It is important to start examining how much will change with Donald John Trump, the unusual American president who fails to conform to the usual standards expected of such an office. There is much to play for within American politics over the next few years and doom-laden prophets of doom who have seen Trump as the harbinger of some sort of American fascism are mistaken. Trump has to deliver on at last some of his electoral promises to the working-class voters who helped secure his election.

By Paul B Rich*

The initial excitement in a surprising presidential election has now largely faded away as global audiences start to examine the realities of a Trump administration in the White House. It is important to start examining just how much will change with such an unusual American president who fails to conform to the usual standards expected of such an office.  In an election high on rhetoric, often of the lowest kind, and low on hard policy, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly how things will evolve. But several things are starting to seem clear.

First, the election is by no means the harbinger of a new Churchillian- type dark age. The Trump administration is likely to prove quite weak and destined to disappoint many of the working-class rustbelt voters who looked for some sort of quick fix to long-term problems of deindustrialisation. Trump lacks a party and grass roots political machine to organise his support into a more durable coalition in American politics: this is a major reason why the epithet of “fascist” has never rung true.

Trump is essentially a media-savvy “populist”without a party who sees politics more in terms of a reality TV show than serious and protracted political negotiation expected in politics rather than the “deals” achieved in business. After a short honeymoon period, he is likely to find making progress in legislation increasingly difficult in the U.S political system unless he surrounds himself with skilled political entrepreneurs rather than blind ideologues.

So far there are only a few signs of this, though strategic realists can derive some comfort from the appointment of General Mattis as Secretary of Defense. But Trump has also appointed as his National Security Advisor Mike Flynn, widely seen as an extreme Islamophobe prone to conspiratorial thinking and understanding Jihadist terrorist movements in religious terms, ignoring in effect the social and economic background of terrorist recruits or issues of marginalised youth. Such appointments send out mixed signals and indicates that the direction of policy under Trump might be hard to read.

Certainly, by appointing in some cases political has-beens or right wing-extremists Trump may end up paralysing his administration as he finds himself cut adrift from the mainstream political class he has done so much to alienate.  This is already evident in the poisonous atmosphere now pervading his relations with the intelligence community on the issue of alleged Russian hacking during the US presidential election. It is hard to recall any similar situation in the run-up to a new president taking office; and Trump looks set to be one of the most divisive presidents in recent times at a time when much of the dominant mythology that had underpinned American self-belief centred on ideas of the American Dream have fallen into serious doubt among sections of the population.

It has often been remarked how Trump displays some of the features of populism and nativism, which stretch back, via William Jennings Bryan in the 1890s, to the No-Nothings in the 1840s: these were movements and charismatic political figures bound by unstable political ideologies and intense dislike of established moneyed interests. They usually lacked much political focus and largely failed to secure any durable change in the political system, certainly in terms of the domination of the two main parties. This populism was often quite radical in orientation as it expressed the ideas of the outsiders: small landholders against land barons and cattlemen, for instance, and small towns and rural communities against big cities. In the South, though, it took the form of a racist populism defending Jim Crow segregation, while more generally it expressed the poorly-educated but religiously-observant communities in the Mid-West and the South against the prosperous East Coast elite.

Trump has certainly expressed some of this populist rhetoric in the election; but there are major doubts about its authenticity as I think this was really a contrived pseudo populism conjured up by a successful TV reality host. Trump was very successful in packaging himself to appeal to an angry section of the white middle and lower class who felt let down by the failure to deal with the banking crash of 2008 and the ever-widening income differences between average wage and salary earners and the super-rich. Ironically Trump looks set to make this issue even worse by cutting taxes for the very wealthy; and unless he really can fulfill promises to repatriate thousands of jobs to the United States from countries such as Mexico, he is in danger of rapidly disillusioning his supporters

This brings us to the second major theme emerging from Trump’s election, namely neo-isolationism. I say “neo” because it is hard to see a Trump administration being able to return to anything like the isolationism of the inter-war years following the refusal of the US Congress to enter the League of Nations in the early 1920s. The isolationism of this time was driven more by party than president since it was a Republican Congress that vetoed the application to join the League by President Woodrow Wilson. The plutocratic Republican presidents of Harding, Coolidge and Hoover were the political consequences of this, and, though the Republicans were eventually defeated by Franklin Roosevelt in the landmark 1932 election, they did not go into political meltdown but remained a major political force right through the years of the New Deal and of World War Two.

The situation now is considerably different with Trump standing out on what seemed to many to be an isolationist platform against the Republican Party, many of whose leaders refused during the election to endorse him. He has several possible routes to follow in this situation: he can play the tough guy and ignore this, though his lack of interest in day to day politics and short attention span suggests that this will be unlikely.

Another more obvious tactics is to stay much of the time in Trump Tower and, like some latter-day absolutist monarch, play hard to get and win over, on his terms, at least some of his Republican opponents with suitable jobs. This is the likely sort of behaviour by a property tycoon who sees politics as essentially a series of deals. Appointing hardliners like the racist Steve Bannon as his political advisor is thus very possibly another tactic in this playing-hard-to-get strategy, though if it fails he might find his administration being taken over by the lunatic fringe and pursuing an ideological programme that would split America and lead, very possibly, to urban riots and unrest. This is the nightmare scenario that some pessimistic observers such as George Soros have predicted, suggesting a Trump presidency will lead the U.S into class war and a police state, though, as I suggest here, there are multiple factors working against it.

Over time, of course, Trump might mellow anyway and move towards the political mainstream. If this occurs it will echo the shift from the first ideological Reagan administration evolved into a more pragmatic second administration that dispensed with the Cold War rhetoric of the Soviet Union as the “evil empire” and moved towards negotiations with President Gorbachev, helping pave the way for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

There is thus some cause for cautious hope when we come to the third theme of foreign policy. Trump’s links with President Putin might translate into hard progress diplomatically on Syria in a way that might never have occurred if Hillary Clinton had been elected president.  The history of diplomacy suggests that successful outcomes depend on parties forgetting about rival belief systems and negotiating tangible agreements seen to accord with perceived national interests. A Trump administration is thus likely to be narrowly realist in foreign policy, looking towards successfully negotiating a series of deals it views as favouring the American national interest. It will not have any wider Kissinger-type vision of transforming global order and will be forced to accept a certain level of pragmatism regarding several issues.

Starting with Syria, therefore, it is possible to see the US under Trump securing at least an interim peace settlement that maintains the Assad regime in power for the next few years, while reducing the part of Syria he controls into a Russian client state. A new balance of power politics will be established in the Middle East with the US playing a far less prominent role than formerly. This decline will continue a pattern of withdrawal that started under Obama in 2011 with the troop draw-down in Iraq. The US will still exert a more indirect influence via other actors in the region; though a close relationship with Israel will indicate that this will be the new “special relationship” in US policy, as Trump ends up sustaining and supporting an increasingly aggressive and expansionist government in Jerusalem. With Arab states largely preoccupied by regional concerns, such as the proxy war in Yemen and continuing state breakdown in Libya and Somalia, it is hard to see what significant opposition will occur if Israel intensifies pressure on the Palestinian communities on the West Bank. Indeed, this is the “permissive environment” that hard-line Zionists have long been dreaming of and it is possible to see the early stages of an ethnic cleansing taking place over the next few years. Palestinian refugees will join those from Syria and Eritrea and elsewhere in the exodus as Israeli hard-liners pursue a strategy of territorial consolidation by ever expanding Jewish settlement over most of the area of the former Palestinian mandate.

Further afield, Trump is likely to continue the rebalancing of American grand strategy begun under Obama away from the Middle East to North East and South East Asia. Taking a tough line with China on trade and rejecting the TPP might well spill over into increasingly aggressive military posturing, especially in disputed areas such as the South China Sea.

Though Trump has not been averse to attacking fellow members of NATO for not paying a fair share to the alliance (Luxemburg spends only 0.9 percent of its GDP on defence) he will find it rather more difficult to do the same in South East Asia towards states such as Malaysia, Taiwan and the Philippines given how vital these allies are in any containment policy towards China. As we have often been reminded, the Cold War is by no means over in the Pacific, especially on the Korean peninsula, and it is highly likely that a Trump administration will end up behaving not too differently to previous Republican administrations stretching back to Eisenhower in the 1950s.

In the end, what’s in a name or a label? Trump has already achieved a remarkably distinctive brand label known round the world. Being called a “donkey” by ISIS is no bad publicity and can play well with a domestic American audience, especially if it is accompanied by some tangible results such as a few jobs, such as those in the motor industry, saved for American workers rather than going to Mexico. Given the interlocking nature of the modern global economy it is impossible for any US administration to be seriously isolationist, despite the obvious political payoff from protectionist rhetoric.

Such rhetoric will almost certainly be the currency of US politics over the next few years as Trump faces the political fact that he obtained office through a flawed electoral system that ensured a majority in the electoral college despite losing the national poll by some 3 million votes, repeating the same defeat of Al Gore by George W. Bush in the 2000 presidential election. His authority and legitimacy are tarnished right from the start and much will depend on how far the Democratic Party can reorganise itself over the next few years and come up with a compelling candidate to challenge either Trump or his successor in the next presidential election. Unless the Republicans continue to do well in mid-term elections, only two years away Trump faces the prospect that he could be a lame duck president able to achieve very little by 2019.

There is thus much to play for within American politics over the next few years and doom-laden prophets of doom who have seen Trump as the harbinger of some sort of American fascism are I believe mistaken, though there could be threats to press liberty – though these too hardly start with Trump. There are short-term payoffs in this media-inspired pseudo populism but, like all populisms, it is always at risk of losing ephemeral electoral support. Trump, in the end, has to deliver on at last some of his electoral promises to the working-class voters who helped secure his election in such strategically vital states as Michigan and Pennsylvania: if he fails to do this and ends up simply cutting taxes for the super-rich, then this will be an administration that will soon find itself in trouble.

About the author:
*Paul B Rich, Editor, Small Wars and Insurgencies (Routledge), is an advisor with Mantraya. He can be contacted at paulrich999@netscape.net. Views expressed in this piece are that of the author.

Source:
This article was published by Mantraya

In December 2016, twelve years after the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, Aceh was once again struck by an earthquake. However, over the past decade the landscape of responders has evolved and changed and there is need for better understanding of new actors to strengthen coordination during disasters.

By Ennio V. Picucci*

On 7 December 2016, at 5:03 a.m. local time, a 6.5 magnitude earthquake struck the province of Aceh, Indonesia. According to the Meteorology, Climatology and Geophysics Agency (BMKG) the epicentre of the earthquake was on land, making the chance of a tsunami impossible but resulting in stronger impact on buildings in the area.

According to a spokesperson from the National Agency for Disaster Management (BNPB), over 100 buildings including shops, mosques and schools collapsed and thousands of houses were partly damaged by the quake. After weeks of search and rescue operations, the official number of people killed is 103, with hundreds of injured and over 88,000 displaced.

Actors Involved in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)

The earthquake triggered the response of a wide range of actors. The coordination of response and assessment activities was led by the National Agency for Disaster Management (BNPB) and the Regional Disaster Management Agency (BPBD). The Indonesian military immediately deployed over 700 personnel including health and logistics experts. The Indonesia Red Cross (PMI) mobilised their emergency response teams and distributed blankets, tarpaulins, body bags, family kits and hygiene kits.

PMI set up three accounts for raising funds and put its blood transfusion unit on standby in case blood stock would be needed. International organisations such as CARE and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) sent their assessment teams to the affected areas and assisted in the search and rescue of survivors stuck under the rubble of collapsed buildings.

Other governmental and non-governmental agencies involved in the response included the National Search and Rescue Agency (BASARNAS), Indonesian National Police (POLRI), Disaster Victims Identification team (DVI), Handicap International and the IFRC Country Cluster Support Team (CCST).

Search and rescue operations proceeded day and night but were complicated due to power outages and rain fall. In response to the blackouts, the State Electricity Company (Perusahaan Listrik Negara) deployed 20 of their personnel to the disaster zone to check the electrical conditions in the area. Heavy machinery was deployed to access people stuck under debris.

According to ASEAN’s AHA centre, a total of 181 governmental and non-governmental agencies were involved in the response activities in Aceh. Singapore and other countries stood ready to provide assistance if needed. With such myriad responders it is all the more important to sort out who offers what assistance.

Changing HADR Landscape in South-East Asia

In the recent response, the range of actors involved in HADR was significantly different compared to the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami response. The earthquake of 2004 caused an enormous tsunami that affected several countries and triggered an immense international response including militaries of dozens of nations, as well as United Nations agencies, (international) NGOs and private corporations.

During the 2016 Aceh earthquake, UN agencies did not play a leading role in the coordination of HADR and no foreign troops were involved in aid delivery. The main reason for this is that the disaster was of a much smaller magnitude and therefore did not require such a large-scale international response. Also Indonesia and other countries in Asia-Pacific have strengthened their disaster management systems significantly.

After the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami of 2004, many new NGOs and government agencies were formed in response and to deal with future disasters. Over the years for example, ASEAN has grown in importance as best illustrated by the establishment in 2011 of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian

Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre).

To date, some of the organisations that emerged in the aftermath of the 2004 earthquake and tsunami do not exist anymore or have transformed, accompanied by plenty of newer actors. Indonesia’s BNPB which led the response efforts during the 2016 earthquake, was established in 2008 to replace a previous government institution. Also the relatively new AHA Centre aims to become the main regional coordinator in HADR. Especially at the grassroots level, the landscape of actors is very dynamic and constantly changing.

Dynamic, But A Challenge to Coordination

This dynamism represents a challenge to the coordination of disaster response. Effective coordination is therefore important to create synergies and avoid the overlapping of aid. When as many as 181 organisations are involved in the response efforts after a disaster there is a high chance that aid is duplicated in some places and under-resourced in others. This is particularly challenging as many are new and not well known to the coordinating agencies. This proliferation is expected to continue for the foreseeable future. This represents a challenge but also an opportunity to close gaps in HADR work across the Asia-Pacific and beyond.

For the near term, there is a need to map current and emerging actors involved in HADR to find out who they are and how they can work together to strengthen coordination mechanisms. The importance of strengthening coordination in HADR is highlighted by the 2016 One ASEAN, One Response declaration.

Events such as the most recent earthquake in Aceh accentuate the importance of knowing who’s who to identify quality leadership and synergies among them. The growing importance of ASEAN and the leadership potential of its AHA Centre bear great promise for a more unified approach to Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in order to strengthen disaster risk governance in the Asia-Pacific.

*Ennio V. Picucci is a Research Associate at the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.

Contrary to earlier assessment, the so-called Islamic State (IS) can be defeated. IS support can be contained, its membership can be isolated, and its leadership can be eliminated with the right resources.

By Rohan Gunaratna*

Since its rise in Iraq and Syria, the so-called Islamic State (IS) managed to change the global threat landscape dramatically. Although the IS core in Iraq and Syria is under threat, IS has expanded worldwide and created a series of provinces. IS global expansion has increased its resilience to destruction and contributed to the durability of the movement. However, like other threat groups, IS is not invincible.

The key to defeating IS is coordinated and collaborative action and innovative leadership. To mobilise support, it is crucial for governments to forge and sustain partnerships between government, private sector and community to prevent attacks, protect targets and pursue terrorists.

The Battlefield Context

In the battlefield, international coalitions in Syria and Iraq should raise national capabilities – both general purpose forces and special operations forces – to fight back. Coalition forces should continue to target high profile leaders, active advocates, facilitators and directors of attacks worldwide, using drones and airstrikes. The kinetic or militarised phase should be followed by a stabilisation phase and post-conflict peace building phase where areas recovered from insurgent and terrorist control should be restored to normalcy.

During this period, many countries, especially those countries fighting IS, will suffer. Observing the European experience it is evident that only half of the IS attacks could be disrupted. This suggests that governments should work with partners to anticipate likely attack scenarios and develop contingency and crisis management plans following a successful attack. Other lessons learned include the necessity of increased security and police visibility to prevent attacks.

In light of the reduced flow of foreign fighters to the IS heartland, the timing is right for governments and their community partners to develop strategic capabilities in rehabilitation and community engagement. In this case, the approaches of rehabilitation are religious, educational, vocational, social and family, creative arts, recreational, and psychological. Engagement strategies to build relationships and integrate individuals though ideology and psychotherapy, are powerful tools in transforming IS fighters.

Managing the Foreign Fighter Threat

Moreover, in designing strategies to reduce and manage the foreign fighter threat, governments and partners should also consider the threat posed by both IS and non-IS fighters. In addition to rehabilitating those who have surrendered or become captives governments should create platforms to engage Iran’s militias, Shia fighters, and Hezbollah along with Sunni opposition groups.

The Shia fighters are estimated to be in the thousands and the potential threat of Shias has to be managed carefully. The Jabhat Fateh Al Sham (JFS), previously Al Nusra, the Al Qaeda branch in Syria, poses a long-term threat, along with other ideologically indoctrinated and battle hardened groups.

Rehabilitating and reintegrating fighters and supporters should be a priority. However, in parallel, there should be a robust community engagement strategy to counter extremism and promote moderation. In order to prevent radicalisation, governments and their partners should focus on the physical and cyber space as well. The online and offline community engagement initiatives should address extremism both within and outside the Muslim community. This should also include right wing and anti-Islamic groups, which are on the rise.

The emergence of right-wing anti-Islamist populist movements coupled with hate crimes and Islamophobia will only worsen the situation and play into the hands of IS and Al Qaeda (AQ). These groups want to see inter-communal discord and clashes which permits them to gain new recruits.

In this regard, such over-reactions will justify the IS war narrative against the West and non-Muslims. Particularly, there is need to temper and rein in the animus by more constructive efforts such as inter-ethnic and inter-religious dialogues, peace movements and goodwill groups.

Strategic Communications

The complex and fluid threat environment is strengthened by the growth of IS virtual communities collaborating across regions sharing information. Like AQ, IS too misinterpreted and misrepresented Islam to advance a political project. It is imperative to highlight that both these groups killed, maimed and injured more Muslims than any non-Muslim State.

In addition to influencing the human terrain, engaging the media, the education and religious sectors are vital. For instance, the immense suffering of Muslims both in the battlefield and off-the-battlefield attacks has not been adequately portrayed. The media was unable to shed adequate light on the fact that a third of those killed by Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel – the Tunisian behind the 2016 truck attack in Nice – were Muslims. Overall, to manage the IS threat, the response should be multi-pronged, multi-agency, multi-dimensional and multi-national.

With IS struggling to survive in its heartland, a heightened security environment will prevail throughout 2017. In August 2016, according to the Pentagon, the number of foreign fighters entering Iraq and Syria diminished from 2000 to 200 in early 2015. Similarly, West Point’s Combating Terrorism Centre reported that IS official online postings dropping from 700 in August 2015 to 200 a year later. Thus through sustained military action, the IS operational threat is likely to diminish in the short-term (1-2 years) and the ideological threat will possibly reduce in mid-term (5 years).

The greatest impact of IS is the damage it inflicted on communal harmony – on Muslim-non-Muslim relations. As was evident following the Paris attacks, the relationship between the French Muslims and non-Muslims suffered. In the long term (10 years), governments working with community organisations will be able to reduce the suspicion, prejudice, anger and hatred precipitated by IS. However, in the meantime visionary and steadfast counter insurgency and terrorism leadership is essential to fight and defeat IS.

*Rohan Gunaratna is Professor of Security Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technology University, and Head of RSIS’ International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR).

A new method of stimulating the renewal of living stem cells in tooth pulp using an Alzheimer’s drug has been discovered by a team of researchers at King’s College London.

Following trauma or an infection, the inner, soft pulp of a tooth can become exposed and infected. In order to protect the tooth from infection, a thin band of dentine is naturally produced and this seals the tooth pulp, but it is insufficient to effectively repair large cavities.

Currently dentists use man-made cements or fillings, such as calcium and silicon-based products, to treat these larger cavities and fill holes in teeth. This cement remains in the tooth and fails to disintegrate, meaning that the normal mineral level of the tooth is never completely restored.

However, in a paper published today in Scientific Reports, scientists from the Dental Institute at King’s College London have proven a way to stimulate the stem cells contained in the pulp of the tooth and generate new dentine – the mineralised material that protects the tooth – in large cavities, potentially reducing the need for fillings or cements.

The novel, biological approach could see teeth use their natural ability to repair large cavities rather than using cements or fillings, which are prone to infections and often need replacing a number of times. Indeed when fillings fail or infection occurs, dentists have to remove and fill an area that is larger than what is affected, and after multiple treatments the tooth may eventually need to be extracted.

As this new method encourages natural tooth repair, it could eliminate all of these issues, providing a more natural solution for patients.

Significantly, one of the small molecules used by the team to stimulate the renewal of the stem cells included Tideglusib, which has previously been used in clinical trials to treat neurological disorders including Alzheimer’s disease. This presents a real opportunity to fast-track the treatment into practice.

Using biodegradable collagen sponges to deliver the treatment, the team applied low doses of small molecule glycogen synthase kinase (GSK-3) to the tooth. They found that the sponge degraded over time and that new dentine replaced it, leading to complete, natural repair. Collagen sponges are commercially-available and clinically-approved, again adding to the potential of the treatment’s swift pick-up and use in dental clinics.

Lead author of the study, Professor Paul Sharpe from King’s College London said: “The simplicity of our approach makes it ideal as a clinical dental product for the natural treatment of large cavities, by providing both pulp protection and restoring dentine.

“In addition, using a drug that has already been tested in clinical trials for Alzheimer’s disease provides a real opportunity to get this dental treatment quickly into clinics.”

Anthropogenic groundwater exploitation changes soil moisture and land-atmosphere water and energy fluxes, and essentially affects the ecohydrological processes and the climate system. In over-exploited regions, the terrestrial water storage has been rapidly depleted, causing unsustainability of water use and inducing climate change.

Recently, Prof. Zhenghui Xie and Dr. Yujin Zeng from CAS Institute of Atmospheric Physics, incorporated a scheme of anthropogenic groundwater exploitation into the Community Earth System Model version 1.2, and conducted a series of simulations over global scale to investigate the impacts of anthropogenic groundwater exploitation on the hydrological processes and climate system around the world.

“Quantifying the hydrologic and climatic responses to anthropogenic groundwater extraction not only advances our understanding on the hydrological cycle with human intervention, but also benefits effective human water management for sustainable water use,” said Prof. Xie.

They found that groundwater exploitation caused drying in deep soil layers but wetting in upper layers.

“A rapidly declining water table is found in areas with the most severe groundwater extraction,” Prof. XIE observed, “The areas include the central United States, the north China Plains and the north India and Pakistan.”

The atmosphere also responded to groundwater extraction, with cooling at the 850 hPa level over the north India and Pakistan and a large area in the north China and central Russia. Increased precipitation occurred in the north China Plains due to increased evapotranspiration from groundwater irrigation. Decreased precipitation occurred in north India because the Indian monsoon and its transport of water vapor were weaker as a result of cooling induced by groundwater use. Local terrestrial water storage was shown to be unsustainable at the current high groundwater extraction rate.

“A balance between reduced water withdrawal and rapid economic development must be achieved in order to maintain a sustainable water use, especially in regions where groundwater is being over-exploited,” Xie suggested.

This research finding has been published in Journal of Climate.

Spain is leading the world in deceased organ donation. A new article published in the American Journal of Transplantation contains important information that can help other countries learn from the success of the Spanish system to help address the worldwide problem of transplant organ shortages.

In the United States, nearly 120,000 people need a lifesaving organ transplant, and every ten minutes, someone is added to the national transplant waiting list. Due to organ shortages in the United States and around the world, many individuals die or experience a poor quality of life while on transplant waiting lists.

In 1989, the Spanish Ministry of Health created the Organización Nacional de Trasplantes (ONT), a technical agency in charge of the coordination and oversight of donation and transplantation activities in Spain. It created a model of coordination in deceased donation that made the country evolve from 15 donors per million population to more than 30 per million population in less than a decade.

The so-called Spanish model relies on the designation of appropriate professionals (mostly intensive care doctors) to make donation happen when a patient dies in conditions that allow organ donation. These professionals are supported in their work by ONT and regional coordination offices.

The Spanish model also makes it a priority to identify donation opportunities not only in intensive care units, but also in emergency departments and hospital wards. In addition, it considers organ donation from persons over the age of 65 years. (While only seven percent of organ donors are over the age of 65 years in the United States, ten percent of organ donors in Spain are over the age of 80.)

Furthermore, the model has considered donation after circulatory death, in which circulation, heartbeat, and breathing have stopped (as opposed to brain death, in which all the functions of the brain have stopped), even in the setting when death follows a sudden cardiac arrest in the street.

“The most important success is that the system has made organ donation be routinely considered when a patient dies, regardless of the circumstances of death,” said ONT’s Beatriz Domínguez-Gil, MD, PhD, co-author of the article highlighting the Spanish Model’s impact. “Professionals attending to these patients in our country consider that, in caring for patients at the end of their lives, it is their duty to systematically explore their wishes with regards to donating organs upon their death.”

Lead author Rafael Matesanz, MD, PhD, who is the director of ONT, highlighted that “good organization in the process of deceased donation and continuous adaptations of the system to changes are always the basis of successful results in organ donation”.

He noted that the elements and strategies of the Spanish model might be applicable to other countries, with some adaptations depending on the way organ donation is organized, the type of healthcare system in place, and other factors.

By Benedetta Berti*

(FPRI) — The end of 2016 brought important changes in Lebanon. Michel Aoun’s election in October finally ended the destabilizing presidential vacuum in place since May 2014, ushering in a new government of national unity under the premiership of Saad Hariri. These significant developments reflect ongoing shifts in the balance of power and in the broader political dynamics within Lebanon.

The new government signals both deep change and profound continuity. It reiterates that, much like in the past, Lebanon’s political fate continues to be tied to both the outcome of the Syrian civil war and the broader geopolitical balance of power in the region. But it also reveals that the main lens through which we have looked at Lebanese politics since the fateful assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005—namely the sectarian-cum-political “March 14” (M14) vs. “March 8” (M8) rivalry—may no longer be able to adequately capture the actual situation in the country.

For the past decade, the M14 forces and the M8 resistance camp—two largely antagonistic political blocs—have dominated Lebanese politics, with the former a favorite of the West, backed by Saudi Arabia and led by al-Hariri’s son Saad, head of the Tayyar al-Mustaqbal (Future Movement), a political party that largely represents Lebanon’s Sunni community. On the other hand, Iran and Syria support the resistance camp, which is dominated by Hezbollah (and Amal), both speaking for the majority of the country’s Shiites. With the Lebanese Maronite Christian community more or less evenly divided between the two political camps, M14 and M8 quickly became more than just an expression of sectarian politics: these alliances indeed reflected rooted and divergent political, sectarian, and geo-strategic interests. With the beginning of the Syrian civil war, the deep animosity, mutual distrust, and sheer parochialism of both political camps became even more entrenched, leading to deep and prolonged political paralysis. In past years, this polarization paralyzed the government, preventing it from carrying out its duties, from garbage collection to gas exploration. The impasse has also delayed important political and economic reforms, including the revision of the country’s electoral system, putting the democratic system on virtual hold.

But, after years of stalemate and deadlock between M14 and M8, the election of Michel Aoun as president revealed a partial change in the political equation.

To begin with, Aoun’s ascent confirmed the decline and growing rifts within the “March 14” political alliance. After the end of Michel Suleiman’s presidential term in 2014, the main parties in the March 14 coalition jointly backed the nomination of Dr. Samir Geagea, leader of the Lebanese Forces party, to succeed Suleiman, against the March 8 candidacy of Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader Michel Aoun. Yet, by early 2016, the March 14 vote split following Saad Hariri’s ill-advised nomination of Damascus-friendly Marada Movement leader Sleiman Frangieh as a “consensus candidate” to end the presidential rift. Ironically, Hariri’s move did not fill the presidential vacuum, but it did manage to facilitate a dialogue between enemies, Geagea and Aoun. The two rival Christian leaders agreed that they hated the idea of being politically sidelined by Hariri even more than they disliked each other, so they struck an agreement, with Geagea withdrawing his candidacy and backing Aoun’s presidential aspirations.

In addition, the disagreement between Geagea and Hariri not only (further) undermined the unity of the March 14 coalition, but it also revealed the declining influence of Saad Hariri over his political allies. In the past decade, and especially since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, his leadership has been questioned within both March 14 in general and the Lebanese Sunni community more specifically—a trend observable by looking at the Future Movement’s performance in the 2016 municipal elections. Adding to Hariri’s political troubles and financial woes, 2016 also saw Saudi Arabia—the statesman’s traditional backer—significantly cut down support for Lebanon in general and for Hariri’s political and economic ventures more specifically. After becoming increasingly frustrated by its regional losses to Iran, notably in Syria and Yemen, since early 2016, Saudi Arabia opted for a new strategy with respect to Lebanon, withdrawing aid and support and increasing regional pressure on Hezbollah. While hoping to weaken Hezbollah as well as to force the Lebanese government to reign in the organization and distance itself from Iran, the Saudi “disengagement” has chiefly hurt the Kingdom’s Lebanese allies—namely, Hariri and his party.

Moreover, the presidential election revealed the potential strength of the country’s two main Christian political parties—that is, when their leaders choose to work together beyond the M8-M14 divide. The Geagea-Aoun deal was a game changer: not only did it de facto force Hariri to shelve his plan and somewhat abruptly switch his presidential endorsement from Frangieh to Aoun, leading to his election, but it also represented an important instance of cooperation between the two Lebanese Christian leaders after years of steep animosity and division. Even though it would be premature to foresee long-term unity and harmony between the Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement, the election of Aoun could still very well usher in an era of increased collaboration beyond the M8-M14 rift.

It is therefore unsurprising to note that Hariri’s own woes, combined with the internal rift over the presidential vacuum, accelerated the weakening of March 14 as a political project and of his political leadership, which contributed to Aoun’s election. This predicament also pushed Hariri, as the newly confirmed PM, to accept a number of significant compromises in forming the new “national unity” cabinet in December 2016. The cabinet line-up indeed awards Aoun’s party and his March 8 allies—including Hezbollah—a whopping 17 out of the 30 available cabinet seats, while reserving 10 posts for the Future Movement and the Lebanese Forces, and an additional three seats for (likely) “friendly” appointees. Significantly, Aoun’s own party received eight ministries—including Defense, Justice, Energy, Trade and Foreign Affairs—while the Future Movement received seven ministerial posts, most notably that of Interior and Telecommunications.

The election of Michel Aoun and the cabinet line-up, together, stress the change in the relevance of the M14-M8 divide and the decline of the political project spurred by the 2005 Independence Intifada that put an end to fifteen years of Syrian tutelage over Lebanon.

They also confirm the deep influence that the regional balance of power plays on domestic Lebanese politics. And here, the trend is one of substantial continuity, with Lebanon’s domestic politics still deeply shaped by the region. The rise of Michel Aoun and the nomination of the national unity government are indeed reflections of the broader regional dynamics, confirming the turning of the tide in favor of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad and his allies, including Iran. In this sense, pro-Syrian voices are well represented in the cabinet, while both Iran and Syria have reacted very positively to the recent shifts in the Lebanese political arena.

Yet, even though the new government and the election of Michel Aoun clearly indicate a shift of the political pendulum towards the FPM leader and his allies, the longer-term impact of these developments remains uncertain. Domestically, the new government faces an uphill path in finding the necessary consensus to truly “restore confidence” (its chosen slogan), make an impact, and move Lebanon out of its political paralysis by jumpstarting the reforms the country needs, beginning with the revisions of the electoral laws in preparation for the Parliamentary elections scheduled for June 2017 (they should have been held in 2014, but have so far been postponed due to internal instability and fierce clashes over the electoral laws). Electoral reforms are indeed an especially contentious topic, and significant debate over which system to adopt (majoritarian or proportional) will likely yet again paralyze the political system.

But even when it comes to international relations, Lebanon’s future is far from clear. For example, it will be especially interesting to observe how the newly elected president will reconcile between the pro-Syrian stance of its closest political allies, including Hezbollah, and the official policy of non-alignment when it comes to the Iranian-Saudi rivalry and how being in power will affect his calculus when it comes to both domestic and foreign allies. Similarly, it will be important to observe how Hariri as a PM deals with the need to keep his party’s foreign supporters happy while recognizing the shifting power dynamics within the Levant.

In sum, even though the domestic reshuffling of the political cards reflects a shift in the domestic and regional balance of power, there is still remarkable continuity in the challenges ahead for Lebanon, with the country once again battling to prevent paralysis, reduce polarization, and contain instability and, in so doing, weathering the regional storm.

About the author:
*Dr. Benedetta Berti is a Robert A. Fox Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. She is also a foreign policy and security researcher, analyst, consultant, author and lecturer.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI

By Terri Moon Cronk

The Defense Department believes the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s days are numbered in Iraq’s second-largest city of Mosul, Pentagon spokesman Navy Capt. Jeff Davis said Monday.
Iraqi security forces prepare to zero their M16 rifles at the

Davis said it’s significant that counter-ISIL forces have reached the Tigris River and converged on the three axes from which the Iraqi security forces approached Mosul — north, east and southeast — and gained control of the eastern end of Mosul. Since Jan. 7, Iraqi security forces have continued to gain territory and consolidate those gains, he noted.

ISIL’s Days Are Numbered

“[ISIL fighters] are surrounded on all sides by a superior force they’re facing [in addition to] resistance from within the city, and they’re being bombarded daily by coalition air and artillery strikes,” Davis told reporters. “And [ISIL] has no ability to reinforce or resupply. We do believe their days there, [particularly] in eastern Mosul, are numbered and they are beginning to realize it.”

While friendly forces have pushed their way onto the banks of the Tigris River in the vicinity of the southernmost bridge around Mosul, ISIL fighters over the weekend blew up the last of five bridges, the DoD spokesman said.

“We are now seeing some makeshift attempts to [cross the river on foot] using planks,” Davis said. On another bridge, where the span over land was taken out by coalition forces, ISIL was observed using a crane to move vehicles across the river, one by one in what Davis called a very “painstaking way.”

“We’ve also seen them use slides to take cargo in boxes and slide them down onto the ground from the bridges that have coalition-damaged spans. All five bridges around Mosul are unusable,” he said.

After occupying Al Salam Hospital in southeastern Mosul as a fighting position and storage facility for quite a while, ISIL has been forced out of the facility, Davis said.

ISIL’s Morale Declines

“We’re seeing continued signs of ISIL fighters having loss of morale,” Davis said. “Many of them have not been paid in months; we’ve seen fewer [vehicle-borne homemade bombs] than we had previously in Mosul, and indications are that ISIL can’t respond to coordinated attacks on multiple axes.”

What Operation Inherent Resolve officials have seen as a lull in morale particularly from the east of Mosul are ISIL desertions and fighters leaving their positions, Davis said.

“It’s a sign of the fact that they recognize their defeat is imminent,” he said.

The residents of Mosul are increasingly putting up resistance, Davis added, where people “are very quick to turn against [ISIL] to help drive them out, particularly when [the enemy] is close to taking [territory].”

Situation in Raqqa

In Raqqa, Syria, which ISIL proclaims as its capital in that country, counter-ISIL Syrian forces also are moving in on their axes of approach to retake the city from ISIL control, Davis said.

Coming into Raqqa from two axes, the SDF has cleared most of the northern axis in the north and from the northwest, toward the southern segment of the city, Davis said, adding that the SDF are within four kilometers of the city and the Tabqu Dam on the Euphrates River. He called both achievements “significant in isolating Raqqa.”

By Sinisa Jakov Marusic

Macedonian President Gjorge Ivanov on Monday entrusted Nikola Gruevski with a fresh mandate to form a new government after his VMRO DPMNE party narrowly won the December 11 elections.

He has 20 days to secure a majority of 61 in the 120-seat parliament and present a new team to parliament, or return the mandate.

The talks on a new government are expected to be tough for Gruevski whose party won 51 seats in the elections, only two more than the main opposition Social Democrats, SDSM.

To obtain a majority he will have to reach terms with one or more of the ethnic Albanian parties that jointly hold 20 seats.

On Saturday, they raised the bar for their participation in a coalition government after they signed a joint declaration on their agreed terms for joining any new government.

The declaration contained seven points, without concrete deadlines for their fulfillment, but containing ideas that they claim would ensure complete equality between the Macedonian majority and the Albanian minority – about a quarter of the population.

They centre on the rule of law and justice, economic equality, speedier EU and NATO integration and better neighbourly relations.

Among other things, the Albanian parties want the Albanian language made official over the entire territory of the country, not only in areas where they live in significant numbers.

They also want talks on changing the country’s flag and anthem to reflect the Albanian component.

They also want Macedonia to sign a declaration that condemns “the genocide against Albanians” conducted between 1912 and 1956, which covers the period from the first Balkan War, when Serbia annexed Macedonia, to the early years of Communist Yugoslavia.

Gruevski would also be asked to agree to the prolongation of the work of the Special Prosecution, SJO, which was formed in 2015 as a result of EU-sponsored crisis talks and tasked with investigating high-level crime.

Gruevski and his top party associates have so far been the main subjects of the SJO’s work.

In an interview for the daily Dnevnik at the weekend, Gruevski conveyed his reluctance to go along with the entire Albanian agenda.

“I will try to form a government but not at any cost,” he said adding that if his former Albanian partner in government, the Democratic Union for Integration, DUI, honoured the unwritten principle of aligning with the biggest ethnic Macedonian party in a coalition, he would not have a problem.

However, he added: “If VMRO DPMNE as the winning party is duped by the DUI, no matter the reasons, be assured that VMRO DPMNE will come back in a big way with at least two terms [in power]in a row.”

Should Gruevski fail to form the government, the leader of the opposition SDSM, Zoran Zaev, will be given the task – and will face the same demands from the Albanian parties.

During the elections, Zaev’s less ethnic-based civil platform attracted the votes of many ethnic Albanians who were unhappy about the ten years of Gruevski’s rule and with the Albanian parties that had supported him.

Gruevski accused him of plotting to divide the country along ethnic lines, which he denied.
– See more at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/gruevski-asked-to-form-macedonian-govt–01-09-2017#sthash.x772oqxR.dpuf

By Elise Harris

Pope Francis has decided to begin 2017 in much the same way as he did last year: praying for Christian unity.

And it’s this drive for unity – not only among Christians but with other religions as well – that’s emerged as sort-of personal manifesto from practically the moment he took office.

In his newest and first prayer video for the year, Pope Francis prayed for Christian unity, specifically “that all Christians may be faithful to the Lord’s teaching by striving with prayer and fraternal charity to restore ecclesial communion and by collaborating to meet the challenges facing humanity.”

Released Jan. 9, the video shows images of different churches and people working together in service projects as the Pope, in his native Spanish, notes how “many Christians from various churches work together to serve humanity in need, to defend human life and its dignity, to defend creation and to combat injustice.”

As the screen changes to show different hands grabbing the same rope one at a time, Francis says the desire to walk together and collaborate “in service and in solidarity with the weakest and with those who suffer, is a source of joy for all of us.”

He closes his video asking viewers to “join your voice to mine in praying for all who contribute through prayer and fraternal charity to restoring full ecclesial communion in service of the challenges facing humanity.”

At the beginning of each year the Pope’s prayer intentions for the next 12 months are released, showing topics he wants to draw attention to throughout the year. This year, Christian unity is setting the tone.

Similarly, last January Pope Francis kicked off 2016 with a monthly intention for interfaith dialogue, praying that “sincere dialogue among men and women of different faiths may produce fruits of peace and justice.”

In his first-ever video on the monthly papal prayer intentions, Francis noted that “many think differently, feel differently, seeking God or meeting God in different ways.”

“In this crowd, in this range of religions, there is only one certainty that we have for all: we are all children of God,” he said, adding that this “should lead to a dialogue among religions. We should not stop praying for it and collaborating with those who think differently.”

Both ecumenical and interfaith dialogue have been major priorities for Pope Francis in general. But 2016, which happened to coincide with the Jubilee of Mercy, was especially packed with ecumenical and interfaith meetings and encounters, some marking historic new steps.

Almost monthly, the Pope made some sort of new gesture or held a landmark meeting. If we take a look at some of the major events from last year, we see that from the very beginning this emphasis on dialogue was in many ways a papal priority for the year.

In addition to praying for interfaith dialogue in January, Pope Francis made his first visit to Rome’s synagogue that month, where he embraced Rome’s Chief Rabbi, Riccardo Di Segni, and urged Jews and Christians to unite against war and violence.

A month later Pope Francis met with Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill Feb. 12 while on his way to Mexico, marking the first-ever meeting between a Pope and a Patriarch of Moscow.

The two signed a joint-declaration that focused at length on anti-Christian persecution, the threat of secularism to religious freedom and the Christian roots of Europe. While many, Greek Catholics in particular, weren’t happy with how the document handled the Ukraine crisis, for others it was a decent start to a nuanced yet positive process.

In March Pope Francis put this desire for interfaith unity into action by washing the feet of 12 migrants during his Holy Thursday Mass at a refugee welcome center on the outskirts of Rome. The migrants belonged to different faiths, and included Muslims, Christians and one Hindu.

April marked not only the Pope’s daytrip to the Greek island of Lesbos where he met with Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople and Orthodox Archbishop Ieronymos II of Athens and All Greece to draw attention to the migration crisis, but it was also the month Francis met with the head of the Society of Saint Pius X, Bishop Bernard Fellay.

After what has been a lengthy and at many times tumultuous process of dialogue between the SSPX and the Vatican to restore ties, recent steps have suggested a warming in relations.

Among these steps was Pope Francis’ decision in September 2015 to allow SSPX priests to validly hear confessions during the Jubilee – a mandate he has indefinitely extended – as well as his decision that year to send a cardinal and three bishops to visit the seminaries of the SSPX in order to become better acquainted with the society, and to discuss doctrinal and theological topics in a less formal context.

These moves culminated in the Pope’s meeting with Fellay in April 2016, during which “it was decided that the current exchanges would continue,” a statement from the Vatican describing the meeting read.

While the canonical status of the society was not directly addressed, the Pope and Bishop Fellay determined “that these exchanges ought to continue without haste.”

In May Pope Francis made what many viewed as a quantum leap in terms of Catholic-Muslim relations when he welcomed the rector of Egypt’s prestigious al-Azhar University, Imam Ahmen al-Tayyeb, to the Vatican for a private audience.

Relations were strained under Benedict in 2011 with claims he had “interfered” in Egypt’s affairs by condemning a bomb attack on a church, but they made a dramatic shift after Francis and Al-Tayyeb’s meeting. Following their May 2016 encounter, it was announced in October that the university and the Vatican will officially resume dialogue toward the end of April 2017.

In June Pope Francis traveled Armenia for a trip largely made to commemorate the centenary of the Armenian Genocide and support the country’s Christian majority. During his visit the Pope met with Karekin II, Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of All Armenians, speaking to him of their brotherhood and placing a strong emphasis on unity.

At an ecumenical meeting with Armenian Orthodox leaders the day before his audience with the Patriarch, Francis prayed that they would “race toward our full communion” with determination.

As if the events of the first half of the year weren’t enough, after popping over to Poland for WYD in July, Francis made a quick visit to Assisi at the beginning of August to celebrate the 800th anniversary of the dedication of the Portiuncula chapel, the site where the Franciscan order began.

During the visit he had a surprise meeting with Mohamed Abdel Qader, the Imam of Perugia and Umbria, who was present with the Pope at the 30th World Day of Prayer for Peace in Assisi a month later.

Convoked by St. John Paul II in 1986, the gathering brings together representatives of various other religions, both Christian and non-Christian. During the September encounter, Francis was joined by Patriarch Bartholomew, Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury Justin Welby, as well as Imam Ahmen al-Tayyeb.

At the end of September Pope Francis made his visit to the Caucasus nations of Georgia and Azerbaijan.

While in Georgia, which is a majority Orthodox nation where relations with Catholics have traditionally been tense, the Pope met with Catholicos and Patriarch of All Georgia Ilia II, saying unity is necessary and love for God and the Gospel must overcome “the misunderstandings of the past” and the problems of the present and future.

Despite obvious tensions felt during the visit, demonstrated by the visible presence of members of the Orthodox Church protesting the Pope’s visit as well as the failure of the Orthodox delegation to show up at the only public Mass the Pope celebrated, Francis has on several occasions spoken highly of Ilia, calling him “a man of prayer.”

In Azerbaijan, which marked the first time Francis has traveled to a majority Shi’ite Muslim nation, he praised the peaceful coexistence of Catholics, Muslims, Orthodox and Jews the country enjoys. Only 600-700 Catholics live in the country.

Then in October Pope Francis made his historic visit to Sweden for a joint commemoration of the 500th anniversary of the Reformation. The event also marks 50 years of ecumenical dialogue between the Catholic Church and the Lutheran World Federation.

During a large ecumenical encounter Pope Francis and Lutheran Bishop Munib Younan, president of the Lutheran World Federation, signed a joint statement together. In a separate event later that day, Francis stressed that “we remember this anniversary with a renewed spirit and in the recognition that Christian unity is a priority, because we realize that much more unites us than separates us.”

Pope Francis gave an interview in November ahead of the close of the Jubilee of Mercy that focused heavily on the rapid progress ecumenical and interfaith relations seem to be making during his pontificate.

In the interview, Francis credited this pace to his predecessors, saying the “small and large steps” that have been taken during his tenure are not of his own doing, but are rather indicative of the path of dialogue outlined during the Second Vatican Council “which moves forward, intensifies.”

“I have met the primates and those responsible, it’s true,” he said in the interview, “but my predecessors have also had their encounters.”

While John Paul II was the first Pope to do make many of the signs Francis is known for now, such as visiting synagogues and mosques, Francis noted that “the measure in which we go forward the path seems to go faster.”

So while it has always been fairly obvious that ecumenical and interfaith dialogue have had a front row seat in Francis’ pontificate, taking a look back puts into perspective just how much of a priority it’s been.

In addition to highlighting this priority, the Pope’s prayer video this month is also a clear reflection of his preference to focus on shared areas of interest and collaboration in ecumenical and interfaith discussions, rather than points of theological division, as a means of providing both sides the common ground on which to move forward.

For Francis, while questions of theology and doctrine are important, working together to serve the poor and vulnerable is the privileged place where ecclesial unity is expressed, even if the theological wrinkles have yet to be ironed out.

And if his prayer intention this month is any indication, as we look ahead to 2017 we can anticipate that the type of events and encounters we saw in 2016 won’t slow down, but will likely continue to gain steam.

The Counter Terrorism Department of Pakistan’s Punjab province claims to have arrested two people over last year’s deadly suicide blast in crowded park in Lahore over Easter.

A spokesman for the department said that the arrested transported the suicide bomber who was trained in Afghanistan before being sent to Pakistan.

Franciscan Father Jamil Albert, who visited Gulshan-e-Iqbal Park moments after the bombing, welcomed the arrests and lauded government efforts in fighting terrorism.

“Punishment for terrorists and their facilitators and handlers is crucial to discourage youth from joining such groups,” he said.

A Taliban splinter group Jamaat-ul-Ahrar claimed responsibility, saying it targeted Christians celebrating Easter.

At least 75 people were killed and scores of others were wounded when a suicide bomber exploded his explosive-laden vest in Gulshan-e-Iqbal Park on March 27 last year.

Among the victims were at least 24 Christians who had come to the park to celebrate the religious festival, according to data provided by Caritas Pakistan.

Over the past many months, a tectonic shift has taken place as the traditional foreign hegemonic presence in the region, the United States, increasingly saw its influence and presence evaporate.

By Kabir Taneja

There have been umpteen numbers of attempts over the past two years to orchestrate a ceasefire amidst the Syrian civil war, a conflict now raging for more than a half a decade with no end in sight and hundreds of thousands having been killed, and millions displaced.

However, over the past many months, a tectonic shift has taken place as the traditional foreign hegemonic presence in the region, the United States, increasingly saw its influence and presence evaporate. This vacuum created was filled up quickly by a cocktail of Russian military presence in Syria and regional actors such as Iran and Turkey making steadfast commitments to draw that ever-so-elusive “red line” that once the now outgoing US President Barack Obama once announced, only to never walk his talk. History will condemn the US administration, historically the most prevalent foreign power in the Middle East, as the one that stood by and watched the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad use chemical weapons on his own people, and only reacting in platitudes.

Over the past month, the optics of the Syrian crisis have also shifted as Moscow seems to be entering a phase where it seemingly would like to scale down its associations with the conflict. For this, both Russia and regional heavyweight Turkey, orchestrated yet another ceasefire between the Assad regime and the rebels on 30 December 2016. At this point, the rebels, fighting an intense battle with the regime forces were on the cusp of losing Aleppo to the Syrian army. For them, the ceasefire meant an escape route to safety outside the city and away from the regime, which the rebel commanders took as they suffered heavy casualties. Aleppo’s freedom from the rebels was celebrated via posters of Vladimir Putin, Bashar al-Assad, Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Iran backed militia Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah coming up on the bombed out, destitute structures of the city. Western analysts reacted to these imageries by labeling it as ‘the new world order.’

The ceasefire agreement, however, had a few strings attached, with the most prominent one being it did not involve ISIS or the YPG (Kurds), the latter perhaps being the cornerstone reason for Turkey’s involvement with Russia over the outcomes in Syria as the US continues to arm Kurdish rebels against ISIS. Conflicting reports also surfaced on whether the recent Al-Qaeda breakaway Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al Nusra), was also part of the arrangement. While rebel leaders said al-Sham was indeed part of the ceasefire, the Syrian regime was of a contradicting opinion.

Only months ago, both Moscow and Ankara were at odds after a Turkish Air Force F–16 shot down a Russian Sukhoi SU-24M near the Syria–Turkey border on November 2015. Today, Turkey, a member of NATO, prefers to stick by Russia’s narrative on the Syrian crisis. But this optic is what stands as of today, and could change within days, or perhaps even hours.

As per a release by the opposition taking part in the talks, the Assad regime broke the ceasefire agreement in the areas of Barada Valley, Eastern Ghouta, the Hamaa suburbs and Daraa. The Syrian Revolution, armed groups signatories to the Ankara agreement of 29 December 2016, blamed the ‘guarantors’ for not keeping their end of the bargain, leaving the political process on, as expected, a knife’s edge.

Turkey’s narrative in the region has been largely counterproductive, specifically when it came to dealing with ISIS. In the beginning, Turkey allowed ISIS to fester on its own soil, in a poorly sought and historically marooned policy of trying to pitch one extremist group against the others. Ankara and Istanbul as cities became hubs for ISIS recruitment as Erdogan’s administration decided to turn a blind eye in the hope that ISIS will counter Turkey’s number one security and political concerns, the Kurds and their will to construct an independent Kurdistan aided by far-left organisations such as the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane (PKK), also known as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. According to a recent Turkish report from a pro-Turkish Syrian government channel, the PKK has killed more than 3,400 Turkish army and security forces in 2016 alone.

Over the past few years, Turkey allowed ISIS to conduct illicit oil trade across its borders as part of its anti-Kurd posturing, while its prominent Western allies and NATO colleagues spent resources in arming and training Kurdish Peshmerga fighters to counter ISIS’s advances, along with other rebel groups, including Shia militias. For Erdogan, showing a strong hand against the likes of the PKK, whose main influence zone is Iraqi Kurdistan, and standing against the Kurds independence movement is of critical importance that till now trumped ISIS as a premier threat.

Turkey has seen a steady escalation in attacks on its soil since 2015. Between 5 June, from an attack on a political rally in Diyarpakir that killed two people to the New Year’s eve attack on an Istanbul nightclub that killed thirty nine, Turkey has lost nearly 500 citizens in nineteen major terror strikes. Out of these, nine were linked to Kurdish militant groups, six linked to ISIS, while four remain unknown. However, the attack on 31 December 2016 in an upmarket Istanbul nightclub was perhaps the most significant, and a primer of the things to come between ISIS and Turkey, the former once living rent free in the latter’s backyard. According to another data set released by Versik Maplecroft, 685 people were killed and more than 2,000 wounded in 269 separate terrorist incidents in Turkey over the past twelve months.

ISIS has claimed responsibility for the deadly attack Sunday on a nightclub in Istanbul that left at least 39 people dead. pic.twitter.com/sYNCmjqauy

— CNN Breaking News (@cnnbrk) January 2, 2017

In November 2016, the elusive leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in an audio message released after the death of ISIS’s second in command and chief of its foreign operations, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, asked the group “to unleash the fire of their anger” on Turkish armed forces and to take the battle to Turkish soil itself. On 20 December, Russia’s Ambassador to Turkey, Andrei Karlov, was shot dead at an art gallery in Ankara by an off-duty police officer named Mevlut Mert Atlintas while shouting ‘don’t forget Aleppo,’ in an event dramatically captured by international media. It remains unclear whether the gunman acted alone or was part of a group, as no terror organisation claimed credit for it. Both Turkey and Russia, despite the gravity of the situation, played down the assassination, calling it an attempt to disrupt the positive developments in Turkish–Russian ties. Only a few months ago, a killing of such magnitude could have had tremendous geopolitical implications; however, this time Karlov’s legacy was swiftly brushed under the carpet to maintain the larger interests at play.

Hours before the attack on Istanbul last week, ISIS media outlets released a grotesque video of them burning two captured Turkish soldiers alive. The Istanbul terror attack, which also took the lives of two Indians, was claimed by ISIS not via Amaq, one of its more prominent news agencies, but via Nashir, a pro-ISIS media outlet known to be closer to the top hierarchy of the group. This was only the second time ISIS claimed responsibility via Nashir, with the first being just days before when the group took claim of the terror strike in the southern Jordanian city of Karak that killed ten people.

A statement released by ISIS post the Istanbul attack were more direct, and backed by religious connotations of Turkey’s alliances with Christian states (reference to the US, European nations and Russia). The statements labelled Turkey as “protector of the cross” and highlighted it targeting Christians who were partying at the nightclub (majority of those killed, however, were Muslims). It further read, “It (the attack) came in revenge for the religion of Allah the Almighty and in fulfilment of the order of the Emir of the Believers (al-Baghdadi) to target the servant of the cross, Turkey.”

Erdogan’s government is now in all likeliness on the cusp of taking further unilateral military actions against ISIS in Iraq and Syria than before. However, it may face challenges on the same, as its military still remains fractured as a result of the attempted coup against Ankara in July last year. In the post-coup fallout and purge, more than 270 Turkish Air Force pilots were discharged from their duties, a critical gap that has brought down the global average of accepted norms for sustainment from a 1.25:I pilot-to-cockpit ratio down to a mere 0.8:I for Turkey’s F-16 fleet. The post-coup purges have also affected the core military and naval strengths as well. To compensate for Turkey’s lost military edge, it has reportedly been the US that has swooped in to seize the opportunity to swing a ‘wayward’ Ankara back towards western geopolitical designs by providing air-cover for Turkish ground troops moving towards the Al-Bab region near Aleppo to push-back “Sunni Muslim hardliners and Kurdish fighters” from its borders with Syria.

Turkey perhaps is in line now to see more violence on its soil in the time to come. This outcome, as it stands today, could have been avoided if Erdogan’s initial response to ISIS would not have seen the terror group as a proxy against the various pro-Kurdish militia movements emitting from both Iraq and Syria. Even as Erdogan used the issue of tacking the Kurds to cut democracy to size in Turkey and seize greater control over the country, he will look to empower himself even further on back of tackling ISIS and maintaining balance after the attempted coup. This consolidation of power and Erdogan’s temperament as a leader perhaps pushes Turkey ideologically more towards Putin’s Russia than the US, which has all but squandered away its influence on the crisis under the Obama administration.

The subject of a Palestinian state has been paramount long before Dec. 28, when US Secretary of State John Kerry took the podium at the Dean Acheson Auditorium in Washington DC to pontificate on the uncertain future of the two-state solution and the need to save Israel from itself.

In fact, unlike common belief, the push to establish a Palestinian and Jewish state side-by-side goes back years before the passing of UN Resolution 181 in November 1947. That infamous resolution called for the partitioning of Palestine into three entities: A Jewish state, a Palestinian state, and an international regime to govern Jerusalem.

A more thorough reading of history can pinpoint multiple references to the Palestinian (or Arab state) between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. The idea of two states is Western par excellence. No Palestinian party or leader had ever thought that partitioning the Holy Land was an option.

Then, such an idea seemed preposterous, partly because, as Ilan Pappe’s “Ethnic Cleaning of Palestine” shows, “almost all of the cultivated land in Palestine was held by the indigenous population (while) only 5.8 percent was in Jewish ownership in 1947.”

An earlier but equally important reference to a Palestinian state was made in the Peel Commission, a British commission of inquiry led by Lord Peel that was sent to Palestine to investigate the reasons behind the popular strike, uprising and later armed rebellion that began in 1936 and lasted for nearly three years.

There were two “underlying causes of the disturbances,” resolved the commission: Palestinian desire for independence, and the “hatred and fear of the establishment of the Jewish national home.” The latter was promised by the British government to the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland in 1917, which became known as the Balfour Declaration.

The Peel Commission recommended the partition of Palestine into a Jewish state and a Palestinian state, which would be incorporated into Transjordan, with enclaves reserved for the British Mandate government.

In the time between that recommendation 80 years ago, and Kerry’s warning that the two-state solution is “in serious jeopardy,” little has been done in terms of practical steps to establish a Palestinian state.

Worse, the US has used its veto power in the UN repeatedly to impede the establishment of a Palestinian state, as well as utilizing its political and economic might to intimidate others from recognizing (although symbolically) a Palestinian state. It has further played a key role in funding illegal Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem — all of which rendered the existence of a Palestinian state virtually impossible.

The question now is: Why does the West continue to use the two-state solution as its political parameter for a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while at the same time ensuring that its own prescription for conflict-resolution never becomes a reality?

The answer partly lies in the fact that the two-state solution was never devised for implementation to begin with. Like the “peace process” and other pretenses, it aimed to promote among Palestinians and Arabs the idea that there is a goal worth striving for, despite being unattainable.

However, even that goal was itself conditioned on a set of demands that were unrealistic to begin with. Historically, Palestinians had to renounce violence (their armed resistance to Israel’s military occupation), consent to various UN resolutions (even if Israel still rejects those resolutions), accept Israel’s “right” to exist as a Jewish state, and so on.

That yet-to-be-established Palestinian state was also meant to be demilitarized, divided between the West Bank and Gaza, and excluding most of occupied East Jerusalem. Many new “creative” solutions were also offered to alleviate any Israeli fears that the non-existent Palestinian state, in case of its establishment, would pose a threat to Israel.

At times, discussions were afoot about a confederation between Palestine and Jordan, and at other times — as in the most recent proposal by the head of the Jewish Home Party, Israeli Minister Naftali Bennett — making Gaza a state of its own and annexing to Israel 60 percent of the West Bank.

When Israel’s allies — frustrated by the rise of the right wing in Israel and the obstinacy of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — insist that time is running out for a two-state solution, they express their worries in the form of tough love. Israel’s settlement activity is “increasingly cementing an irreversible one-state reality,” said Kerry in his major policy speech last month.

Such a reality would force Israel to either compromise on the Jewish identity of the state (as if having religious/ethnic identities for a modern democratic state is a common precondition), or having to contend with being an Apartheid state (as if such a reality does not exist anyway).

Kerry warned Israel that it will eventually be left with the option of placing Palestinians “under a permanent military occupation that deprives them of the most basic freedoms,” thus paving the ground for a “separate and unequal” scenario. Yet while warning that the possibility of a two-state solution is disintegrating, few bothered to try to understand the reality from a Palestinian perspective.

For Palestinians, the debate on Israel having to choose between being democratic and Jewish is ludicrous. For them, Israel’s democracy applies fully to its Jewish citizens and no one else, while Palestinians have subsisted for decades behind walls, fences, prisons and besieged enclaves such as the Gaza Strip.
And with two separate laws, rules and realities applying to two separate groups in the same land, Kerry’s “separate but unequal” Apartheid scenario took place the moment Israel was established in 1948.

Fed up by the illusions of their own failed leadership, according to a recent poll, two-thirds of Palestinians now agree that a two-state solution is not possible. That margin is growing as fast as the massive illegal settlement enterprise dotting the occupied West Bank and Jerusalem.

This is not an argument against the two-state solution, for it merely existed as a ruse to pacify Palestinians, buy time and demarcate the conflict with a mirage-like political horizon. If the US was indeed keen on a two-state solution, it would have fought vehemently to make it a reality decades ago. To say that the two-state solution is now dead is to subscribe to the illusion that it was once alive and possible.

That said, it behooves everyone to understand that coexistence in one democratic state is not a dark scenario that spells doom for the region. It is time to abandon unattainable illusions and focus all energies to foster coexistence based on equality and justice for all. There can be one state between the river and the sea, and that is a democratic state for all its people, regardless of their ethnicity or religious beliefs.

With yet another sports competition just moved out of Russia (nakanune.ru/news/2017/1/9/22457512/) and attention to former sports minister Vitaly Mutko’s role in the doping scandal intensifying (echo.msk.ru/blog/gudkov/1906450-echo/), many in Moscow now fear that Russia could be stripped of the 2018 World Cup.

That would be a both a major personal and public relations disaster for Vladimir Putin who has long insisted that hosting the World Cup was just as important an indication that Russia under his leadership was again “standing on its feet” as was the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, now so tarnished by the Russian government’s doping program.

As a result, some in Moscow are considering how best to play defense, including radical steps like firing Mutko, in an effort to save the situation. And it is likely although certainly not the subject of public discussion that the Kremlin will try to save its right to host the competition by trying to corrupt any decision-making process about it.

On the “Versiya” portal, Irina Gritsinskaya says that FIF has begun an investigation into the role of Mutkov in the doping scandal and that if it determines that he was involved, he will be banned from football in the future and the 2018 World Cup may be shifted from Russia (versia.ru/posleduet-li-za-rassledovaniem-deyatelnosti-mutko-lishenie-rossii-futbolnogo-chempionata-mira-2018).

The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) had pointed to Mutko in its report of some six months ago, the sports commentator says. It appears to be coming up again because of the spate of decisions by various sports groups to shift international athletic competitions out of Russia to other countries.

And now it is football’s turn, she says. At the end of December, FIFA dropped Russia from 55^th to 56^th in its world rankings even though the Russian team had not taken part in any matches earlier in the month, an indication, she suggests, that the football world is now taking a closer look at all things connected to Russia.

Indeed, when the FIFA report was released, Grinitskaya says, “it became know that among those suspected of using drugs were [11 current Russian] football players,” in addition to four who had been identified as doing so earlier. That creates a new situation with which Moscow must cope.

According to Grinitskaya, the smallest loss Russia is likely to have to absorb is the retirement of Mutkov. More serious but still not fatal would be a ban on the 11 new players who reportedly have taken performance-enhancing drugs. But the most serious would be for FIFA to decide to strip Russia of the right to host the competition in 2018.

Vladimir Putin has pledged Moscow’s full cooperation with the investigation, although he has continued to insist as have all other Russian officials that there never has been and is not now a state-organized program of doping and its cover up, despite what FIFA’s earlier research showed.

The question in Moscow now is whether Russia will be allowed to host the 2018 competition or not, Grinitskaya says. Some experts like the observer for the Russian sports paper “Chempionat,’ say that FIFA will try to avoid taking the games away from Russia because of the complications that would introduce so close to their scheduled starting date.

But he and others acknowledge that pressure from various countries and athletic federations may increase to the point that FIFA will have no choice, whatever its preferences are.

Grinitskaya quotes an Italian sports writer from “Il Giornale” about what the latter says are US attempts to take the World Cup away from Russia. But he adds, in what may be Moscow’s last hope to save the situation, “I do not think that Mr. Trump will have the audacity to do so.”

When a newborn opens her eyes, she does not see well at all. You, the parent, are a blurry shape of light and dark. Soon, though, her vision comes online. Your baby will recognize you, and you can see it in her eyes. Then baby looks beyond you and that flash of recognition fades. She can’t quite make out what’s out the window. It’s another blurry world of shapes and light. But within a few months, she can see the trees outside. Her entire world is coming into focus.

UNC School of Medicine scientists have found more clues about what happens in the brains of baby mammals as they try to make visual sense of the world. The study in mice, published in the journal Nature Neuroscience, is part of an ongoing project in the lab of Spencer Smith, PhD, assistant professor of cell biology and physiology, to map the functions of the brain areas that play crucial roles in vision. Proper function of these brain areas is likely critical for vision restoration.

“There’s this remarkable biological operation that plays out during development,” Smith said. “Early on, there are genetic programs and chemical pathways that position cells in the brain and help wire up a ‘rough draft’ of the circuitry. Later, after birth, this circuitry is actively sculpted by visual experience: simply looking around our world helps developing brains wire up the most sophisticated visual processing circuitry the world has ever known. Even the best supercomputers and our latest algorithms still can’t compete with the visual processing abilities of humans and animals. We want to know how neural circuitry does this.”

If cures for partial or entire blindness can be developed through, say, gene therapy or retinal implants, then researchers will need to understand the totality of visual brain circuitry to ensure people can recover useful visual function.

“Most work on restoring vision has focused on the retina and the primary visual cortex,” Smith said. “Less work has explored the development of the higher visual areas of the brain, and their potential for recovery from early deficits. I want to understand how these higher visual areas develop. We need to know the critical time windows during which vision should be restored, and what occurs during these windows to ensure proper circuit development.”

To understand the potential challenges that vision restoration later in life might entail, take the case of bilateral cataracts — when the lenses of both eyes are cloudy and vision is severely limited. In developed countries, it’s common to have such cataracts surgically removed very early in life. If so, vision typically develops appropriately.

“But in less developed, rural parts of the world, people often don’t get to a clinic until they are teens or older,” Smith said. “They’ve gone through life seeing light and dark, fuzzy things. That’s about it. When they have the cataracts removed, they recover a large amount of visual function, but it is not complete. They can learn to read and recognize their friends. But they have great difficulty perceiving some types of visual motion.”

It’s the kind of visual perception needed during hand-eye coordination, or simply while navigating the world around you.

There are two subnetworks of visual circuitry, called the ventral and dorsal streams, and the latter of these is important for motion perception.

Smith wanted to know if visual experience is particularly essential for proper development of the dorsal stream. And he wanted to understand what could be changing at the individual neuron level during this early development.

To explore these questions, Smith and his UNC colleagues conducted hundreds of painstaking, time-consuming experiments. In essence, Smith’s lab is reverse engineering complicated brain circuitry with the help of specialized two-photon imaging systems Smith and his team designed and built at the UNC Neuroscience Center, where he is a member.

“If you want to reverse engineer a radio to know how it works, a good way to start would be to watch someone put together a radio,” Smith said. “Well, this is kind of what we’re doing. We’re using our imaging systems to watch how biology builds its visual processing circuitry.”

In one series of experiments, Smith’s team reared mice in complete darkness for several weeks. Even the daily care of the mice was in darkness with the aid of night-vision goggles. Using his imaging system and precision surgical methods, Smith and colleagues could view specific areas of the brain with neuron-level resolution. They showed that the ventral visual stream in mice did indeed come online immediately, with individual neurons firing as the mice responded to visual stimuli. But the dorsal stream did not.

“Keeping the mice in darkness significantly degraded the magnitude of visual responses in the dorsal stream – responses to what they were seeing,” Smith said. The neurons in the dorsal area weren’t firing as strongly as they did in mice raised with normal visual experience. “Interestingly, even after a recovery period in a normal light-dark cycle, the visual deficit in the dorsal stream persisted.”

This is reminiscent of the persistent visual deficits seen in humans with bilateral cataracts that aren’t repaired until later in life.

“Not only did the mice need visual experience to develop their dorsal stream of visual processing, but they needed it in an early developmental time window to refine the brain circuitry,” Smith said. “Otherwise, their vision never properly developed.”

These experiments can help explain what happens in the human analogs of the ventral and dorsal streams when we’re babies, when part of our vision slowly develops and we try to make sense of the world moving around us during the first several months after birth.

Smith added, “Now that we have a little bit of a feel for the lay of the land – how these two subnetworks develop — I really want to drill down into the actual computations that these different brain areas are performing. I want to analyze what information neurons in higher visual areas are encoding. What are they encoding better, or more efficiently, than neurons in the primary visual cortex? What, exactly, are they doing that allows us to analyze complex visual stimuli so quickly and efficiently?”

It has become consensus to argue that we have approached ‘peak trade’ or the ‘end of globalisation’: that the past five years of stagnant global trade growth are not temporary, but instead reflect persistent forces that are likely to drive a continued stagnation in global trade over the long run. Though this view preceded the Brexit referendum, this column argues that it has now been amplified by the UK’s vote to leave the EU and the prospect that, potentially, US President-elect Trump and other leaders across developed markets will implement protectionist trade policies. The authors consider the arguments for ‘peak trade’, and conclude that, though downside risks to the trade outlook are prominent, there is little evidence – yet – that the current stagnation in global trade is predestined to extend far into the future.

By Ian Tomb and Kamakshya Trivedi*

Over the past five years, global trade growth has been stagnant. With protectionist sentiment intensifying across advanced economies and China and other emerging markets (EMs) appearing to pivot away from export-oriented growth strategies that had incentivised the creation of global supply chains in the 2000s, a hypothesis informally known as ‘peak trade’ has become increasingly popular (Economist 2014). According to this view, the current trade stagnation is not temporary, but instead reflects fundamental changes to the global economy. In the coming decades, these changes will prevent growth in global trade from outpacing growth in global GDP, as it has since World War II. If true, this idea has profound implications. It implies a stoppage, or even a rolling back, of many of the core benefits and costs that have come to define the globalised world, including increased gains from trade, cross-border financial flows and geopolitical interdependence.

Our analysis (Tomb and Trivedi 2016), which we outline here, counters this view. Using a variety of approaches, together with data that allows us to track the paths of nearly 400,000 trade flows over the past 20 years, we push back against three primary variants of the peak trade argument.

Peak trade view #1: A falling ‘trade beta’

First, many economists note that the measured sensitivity of trade growth to income (or GDP) growth has declined in recent years (for example, Escaith and Miroudot 2015). This ‘trade beta’ has fallen from above 2 to near, and even below, 1, the value at which trade simply keeps up with income. Our work suggests, however, that the trade beta—not a clearly-defined structural parameter, and difficult to estimate without bias—may not reliably represent the actual (causal) effect of income growth on trade growth. Shifts in different countries’ relative GDP growth rates, for example, can distort the trade beta in standard cross-country models, creating the impression that income is having a larger or smaller influence on trade.

More generally, the trade beta is not a sufficient statistic for the evolution of global trade. Shifts in the measured trade beta sometimes sit awkwardly with the broader global trade picture. For example, Figure 1 shows that the trade beta—estimated using a standard ‘gravity equation’—declined sharply in the early 2000s, a period of historically rapid trade growth. Moreover, estimating the trade beta with our detailed data set reveals year-to-year changes that are too volatile—including in recent years—to plausibly reflect shifts in meaningful economic relationships.

Figure 1 Shifts in the ‘trade beta’ fit awkwardly with shifts in global trade growth

Notes: The figure plots 95% confidence intervals surrounding estimates of the income elasticity of imports recovered by applying a standard (simple) cross-country gravity equation to a balanced panel of nearly 400,000 different exporter-importer-good triples.
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; World Bank.

While we can’t rule out the possibility that the relationship between income and trade has changed over time, we think the evidence is also consistent with a simpler explanation. The causal effect of income growth on trade growth may have stayed roughly stable over time, while other forces—including shifts in the demand for tradeables, changes in trade costs and the availability of trade finance, and the ebbs and flows of protectionist trade policies—have played the starring role in driving global trade over the past two decades, and will continue to do so in the future.

Peak trade view #2: A ‘structural’ trade slowdown

The collapse in global trade growth in 2011 is an example of the influence of other such factors. The slowdown in trade flows across the globe during the US debt ceiling crisis and the euro area sovereign crisis that summer was far more severe than predicted by observable short-run (or ‘cyclical’) drivers, such as a mild slowdown in global GDP growth. This prompted many observers to conclude that ‘structural’ changes—forces operating over very long time horizons, and with the potential to drive trade growth still weaker in coming decades—were, in large part, responsible (Constantinescu et al. 2016). We think the facts sit better with an alternative interpretation: a return to trend. Setting aside the financial crisis years, global trade growth has undergone two major shifts in the past two decades:

1. In the early 2000s, annual growth in the value of global trade increased from tepid, but not historically slow rates (1.6% from 1995-2002) to historic double-digit levels (12.5% from 2002-2008).
2. Then, in the summer of 2011, trade value growth quickly fell to levels close to zero, where it has remained for the past five years. While clearly low, these growth rates are considerably closer to historical benchmarks than the very high levels of trade growth observed during the 2000s (Figure 2).

Figure 2 The trade boom of the 2000s, not the trade stagnation of the 2010s, is historic

Notes: The figure plots annual % growth in global trade and global GDP, 1995-2014.
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; World Bank.

In sum, the global trade slowdown does not appear to be the beginning, or the middle, of a downward deviation from a 70-year trend of globalisation, but instead marks the end of a decade-long upward deviation from this long-run trend—the trade boom of the 2000s. This is evident not just at the aggregate level, but also when we dig deeper into individual trade flows. For example, Figure 3 shows that the countries that dramatically increased their import growth in the 2000s (such as India and Russia) saw the largest import growth declines in 2011, while countries that experienced a mild acceleration in the 2000s (such as Mexico and the Philippines) saw their import growth rates only mildly affected by the global trade slowdown.

Figure 3 The trade slowdown is, in large part, the end of the 2000s trade boom

Notes: The figure plots the ISO codes of 49 countries that, together, account for roughly 95% of global imports. Imports are measured in value terms. The regression results reported in the figure are weighted by each country’s average share of global imports, 2002-2014. The four colours of the plotted countries represent four geographical regions: Africa and the Middle East (orange), the Americas (red), Asia (green) and Europe (blue). Countries plotted in lower (upper) case featured 2002 per-capita GDP of less than (greater than) current USD $20,000.
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; World Bank.

As Figure 4 makes clear, a similar pattern is also visible at the level of individual goods: those goods that saw the largest increases in the rates by which they were traded in the early 2000s then saw these growth rates fall back to baseline during the global trade slowdown.

Figure 4 Trade in specific goods accelerated in the 2000s, then returned to baseline during the global trade slowdown

Notes: The figure plots 166 goods that account for 95% of global trade between 2002 and 2014. Dotted line represents regression of vertical on horizontal axis. Each bubble represents one of 255 three-digit UNCTAD good codes. Bubble size represents the good’s average share of global trade, 2002-2014. The regression results in the figure are weighted by these shares. The displayed categories 333 and 334 each represent petroleum. Manufactures are plotted in dark blue; commodities are plotted in magenta.
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

Peak trade view #3: A change in the EM growth model

Finally, many observers suggest that, by beginning to turn away from export-led growth models, EMs—and, especially, China—have driven the trade slowdown and may weigh on trade growth further in coming decades.¹ We agree that long-run declines in Chinese trade growth likely reflect important and potentially persistent changes to the Chinese economy, and that these changes may impose an important drag on the open economies of Asia in future (for example, China alone accounted for a third of the slowdown of South Korea’s exports during the global trade slowdown).

However, because China and other EMs don’t (yet) account for a large enough share of global trade, their slowing import growth matters less for the global picture than import growth declines in developed markets, particularly in Europe. Europe imports roughly 43% of global traded goods, but accounts for only roughly 20% of global GDP. It represents an important source of external demand for nearly all of the world’s major exporters, and decreased its rate of import growth by slightly more than the global average in 2011. Weighing each country’s import slowdown by its share of global trade (a ‘shift-share’ framework), we find that Europe accounts for roughly half of the global trade slowdown. By contrast, China—which imports a far smaller fraction of global trade, but slowed its rate of import growth at a comparable pace—contributed only 10% (Figure 5).

Figure 5 Europe imports a large share of global trade, and was the key driver of the global trade slowdown

Notes: The figure decomposes the global trade slowdown of 2011 into seven comprehensive categories of importers: Europe, ex-Germany (Eurp), Asia, ex-China and Japan (Asia), the USA (USA), Germany (DEU), China (CHN), North America (NAmr), Japan (JPN), Africa and the Middle East (A&ME), and South America (SAmr).
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; World Bank.

Downside risks are prominent, but ‘peak trade’ is premature

With the UK voting to leave the EU, US President-elect Trump highlighting his intention to withdraw the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the potential for political populism to make inroads in continental Europe, the outlook for global trade is uncertain, and the downside risks from policy have risen. While it is easy to get pessimistic about the prospects for trade growth based on recent political news, it is however worth noting that we have seen some progress towards important trade agreements (such as the current negotiations between Japan and the EU), and that some trade flows—including flows sent from key global exporters in Asia (Figure 6)—have quickened in 2016.

Figure 6 Some recent signs of global trade growth—including exports from key Asian countries—have been encouraging

Notes: The figure plots the 6 month moving average of annualised 6 month % export growth (seasonally-adjusted) for the displayed exporter.
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research; Haver Analytics.

To sum up, we do not think that the stagnant trade growth of the past five years is more sinister than the typical ebbs and flows associated with shifts in income growth, technological innovations, and policy changes that have driven the growth of global trade since World War II. Though material downside risks to the trade outlook are highly visible at the moment, a conclusion that this represents ‘peak trade’ is, in our view, premature.

About the authors:
*Ian Tomb, Emerging Markets economist, Goldman Sachs

Kamakshya Trivedi, Chief Emerging Markets Macro Strategist, Goldman Sachs

References:
Hoekman, B (ed.) (2015). The global trade slowdown: A new normal? CEPR Press.

Constantinescu, C, A Mattoo and M Ruta (2016). Explaining the global trade slowdown. VoxEU.org, 18 Jan 2015.

The Economist (2014). International trade: A troubling trajectory. Dec 13.

Escaith, H  and S Miroudot (2015). World trade and income remain exposed to gravity, in B Hoekman (ed), The global trade slowdown: A new normal? CEPR Press.

Tomb, I. & Trivedi, K. (2016). Pushing back against ‘peak trade’. Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper 230, available at the Goldman Sachs research portal.

Endnotes

[1] An excellent introduction to these arguments can be found in Hoekman (2015).

Following president-elect Trump’s jab at “Hillary Flunky” Meryl Streep’s anti-Trump tirade at The Golden Globes, The White House has defended the actress’ “carefully considered message” as protected by her “first amendment rights.”

President-elect Trump was clear how he felt about Streep’s speech…

“Meryl Streep, one of the most over-rated actresses in Hollywood, doesn’t know me but attacked last night at the Golden Globes. She is a Hillary flunky who lost big. For the 100th time, I never “mocked” a disabled reporter (would never do that) but simply showed him groveling” when he totally changed a 16 year old story that he had written in order to make me look bad. Just more very dishonest media!”

And now, as The Hill reports, President Obama’s top spokesman on Monday defended actress Meryl Streep’s Golden Globes speech that criticized President-elect Donald Trump.

“She clearly was delivering a thoughtful, carefully considered message that she believes in deeply,” White House press secretary Josh Earnest said.

“It seemed to me to be fairly straightforward exercise of her First Amendment rights as a citizen of the United States,” he added.

Earnest said he has not spoken to Obama about the speech, but predicted the president wouldn’t publicly echo Streep’s criticisms while he is still in office.

Earnest concluded with a final jab at Trump…

“He’s got institutional responsibilities… He has to set aside those personal feelings in order to preside over an effective transition… The president has faithfully presided over a process that has done exactly that.”

Obama is an admirer of the Academy Award-winning actress. He awarded her the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2014.

Who can blame her for being upset after dumping $114,000 on a loser…

It cannot be denied that the ulama or the classical Islamic scholars are still looked up as resource persons in everyday practical Muslim life around the world. Therefore, empowering and equipping them with the modern-age skills of sophistication will greatly help the larger Muslim society usher in an enlightened religious, social and cultural worldview.

Scores of preeminent Islamic intellectuals have greatly benefited from their madrasa background in making headway in their academic life. Consequently, a considerable number of Muslim parents get their children enrolled in madrasas despite the unfavourable perception towards the madrasa education and its relevance in the contemporary age.

However, evolving a progressive, pluralistic and accommodative Islamic theology to enable the traditional classical Islamic scholars (ulama) to revitalise their traditions is a long overdue. Doing this will certainly help the Madrasas’ thought leaders deepen their worldview incorporating the progressive religious insights and scientific trends in the light of established Islamic ethos.

Keeping this in view, the US-based University of Notre Dame has introduced an online program to enhance capacity and acquire tools for academic engagement by the Contending Modernities initiative. Most particularly, this extensive program is focused on the conciliation of traditional Islamic thought with contemporary scientific and philosophical worldviews.

The three-year course will primarily consist of four parts: Ilmul Kalam (Islamic scholastic theology), Islamic jurisprudence (Ilm-ul-Fiqh), Muslim history (al-Tarikh al-Islami) and an objective study of different branches of the classical and modern Islamic theology. A certain amount of emphasis will also be laid on the English and Arabic language ability in writing.

A well-versed team of three eminent Islamic scholars—who are also madrasa graduates—has been formed to run this long-term course:

Dr. Ebrahim Moosa, a Professor of Islamic Studies at the University of Notre Dame with appointments in the Department of History and the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies in the Keough School of Global Affairs. Dr. Moosa was trained in both traditional (orthodox) Islamic institutions in India and in the modern academy specializing in the study of religion at the University of Cape Town. He earned his ʿalimiyya degree specializing in Islamic Studies and Arabic Studies (1981) from Darul Uloom Nadwatul ʿUlama, one of India’s foremost Islamic seminaries in the city of Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh.

Dr. Mahan Mirza, a Professor of the Practice in the Contending Modernities program at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, has spent several years working with religious groups around issues of social justice. He earned an MA from Hartford Seminary in the study of Islam and Christian-Muslim relations and a PhD from Yale University’s program in religious studies and studied Islam from a diverse set of perspectives. Dr. Mirza worked on Abu Rayhan al-Biruni, a scientist from the 11th century, focusing on his intellectual framework of inquiry of. He also contributed to the establishment of Zaytuna College, the first Muslim liberal arts college to be accredited in the United States, serving as the college’s Dean of Faculty from 2013-2016.

Dr. Waris Mazhari, a graduate of Uloom Deoband and presently a lecturer at the Department of Islamic Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, in New Delhi, has been, for the past fifteen years, working as an editor of the Urdu monthly journal Tarjuman-e- Darul Uloom. He also served as Research Associate for Virtual Dialogues, an initiative at Duke University in North Carolina, USA. A prolific writer with countless articles and multiple books under his name, his chief interests are in the areas of interfaith dialogue, peace and social harmony, the reconstruction of religious thought in Islam, and reform in Indian madrasas.

Starting with an introduction to the course and its chief coordinators, Dr.Waris Mazhari, the lead faculty and teacher at the Department of Islamic Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, said, “The program offers a potentially transformative 3-year educational experience with far-reaching consequences. It will provide the tools, experiences, and intellectual resources to appreciate the virtues of a cosmopolitan outlook consistent with the highest Islamic ideals and in tune with the social and political imperatives of peaceful coexistence in a multifaith and multicultural world.

“As future leaders and scholars, these graduates will be equipped to deal with the challenges of a rapidly globalizing world in the information and digital age,” he said.

Elaborating the key concept behind the Madrasa Discourses program, Professor Ebrahim Moosa of Islamic Studies, University of Notre Dame, said that the project proposes a conciliation of traditional Islamic thought with contemporary scientific and philosophical worldviews that can result in orthodox affirmations of human dignity that are essential for peaceful coexistence in a pluralistic world.

“This will be accomplished through an educational curriculum that enables traditional Muslim scholars and ulama in India to update their tradition by deepening their theological and scientific literacy,” he said.

Professor Moosa also informed that the course is aimed at engaging over one hundred madrasa graduates and religious leaders, and that it will provide globally accessible educational modules. “The program is envisioned as a modest step in the effort to revitalize the intellectual culture of Muslim societies,” he averred.

Professor Mahan Mirza of Notre Dame University, who is also a Lead Faculty of the program, participated in the introductory workshop through Skype. He underlined the imaginative ways of thinking about religion, theology, science, philosophy, faith and values, while stressing the need for constant revitalization and renewal in the Islamic theology (tajdeed fil deen).

“Madrasa graduates and young Islamic theologians will be exposed to exercises in critical thinking and the construction of new knowledge in the service of their societies and communities. Upgrading the capacity of these Madrasa-trained theologians will have a multiplier effect on millions of India’s Muslim population and beyond. As advocates of theological literacy that values human dignity the next generation of Muslim leaders can confidently engage the world with faith and shared-values across cultures and traditions. The transformative impact they will have is a long-term goal of the project,” he said.

A select group of thirty recent madrasa graduates will be enrolled in the course in the spring and summer of 2017. Only students who will qualify the test and interview will be eligible for admission into the course.

*Ghulam Rasool Dehlvi is a madrasa graduate, classical Islamic scholar and Arabic-Urdu writer and translator. He has graduated from a leading Sufi Islamic seminary of India. After BA in Arabic (Hons.), he has done his M. A. in Comparative Religions & Civilisations and a double M.A. in Islamic Studies from Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. Presently, he is pursuing his PhD in Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.

By N. Sathiya Moorthy*

By trying to react half-mockingly at former President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s open threat that he would try and topple the present Government in the New Year, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe has only expressed nervousness, not confidence. As has been the case since the duo came to power in January 2015, President Maithripala Sirisena has come up with a ‘measured reaction’, if it’s any.

There is a difference, though. Unlike on earlier occasions whenever their two parties, namely Ranil’s UNP and Maithiri’s SLFP, had different views on an issue of governance, the latter has actually reacted in this case. He has said that the Government would complete its full term, ending (only) in 2019. His camp did not immediately clarify if he meant this Government, or another, with or without the ‘senior’ UNP partner.

It’s not given to democracies for the political Opposition to publicly challenge the governing party or parties that they would be toppled. It can happen only in Sri Lanka, which is definitely a democracy – but not with all the western norms (!) in place and effectively so. Not that all of the western norms amount to ‘best practices’. Not that all the western nations have the ‘best’ of democracy.

Best practices

Democracy is all about (healthy) precedents and (best) practices. In Sri Lanka, however, floor-crossing midway through the life of a Parliament is a practice – good, bad or ugly. In nations like Italy and Japan, floor-crossings are dime a dozen, en bloc though. There, a new government without fresh national elections every other year, if not month, is the preferred way. Without acknowledging, Sri Lanka has been among the ‘best practitioner’. It may not be the best of practices, however.

In Sri Lanka, again, parties and political leaderships have given themselves new Constitutions, greater powers, et al, from time to time. No leader or political party in power can absolve himself or herself of the ‘constitutional fraud’, all in the name of the people and the nation. Where they succeeded, the nation and democracy suffered. Where they failed, again the nation and the people did not succeed.

Politicians in this country have never ever talked about an ‘anti-defection law’. They need the ‘flexibility’ that the continuing scheme offers to reassure themselves, and promise the moon for intended/ anticipated ‘defectors’. The present (purported) efforts at Constitution-making are no different. It may be so for years and decades to come.

It could not have been otherwise, either. President Sirisena, and all of his SLFP team-members in the Government or in Parliament and Provincial Councils, or outside, have been ‘defectors’ themselves. Rajapaksa had turned the defection games of his predecessors in office into a fine-art. So much so, he did not – or, could not see – it was a weapon that could hit and hurt the holder-user at the wrong time and in the wrong place.

In power, Mahinda provided for checking defections from his own side to the other in Parliament and PCs. He did not expect his own No 2 to defect. It’s another matter that most, and not just many, of the ‘defectors’ in the Sirisena-led SLFP faction did so only after Rajapaksa had lost the presidential polls.

Though known and expected to defect on a future date, Sirisena kept his counsels mostly to himself. Rajapaksa anticipated a ‘Sirisena rebellion’ from within on a wicket that he thought had a strong emotional appeal – namely, ‘Sinhala Buddhism’, and provided for the same even in his post-war political moves on power-devolution. He did not expect the other to take up a larger cause, that too in the name of democracy – and succeed, too.

Notice on China?

Rajapaksa made his intent and declaration at a meeting with ‘foreign correspondents’ based in Colombo. Not that it needed any explanation, elaboration or even publicity. Political parties the world over, especially so in democracies, have always acted with similar intents and purposes. What they intent doing, how they go about it, and where they succeed, is alone what makes the difference.

It’s anybody’s guess why he chose the forum instead of talking to the domestic media, which is the best communication platform available to any leader in any democracy. Better still, Mahinda R could have openly challenged the present-day rulers from a political platform – and in Sinhala, the language that his ‘electoral constituency’ understands, and/or understands better.

Clearly, Mahinda was serving the first notice on the ‘overseas backers’ of the twin leadership at the helm. It does not have to mean that they are all funding and propping up the present leadership. Either he has come to see them as doing so, or it’s just an ‘early warning’ that they better draw the line lest they should pay a diplomatic and/or a ‘decisive’ price in bilateral terms.

Ever since losing the presidential polls, Rajapaksa has been talking about western powers working on a ‘regime-change’ in Sri Lanka and that some Sri Lankans too had conspired with them. He did not name names about domestic ‘co-conspirators’, but named only the Indian neighbour in the process.

Maybe, he did so in March 2015 only because he was talking to an Indian journalist. Maybe, he did not talk to a western journalist and named his or her country, as the value-based questions might have been of a different kind – say, on human rights, war-crimes and accountability issues. It would not have been focussed as much on the betterment or worsening of bilateral relations. But that’s what Indian interlocutors, including journalists, are prone to.

This time round, Rajapaksa used even a stronger term to ‘describe’ the Indian behaviour. He said that India was behaving like a ‘mouse’ (holding its breadth and keeping mum) when the present Government (too) was moving closer to the latter’s Chinese ‘adversary’.

But it could also imply that Mahinda R was addressing and targeting China, too.  After all, China also quickly adapted itself to the emerging/existing ground realities in Sri Lanka and has been doing ‘better businesses than during the Rajapaksa era. It hurts, and naturally so, for Rajapaksa to see that China too has been looking at the ‘business’ end of the bilateral game, and not of politics and ‘political loyalties’ anymore!

Bothering question

Does it mean that China could and would begin talking even more about the past deeds and deals in the country, as much as it has started talking about the present-day rulers, the latter more in the nature of policies and not personalities?  If so, where could it begin and where would or should it end – when, how and why? That should be a question bothering the Rajapaksas already.

As coincidence would have it, the Rajapaksa ‘threat’ comes after top Rajapaksa aide and ex-Foreign Minister G L Peiris declaring that the former did not discuss ‘regime-change’ in Sri Lanka when the two were in Beijing a few weeks ago, as a ‘State guest’ or sorts. It might have been the case, too. But did it imply that the Rajapaksa camp was expecting/hoping that it would have been the case, otherwise?

Clearly, China has learnt real-politik from western counterparts/competitors, well and fast? They do not drop ‘old friends’ like hot bricks. They maintain the traditional Chinese SOP, yes. But when it comes to acknowledging that they needed to do business with the new rulers in a democracy, they would rather do so than try and prop up someone who is not going to return to power by any stretch of imagination.

The new Government’s 19-A has returned the nation to the days prior to Rajapaksa’s 18-A, which gave him the opportunity of serving a third term, if voted in. It went beyond the original constitutional upper-limit of two five-year terms for the President. The new Constitution is expected to reiterate the same even more forcefully and fiercely. Whether the ‘senior’ UNP partner in the Government and Parliament would otherwise be able to ‘abolish’ the Executive Presidency wholly and whole-heartedly is another question.

Sirisena-centric?

For all purposes, the Rajapaksa threat is aimed at his own camp-followers in the JO parliamentary party. He needs to reassure them that he has not given up, or would not yield to political or legal pressures of whatever kind lest they should themselves cross over. Two, he needs to unsettle those on the other side of the political fence, starting with the SLFP, but not excluding others – parties and parliamentarians, jointly and severally.

Rajapaksa’s threat however is as much aimed at Sirisena as any other SLFP leader. Obviously, he wants the present Government unsettled as early as can be achieved. There is no denying that the popular imagination that the anti-Rajapaksa social media in particular in the weeks and months ahead of the twin-polls for the presidency and Parliament in January and August 2015 are all dead and gone. No third force other than the ruling combine and the Rajapaksa-centric Joint Opposition (JO) is visible even remotely in the distant horizon.

Even without the Rajapaksas trying it, anti-incumbency is beginning to catch up, as can only be expected. It’s only natural in any political climate. The more the Rajapaksas had tried, the greater would have been the cohesion in the past. But the slow pace of the Rajapaksas’ political mobilisation post-polls meant that the inherent differences within an ‘unnatural cohabitation’ would have to end.

In the case of CBK-Ranil combine, mutually-opposed as they were since the beginning of the latter’s Prime Minister Job in the first half of the last decade, the inherent divisions meant that the former would sack the ‘democratically-elected’ Government under a democratic provision that UNP’s very own JRJ had included in his Second Republican Constitution of 1978. Incumbent Sirisena now does not have any use for the same. Nor does he have the luxury of dismissing elected Governments and dissolving functional Parliaments at leisure and pleasure, just because they had completed the first year in office. His own Government’s 19-A has ensured as much.

Mahinda R’s current threat thus primarily targets Sirisena, also because he does not have the numbers to have the latter replaced without fresh elections that are not anyway due for three more years. The message is that the latter take the lead, unsettle the UNP leadership of the Government, and let Mahinda R or someone of his choice to become Prime Minister in Ranil’s place. It’s a job that Rajapaksa was ready to settle for, and campaigned for, after losing the presidential polls. He even came down to contesting and winning a seat in Parliament.

Third narrative

Alternatively, the Rajapaksa camp could also target the Sirisena faction of their SLFP to deplete him of a parliamentary majority – and thus credibility. A third narrative seems to be that the Rajapaksa camp would readily adapt the GLP-led Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), ‘taken over’ by them not very long ago, and bid their time until such time the ‘official’ SLFP welcomed them back with open arms – rather, with folded arms and whispering humbleness.

Peiris has already indicated more than once that the SLPP would contest elections in the company of the Rajapaksa-centric JO. It’s another matter that barring a few, none in the camp has the capacity and/or capability to win their own seats – that they may either hold now in Parliament or in the PCs, or intent holding – without the ‘Mahinda’ stamp, blessings and campaign-power.

By mockingly challenging Mahinda to ‘topple’ the Government when he is away on a foreign tour in the first half of the New Year, PM Ranil has not displayed any confidence. He has only exposed the UNP’s legitimate nervousness at the possibility. It’s then not for him or the UNP, or even President Sirisena, who also heads the SLFP partner, to set the time and mode for a Rajapaksa attempt of the kind. The latter would choose his time, place and mode. That’s politics.

Close to two years in office, the Maithri-Ranil duo has done little to discredit the Rajapaksa regime – other than in mere words. They have gone the Rajapaksa way on key issues of governance and performance, foreign and economic policies. More importantly, they have done precious little to curtail Malinda’s political mobility in terms of corruption charges that they had flagged since his days in office. PM Ranil has also punctuated his innings with a periodic outburst at the media, building upon the reputation that Mahinda R had accumulated during his years in office.

Under the Constitution, Mahinda R cannot return as President, at least until a further amendment became possible and is carried through. He may not be able to become Prime Minister if cornered in a corruption case. It’s the line that’s still available to his detractors in this Government. But neither can deny him the political leadership and electoral backing that he demonstrably has. That’s a beginning, not the end. Mahinda seems to be banking on it, and wanting to cash on it, too!

This article was published in The Sunday Leader.

The tragic shooting at the Fort Lauderdale airport on January 6 occurred in a “gun-free” zone. Florida is one of six states that make it illegal for individuals–even those who have concealed carry permits–to carry guns in any part of an airport terminal.

The killer’s motive is at this point undetermined, but he did fly to the Fort Lauderdale airport with his gun legally checked in his luggage, and after arriving took it out to shoot people in the terminal. Some people speculate that shooters deliberately choose “gun-free” zones for their attacks to minimize the probability that their attacks will be interrupted by legally armed citizens. Would this shooting have happened had the baggage claim area in the Fort Lauderdale airport not been a “gun-free” zone?

This is a policy-relevant question because prior to the shooting, Florida State Senator Greg Steube introduced SB 140, legislation that would allow concealed weapon permit holders to carry in airport terminals, college campuses, and other places that the state now declares “gun-free.”

As Second Amendment advocates often say, declaring a place to be “gun-free” only keeps law-abiding people from carrying guns there. Someone who wants to engage in a mass shooting surely will not be deterred by a location being designated “gun-free,” and might be encouraged because it lessens the probability of armed opposition.

I’m not opposed to gun-free zones, but the only way it makes sense is to actually check to make sure people are not carrying guns. If people have to walk through a metal detector, have the contents of packages checked, etc., then there is some assurance the area really is gun-free. If anybody can just walk in, designating an area “gun-free” makes it slightly more dangerous for everyone.

The motive for this shooter to fly to Fort Lauderdale and unpack his gun to shoot in the baggage claim area is somewhat of a mystery because anyone can just walk into the baggage claim area at any time. The shooter could have taken the bus to Fort Lauderdale and taken an Uber to the airport to go to the baggage claim area, without having taken the flight, so the fact that the shooter flew to Fort Lauderdale is only peripherally relevant to the shooting, even though it took place in an airport.

When events like this happen, questionably effective security measures are often put into place in response. We have to take off our shoes, and are limited in our carrying “liquids, aerosols, and gels,” because of policy responses to specific past events.

I’ve seen some suggestions, after this shooting, that firearms be banned from checked luggage. Thus, it is worth emphasizing that because there are no security checkpoints at baggage claim, banning guns from checked luggage will not prevent criminals from taking guns to baggage claim areas. Whether guns can be carried in checked luggage has no policy relevance to this particular event.

As to policy relevance, the shooting may have a bearing on Senator Steube’s bill to allow people with concealed carry permits to be armed in airport baggage areas and other “gun-free” zones. The Florida legislature will be taking up the issue in the next few months. What do you think? Should Florida remove the “gun-free” designation from airport terminals? (Areas past the TSA checkpoints would, of course, remain gun-free.)

I’m not trying to convince readers of anything because people on both sides have strong opinions, and I don’t think I could change any minds in a blog post. In the context of this recent shooting, I am saying that the shooter did not need to fly his gun in to commit his crime. Anyone can bring a gun into baggage claim because nobody checks to see who’s armed, although Florida is one of the few states in which it is illegal to do so.

Should the Florida legislature pass SB 140 and allow concealed carry permit holders to bring firearms into airport terminals? Nobody is stopping them or checking now, even though it is against the law. In light of Florida SB 140, this is not a hypothetical question.

This article was published by The Beacon.