With new trends and directions in global business, African countries have to look to the Eurasian region as a huge market for exports as well as make efforts to consolidate and strengthen economic cooperation, according to Tatiana Cheremnaya, the President of ANO “Center for Effective Development of Territories” and Head of the working group on public-private partnership “Business Union of Eurasia” in this wide-ranging interview.

She further discusses Russia’s economic relationship, challenges and untapped potential business and investment opportunities with Africa. She spoke recently in this interview with Kester Kenn Klomegah, an independent research writer on Russian-African affairs in Moscow.

Interview excerpts follow:

Q: How important is Eurasian market for African countries?

Tatiana Cheremnaya, the President of ANO “Center for Effective Development of Territories” and Head of the working group on public-private partnership “Business Union of Eurasia”.

Cheremnaya: The Eurasian marketplace, in scale and capital intensity, is huge. It includes some countries of Europe and post-Soviet countries and rather fast-growing Asian countries. It is obvious that the interest among African countries for access to these markets is enormous both in the context of just entering the market of a particular country and implementation of joint interstate projects. In this case, first of all, we are talking about high requirements in the implementation in Africa of infrastructure projects, including roads, bridges, pipelines, electricity and the search for alternative sources of energy, communication, without which it is impossible to imagine a dynamic and systematic development of the economies of African States.

The implementation of such projects can be possible with the introduction of public-private partnerships. Here you can define several main points of contact between the Eurasian and African companies:

1. The implementation of joint projects in the framework of BRICS. We know that the unit includes one African country – South Africa. Today in the framework of the unit formed the New development Bank BRICS, the funding of joint transnational projects. In 2016, the Bank has approved the financing of the first investment projects in the BRICS countries totaling more than $1.5 billion.

2. Joint cooperation between the units of the Eurasian Economic Commission and the African Union. It is qualitatively new direction in the cooperation between the two blocs was laid in July 2016, when in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, the delegation of the Eurasian Economic Commission held talks at the African Union Commission. It is worth noting that the African Union itself includes the 54 African States, and in the area of Eurasia includes 89 countries. The scale of the Eurasian-African cooperation is evident.

3. Giant cross-country infrastructure projects, which can be safely attributed to the project Great Silk Road. Here the role of the Eurasian economic Union and the project “Economic Belt Silk Road” is the formation of a common economic space, institutional capacities mates, and the possible components of a proactive commercial and economic strategy of Russia and its Eurasian Economic Union partner. Project financing is also being implemented in the framework of interstate financial institutions creates a system of regional-global financial institutions with total capital to date $240 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, development Fund of Silk Road.

Q:How challenging, of course, is this market?

Cheremnaya: Of course, to enter the Eurasian markets from Africa is quite difficult. Here we are talking primarily about the high-tech, and the competitiveness of African business. That is, on one hand, we have a cheap labor force, good climate, really good opportunities all appearing for business development on the African continent. But, on the other hand, it often happens that a business can’t compete with the Eurasian giants. However, in time within such a community as BRICS, or the cooperation between the Eurasian economic Union and the African Union, can be reached certain agreements on implementation of joint projects and the release of African companies into the Russian market, what needs to be done.

Q: Do you also think that industrialists and business directors from the Eurasian region can cooperate with other foreign investors on projects in Africa?

Cheremnaya: Of course, we can talk about cooperation between the African and Eurasian investors. Generally, in the age of globalization, cooperation is a basic and necessary condition for the development of cooperation among countries and enhanced the pace of development of the economies of some African countries gives reason to predict the emergence of truly important and profitable joint projects.

It is worth noting that according to the World Bank, in 2013, among the 50 economies that have improved their economic performance since 2005, about a third owned by the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Studies conducted over the past three years also show that Africa today is no longer perceived as a backward region. It becomes an attractive investment and Eurasian countries see it as a place for prospective business.

It is worth noting that the basis for cooperation, for example, Russia and Africa are already actively created. So, in 2014, the visit of the official Russian delegation to Zimbabwe, where they discussed a number of key bilateral agreements designed to provide preferential treatment to investment from Russia. Russian companies interested in developing major infrastructure projects in the African region, primarily in the mining industry, and have the necessary experience, technology and expertise for the development of industrial and infrastructure projects.

Between countries today are considered joint projects that can participate in such major Russian companies as KAMAZ, Russian Railways, ALROSA, Uralvagonzavod and “Inter RAO”. In addition, to the infrastructure of the Russian-African partnership is also planned in other areas, such as automotive, agricultural production, implementation of joint projects in the sphere of development of agriculture, education and tourism.

Specifically, there is an investment in the republic of Ghana “One District, One Factory”. Opportunities to attract investment from the Eurasian countries have in most African States. For example, South Africa is the infrastructure in Zimbabwe and high-tech projects, and Ghana is the implementation of the “One District, One Factory”. All projects are very important for economic development of the African continent. But in each case for the investor is important, and profitability of such projects. For example, for the “One District, One Factory”, each individual plant will be measured from the point of view of expediency of investment of the investor. Here one should not expect miracles, but you need to work on each project with the Eurasian partners.

Q: Do you think potential investors from the Eurasian region face competition for investment projects with other foreign players in Africa?

Cheremnaya: Yes, of course, investors of the Eurasian region are interested in implementation of joint projects. It is worth noting that today for the African continent, plays an increasingly important role in the foreign policy of the developed countries, is real struggle among the major powers of the world. For example, countries such as the United States, England, France, China, and India are gradually increasing its economic and political influence on the African continent. The interest of the developed world to Africa is, of course, largely from the increased need of their industry in the extraction of raw materials, which are present on the continent of Africa.

Furthermore, Africa is still untapped market for technology products and consumer goods. Also other Eurasian countries have interest in the continent; we can hardly compete with the leading world powers. Russian business is very interested in business development and their presence in Africa.
So in the near future can predict the development of the Eurasian-African cooperation in the field of business. In this situation it is necessary to search for effective forms of cooperation that have a solid foundation for the cooperation of business, addressing the goals and objectives of the Eurasian countries and Africa

Q: So these Russian companies such as KAMAZ, Russian Railways, ALROSA, Uralvagonzavod, “Inter RAO”…how do you assess their influence or activities in Africa? What are their levels of operations in Africa? For instance, Russia Railways, how do you measure this company’s success as compared to China in Africa? China has completed railway lines in a number of African cities including Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Cheremnaya: With regard to the participation of Russian companies in infrastructure projects in Africa, they are already there and as I wrote, will increase significantly. So, for example, Russian Railways is increasing its influence and implementation of joint projects in the field of railways, as Africa is actually very poorly developed railway infrastructure.

If we consider the railway infrastructure in Africa, we note, for example that Algeria has an extensive network of railways in the north of the country; the rail infrastructure of Angola was virtually destroyed during years of civil war; in Botswana, Chad, the Gambia and Burundi passenger railways in general no; in Ethiopia, Djibouti, Guinea, Ghana and the Congo, there is one rail that is in poor condition; railroad developed only in Egypt, Kenya, Namibia, Zimbabwe.

There has been much activity in the railway sector in East Africa. From an economic point of view, it is a very profitable business. On the one hand, there is access to global markets and with another – stimulates regional trade. The countries themselves certainly can’t afford to implement such capital intensive projects, so come to the aid of other countries. And if the past is largely in the construction of railways helped the European countries, now in road infrastructure often puts China. Of the ongoing projects, it is worth noting the railway Mombasa – Nairobi to Kigali (Rwanda) and Juba (South Sudan), the road between Addis Ababa and Djibouti. The construction financing deals with Export-Import Bank of China. Except for the road construction, China also supplies and most of the rolling stock, including locomotives.

But the Russian Railways company is also one of the participants of the market of road infrastructure projects in Africa. In particular, the Sudanese government suggested that Russia participate in construction of Trans-African railroad from Dakar (capital of Senegal), in Port Sudan in the Red sea, which would connect many countries from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. In the future, this railway will connect the capital of Senegal, with the port of Djibouti. The management of Russian Railways said that the company is interested in participation in infrastructure projects in Ethiopia. The Russian Railways, in fact, can become a consultant or general contractor of the project in Africa, as the team has the necessary experience and knowledge.

As for the Russian company “KAMAZ” it is necessary to note that “KAMAZ” works in countries on the African continent since the days of the Soviet Union, the machine “Soviet-style” still can be seen on the roads of Africa. The share of the African continent in the global economy in the near future will increase, and the management of “KAMAZ” seeks to take advantage of a favorable situation. The company “MAZ” – the Russian manufacturer of trucks – in November 2016 began to put Africa right-hand drive trucks. While we are talking only about South Africa, but in the future cooperation is planned with countries such as Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Namibia.

However, the Russian production is not always able to compete with the Chinese, because in many areas of work in Africa, China has the best position. But currently, Russia is strengthening its position in Africa, these projects that implement only experienced Russian companies.

Q: How important is Russian Export Center for Africa? Which Russian products “Made in Russia” are being promoted in Africa market currently, again compared to India and China whose various products including consumer goods, pharmacy and automobiles very common in Africa?

Cheremnaya: The importance of the Russian Export Center is difficult to overestimate. Indeed, the Center is doing a great job for development, including the African market. According to the report of the Russian Export Center, export of Russian goods to the African continent increased by more than 50 percent in 2016. In Africa, the demand for Russian goods, while their exports to other countries, by contrast, only falls. Given that the difficult economic situation in Russia contributed to a significant decline in exports in almost all countries of the world, has shrunk by nearly a third to US$129,7 billion and in African countries we are seeing demand growth, contrary to the general trend of demand for Russian goods. The maximum growth of exports showed Algeria (US$556 million), Angola (US$298 million) and Egypt (US$178 million).

It should be noted that the attractiveness of African markets is associated with a low level of competition because the market is actually free for low-end products. As for China, here directly is not a competitor to Russia because Russia is a strong player and China is interested in markets with much greater capacity. For Russia as a country that traditionally exported only raw materials, Africa is a very good place to start. However, we know that African countries are fast growing. So, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts by 2016 economic growth in Tanzania 6%, Zimbabwe 3%, while, for example, in the USA only 2%. That is, for Russia, the African market is very interesting and we can talk about expanding cooperation with African countries to export products “Made in Russia” in various segments.

Q: So what are the key problems and impediments to developing practical and active Russian-African business, especially in the manufacturing and consumer sectors, not theories but real active bilateral economic cooperation? What should be done from both sides, from Russian side and from African side?

Cheremnaya: The problems of effective cooperation between Russia and Africa are political in nature. Thus, the strengthening of Russia’s position leads to the strengthening of its influence in the world, including in Africa and vice versa, sectional policy has significantly reduced Russian exports.

The second problem for the development of Russian-African business is the lack of competitiveness of Russia which allows working only in the low-budget segment. This is due to structural problems in the Russian economy, the need for modernization, the bulk of the products produced during the Soviet Union.
The third problem is the unwillingness of the African market to cooperate, due to the strong backlog of the country in socio-economic aspects, for example, we are talking about the lack of qualified personnel, low standard of living of the population and hence the low effective demand.

The fourth problem is competition from the United States, China and India as more developed countries with more advanced technological solutions, and from the European countries as the former “patrons” of African countries.
However, these barriers can be gradually removed by constant open dialogue between African governments and Russia, as well as directly between interested companies of the two countries. For cooperation with Russia is necessary to develop competitive solutions in terms of infrastructure development and proposals for the supply of consumer goods, as well as the removal of bureaucratic barriers.

African countries need not only steps on the path to economic growth, but also political decision-making directed at improving living standards and increasing the stability of the political and economic systems of African countries which could significantly reduce risks for investing in African projects.

Just before Christmas, it was announced that Mohammed al-Ansi aka Muhammad al-Ansi (ISN 029), a Yemeni prisoner at Guantánamo, had been approved for release by a Periodic Review Board. The decision made al-Ansi the 38th prisoner to be approved for release by a PRB, and the seventh to be approved for release not after a first review, but after a second review. The decision also means that, of the 59 men still held, 23 have been approved for release.

The PRBs — consisting of representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, Justice and Homeland Security, as well as the office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — were set up in 2013 to review the cases of all the prisoners not already approved for release or facing trials, and 64 men have had their cases reviewed, with just 26, to date, having their ongoing imprisonment upheld. That’s a success rate of 59% for the prisoners, which rather undermines the alleged basis of their ongoing imprisonment when the PRBs were set up.

41 of the 64 men had been described as “too dangerous to release” by the previous review process, the Guantánamo Review Task Force that President Obama established shortly after taking office in 2009, even though the task force acknowledged that there was insufficient evidence to put them on trial, while the 23 other men had been recommended for prosecution until the basis for prosecutions largely collapsed under judicial scrutiny. For further information, see my definitive Periodic Review Board list on the Close Guantánamo website.

Al-Ansi had his case reviewed on February 23, 2016, when both his personal representatives (military personnel appointed to help the prisoners with their PRBs) and his attorney at the time, Lisa Strauss, stressed to the board members how al-Ansi has become a prolific and talented artist at Guantánamo, how he has a supportive family and chronic health issues, and how he bears no ill-will towards the United States. It was difficult to square this assessment with the US authorities’ ongoing efforts portray him as one of the so-called “Dirty Thirty,” men seized crossing from Afghanistan to Pakistan in December 2001, who, while mostly young, and mostly recent arrivals in Afghanistan, were unconvincingly portrayed as bodyguards for Osama bin Laden, but he was approved for ongoing detention on March 23, 2016.

A file review — an administrative process guaranteed every six months — took place on September 13, 2016, resulting in the following statement from the board members: “After reviewing relevant new information related to the detainee as well as information considered during the full review, the Board, by consensus, determined that a significant question is raised as to whether the detainee’s continued detention is warranted and therefore an additional full review should be conducted.”

That review took place on December 6, when his recently appointed attorney, Beth Jacob, made representations on his behalf. Jacob works for Kelley Drye & Warren, a national law firm, and stated at the review, “I have represented Mr. al Ansi [since] shortly after the Board’s decision on the initial review; I was not his lawyer at the time of the previous board hearing. I have met and spoken with Mr. al Ansi numerous times in the past year, and also read some of his earlier letters and the files of his case. He has been open and respectful of me in all of our interactions.”

Beth Jacob’s submission to the board also stated:

At our first meeting, Mr. al Ansi paid me the compliment of bringing a selection of his paintings where he has learned art through classes at Guantánamo. We spent the first hour discussing his artwork. After several meetings, he trusted me with his originals, and I showed them to an artist who lives and works in New York City. She was struck by his ability and innate talent, as she has written in her letter to this Board.

Both this artist and Reprieve pointed out that Mr. al Ansi’s art will stand him in good stead if he is deemed transferrable. First, it will give him something to do and a means of expression, in the first days and weeks after his transfer. Second, he will be part of a community of artists, which will provide stability and social contacts. Third, there is the possibility of earnings from his art. But Mr. al Ansi is planning for more practical ways to make a living — he told me he would like a construction job, and among the many classes that he is taking here at GTMO is one about small business.

Beth Jacob also spoke about the importance of al-Ansi’s family, describing him as one of five children, whose “siblings are educated, married and hold responsible jobs,” adding, “Although they grew up in Saudi Arabia, the family now lives in Yemen. But despite the unsettled conditions in Yemen, the al Ansi family still has resources which they are completely willing to use to help their brother start a new life after Guantánamo, as shown by the statements the family submitted to the first board and the panel. His family will be a stabilizing force when he is transferred.”

Jacob also spoke about his health, although a key passage in her submission was redacted. What was clear, however, is that he suffers from “chronic conditions,” and he “knows that managing the chronic conditions take much time, effort and attention, and that he must follow a strict diet and exercise regimen, in addition to his medications.”

Repeated from al-Ansi’s first review was a promise of assistance from The Carter Center, founded by President Carter, and from Reprieve, “through its successful Life After Guantánamo project, which has helped over three dozen former detainees, many of them Yemenis, make the adjustment from Guantánamo to life in society.”

Beth Jacob concluded her submission by stating:

Mr. al Ansi comes before you as someone who has matured during his time in Guantánamo, from a teenage to man who devotes his free tie to art, understands the importance of family, and is confronted with serious medical challenges. He has taken advantage of his years here in taking numerous cases, including learning English. He has been unfailingly polite and gentle in all of his conversations with me, and non-ideological. He is known to the guards as someone who will help mediate disputes — a peacemaker, not a troublemaker. I ask this Board to approve him for transfer.”

In approving his release, in a decision dated December 9, the board members, having determined, by consensus, that “continued law of war detention of the detainee is no longer necessary to protect against a continuing significant threat to the security of the United States,” stated that al-Ansi “demonstrated candor and provided details of his pre-detention activities and mindset, and also noted his efforts to take advantage of opportunities in detention to better himself, including academic, art, and business classes.” They also noted that he “does not appear to be driven to reengage by extremist ideology, has not made statements against the US or Western allies, and … has been mostly compliant in detention.” The board members also “considered the support network available to [him] upon transfer, from family and others, and that [he] has no known familial ties to extremism.”

It is not known if al-Ansi’s approval for release means that he is included in the 17 or 18 men that the New York Times reported last week would be free before President Obama leaves office (and which I wrote about here), but as Carol Rosenberg noted for the Miami Herald, because, by law, “Congress must get 30 days advance notice of a transfer from Secretary of Defense Ash Carter” and “[s]ince December has 31 days, the Pentagon could theoretically have sent transfer notices to Congress as late as Wednesday [December 21] and still arrange military transport from Guantánamo before Inauguration Day.”

I also await further results from the Periodic Review Boards, as the outcome of al-Ansi’s full review maintained a 100% success rate in these second full reviews, when the prisoners are once more interviewed by video link by the board members. Three other men whose ongoing imprisonment was approved by PRBs were, like al-Ansi, granted second full reviews, which have already taken place, although decisions have not yet been taken. The men in question are Moath Hamza Ahmed Al-Alwi (ISN 28), Said Salih Said Nashir (ISN 841) and Uthman Abd al-Rahim Muhammad Uthman (ISN 27). Three other me have also been promised second full reviews after file reviews, although dates have not yet been set for those reviews. These three men are Saifullah Paracha (ISN 1094), Sharqawi Abdu Ali Al Hajj (ISN 1457) and Omar Mohammed Ali Al-Rammah (ISN 1017).

I will be writing more about these reviews soon.

More than 30,000 Rohingya Muslims have already fled and thousands of stateless Rohingya Muslims are trying to reach Bangladesh amid reports of abuse by the Burmese army.

The alleged charges against the Burmese army are very serious – rape, mass slaughter, burning entire villages and loot, all extremely serious human rights violations.

However Bangladesh has not labelled the Rohingyas as refugees and the Bangladeshi establishment is drafting policies to stop the Rohingyas from entering their borders. This has given rise to refugee crisis in Bangladesh.

A United Nations official was recently quoted saying that Myanmar’s western Rakhine (formerly Arakan) State has been witness to Burmese authorities carrying out a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing of Rohingya Muslims with military atrocities continuing in the garb of combating Islamic militants in the region. Thousands of Rohingya Muslims are fleeing the country and entering into Bangladesh to save their clan from getting extinct.

The European Commission is allocating €300,000, equivalent to Tk 24,941,382, to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to Rohingya refugees, who have recently fled from Myanmar to Bangladesh.

“Most of the Rohingya families who have recently crossed the Naaf River have arrived with nothing, and are therefore in critical need of humanitarian assistance,” said Roman Majcher, Head of the European Commission’s humanitarian aid department (ECHO) office in Bangladesh. “The support from the European Commission will not only ensure that their urgent needs are addressed, but will also contribute to help them cope with what they have just gone through by providing them with psychological support.”

The EU-funded financial assistance will focus on immediate relief and assistance to Rohingya refugees in terms of food and nutrition support, as well as the provision of non-food relief items such as sleeping kits, hygiene parcels and warm clothes etc.

The 1.1 million Rohingyas are viewed as one of the world’s most persecuted minorities. Thousands of Rohingya Muslims have been crossing the border for decades to seek refuge in one of several refugee camps near Cox’s Bazaar, a major population centre. However moves to staunch the flow of these migrants continue by the Bangladesh government.

In 1962, after General Ne Win’s Coup, the condition of the Rohingyas worsened. Win’s policy of “Myanmarisation” or racial purity of the Bama ethnic group led to increasing tortures on the Rohingyas. The Burma Citizenship Law (1982), was passed during the Ne Win period wherein the Rohingyas were not listed as one of the country’s 135 “national races” entitled to Burmese citizenship.

The Rohingyas are considered to be illegal immigrants by Bangladesh and there is serious resistance to the Rohingyas mixing with the extant Bangladesh demography.

Aung San Suu Kyi who is considered as the democratic face of Myanmar, has made few statements on the crisis. This is indicative of the tenuous hold on a semblance of democracy that she is maintaining. It is an acknowledged fact that the transition to a democratic set up has been more lip service than anything else, and Suu Kyi is well aware of how quickly things could revert to the earlier military ‘junta’ that ruled over Myanmar for decades and still maintain a stranglehold over politics in the country.

The military still controls the key Ministries of Home Affairs, Border Affairs and Defence with activists like Suu Kyi playing minor roles in decision making processes. Owing her well known public persona, it is convenient to keep her as the facade for international interactions such as those with President Obama. This gives a tinge of legitimacy to the state of affairs in Myanmar today, which was under crippling sanctions by the international community during the rule of the military junta.

Theorizing Mediatized Conflict as in the case of Rohingya Muslims is an arduous task since there is a very thin line between fact and fiction shown on television news these days. With the commercialisation of the broadcast industry and the entry of corporate houses in mainstream media world, profit making and not ethical news reporting has become the new motive.

Profits are made through sensationalism for which often catchy headlines and news production with images, animations and dramatic recreation of events are used for higher TRP’s. This negative role of media today however is a new characteristic feature of the news industry. Ethical journalism has been replaced by sensational breaking news and exclusive phenomenon.

But the media often referred to as the fourth estate is a powerful tool that can bring about great revolutionary changes in the society.

Conversely, as is evident from the case of beheading cited above, the media’s reach can negatively impact a sensitive society such as Myanmar, with instant reprisals coming forth to the already beleaguered Rohingya community. It is this inherent fear that is stopping the Rohingya Muslims from interacting with the reporters.

In a bid to legitimize its actions in the international media the Burmese authorities have labelled the Rohingyas as jihadists. With increasing focus on the radical Islamic threat in the west, this is a subtle subterfuge to shift the pivot of media attention from the serious humanitarian crisis facing the Rohingyas; being denied food, medical aid and the right to live in dignity in the conflict torn zone, the Rohingyas are staring at extermination in the presence of a couldn’t care (or wouldn’t care) less world.

In a world torn by conflicts perceived as much more serious and apocalyptic, it seems the plight of the Rohingya Muslims has taken a back burner. When reporting from a conflict zone results in barbarous beheadings, then it is high time the world stood up and took notice of what is going on. Highlighting the case of the downtrodden still remains an important facet of media reporting. When their actions result in such extreme reactions, it becomes imperative to do something about it.

The risk of flooding in the United States is changing regionally, and the reasons could be shifting rainfall patterns and the amount of water in the ground.

In a new study, University of Iowa engineers determined that, in general, the threat of flooding is growing in the northern half of the U.S. and declining in the southern half. The American Southwest and West, meanwhile, are experiencing decreasing flood risk.

UI engineers Gabriele Villarini and Louise Slater compiled water-height information between 1985 and 2015 from 2,042 stream gauges operated by the U.S. Geological Survey. They then compared the data to satellite information gathered over more than a dozen years by NASA’s Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment (GRACE) mission showing “basin wetness,” or the amount of water stored in the ground.

What they found was the northern sections of the country, generally, have an increased amount of water stored in the ground, and thus are at greater risk for minor and moderate flooding, two flood categories used by the National Weather Service. Meanwhile, minor to moderate flood risk was decreasing in the southern portions of the U.S., where stored water has declined. (See the above map.)

Not surprisingly, the NASA data showed decreased stored water–and reduced flood risk–in the Southwest and western U.S., in large part due to the prolonged drought gripping those regions.

“It’s almost like a separation where generally flood risk is increasing in the upper half of the U.S. and decreasing in the lower half,” said Villarini, associate professor in civil and environmental engineering and an author on the paper, published in the journal Geophysical Research Letters. “It’s not a uniform pattern, and we want to understand why we see this difference.”

Some of the regional variation can be attributed to changes in rainfall; a study led by Villarini published last year showed the Midwest and Plains states have experienced more frequent heavy rains in the past half-century. More rainfall leads to more groundwater, a “higher water base line,” Villarini explained.

“The river basins have a memory,” added Slater, a post-doctoral researcher and the paper’s corresponding author. “So, if a river basin is getting wetter, in the Midwest for example, your flood risk is also probably increasing because there’s more water in the system.”

Why some sections of the nation are getting more, or less, rainfall is not entirely clear. The researchers say some causes could be the rains are being redistributed as regional climate changes.

The researchers hope that their findings could revise how changing flood patterns are communicated. In the past, flood risk trends have typically been discussed using stream flow, or the amount of water flowing per unit time. The UI study views flood risk through the lens of how it may affect people and property and aligns the results with National Weather Service terminology understood by the general public.

“The concept is simple,” said Villarini, whose primary appointment is in IIHR-Hydroscience, a branch of the College of Engineering. “We’re measuring what people really care about.”

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said goodbye to staff and Permanent Representatives at United Nations Headquarters in New York, saying that though he had delivered many speeches over his decade in office, he had but two important words for those gathered to wish him well: “thank you.”

Thanking staff and delegations for their “hard work [and] leadership for humanity,” Mr. Ban said that he had been motivated by this commitment and that he was “proud to call you my colleagues.”

Citing sustainable development, climate change, gender empowerment and youth, among the issues that had been at the top of his agenda, he urged the enthusiastic gathering to “keep believing [and] working hard” to achieve the noble goals of the UN, and to be a “voice for the voiceless.”

“It has been a privilege to serve the world’s people. And it has been an honour to serve with you and all our partners – including Member States, civil society, and many more,” he stated.

For his last day in office, Mr. Ban will serve as a special guest tomorrow at the annual New Year’s Eve celebration in Times Square, joining New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio to push the Waterford crystal button and lead the sixty second countdown to the New Year.

Approximately one million revellers are expected to fill the fabled Square, joined by over 198 million Americans and more than one billion television viewers worldwide who will ring in the New Year watching the historic Times Square New Year’s Eve Ball Drop, according to the event organizers.

Mr. Ban’s last day in office will be the culmination of a decade of service at the helm of the United Nations, during which he sought to mobilize world leaders around a set of new global challenges, from climate change and economic upheaval to pandemics and increasing pressures involving food, energy and water. In addition, he has sought to be a bridge-builder, to give voice to the world’s poorest and most vulnerable people, and to strengthen the Organization itself.

Mr. Ban began his first term as Secretary-General on 1 January 2007, and was unanimously re-elected by the General Assembly to a second term on 21 June 2011.

He will be succeeded on 1 January 2017 by António Guterres, of Portugal, who was formally appointed by the UN General Assembly on 13 October.

(RFE/RL) — The governor of the Turkish city of Istanbul has said at least 35 people were killed and about 40 injured when an armed attacker struck a nightclub early on January 1.

Governor Vasip Sahin told journalists that a single gunman carried out the attack, which he labeled a “terrorist” incident.

The NTV television channel reported that police and numerous ambulances are at the Club Reina in the city’s Besiktas district.

According to some media reports, the attacker was dressed in Santa Claus outfits when he entered the club and opened fire.

Media were reporting that least 500 people and as many as 800 were in the club at the time of the attack. Some partygoers reportedly jumped into the Bosporus Strait to escape the gunfire.

Security was high as the city was celebrating New Year’s. In Istanbul, some 17,000 police were reportedly on duty.

Daesh in Syria have cut off the water supply from two pumping stations on the Euphrates to the east of the city of Aleppo, which was recently liberated from militants.

The blockage occurred on Friday, prompting Aleppo’s Water Organization, Syria’s Red Crescent Society, and local residents to look for ways to restore the water supply to the city.

Rebel groups in Syria have resorted to cutting off water supplies to different residential areas in an apparent bid to retaliate battlefield losses.

On Thursday, the United Nations warned that four million people in the Syrian capital city of Damascus had been deprived of safe drinking water supplies for over a week after springs outside the city were deliberately contaminated by militants.

Water supplies from the Wadi Barada and Ain al-Fija springs to the northwest of Damascus, which served 70 percent of the population in the city, were cut after water facilities were deliberately targeted and damaged, the UN announced in a statement.

Syrian officials had earlier detected diesel contamination in the water piped to the capital and had cut supplies over safety concerns.

According to the UN, 15 million people across Syria are in need of help to access water and households spend nearly a quarter of their income on water.

In a separate development on Friday, the Syrian government forces found a cache of US-manufactured weapons worth of millions of dollars in eastern Aleppo, Russian media reported. The weapons had been sent to the rebel fighters in hundreds of boxes disguised as humanitarian aid, the reports said.

An evacuation deal brokered by Russia and Turkey recently saw militants move from the east of the city — which had been held by armed groups for four years — to designated areas in the Idlib Governorate. As the evacuations were underway, the Syrian government said that trucks meant to deliver humanitarian aid to the area under the auspices of international organizations had to be inspected. Some of those organizations, however, denied inspections.

Last week, a Syrian army unit also discovered a major cache loaded with a considerable amount of munitions in an Aleppo neighborhood. The military later released footage of the weapons depot.

On Friday, the Syrian army announced a nationwide halt to fighting under a deal with the foreign-backed opposition. The ceasefire, also brokered by Russia and Turkey, does not apply to Daesh and Fateh al-Sham terrorist groups.

Over the past almost six years, Syria has been fighting foreign-sponsored militancy. UN Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura estimated in August that more than 400,000 people had been killed in the Syrian crisis until then. The UN has stopped its official casualty count in Syria, citing its inability to verify the figures it receives from various sources.

Original source

By Todd Royal

In number 51 of the Federalist Papers, James Madison writes, “If Men were angels no government would be necessary.” A strikingly similar sentiment to thousands of years ago when the Jewish prophet Jeremiah said, “The heart of man is exceedingly wicked, who can know its evil ways.”

The world, led by the West has tried appeasement, isolationism, and moral equivalence to avoid war; instead of a Cold War type of coalition that President Harry Truman began to check the Soviet Union. We are reaching a precipice where ISIS is still thriving, Aleppo is in ruins, Crimea was annexed, Ukraine was invaded, and the world does nothing.

This view that appeasement and minding your own business will make troubles and problems go away is naïve at best, and a precursor to the beginning of World War III at worse. Somewhere in between is a world where billions are still living under dictators with no hope in sight.

Where are the words of Kennedy, Reagan, and Walesa crying for even one soul living under deplorable conditions? They are nowhere to be seen or heard from these days. If the world doesn’t wake up, and leave its listless slumber, then the echoes of 1933 will be replaced by a Russia-Chinese-Iranian axis that will make the previous axis look small in comparison. No more commerce, no more globalization, no more growth thru fiscal or monetary policy dominating the front pages of our news – wars that we have never seen, or imagined – will take over our lives and our countries.

It is time for the world to arise, and that’s why the world needs to be strong again for individual freedom, national sovereignty, functioning governments, and begin to check and aggressively retaliate against this decade’s axis of evil: Russia, China, and Iran. Those three menaces are now leading the world in terrorism, environmental degradation, and hegemonic behavior in the fragile Middle East.

International relations expert Professor Robert D. Kaufman of Pepperdine University’s School of Public Policy, speaking on China’s own bid for hegemony, says: “East Asia is the most important power center of the 21^st century.” Sage words, yet the U.S. has its Asian allies very worried after doing nothing when China brazenly stole US military hardware outside Subic Bay, near the Philippines in international waters.

US and allied restraint doesn’t endear the Chinese to the West, but only encourages more outlandish, provocative behavior. Asian allies should be more than worried, and prudence calls for Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines to consider their own positions with China while pursuing larger military budgets that include a nuclear deterrence.

And the world further better wake up to the fact that China has their own proxy, North Korea, more dangerous than Iran’s proxies – Hamas and Hezbollah – that have caused nothing but misery and destruction. North Korea, with China’s blessing, now has a nuclear arsenal capable of reaching Europe and North America. The world needs a strong response to China. That is the only thing Beijing will understand.

What appeasement also does is not assess your enemies through the lens of deterrence, balance of power, and a vibrant NATO coalition that should have stood up to Putin years ago. Simply put, “Putin is not our friend.” To think otherwise is laudable for the amount of foolish thinking that requires.

He’s a bloodthirsty, greedy, former KGB colonel who was never going to let democracy and rule of law thrive in his country. The Russians made a Faustian bargain of so-called security for autocratic rule. Now, mob-like conditions exist, and you are either a billionaire autocrat with the Kremlin’s blessing, or you are an exile who at some point has spoken out against this regime’s criminal behavior like Garry Kasparov.

But does the world care? It sure seems we do at this point.

Why the North Koreans are so dangerous is the very reason the Iranians become more and more dangerous. Another Faustian bargain here though, that if a Western country gives enough money and incentives, rogue regimes will stop their bad actions. Nothing could be further from the truth, whether it’s the North Koreans or the Iranians. Agreements, deals, or even cold, hard cash will never change these regimes. They only understand the barrel of a gun or an aircraft carrier knocking at their doorstep.

That’s the cold, hard, ugly reality of geopolitics. You don’t have friends, only interests that align and the willingness to enforce behaviors that lead to individual freedom and thriving economic markets. That is usually it, and moreover believing a nation is nothing more than interest is better left for the religious, and not the astute nation that wants a winnable peace.

The Iranians haven’t changed their ways since the P5 +1 agreement, if anything, they have gotten worse; and now the UN solidifies their actions by saying it is okay for them to build nuclear submarines since 99 U.S. Senators voted to resume sanctions. The Europeans were incorrect in the early 1930s about the threats they faced, and they are wrong now. The world needs strength, not capitulation.

What’s more worrisome than the activities of China, Russia, and Iran is how leading Western voices, such as the eminent President for the Council on Foreign Relations; Richard N. Haas continue to misunderstand the threats the world is currently facing.

Mr. Haas recently wrote a beautiful article titled, “The Case for Sovereign Obligation.” He writes movingly about how the world needs to come together in what he affirms as World Order 2.0. A world “That includes not only the rights of sovereign states but also those states’ obligations to others.” The Peace of Westphalia, international order, and responsibility to protect (R2P) with all three sovereign doctrines speaks of an:

“Obligation a government has to its own citizens that, if ignored, are supposedly enforceable by other states through measures up to and including military intervention.”

Mr. Haas should be commended for writing these words from such a prestigious institution, but they don’t address how do you intend to make China, Russia, and Iran live up to these heightened, lofty ideals? The Council on Foreign Relations has written repeatedly on the nobility of the P5 +1 agreement, and how it is working when in reality it isn’t. Who doesn’t want the agreement with North Korea and Iran to work and avoid bloodshed? Any sane, rational person – that’s who.

But what our pre, during, and post-World War II order taught us are regimes bent on destruction only understand force, and winning the peace is key, not half-measures, or haughty Westphalian orders without mechanism to ensure adherence. This current order is unraveling, and when sometime allies – Turkey and Russia – have broken trust, as witnessed by the assassination of the Russian ambassador to Turkey, then bloody responses will be in order.

What a connected global world has done is to illuminate apathy and hypocrisy by the West, and free forming societies in Asia. Enemies of freedom and order are using globalization to spread their malicious influence. Unless the West finds the words of Churchill when he said: “We sleep safely at night because rough men stand ready to visit violence on those who would harm us,” then unabated violence will continue.

If the free world doesn’t begin to reflect those values, and back them up with at least the threat of force, then more Aleppos will be laid to waste. And next time, who’s to say the cities won’t be Paris, New York, or Tokyo. Beijing, Tehran and Moscow would only be too happy to make that a reality. We can no longer say we don’t know, or understand the threats now facing free people.

The opinions, beliefs, and viewpoints expressed by the authors are theirs alone and don’t reflect any official position of Geopoliticalmonitor.com, where this article was published.

By N. Sathiya Moorthy

Every time Maldives is in an Indian discourse, question arises if the larger neighbour should go beyond incremental improvements in bilateral relations. In time of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the refrain should be to prefer ‘surgical strikes’, but of a positive kind.

The question arises if PM Modi should consider going ahead with his proposed March 2015 visit to Maldives when smaller neighbour was going through early signs of domestic rife. One and half years down the line, there is no expectation of a ‘better time’ to arrive on the Maldivian domestic front, after making a few things clear to his hosts.

Today, there is no hope of ‘normalcy’ returning to Maldivian politics before the November 2018 presidential polls. It could prolong, not get shortened, in the current course. By hind sight, a timely visit in March 2015 as part of the unprecedented four-nation Indian Ocean tour by any Indian PM could help matters even on Maldivian domestic front.

Conventional wisdom dictated that VVIP visits from foreign nations could be politically misleading. In India-Maldivian relations it has been more so. The Maldivian scheme also did not provide for toning down domestic content ahead of the planned Modi visit. It did not help matters, either.

As subsequent developments showed, a trial court in Maldives sat through the night on a Friday, a public holiday in the Sunni-Islamic nation, to pronounce verdict in ‘Judge Abdulla abduction case’. The court sentenced former President Mohammed ‘Anni’ Nasheed to 13 years in prison, but through a controversial application of anti-terrorism act, ready to be replaced with a new piece of legislation. Had India stuck to the original plans, PM Modi would have been in Maldives around the time.

Even without the timing of the verdict, the domestic tensions arising out of the Nasheed arrest and a fast-tracked trial could have led to the choking of the narrow streets of capital Male, when the Indian visitor arrived. Already, there has been heightened reports of ISIS activities involving Maldivian nationals, though outside the country.

As independent Indian investigations showed, Maldivian ISIS activists had also been assigned to target American and Israeli diplomatic assets in the south Indian cities of Chennai and Bengaluru. For three or four years earlier, intermittent reports spoke of Maldivians fighting the terror-war against the US-led forces on Af-Pak border.

No winners…

In context, question arises if India should seek to balance its larger and long-term interests in the region against value-based politics of the democracy kind, that is being continuously fought in Maldives. More importantly, an early Indian politico-diplomatic facilitation by India under the circumstances prevailing in the first quarter of 2015 could mean that the Maldivian domestic issues might not have blown up on the nation’s face.

Today, there are no winners in Maldives. Everyone, including India, seems to be a loser – at least over the short and medium term. The long-term is built on the gains/losses of the other two. The political Opposition, first confined mostly to Nasheed’s MDP, and more recently, Yameen’s PPM faction led by half-brother and former President, Maumoon Gayoom, have lost even more.
Yameen himself cannot claim to have won flatly. Gone for instance are the days when an incumbent leader in an ‘isolated’ nation in the Indian Ocean could hope to win successive elections without any serious competition. Gayoom did so for 30 long years. He lost when he lost touch with emerging GenX realities in the ‘communication era’ that did not leave Maldives alone or aside.

Yameen’s case is no different. He is now hoping to win the 2018 elections through a popular mandate based on development works that he has initiated. There is a lesson in neighbouring Sri Lanka, which Maldivians follow closely. Former Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa went beyond the war-victory over the globally-dreaded LTTE, but his ‘development agenda’ could not still win him re-election in January 2015.

National self-interest

It’s not about who wins or loses the presidential polls or any other in Maldives. It’s about India’s own ‘national self-interest’. It can be achieved, and ever more successfully, only through two or three clear initiatives and positives. Broadly-speaking, it comprises issues of democracy, development and security/strategic concerns, not necessary in that order

All of India’s smaller neighbours near-eternally require development funds. As with democracy, the aspirations of their peoples are also increasing in this era of IT connectivity and social media. Hence, the need for successive governments in these neighbourhood nations to whichever source that is ready to fund their developmental aspirations.

India’s concerns are not about the neighbourhood nations’ initiatives and preparedness to accept development funding from wherever, whenever. It has clearly understood that other nations cannot afford to wait until India became economically strong enough to support their developmental plans.
Instead, India’s concerns are about the real intent of the funding party/agency vis a vis India’s own geo-strategic concerns in bilateral security concerns. India’s internal security is also an issue. In the Cold War era it concerned the US presence in the neighbourhood in more ways than one. In the post-Cold War era, it’s about China, which is more immediate a neighbour and also a threat.

Island for China

Only players have changed. In Indian context, positions and posturing have remained the same. If it was US seeking a naval base in neighbouring Sri Lanka during the Cold War era, now it’s about China extending and expanding its reach faster.

It’s another matter that India looked at issues with a differentiated approach, considering that it shared a 4,000-km disputed border with China, yet cannot expend continually on modernising and refurbishing its military and strategic defences. According to reports, India is the second largest importer of arms and armaments, next only to Saudi Arabia. The only consolation from the economic stand-point is that the Indian imports cost a third of the Saudi spending of $ 90-b plus in a few years’ time.

In Maldivian context, China is building the eye-catching Male-Hulhule sea-bridge, connecting the capital city to the airport-island. China had evinced interest in acquiring real estate on the Indian periphery. It succeeded in Sri Lanka and Maldives almost simultaneously.

Alongside negotiating to buy 80-85 percent of the stakes in the Hambantota port project in Sri Lanka, a Chinese company has been given a 50-year lease of the Feydhoo Finolhu Island in Maldives for $ 4 million. Interestingly, it’s the nearest uninhabited island to capital Male and the international airport, and was in the occupation of the police welfare company.

Feydhoo Finolhu is one of the 11 islands and two lagoons short-listed for leasing out, to promote tourism and other economic activities, according to Tourism Minister Moosa Zameer. From a Maldivian perspective, every Government over the past decades has sold the ‘family silver’ likewise to domestic or foreign entities to make the economy work.

The Nasheed leadership, promising to be different, did not do anything of the kind either. It’s anybody’s guess, how long this game would go one, or when it would end. But when the latter happens, Maldives could collapse as an economy, as it would have nothing more to look for, having got used to living of the inheritance far too long.

But it’s India that should be concerned, if not outright worried. It cannot stall Chinese or any other ‘economic intrusion’ in the neighbourhood without having the economic wherewithal, continuing commitment and extended vision of the self. If it came to that, it may have to make sacrifices nearer home, to ensure that the aspirations of the neighbourhood did not have to find external/extra-regional sources to fund their relatively smaller aspirations.

It also goes to the credit of China now, and of the US during the ‘Cold War’ years that they could use their diplomatic muscle to ensure that their ‘client State’, if any, in the Indian neighbourhood did not suffer international humiliation or harassment beyond a point. China does not care for democracy or human rights even in third nations of interest to its geo-strategic concern.

The US has made circumventing the same into a fine-art and making the rest of the world that it was right, whichever way it has chosen. Both have veto-votes in the UN Security Council (UNSC) that they do not think twice to use in favour of a nation, big or small, that they need as badly as the other way round.

India is not a member of the UNSC, and that’s again another grey area that the rulers in India’s neighbourhood are not always comfortable with. More importantly, India’s ‘commitment’ to the cause of ‘autocratic rulers’ in the neighbourhood, and/or arguing their case without losing space, foothold and ground in those nations, have remained unclear and unsure.

It’s another area that India needs to work on. Maldives is no exception. It’s one area from where India can begin working on, with all three or short, medium and long terms in mind. In doing so, India needs to consider if it would be satisfied with another piece of ‘real-estate’ in these nations, as is now being promised in Sri Lanka at eastern Trincomallee for developing a special economic zone, or would not want any third nation (corporate or government) to get involved, in such shady deals of whatever kind.

By Akanksha Narain*

Donald Trump’s unexpected victory has not only shocked the world but is also likely to shake up US foreign policy.

While Trump’s unpredictability, campaign rhetoric and unclear foreign policy stance have left analysts and policymakers confused, there are enough hints that indicate significant change in US foreign policy towards Southeast Asia.

US Foreign Policy under President Obama

US’ role in Southeast Asia has been that of a net security provider, both through partnerships and alliances. The ASEAN region is the US’ fourth largest trading partner and a significant receiver of foreign direct investment. Despite an aggressive and powerful China overshadowing the smaller and militarily weaker Southeast Asian economies, they have been growing rapidly.

The Obama administration’s ‘pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific entailed increasing US influence in the region through new trade partnerships, free trade agreements (FTA), defence agreements, and establishing new security partners, like Vietnam. It also featured a growing US proximity to countries like India to act as a counter-balance to China in the region.

An End to TPP: Economic Fallout of Trade Protectionism

The president-elect’s rhetoric of “America First” and “Make America Great Again” seeks to shift US focus from external commitments to domestic politics. It is Trump’s belief that the country’s people and economy, among other things, have been losing out to trade deals that favour others at the cost of domestic economy. Similarly, military and security commitments abroad, be it with Japan or South Korea, are draining the US of its precious economic resources. Consequently, Trump, during his election campaign, promised to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and to make other countries also the shoulder economic burden of protecting them.

The likely economic and strategic fallout of Trump’s future Southeast Asian policy is manifold. Stricter trade protectionism, including withdrawing from TPP, will negatively impact Southeast Asia. The resulting higher tariffs will affect the countries that rely on the US for their export revenue. Vietnam earns US$ 30.5 billion from its exports to the US and, according to Deutsche Bank, Singapore may stand to lose close to 30 per cent of its export revenue. Further, any change in immigration policy, as suggested by Trump, would mean great losses for the Philippines. Currently, nearly 4 million Filipinos reside in the US and their remittances significantly contribute to Philippines’ GDP.

The impact will not be limited to Southeast Asia – the US itself will lose out on any potential gains from a FTA with the region. According to Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, TPP is “an unmistakable indicator of region’s confidence in the USA.” The decision to dishonour its commitment will shake the region’s confidence in the US. Additionally, any trade barriers imposed on China by the US will trigger reciprocity, and trade wars will be detrimental not only to the US and China but also to Southeast Asia.

US’ Retreat: Strategic and Social Costs

Shifting greater cost for providing security to other countries will heavily hit Southeast Asia as increased military expenditure will come at the cost of infrastructure development and social welfare. Trump’s decision to move towards isolationism and reducing external engagements will also leave a power vacuum in Southeast Asia, which an expansionist China would quickly fill. With the US and TPP out of the picture, China-backed regional free trade agreements, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), would augment China’s influence in Southeast Asia.

The inroads made by China at a time of a retreating US, however, will not bring stability to the region. With Trump planning to reduce its presence in the Asia-Pacific, the smaller states will lose out on their negotiating power with China. The region may be forced to appease China at a time when a number of ASEAN countries are also embroiled in territorial disputes with it. Philippine President Rodrigo Détente’s rapprochement with China despite a raging territorial conflict is a case in point.

Lastly, the US has also played the role of moral police in the ASEAN region. It imposed sanctions on Myanmar during the brutal rule of the junta government, which are now being lifted as it makes its way to becoming a democracy. The Obama administration has time and again also expressed concern over the plight of Rohingya Muslims, human slave camps, and fishing boats in neighbouring Thailand and Malaysia. Moreover, it was during a US investigation that the alleged role of Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak, in amassing disproportionate wealth, was uncovered. Without the significant presence of the US in the region there are not many other countries that can flex their muscles on such issues. Therefore, it makes sense why the region’s authoritarian leaders like Cambodia’s Hun Sen or Thailand’s General Prayuth Chan-ocha and the Malaysian PM have welcomed Trump’s election.

What Next?

If the US were to indeed reduce its economic and military presence in the region, ASEAN countries will have to look to other trading and alliance partners such as the European Union, Australia, India, China, and Japan. The question that remains is: will they be able to fill the US’ big shoes and bring stability to the region?

* Akanksha Narain
Consultant, Centre for Media and Strategic Studies, New Delhi

In continuation of the previous month’s positive performance, Pakistan’s external trade showed improvement in November 2016 exports amounting to US$1.76 billion, exhibiting a reversal from the consistent monthly downward trend seen this year. The textiles and clothing sector, which constitutes more than 60% of the country’s exports also picked up its pace, rising 9.7%YoY to US$1.05 billion during the month under review.

This growth was broad-based recovery in both low value (+15.6%YoY) and value-added segments (+7.6%YoY). However, on a cumulative basis, 5MFY17 textile exports were still lower at US$5.13 billion.

Going forward, analysts expect textile exports to largely remain under pressure due to: 1) demand side bottlenecks with weak Chinese demand outlook and economic slowdown in the EU following Brexit, 2) lower currency competitiveness amid sharp depreciation in regional currencies and 3) low commodity prices.

That said, the sector anxiously awaits the yet to be announced incentive package estimated at around Rs75 billion by the Government of Pakistan (GoP). This package is aimed at enhancing export competitiveness over regional countries and providing relief to the textile sector.

Moreover, encouraging cotton arrivals to date for MY17 (up 12.33%YoY to 10.14 million bales) is expected to reduce the cotton shortfall next year.

Performance of the value added sector posted growth with Knitwear, Readymade garments and Bedwear registering double digit growth. Moreover, the low valued added segment depicted a commendable recovery after a consistent decline this year, where the exports of cotton yarn increased by 42.1%YoY/10.3%MoM. However, on a cumulative basis, textile exports after recovery still remained unimpressive with 5MFY17 exports recording a decline of 2.0%YoY.

According to the fortnightly cotton arrivals report of PCGA, a total of 10.14 million bales arrived in the country by mid-December this year as against 9.03 million bales last year, up 12.33%YoY. Arrivals from Punjab increased by 19.38%YoY to 6.44 million bales, while flows from Sindh increased marginally by 1.86%YoY to 3.70 million.

Initially the GoP had fixed the target of cotton for MY17 around 14 million bales, which was later slashed to less than 11 million bales. In an attempt to ensure ample availability of cotton in the country, the GoP has also lifted the ban on cotton from India.

Going forward, any substantial increase in the export of textiles and clothing seems unlikely amid emerging: 1) concerns on low currency competitiveness following sharp decline in regional currencies, 2) risk of potential decline in exports to European Union post Brexist and 3) sluggish Chinese demand.

The added irritants are disruptions in the supply of electricity and gas, despite high tariffs. It appears as if the Ministry of Textiles, Ministry of Commerce and Trade Development Authority of Pakistan (TAP) seems to have gone into complete hibernation.

On January 1, 1988, just a year and a half before he passed away on June 3, 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini made a historic move, reaching out the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, in a gesture of anti-imperialist solidarity, despite the long hiatus in relations with communist Russia. This was at a time of war against Iraq and continued subversion of Iran by the US and Israel. He sent President Gorbachev his only written message to a foreign leader.

Ayatollah Khomeini made other prescient gestures in his short and difficult decade as the leader of the Islamic revolution in Iran; in the first place, the transfer of the Israeli embassy to Palestinian representatives, the canceling of recognition of Israel, and the inauguration of al-Quds Day as an annual international holiday on the last Friday of Ramadan. He met with Fidel Castro and other third world leaders, encouraging solidarity against the imperialist foe.

The unprecedented visit of the Iranian delegation to Moscow was a sincere offer of support to the faltering Soviet leader, who had rejected the atheism of the Soviet past. It contrasts with the treatment of Gorbachev’s new friend, Reagan, who was at the same time conspiring to subvert the Soviet Union, even as Gorbachev was sincerely reaching out to the hawkish Reagan, offering a generous plan of world nuclear disarmament.

The Ayatollah’s warning not to trust the West was being brought home to Gorbachev graphically as the last Soviet troops were retreating into Uzbekistan in 1988. Despite the unilateral withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the US was continuing to arm the insurgents, killing those doomed soldiers as they crossed the Afghanistan-Uzbekistan Friendship Bridge, built in 1982. Imperialism takes no prisoners.

Iran played no part in the US-backed ‘jihad’ in Afghanistan in the 1980s that brought the collapse of the Soviet Union. Iranian leaders knew that nothing good would come from working in alliance with America.

The Ayatollah knew this well, and was alarmed at the naiveté of Gorbachev. The Ayatollah warned in his letter that the western world was an “illusory heaven”, that appeared seductive. But the truth lies elsewhere. “If you hope, at this juncture, to cut the economic Gordian knots of socialism and communism by appealing to the center of western capitalism, you will, far from remedying any ill of your society, commit a mistake which those to come will have to erase. For, if Marxism has come to a deadlock in its social and economic policies, capitalism has also bogged down, in this as well as in other respects though in a different form.”

Gorbachev was offended and objected. “This invitation is an interference in the internal issue of a country. Because every country is free for selecting its school of thought.” He took the Ayatollah’s sincere advice as interference, rather than friendly concern. “Imam Khomeini invited us to Islam; do we have to invite him to our school of thought?”

History has proved the fears that the Ayatollah expressed justified. Gorbachev was standing on the edge of the abyss. Sadly, he scoffed at the ability of the Ayatollah to see the danger and to want to help him. But it was too late by then. Gorbachev had lost control, thinking he was handing power to the people, not recognizing that such a wish was another illusion. The disaster of the collapse of the Soviet Union will reverberate for generations to come, as the Ayatollah predicted.

Gorbachev was operating on a different wavelength when he received the letter from the Ayatollah, trying to cozy up to Israel and the US, again, naively thinking goodwill gestures would be reciprocated. He opened the doors to the emigration of Soviet Jews in 1988 and prepared to renew full diplomatic relations with Israel.

At the same time Gorbachev promised Arafat during a state visit that year that the Soviet Union would recognize an independent Palestinian state if proclaimed, naively hoping that Israel would show gratitude for his generosity by negotiating a genuine peace with the Palestinians. Arafat declared independence in November 1988 and got Soviet recognition the next year, but it was not much consolation. Israel was busy setting up consular offices in Moscow and elsewhere, issuing eventually a million visas to Soviet Jews to come to Israel.

Hundreds of thousands of Russian Jews got instant Israeli citizenship and emigrated, many of them settling illegally in the Occupied Territories, nominally part of a Soviet-recognized Palestinian state. By the end of 1991 when full diplomatic relations with Israel were restored, over 325,000 Soviet Jews had emigrated. Gorbachev’s hope to bring a quick peace to the Middle East were dashed as he was ousted from power, leaving the PLO abandoned and Israel stronger than ever.

Just as the Zionists had hoodwinked Stalin into recognizing Israel, they once again hoodwinked a Soviet leader into re-recognizing it. Instead of increasing Soviet/Russian influence by this dual recognition, all influence was lost, the Palestinians were hurt by the Soviet betrayal, while the Israelis welcomed a million new Jewish immigrants.

Gorbachev’s trust was betrayed by both the US and Israel; the Soviet Union collapsed as Soviet Jews fled to the illusory western heaven. The world logically expected a new era free of the threat of war, a peace dividend that would improve the lot of people everywhere, ensuring that the material imperative behind war was eliminated. But the triumph of empire has never led to an end to empire, and strengthening empire has never led to improving the lot of the periphery.

This was clear in the centuries of imperialism, where the periphery was impoverished at the expense of the center. There was no reason to believe a new Great Game of empire could be any different, even Bush I’s postmodern variant, with the US firmly in control. Indeed, the impoverishment of all who are not part of the center/periphery elite has only accelerated.

Today, the US continues to work with the Saudis to destabilize the Iran-Iraq ‘Shia arc’ replaying the endgame against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, this time with clandestine operations being carried out by the US, Saudis and Israelis—all jealous of Iran’s increasing influence in the Middle East.

US support for Islamists continues to haunt the region, notably in Syria, even as US power ebbs. Following the uprisings in the Arab world in early 2011, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev suggested that the revolts in the Arab world were sparked by outside forces scheming to undermine Russia. “I won’t call any names but a whole range of countries, even those we have friendly relations with, have nevertheless been involved in terrorism in the [Russian] Caucasus.”

In the ideological vacuum created by the collapse of communism, two Russian ideologies have arisen—Atlantism and Eurasianism, both with roots in the nineteenth century, the latter, a geopolitical reaction to the decadence of the West, articulated persuasively by Nikolai Trubetskoi and Lev Gumilev in the mid-1920s and today by Alexander Dugin.

Russia and Iran are already playing key roles in establishing this new reality, building on the first step taken by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1988. The world’s problems will only be solved based on a new geopolitical reality with Russia and Iran at its heart, the kernel of truth in the Ayatollah’s historic gesture in 1988.

American Herald Tribune

With less than a month before Donald Trump’s assumption of power as US’s next president, Iran’s ‘waiting game’ is more than a passive observer of the changing guards at the White House and, indeed, reflects the proactive elements of an “active diplomacy” that draws on the contributions of public diplomacy as well as “indirect diplomacy” through third parties, such as Europe, Turkey, and the European Union.

There is, of course, a great deal of uncertainty about the Trump administration and its Iran policy, which is difficult to predict as a result of “mixed signals” garnered from both Trump’s own policy statements, such as on the priority of fighting ISIS terrorism, shared with Iran, as well as from Trump’s foreign policy team that, so far, reflects an uneasy combination of hawks and doves.  Thus, whereas Trump’s choice of pragmatic Rex Tillerson as the Secretary of State bodes well for the lofty objective of US-Iran dialogue and even rapprochement, unfortunately the same cannot be said about Trump’s national security team, headed by hawkish Mike Flynn, better known for his hawkish Iranophobic and Islamophobic positions that sow fear among some mainstream Republican politicians, who are nonetheless somewhat comforted by Trump’s pick of James Mattis, as the Secretary of Defense, in light of Mattis’s more nuanced foreign policy approach.  The big question is, of course, who will Trump listen to first and foremost when it comes to Iran, and whether or not Trump will have a coherent Iran policy, instead of an incoherent and ‘Janus-faced’ policy featuring a bifurcated approach that, perhaps simultaneously, pushes the arch of confrontation and cooperation with Iran?

Lest we forget, during the Obama administration the US’s Iran policy has evolved along the lines of “mixed motives” games of simultaneous cooperation and conflict, to use a popular jargon in international relations theory, as a result of which (a) the nuclear accord is implemented by both sides, albeit with some Iranian misgivings and complaints about the US’s scope of implementation, and (b) US and Iran fight pretty much the same fight against ISIS terrorism in Mosul, featuring both US and Iranian military advisers on the ground.

In Iran, there is a hopeful expectation that President Trump will deliver on his campaign promise of cleaning up Obama’s rather messy and convoluted, and some say half-hearted, war on ISIS, energizing it to new levels, based on mutual interests — that could bring US closer to the emerging anti-ISIS alliance featuring Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Syria.  Indeed, there is no reason why US should not join the trilateral dialogue on Syria, which recently took place in Moscow and showed Turkey’s new resolve to cooperate with the regional actors to tackle the menace of terrorism.  As a result, any new US Iran policy must be in tandem with a new US Turkish policy, which in turn requires a new Washington outreach to Ankara.

According to Abbas Maleki, a former Iranian deputy foreign minister (and co-author of books and articles with this author), Iran’s President Rouhani should consider sending a letter to Trump elucidating on Iran’s foreign policy objectives.  This is an apt suggestion and one that is tantamount to extending a small olive branch early on, with the intention of clarifying Iran’s intentions, which are geared toward regional peace and stability.  Mr. Trump, who must notify the US Congress of his position on the Iran nuclear deal within the first few months of his presidency, has also key decisions to make, e.g., with respect to the multi-billion dollar Boeing deal with Iran, which he tweeted in favor of last January.  That deal, as well as other similar commercial deals with Iran, are in the economic interests of both US and Iran and, indeed, can pave the way to improved diplomatic relations between the two countries, who at the moment lack the ties of economic ‘interdependence’. Cultivating those ties will certainly play a catalytic role in improving the troubled US-Iran relations.

Hypothetically speaking, in a letter to Trump Iran’s President can raise the possibility of a new security dialogue between US and Iran, similar to the two rounds that have inspired in the past on Iraq’s security, perhaps expanding its purview to include Afghanistan and Syria.  US and Iran are commonly bedeviled by the Afghan drug traffic and this too forms another area of potential bilateral and multilateral dialogue.  The situation in Yemen and the need to foster regional cooperation for the sake of ending the on-going and senseless slaughter in Yemen is also a crucial point of reference in such a hypothetical letter from Iran to Trump.

In conclusion,  Mr. Maleki has also wisely advised against any provocative Iranian action that would heighten Trump’s concerns about Iran, given Trump’s preoccupation with other issues, both domestic and foreign, and therefore it is incumbent on Iran not to somehow self-consciously transform its present ‘waiting game’ into a confrontation game one way or another — a more prudent approach would be none other than the game of amity and “open-minded” flexible response stemming from Iran’s own national security interests and priorities.

This article appeared at Iran Review.

By Behzad Khoshandam*

The Janus-faced appearance of any country’s foreign policy is a combination of its domestic and foreign forces. During 2016, Iran’s foreign policy was an arena for diplomatic efforts within framework of different emerging retrenchments. The Janus-faced countenance of Iran’s foreign policy in 2016 can be assessed from the standpoint of adaptability, dynamism in relation to surrounding developments and performance of internal forces on the basis of the idea of “constructive and purposive interaction,” which aims to forge balance in the country’s foreign relations.

The first area in which Iran’s foreign policy ideas were realized in 2016 was about implantation of the country’s nuclear deal with the P5+1 countries, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which came into effect as of January 2016 on the basis of Iran’s logic of strategic patience in the third millennium. The result of such logic was realization of Iran’s strategic, trade, economic, oil-related and political interests, though Iran’s foreign policy was also facing certain challenges in 2016.

On the other hand, despite challenges posed to the European Union by the Brexit, the common mutual need for bolstering interaction and convergence of approaches and views between Iran and the European Union in 2016 caused these actors to start a new honeymoon in their relations aimed at realizing the idea of a multipolar world in 2016.

Apart from major trade and economic agreements signed with various countries and major global actors, successful participation in the 171th summit meeting of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) on November 30, 2016, should be considered as another achievement for Iran’s foreign policy in 2016.

The OPEC meeting in November 2016 can be considered as an impetus for the revival of OPEC through developments that took place during past few decades in the arena of international relations as a result of constructive actions as well as effective and timely participation of the Iranian diplomacy.

Iran’s position in approaches taken by nominees for the 45^th president of the United States through their election campaigns in 2016 also contained thought provoking historical lessons. The nominees from both Democrat and Republican parties in 2016, both in their election debates and in other positions, frequently and with high sensitivity focused on the issue of Iran as well as discourses and approaches that the country supports with regard to a wide range of issues. Strategic outcomes of such a stance on Iran by American officials in 2016 are indicative of the fact that Iran still continues to remain as one of the most challenging issues in the United States’ foreign policy under the President –elect Donald Trump as the 45^th president of the United States.

Major foreign policy crises across the world, including the crises in Syria and Iraq, the crisis of Daesh, the crises in Lebanon, Nagorno-Karabakh, Afghanistan, Palestine, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia, the crisis faced by Kurds, as well as the crises of immigrants and even the crisis in Ukraine were focus of attention for Iran’s foreign policy in 2016. Iran considered participation in the resolution of the aforesaid crises as an undeniable necessity for its foreign policy in 2016. In view of short-, medium-, and long-term effects of the aforementioned crises on Iran’s interests and values, the highest amount of energy spent by Iran’s foreign policy in 2016 was allocated to creation of strategic trends and coalitions in the country’s spheres of influence in order to increase its strategic depth. Fighting against terrorism and extremism and taking advantage of the capacity of such partners as Russia was also a focus of attention for Iran when setting its foreign policy agenda in 2016.

One of the most unprecedented decisions taken in the area of Iran’s foreign policy in 2016 was allowing Russia to take advantage of the country’s Nojeh Air Base in order to support the legitimate nation-state of Syria.

As an extension of these efforts, Iran’s foreign policy actions in 2016 became more proactive toward resolution of the global crisis, which is still underway in Syria. Iran’s effort to build new coalitions as well as indigenous and intra-regional convergence among Iran, Russia and Turkey for the resolution of the global crisis in Syria was finally followed with positive effects for the entire region. The outcome of taking part in such efforts was the liberation of the strategic Syrian city of Aleppo in late 2016. The liberation of Aleppo has been considered as a turning point in foreign policy of regional and international powers in Syria in 2016, which was made possible as a result of strategic and coordinated actions taken by the axis of Iran, Russia and Turkey.

On the other hand, the approach taken by actors, who were rival and opposite to Iran’s foreign policy actions in 2016, also went through many ups and downs. The rival, and to some extent aggressive, approach taken by these actors paved the way for intensification of conflicts between the interests of these actors and Iran’s foreign policy in 2016. Examples of measures taken by such actors toward Iran can be seen in biased approaches adopted by some regional actors, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Israel. Meanwhile, opening the way for interventions by such transregional actors as the UK, which highlighted issues like the proxy wars in neighboring regions around Iran through such Arab mechanisms as the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council in late 2016, was another example of these hostile measures.

On the whole, Iran’s foreign policy in 2016 can be assessed within framework of the effort made to realize the important goal of expedient interaction with the West and international organizations in a bid to clear the way for the JCPOA to enter into force. Other characteristics of Iran’s foreign policy in 2016 were playing a maximum role in neighboring regions in order to create balance; the rivalry between Iran, on the one hand, and some European and Asian actors, on the other hand; and Iran’s serious turn toward Eurasia. Through an adaptive and dynamic approach, Iran’s Janus-faced foreign policy in 2016 managed to give birth to serious trends in such areas as security, economy and politics both at international (oil sector achievements) and regional levels (including with regard to crises in Syria, Iraq and other places).

*Behzad Khoshandam
Ph.D. in International Relations & Expert on International Issues

About 1,000 migrants have tried to force their way into the Spanish enclave of Ceuta bordering Morocco by storming a wired border fence. Local officials say dozens of security forces from both Spain and Morocco have been injured.

Crowds of migrants approached the 6-meter-high barbed wire border fence early Sunday and tried to break into Ceuta in several places. The local officials called the attempt “well organized and violent,” local news outlets write.

Migrants tried “to force open some of the doors in the external fence, using iron bars, wire cutters and large stones,” a statement by Ceuta government said, as cited by the local media. The refugees then assaulted Moroccan security forces as well as Spanish police (Guardia Civil).

At least five Spanish officers have been injured as a result, Ceuta officials said. Two of the refugees have been allowed into the enclave for medical treatment.

The Moroccan Interior Ministry said the number of migrants who tried to enter Ceuta totaled 800 and that all of them have been arrested, Reuters reports. The ministry added that 50 of its security forces have been injured in the clashes. Ten are in critical condition, while one has lost his eye.

“From now on, those making such attempts will be presented before the competent judicial authorities who will decree their expulsion from the kingdom [of Morocco] or heavier penalties, according the gravity of the act,” Reuters quoted the ministry as saying in a statement.

During the course of the day, dozens of migrants managed to climb the first line of the barbed wire fence. A video by RT’s Ruptly news agency shows migrants later lifted by the crane from the fence.

In a separate incident, Moroccan police arrested a local woman who tried to smuggle a 19-year-old migrant from Gabon in a suitcase, Reuters reports, citing local officials. Last month two Spanish police officers and dozens of migrants were injured after around 400 refugees tried to make their way into Ceuta.

Ceuta is alongside another Spanish enclave in Morocco, Melilla, one of the most common spots for African migrants trying to reach Europe. The attempted crossings into the enclaves have resulted in repeated injuries and even deaths.

According to the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the past year turned out to be the deadliest on record with regard to the number of refugees drowning en route to Europe. The organization estimated that over 5,000 migrants lost their lives after trying to cross the Central Mediterranean Sea.

Armed men have attacked a prison in Bahrain, killing one policeman and allowing inmates to escape, the Interior Ministry says.

The attack took place at Jaw prison, where several activists, dissidents and anti-government protesters were being held. The notorious jail is located south of the capital Manama.

The ministry confirmed in a statement on Sunday that the armed assault resulted in the death of policeman Abdul Salam Saif and the escape of a number of detainees.

It added that Bahraini regime forces had launched a manhunt for the attackers and the escapees.

Thousands of Bahraini activists are in jail on charges ranging from participating in anti-regime protests to armed attacks on Al Khalifah forces.

Bahrainis are preparing to hold anti-regime protests in the first few days of the New Year in memory of those killed by regime forces.

In recent months, Bahraini authorities have also banned Friday prayers and detained worshippers. The ruling Al Khalifah regime’s ban on Friday prayers has been in effect for the past six months. All sermons, which carry the message of unity and esteem for the Bahraini nation and Muslim societies, have been declared unlawful.

Original source

At the request of Iraqi forces, the coalition struck a mortar tube operated by Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant terrorists who were firing on Iraqi forces in east Mosul on Sunday, according to a Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve news release.

A precision guided artillery round hit the mortar tube, which was located between two empty school buildings. No civilians were in the area and minimal damage was reported to the buildings, the release noted.

ISIL is known to use facilities such as mosques, hospitals and schools — which are all protected under the rules of international law — as weapons storage facilities, fighting positions and bases for its terrorist operations, the release said. CJTF-OIR officials said in the release that they have seen this tactic used in ever greater numbers as Iraqi forces successfully push further into Mosul.

While the coalition takes extraordinary efforts to protect civilians and strike appropriate military targets, the release said, the coalition will continue to strike ISIL wherever and whenever its partners’ lives are in danger, in accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict.

All coalition strikes are coordinated with and approved by the government of Iraq, the release said. ISIL’s days in Mosul are coming to an end, CJTF-OIR officials said, adding that with the support of the coalition, the Iraqis will soon liberate their city and return it to the people of Iraq.

Pavel Pryanikov, the always interesting and sometimes provocative editor of the Tolkovatel portal, says that the three most important trends of the past year that are likely to cast a shadow on Russian domestic politics in the year ahead are the return to high office of the methodologists, the end of Russian nationalism, and the revolt of the regions.

“The main event of 2016,” the blogger says, is the return of the methodologists “to the levers of power.” They first emerged out of the technical intelligentsia in the 1970s, were brought into midlevel positions by “the liberal Chekist” Andropov, and played a role in perestroika (ttolk.ru/2017/01/01/три-с-половиной-тренда-внутренней-пол/).

The second trend of the last year, he continues, is “the continuation of the active departure of Russian nationalists from the ranks of ethnic Russians.” The largest number of these are turning to Islam, some to the Ukrainians and a still smaller part to the “all-European” position. There are compelling reasons for this, Pryanikov argues.

“In Russia, there are only three groups with solid support and traditions of activity over the last two to four generations: the special services, the old Moscow liberals and Islam. But the first two are closed: entrance to them is now by birth. And the most democratic [of these options] is Islam.”

And the third trend which emerged last year and is likely to become more important in 2017 involves protests by the regions. “The destruction of the USSR also began with the fronds of national regimes.” That by itself makes the protests from the Transbaikal, the Middle Volga and the North Caucasus significant.

Pryanikov adds a fourth to this list, one he says is for the moment still “a half-trend.” That involves “the erosion of supreme power” because of the presence in the Presidential Administration of the methodologists who control the media, and the Volodin command which controls the United Russia Party and the governors.

Putin retains control over both, but this system of “’checks and balances,’” one that recalls the arrangements in Boris Yeltsin’s time may or may not prove stable, especially given that Putin is “already a real grandfather, a pensioner of 65” just as Yeltsin was in 1997 when the former president “rapidly lost the levels of rule on those checks and balances.”

What remains to be seen in the year ahead is whether this “half trend will grow into a trend” or not.

By Hanna Kawas*

On Dec. 15, 2016, Tunisian Mohammad al-Zawahri, a Hamas leader and flight engineer specializing in unmanned aerial vehicles, was assassinated in the Tunisian city of Sfax. This operation bore eerie similarities to another assassination 28 years earlier of prominent Palestinian leader and high-ranking Fatah official Khalil Al Wazir (popularly known as Abu Jihad).

According to Gideon Levy in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz on Dec. 22, “Back in 1988, not far from the place where Zawahri was murdered, Israel murdered Abu Jihad in front of his wife and children in an operation given the poetic name ‘Show of Force’. Its perpetrators, from the elite Sayeret Matkal unit, boasted of it for years afterward.”

Israeli investigative journalist Ronen Bergman, a recognized expert on the Israeli Mossad, wrote in an opinion article in the Ynetnews on Dec. 19, 2016:

“If the Mossad is indeed behind the assassination of Hamas aviation engineer Mohammad al-Zawahri in Tunisia, as reported by the foreign press, this is the first assassination attributed to the Israeli intelligence organization under Cohen’s leadership (or perhaps the second: Omar Zayed of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine died under mysterious circumstances in Bulgaria).”

Bergman also acknowledged in that same article that:

“Tunisia is what the Mossad calls a ‘soft target’ state…not an actual enemy state” and also noted that “The people arrested in Tunisia were likely not involved and will be released soon.”

Four years ago, the Times of Israel reported on Nov. 1, 2012 that:

“Yedioth Ahronoth investigative reporter Ronen Bergman’s interview with Nahum Lev, the commander of the operation and the officer who killed Abu Jihad, was cleared for publication…after being blocked by the military censor for more than a decade. The interview was conducted prior to Lev’s death from a car accident in August 2000. In allowing its publication, Israel essentially confirmed the open secret that it carried out the operation.”

Was the Tunisian Security establishment complicit in both these assassination operations?

Following is some of the most relevant background information:

Zine El Abidine Ben Ali came to power in Tunisia on November 7, 1987 in a bloodless coup d’état against then President Habib Bourguiba in questionable and suspicious circumstances.

In his early days, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was awarded training at the “Senior Intelligence School in Maryland and the School for Anti-Aircraft Field Artillery in Texas.”

In 1987, the new Tunisian security chief Abderrahmane Balhaj Ali, “accompanied Ben Ali to Carthage at the time of his assumption of power…as general director of the presidential security”, a position he continued to hold for 14 years.

On April 16, 1988, just a few months after Ben Ali became President, Abu Jihad was assassinated by the Mossad. In 1993, David Yallop, the British investigative journalist, in his book “To the Ends of the Earth”, exposed the complicity of the U.S. and Tunisian governments in the murder of Abu Jihad. He noted:

“The ‘High Backing’ also included the President of Tunis, Ben Ali, and the United States government, specifically the State Department.” (Page 224)

On February 7, 2011, after the Tunisian popular revolution that ousted Ben Ali and his cohorts, Canada Palestine Association sent a letter to the Tunisian Ambassador to Canada, regarding the murder of Palestinian Leader Abu Jihad entitled “Bring Ben Ali and his Police and Intelligence Officers to Justice”. To this date, we have NOT received any response, not even an acknowledgement of receipt of the letter.

Times of Israel reported on Nov. 5, 2012 that the Tunisian “Wafa movement announced…that it intended to sue Israel in a Tunis court over its involvement in the killing of Fatah official Khalil Al-Wazir (Abu Jihad)…Fadira Najjar, an attorney and member of Wafa, told Tunisian television that the assassination was perpetrated on Tunisian soil and is considered a war crime under international law. Najjar claimed that deposed Tunisian president Zine El-Abidine Bin Ali colluded with Israel in the killing, along with security officials.”

It is worth noting that a Ynetnews story on this same subject did not refer to Tunisian “security officials” that were involved in the murder of Abu Jihad.

A year ago, Balhaj Ali was resurrected to again head the Tunisian security apparatus and on Dec. 2, 2015, Jeune Afrique reported that he is “the new strong man of the services of the Tunisian police. His appointment is accompanied by a series of changes in the security apparatus…”

On Dec. 16, 2016 Ynetnews reported his sudden resignation this way: “Five hours after the assassination (of al-Zawahri), the Tunisian National Security Commissioner, Abed al-Rahman Balhaj Ali, announced his resignation without specifying why. Political sources in Tunisia have not ruled out the possibility that the resignation came against the backdrop of the assassination.”

Haaretz also reported on Dec. 18, 2016 that “Foreign elements were behind the assassination of a Hamas drone expert last Thursday, Tunisia announced on Sunday evening, following allegations that the engineer’s death was orchestrated by Israel’s Mossad.”

All of these facts raise many serious and troubling questions:

What is the “Senior Intelligence School in Maryland”? Is it similar to the “School of the Americas (Assassins)? Is it tied to the CIA? Does it train and recruit foreign nationals as CIA agents? Was Ben Ali recruited to the CIA? Did the Tunisian government knew of Ben Ali’s activities?

What does Abderrahmane Balhaj Ali know about the 1987 Tunisian coup d’état? Was he ever questioned by the Tunisian governments that followed Ben Ali’s Government and did he have any role in the Abu Jihad assassination? Was he ever questioned about what he did know “as general director of the presidential security” about the murder of Abu Jihad?

Why did Balhaj Ali resign five hours after the assassination of al-Zawahri? You would think that the “Tunisian National Security Commissioner” would want to investigate and expose the assassins!

What are the connections and similarities between the assassinations of Mohammed Zawahri and Abu Jihad? And, more importantly, would exposing and convicting the Tunisian security and police officials who were complicit in Abu Jihad’s murder have prevented the murder of al-Zawahri?

Why did the Tunisian government blame Zawahri’s assassination only on “foreign elements”?

Was Israeli journalist Bergman right when he stated “The people arrested in Tunisia were likely not involved”? And were those people scapegoats, to protect higher ranking Tunisian officials that were involved?

Why does the Mossad consider Tunisia a “soft target” state? And why does the current Tunisian government insist on ignoring popular and parliamentary demands to penalize any normalization with Israel?

And the most crucial point: Is the current Tunisian government willing or capable of appointing a National Security Commissioner that serves the Tunisian and Arab peoples and has no ties or allegiance to the CIA, Mossad, Italian or French security services?

Why does Saudi Arabia harbor and protect the deposed Tunisian leader Ben Ali, who has been convicted in absentia on multiple counts by Tunisian courts, thereby thwarting justice? Why is Saudi Arabia giving refuge to this murderer with Tunisian and Arab blood on his hands?

And finally, why are the Fatah leadership and its Palestinian Authority security forces not actively investigating and bringing to justice the murderers of Abu Jihad and Yasser Arafat, rather than chasing after those who oppose and resist the Israeli enemy?

To have genuine justice for the many Palestinians and Arabs who have been murdered in cold blood by the Israeli Mossad, we need to also “clean house” and expose and prosecute all those complicit in such crimes, especially those still in power.

The ‘Arab Spring’ that was started in Tunisia in December 2010 will surely continue until it accomplishes its objectives in bringing freedom, democracy and independence to the Arab nation and peoples.

*Hanna Kawas is Chairperson of the Canada Palestine Association and co-host of Voice of Palestine. He contributed this article to PalestineChronicle.com. Visit: http://www.cpavancouver.org.

The United Arab Republic has its origin in the British colonial expansion. For about two centuries the territories of the UAE were administered by the British colonial rulers of India. The colonial authorities protected the land and residency rights of natives while excluding immigrants for these rights. Emirati citizenship is now confined only to those whose ancestors lived in the seven Emirates before 1925. In 2015 its population was over nine million of which 89 per cent were immigrants mainly from South Asian countries with no residency rights. Since 1971 GDP of the UAE has increased by 231 times making it one of the richest counties in the world. This massive increase in the country’s wealth is mainly due to the economic activities of its millions of migrant workers but its main beneficiaries are Emiratis. The paper offers an overview and analysis of these developments.

By Riaz Hassan*

The modern state of the United Arab Republic or the UAE has its origin in the British colonial expansion in Asia. Since the 16th century it was an outpost of the Ottoman Empire. In the early 19th century it came under the political control of Great Britian and came to be known as the Trucial Coast. For centuries the area was desolate, and sparsely populated by tribal people. It was a traditional Arab Bedouin society ruled by tribal chiefs. Its inhospitable geography and harsh climate of oppressively long, hot and humid summers made it a very isolated place. The rulers had absolute power but exercised it in a manner which was accepted as fair by the subjects. The economy was based on fishing, pearling in the coastal areas and some agriculture in the oasis areas of the interior. No reliable figure of its population is available but the best estimate puts it between 50 to 80 thousands.

The population was dominated by two main tribal factions known as Hinawi and Ghafiri which had their origins in a civil war in the early 18th century over the succession to the imamate of Oman. This tribal alignment continued even after the civil war and spread to the Trucial Coast where it manifested in enmity between two main tribes of the area, Bani Yas and Qawasim. Bani Yas were Hinawi and the Qawasim Ghafiri. The Qawasim occupied Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah and an outlet on the Gulf of Oman in the Shimayliyyah. They were mainly seafaring people and achieved fame as able sailors and notoriety as pirates. It was because of these activities that the Coast came to be known as the Pirate Coast. Bani Yas were inland people residing in the interior mainly in Abu Dhabi. The seafaring activities and power of Qawasim in the coastal areas gave them power and influence, which was widely recognised by other tribes including Bani Yas. But their seafaring activities and especially their piratical attacks on trading ships of other countries became a source of enmity in particular of Britain who had become the dominant power as a result of their colonization of the Indian sub-continent.

By the end of the 18th Century, much of India was ruled by the British East India Company and the British government was asserting its control on trading sea routes to India which included the Trucial Coast. The coastal areas at that time were under the control of the ruling family of Sharjah – the Qawasim, which had achieved fame as a great seafaring power in the Persian Gulf. Their ships were engaged in trade as well as in piratical activities harassing merchant ships that sailed in the Persian Gulf. The trading ships of the East India Company frequently used the Gulf waters and became common targets of Pirate attacks, which enraged the British authorities in India.

In 1819 the Government of Bombay (later Government of India) dispatched punitive expeditions aimed at ending piracy in the Gulf waters. The expedition forces attacked and bombed the main towns from which the Qawasim ships sailed and forced the local rulers into submission of the British authority through a series of treaties with the tribal chiefs. The first of these treaties known as the General Treaty of Peace was signed in 1820 between the British rulers of the Government of Bombay and the tribal chiefs of the Trucial Coast that bound the signatories not to engage in piracy or pillage on land or sea. In general, the British rulers of India regarded the people as savages and backward.

The General Treaty of Peace required the tribal rulers to keep the Gulf route to India safe and open. The most important clause of the Treaty required cessation of piracy and plundering on sea and land and desistance from the slave trade which was still carried out in the area. While the British ships were protected under the agreement, it did not prevent piracy and warfare between the coastal tribes. This was achieved through the Treaty of 1835 that required a truce between the chiefs of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah and Ajman to report any aggression at sea to the British each year and to not retaliate against each other. This arrangement lasted until 1853 when the Treaty of Perpetual Maritime Truce was signed and the tribal chiefs undertook total cessation of hostilities at sea.

These agreements had the effect of stabilising their respective positions in inter-tribal and intra-tribal relations. This stability enhanced the power and confidence of tribal chiefs which made the British authorities in India wary that the Chiefs may enter into political or commercial agreements with other European powers including France, Belgium and Russia who were vying for influence in the Coast. To prevent this, Britian signed the Exclusive Agreement of 1892 which bound the Tribal chiefs not to enter into any agreement with any power other than Britian and not to cede, mortgage or sell any part of their territory. The cumulative effect of these Treaties consolidated and cemented British power and influence in the Trucial states which protected the British interests, especially safety of the sea routes to India. As Qawasim were the main sea faring tribes, these treaties severely curbed their power.

As a result of the treaties with Britian the tribal chiefs and later their descendents began to acquire a certain amount of stability and authority as rulers: the responsibility of each new ruler for fulfilling the treaty obligations towards Britian made for continuity and a gradual stratification of certain political and social elements in the land he controlled; so adding a new dimension to his sovereignty. The tribal chiefs gradually evolved into rulers and the areas over which they exercised a certain amount of jurisdiction evolved into sheikhdoms. It was through these treaties that Britian played an important role in the development of various Trucial States which became not formal colonies but British protectorates. And in December 1971, after Britian ended 150 years of special treaty relations with them, they merged to become the United Arab Republic (Zahlan 1977).

The Trucial States were treated by the British colonial administrators not as part of the Arab world but as extensions of the Indian sub-continent, perhaps more like Indian princely states. They were governed by political officers of the British government of India. Periodic visits by British political authorities were the sign of British Raj. There was no local currency and the Indian rupee had become the currency accepted for most financial and commercial transactions. The largest foreign community in the area was made up of Indian merchants who were regarded as British subjects and had to be treated with due care and deference, and India had the major share of the Coast’s foreign trade.

Under the 1892 Treaty local rulers could not have any foreign contacts except with Britain. But the period between the two World Wars saw the rise of Saudi Arabia and Iran. Both began to assert their presence in the Gulf which prompted the British colonial authorities to place strict restrictions on the movements of people into the region. An additional reason for the colonial authorities’ vigilance was the discovery of oil in the region which made the Gulf an arena of major competition between European powers.

Native Land and Residency Rights

The British policies had the direct effect of strengthening the native land and residency rights. There was little or no interference in internal affairs and no attempts were made by the British authorities to introduce changes in the traditional political structures. The treaties between the local chiefs and Britian prevented any dilution of their land ownership by clearly stipulating that land and its resources could not be sold to foreigners, and no foreigners except the British subjects had residency rights. As a result, only non-British who had residency but not citizenship rights were the Indian merchants, because they were British subjects. While the purpose of various Treaties between the British and the local rulers was to ensure and cement British political hegemony, an unintended consequence of these Treaties was a strengthening of native land rights. In the Trucial States the British not only recognised the land and residency rights of the natives but protected and strengthened them through Treaties while excluding immigrants from these rights.

Exclusionary Citizenship as State Policy

The British polices laid the foundation of restricted residency and citizenship rights. The new UAE State adopted the principle of Jus Sanguine, with citizenship defined strictly by ancestry. Emirati citizenship is confined only to those whose ancestors lived in the seven Emirates before 1925. It has no system of naturalization or permanent residency. Its population had increased from 557000 in 1975 to over nine million in 2015, of which 89 per cent were migrants with no residency rights. Over 60 percent of the migrant workers were from South Asia on short-term work contracts (see Tables 1 and 2).

Table 1: UAE Population and GDP 1975 and 2015

Sources: http//hq.magazine.com/socioeconmics/2015/04/uae-population-by-nationaliy (UAE migrants)

In 1971 the UAE was a relatively underdeveloped and poor country with a GDP of around $2.5 billion. In 2015 its GDP had climbed to $370 billion, making the UAE the world’s 7th richest country in terms of per capita GDP. Between 1971 and 2015 the country’s GDP increased by 231 times. One quarter of its GDP is derived from oil-related sectors and the rest come mainly from services, manufacturing and construction. Only one per cent of the Emirati labour force is employed in the private sector and 60 per cent in the public sector. The massive increase in the country’s wealth is due to the economic activities of the UAE’s millions of migrant workers, but its main beneficiaries are Emiratis. The following figures confirm this. In 2015 the UAE’s per capita GDP was $67616 and the estimated average annual wage of its migrant worker was $4355.

Paradoxically migrant workers have been instrumental in shaping the social links between UAE citizens and their rulers. Firstly, by contributing and transforming oil wealth into well- being of its citizens. Secondly, by laying the foundation of the post-oil economy, and finally by shaping citizens’ perceptions of migrant workers as competitors in the labour market and a threat to national cohesion. Under pressure from citizens, the UAE rulers oppose naturalization of foreign nationals because, under conditions of a declining proportion of citizens in the population, non-nationals pose a threat to the nation’s cultural identity as they do not share same values as natives. Migrant workers are seen as a potential source of ‘working class militancy’ for better social, economic and political rights, posing a threat to the social fabric of Emirati society.

Consequently, the political framework for purposes of residency status has evolved de jure and de facto ways separating nationals and foreigners. De jure separation is embodied in the legal provisions differentiating between nationals and foreigners. All foreigners are obliged to have a national sponsor known as the Kafala system. Through the Kafala system the state has outsourced management and control of migrant workers to non-state actors. It is a system of labour brokers allied to the ruling family and Emirati citizens. These brokers sponsor foreign employees and are responsible for their actions and well-being while they are in the country. On arrival most foreign workers surrender their passports to their Kafeel/sponsor. Foreign business owners obtain workers’ visas through partnership with citizens, in which the foreigners may own up to 49 per cent of a business. This allows wealthy expatriate elite managers and business owners to govern the day-to-day lives of migrant workers, thereby assuming responsibility for migrant well-being.

Migration to the Gulf States tends to be highly exploitative during recruitment processes and in their employment conditions overseas. The worker-paid migration costs can be as high as a third of the amount low-skilled workers will earn in two or three years abroad. Many workers borrow money at high interest rates from moneylenders to cover their migration cost. Due to the high expense to migrate, some workers overstay their visa duration, thereby becoming irregular migrants, rendering themselves vulnerable to further exploitation as well as risking imprisonment. The findings of recent studies also reveal that migration costs are regressive – costs fall as workers’ skills and wages increase. Hence, the maximum burden of the migration cost lands on the semi-skilled and unskilled workers who mostly come from low-income households. Even though governments have put in place institutional arrangements and framed laws, rules and regulations to protect workers from such exploitation, it has been difficult to stop such practices (ILO 2016).

According to a 2016 ILO Report, this appears to be especially true for migration through the South Asia-GCC region corridor. The benefits of reducing these crippling migration expenses, especially for the semi-skilled and unskilled workers, would be enormous. Not only would it enable more people from low-income households to access foreign employment opportunities, it would also prevent asset depletion on the part of migrant households (through the sale of property and other possessions) to finance the migration journey. Lower costs would also prevent migrants from falling into heavy debt traps, which may well absorb a substantial portion of their earnings. It might also help protect workers from forced labour. Fair and low fees for obtaining a visa alone would result in larger remittance flows to migrant households and their communities, which could be used for education and medical care by family members left behind and result in desperately needed human capital formation and other productive uses as well as greater consumer spending to better bolster the economy (ILO 2016).

The UAE model of successful economic development and nation building by non -nationals has attracted global attention. What is really intriguing for observers is that, notwithstanding highly exploitative economic and working conditions for millions of migrant workers, and cultural and religious differences between migrant workers and Emiratis, the country enjoys industrial, religious and ethnic peace.

About the author:
*Professor Riaz Hassan is Visiting Research Professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore. He can be contacted at isasriaz@nus.edu.sg. The author bears responsibility for the facts cited and opinions expressed in this paper.

Source:
This article was published by ISAS as ISAS Insights 374 (PDF)
References
Zahlan, Rosemarie Said. 1977. The Origins of the United Arab Emirates: a political and social history of the Trucial States, London: MacMillan.

ILO. 2016. The Cost of Migration: What low skilled migrants from Pakistan pay to work in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Islamabad: International Labour Organization.