary of Defence, William Perry, argued in a speech in March this year at a conference organised by the British newspaper, the Guardian, that the gains between Russia and the U.S. had been “squandered” more as a result of U.S. than Russian actions.

“In the last few years most of the blame can be pointed at the actions that Putin has taken. But in the early years I have to say that the U.S. deserves much of the blame. Our . . . first action that really set us off in a bad direction was when NATO started to expand, bringing in the eastern European nations.” He went on to say the decision reflected a contemptuous attitude among American officials towards the troubled former superpower.

The second major misstep, he said, was the Bush administration’s decision to deploy a ballistic missile system in Eastern Europe in the face of a determined opposition from Moscow. “We rationalised the system as being able to defend against an Iranian nuclear missile – but they don’t have any. The Russians said, ‘Wait a bit, this weakens our deterrence’. The issue again wasn’t discussed on the basis of its merits – it was just ‘who cares about what Russia thinks?’”

The Obama administration has since modified the missile system based in Eastern Europe, replacing long-range with medium-range interceptor missiles. Russia has welcomed this but demands rightly that the missiles could still be turned towards Russia. Moreover, with Iran having agreed to halt its nuclear program, there is no need for a missile system.

Later came the U.S. and EU decision to support the revolution in Ukraine, even though there was no good reason for it since an election was in the offering and it meant tolerating militants who were members of organisations with a fascist pedigree.

Instead of intervening in the political whirlwind of a very corrupt state Obama should have concentrated his energies on a reduction of nuclear arsenals held by the U.S. and Russia.

Can Trump do the right thing and repair the damage and prove Trotsky wrong?

*Jonathan Power syndicates his opinion articles. He forwarded this and his previous Viewpoints for publication in IDN-INPS.

Donald Trump’s election victory left Southeast Asia feeling uncertain about the future. Rhetoric from his campaign trail suggests a future of isolationism and protectionism. ASEAN states, which have long depended on the United States to hedge against China, need to strengthen ASEAN centrality.

By Harry Sa*

Since Donald Trump’s stunning victory in the US presidential elections, experts have speculated on what a Trump administration means for the Asia Pacific. As Trump’s policies were never clearly outlined, the Asia Pacific countries are struggling to formulate a sensible response. A sense of unease is rippling throughout the region as Asian leaders wonder what the next four years will bring.

One can get some sense of Trump’s Asia Pacific strategy by examining his campaign rhetoric; unfortunately, the direction of Trump’s policies does not bode well for Southeast Asian states. However, beneath the pessimism and doomsday scenarios may lie an opportunity for ASEAN.

Asia Pacific Strategy from the Campaign Trail

Donald Trump’s campaign was rife with hyperbole and vague positions, making it difficult to identify any concrete policies towards Asia. In fact, the only time Southeast Asia was ever mentioned was in tirades against job theft. We do know, however, how he feels about certain issues in the region.

Firstly, Trump will reexamine existing alliances with Japan and South Korea. He has repeatedly shown interest in shedding more of the costs associated with maintaining the alliances. Secondly, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is now all but dead. Congress is determined not to ratify the TPP before the end of President Obama’s tenure, passing the buck to the next administration.

After mercilessly targeting free trade deals throughout his campaign, it seems unlikely as ever that the TPP will be passed. And lastly, signs point to an economic showdown with China over its fiscal and trade policies. Trump has blamed the US for being weak in the face of China’s currency manipulation, threatened tariffs on Chinese imports, and promised to prevent American companies from offshoring jobs to China.

Of course, it is difficult to discern just how much of Trump’s rhetoric will be translated into policies. For example, Trump has not announced when he will begin negotiations over US bases nor has he clarified exactly how much more Asian allies are expected to pay. Only days after his victory, he assured South Korea’s president that the US remains committed to its defence, and Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reportedly had a productive and cordial meeting with the President-elect. Nevertheless, any one of his many campaign promises becoming a reality will have negative implications for Southeast Asia.

ASEAN’s Reliance on Great Powers

ASEAN, generally, has been interested in keeping the US in the region. For the past few decades, ASEAN’s great power relations can be summarised in the following way: depend on China for development and prosperity, depend on the US for security. This, of course, is a gross oversimplification, but endless pages of scholarship have documented the hedging behaviour of Southeast Asian states precisely along those lines.

Despite the US’ much vaunted “rebalance to Asia” policy, there were always the persistent concerns of American abandonment. For a time, the Obama administration did seem to make progress. The US increased its participation in ASEAN-led groups, strengthened its institutions, shifted a large number of strategic assets into the region, repaired ties with Myanmar and Vietnam, and was on the verge of ratifying the TPP.

It seemed ASEAN’s bet on the US would pay off. However suddenly, after the fateful Tuesday night on 8 November 2016, all the progress made in the past eight years is under threat of being undone. So where can ASEAN go from here?

Only Answer: ASEAN Centrality

Trump’s election is a reminder of the fickle and punishing nature of international politics, but it is also a clarion call to strengthen unity in an institution that has repeatedly failed to do so. Southeast Asian leaders have long harboured the suspicion that the US is an unreliable partner, and the election results threaten to confirm this.

The void left by a hypothetical American retrenchment will almost certainly be filled by China, leaving ASEAN states with virtually no options to hedge against their economic dependence on their giant neighbour. There is only one feasible answer: strengthen ASEAN centrality.

Altogether, ASEAN comprises some 600 million people; roughly twice that of the US. It boasts a young and growing population that can double as a massive market and a diligent labour force. The region is blessed with an abundance of natural resources, and geographically, it occupies a strategic location that sees trillions of dollars of trade pass through its seaways each year. What ASEAN lacks, however, is a collective vision and the political will to strive towards it.

The territorial disputes of the South China Sea exposed just how fragile ASEAN unity was when, during its 2012 annual foreign ministers’ meeting, it failed to issue a joint statement for the first time in history. In June 2016, ASEAN foreign ministers, once again, struggled to come up with a joint statement. Though initially issued, it was retracted due to dissent within the organisation.

With all the uncertainties surrounding a Trump presidency, ASEAN now has an opportunity to make a conscious effort towards a more unified and collective foreign policy. It needs to consider the possibility that the US will not always be there to act as a stabilising force. If there were to be any hope for any of the ten member states to work with China without succumbing to their overwhelming economic, political, and strategic influence, it will come from a firm and robust collective identity.

Notwithstanding all this, American withdrawal is not a foregone conclusion. There are numerous factors that will prevent or delay dramatic changes. Alliances are sticky. Interdependence still dominates and will mollify US-China relations. Campaign promises are, more often than not, mere rhetoric. Additionally, there will be thousands of hardworking civil servants and policy advisers on both sides of the Pacific trying to preserve what has largely been a productive relationship. Asia is too important a region for the US to ignore. A Trump presidency will not change that. Nevertheless, ASEAN has to respond to this wake up call.

*Harry Sa is a Research Analyst with the United States Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

According to the Times of Israel ( November 19, 2016) a Hamas-linked imam and an Israel chief rabbi unite in call for peace at Spain interfaith summit. Jewish, Muslim and Christian clergy denounce violence, and vow to promote a ‘life of mutual respect.

Summit organizers said in a statement that while some participants were “considered extremists,” the Jewish, Christian and Muslim clergy recognized their “special responsibility to contribute to the desired peace.”

Hamas-linked Sheikh Imad Al-Falouji, a founder of the terror organization’s military wing and former Gaza imam, was listed alongside Israel’s Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi David Lau as participants in last week’s Religious Leaders for Peace in the Middle East Summit.

The joint declaration signed by the Israeli and Palestinian religious leaders conceded they were “responsible for promoting a life of mutual respect based upon justice and safety,” and had gathered in Spain “to relentlessly seek peace in the Land.”

The leaders stressed that Judaism, Islam and Christianity valued the sanctity of life, and vowed to work against religiously-motivated violence.

“The violence that is conducted, supposedly in the name of God, is a desecration of His name, a crime against those who are created in His image, and a debasement of faith. The proper means of solving conflict and disagreement is by negotiation and deliberation only,” the statement said.

“We vehemently call for the cessation of incitement, misrepresentation and distortion of the image of the other and of the neighbor. We commit ourselves to educate future generations to uphold mutual respect.”

The declaration also called for a solution to the conflict that “recognizes the right of the two peoples to exist with dignity,” and urged Israeli and Palestinian leaders to work towards that goal.

The summit and declaration came after months of behind-the-scenes work by former government minister and coexistence activist Rabbi Michael Melchior, who heads the Mosaica Center coexistence group.

Other Palestinian Muslim leaders participating in the summit included leading Sharia scholar Sheikh Raed Badir; Secretary General of the World Muslim Conference for Jerusalem of the Union of Islamic States Dr. Izzat Jaradat; former member of the Shura Council of Hamas Prof. Fakher Abu Awad; head of the Southern Branch of the Islamic Movement Sheikh Hamad Abu Dabes; Sharia judge in Gaza Dr. Maher Khuder; and Dr. Mahmoud al-Habash, the head of the religious justice system of the Palestinian Authority.

Jewish religious leaders attending the summit included Ramat Gan Chief Rabbi Yaakov Ariel; Kiryat Ono Chief Rabbi Ratzon Arusi; Or Yehuda Chief Rabbi Zion Cohen and various yeshiva leaders.

The Melchite Archbishop George Bakuni, Latin Bishop of Jerusalem William Shomali, Lutheran Bishop Munib Younan and Greek-Orthodox Metropolitan Timotheos Margaritis also participated in the summit which was hosted by the Spanish government.

Information sharing has come under increased scrutiny in the context of interbank lending, foreign exchange markets, and US Treasury auctions. This column explores the benefits and drawbacks of information sharing by dealers in US Treasury auctions. Information sharing is found to benefit first and foremost the issuer, i.e. the Treasury. The model provides insight on auction revenue, risk-sharing, and the decision to bid through a dealer, with information sharing having a sizeable effect on each.

By Nina Boyarchenko, David Lucca and Laura Veldkamp*

Recent financial market misconduct in the interbank lending (Libor) and foreign exchange markets – involving misuse of information about clients’ orders – has prompted legal action, incurred record fines, compromised reputations, and prompted international initiatives to curb information sharing. In US Treasury auctions, where trillions of dollars are sold each year largely to, or through, a small set of primary dealers, the use of information has similarly come under increased scrutiny (Bloomberg 2015).  While it may all sound straightforward, it is in fact not obvious who is harmed when information is shared.

Regulatory initiatives to curb information sharing in Treasury and other markets attempt to protect clients from harm, but we find that information sharing among dealers creates value for investors and improves risk-sharing. Investors are harmed from information sharing not when dealers exchange information with other dealers, as one may suspect, but when dealers share information with other investors. For the Treasury, information sharing can boost auction revenues, an effect that we estimate in the order of about $4.8 billion per year. This increased revenues come at a cost of increased revenue volatility and risk of a failed auction, which is when revenues fall well below expectations.

How dealers use clients’ order flow information is not a new issue for economists or practitioners. In the economics literature, the use of order flow information has been central to our understanding of sovereign auctions (Hortacsu and Kastl 2012), to market making theory generally (Kyle 1985) and to market practice for decades. In describing Treasury market pre-auction activities in the 1950s, Robert Roosa (1956) noted that “dealers sometimes talk to each other; and they all talk to their banks and customers; the banks talk to each other”. Sharing order-flow information – or, colloquially, ‘market colour’ – with issuers is even mandatory for primary dealers both in the US and abroad.

Despite these long-standing discussions, how information is shared in sovereign auctions has recently been an area of active policy debate. The Treasury Market Practices Group is currently reviewing best practices for information handling by dealers, and outside the US, information sharing practices are changing as well. In 2011, the UK Debt Management Office sanctioned that UK primary dealers (called ‘Gilt-edged Market Makers’) “whilst not permitted to charge a fee for this service, may use the information content of that bid to its own benefit”.¹ The revised guidelines stated instead “information about trading interests, bids/offers or transactions may be subject to confidentiality obligations or other legal restrictions on disclosure (including pursuant to competition law)”.

In a recent paper, we explore the benefits and drawbacks of information sharing (Boyarchenko et al. 2016). Because regimes with and without information-sharing restrictions cannot be simultaneously observed, existing data do not reveal what effects this policy change might bring. Therefore, we use a calibrated model that matches the bidding behaviour and settlement prices in US treasury auctions. Then we change the information-sharing rules inside the model to measure their effects on treasury revenue and investors’ profits.

The results prove that information sharing first and foremost benefits the issuer, which, in the case of US sovereign auctions, is the Treasury. Based on our model calibration, moving from full information sharing to no information sharing would lower Treasury auction revenues by $4.8 billion annually. When more information is shared, auction risk is reduced, investors and dealers bid more aggressively, which ultimately boost auction revenues. While intuitive, this economic channel is hardly discussed in the policy debate on establishing ‘Chinese walls’.

Dealers sharing information with their clients doesn’t sound too objectionable. But surely dealers swapping notes with other dealers cannot be good for small investors, right? No. In fact, the model teaches us that this thinking is backward – when dealers swap information with other dealers, investors benefit. The ability for dealers to share information between his/her clients can actually be worse for those clients.

Why? Because the two types of information sharing have opposite effects on information asymmetry. When dealers share their clients’ information with other clients, there is a shared belief among those clients. However, this in turn causes the beliefs of investors across different dealers to become more polarised, or asymmetric. Information asymmetry encourages some bidders to take large positions against others, worsening overall risk-sharing. This result is harmful for investors overall.

Of course, each investor individually prefers more information to less. But information acquisition is a prisoners’ dilemma problem – an example of the Hirschleifer (1971) effect. In contrast, when dealers share information with each other, the advice they provide to their clients is similar. Clients with more similar beliefs share risk more efficiently, which benefits the investors. In short, dealer information sharing with other dealers has an opposite effect on investor utility from sharing with clients.

We are not dismissing the potential fact that dealers who share information with each other can also collude with each other. While information sharing does not imply collusion, it makes it possible. That being said, the benefits for information sharing outweigh the prevention of information sharing in fear of collusion. If collusion is the only problem, then the obvious remedy is to aggressively enforce anti-collusion laws.

But what if, when information is shared, some collusion cannot be prevented? Even if this is the case, information sharing may be its own remedy. The victim of collusion is the Treasury, which loses revenue when bidders collude on low bids. Since the Treasury is also the main beneficiary of information sharing, when enough information is shared, the revenue benefits of information sharing exceed the revenue costs of collusion. If in addition to sharing information with other dealers and colluding, dealers also share enough information with clients, the net effect on Treasury revenue is positive in our calibrated model.

While information sharing has many upsides, it also has important downsides. One of the most troubling of these is that the combination of information sharing and mixed auctions amplifies negative news, potentially resulting in failed auctions, and more likely reduction in revenues well below expectations.

Treasury auctions are mixed auctions, meaning that investors can either place bids through a dealer or bid directly, without dealer assistance. An investor with good news, who will want to buy many Treasuries, should want to keep that information to themselves. If the information were shared with a dealer who observed their bids, inferred their beliefs, and in turn shared that knowledge with clients, those clients would bid more aggressively upon learning the good news and push the price higher. Avoiding a higher auction price requires not sharing their information or their demand with a dealer and instead, bidding directly. But an investor with negative information typically expects to bid for only a few shares. If the investor expects to end up only with small amounts of the new issue, the consequence of sharing the negative news and pushing the price down is small. But the benefit of getting information (market colour) from their dealer and learning that perhaps the outlook is not as bleak as (s)he thought can be large. As negative-news investors bid through dealers, their negative news is disseminated by the dealer, resulting in weaker demand. If positive news is kept private with investors bidding directly and negative news is shared with dealers, then auction prices will be more responsive to bad news than good news. This asymmetry manifests itself as an increased risk of a failed auction.

Conclusion

Using a model to measure the potential effect of unobserved policy requires that one believes the model to be a reasonable representation of reality. Of course, reality will always be more complex. But the model provides a guiding map by suppressing details. Our model clarifies the various effects of information sharing on auction revenue, on risk-sharing, and on the decision of whether to bid through a dealer or not. Because the size and nature of these effects are ambiguous absent a model, they have not received much attention in the current policy discussion. Our calibration suggests, however, that each effect is sizable. As new policies are crafted and considered, we hope that the model’s insights into who wins and who loses from information sharing can inform this important debate.

*About the authors:
Nina Boyarchenko, Financial economist, Federal Reserve Bank of New York

David Lucca, Research Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Laura Veldkamp, Professor of Economics at the Stern School of Business, New York University

References:
Bloomberg (2015) “As US probes $12.7 trillion Treasury market, trader talk is a good place to start”.

Boyarchenko, N, D O Lucca and L Veldkamp (2015) “Intermediaries as information aggregators: An application to US Treasury auctions”, FRB of New York Staff Report, 726.

Hortaçsu, A and J Kastl (2012) “Valuing dealers’ informational advantage: A study of Canadian treasury auctions”, Econometrica, 80(6): 2511-2542.

Hirshleifer, D (1971) “The private and social value of information and the reward of inventive activity”, American Economic Review, 61.

Kyle, A S (1985) “Continuous auctions and insider trading”, Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1315–1335.

Roosa, R V (1956) Federal Reserve operations in the money and government securities markets, 332, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Endnotes:
[1] GEMM Guidebook, 2011 and 2015 versions.

Frozen beneath a region of cracked and pitted plains on Mars lies about as much water as what’s in Lake Superior, largest of the Great Lakes, a team of scientists led by The University of Texas at Austin has determined using data from NASA’s Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter.

Scientists examined part of Mars’ Utopia Planitia region, in the mid-northern latitudes, with the orbiter’s ground-penetrating Shallow Radar (SHARAD) instrument. Analyses of data from more than 600 overhead passes revealed a deposit more extensive in area than the state of New Mexico. The deposit ranges in thickness from about 260 feet to about 560 feet, with a composition that’s 50 to 85 percent water ice, mixed with dust or larger rocky particles.

At the latitude of this deposit — about halfway from the equator to the pole — water ice cannot persist on the surface of Mars today. It turns into water vapor in the planet’s thin, dry atmosphere. The Utopia deposit is shielded from the atmosphere by a soil covering estimated to be about 3 to 33 feet thick.

“This deposit probably formed as snowfall accumulating into an ice sheet mixed with dust during a period in Mars history when the planet’s axis was more tilted than it is today,” said Cassie Stuurman of the University of Texas Institute for Geophysics, a unit of the Jackson School of Geosciences. She is the lead author of a report in the journal Geophysical Research Letters.

The name Utopia Planitia translates loosely as the “plains of paradise.” The newly surveyed ice deposit spans latitudes from 39 to 49 degrees within the plains. It represents less than 1 percent of all known water ice on Mars, but it more than doubles the volume of thick, buried ice sheets known in the northern plains. Ice deposits close to the surface are being considered as a resource for astronauts.

“This deposit is probably more accessible than most water ice on Mars, because it is at a relatively low latitude and it lies in a flat, smooth area where landing a spacecraft would be easier than at some of the other areas with buried ice,” said Jack Holt, a research professor at the University of Texas Institute for Geophysics, and a co-author of the Utopia paper who is a SHARAD co-investigator and has previously used radar to study Martian ice in buried glaciers and the polar caps.

The Utopian water is all frozen now. If there were a melted layer — which would be significant for the possibility of life on Mars — it would have been evident in the radar scans. However, some melting can’t be ruled out during different climate conditions when the planet’s axis was more tilted.

“Where water ice has been around for a long time, we just don’t know whether there could have been enough liquid water at some point for supporting microbial life,” Holt said.

Utopia Planitia is a basin with a diameter of about 2,050 miles, resulting from a major impact early in Mars’ history and subsequently filled. NASA sent the Viking 2 Lander to a site near the center of Utopia in 1976. The portion examined by Stuurman and colleagues lies southwest of that long-silent lander.

Use of the Italian-built SHARAD instrument for examining part of Utopia Planitia was prompted by Gordon Osinski at Western University in Ontario, Canada, a co-author of the study. For many years, he and other researchers have been intrigued by ground-surface patterns there such as polygonal cracking and rimless pits called scalloped depressions — “like someone took an ice cream scoop to the ground,” said Stuurman, who started this project while a student at Western.

In the Canadian Arctic, similar landforms are indicative of ground ice, Osinski noted, “but there was an outstanding question as to whether any ice was still present at the Martian Utopia or whether it had been lost over the millions of years since the formation of these polygons and depressions.”

The large volume of ice detected with SHARAD advances understanding about Mars’ history and identifies a possible resource for future use.

“It’s important to expand what we know about the distribution and quantity of Martian water,” said Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter Deputy Project Scientist Leslie Tamppari of NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California. “We know early Mars had enough liquid water on the surface for rivers and lakes. Where did it go? Much of it left the planet from the top of the atmosphere. Other missions have been examining that process. But there’s also a large quantity that is now underground ice, and we want to keep learning more about that.”

Joe Levy of the University of Texas Institute for Geophysics, a co-author of the new study, agreed.

“The ice deposits in Utopia Planitia aren’t just an exploration resource. They’re also one of the most accessible climate change records on Mars,” he said. “We don’t understand fully why ice has built up in some areas of the Martian surface and not in others. Sampling and using this ice with a future mission could help keep astronauts alive, while also helping them unlock the secrets of Martian ice ages.”

By Gianfranco Terrazzano

There is a major link between underdevelopment and the risk of conflict. The West’s most immediate foreign security threats come from organizations in fragile regions. These regions suffer from weak governments, dismal economies, and violent conflict. In Africa, weak governments, underdevelopment, and conflict seem to go hand-in-hand. As such, this region has a long history of instability and conflict, and has become a breeding ground for radical terrorist organizations.

Since the end of the Second World War, Western politicians have often advocated for the spread of democracy as a means to promote political freedoms, stability, and prosperity in fragile regions. As such, the international community has worked to create the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, which was adopted by the African Union (AU) in 2007. Nearly a decade after its creation, twenty-three states have signed and ratified the Charter, twenty-three states have signed but have not ratified the Charter, while seven African Union members have not signed or ratified the Charter. Although there are fifty four member states in the African Union, the analysis does not include the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, as it is not fully recognized by the international community as an official state and sufficient data is lacking.

Throughout the analysis, ten progress indicators are used – three measures of political institutions, three measures of economic progress, two measures of human development, and two measures of combat deaths – to determine whether the Charter has been successful in achieving international objectives. The three political indicators – obtained from Freedom House’s Freedom in the World data set – measure the number of electoral democracies, the political rights, and civil liberties in each country. In terms of political rights and civil liberties, the lower the score, the greater the political freedoms, with 1 being the greatest degree of freedom and 7 being the lowest degree of freedom. The economic indicators look to determine the per capita GDP, per capita GDP growth rates, and the degree of income equality (the lower the Gini index, the more equal the society). The development indicators measure the annual life expectancy at birth and the number of under five-year old deaths per year in each country. I also use data from two sources to track the number of annual battle deaths.

The analysis examines whether countries that have ratified the Charter have made substantial progress over and above the progress made by countries that have not ratified the Charter. The fifty-three countries are broken up into three groups: the twenty-three countries that have ratified, the twenty-three countries that have signed but have not ratified the Charter, and the remaining seven countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter. As the aim is to determine whether the Charter has benefited the African region, the ten progress indicators are used to determine whether progress has been made since 2007 (when the Charter was adopted by the AU). Although relative improvements are one of the main determinants of whether the Charter has been successful, the analysis will also considers which group of countries are better off in absolute terms.

The summary of the quantitative analysis is presented in Tables 1-4. In order to determine the effectiveness of the Charter, the tables illustrates whether each group has made improvements or has regressed since 2007. For convenience, I have highlighted improvements made since 2007 in green, and have highlighted regressions in orange.

Political Freedoms

Table 1: Political Indicators

According to the data presented in Table 1, it appears that ratifying or signing the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance has not improved the number of electoral democracies or the degree of political freedoms among participating countries. In fact, the only group of countries that have experienced a greater degree of political freedoms since the creation of the Charter were the countries that did not sign or ratify. Furthermore, the countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter were the only group of countries that saw an increase in the amount of electoral democracies since 2007. Countries that signed or ratified the Charter actually saw a reduction in the number of electoral democracies.

With regards to civilian’s political rights, again, only countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter saw an improvement. Civilians living in either countries that have signed or ratified saw reductions. As illustrated in Table 1, no group of countries have made any improvements in their civil liberties. However, only the countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter did not experience a reduction in civil liberties.

Since 2007, countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter have made the greatest improvements in political institutions. However, in absolute terms, civilians living in countries that have either signed or ratified the Charter live with greater political freedoms.  This cannot be attributed to the implementation of the Charter, as these countries had greater political rights and civil liberties prior to its creation in 2007. After examining the data presented in Table 1, I cannot conclude that signing or ratifying the Charter has resulted in greater improvements in the degree of democratic institutions or political freedoms.

Economic Progress

Table 2: Economic Indicators

Although the only group to make improvements in terms of the political indicators were the countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter, it appears that all countries have made improvements in their standard of living, as measured by per capita GDP. Figure 1 graphs the three groups of countries’ average annual per capita GDP since 1991. According to Figure 1, it is apparent that the countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter have the greatest standard of living among all African Union members.

Figure 1: The Impact of the Charter on Standards of Living in Africa. (Fig 1 source)

The economic indicators illustrated in Table 2 and Figure 1 suggest that signing or ratifying the African Charter has not resulted in significant improvements in economic well-being. In fact, the countries that have had the most economic success are countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter. In 2015, countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter had an average per capita GDP nearly 4.5 times greater than those that have ratified the Charter.

Although the countries that ratified, on average, have the lowest per capita GDP, they have experienced the greatest growth since 2007. However, the relatively large growth rates do not represent significant economic progress. Instead they are best explained by their low per capita GDP prior to 2007.

The countries that have ratified the Charter have agreed to implement policies that encourage economic equality (Article 33). However, Table 2 illustrates that the only group of countries that have reduced income inequality since 2007 are those that have not signed or ratified the Charter.  The ratification of the Charter does not appear to have promoted an equitable distribution of income. According to the data illustrated in Table 2 and Figure 1, countries that have not ratified the Charter appear to be enjoying the greatest economic success, while countries that have ratified continue to have struggling economies. The economic indicators suggest that ratifying the Charter has not resulted in major improvements in economic well-being.

Human Development

Table 3: Human Development Indicators

All countries have experienced major human development improvements since the creation of the African Charter in 2007. As illustrated in Table 3, countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter have the longest life expectancy, and the fewest number of early childhood deaths. However, the greatest improvements – in terms of life expectancy – have been made in countries that have ratified. Yet, these countries remain the worse off. Between 2008 and 2015, the average life expectancy for people in countries that have ratified was 8.45 years less than those living in countries that have neither signed nor ratified the Charter.

Similar to life expectancy, Table 3 illustrates that all groups of countries have seen improvements in early childhood deaths. However, countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter have made the greatest reductions. Between 2008 and 2015, ratified countries have experienced an average of 42,957 more early childhood deaths per year than countries that have only signed, and 55,761 more childhood deaths than countries that have not signed or ratified. Although countries that have ratified the Charter have made development improvements, the improvements made by those that have not ratified have been more impressive.

Combat Deaths

Table 4: Combat Indicators

The limitations of conflict data are well known. Data was acquired from two well-respected sources in order to increase confidence surrounding the findings. Although both sources report a different number of casualties, the trends are very similar. All groups of countries have experienced reductions in average annual battle related deaths since 2007. According to both sets of data presented in Table 4, countries that have ratified the Charter have experienced only small reductions in battle related deaths since 2007, while those that have not ratified have experienced significantly greater reductions.

According to the data collected from the World Bank, the countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter experienced an 88.5 percent reduction in annual average battle related deaths since the adoption of the Charter. Whereas those that have ratified have only experienced an 18.6 percent reduction. Since the creation of the charter, the number of deaths decreased, on average, by 5,114 per year within countries that neither signed nor ratified. Those that ratified experienced only 124 less annual deaths since 2007. Although I cannot make the claim that not ratifying the Charter has resulted in major reductions in combat related deaths, it is clear that, on average, ratifying the Charter has not resulted in major reductions in conflict.

Conclusion

According to the data presented in Tables 1-4, it appears that the countries that have ratified the Charter have not made significant improvements relative to the countries that have not.

Although ratified countries have experienced greater growth in average annual per capita GDP and annual life expectancy, it should not be concluded that the ratification of the Charter has led to substantial improvements. The relatively large increase in annual growth rates is better explained by the low starting per capita GDP, rather than any substantial improvement in economic potential. Due to the low initial per capita GDP, any small improvement will be magnified through greater growth rates.  The countries that have ratified have also experienced greater improvements in life expectancy. Yet, their average annual life expectancy still remains nearly 8.5 years lower than in countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter.

Countries that have not signed or ratified the Charter have experienced greater improvements in the number of countries with electoral democracies, political rights, income equality, and reductions in early childhood and combat related deaths. Furthermore, these countries have much longer average life expectancies, and their per capita GDP is approximately 4.5 times greater than the countries that have ratified the Charter. Since 2007, it cannot be concluded that the countries that have ratified the Charter have experienced greater institutional, economic, developmental, or conflict related improvements than the countries that have not.

The African Charter alone has not generated great improvements among African Union members. The fundamental failure of the Charter is that it does not have the ability to alter the incentives and opportunities available in these countries. The result has been no substantial social change. The lack of enforcement partly explains why the Charter has failed to bring substantial gains to the Parties that have ratified the agreement. There remains a clear time-consistency problem, where leaders of a country can agree to abide by the liberal democratic institutions in place, and then defect on their promise whenever it is in their short-term interest to do so. Other actors within these countries – leaders of other factions, potential investors, and civilians – understand that the lack of enforcement allows leaders to defect from their agreement to uphold the Charter. The other actors then realize that it is also in their best interest to defect from the agreement. For example, instead of respecting the outcomes of an election, rival factions will predict that the current leader does not have the incentive to abide by electoral rules. Instead of peacefully abiding by electoral rules, other factions have the incentive to acquire state power through force.  In fact, there are numerous examples of this situation occurring.  According to the National Democratic Institute, between 2007 and 2013, ten military coups in Western Africa had taken place in countries that have ratified the Charter.

Once defection from the principles of the Charter becomes beneficial and inevitably occurs, other groups no longer benefit from adhering to the Charter. Without an enforcement mechanism to make the agreement credible, the Charter is unlikely to significantly improve the standard of living in Africa.

This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com

By Cheryl Pellerin

As part of ongoing efforts to disrupt terrorist networks, Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook on Tuesday confirmed that U.S. forces conducted a precision airstrike near Sarmada in northwest Syria Nov. 18 that killed Abu Ayyub al-Masri, a senior al-Qaida leader in Syria.

Al-Masri was an Egyptian who joined al-Qaida in Afghanistan and later moved to its Syrian affiliate, Cook said during a briefing with Pentagon reporters.

“He had ties to terrorist groups operating throughout Southwest Asia, including groups responsible for attacking U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan and those plotting to attack the West,” he added, noting that al-Masri’s removal from the battlefield is another blow to al-Qaida in Syria.

The successful airstrike “demonstrates continued U.S. determination to target al-Qaida leaders wherever they pose a threat to the U.S., our allies and interests,” Cook said.

Carter Call with Barzani

This morning, Cook said, Defense Secretary Ash Carter spoke by phone with Kurdistan Regional Government President Masoud Barzani.

“They had a very productive call focused on the ongoing fight against [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant],” the press secretary said, and Carter thanked Barzani for the courage of Kurdish fighters and for close KRG cooperation with the central government in Baghdad and the coalition in planning and executing operations to free Mosul.

Barzani thanked Carter for the coalition’s continued support to Peshmerga forces, Cook added, and the two leaders pledged to remain in close coordination as the Iraqi-led counter-ISIL campaign progresses in Iraq.

Progress in Iraq, Syria

In Iraq, Cook said, Iraqi forces continue to clear areas in and around Mosul despite strong ISIL opposition.

“The [Iraqis] continue to make progress while exercising commendable care to avoid civilian casualties. They’ve been dealing among other things with vehicle-borne [homemade bombs] and the use of human shields by ISIL,” he told reporters.

In the last 24 hours the coalition conducted nine strikes, delivering 72 munitions to support operations in and around Mosul.

“This remains a tough urban campaign,” Cook said, “though it will end with Mosul free of ISIL’s rule.”

In Syria, Syrian Democratic Forces continue to seize and clear territory north of Raqqa in preparation for that city’s isolation and eventual liberation, he said.

“Those SDF forces are now 20 kilometers from Raqqa. The SDF has essentially closed a pocket of ISIL forces now encircled by their advance and they are clearing that pocket in preparation for future operations,” Cook said.

In the last 24 hours, the coalition has conducted 11 strikes delivering 35 munitions in support of the SDF’s drive on Raqqa, he said.

“We continue to see indications that the simultaneous pressure on ISIL in both Syria and Iraq combined with relentless strikes on ISIL leadership is complicating ISIL’s ability to reinforce and to command and control its forces,” Cook said.

Thanksgiving for Troops

As Americans prepare for the Thanksgiving holiday, Cook said, “Around the world our troops and DoD civilians are working to protect the nation. And as you might expect, the Department of Defense is working to provide as joyous a holiday as possible for those personnel who can’t be home with their families.”

This week, for deployed service members in Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan and Kuwait, the Defense Logistics Agency will provide 34,760 pounds of turkey, 32,550 pounds of beef, 21,450 pounds of ham, 28,980 pounds of shrimp, 9,115 pounds of stuffing mix and 879 gallons of egg nog.

“We want to wish a happy Thanksgiving to our troops deployed around the world, as well as to those here at home and to their families,” Cook said.

Chinese e-commerce giant Alibaba Group has removed the yoga mats carrying images of various Hindu deities from its Alibaba.com website within 24 hours after Hindus protested.

Hindu statesman Rajan Zed, who spearheaded the protest asking for immediate withdrawal of objectionable yoga mats, in a statement in Nevada (USA) today, thanked Alibaba Group for understanding the concerns of Hindu community, which thought images of Hindu deities—Lord Ganesha, Lord Krishna, Lord Shiva and Lord Vishnu—on yoga mats were highly inappropriate.

These objectionable yoga mats, which were available for purchasing on Alibaba.com website on the early morning of November 21, were not seen on the website when searched on late November 21 evening.

Zed, who is President of Universal Society of Hinduism, however, stated that a formal apology from Alibaba Group to the upset Hindu community was still due.

Rajan Zed suggested Alibaba Group and other corporations to send their senior executives for training in religious and cultural sensitivity so that they had an understanding of the feelings of customers and communities when introducing new products or launching advertising campaigns.

Zed had earlier said that Lord Ganesha, Lord Krishna, Lord Shiva and Lord Vishnu were highly revered in Hinduism and were meant to be worshipped in temples or home shrines and not to sit on or put feet/buttocks/legs on or sweat on, as was the case of yoga mats being sold with their images. Inappropriate usage of Hindu deities or concepts for commercial or other agenda was not okay as it hurt the devotees.

Hinduism was the oldest and third largest religion of the world with about one billion adherents and a rich philosophical thought and it should not be taken frivolously. Symbols of any faith, larger or smaller, should not be mishandled, Rajan Zed had noted.

Zed had also pointed out that such trivialization of Hindu deities was disturbing to the Hindus world over. Hindus were for free artistic expression and speech as much as anybody else if not more. But faith was something sacred and attempts at trivializing it hurt the followers, Zed added.

Hangzhou (China) headquartered Alibaba Group, established in 1999, generated USD 17.8 billion of GMV in November 11 Global Shopping Festival. Its “mission” is “to make it easy to do business anywhere” and its “vision” includes “a company that lasts at least 102 years”. Jack Yun MA, a former English teacher from Hangzhou, is the Executive Chairman. It also has offices in Hong Kong, Taiwan, USA, United Kingdom, Italy and India.

By Catherine Stupp

(EurActiv) — Five EU countries said they want the European Commission to propose legislation that would make it easier for police to crack through encryption technology.

Croatia, Italy, Latvia, Poland and Hungary all want an EU law to be created to help their law enforcement authorities access encrypted information and share data with investigators in other countries.

Poland and Latvia want EU legislation to focus on making it easier to access data stored remotely in clouds, which are often operated by companies based in other EU countries or outside the 28-member bloc.

“One of the most crucial aspects will be adopting new legislation that allows for acquisition of data stored in EU countries ‘in the cloud’,” without forcing police to request data through official exchange agreements, Polish officials wrote.

The Slovakian government, which currently holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, asked EU countries over the summer to identify how their law enforcement authorities deal with encryption technology that’s designed to prevent anyone from intercepting communication unless they have secure passwords.

Twelve countries’ responses were obtained through a freedom of information request by the Dutch internet rights NGO Bits of Freedom. Requests are still pending in the 16 EU countries that haven’t responded yet.

Authorities in Estonia, Denmark, Finland, Croatia, Italy, Poland and Sweden often come up against encrypted data during criminal investigations, according to the countries’ responses.

Latvia and the UK said their law enforcement authorities “almost always” encounter encryption.

Several countries that responded to the survey said their police forces lack the funds and technical know-how to intercept criminals’ communication if they use encryption. Most respondents said they wanted the EU to help sharpen national authorities’ technical skills.

Outspoken ministers from a group of EU countries have amped up pressure to introduce laws that would make it easier to crack open encryption technology, following terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels over the last year.

The German and French Interior Ministers Thomas de Maiziere and Bernard Cazeneuve recently wrote to the European Commission asking for an EU-level fix to help authorities access encrypted data in terrorism investigations, as first reported by AFP on Saturday (19 November).

National ministers will discuss encryption at a meeting early next month, diplomats told AFP.

German government officials have been quick to dismiss charges that the country is pushing tech companies to create so-called backdoors, or built-in ways to bypass encryption in their products. Critics argue backdoors would weaken encryption across the board, making technology less secure and vulnerable to attacks from anyone.

“A regulation to prohibit or to weaken encryption for telecommunication and digital services has to be ruled out, in order to protect privacy and business secrets,” the German government wrote in its response to Slovakia’s survey.

Germany has instead used software that can be secretly installed on devices to monitor communication before it’s encrypted.

Italian authorities responded that their criminal investigations are mostly hampered most by “the lack of traceability of Tor connections and Bitcoin transactions”. Tor is the secure internet browser that can be used anonymously to access encrypted websites.

Days after it was revealed that the shooter who killed nine people in Munich this July bought his gun on the darknet, Angela Merkel announced that her government would look into how investigators can trace criminals who use encryption and the darknet.

But so far, EU authorities have struggled to agree on how to address encryption.

Andrus Ansip, the Commission vice president in charge of the EU’s technology policies, has said he opposes laws that force companies to create backdoors to weaken encryption.

Europol, the EU law enforcement agency, and ENISA, the agency in charge of cybersecurity, signed an agreement in May opposing laws that strongarm firms into providing backdoors.

The United States said Tuesday it strongly opposes the Russian Federation’s ratification of an agreement secured with the de facto leaders in Georgia’s breakaway region of Abkhazia regarding a joint military force.

“We do not recognize the legitimacy of this so-called ‘treaty,’ which does not constitute a valid international agreement,” said US State Department spokesperson John Kirby.

“The United States’ position on Abkhazia and South Ossetia remains clear: these regions are integral parts of Georgia, and we continue to support Georgia’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity,” Kirby said.

According to Kirby, Russia should fulfill all of its commitments under the 2008 ceasefire agreement, withdraw its forces to pre-conflict positions, reverse its recognition of the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, and provide free access for humanitarian assistance to these regions.

By Lars Brozus*

After 1945, Washington’s approach to international politics was by and large based on ideas linked to the notion of “liberal internationalism.” A bipartisan consensus existed postulating that a liberal international order – defined by norms and institutions in support of open societies and markets – was in the US’s core interest. Included in that consensus was support for a generous immigration policy as well as liberalised trade and financial relations. International institutions and alliances were created to protect this order. Hence Washington’s support for the UN system, the international financial institutions (World Bank, IWF) and NATO, among many others.

There also was a shared understanding in US politics that Washington’s leadership was essential to preserve the liberal international order. Therefore, disproportionally high contributions from the US budget to maintain this order were reasonable: Washington’s benefit from a more-or-less stable and predictable international environment that was governed by rules manufactured “at home” outweighed any over-investment. Even more so as these investments enabled the US to project both hard and soft power globally.

In contrast to this bipartisan consensus on foreign policy, the incoming US President Donald Trump perceives international politics as a zero sum-game: one side wins what the other side loses. Washington’s commitments to defend Japan and South Korea or to deter Russia from invading Europe come at the expense of American citizens (aka taxpayers). The creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and China’s accession to the WTO contributed to the loss of manufacturing jobs in the homeland. In this view, establishing and maintaining the liberal international order has contributed to the decline of US industry and the American working class.

Accordingly, “America first” is the key phrase of Trump’s foreign policy agenda. He intends to push for better international deals: fair trade instead of free trade. The European and Asian allies should pay more for their security, and the US should no longer be disadvantaged by international pacts such as the 2015 Paris climate accord or international trade agreements such as the TPP and TTIP.

However, it would be wrong to portray Trump as an isolationist. Quite to the contrary: he has announced that his administration will rebuild America’s military force, and promised to take extreme measures against the “Islamic State,” even – and this is revealing of his anti-multilateralist position – including actions that violate international law. Trump’s agenda should not be equated with a renouncement of global leadership. What changes is rather the interpretation of this role: less so in terms of a benign hegemon in favour of a rule-bound multilateralism, and more in terms of a self-interested highly selective bilateral approach to international politics.

It is not clear yet what the effects on Europe and the EU will be. On the one hand, many governments fear that a self-interested and more inward-looking US might provoke Russia into testing the strength of the NATO and European solidarity. Trump’s triumph has been welcomed by right-wing populists all over Europe such as Marine Le Pen who is a contender in the French presidential elections scheduled for 2017. Nigel Farage, the former head of UK’s Independence Party, has close contacts to Trump. It is a worrying perspective that right-wing populists could become the US’ favourite partners in Europe. On the other hand, and in view of the changing nature of the transatlantic alliance, the EU needs to be clear about its interests. Berlin and Brussels will, most likely, face growing pressure to do more for Europe’s defence. This opens an opportunity for increased cooperation.

Of course, it remains to be seen whether Trump will actually be able to implement his foreign policy agenda. His critics on both sides of the Atlantic point to restrictions that are inherent in the system of checks and balances that characterises the US’ political system. In the US, constitutionally, authority over foreign policy is divided between the president and Congress. The Congress has three major options to influence foreign policy: via budget legislation; the confirmation of high-ranking government officials; and its approval of internationally binding treaties. Additionally, the US Congress may also articulate foreign policy positions of its own. Take Russia for example: in the Kremlin’s view, Trump’s election presents a window of opportunity for the normalisation of diplomatic relations. A new Yalta (where in 1945 the victorious Allied powers met to divide the world amongst them) with bilaterally recognised and respected “zones of influence” would be the result. However, Trump’s administration might be limited by the anti-Russian positions within the Republican Party, which holds the majority in Congress.

However, make no mistake, because whether and to what extent President Trump could be reined in by the US Congress depends on the thematic issues in question. The latter tends to play a more significant role in areas including trade, migration and development cooperation, than in issues of national security. The concentration of foreign policy authority in the executive branch of government, namely the White House, should also be taken into account.

*Lars Brozus
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin

The United Nations is extremely concerned by the continued worsening humanitarian situation in Ganfouda area in the Libyan city of Benghazi due to increased hostilities over the past week, a senior UN aid official in the North African country said Tuesday.

“I am extremely worried by the impact on civilians of intense fighting in and around the Ganfouda area,” the Libya Humanitarian Coordinator a.i.,Ghassan Khalil, said in a statement. He also noted that many people remaining in the area have limited or no access to drinking water or food, while other essential goods and medical supplies are running critically low.

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Ganfouda district has been inaccessible for many months for aid organizations, leaving civilians in dire and urgent need of protection and humanitarian assistance. The Humanitarian Country Team stands ready to assist as soon as access is granted by all parties.

Dr. Khalil called on all parties to take all feasible precautions to spare civilians and civilian infrastructure in the conduct of hostilities.

“The sick and injured must be allowed to seek and receive medical assistance and civilians and captured fighters alike must be treated humanely, regardless of their origin or political affiliations,” he said.

“Women and children should receive special assistance and protection. Those civilians wishing to leave should be allowed to do so in safety and dignity without delay,” he added.

Following six months of armed conflict in 2011, Libya has been plagued with fresh violence and political divisions.