British Prime Minister Theresa May came under the threat of a potential terrorist attack last week when information on her flight from Washington to Ankara became available to anyone with a real-time aircraft tracker, experts said.

The Flightradar24 website uncovered the exact location, height, speed and direction of the plane known as “May Force One,” turning the prime minister into “a flying target” for terrorists, experts told the Daily Mail.

Possible attackers could have obtained the full information on May’s flight simply by using a mobile phone.

Theresa May heading home… #MayForceOne Kittyhawk 37
" class="wp-smiley" style="height: 1em; max-height: 1em;" /> RAF Voyager ZZ336 KRF37 https://t.co/05rLh0VW6Y
(h/t @IclouMik ) pic.twitter.com/HFwPONFciP

— CivMilAir ✈ (@CivMilAir) January 28, 2017

“This is perfect information for a would-be terrorist. They should have turned off the tracker on the plane. It is ridiculous and irresponsible that this information is publicly available,” said Chris Phillips, the former head of the National Counter Terrorism Security Office.

“Planes are in the most danger when they are taking off and landing. If you know the next incoming plane has the prime minister on board, you can lie in wait and fire something at it,” he added.

Experts insisted that the transponder, a device that reveals the plane’s location, installed on May’s aircraft, should be switched off, as is the one that is installed on the US president’s Air Force One.

Civil planes have two transponders. The second one isn’t visible to websites such as Flightradar24. It is instead used for communicating with air traffic controllers during flight.

May had quite a lengthy overall route with flights from London to Philadelphia, then Washington, where she met with US President Donald Trump, before jetting off to Turkey’s capital, Ankara, for talks.

Following a string of terrorist attacks in Turkey last year, the UK Foreign Office issued a warning for British tourists, saying that there is believed to be “a heightened risk of terrorist attack against the aviation industry in Turkey.”

Normally, military and diplomatic jets do not appear on websites such as Flightradar24. However, last week, another RAF plane was also tracked down by an enthusiast taking off in London and landing on Malta and back.

The converted RAF Voyager, previously nicknamed “Cam Force One,” made its first in July 2016, when it took then-Prime Minister David Cameron to a NATO meeting in Warsaw. The jet, which was refitted at a cost of £10 million ($12.5 million) is used to take top-ranking officials and the Royal Family to overseas meetings.

There has not been a Protestant on the Supreme Court since Justice John Paul Stevens retired in 2010. There has not been a Protestant nominated since 1990 when George W. Bush called upon David Souter. Right now there are five Roman Catholics and three Jews. Neil Gorsuch, according to the Washington Post, belongs to St. John’s Episcopal Church in Boulder, Colorado. I skimmed though the website and it appears to be typical liberal mainline Protestant Church. (It took me almost five minutes and multiple searches before I found the name “Jesus” even mentioned, but the main web page is filled with “social justice” stuff and ways members of the congregation can become involved with gun control initiatives. Very sad.) Just to put all my cards on the table, I am a Protestant, a member of the Presbyterian Church in America. Here’s my church home.

So does a Protestant seat matter? Jurisprudentially, no. The Roman Catholic jurists such as Thomas and the late Antonin Scalia have been wonderful in carrying the standard for judicial modesty and an approach to legal interpretation focused on the text and original intent of the ratifiers. Because the Court is not (or should not) be a policy-making body, I don’t buy the argument that “diverse” perspectives are needed and thus we must have a Protestant seat, or a woman’s seat, or a black seat, etc. What we need are intelligent individuals committed to putting aside personal views in order to interpret rather than make law. Give me Roman Catholic Thomases every day of the week over Protestant Souters.

As a Protestant and one involved in various national, conservative legal organizations, I am astounded at how Roman Catholics predominate in groups such as The Federalist Society. When discussing the matter with my Catholic friends I often hear the answer that the Catholic Church has a well-thought out theology (see the Catechism of the Catholic Church) that is appealing to the same sort of mind that is attracted to originalism and textualism in jurisprudence.

Unfortunately, liberalism so infected mainline Protestant churches in the early 1900s that what is left focuses on gun control and other secular matters (as exemplified by the St. John’s website linked to above) rather than the purpose and work of Jesus Christ coupled with a systematic theology grounded in Scripture. There are exceptions such as the Reformed parts of the Protestant Church that follow the intellectually rigorous Westminster Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism, but these are in the minority.

All too often I hear from liberal Protestants that we need to eschew theology and just focus on Christ. I am all for focusing on Christ, but who He is is a deep theological question (“theology” after all means the study of God). Is he just a gifted moral teacher whose example we should follow, or is he the Son on God who paid the penalty for the sins of His people? The anti-intellectualism the runs through the liberal Protestantism and the triumph of liberalism are discouraging. This twin-headed monster is an important part of the explanation of why it is news that a conservative, non-Catholic has been nominated to the Supreme Court.

This article was published by The Beacon.

Burmese government forces committed rape and other sexual violence against ethnic Rohingya women and girls as young as 13 during security operations in northern Rakhine State in late 2016, Human Rights Watch said Sunday. The Burmese government should urgently endorse an independent, international investigation into alleged abuses in northern Rakhine State, including into possible systematic rape against Rohingya women and girls.

Burmese army and Border Guard Police personnel took part in rape, gang rape, invasive body searches, and sexual assaults in at least nine villages in Maungdaw district between October 9 and mid-December. Survivors and witnesses, who identified army and border police units by their uniforms, kerchiefs, armbands, and patches, described security forces carrying out attacks in groups, some holding women down or threatening them at gunpoint while others raped them. Many survivors reported being insulted and threatened on an ethnic or religious basis during the assaults.

“These horrific attacks on Rohingya women and girls by security forces add a new and brutal chapter to the Burmese military’s long and sickening history of sexual violence against women,” said Priyanka Motaparthy, senior emergencies researcher. “Military and police commanders should be held responsible for these crimes if they did not do everything in their power to stop them or punish those involved.”

Between December 2016 and January 2017, Human Rights Watch researchers in Bangladesh interviewed 18 women, of whom 11 had survived sexual assault, as well as 10 men. Seventeen men and women, including some women who survived assaults, witnessed sexual violence, including against their wives, sisters, or daughters. Altogether Human Rights Watch documented 28 incidents of rape and other sexual assault. Some incidents involved several victims. A report released by the United Nations Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR) on February 3 found that more than half of the 101 women UN investigators interviewed said they were raped or suffered other forms of sexual violence. The report, based on a total of 204 interviews, concluded that attacks including rape and other sexual violence “seem[ed] to have been widespread as well as systematic, indicating the very likely commission of crimes against humanity.”

After attacks by Rohingya militants on border police posts on October 9, 2016, the Burmese military undertook a series of “clearance operations” in northern Rakhine State. Security forces summarily executed men, women, and children; looted property; and burned down at least 1,500 homes and other buildings. More than 69,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh, while another 23,000 have become internally displaced in Maungdaw district.

Several women described how soldiers surrounded their villages or homes, then gathered the villagers in an outdoor area, separating men from women, and detained them for up to several hours. Soldiers often shot villagers, and raped and gang raped women and girls. “Ayesha,” a Rohingya woman in her 20s, told Human Rights Watch: “They gathered all the women and started beating us with bamboo sticks and kicking us with their boots. After beating us, the military took [me and] 15 women about my age and separated us.… [The soldiers] raped me one by one, tearing my clothes.”

During raids on homes, security forces frequently beat or killed family members and raped the women. “Noor,” in her 40s, said that 20 soldiers stormed her home and grabbed her and her husband: “They took me in the yard of the home. Another two put a rifle to my head, tore off my clothes, and raped me.… They slaughtered [my husband] in front of me with a machete. Then three more men raped me.… After some time, I had severe bleeding. I had severe pain in my lower abdomen and pain in my whole body.”

The sexual violence did not appear to be random or opportunistic, but part of a coordinated and systematic attack against Rohingya, in part because of their ethnicity and religion. Many women told Human Rights Watch that soldiers threatened or insulted them with language focused on their status as Rohingya Muslims, calling them “you Bengali bitch” or “you Muslim bitch” while beating or raping them. “We will kill you because you are Muslim,” one woman said soldiers threatened. Other women said that security forces asked if they were “harboring terrorists,” then proceeded to beat and rape them when they said no. A woman in her 20s who said soldiers attempted to rape her in her home, added that they told her, “You are just raising your kids to kill us, so we will kill your kids.”

Burmese authorities have taken no evident steps to seriously investigate allegations of sexual violence or other abuses reported by nongovernmental organizations, including Human Rights Watch. A national-level investigation commission on the situation in Maungdaw district headed by the first vice president and comprised of current and former government officials released an interim report on January 3, 2017. The commission claims to have addressed rape allegations and “interviewed local villagers and women using various methods … [but found] insufficient evidence to take legal action up to this date.” Also contrary to the findings of human rights groups, the commission rejected reports of serious abuses and religious persecution, and said there were no cases of malnutrition.

On December 26, 2016, the Information Committee of State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi issued a press release addressing “the rumours that some women were raped during the area clearance operations of security forces following the violent attacks in Maungtaw Township.” Accompanied by an image stating “Fake Rape,” the release claimed that the investigation commission had interviewed two women who gave conflicting testimony as to whether they had been raped, and that village leaders later refuted their accounts. However, video footage of the commission’s visit shows an interviewer asking one of the women about violence against other women she witnessed, not her personal experience. Nothing in her video testimony suggests she lied in her interview. The interview appears confrontational, and out of keeping with accepted guidelines on how to conduct interviews with victims of sexual violence. The problematic circumstances under which authorities conducted these interviews, as well as the risks to the women, including when authorities exposed their names and identities to the media, raise serious doubts about the credibility of the Information Committee’s press release.

“The government should stop contesting these rape allegations and instead provide survivors with access to necessary support, health care, and other services,” Motaparthy said.

Rohingya victims of sexual assault face limited access to emergency health care including to prevent unwanted pregnancy from rape and infection with HIV, and to treat other sexually transmitted infections. Though the Burmese government has permitted some aid to go through to northern Rakhine State, it continues to obstruct international assistance from reaching the civilian population. It is unknown how many rape survivors remain in the area and whether they have received appropriate health care. None of the women Human Rights Watch interviewed had access to medical facilities until they reached Bangladesh. Many reported that in Bangladesh, they lacked information about services available, or could not arrange child care or pay transportation costs to clinics.

“The government’s failure to investigate rape and other crimes against the Rohingya should make it clear to Burma’s friends and donors that an independent, international inquiry is desperately needed to get to the bottom of these appalling abuses,” Motaparthy said.

Ethiopia is 12 months in to a political crisis which has seen at least 1,000 people killed. But unless the government introduces significant reforms, it will get worse.

By Andrea Carboni*

An unprecedented wave of protests has shaken Ethiopia since November 2015. These protests have revealed the fragility of the social contract regulating Ethiopia’s political life since 1991, when the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front coalition (EPRDF) overthrew the Derg and assumed power. This tacit agreement between the ruling coalition and the Ethiopian people offered state-sponsored development in exchange for limited political liberalisation. After twenty-five years of EPRDF rule, frustrated with widespread corruption, a political system increasingly perceived as unjust and the unequal gains of economic development, hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians have now descended into the streets, triggering a violent reaction from the state.

As we enter the twelfth month of the uprising, violence shows no sign of decreasing in Ethiopia. In its efforts to put down unrest, the government has allowed the security forces to use lethal violence against the protesters. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, more than one thousand people are estimated to have died as a result of violent state repression since last November. Thousands of people, including prominent opposition leaders and journalists, have been arrested and are currently detained in prison.

International concern

International institutions and non-governmental organisations have expressed major concerns about the deteriorating human rights situation in the country. The UN Human Rights Council called for “international, independent, thorough, impartial and transparent investigations” over the repression in Ethiopia, a request that was swiftly rejected by the government. Ethiopia’s Information Minister instead blamed “foreign elements” linked with the Egyptian and the Eritrean political establishments for instigating the rebellion and arming the opposition.

Rather than stifling dissent, state repression has contributed to escalating protests. Violent riots have increased after the events in Bishoftu on October 2, when a stampede caused by police firing on a protesting crowd killed at least 55 people. In the following days, demonstrators have vandalised factories and flower farms – including many under foreign ownership – accused of profiting from the government’s contested development agenda. An American researcher also died when her vehicle came under attack near Addis Ababa. Although protesters have largely remained peaceful and resorted to non-violent tactics, these episodes of violence raise concerns over escalating trends in the protest movement.

This map shows the number of reported fatalities in Ethiopia, November 2015 – October 2016. Image credit: Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset.

Unrest and repression

The geography of unrest is also telling of the evolving protest cycle in Ethiopia. The protests originated last November in the Oromia region, where the local population mobilised to oppose a government-backed developmental plan which would displace many farmers. The Oromo people, who constitute Ethiopia’s single largest ethnic group, accuse the EPRDF of discriminating against their community, and its local ally, the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation (OPDO), as being a puppet in the hands of the Tigray-dominated ruling coalition.

Until mid-July, the unrest had largely remained confined to Oromia’s towns and villages. Local tensions around the northern city of Gondar inaugurated a new round of protests in the Amhara region, where regionalist demands joined the widespread discontent with state repression. In the following weeks, protests spread further into the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’, the native region of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, as local communities began to stage anti-government protests. Episodes of communal violence and attacks against churches have been reported in Oromia as well as in other ethnically mixed areas of the country.

Despite increasing dissent, the government seems unwilling to mitigate its repressive measures. Internet access was allegedly shut down in an attempt to hamper the protest movement, which uses online media and social networks to disseminate anti-government information. On October 9, the government introduced a six-month state of emergency, the first time since the ruling EPRDF came to power in 1991. At least 1,600 people are reported to have been detained since the state of emergency was declared, while the Addis Standard, a newspaper critical of the government, was forced to stop publications due to the new restrictions on the press.

Polarised politics: government and opposition

These decisions notwithstanding, it is unclear how the EPRDF can manage to restore the government’s authority and preserve investor confidence by adopting measures that continue to feed resistance. After pressure from German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Hailemariam pledged to reform Ethiopia’s electoral system, which currently allows the EPRDF to control 500 of the 547 seats in Parliament. These limited political concessions are unlikely to satisfy the protesters’ demand for immediate and substantial change, since the proposed reform would only produce effects after the 2020 general elections.

According to the opposition, this is the evidence that the Tigray minority, which dominates the upper echelons of the government and the security apparatus, is unwilling to make any significant concessions in the short term. By labelling the opposition’s demands as racist and even denying their domestic nature, the government is leaving little room for negotiation and compromise and risks contributing to the escalation of the protests.

For over a decade, Ethiopia has been one of the fastest growing economies in Africa. Foreign investments – most notably from China – have funded large-scale infrastructure projects, including the recently inaugurated railway to the port of Djibouti.

The on-going unrest is likely to have a negative impact on Ethiopia’s economy, reducing the country’s considerable appeal among foreign investors and tourists. The demonstrations have revealed the growing discontent of the Ethiopian people, and especially of its disenfranchised youth, over the EPRDF’s authoritarian and unequal rule. The EPRDF therefore needs to implement far-reaching reforms and embrace dialogue with the opposition to prevent the current unrest from deteriorating.

*Andrea Carboni is a Research Analyst at ACLED and PhD student at Sussex University.

This article was originally published by Insight on Conflict and is available by clicking here. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of TransConflict.

(RFE/RL) — The White House says President Donald Trump discussed the conflict in eastern Ukraine during a call with NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg and agreed to attend a meeting of alliance leaders later this year.

The statement on February 5 said the two “discussed the potential for a peaceful resolution of the conflict” in eastern Ukraine, without providing details.

The previous U.S. administration and other allies slapped sanctions on Russia for its illegal 2014 annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region and in retaliation for Moscow’s support for separatist militants in eastern Ukraine, where a flare-up in fighting has killed at least 35 in the past week.

Since the conflict in eastern Ukraine erupted in April 2014, more than 9,750 people have been killed.

Trump in the past has criticized NATO, once calling it “obsolete,” and has expressed a desire for warmer relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, worrying some European leaders about his level of commitment.

In the call, Trump expressed “strong support” for NATO but urged fellow members to contribute more financially, in line with his campaign vow to get members to increase their funding for the alliance.

“The leaders discussed how to encourage all NATO allies to meet their defense-spending commitments,” the statement said.

The White House added Trump agreed to attend a meeting of NATO leaders in Europe in May.

Russian officials have always manipulated and sometimes totally falsified statistical information about their country, but in the coming months as Vladimir Putin prepares for his re-election campaign, they are certain to do so even more than in the past to suggest the country as flourishing even if it is not, Sergey Shelin says.

The Rosbalt commentator says that plans to release statistics showing Russia and Putin in one as well are already part of the pre-election planning, now in full-swing given that the voting is only 18 months away and that such data are needed to counter “rumors” that things aren’t so good (rosbalt.ru/blogs/2017/02/03/1588984.html).

In sum, “the pre-election 2017 despite anything must become a year of economic and social victories, at least on paper.” Some of this will be achieved by changing the way certain statistics are calculated, as has happened in the last few weeks when GDP was “corrected” upward by changing the rules for its calculation.

Another part will be achieved by changing the base lines against which the data are compared. If the situation in Russia looks bad compared to what it was in 2013, then Moscow statisticians will put out data comparing things to that in the crisis year of 2016 and say things are getting better and better.

But a least some of this will reflect open falsification, especially if the Kremlin decides it needs to claim not a one percent growth rate but “three or even four” in order to win over those who think things are not going well, Shelin continues.

One place where all these methods may be employed together, the Rosbalt commentator says, is to allow Putin to claim that he has fulfilled his earlier promise to “catch up and surpass” Portugal in terms of GDP. By using “progressive methods,” Shelin says, that can be achieved “without any difficulty. It is only a matter of sleight of hand.”

The Kremlin’s statisticians will face a somewhat more difficult but not insuperable problem in presenting data “directly connected” with the lives of ordinary Russians such as housing, food prices, and wages and salaries. There people have their own experiences to rely on; they must be convinced that what they see with their own eyes is an exception.

These statistical magicians have the following tasks: Their “minimum program is to forget about the miracles of 2015 but by any means to achieve some kind of growth in 2017 in comparison with the unsuccessful year of 2016.” Their “maximum program” is to do even more by changing statistical methods and simply putting out inaccurate information.

They may take such steps regarding demography, given that births are falling. They can claim, somewhat plausibly, that there are more births than counted because many are out of wedlock, but one can be sure that if they come up with figures including those now, they will compare them only against figures from the past that didn’t include such children.

The statisticians are likely to make similar efforts with regard to Putin’s much-ballyhooed “May decrees.” While most think these were fulfilled because that is what the media say, statistics show that they haven’t been; and so the statistics will have to be brought into line with the Kremlin’s “truth” in order to help Putin win support.

By Gautam Sen*

The new President of the United States of America (USA), Donald Trump, seems to be intent on fulfilling his campaign pledge to erect a wall along his country’s border with Mexico to stall further illegal immigration from Mexico and other Latin American countries. On January 25, 2017, Trump signed an executive order for constructing a wall along the US – Mexico border stretching 3100 kms. Trump also demanded that Mexico bear the cost of the proposed wall. These announcements have not only caused deep consternation in Mexico, but also drawn opprobrium from Latin American leaders. An immediate casualty has been the cancellation of the first working-level visit of Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto to the US after President Trump assumed office.

The Mexican president has rejected outright, the demand for his country to pay for the construction of the wall, which obviously is not in Mexico’s interest. In the context of these developments, a scheduled meeting between the Mexican Foreign Minister Luis Videgara and the new US Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly, on border management and immigration matters, has also been called off.

The Trump Administration is reported to be considering a set of punitive measures against Mexico if the latter does not agree to defray the construction cost of the wall. President Trump has issued an executive order directing all executive branches to identify all bilateral and multilateral development aid, economic assistance, humanitarian aid and military aid to Mexico over the past five years. This is obviously to identify the areas where Mexico’s dependence on the US is considerable, and pressure on Mexico could be effectively applied to accede to the US demands and cooperate towards construction of the border wall.

Trump also mentioned on January 26 that a 20 per cent tariff may be imposed on Mexican goods exported to the US to raise resources for building the wall. A 35 per cent border adjustment tax, in the garb of a border tax reform policy, on cross-border movement of goods has also been hinted at by the Republican congressional sources. It appears that there has been a repercussion to Trump’s threat. Ford has just cancelled a $1.6 billion automobile plant investment in Mexico. Earlier, Ford had planned to shift its Ford Focus small car plant from Michigan to Mexico which had drawn the ire of Trump. Similar pressure is building up on General Motors.

Tariff measures of the type aimed at Mexico, are likely to affect other western hemispheric countries also. Trump also proposes to tax remittances of Mexicans, and the US citizens of Mexican origin, to Mexico. Mexico’s economy minister has retorted that his government would respond immediately to any coercive trade action by the US administration. The Mexican Government has also indicated that it would not tolerate actions planned by the new US administration on the border wall and punitive taxation on the Mexican goods, as they impinge on Mexican dignity and pride.

Former US President George Bush had signed the Secure Fence Act in 2000 after congressional approval. The Act had approved construction of a fence along the US-Mexico border for approximately 700 of the total 1900 mile long border. As per the US Government Accountability Office (GAO), 652 miles of border fence-cum-wall has since been erected. The fence and other barriers that cover the 652 miles of the sanctioned border project, is actually a collection of walls, fence and other obstacles. The existing border wall is effective and strongest in places where large populations are concentrated e.g. San Diego, California on the US side, and Tijuana on the Mexican side. In some places, the wall passes through barren territory, and in many parts its condition is such that people can walk through. There are also portions of the border where the terrain conditions are difficult and it is extremely difficult to cross. The fence-cum-wall has been erected at a cost of US$ seven billion, and is not exactly impenetrable. This indicates the substantial effort and resources which will have to be deployed to cover the entire length of the border in an effective manner.

Though Trump has claimed that the erection of the wall would cost US$ eight billion, a realistic assessment is that it will be much more. Authoritative sources (like Bernstein Research Group), and the expenditure trend on the approximately 652 miles of wall-cum-fence constructed, indicate that actual cost of the entire border wall project will be in the range of US$ 15 – 25 billion. If the above-mentioned details are taken into account, the effort and expenditure on the border wall will be substantial, apart from the political and socio-economic fallout on American citizens in its southern border states like California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas, as well as on its relations with Mexico. Republican Senator John McCain of Arizona has expressed deep concern on the proposed border wall and its serious implications on trade relations with Mexico, and also consequent economic consequences on his state of Arizona and the country as a whole. Republican Senator Lindsay Graham of South Carolina, has tersely observed that ‘border security yes, but tariffs no’.

The reaction to Trump’s utterances and avowed policies on the border wall and tariff has attracted strong criticism from the Latin American governments. In the January 2017 summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) at Punta Cana in Dominican Republic, attended by ten heads of state and 33 foreign ministers, the consensus was that the Trump administration`s action was outrageous, and the CELAC group of countries have to respond to the new aggressive policy of prosecuting migrants. President Danilo Medina of Dominican Republic – the host country – and Rafael Correa of Ecuador took the lead in consolidating the CELAC countries’ position against Trump’s policy on the Mexican border wall – which they termed as a ‘wall of infamy’ , his anti-immigration plan and threat of escalated tariff.

Though the stance taken by Trump is not totally unexpected in the backdrop of his pre and post election utterances, it is surprising that he is rushing through his controversial policies soon after taking office. Actions which the US president has proposed before completing a month in office and even before delivering his first State of the Union Address, appear to indicate that he intends to take a posture of resoluteness on controversial issues, such as the US-Mexico border management and trade, in order to consolidate his domestic constituency. This forebodes political turbulence within the US, apart from introducing many imponderables in western hemispheric economic relations, and also undermining the existing North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which has served this hemispheric community reasonably well since its formation in 1994. It is also surprising that Trump, who is known to view developments and decide on policies in transactional terms, appears short-sighted and unwilling to view the implications of his policies on his country`s economy and international influence in a long-term perspective.

Mexico is the third largest import source and trade partner of the US. Mexico is also the second largest export market, and the third largest agricultural export market of the US. The Mexico-US trade is more than US$ 583 billion (US imports: $316 billion + exports $267 billion: as per 2015 US Trade Representative Office data), and the US foreign direct investment in Mexico is more than US$ 107 billion. It is not clear whether Trump has weighed the impact of a higher tariff barrier on Mexican exports to the US, and the consequent impact on the US consumers. There would also be supply chain problems because of the cost impact on the US intermediate components that are exported to Mexico, value-added there and re-exported to US, which would be affected by the proposed escalation in tariff.

Any constriction in Mexican exports and supply-chain problems, would have a huge negative impact on the US industry and its labour market. The US industrial goods sector, automobile market and even its agriculture, would be affected. Interestingly, the US upper middle country, mid-west and the southern states – the ‘rust belt’ which had voted overwhelmingly for Trump in the last presidential elections, would be impacted the most. This is because, Mexico would definitely retaliate by imposing countervailing tariffs on the US exports, particularly those which are leviable on goods to be imported and exported after value addition in Mexico. Mexico is also likely to raise tariffs on agricultural imports from the US of corn, dairy products, pork and beef estimated at more than $18 billion, which in turn will affect consumption in Mexico and the US farming community. Mexico is also likely to resort to fiscal measures to restrict profit plough-back from the US investments.

Trump has indicated on many an occasion that the US economy and jobs are his primary concern. The slew of actions which he is contemplating is unlikely to benefit either. A cost-benefit analysis seems to indicate that negative international repercussions and even domestic political fallout, would decidedly outweigh the economic gains which are difficult to assess at this stage.

*The author is a commentator on international affairs and a retired IDAS officer who has held senior positions in the Government of India and in a State Government. The views expressed are the author’s own. Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/president-trump-and-the-mexican-border-wall_gsen_030217

By Md. Muddassir Quamar

On January 21, 2017, the Turkish Parliament passed a constitutional amendment bill with 18 articles to change the system of government. The bill proposed by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and supported by its new-found ally, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), received 339 votes in favour in the 550-member parliament, clearing the required threshold of three-fifths (330) majority. If approved in a referendum, to be held within two months of presidential approval, the constitutional amendment will effectively convert Turkey into a presidential system of government. Media reports suggest that the referendum date will be announced shortly and is expected to be held in early April.

The procedure followed by the government to pass the amendment bill in parliament has come in for criticism from various quarters. Parliamentary debates have been marred by controversy, with the opposition and government members getting into shouting slugfests and brawls over various clauses. The first round of debates led to some changes in the draft bill, which were approved by a parliamentary committee in December 2016. The new draft bill was again presented for debate in the parliament, leading to final approval on January 21.

The proposed amendment has left the Turkish polity deeply divided. Opposition parties, especially the Republican People’s Party (CHP), which is the oldest political organisation in Turkey and currently the second largest after AKP, and the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP), have vehemently opposed the bill accusing the ruling AKP of pushing for a one-man rule. It has been argued that, if approved, the new system can give President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan an opportunity to be elected for two more terms. His current term ends in 2019 and the new system will become effective the same year. Given its provision for two five-year terms, if Erdoğan wins, he can effectively rule Turkey until 2029.

On the other hand, the ruling AKP and its ally MHP have argued that the old system of governance has rendered Turkey unstable and hinders decision making and economic growth. The pro-amendment parties argue that a presidential system will provide the needed stability and a strong government that can take the country on the path of fast development. It has been presented as a pill that will cure Turkey of all its ills.

However, the concerns of the opposition and many intellectuals have become accentuated with the streak of recent developments. The AKP Government has taken measures that many believe is authoritarian in nature and scuttles Turkey’s democratic ethos. Though the AKP has been in power since 2002, it had started taking tough stand against the opposition after the Gezi Park protests erupted in mid-2013. Inspired by the Arab Spring protests, the demonstrators initially demanded the rollback of a government proposal for an urban redevelopment plan. However, the protests gradually evolved into a movement against the AKP government’s failures and solicited a strong response from then Prime Minister Erdoğan leading to police action and violence.

The political situation sharpened thereafter due to declining popular support for AKP. Though Erdoğan was elected president in the first direct presidential election held in August 2014 with a simple majority, winning 51.7 per cent of the votes, opinion polls showed that the AKP was losing popular support in the run up to the 2015 parliamentary elections. Expectedly, the AKP lost its parliamentary majority in the June 2015 general elections, gaining 40.8 per cent of votes and 258 seats, 18 less than the required simple majority of 276. As coalition talks failed, a snap election was held in November and the AKP surprisingly won a majority with 49.5 per cent of popular votes, getting 316 seats in parliament. The ‘shocking’ election results were largely attributed to Erdoğan’s tough stand against militant Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) and Turkey’s perceived strong action in Syria.

In fact, in the lead up to the snap elections, the peace negotiations with the PKK that started in March 2013 broke down leading to escalation in violence. It led to a strong action by the police against the PKK and its sympathisers. Further, action was taken against those perceived to be opposing the government’s action. While the election campaign was at peak, a crackdown on the media and civil society gave a glimpse of the days to come. The government took action against pro-opposition journalists and media houses. In October 2015, many media firms were shut down while journalists critical of AKP policies were fired or arrested.

The crackdown became frequent and massive after the failed coup in July 2016. An emergency was imposed initially for three months and has now been extended until early April 2017. Analysts have argued that the coup has provided a license for Erdoğan to target his opponents, with many pro-Kurdish opposition leaders and journalists, academics and intellectuals being fired from their jobs or forced to leave the country. The purge in the military, civil services and judiciary and even in universities has continued in the name of action against supporters and sympathisers of the Gulenist movement that has been accused of plotting the coup. Thousands of soldiers and civil servants have been fired and hundreds are under trial.

The constitutional amendment will change Turkey’s 94-year old parliamentary system of government, which it has been following since the foundation of the republic in 1923. Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian behaviour and the fact that the new system places extraordinary powers in the president, especially in appointments of constitutional and administrative functionaries, raise serious doubts about Turkey’s slide into an autocracy. AKP’s inability to address economic downturn and political problems and targeting of critiques, are a further cause of worry. The Turkish republic stands at a crucial juncture today. As the constitutional amendment bill awaits referendum, serious questions arise about the direction in which Turkey is heading. At the heart of the concern is, the new system might undo the democratic gains made over the past decades.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India. Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/is-turkey-heading-towards-a-presidential-system_mmquamar_030217

By Rakhahari Chatterji

The South China Morning Post quotes an official from China’s Central Military Commission writing, “A war ‘within the president’s term ‘ or ‘war breaking out tonight’ are not just slogans, they are becoming a practicality reality” (The Statesman 29 January 2017). Quite obviously, it is in reaction to the recent statements coming out of the new administration in the United States.

This view is shared by Dan De Luce who in a recent post in the Foreign Policy Magazine (26 January 2017) has accused Trump of leading the world to the brink. He quotes Evan Medeiros who served as the top advisor on Asia in Barack Obama’s White House, labeling the US under Trump as both ‘confrontational and disoriented’ on the South China Sea.  He argues that the new administration’s statements about US policy towards China and South China Sea are not only antagonizing and provoking China but also confusing allies and aggravating tensions.

Rex Tillerson, Trump’s choice for secretary of state, stunned lawmakers and foreign governments at his January 11 Senate confirmation hearing when he said that the United States would be ready to block China’s access to artificial islands it is building in the South China Sea. If it is a serious statement of policy that the US would be ready to act upon, it would require a blockade ‘which is an act of war’.

Like on many other issues, Trump believes, and he has very much given everyone to so understand from his campaign days, that it is time for the US to replace its weak dealing with China by a strong hand, assuming that getting tougher with China will lead Beijing to back down. So he is ready to break with the US stance on China of the past several decades.

The statements emanating from the new US administration seem to suggest it is “willing to court conflict with China without being terribly well-informed on this issue,” De Luce quotes Mira Rapp-Hooper of the Center for a New American Security as saying.

The idea behind Trump’s approach seems to be that the United States has been weak in its dealings with Beijing, and that a strong hand is needed. Experts say the Trump administration is testing the hypothesis that if Washington simply gets tougher with China, Beijing will back down. But US encounters with China during Clinton or Bush administrations were by no means easy to handle. China has only grown more powerful today with a massive economy and an increasingly capable military ‘equipped with ship-killing missiles that threaten the U.S. Navy’s dominance’. And its leaders confidently believe that their country’s moment has arrived.

Whether on Taiwan or South China Sea, China has made clear that it is not going to back down under pressure. Foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said: “We urge the United States to respect the facts, [and] speak and act cautiously to avoid harming the peace and stability of the South China Sea.”

The Trump administration’s policies, as they are taking shape through statements and actions so far, appear to be directionless but provocative on all fronts (think of the newly declared immigration policy). Talking about the Indo-Pacific alone, it is baffling, to say the least, why the US should abandon the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a proposed 12-nation trade pact with strong support among Asian allies and partners which was a signature step of the Obama administration.

Ash Carter, Defence Secretary in the preceding Obama administration, recently in a piece titled, “The Rebalance and the Asia-Pacific Security” (Foreign Affairs, Nov-Dec 2016) has shown the important role the US has played in this region since World War II: “During Democratic and Republican administrations, in times of surplus and deficit, and in war and peace, the United States has played a part in the region’s economic, diplomatic, and security affairs… The results have been extraordinary: the Asia-Pacific has long been a region where every nation has the opportunity to thrive.” According to him, the Trans-Pacific Partnership aimed to bind together the United States more closely with 11 other economies in the region “is an opportunity that the United States…should not miss.”

Now the Trump administration’s pull out of the TPP has given a severe blow to its credibility in the region, from Vietnam to Japan, and China will likely fill in the void. While threatening the use of force to restrict China in the South China Sea, Trump has given it a free hand in the Indo-Pacific.

What should India do if the war talk between the US and China becomes more intense with the possibility of the impossible looming large?

On a number of issues like terrorism and India’s attempt to become a NSG member, India and China are not on the same page. The Modi-Xi bonhomie of 2014-15 has paled of late. India has neither warmed up to the ‘One-Belt-one-Road’ idea floated by China nor hesitated to express serious reservations on the China-Pakistan Economic Co-operation (CPEC) which runs through Pak-occupied Kashmir. On the other hand, India has positioned herself closer to the United States.

Under Modi government India has signed, significantly departing from its policy of not entering into a military agreement with any major power, the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the United States which will allow their militaries to work closely and use each other’s bases for repair and replenishment of supplies. Although under the agreement, as reported, comprehensive logistics support will be decided on a case-by-case basis by the parties, the agreement does include “reciprocal logistics support…during authorised port visits, joint exercises, joint training, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts” (Indian Express 31 August 2016). Thus, there is enough room for India under LEMOA getting entrapped in a US-China conflict.

There is, indeed, no reason for India to welcome a war at its doorstep now or in the foreseeable future, not to speak of getting engaged in such a war. If that be so, the best policy for India would be to help reduce such a possibility. Despite some amount of coolness in India-China relations of late, it is a fact that both China and India have maintained a decent relationship during the last few decades. Trump also is communicating with Modi. Therefore, India still has some leverage with both. It  should take this opportunity and urge upon them the need for approaching and settling the issues not in terms of a zero-sum game but pragmatically within the framework of benevolent self-interest and consensus among regional countries.  In today’s world no country has the privilege of dragging the whole world into a nuclear holocaust. In such an effort for world peace Modi will certainly find collaborators among leaders from May to Merkel and beyond.

This article originally appeared in Indian Defence Research Wing.

The BJP government in India unveiled it annual budget on February 1 that focuses on recovery after the cash crunch unleashed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s shock therapy, and which has made people feel badly stranded at a crossroads without cash and not  knowing where to go for getting their own money deposited in banks.

While demonetization forces the people to deposit all their money in banks, especially in rural areas where the economy is hidden, India’s Minister of Finance Arun Jaitley claimed his budget is focused on increasing rural incomes and boosting infrastructure, besides ushering in long-pending reforms in the financial sector.

Modi’s surprise decision last November on a night as the results of US presidency poll were pouring in, to scrap high-value banknotes worth 86 percent of India’s cash in circulation has hit consumer demand, disrupted supply chains and hurt capital investments. PM Modi did find some space in international news, but he could not equal or outsmart Trump’s grand victory defeating the “official candidate” Hillary Clinton.

As Gujarat CM, Modi had promised a vibrant economy during his 2014 maiden elections to parliament from Varanasi in UP, but India’s economy has only just survived, let alone becoming a strong one — below the target rate of 8 percent or more that Modi needs to create enough jobs for the 1 million young Indians who enter the workforce in India, a nation of 1.3 billion where half the population is below the age of 25.

Jaitley presented his budget as five states are going to assembly polls later this month the outcomes of which could decide the future politics of India as well as political alliances and equation. Jaitley said that the impact on growth from the government’s cash crackdown would wear off soon. “We are seen as an engine of global growth,” Jaitley said as he delivered the opening remarks of his fourth budget.

Budgets are essentially statements on the status of national economy and they are meant to allocate resources for every sector of the nation and specify the sources of resources including taxes needed for developmental projects, etc. Generally the budgets remain as unfulfilled promises and project proposals as a lot of resources are being diverted and siphoned off by many “important” persons for their personal and private purposes, thereby making corruption inevitable at the source.

The budget talked about concessional tax rates being provided to those moving toward non-cash payment mechanisms, and making it mandatory for many Government transactions to move to digital, which again are important steps in this direction. The reduction of personal income tax at the lowest slab to 5 percent is more a gesture of goodwill for those who bore the pain of demonetization, rather than a big reward.

The budget makes clear the intention of the Government to fight black money and digitize the economy. Limiting the amount of cash per transaction to Rs. 3 lakh, reducing the limit of cash donations to trusts/political parties to Rs. 2,000 per person, and coming up with an innovative way of funding political parties (electoral bonds) are all excellent initiatives. The implementation, though, needs to be watched.

Jaitley’s chief economic adviser advocated slashing personal income tax and accelerating cuts in corporate tax rates. He cautioned, however, against pursuing debt-fuelled fiscal expansion. Still, economists are penciling in a federal fiscal deficit of 3.3 percent of GDP for 2017/18. That would be higher than the 3 percent pledged earlier but lower than 3.5 percent that the government has budgeted for the year soon to end.

The BJP budget has been in consistent with the government’s focus over the last two years on “fundamental” growth, rather than subsidies and loan waivers. It focused on increasing rural incomes and boosting infrastructure, besides ushering in long-pending reforms in the financial sector.

The rollout of a nationwide Goods and Services tax (GST), expected in July after years of delays, and could also weigh on economic growth. Countries that have introduced GST in the past have often faced a relative economic slowdown before the benefits of a unified tax regime feed through.

The budget, as well as the government, has not taken into account the suicides of farmers in rural areas, although the budget also provided for an additional Rs.20, 000 crores for the long-term irrigation fund under NABARD. The total allocations to rural, farm, and allied sectors saw a whopping 24 percent hike in outlay at over Rs 1, 87,000 crore.

The impetus given to affordable housing by according it the status of an ‘Infrastructure Industry’ and increasing the area eligible for affordable housing are steps in the right direction, which would ensure that more people in the country can afford to buy their own homes.

Reportedly, assets worth $7.6 trillion are stashed in tax havens across the globe. Jurisdictions known as ‘tax havens’ offer powerful MNCs and rich individuals banking secrecy and the ability to sidestep financial regulations that apply to ordinary people. However, this secrecy hurts the public, as profits and wealth go untaxed, countries lose revenue and allocations in budgets shrink. Reportedly, assets worth $7.6 trillion are stashed in tax havens across the globe.

Not only the rich lords hoard black cash in the country, but the cross-border movement of money that is illegally earned, transferred or utilized (through trade manipulation, organized crime and corruption) or tax avoidance by multinational companies also cause over $1 trillion every year to illicit financial flows in developing countries, including India.

Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTAAs) have been misused and exploited in the past, to avoid paying any taxes – resulting in double non-taxation – and re-routing black money through tax havens for investment in India. The General Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAAR) have also been adopted by the government, extends to deny double taxation avoidance benefits if deals in tax havens are found to be avoiding taxes.

The Union Budget has announced a few new laws to address financial crime – one for confiscation of property of economic offenders and another to deal with illicit deposit schemes. India will start exchanging information with other countries, and receive information regarding Indian citizens’ assets abroad starting September 2017, on an automatic and periodic basis.

Still, economists are penciling in a federal fiscal deficit of 3.3 percent of GDP for 2017/18. That would be higher than the 3 percent pledged earlier but lower than 3.5 percent that the government has budgeted for the year soon to end.

While opinions vary on how long the disruptions caused by Modi’s crackdown on untaxed and illicit wealth will last, there is near unanimity among economists that Asia’s third-largest economy needs a helping hand.

The issue of combating black money was not given proper thoughts. The budget speech did not draw attention to a number of initiatives taken by the government in the past few months to curb the menace of tax avoidance.

Government of India should seek to address these loopholes in the norms of international taxation at the national level, while simultaneously support the establishment of a representative and well-resourced global tax body under the auspices of the UN.

Observation

India acclaimed to be a “bright spot” in the world economy, and Finance Minister Arun Jaitley repeated the same as he unveiled his annual budget, adding that the impact on growth from the government’s cash crackdown would wear off soon.

The BJP government’s budget has kept in pace with the economic policy of India for the last many years since the large scale privatization cum divestment program during the Congress reign with Manmohan Singh as finance minister to promote WB and IMF polices, to release the money of the state sectors for use by the private compote lords and global multinational magnets to increase their own wealth instead of taking care of welfare programs of common men.

The BJP budget this year was a usual one and as former finance minister Chidambaram said there are no real high lights. Those who had expected relief for those who suffered as Modi imposed demonetization without adequate preparation too launch his pet financial dream of ending black and other dirty money in the country. Now it is clear that the black money is here to stay no matter what measures the government adopt mainly because they only corporate lords who control the government want all these dirty cash circulation so that they could make more profits- after the objective of all governments – both elected and electionless – serve the cause of the rich and corporate lords and for which, unfortunately, common people vote a party to power.

The worst of the cash crunch is now almost over, leaving behind a shaky nation, and the government expects it to be fully cleared by the end of April. A private manufacturing survey showed business is slowly returning to normal. Still, the finance ministry forecasts that growth could dip to as low as 6.5 percent in the current fiscal year to March, before picking up slightly in the coming fiscal year to between 6.75 and 7.5 percent. That is below the target rate of 8 percent or more that PM Modi needs to create enough jobs for the 1 million young Indians who enter the workforce in India – a nation of 1.3 billion where half the population is below the age of 25.

The BJP which, like the Congress party, promotes the rich and corporate lords to sponsor cricket and IPL type joint sport exercise to keep the people under illusions, pursues the congress policies by keeping in view the goals of World Bank and IMF, denying subsides and freebies to poor and under privileged- thereby they want to remove the poor classes altogether and increase the illegal wealth of the rich. That is basic of capitalism that fuels wars of imperialism for acquiring more resources- now energy resources of West Asia.

The merging of the Railway Budget with the general budget was done seamlessly and was touted as a historic move, ridding us of the colonial era practice of separate budgets. However, the rationale for merging the railway budget with general budget this year as a new experiment has caused confusion as a separate budget for rail steadily raised the facilities and working of the sector, increasing rails and spending more resources year by year. Unlike other transport sectors, railways have achieved great strides over years and rail system today is not what it was say 10 years back. As the largest employment sector railways is also the cheapest mode of transport in India.

The nation expected the finance minister and PM Modi to give details of demonetization efforts of the fo government giving a brief about the amount of black money it should get and what are the new techniques being employed to tackle this grave anti-national mischief by liquor-cricket bosses like Mallya- a BJP MP with links everywhere especially with cricket bosses and other corporate lords. The Modi government refuses to take the people into confidence on demonetization.

Perhaps, the intentions of the government to guide the country onto the path of inclusive growth are clear. While there will always be some misses and hits in the budget, the Modi Government, unlike the Congress and even Vajpayee governments that religiously promoted corruption and black money as their key policy, has shown the political will to fight corruption and black money, which have become strong appendages of our economy.

Taxes the major revenues for the governments but the Modi government is eager to be sympathetic to big business houses with tax rebates. The minister’s roadmap in the FY-2015 budget promised to reduce the corporate tax rate to 25% within four years, even after three years.

In a difficult year, represented by growing global uncertainties, lower economic growth at home and increasing oil and commodity prices, the finance minister has done to sticking to the fundamentals and doing what is good for the economy, rather than for the vote bank.

While avoiding populist measures and focusing on investment activities that have a multiplier effect, Arun has also tried to garner additional resources through higher tax compliance, rather than higher tax rates. In fact, contrary to popular expectation, the definition of long term capital gains for property transactions was brought down to two years from three years.

Kuwait has refuted a story published by Al Bawaba and shared widely earlier this week on social media by US President Donald Trump, Reuters reported.

The story, which originally appeared in The New Arab, said that a travel ban had been put in place for citizens applying for new visas from Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan due to internal “instability,” according to an unnamed Kuwaiti official.

After the story went up on Al Bawaba, it was shared via Donald Trump’s official Facebook page, with Trump commenting that such a ban was “smart!” and garnered widespread attention online.

Kuwait’s foreign ministry has denied the report, saying it “categorically denies these claims and affirms that these reported nationalities … have big communities in Kuwait and enjoy full rights.” The remarks were published in state-owned news agency KUNA.

The original report indicated that citizens from the five countries, including Syrians, who already held visas to Kuwait, would be able to continue visiting or living in the country.

Original source

By Diaa Bekheet

Cameroon beat seven-time champion Egypt 2-1 in the final match of African Nations Football Cup in Libreville, Gabon, Sunday. It is the fifth time for Cameroon to claim the trophy.

Egypt’s midfielder Mohamed Elneny put his team ahead when he scored in the 25th minute of the first half.

Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi telephoned the team during the half-time break to voice his support after Elneny netted the goal, Egyptian media reported.

In the second half, Cameroon’s Nicolas Nkoulou leveled the score with a brilliant header, then Vincent Aboubakar scored the decisive goal about three minutes before the final whistle.

Support for the Egyptian team was little noticed as the majority of the nearly 40,000 soccer fans who packed up the stadium in Gabon’s capital, Libreville, supported Cameroon.

By Carl Kozlowski

Harry Connick Jr. has spent the last 30 years entertaining America as one of Hollywood’s most versatile talents: singer, songwriter, pianist, actor, and “American Idol” host. Now he’s the star of the daytime talk show “Harry”, which airs primarily on local Fox affiliate stations nationwide.

Connick’s devout Catholic faith has also guided him throughout his career, as well as his 27-year marriage to model Jill Goodacre and as a father to three daughters. Connick spoke with Carl Kozlowski for Catholic News Agency about how he ties it all together while keeping his personal value system firmly in place.

CNA: You’ve spent 30 years in the public eye, singing, performing, acting, and hosting American Idol. How’d you decide now’s the time for a talk show?

Connick: I was working with Justin and Eric Spangle, who used to be writers and executive producers at Letterman, on a different project a few years ago. We talked about doing a daytime show, not just a talk show but one that combined all the things I love to do: entertaining, singing, comedy; just a party show in the middle of the afternoon. There was nothing quite like what we had in mind. When we pitched it the network liked it, and we put a team together quick.

CNA: You’re very outspoken about your faith. Does it have an influence on the show?

Connick: I’m sure it does influence my decisions. The decisions I make and my faith and values are entwined. All I really want – when I pray , I don’t really ask for anything. All I want to do is God’s will and make the best decisions I can. I don’t go out and preach. This show is about being aspirational and inspirational. All I want is to make the best decisions. Faith is an extra big part of my life, which we like to show on the show rather than talk about. Faith, family and community are things that we show by example. We don’t go into politics or heavy social issues. We want to give people a respite from their day and some entertainment. It’s hard to articulate how my Catholic faith affects the show, but I’m sure it’s a subconscious part of it.

CNA: I’m a professional standup comic as well, so I relate. Our faith affects where you find your taste, or draw the line.

Connick: We try to find people on the show, or do things on the show, that are the highest things I can do – leaders in their community, inspirations in what they do, shining examples of what craft and hard work can do. You do that, and it falls into place. We’re standing somewhere else. If I keep striving to put on the best quality show based on the values I have, I don’t have to think “oh we’re crossing the line” because the line is built in. We follow that and do the best quality work we can.

CNA: How does your faith help you navigate the world of showbiz? You’ve been married forever by Hollywood standards, and are never in tabloids. Does faith help you in that regard?

Connick: All I can do is worry about me and my family. I don’t really worry about anybody else, they have to do what works for them. I wake up everyday and try to be the best husband, father and entertainer I can be. I’m no different offstage or talking to you or onstage than I am going to dinner with my family. It’s all the same place and I apply the same values to all I do. It works for me. Many people in and out of showbiz live their lives in different ways. I try to be the best I can be. But people who get married don’t always stay married. I’ve been really lucky that I’ve been with my wife for 27 years. But if you think of the public lives of people who’ve been unlucky, it seems showbiz is some tumultuous crazy world but some are fortunate and some unfortunate. All I can do is keep striving to be better.

CNA: What’s your favorite part of doing the show, and what’s your biggest challenge?

Connick: My favorite part is going out with the audience every day and meeting them, sharing this tightrope experience with them. The experience is so broad, from playing music to laughing and learning. These shows are very planned, but I said I don’t want to know about stuff . And if someone wants to show me how to be a lumberjack and saw pieces of wood, I want to learn on the spot. I want to experience it with the audience. I think it was hard for them to believe that I really don’t want to know. At this point, they don’t tell me anything. I show up and get surprised, and I don’t think you can fake that. We’re all in sync on that.

CNA: Doing the soundtrack for “When Harry Met Sally” blew you up. What was that like?

Connick: I remember that vividly. I had a couple albums out that sold well for who I was at the time and the type of music I played. But it was warp speed with Harry; people started recognizing my name and face and it helped sell bigger venues. I had a bigger spotlight and I had to live up to it but I thrived under that challenge. It expedited the creative process. If I was on stage in front of 300 people instead of 30, I had to work harder at my performances because I had a greater responsibility. It was very exciting, but creative too.

CNA: Your hero seems to be Sinatra, and now you have a similar career in acting, singing, and live concerts.

Connick: I’m a big fan of Sinatra, he was the best at what he did. The last thing I do is model my career after him, though, because we do different things. He was a great singer and a great actor … It never crossed my mind to emulate his career, because we have different interests. I love orchestrating music and conducting and being on Broadway. He was an incredible artist, the best at what he did, but it never occurred to me to model my career after what he did. There was no one I modeled my career after because there was no one else who did what I did. The reasons I never set out to do a talk show is they’re formulaic. People come out, tell jokes and read questions. But that’s not what I do, and we built the show around my skill set. So far, I don’t know of a daytime host who hosts and is the musical director for the band. You have to do things that do good for you and when there’s an uncharted course, you have to figure out how to get through it.

CNA: Out of all your performing skill sets, what is your favorite thing to do?

Connick: I think it’s the variety of it. I love entertaining, I love to sing, I love to make people laugh, I love learning and meeting people. I love acting, Broadway, standing in front of an orchestra and conducting a piece of orchestration .This show is so fun because it allows me to fire on all cylinders everyday.

By Markus Wauran

There were so many controversial statements made by Donald Trump during the US presidential race, which made many underestimate Trump’s chances of victory. One of these controversial statements came during an exclusive interview with the New York Times on March 20, 2016. Trump said if he were elected US president, he would be open to Japan and South Korea producing their own nuclear deterrents, and that they should not always be depending on the US military to protect them from North Korea and China. The US military would not be able to protect Japan and South Korea for a long period of time. He argued that the United States cannot always be the policemen of the world.

Trump also asserted that there will be a point when the U.S. would not be able to do all that anymore. North Korea probably has their own nuclear arsenal, so he would rather have Japan and South Korea have a nuclear capability too, as we are living in a nuclear world right now.

This controversial statement alarmed the world and received a strong reaction from various sides. President Obama, during the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington on April 1, among others, stated that all this time the U.S. involvement in the Asia-Pacific region has been important because it has been the key to maintaining peace between the U.S. and countries in the region up until now. Having US presence is very important to forestall any conflicts with and between these countries. Therefore, Obama continued, the person (Donald Trump) who made such comments does not know much about policies, as well as nuclear policy, or the Korean peninsula, or even about the world in general. Japan and South Korea have been considered important pillars of US presence in Asia Pacific, as this advantages the U.S. quite substantially on the trade side, and prevents nuclear escalation and conflict.

Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fumio Kishida as quoted by CNN, also reacted by expressing his disagreement with Trump’s proposal, saying it’s impossible for Japan to build a nuclear capability. Japan is the only country that has experienced a nuclear attack, and if they follow Trump’s proposal, there will be a chance that the Hiroshima and Nagasaki tragedy could happen again.

Jonathan Cristal, a professor and observer from the World Policy Institute in New York, also commented by saying that Trump’s proposal is contrary to the government’s commitment to strengthening alliances with various countries like Japan and South Korea, the two strongest US allies in Asia. Cristal stated that Japan and South Korea will consider various other options if it comes to be true that the U.S. is no longer protecting them. One option is that Japan and South Korea will pay more for their own protection, similar to the way Estonia contributes 2% of their GDP as per NATO rules. Another option is that Japan and South Korea develop their own nuclear weapons. Cristal concluded by saying if Trump ignored the US alliance in Asia and encouraged Japan and South Korea to produce their own nuclear weapons, there would be a domino effect of other countries following suit.

Trump’s statements on the matter ignore international convention as regulated in the NPT (Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty), set by the United Nations in 1968, and ratified by the United States itself. Basically, the NPT consists of three pillars: first, non-proliferation, i.e. nuclear-weapon states pledge not to increase, and must reduce as well as revoke/separate their nuclear warheads; second, disarmament, i.e. nuclear weapons eradication in which non-nuclear-weapon states pledge not to acquire and manufacture nuclear weapons; third, peaceful use, which is that nuclear energy should only be used for peaceful purposes. As a matter of fact, the NPT was inspired by President Eisenhower, one of Donald Trump’s predecessors (also from the Republican Party), following his “Atom for Peace” speech to the UN General Assembly in 1953.

Almost all states have ratified the NPT, with the exception of India, Pakistan, and Israel. North Korea ratified the NPT in 1985 and then withdrew from the treaty in 2003. Upon the signing of the NPT, there were only five states recognized as ‘nuclear-weapon states,’ namely the U.S., Russia, UK, France, and China.

Enter President Trump…

Whatever our opinions are about the above statements from Trump, as the new US leader, he will do his best for the people of the U.S., to ‘make America great again’ as promised in his campaign.

Trump’s statements probably stem from some of the following: First, the U.S. trying to reduce the burden of being guarantor of the security of Japan and South Korea; second, renegotiating the terms of payment to be received by the US from having their troops on the ground, as many as 54,000 in Japan and 28,500 in South Korea, for which Japan pays USD 1.6 billion and South Korea USD 866 million annually; third, creating a balance of power among nuclear-weapon states in East Asia, which is currently being monopolized by China and increasingly North Korea; fourth, if there is a nuclear race, triggered by Japan and South Korea, the U.S. will be very much advantaged as the main supplier, although it would violate the NPT, which the U.S. is one of the signatories; fifth, creating East Asia as the new crisis region besides the Middle East, where the U.S. will benefit economically, politically, and militarily; sixth, balancing the military/arms advancement of China as well as countering the aggressiveness of North Korea.

Following Donald Trump’s election win, there is an interesting development that can be analyzed further: the signing of a nuclear agreement/treaty between PM Shinzo Abe of Japan and PM Narendra Modi of India on November 11 in Tokyo. The agreement calls for Japanese companies to be able to export nuclear technologies to India. We know that India-China relations have been hostile for a long time, and just recently tensions over the Senkaku Islands have also escalated. The Japan-India nuclear agreement gave a strong indication that both countries are on their way to creating an alliance, in parallel with strengthening the longstanding strategic alliances between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, to counter the expansionist behavior of China and aggression from North Korea.

Many hope that Trump’s statements on the campaign trail will not become policy now that he is president. The role of the UN in encouraging Trump to comply with the NPT is very much needed, similarly to Japan and South Korea as member states of the Treaty, to adhere with the NPT and not to produce a nuclear weapon. As we know that Japan and South Korea are very advanced and have a solid grip on nuclear technology – it will not be hard for either country to produce a nuclear weapon.

If Trump follows through on his former stance and Japan and South Korea implement the idea, it will create a domino effect where other states in the Asia region will scramble to follow suit. They will definitely take measures to keep and defend their sovereignty. There may be an ASEAN state that will extricate itself from the joint commitment of the SEANWFZ (South East Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone) Treaty, putting its national interest above all else. On the other hand, China and North Korea will keep on competing to enhance their nuclear capabilities. As a result, the East Asia region, including ASEAN, will be a hot zone and it is not impossible that a nuclear war may be the ultimate result.

*Markus Wauran was a member of the House of Representatives of Indonesia (DPR/MPR-RI) between 1987-1999,  and Chairman of Committee X, covering Science and Technology, Environment and National Development Planning (1988-1997).  This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com

If you want to win an Oscar it is best to be an American actor in a film that portrays American culture.

That is the conclusion of a paper published Sunday, in the British Journal of Psychology by Dr Niklas K. Steffens from the School of Psychology at The University of Queensland and his fellow authors.

The researchers conducted a large-scale analysis of the distribution of the Academy Awards for best actor and for best actress in a leading role by the Los Angeles-based Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences (i.e., the Oscars) as well as the award for best actor and for best actress in a leading role by the London-based British Academy of Film and Television Arts (i.e. the BAFTAs) since 1968.

This covered a total of 908 merit prize winners, comprising 97 winners and 383 (unsuccessful) nominees for the Oscars and 97 winners and 331 (unsuccessful) nominees for the BAFTAs. Both awards state that they aim to recognise best performances in films from all over the world.

The results show that US actors dominated the awards, winning more than 50 per cent of all prizes across Oscars and BAFTAs. Nevertheless, actors were more likely to win if they shared social group membership with the judges.

This meant that American actors won 52 per cent of all BAFTAs but 69 per cent of all Oscars, while British actors won 18 per cent of all Oscars but 34 per cent of all BAFTAs.

Dr Steffens said, “We know a lot about the factors that increase people’s capacity to show exceptional performances. However, a somewhat different question is what makes a given creative performance likely to be seen as exceptional. This was the question we addressed in this research.”

According to Dr Steffens, “These results show that whether we see a given performance as extraordinary is not just a function of the objective quality of that performance. For perceivers are much more likely to recognise a performance as truly brilliant when perceivers and performers share membership in a social group.”

The data also showed that nationality made a difference to actually winning an award. For the Oscars, American actors received 67 per cent of all nominations but 78 per cent of all awards. The same held true for the BAFTAs, where British actors won 31 per cent of all nominations but 42 per cent of all awards.

Commenting on this pattern, Dr Steffens said, “Shared social group membership becomes even more important when the diagnostic value of a quality indicator increases – that is, when we establish whether something is not just excellent but outstanding.”

“In this case, American actors win two out of three of all Oscar nominations but almost four out of five of all Oscar awards,” Dr Steffens said.

Another important determinant of success was the subject matter of the film. In the Oscars, American artists accounted for 26 per cent of award winners whose performance was in films about non-US culture but for 88 per cent of award winners whose performance was in films about American culture.

Dr Steffens said, “There is a widespread belief that our perception of makes a creation original and outstanding is given by its objective qualities, but in fact it is heavily influenced by the social groups we are members of, and which provide the basis for making sense of the world.”

By Namrata Hasija*

The relationship between India and Taiwan is seen by many as both new and emerging. However, the fact of the matter is that India and ROC (Republic of China) – the official name of Taiwan – share long-standing historical linkages. The relationship intensified when Jawaharlal Nehru visited China on the invitation of General Chiang Kai-shek and when India supported the ROC after the Japanese invasion. The comradeship was taken further with the visit of General and Madam Chiang Kai-Shek in 1942, though the ties nose-dived when India de-recognised the ROC, following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.

Thereafter, no diplomatic exchanges took place between India and the ROC for decades.

However, in the 1990s with the ‘Look East Policy’, the relationship was renewed albeit with the shadow of PRC looming large in India’s relations with Taiwan. Under India’s ‘One China Policy’, both countries decided to build relations unofficially. India set up the India-Taipei Association (ITA) in Taipei in 1995, and a few months later Taiwan opened the Taipei Economic and Cultural Center (TECC) in New Delhi. Indeed, nearly two decades have passed since the establishment of bilateral relations (but not diplomatic relations) between India and Taiwan.

The relationship between the two countries has progressed in the field of economics, industry, trade and education, though the full potential of the relationship has never yet been wholly realised. India has always been cautious of the PRC and has turned away many overtures by Taiwan.

With the change of political leadership in India in 2014 and in Taiwan in 2016, a new surge in the relationship can be seen. Under the respective new regimes, India’s ‘Act East Policy and Taiwan’s ‘New Southbound Policy’ present another chance to consolidate an already existing relationship. In fact, at the moment, India and Taiwan have been quietly rebuilding their relationship, without any need to grab headlines.

Taiwan’s former Foreign Minister Tien Hung-mao made a low-key visit to Delhi to take part in the Raisina Dialogue, focusing on Asian connectivity, organised by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and the Observer Research Foundation in March 2016. He was there despite the presence of Li Zhaoxing, former Foreign Minister from China and the situation was handled splendidly by the organisers. Further, in 2016, the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Republic of India signed an air services agreement, as well as an MOU on agricultural cooperation at the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Taipei.

The two countries also signed a Letter of Intent (LOI) for Cooperation on Railway Heritage in Chiayi City on December 24, 2016. In September 2016, the Taipei Economic and Cultural Center, New Delhi, also inaugurated the Taiwan Alumni Association in India. This will help Taiwan build a platform in India for students and professionals who have studied or worked in Taiwan. This will also give Taipei a database of human resource in India which can help to employ people in Taiwanese firms in India or Taiwan.

All these agreements and initiatives were part of the New Southbound Policy’s goal of sharing resources and promoting cultural exchange and cooperation as well as part of India’s Act East Policy.

India’s trade deficit with China has swelled manifold and Taiwan is also overtly dependent on the Chinese economy for sustenance. Thus, both countries are working to build economic relations to reduce dependency on China. India was Taiwan’s 17th biggest trade partner in the first half of 2016 with $2.27 billion in total imports and exports. As of the end of 2015, around 90 Taiwanese companies have set up business operations in India, with a total investment of $311 million in the fields of information and communication technology, medical devices, automobile components, machinery, steel, electronics, construction, engineering, financial services etc. The Taiwan Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association has selected two sites in Bengaluru and Greater Noida to build electronics manufacturing clusters with a view to deepening the supply chain collaboration with its Indian partners.

In the field of education, Taiwan’s Ministry of Education grants multiple scholarships to Indian students. At present, 1,143 Indian students are pursuing study of Mandarin language or higher education in Taiwan. The Taipei Economic and Cultural Center (TECC), New Delhi, has also established Mandarin centres in various Indian universities. Currently, there are 11 teachers from Taiwan teaching Mandarin, and there are over 3,000 Indian students who have taken Chinese courses in India. Taiwan Education Centers (TEC) in Indian universities also provide Chinese courses for senior officials in the Indian Army, tourism promoters and Indian employees working in Taiwanese enterprises in India. This collaboration is especially important for India as Mandarin could be an important tool when it comes to understanding Mainland China.

Despite these developments, the shadow of PRC still looms over this dynamic relationship. Taiwan offered to establish military and strategic cooperation to counter China in the region, especially during the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) rule when it first came to power in 2000. However, India did not show much keenness.

With the DPP again coming to power in 2016 and their plan to wean Taiwan away from closer ties with China, India should reconsider its proposal of not sending a military attaché to Taipei. Taiwan is one of the best China watchers in the world and India should tie up with it to gain a better insight into Chinese strategies. For this purpose, India should strengthen military and strategic ties with Taiwan.

It is high time India rethinks its foreign policy towards Taiwan and consolidates this relationship to crystallise its ‘Act East Policy’. While the Narendra Modi government has given special attention to developing triangular and quadrilateral coalitions with the US, Japan and Australia as a part of its regional security strategy, the inclusion of Taiwan could prove very significant in this endeavour.

*Namrata Hasija is a Research Associate, Society for Policy Studies (SPS) and President, Taiwan Alumni Association in India. Comments and suggestions on this article can be sent to editor@spsindia.in

By Deepak Kumar Nayak*

On February 2, 2017, Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres killed a civilian, identified as Dasru Durua, at Bara village under the Mathili Police limits of Malkangiri District.

A day earlier, orchestrating the first violent incident of the current year (2017) in the State, the Maoists triggered a landmine explosion near Mungarbhumi in Koraput District, killing eight Police personnel and injuring another five. The explosion targeted a Police van, carrying 13 Police personnel, on its way to the Police Training College in Angul District. This was the worst attack, in terms of fatalities, against the Security Forces’ (SFs) recorded in the State since May 23, 2011, when nine Policemen were killed in a Maoist-triggered landmine blast in the Sunabeda forest area of Nuapada District.

According to partial data collated by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least nine persons, have been killed in Maoist-linked violence in the State in 2017, thus far (data till February 5, 2017). These included eight Policemen and one civilian. No fatality among the Maoists has yet been recorded.

Through 2016, Odisha accounted for 72 fatalities (27 civilians, three SF personnel and 42 Maoists) as against 35 fatalities (20 civilians, four SF personnel and 11 Maoists) recorded through 2015. [According the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) data as against 38 fatalities (25 civilians, three SF personnel and 10 Maoists) recorded through 2015, Odisha accounted for 64 fatalities (20 civilians, three SF personnel and 41 Maoists) up to November 15, 2016.]

Though the increase in civilian fatalities is a worry, there has been significant improvement in the civilian security situation in the State since 2010 when the number of fatalities in this category had stood at 62. The number of civilian fatalities declined through 2011 (36), 2012 (27), and 2013 (22), they increased to 31 in 2014.

In the meantime, SFs achieved a kill ratio of 1:14 in 2016, a dramatic improvement over the kill ratio of 1:2.75 in 2015. Significantly, the Maoists had achieved a positive kill ratio kill ratio of 1:9.12 in 2008, when SFs killed eight Maoists while losing 73 of their own personnel.

In the most successful operations ever conducted by the SFs against the CPI-Maoist, since the formation of the outfit in September 2004, SFs killed at least 30 Maoists in two successive encounters in the Bejingi Forest area, between Ramgarh and Panasput, in the Malkangiri District on October 24 and 27, 2016. Those killed included Bakuri Venkata Ramana Murthy aka Ganesh aka Prasad aka Ramireddy, ‘official spokesman’ of the Andhra Odisha Border Special Zonal Committee (AOBSZC) and ‘secretary’ of the ‘east division unit’ of the party; and Chemella Krishnaiah aka Bhaskar aka Daya, ‘secretary’ of the Koraput-Srikakulam ‘joint division’ of the AOBSZC.

Other parameters of violence also indicate that the trend of improvement in the security situation established in the State since 2010 continued through 2016. The number of overall Maoist-linked incidents recorded in the State stood at 66 in 2016 (up to November 15, 2016) as against 92 through 2015, and 103 through 2014. As in 2015, year 2016 did not record a single major incident (involving three or more killings) targeting civilians. The last such incident was recorded on April 27, 2014, when the Maoists had killed three villagers in Malkangiri District. The Maoists carried out a single attack on economic targets in the State in 2016 (UMHA data, up to November 15, 2016) as against 17 such incidents in 2015. After November 15, one such incident was recorded on November 18, 2016.

Further, SFs arrested another 38 Maoist cadres, including three ‘commander’ level cadres in 2016 (up to November 15, 2016), in addition to 60 such arrests through 2015. Mounting SF pressure has also resulted in the surrender of another 60 Maoists (up to November 15, 2016), in addition to 73 through 2015, and 100 each through 2014 and 2013.

Following the defection of Sabyasachi Panda from the CPI-Maoist on August 10, 2012 and his subsequent arrest on July 17, 2014 Maoists’ fortunes in Odisha have declined rapidly. Adding to their problems, Nachika Linga, the leader of the Narayanpatna-based CPI-Maoist front organization Chasi Mulia Adivasi Sangh (CMAS), surrendered on October 28, 2014, resulting in a further weakening of the rebel formation in 2015. The Maoists further received another shock in their ‘safe haven’ in the Bejingi forest area, between Ramgarh and Panasput, in Malkangiri in 2016. Between 50 and 60 Maoists were reportedly holding a ‘plenary session’, attended by top leaders to discuss their ‘tactical counter offensive campaign’ (TCOC) against the SFs and were reportedly planning ‘something big’ to revive their movement in the region, when SFs launched two successive operations and eliminated at least 30 Maoists on October 24 and 27, 2016.

Nevertheless, residual Maoist capacities and capabilities continue to present a significant challenge in the State. Crucially, civilian fatalities and the number of incidents of civilian killing increased from 20 and 18 respectively in 2015 to 27 and 23 in 2016. Civilian killings were reported from six Districts – Koraput (nine), Malkangiri (seven), Kandhamal (six), Kalahandi (three), Nuapada (one), and Rayagada (one) – in 2016; as against four Districts – Malkangiri (16), Kalahandi (two), Angul (one) and Balangir (one) – in 2015. Overall fatalities in Maoist-linked violence also increased from 35 in 2015 to 72 in 2016.

The Maoists also engineered at least 10 arson-related incidents in 2016, in comparison to seven in 2015. The Maoists were also involved in six explosions in the State, as against five in 2015; as well as 24 exchanges of fire between SFs and CPI-Maoist through 2016 in nine Districts, in comparison to 14 such incidents in six Districts in 2015.

Further, the number of bandh (total shut down) calls given by the Maoists in 2016 remained the same (10) as in 2015. The number of bandh calls stood at two in 2014. Out of Odisha’s 30 Districts, fatalities were reported from eight: Deogarh (two), Kalahandi (eight), Kandhamal (six), Koraput (12), Malkangiri (39), Nuapada (one), Rayagada (two) and Sundergarh (two) – in 2016; in comparison to seven Districts – Angul (one), Bolangir (one), Kalahandi (three), Kandhamal (two), Koraput (one), Malkangiri (25) and Sundergarh (two) – in 2015. Indeed, on December 5, 2016, Odisha Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik informed the State Assembly that 19 of the 30 Districts of Odisha remained Naxal [Left Wing Extremism (LWE)] prone. According to UMHA’s list of 106 Maoist-affected Districts in the country, 19 fall in Odisha.

Meanwhile, the State Election Commission was forced to issue a notification dated January 21, 2017, to either postpone or cancel General Elections for three tier Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRI) in some highly vulnerable areas of Malkangiri District. The decision came “after considering the joint report of Collector and Superintendent of Police, Malkangiri, to the effect that the process of election was vitiated as the Election Officers could not perform their duties in some Gram Panchayats [village level local self Government institution) due to law and order situation and conduct of free and fair election is likely to be affected in the present scenario in Chitrakonda Block [Malkangiri District]”. The February 2, 2017, civilian killing in Malkangiri District was related to these scheduled elections. The deceased was the only candidate for Ward No. 7 of the Bara village in Kartanpalli gram panchayat under the Mathili tehsil (revenue unit) in Malkangiri.

Significantly, the Maoists have long had a strong presence in Malkangiri District – a strategic location that shares borders with Maoist affected areas of both Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. The latest developments show that, despite the reverses they have suffered, they continue to maintain a significant presence in Malkangiri. The PRI elections are scheduled to be held in five phases – February 13, 15, 17, 19 and 21, 2017. Posters and banners threatening people with dire consequences if they participated in the elections have been put on several occasions in different areas of the State. The Maoists had also created problems during the last PRI elections held in the State during the five-phase polling that commenced on February 11, 2012, and ended on February 19, 2012. The Maoist influence was palpable in the Narayanpatna Block of Koraput District, where most of the candidates ‘won’ uncontested during those elections.

Finding the existing deployment of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) [eight battalions each of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and Border Security Force (BSF) and one battalion of the Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA), a specialized unit of the CRPF] insufficient, Odisha Chief Secretary Aditya Prasad Padhi stated, on June 21, 2016, that the Government would ask for two more battalions of CAPFs to tackle LWE in the State. No further information is available in this regard.

Past experience has shown that, while normalcy can be attained in insurgency affected areas with the help of CAPFs, it can only be sustained by improving the strength and quality of the State Police. Worryingly, however, the strength of the State Forces remains abysmal. According to Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D) data for 2016, the police-population ratio in Odisha was 130.95 (as on January 1, 2016) as compared to a poor national average of 137.11 [over 220 policemen per 100,000 population are considered necessary for ‘peacetime policing’]. Vacancies in the leadership, i.e. at the Indian Police Service (IPS) level, stood at 79, with a sanctioned strength of 188 IPS posts. Unless these deficits are addressed, the residual threat of a Maoist revival will persist.

The Maoists in Odisha are down but not out, and their activities indicate that they will certainly continue to challenge the security environment in the State. The absence of a strategic thrust to improve State Police capabilities and an enduring dominance of the entire State jurisdiction speaks poorly of the administration’s assessment and comprehension of the problem, as well as of its response.

* Deepak Kumar Nayak
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

By Tushar Ranjan Mohanty*

Baba Ladla alias Noor Muhammad, the notorious Lyari gangster who carried a reward of PKR three million, was killed on February 1, 2017, during a shootout with Rangers personnel in the Lyari Town area of Karachi, the provincial capital of Sindh. Two of Baba Ladla’s close associates, Sikandar aka Sikko and Mohammad Yaseen aka Mama, were also killed in the encounter. During the operation, Head Constable Fayyaz and Constable Tufail were also killed. One Kalashnikov, two 9mm pistols and a hand grenade were also recovered from their possession. The “most wanted” suspects had been involved in numerous terrorist incidents, according to a Press Release issued by the Rangers: “Baba Ladla was wanted in more than 74 crimes by Police.”

The Press Release also revealed that Baba Ladla had, with the help of Peoples’ Aman Committee [a militant group tied to the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)] chief Uzair Baloch, committed the murders of Shera Pathan, Arshad Pappu and Yasir Arafat, rival Lyari gangsters allegedly patronized by the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)]. It also stated that, in March 2013, Baba Ladla had abducted a group of Muhajirs and murdered them. Of the other gangster gunned down in the operation, Sikander was wanted in more than 15 crimes, and was described as a close aide of Baba Ladla and also his facilitator. In April 2012, Sikander had committed the murder of Station House Officer (SHO) Fawad Khan while in the same year he had also killed Constable Asif. In 2013, Sikandar had tortured and subsequently killed two other men. He had also been involved in the sale and purchase of illegal weapons.

On January 28, 2017, Police shot dead a Lyari gangster, identified as Irfan Pathan, who was wanted in more than 100 target killing cases, including murders of political workers and rivals, in Singo Lane of the Chakiwara area in Lyari Town. Officials said Irfan Pathan was a ‘shooter’ of the Faisal Pathan group of the Uzair Baloch gang, and he was also involved in multiple rape cases and had abducted several women from the area. Four other gangsters, identified as Rehan Pathan, Yousuf Pathan, Ismail and Ehsan Lala, managed to escape under the cover of fire. A cache of arms and ammunition were recovered from their hideout, including 301 grenades of different types, four .303-rifles, four SMGs, two G-3 rifles, one 9mm pistol, one 30-bore pistol, one 22-bore pistol, one 32-bore pistol, one LMG, one 12-bore repeater, two 30-bore mini-Kalashnikovs, four jackets, two telescopes, one gas mask and a huge quantity of ammunition.

On January 12, 2017, three gangsters were killed in an intelligence-driven targeted raid by Rangers personnel in the Yousaf Goth locality of Gadap Town in Karachi. One accomplice managed to escape, while a heavy cache of automatic weapons & ammunition was recovered.

Another notorious gangster, Bilal aka Bhaiyya, who carried a reward of PKR 1.5 million, was killed in a Police shootout in the Gao Godam area of Lyari Town in Karachi on December 7, 2015. Bilal, who was affiliated with the Uzair Baloch gang, was wanted in at least 100 criminal cases, including 50 murders, according to Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) Zahid Hussain. Three of Bilal’s associates, Mullah Sohail, Yousuf Pathan and Rehan Pathan, managed to flee from the spot during the operation.

After Bada Ladla’s killing, Muhammad Saeed, Director General (DG) Rangers, visited different parts of Lyari on February 4, 2017. In a briefing on the security situation, he said peace would be established in every part of Karachi. Terrorist elements and their aiders and abettors would be strictly dealt with and no successors of Baba Ladla would be allowed to raise their heads.

Due to the Rangers Operation, Karachi, the commercial capital of the country, had witnessed a seven-year low in terrorism related violence. The Sindh Rangers were called in on September 4, 2013, when violence in the city was at a peak, with 1,668 fatalities. According to South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) data, the violence in the Province has dropped to its lowest since 2010. Sindh recorded 271 fatalities, including 76 civilians, 24 SF personnel and 171 terrorists in 2016, in comparison to 718 such fatalities in 2015, including 350 civilians, 58 SF personnel and 310 terrorists. While the overall fatalities recorded a 62.25 per cent decrease in 2016 in comparison to previous year, civilian, SF and terrorist/organised crime categories had seen a 78.28, 58.62 and 44.83 per cent decline, respectively.

The annual report of the Sindh Police released on December 27, 2016, disclosed that there was a 32.93 percent decline in killings in 2016, when 666 persons were killed, as compared to 2015, which saw 993 fatalities. According to the data, incidents of targeted killing also decreased by 71.69 per cent, with 45 persons shot dead in 2016, as compared to 159 in the previous year. Karachi also witnessed a sharp decline in incidents of terrorism, kidnappings for ransom and extortion by 60, 57 and 34 percents respectively in 2016, only two incidents of terrorism were reported in the outgoing year as compared to the previous year, incidents of kidnappings for ransom dropped to 21 from 49 in 2015, and 146 cases of extortion were reported as compared to 224 in the previous year. The Police report claimed that the number of target killings had reduced because of the ‘good performance’ of the Police, but did not mention the achievements of the Sindh Rangers’ Karachi operations that have been ongoing for the past three years.

Meanwhile, a Sindh Rangers report issued on December 29, 2016, claimed that a total of 446 ‘target killers’ had been arrested in 2016, most of them belonging to the ‘militant wings’ of different political groups. According to the report, which focused on the ongoing Karachi operation, Sindh Rangers conducted 1,992 operations across the city over the year, during which more than 2,847 suspected criminals were taken into custody. A break-up of the numbers shows that of the 446 target killers arrested by the Rangers, 348 belonged to various political groups, 87 had links to Lyari gangs, while 11 were affiliated with different sectarian groups. In the report, the Rangers also claimed that murders and targeted killings in the city hit an all-time low in the year, with 87 people falling victim, compared to 199 in the preceding year. The report added that at least 1,845 arms, including machine guns, light machine guns, sub-machine guns, rocket launchers, detonators, pistols/revolvers and explosives, had been confiscated during the year. A total of 194,579 rounds of ammunition of different calibres were also recovered.

The number of major incidents (each involving three or more fatalities) decreased by 43.33 per cent in 2016 in comparison to the previous year. Sindh accounted for 34 major incidents of violence, resulting in 134 deaths in 2016, as against 60 such incidents, accounting for 295 fatalities in 2015.

There was also a considerable decrease in the number of explosion-related incidents in 2016. In comparison to 26 blasts resulting in 102 fatalities and 202 injured in 2015, 2016 recorded 19 blasts resulting in just three fatalities and 64 injured. Similarly, there was just one suicide attack of sectarian nature in which at least 13 persons, including five Policemen, were injured, as Police foiled two separate suicide blasts during Eid prayers in the Khanpur tehsil of Shikarpur District in Sindh. There was also relative calm in the Province from the perspective of sectarian violence. While the number of incidents of sectarian violence decreased from 30 in 2015 to 19 in 2016, the resultant deaths came down from 164 in 2015 to 25 in 2016 – a 84.75 per cent decline.

Despite the law-enforcement agencies’ crackdown on the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) in Sindh and the killing of its key leaders, the outfit still managed to carry out 17 attacks through 2016, 10 of them in Karachi alone. The Islamabad based security think-tank Pak Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS) claimed, in a report, that 10 people were killed and another 30 injured in the 10 attacks carried out by the LeJ in Karachi in 2016. Muhammad Amir Rana, PIPS Director, asserted that the terror group was trying to fill the void created by the elimination of its main leaders and weakening infrastructure. The operational capacity of this terrorist formation was eroded further in 2016, as compared to 2015, with the arrest of LeJ Sindh chief Naeem Bukhari aka Atta-ur-Rehman.

Conventional crimes, however, remain on the rise. Citizens-Police Liaison Committee (CPLC) crime statistics indicate a proportional increase in conventional crimes, such as robberies, car snatching, thefts and mobile snatching, by 24 per cent. According to CPLC data, till mid-December 2016, 14,974 people had been deprived of their mobile phones at gunpoint, while 17,790 mobile phones were stolen. On average, around 15 vehicles were snatched per month, the highest in November, when 23 vehicles were reportedly stolen. Through 2016, nearly 1,500 cars were stolen, 2,342 motorcycles were snatched, and another 21,028 motorcycles were stolen.

In its January 9, 2017 report, CPLC identified sixty ‘hot spots’ in Karachi, where street gangs operate and most incidents of snatchings take place. These areas included PIDC, Tariq Road, Sakhi Hassan, Hassan Square, Bahadurabad, Aisha Manzil and the NIPA Chowrangi which are high-risk areas, and even some areas in the city’s posh localities, such as Defence and Clifton, make it to the list. All this, even after more than three years of the Karachi Operations, which claimed great success according to the Rangers and Provincial Government.

Almost 75 per cent of militants on the terrorism watch list for their alleged links with over a dozen proscribed organisations remain untraceable in Karachi, according to official documents. The Sindh counterterrorism forces were unable to trace 142 of a total of 190 terrorists, who were listed in ‘category A’, a term used for terrorists put on exceptional risk or high risk. Six most wanted terrorists belonging to proscribed organizations had shifted to Holland, Bangladesh, Dubai, Ethiopia, United Arab Emirates and Afghanistan, official documents said. Interviews with police officers and documents prepared by Sindh counterterrorism forces further revealed that “there is a strong possibility that some of these militants must have planned to execute recent terror attacks in Karachi.”

Despite of geo-tagging of 7,724 madrassas completed on September 4, 2016, around 93 madrassas in Sindh continue to have solid links with terrorist or banned outfits, and intelligence agencies have credible information about the activities taking place there. Under the NAP, geo-tagging of 7,724 madrassas had been completed by the Sindh Special Branch and the IT Branch, helping security agencies define their exact location and to maintain a strict watch on them. Of this total, 3,110 were located in Karachi, 1,290 in Hyderabad, 750 in Mirpurkhas, 1,536 in Sukkur and 1,037 in Larkana Division. Sources indicated that there were 10,030 madrassas in Sindh, of which 2,309 madrassas had been sealed under different charges, while 1,184 were yet to be registered.

On August 11, 2016, the Supreme Court assailed the Sindh Government for not taking proper steps to ensure maintenance of law and order in the provincial capital. During the proceedings of the ‘Karachi law and order case’, Chief Justice Asif Saeed Khan Khosa inquired about the status of CCTV cameras to be placed at different locations in the city. The Chief Secretary replied that an amount of rupees ten billion had been allocated for new CCTV cameras. The Court responded, “The issue is not allocating funds but also spending them where they are required to be spent… We want full implementation on the orders of the Karachi law and order case.”

While Sindh in general and Karachi in particular have seen a ray of relative light after years of darkness, a confrontation between the Federal and Provincial Governments regarding Policing power has undermined operational effectiveness. In particular, the Provincial Government had questioned the ‘targeted operations’ by the Rangers, which is a Federal Security Force. In every 90 days, the rangers needed Provincial Government’s validation for further continuation. The clash between two different political parties, PML-Nawaz at the centre and Pakistan People’s Party in the Province, threatens the future successes against the terrorism-crime nexus in Sindh.

* Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

A court in Lorestan province of Iran has convicted a man and a woman of adultery and has punished them to execution by stoning.

Since 2002 Iranian Judiciary has been indecisive about this cruel and inhuman punishment. At one time in 2003 the head of the Judiciary, Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, imposed a moratorium on execution by stoning.

The last documented case of stoning was in 2009 when two men were stoned to death in Mashhad. Yet it seems that stoning is back.

The most recent case in Lorestan involves a women and a clergy. The two had an extramarital affair that has become entangled in a local political dispute between competing factions.

The local intelligence officials, including the internet police, have secretly taped the clergy and the women having sex and have gathered other supporting documents. The tape and the documents were presented in the trial for the alleged adultery.

Branch 1 of Koohdasht’s Criminal Court in Lorestan has sentenced the two to death by stoning. The case has not yet been appealed and there is still a chance that the ruling will be overturned.

No information has yet been disclosed about the female defendant but since the punishment is stoning, one can only assume that she must have been married at the time of the affair.

Based on Shiite jurisprudence a married man is entitled to temporary marriages with as many unmarried women as he wishes. As such the punishment of execution by stoning only applies when the female party to sexual intercourse is married.

Despite the 2002 moratorium, stoning has taken place in Iran in 2007 and 2009. The recent ruling also shows that here is no ban on stoning.

The current head of the judiciary in Iran, Sadegh Larijani has defended stoning as the right punishment supported by the Shari‘a law. The current status of stoning in the Islamic Penal Code is as such that the judge with the permission of the Judiciary and supreme judges can use other methods of execution for adulterers.

According to the Islamic Penal Code in Iran an adulterous man and women are buried in a ditch up to the man’s waist and the woman’s chest and then stoned to death.

By Husain Haqqani and Lisa Curtis*

The new Trump Administration must review its policies toward Pakistan in order to more effectively contain, and eventually eliminate, the terrorist threats that continue to emanate from the country. The activities and operations of diverse terror groups on and from Pakistani soil, and the government’s failure to rein them in, threaten vital U.S. national security interests in the region. These include stabilizing Afghanistan, keeping the country from again turning into a global terrorist safe haven, and preventing the outbreak of an India-Pakistan military conflict that could potentially go nuclear.

Obama administration officials came into office eight years ago with the idea that they could coax Pakistan into changing key policies by elevating the U.S.-Pakistan partnership. To these ends, Washington instituted a strategic dialogue and increased both economic and military aid levels.

Unfortunately, Pakistan never changed its policy of supporting certain militant groups that fight Afghan and coalition forces, thus making it impossible for the United States to achieve its objective of keeping Afghanistan from reverting to a safe haven for international terrorism. The U.S. clearly recognizes that Pakistan’s support for the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network and other terrorist groups is not the sole reason for Afghanistan’s security challenges. However, the other problems become insurmountable when the principal insurgent groups enjoy safe havens in Pakistan.

Meanwhile, Pakistani military leaders also continue to support terrorist groups that attack India in an effort to keep it off balance and to draw international mediation into the dispute with India over Kashmir. Pakistan’s seemingly unconstrained expansion of its nuclear arsenal, particularly the development of tactical nuclear weapons and extended–range missile systems, also remains a cause for concern, especially with regard to India.

U.S. assistance levels to Pakistan reached their height in 2011, when the U.S. provided $3.6 billion in military and economic aid, and have decreased every year since. One reason for the decline in aid levels is due to the U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan and the decreased reliance on Pakistan for Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs). Another reason is growing frustration, particularly among members of the U.S. Congress, with continued Pakistani support to the Taliban and Haqqani network that fight Afghan and coalition forces.

To accomplish U.S. counterterrorism objectives in the region and to reverse extremist trends in Pakistani society, Pakistani authorities – specifically the country’s military leaders, who control its foreign and security policies – need to take a comprehensive approach to shutting down all Islamist militant groups that operate from Pakistani territory, not just those that attack the Pakistani state. In the end, turning a blind eye and providing support to some terrorist groups creates an environment conducive to the operation of all terrorist groups.

Pakistan’s tolerance for terror groups also undermines the country itself, corroding its stability and civilian governance and damaging its investment climate, as well as inflicting death and injury on thousands of its own innocent citizens.

Accordingly, the objective of the Trump administration’s policy toward Pakistan must be to make it more and more costly for Pakistani leaders to employ a strategy of supporting terrorist proxies to achieve regional strategic goals. There should be no ambiguity that the U.S. considers Pakistan’s strategy of supporting terrorist proxies to achieve regional strategic advantage as a threat to U.S. interests. U.S. policy must also pay attention to non-proliferation goals while dealing with Pakistan.

At the same time, the Trump Administration should be clear in all forums that the U.S. issue is not with the Pakistani people or the Pakistani nation. Rather, Washington takes strong exception to specific policy choices by parts of the Pakistan Government – chiefly, the military and intelligence apparatus centered in Rawalpindi, adjacent to the capital, Islamabad – that support the existence and activities of terrorist proxies. Accordingly, the Trump administration should both publicly and privately maintain avenues for Pakistan to become a U.S. ally, as well as trade and investment partner, in the future, should its leaders embrace the conduct and policies of an ally.

Moving forward, the Trump administration must link U.S. policies toward Pakistan directly to U.S. objectives, especially in Afghanistan. The U.S. must find ways to limit Pakistan’s ability to frustrate U.S. goals in Afghanistan. Likewise, the U.S. must refuse to get involved in the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir and instead focus on diplomatically isolating Pakistan over its continued support to terrorist groups that attack India and have connections to international terrorism. The U.S. should encourage both India and Pakistan to exercise restraint and pursue measures normalizing their relationship.

Background

In March 2009, then-President Barack Obama defined his top priority as being to disrupt, dismantle and defeat the al-Qaida infrastructure in Pakistan, which posed an imminent and significant threat to the United States and its allies. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was the lead element in the fight. Drone strikes intensified dramatically. In May 2011 Osama bin Laden was tracked down by the CIA, and a Navy SEAL team delivered justice.

Pakistan had helped capture some key al-Qaida leaders in the early years after 9/11. However, in the last decade, the U.S. has not been able to count on consistent Pakistani support in the war against al-Qaida. Today the al-Qaida infrastructure in Pakistan is much reduced but not destroyed. Bin Laden’s successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is still in Pakistan, producing propaganda that calls for attacks on Americans. U.S. intelligence officials reportedly believe that Bin Laden’s son, Hamza, is also active in Pakistan.

Like several other U.S. presidents since the 1980s, former President Barack Obama saw Pakistan as a potentially useful ally in achieving limited U.S. goals in South Asia. The administration hoped that with the right kind of incentives – economic and military – Pakistan could be induced to change those policies that ran counter to U.S. interests. These undesirable policies included Pakistan’s support for terrorists targeting Afghanistan and India and continued expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

A Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) was designated to demonstrate American commitment to the region, as well as an understanding of the links between the challenges facing these two neighboring countries. The SRAP office became the inter-agency focal point for Afghanistan-Pakistan policy, separated from the State Department’s South and Central Asia Bureau.

As part of the plan to reassure Pakistan of American support, Washington dispatched the SRAP for frequent visits to both Kabul and Islamabad; held structured strategic dialogues, both on a bilateral and trilateral basis; and invited Afghan and Pakistani leaders to visit Washington on a regular basis. The creation of the SRAP office, however, at times undermined the goals of the State Department’s South and Central Asia Bureau and resulted in confused U.S. messaging to Pakistan.

Large amounts of economic and military aid have not induced Pakistan to end covert support for the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network, or the myriad India-focused terrorist groups, most notably Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, which Pakistan describes as “freedom fighters.”

Encouraged by the election of a civilian government in Pakistan in 2008, the Obama administration decided to offer a multi-year civilian aid package to Pakistan as an incentive for the government to cooperate with the U.S. This was the first time the U.S. explicitly showed support for civilian rule in Pakistan with high doses of economic assistance. The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (also referred to as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill) offered $1.5 billion in civilian aid for five years with a possibility of extension for another five years. It was presented as the end of “transactional” relations with Pakistan’s military and the beginning of a deeper partnership with its people and their elected representatives.

The package of civilian aid offered to Pakistan came with strings designed to gently nudge Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment to back away from support to militant groups, whether they operated in Afghanistan or India. Positive inducements to the military were offered in the form of aid – materiel and cash, including reimbursements. Public praise was accompanied by private pressure to alter Pakistan’s policies.

Washington hoped that civilian aid (through the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill) and support to a civilian government would help strengthen democratic trends in the country and allow the civilians to exert greater control over the military and intelligence services. That hope was not fulfilled. The aid package, however, was not designed in such a way to make a significant impact on the economy and health or education systems. Pakistan’s civilian governments — both the PPP government (2008-2013) and the PML/N government (2013-present) — have proved unable to push back sufficiently against the existing national security paradigm, and policies framed by Pakistan’s security establishment have endured.

Moreover, the U.S. need for Pakistan’s logistics support in supplying its troops in Afghanistan resulted in a situation wherein Washington’s offer of carrots could not be backed by the threat of effective sticks. The Obama administration wanted to withdraw American forces from Afghanistan, leaving behind a secure and stable government in charge. To that end, it pursued a political solution to the Afghan conflict that depended on Pakistan’s using its influence to persuade the Taliban to negotiate.

While Pakistan’s military leaders may see advantages in a negotiated outcome, they have so far been unwilling to put enough pressure on the Taliban to lower the violence in Afghanistan and to induce the insurgents to negotiate seriously. Without sufficient pressure on their sanctuary inside Pakistan, the Taliban continue to assess they can win the war militarily. Indeed, there are past examples of Pakistan actively working to disrupt peace efforts between the Taliban and the Afghan government.

The fact that Osama Bin Laden was enjoying sanctuary in a location close to Pakistan’s military academy at the time of the U.S. attack in May 2011 reinforced American disenchantment with Pakistan. But American dependence on Pakistan for access and logistics support for U.S. troops inside Afghanistan preempted punitive action. The flow of U.S. assistance continued, despite intelligence that attacks on American and ISAF troops in Afghanistan by the Afghan Taliban or the Haqqani network were orchestrated from Pakistani territory.

In November 2011, U.S.-led NATO forces carried out a counterterrorism attack on a location close to the Pakistan border. Pakistani troops used artillery and heavy machine guns to attack the U.S. helicopters, based on rules of engagement issued by the Pakistani military command following the U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden in May 2011. U.S. aircraft engaged the Pakistani border outpost with counter fire that resulted in the deaths of 28 Pakistani soldiers. In retaliation, Pakistan closed the GLOCs for NATO forces. Until January 2013, the U.S relied on the more expensive northern route.

Pakistan, whose port and trucking companies had benefited by serving the GLOCs, eventually agreed to a compromise solution that re-opened the routes. This gave Pakistani officials an opportunity to claim that the U.S. had effectively acknowledged Pakistan’s indispensability to the U.S.

Now, at the start of the new Trump administration, the U.S. continues to provide economic and military assistance to Pakistan without having secured its objective of convincing Pakistan to end its policy of using terrorist proxies to achieve regional strategic objectives. However, there have been some positive developments with regard to Pakistan’s fight against terrorists that attack the Pakistani state.

Since mid-2014, Pakistan has conducted a major crackdown on the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP, the so-called Pakistani Taliban) in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. This has helped reduce the terror threat inside Pakistan. The Pakistan government also passed a National Action Plan in Parliament in January 2015 to eliminate terrorism and extremism in the country. But these positive moves are incomplete and may not be sustained. They have thus far spared some of the country’s most powerful terrorist organizations and have not targeted the Afghan groups that receive sanctuary in Pakistan — the very groups that most threaten the Afghan state’s existence.

There are conflicting signals as to whether the Pakistani civilian leadership understands the importance of taking a comprehensive approach to combating terrorism and extremism, while it seems clear that leaders within the military and intelligence establishment continue to favor a policy of supporting some terrorist groups that fight in Afghanistan and India. Some Pakistani civilian leaders are concerned over Pakistan’s increasing international isolation over the issue of support for terrorism.

There has been some cautious optimism that Pakistan’s newly-appointed Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Qamar Bajwa could pursue a tougher line on terrorism than did his predecessor, General Raheel Sharif. General Sharif cracked down on terrorists threatening the Pakistani state, but he did little to rein in those that attack in Afghanistan and India. The smooth transition from one Army Chief to another and the apparent lack of interference in Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s decision-making process on the appointment have been received positively by Pakistan’s neighbors. However, it is too early to tell whether General Bajwa will follow through on any meaningful changes to Pakistan’s terrorism policies. Similar hopes with previous army commanders over the last two decades have gone without fulfillment.

The Obama administration erred in relying on a combination of personal ties with Pakistani military commanders and offers of economic and military assistance as instruments for change in Pakistan’s policies. Admiral Michael Mullen, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, held 25 meetings with Pakistan’s former army chief, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, hoping to influence his thinking. Numerous high level visits, including meetings of Pakistan’s top leaders with President Obama, also failed to result in desirable changes in Pakistani policies.

To be fair, the Obama administration was not the first to accept Pakistani assurances and promises of change at face value. U.S. administrations going back to President Eisenhower have pinned great hopes on their alliance with Pakistan only to be disappointed and frustrated.

Pakistanis believe that they offer a fair exchange to the U.S. for its aid by fitting into U.S. strategic plans – containing Communism in the 1950s and 1960s, fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and dealing with al-Qaida after 9/11. They complain that Washington does not always understand Pakistan’s regional concerns and aspirations. In other words, Pakistan justifies its conduct towards the U.S. on grounds of its own threat perceptions.

Pakistan’s use of terrorist groups as part of its security and foreign policy is a function of its obsession with India, which it perceives as an existential threat. From an outside perspective, Pakistan’s paranoia regarding India is unfounded. While India may be unwilling to renegotiate Kashmir’s territorial status, numerous Indian leaders have tried to reach a modus vivendi with Pakistan.

Pakistan’s military has often disrupted nascent peace efforts pursued by Indian and Pakistani civilian rulers, most notably in 1999 during the Kargil conflict. The Pakistan military has been accused of facilitating the attack against India’s Pathankot air base last January that derailed the goodwill created by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s surprise visit to Lahore to meet with PM Sharif six days earlier. And Pakistan-backed militants have acted as spoilers numerous times when bilateral ties seemed to be warming.

American interests in the region are not served by Pakistan’s strategic thinking, which is fueled by the belief that India seeks to weaken and then dismantle Pakistan. Nor are American interests fully compatible with Pakistan’s desire to steer events in Afghanistan and counter any Indian role there. Continued U.S. assistance, offered in the hope of a gradual change in Pakistan’s terrorism policies, only provides Pakistan an economic cushion and better quality military equipment to persist with those policies.

Policy Recommendations

U.S. engagement with Pakistan must be based on a realistic appraisal of Pakistan’s policies, aspirations, and worldview. The U.S. must stop chasing the mirage of securing change in Pakistan’s strategic direction by giving it additional aid or military equipment. It must be acknowledged that Pakistan is unlikely to change its current policies through inducements alone.

The U.S. must also recognize that its efforts over several decades to strengthen Pakistan militarily have only encouraged those elements in Pakistan that hope someday to wrest Kashmir from India through force. Furthermore, the continued provision of military assistance leads many Pakistani leaders to conclude that (1) the U.S. needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs the U.S.; (2) the U.S. is not serious in its expressed concerns about Pakistan’s support for terrorism, lack of democracy, and disregard of human rights; and (3) Pakistan can continue its policy of minimally satisfying the U.S. to keep it on Pakistan’s side.

The Trump administration must be ready to adopt tougher measures toward Islamabad that involve taking risks in an effort to evoke different Pakistani responses. While there is no silver bullet to change decades of Pakistani policy, there are some policies that would improve chances of gaining Pakistan’s cooperation in dealing with terrorism in a vital region of the world.

Designating Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism, as some U.S. congressional members have advised, is unwise in the first year of a new administration, but should be kept as an option for the longer term. Indeed the administration should state up front that it intends to review the intelligence on Pakistani involvement in supporting terror much more critically than its predecessors.

Avoid viewing and portraying Pakistan as an ally. The new U.S. administration should recognize that Pakistan is not an American ally. It has engaged in supporting the Afghan Taliban, who have killed American troops and their allies in Afghanistan. Thinking of Pakistan as an ally will continue to create problems for the next administration as it did for the last one. At the same time, Pakistan is an important country that is willing to cooperate occasionally and partially with the United States. It cannot be treated, for example, in the same way the U.S. deals with North Korea. As a first step, the U.S. must warn Pakistan that its status as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) is in serious jeopardy. Unless Pakistan takes immediate steps to demonstrate that it fully shares U.S. counterterrorism objectives, the U.S. will revoke its MNNA status within six months.

At the same time, maintain the option for Pakistan to be an ally of the United States in the future. Were Pakistan to cease its current tolerance of and support to terrorist groups, one can envisage grounds for common interest and policies on a range of issues that would form the basis of mutual interest. This could involve a package of trade and investment cooperation that would be mutually win-win for the economies of the United States and Pakistan. Pakistan’s economy has strengths and significant potential, and a package that would include catalyzing U.S. private investment, joint activities between U.S. and Pakistani firms, and facilitating trade within the region through infrastructure development could be, if designed appropriately, a key building block of this alliance.

Prioritize engagement with Pakistan’s civilian leaders and continue humanitarian and social assistance programs that are administered by Pakistan’s civilian authorities. Rolling back the tide of extremism in Pakistan will be an enormous task and could take a generation, but once again there are some recent hopeful signs that the Pakistani civilian government under Prime Minister Sharif is trying to move the country in this direction. In March 2016 the Sharif government followed through with the execution of the assassin of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer, who was killed in 2011 because of his support for religious minorities and efforts to roll back controversial blasphemy laws. Prime Minister Sharif also recently re-named its National Center for Physics after a Nobel Prize-winning Pakistani physicist, Abdus Salam, a member of a minority sect of Islam that is considered heretic by hardline Islamists. These important first steps toward signaling a more moderate and tolerant course for Pakistani society must be recognized and encouraged by the international community. It is important, however, to monitor the overall trend and direction of Pakistani policy, given the track record of policy reversals.

Humanitarian and social aid should not be impacted by the counterterrorism issue since it is the military that controls policies toward terrorist groups. Programs such as International Military Education and Training (IMET) on the military side and the Fulbright Program as well as other exchange programs, on the civilian side, should be continued to build and maintain relationships with Pakistan’s military and civilian elite.

Work through diplomacy with other countries, especially China and Gulf Arab states that share U.S. concern about Pakistan’s tolerance of terrorist organizations and individuals. The U.S. must lead efforts, including at multilateral forums, to sanction Pakistani terrorist groups and individuals. In particular, Washington must seek to work more closely with China, which shares concerns about the presence of terrorist groups in the region and the threat they pose to the proposed China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). While China will avoid steps that embarrass Pakistani leaders or that significantly skew the two countries’ historically close ties, Beijing may be willing to work with Washington behind the scenes to press Pakistan to crack down on terrorists within its territory. Gulf Arab countries, too, must be encouraged to press Pakistan to change its direction.

The U.S. can also work with partners to emphasize the potential for Pakistan’s international isolation as a consequence of Pakistan’s own decisions and actions. Both history and recent events demonstrate that the Pakistan Government is deeply aware of and anxious about its international image. Threatening to damage that image in subtle or obvious ways will garner attention in Islamabad and Rawalpindi.

Enforce counterterrorism conditions on U.S. military aid and reimbursements to Pakistan. Even though counterterrorism conditions on military aid have been in place for the last seven years, the Obama administration for several years used its national security waiver authority to bypass the legislative conditions. However, Congress over the last two years has included in the National Defense Authorization Act language that prohibits a portion of military reimbursement payments for Pakistan from falling under waiver authority. Thus, for the first time, this past summer the Obama administration withheld $300 million in military reimbursements for Pakistan because of its failure to crack down on the Haqqani network. In addition Congress blocked U.S. Government funding for the transfer of additional F-16 aircraft to Islamabad for the same reason.

It no longer makes sense to waive the counterterrorism conditions on U.S. aid to Pakistan. The U.S. can and must better leverage U.S. military aid to encourage tougher policies against terrorists who operate from within Pakistan. While a grace period may have been merited for Pakistan seven years ago, it would be foolish to keep giving the Pakistanis a pass when it comes to taking action against terrorist groups that are directly undermining U.S. regional interests, not to mention killing U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan. Whereas U.S. government agencies were divided seven years ago over the nature and extent of Pakistan’s support to the Afghan Taliban and other terrorist and extremist groups, today no one in the U.S. government disputes that Pakistan provides such support.

Keep the option of using unilateral action (including drones) to target Taliban targets in Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban safe havens in Quetta and elsewhere should no longer be safe. This does not require a campaign on the scale of that against al-Qaida from 2009-2012, but it should be more than the one-off attack against Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour in 2016.

Lay out a sequence and timeline for specific actions Pakistan must take with regard to terrorists responsible for attacks outside Pakistan and link these steps to future U.S. military assistance. An important benchmark should be for Pakistan to arrest and keep in jail known terrorist leaders. In April 2015, Pakistan released from jail the ringleader of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, a decision it should be asked to reverse. Other steps should involve closing down terror training camps and disrupting financing of terror activities. Additionally, the U.S. must demand that Pakistan stem infiltration of militants across the Line of Control (LoC) that divides Kashmir. Militant infiltration into Indian-controlled territory dropped considerably when former President Pervez Musharraf was in power, especially from 2004-2007, demonstrating Pakistan has the ability to turn off the taps when it chooses to do so.

Present to Pakistan a list of calibrated actions for ending its support to the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network, and make clear that failure to make substantial progress on these steps could eventually result in Pakistan’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. The U.S. must convey its expectation that Pakistan will take steps that end support to the Taliban, such as preventing Taliban leaders from living and meeting in Pakistan and curtailing export of arms, explosives, and ammunition to the Taliban in Afghanistan. The U.S. must also demand deportation of all Afghan Taliban leaders in accordance with Pakistan’s declared policy of returning all Afghan refugees. In addition, Pakistan must invalidate all Pakistani ID cards, passports, and special passes for the Taliban to prevent them from easily passing through military checkpoints. Lastly, Islamabad must seize the financial assets and real estate holdings of all Afghan Taliban and Pakistani terrorist groups that support them.

If Pakistan does not make progress on the above steps, the U.S. should consider compiling a list of Pakistani military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) officials, current and former, who are known to have facilitated acts of terrorism — including supporting the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network) — and barring them from travel to the U.S.

Pursue Taliban reconciliation talks on a track separate from U.S. and NATO troop-level decisions and levy consequences on Pakistan if it poses obstacles to such peace efforts. Washington should remain open to attempts to restart Taliban talks with the Afghan government, but should not plan its strategy around this long-shot scenario. It is likely the Taliban will try to convince the international community that they are willing to negotiate, in order to influence decision-making on troop levels in Afghanistan by the new Trump administration. Although Prime Minister Sharif’s government has helped to bring Taliban leaders to the negotiating table, Pakistan’s intelligence services at times also have played spoiler when it feared that Afghan Taliban interlocutors could not be trusted to represent Pakistan’s interests. There should be consequences for Pakistan if it blocks realistic efforts to begin peace talks.

Seek to avoid a complete breakdown in U.S.-Pakistan relations. The U.S. cannot achieve its counterterrorism objectives in Pakistan so long as Islamabad tolerates those terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan and India. Yet it also is not in the U.S. interest to make an enemy out of Pakistan without fresh efforts to change Pakistani behavior.

Designating Pakistan a “State Sponsor of Terrorism” early in the Trump administration, as some in Congress have recommended, would preclude the U.S. from providing any kind of aid to Pakistan and would lead to an irreparable breach in the relationship. While Pakistan frequently does not behave like an ally, it does selectively cooperate with the U.S. If Pakistan’s overall conduct does not change, however, the U.S. should be prepared to review whether Pakistan fits the criteria for designation as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism,” in accordance with the graduated measures proposed above.

Conclusion

After 15 years of the U.S. pursuing engagement and providing significant aid to the country, Pakistan has not altered its support for certain terrorist groups. We have seen the limits of relying mainly on inducements to encourage greater cooperation. Moving forward, the U.S. should develop a framework for pragmatic engagement with Pakistan that includes normal trade ties, identifies and rewards areas of cooperation, and penalizes policies that undermine U.S. interests.

A firmer U.S. commitment to remain engaged in helping Afghans achieve a stable and peaceful state and society is critical to motivating Pakistan to reassess the support it has given to the Taliban and its allies over these many years. The wavering level of commitment to Afghanistan by previous administrations, together with timelines for withdrawal based largely on U.S. domestic political considerations, has undoubtedly contributed to Pakistan’s hedging its bets in Afghanistan by supporting the Taliban and its allies.

With India-Pakistan tensions also on the rise, the Trump administration must formulate a new policy approach toward Pakistan quickly. Both Indian and Pakistani officials have ratcheted up their rhetoric toward the other in recent weeks, and neither shows much interest in reviving dialogue. Another major terrorist attack in India conducted by Pakistan-based militants could precipitate a wider conflict that has the potential of going nuclear.

After years of restraint in the face of Pakistani terrorist provocations, the Modi government has laid down a new marker that it will not stand by in the face of such attacks. India’s September 28-29 cross-LoC (Line of Control) strikes against terrorist bases on Pakistani territory were welcomed as a catharsis by the Indian public, whose frustration with Pakistan had reached a tipping point.

The new U.S. administration must be prepared for the possibility of an escalation in India-Pakistan tensions and plan ahead for how it would intervene to defuse any potential military crisis between the nuclear-armed rivals. It would be helpful for Trump administration officials to examine the U.S. role in helping to defuse past India-Pakistan crises, like the 1999 Kargil border conflict and the 2001-2002 India-Pakistan military stand-off. In both cases, the U.S. took a firm stance against Pakistani support for anti-India militant groups and resisted Pakistani calls for the U.S. to play a mediator role in Kashmir. In this way, the U.S. sent a clear signal that it held Islamabad responsible for the escalating regional tensions.

With decreasing U.S. military aid to Pakistan, Pakistani leaders will seek to strengthen ties to traditional allies like China and Saudi Arabia and also explore new partnerships as with Russia. Fortunately, these nations share the U.S. goal of containing terrorism in the region and preventing India-Pakistan hostilities and may be cooperative with the U.S., especially in crisis circumstances. In any case, Washington’s policy should not be constrained by fear that other countries will displace the U.S. role in Pakistan.

For too long, the U.S. has given Pakistan a pass on its support for some terrorist groups based in Pakistan, including those used against India. The U.S. squandered a valuable opportunity in the aftermath of 9/11 and the 2001-2002 India-Pakistani military crisis to alter the Pakistani military’s fundamental calculations on the use of terrorism for foreign policy ends. Pakistan has long insisted that it is unable to meet U.S. counterterrorism demands in any but the long term. Pakistani officials have privately argued that local terrorist groups such as Jaish-e-Muhammad or Lashkar-e-Taiba are too powerful and pervasive for the military establishment to challenge now. The U.S. should no longer settle for Pakistan’s excuses for delaying a full-throttle crackdown on these terrorist groups and should instead hold Pakistan accountable for the activities of all terrorist groups on its soil.

The U.S. should no longer sacrifice its anti-terrorism principles in the region for the sake of pursuing an “even-handed” South Asia policy, but rather should levy costs on Pakistan for policies that help perpetuate terrorism in the region. In particular, U.S. officials must break the habit of trying to balance policies toward India and Pakistan and should instead pursue shared mutual interests with each. At the same time, the U.S. should be modest about its ability to bridge what divides India and Pakistan.

Convincing Pakistan to give up its terrorist proxies may require a basic change in Islamabad’s regional security calculus. This is indeed a tall order that may in the end fail. But given the stakes for the global fight against terrorism and regional conflict, it is a goal well worth the new administration’s pursuing.

*About the authors:
A Hudson Institute Senior Fellow and Director for South and Central Asia, Ambassador Husain Haqqani served as Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States from 2008-2011 and is widely credited with managing a difficult partnership during a critical phase in the global war on terrorism.

Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation

Source:
This article was published by the Hudson Institute.

Acknowledgements

Working Group Participants and Consultants

Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation; Christine Fair Ph.D., Associate Professor, Security Studies Program, Georgetown University; Col (retd) John Gill, Professor, National Defense University; Anish Goel, Ph.D., Senior South Asia Fellow, New America; Husain Haqqani, Director South & Central Asia, Hudson Institute; Polly Nayak, Independent Consultant; Aparna Pande, Ph.D., Fellow, Hudson Institute; Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow and Director of the Intelligence Project at Brookings Institution; David S. Sedney, Senior Associate (non-resident), International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Dr. Marvin Weinbaum, Scholar-in-Residence, Middle East Institute.

List of signatories

Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation; Christine Fair Ph.D., Associate Professor, Security Studies Program, Georgetown University; Husain Haqqani, Director South & Central Asia, Hudson Institute; Polly Nayak, Independent Consultant; Aparna Pande, Ph.D., Fellow, Hudson Institute; and Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow and Director of the Intelligence Project at Brookings Institution.

(Note: Individuals have signed on to this report in their individual capacities. Listing of organizational affiliations are for identification purposes only and do not represent organizational endorsement of the findings in the report.)