By Dr. Matthew Crosston*

As America slowly immolates under the creeping self-implosion of a chaotic and possibly incompetent new presidential administration, it is time to take a step back and realize something the world should be thankful for. While most media outlets all over the world sit enraptured with and concerned over each new episode of Cold War 2.0, the majority of countries do not seem to realize that this rebirth of old animosity and tension is a boon for them.

This Neo-Cold War is, in reality, much ado about nothing. It is an awful lot of posturing for the cameras and a blowing of mighty wind that signifies little. How could I say such a thing? Am I ignorant? Am I naively optimistic? Am I a Putin plant in the West trying to distract audiences from the very real and impending danger of a coming WWIII? Nothing of the sort. I believe this is a fake Cold War based on the ample evidence being provided by both sides. Allow me to count the ways.

Actions by America:

• The Magnitsky Act
• Comprehensive Sanctions after Ukrainian affair
• ‘Intervening’ in Libya and Yemen
• Lobbying against the JCPOA by relevant political leaders, threatening to repeal it
• Deployment of THAAD in South Korea
• Freedom of Navigation patrols in the South China Sea
• Open hostility from prominent members of Congress
• Various expulsions of Russian diplomatic corps members from Washington
• Boots on the ground and more in Syria against Assad

Actions by Russia:

• ‘Intervening’ in Maidan revolution
• ‘Enforcing’ the secession vote in Crimea
• Exiting specific nuclear proliferation treaties
• Reforming and modernizing its military arsenal
• Hacking scandals
• Possibly compromising the US Presidential election
• Strategic moves against NATO relevance
• Various expulsions of American diplomatic corps members from Moscow
• Boots on the ground and more in Syria against Assad opposition

This is not even a full list, but most of the events listed above form the core evidence used to justify the declaration that a new Cold War has begun. But I believe it is quite the opposite: several individual items on the above lists alone would be reason enough for countries in other locales and contexts to go to war with each other. Not only do we presently live in a moment where many in the United States believe that Russia purposely undermined and corrupted the presidential election of 2016 and that the current President sitting in the Oval Office is ‘Putin’s puppet,’ but Russia for its part believes the United States has de facto tried to kill Russian citizens through the soft power manipulation of sanctions, purposely trying to force a revolution from within against Putin by making regular people suffer. It is not important whether these two belief systems are factually true. What matters are the disturbing percentages within both populations that believe they are. Name me other situations where two powerful countries can think such things about the other and NOT end up going to war or escalating their animosity beyond competing press conferences and media blasts (which, in real time, is all this so-called new Cold War has amounted to so far)?

Even more incredulously, both the United States and Russia are presently intervening inside of a foreign country that has semi-disintegrated into near anarchy, but they are intervening on opposite sides of the conflict. Russia has openly questioned the wisdom of removing the Assad regime from power as well as being at least semi-justifiably suspicious of the membership of many opposition groups in terms of their allegiance to democratic institutions or radical Islamist ones. America has steadfastly accused Russia of not only supporting a man who committed war crimes by using biological weapons against his own people, but that the Russian air force has indiscriminately bombed areas of Syria that were purely civilian, thereby violating the Geneva Convention. I am hard-pressed to think of worse accusations to diplomatically lob toward opposing sides during a conflict. But then to remember that these two sides have both personnel and materiel in the battle arena, pursuing contradictory objectives, and that neither side has engaged the other in any manner within Syria, not even once, is simply incomprehensible. Incomprehensible, that is, if this truly was a real Cold War. This implausible level of good luck and/or coincidence can only come about from a deliberate strategy of restraint. And that is my point: it IS a deliberate strategy of restraint manifested on both sides toward each other. Yes, Russia and America have different interests on a number of issues and have pursued those interests with an impressive projection of power in various arenas around the world. But despite this, neither has fallen victim to misperception, misdirection, manipulation, what have you, to the degree that either wanted to incite a real war between them.

I can believe in coincidence in foreign affairs. I can even believe in coincidence a couple of times. But at this point in the so-called New Cold War these two opponents are benefiting from nearly a dozen coincidences in order to not be in an all-out full-scale war. That is too much for even my bleeding optimistic heart. This consistent ability to antagonize but pull back, to accuse but go no further, to reprimand but not retaliate in force, is why Cold War 2.0 is empty. And thank goodness for that: not only does it mean the world is not truly under the threat of nuclear annihilation, but as long as America and Russia continue to play ‘enemy footsie’ with each other they are suitably distracted from noticing areas where they in fact have common interests and might even benefit from uniting into a team. If most of the international community thinks the world is not in a safe place when America and Russia are not getting along, just imagine how much consternation there might be in certain places if they actually became real strategic and foreign policy allies? The ‘meddling’ under that context would make the current complaints of meddling seem infantile.

So cheer up, world. Sit back and watch the Bully Brothers do their thing with each other. In the end, it’s not going to amount to very much and it prevents them from ganging up on you. Because if there is one thing both Russia and America have had in common for generations, it is a sense of global importance and messianism that is breathtaking to behold, if not also mind-blowingly uncontrolled. It just might be better to have those tendencies obsessed with each other rather than focused on someone else.

About the author:
*Dr. Matthew Crosston is Vice Chairman of Modern Diplomacy and member of the Editorial Board at the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

Source:
This article was published by Modern Diplomacy

The Ecuadorian ruling party candidate Lenin Moreno is beating his rival and conservative opposition candidate Guillermo Lasso in the first round. With 50 percent of the votes counted it is still unclear if a runoff is required to decide the new president.

With over 50 percent of the ballots counted, Moreno, a disabled former vice president, secured some 38.26 percent of the vote, compared to around 29.86 percent cast for Lasso. A candidate is required to gain over 40 percent of the vote and a 10-percentage-point difference to avoid the second round of polls on April 2.

A nominee for the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize, Moreno served as Vice President of the country from 2007 to 2013, under President Rafael Correa. It was Correa, serving his third presidential term, who had nominated Morena to run for Alianza País, the socialist political movement in Ecuador.

Morena ran on a promise to continue Correa’s policies and gained votes by promising benefits for the disabled, single mothers and the elderly.

His opponent conservative businessman Lasso, who already lost in the 2013 presidential race against Correa, campaigned on a platform to revive the oil-dependent economy.

The Conservative vowed to create a million jobs if elected president and promised to expel WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange from the nation’s embassy in London.

What began as a regional protest movement in November 2015, is in danger of becoming a fully-fledged armed uprising in Ethiopia.

Angered and exasperated by the government’s intransigence and duplicity, small guerrilla groups made up of local armed people have formed in Amhara and elsewhere, and are conducting hit and run attacks on security forces. Fighting at the beginning of January in the North West region of Benishangul Gumuz saw 51 regime soldiers killed, ESAT News reported, and in the Amhara region a spate of incidents has occurred, notably a grenade attack on a hotel in Gondar and an explosion in Bahir-Dah.

In what appears to be an escalation in violence, in Belesa, an area north of Gondar, a firefight between ‘freedom fighters’, as they are calling themselves, and the military resulted in deaths on both sides. There have also been incidents in Afar, where people are suffering the effects of drought; two people were recently killed by security personnel, others arrested. The Afar Human Rights Organization told ESAT that the government has stationed up to 6000 troops in the region, which has heightened tensions and fuelled resentment.

Given the government’s obduracy, the troubling turn of events was perhaps to be expected. However, such developments do not bode well for stability in the country or the wider region, and enable the ruling regime to slander opposition groups as ‘terrorists’, and implement more extreme measures to clamp down on public assembly in the name of ‘national security’.

Until recently those calling for change had done so in a peaceful manner; security in the country – the security of the people – is threatened not by opposition groups demanding human rights be observed and the constitution be upheld, but by acts of State Terrorism, the real and pervasive menace in Ethiopia.

Oppressive State of Emergency

Oromia and Amhara are homelands to the country’s two biggest ethnic groups, together comprising around 65% of the population. Demonstrations began in Oromia: thousands took to the streets over a government scheme to expand Addis Ababa onto Oromo farmland (plans later dropped), and complaints that the Oromo people had been politically marginalised. Protests expanded into the Amhara region in July 2016, concerning the appropriation of fertile land in the region by the authorities in Tigray – a largely arid area.

The regime’s response has been consistently violent and has fuelled more protests, motivated more people to take part, and brought supressed anger towards the ruling EPRDF to the surface. Regional, issue-based actions, quickly turned into a nationwide protest movement calling for the ruling party, which many view as a dictatorship, to step down, and for democratic elections to be held.

Unwilling to enter into dialogue with opposition groups, and unable to contain the movement that swept through the country, in October 2016 the government imposed a six-month ‘State of Emergency’. This was necessary, the Prime Minister claimed, because, “we want to put an end to the damage that is being carried out against infrastructure projects, education institutions, health centers, administration and justice buildings,” and claimed, that “we put our citizens’ safety first”.

The extraordinary directive, which has dramatically increased tensions in the country, allows for even tighter restrictions to be applied – post an update on Facebook about the unrest and face five years imprisonment – and is further evidence of both the government’s resistance to reform and its disregard for the views of large sections of the population.

The directive places stifling restrictions of basic human rights, and as Human Rights Watch (HRW) states, goes “far beyond what is permissible under international law and signals an increased militarized response to the situation.”

Among the 31 Articles in the directive, ‘Communication instigating Protest and Unrest’ is banned, which includes using social media to organize public gatherings; so too is ‘Communication with Terrorist Groups’, this doesn’t mean the likes of ISIS, which would be reasonable, but relates to any individual or group who the regime themselves define as ‘terrorists’, i.e. anyone who publicly disagrees with them.

The independent radio/TV channel, ESAT (based in Europe and America) as well as Oromia Media meet the terrorist criteria and are high up the excluded list. Public assembly without authorization from the ‘Command Post’ is not allowed; there is even a ban on making certain gestures, “without permission”. Specifically crossing arms above the head to form an ‘X’, which has become a sign of national unity against the regime, and was bravely displayed by Ethiopian marathon runner Feyisa Lilesa, at the Rio Olympics (where he won a silver medal).

If anyone is found to have violated any of the draconian articles they can be arrested without charge and imprisoned without due process. The ruling regime, which repeatedly blames so called ‘outside forces’ for fueling the uprising – Eritrea and Egypt are cited – says the new laws will be used to coordinate the security forces against what it ambiguously calls “anti-peace elements”, that want to “destabilize the country”.

Shortly after the directive was passed, the government arrested “1,645 people”, the New York Times reported, of which an astonishing 1,220 “were described as ringleaders, the rest coordinators, suspects and bandits.”

All of this is taking place in what the ruling regime and their international benefactors laughably describe as a democracy. Ethiopia is not, nor has it even been a democratic country. The ruling EPRDF party, which, like the military, is dominated by men from the small Tigray region (6% of the population) in the North of the country, came to power in the traditional manner – by force; since its accession in 1992 it has stolen every ‘election’.

No party anywhere legitimately wins 100% of the parliamentary seats in an election, but the EPRDF, knowing their principle donors – the USA and UK – would sanction the result anyway, claimed to do so in 2015. The European Union, also a major benefactor, did, criticise the result; however, much to the fury of Ethiopians around the world, President Obama speaking after the whitewash, declared that the “elections put forward a democratically elected government.”

Government Reaction

Since the start of the protests the Government has responded with force. Nobody knows the exact number of people killed, hundreds certainly (HRW say around 500), thousands possibly. Tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, have been arbitrarily arrested and detained, probably tortured, definitely mistreated; family members of protestors, journalists and opposition politicians, are intimidated and routinely persecuted. And whilst 10,000 people have recently been released, local groups estimate a further 70,000 remain incarcerated and the government has initiated a new wave of arrests in which young people have been specifically targeted.

Amongst the list of violent state actions – none of which have been independently investigated – the incident at Bishoftu, which many Ethiopians describe as a massacre, stands out. On 2nd October millions of ethnic Oromos gathered to celebrate at the annual Irreecha cultural festival. There was a heavy, intimidating military presence including an army helicopter; anti-government chants broke out, people took to the stage and crossed their arms in unity. At this democratic act, security forces responded by firing live ammunition and teargas into the crowd.

The number of casualties varies depending on the source; the government would have us believe 55 people died, though local people and opposition groups claim 250 people were killed by security forces. The ruling regime makes it impossible to independently investigate such incidences or to verify those killed and injured, but HRW states that, “based on the information from witnesses and hospital staff…it is clear that the number of dead is much higher than government estimates.”

A week after the Nightmare at Bishoftu, the ruling party enforced its State of Emergency. Another ill-judged pronouncement that has entrenched divisions, strengthened resolve and plunged the country into deeper chaos. Such actions reveal a level of paranoia, and a failure to understand the impact of repressive rule. With every controlling violent action the Government takes, with every innocent person that it kills or maims, opposition spreads, resistance intensifies, resolve grows stronger.

Enough!

The Ethiopian revolt comes after over two decades of rule by the EPRDF, a party whose approach, despite its democratic persona, has been intensely autocratic. Human rights declared in the liberally worded constitution are totally ignored: dissent is not allowed nor is political debate or regional secession – a major issue for the Ogaden region, which is under military control.

There is no independent media – it is all state owned or controlled, as is access to the Internet; journalists who express any criticism of the ruling regime are routinely arrested, and the only truly autonomous media group, ESAT is now classed as a terrorist organization. Add to this list the displacement of indigenous people to make way for international industrial farms; the partisan distribution of aid, employment opportunities and higher education places; the promulgation of ethnic politics in schools, plus the soaring cost of living, and a different, less polished Ethiopian picture begins to surface of life than the one painted by the regime and donor nations – benefactors who, by their silence and duplicity are complicit in the actions of the EPRDF government.

People have had enough of such injustices. Inhibited and contained for so long, they have now found the strength to demand their rights and stand up to the bully enthroned in Addis Ababa. The hope must be that change can be brought about by peaceful means and not descend into a bloody conflict. For this to happen the government needs to adopt a more conciliatory position and listen to the people’s legitimate concerns.

This unprecedented uprising may be held at bay for a time, restrained by force and unjust legislation, but people rightly sense this is the moment for change; they will no longer cower and be silenced for too much has been sacrificed by too many.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has shown to be an exemplary role model for regional cooperation guiding the 10-country bloc on the path toward shared prosperity and sustainable development. Since its launch in 1967, ASEAN has indeed come a long way in accelerating economic growth, promoting durable peace, and nurturing a common vision in the sub region. The rate of poverty has been reduced from 40 per cent in 1990 to just 8 per cent in 2012 (compared to regional average of 15 per cent), GDP per capita has been raised to almost $4,000 over the past decade, and with a combined GDP of $2.5 trillion ASEAN is now the seventh largest economy in the world and the third in Asia-Pacific.

As the Association celebrates its 50th anniversary this year, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) has been a strategic partner of ASEAN during its journey. Over this period both these intergovernmental and regional cooperation platforms have built a strategic partnership which has seen the development of productive symbiosis ultimately benefiting member countries. As ASEAN gains from the multi-sectoral policy advice and capacity programmes facilitated by ESCAP for the more vulnerable of countries within the sub region, the Regional Commission is able to draw from development lessons of ASEAN as the most successful cooperative arrangement in the region.

There are certainly promising prospects for this largest regional bloc of Asia given its determination to foster the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2025, the benefits of which will be far reaching for the sub region with positive spillovers for the rest of Asia. Continued strengthening of policy and incentive frameworks, innovation and improvements in productivity is set to double the size of ASEAN economies to $4.6 trillion by 2050 as the region will continue to be attractive destination for global investment flows, which already reached over $120 billion by 2015. Further reduction in trade costs through the elimination of tariffs, implementation of trade facilitation measures, and progress on the liberalization of services and investment will deepen trade links within the sub region as well as with the wider global economy. Emerging as a consumer hub, almost 125 million household will witness the doubling of their annual income by 2025.

Despite ASEAN’s progress and its impressive economic potential, considerable work still remains to narrow development gaps across countries. The partnership between ASEAN and ESCAP promotes complementarity between the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and AEC, which should over the next decade contribute to narrowing national as well as intra-regional disparities, creating balanced urban growth, and mitigating climate change as well as adapting to its effects. Implementation of urban sustainable goals will be crucial as an additional 25 million people will move to cities by 2025. Building urban resilience will be critical as nearly 40 per cent of ASEAN’s GDP growth will come from 142 cities hosting populations between 200,000 and 5 million people. Creating balanced and inclusive urban growth will require trillions of dollars in investment and effective financial management to provide public services and close gaps in public transportation, ICT infrastructure, housing, and urban environmental management.

The importance of balancing Southeast Asia’s environmental and development needs has also never been more evident. Greenhouse gas emissions grew more rapidly in Southeast Asia than in any other region of the world, increasing by 227% over the past two decades. The impacts of climate change could see ASEAN’s GDP falter by as much as 11 per cent if mitigation measures are not undertaken to curb emissions as part of global efforts. Reducing land use emissions and deforestation while improving energy efficiency and expanding the use of renewables or other low-carbon energy sources are some of the steps to put these countries on a low carbon growth pathway.

Regional cooperation facilitated by the intergovernmental platforms of ASEAN and ESCAP will be also critical to tackling these immense challenges. For instance, this partnership has helped safeguard and improve the livelihoods of many peoples in Southeast Asia. In the area of disaster response, when Cyclone Nargis struck the Ayeyarwady Delta of Myanmar in May 2008, ESCAP and ASEAN together facilitated the flow of humanitarian assistance. In the post-disaster recovery phase, ESCAP and ASEAN jointly organized the Post-Nargis Regional Partnership Conference where over $103 million were raised to support recovery plans. This partnership was further advanced in 2011 with ESCAP’s support for the establishment of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management.

The rich history between our institutions has set the stage for the next phase of progressive collaboration, guided by the AEC 2025 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. As we work towards achieving both these agendas, coordinated action is needed to address transboundary challenges and unlock the possibilities of regional cooperation. These include deepening regional integration; facilitating trade; greater financial integration and widening access to finance; realizing the ASEAN Power Grid, connecting missing transport links; and bridging the digital divide. Our collective efforts, delivered through a coordinated approach under the ASEAN-UN Plan of Action, will provide South-East Asia with the strong foundation it needs to prosper in the face a changing world and improve the lives of its citizens.

ESCAP recognizes that we live in an interconnected region and as such, a prosperous ASEAN benefits the wider Asia-Pacific region. We congratulate ASEAN on achieving 50 years of productive subregional cooperation and promotion of peace and security. With the establishment of the forward-looking ASEAN Vision 2025 and the ambitious objectives of the 2030 Agenda, the future of collaboration between ESCAP and ASEAN to improve the future of all the people in ASEAN looks better than ever before.

*Dr. Shamshad Akhtar is an Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) and the Executive Secretary of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP).

On December 15, the WSJ Dollar Index of the currency’s value against 16 major trading partners hit a 14-year high. The Fed’s hike prompted the worst selloff for developing countries since Donald Trump’s presidential victory last November. In a few words, we saw the replication of last year’s turbulence in the wake of the Fed’s first rate hike in eight years.

Emerging-markets’ currencies and assets experienced the Fed’s dollar spillovers, with exchange rate devaluation crossing South Korea winning to India’s rupee.

In China, fears that a rising dollar somewhat destabilized trading in the RMB, sent the currency to its lowest against the dollar in over eight years. Meanwhile, Chinese bond yields soared and authorities halted trading in some futures contracts for the first time, as a global bond-market selloff worsened

Undeniably, the 2016 movie is a validation of Helen Rey’s “dollar global financial cycle”, where she argues for its potency that disables EMEs standard macroecononics tools, and quash the EM central banks’ monetary policy in the rush to shield national currencies and financial stability.

Notwithstanding the above downsides, the potency of the Fed’s spillovers seem increasingly less virulent when compared to those experienced in past episodes (IMF 2015). According to BIS analyses, spillovers have been generating spillbacks to advanced sovereign bond markets through almost synchronized drawdowns of FX reserves.

For the size of these actions, Jamie Caruana of the BIS writes tha,t “reserve managers sales of government bonds in the SDR currencies could rival, or even surpass, the scale of ongoing purchases by the ECB and the Bank of Japan”, and even so as “EMEs’ sales of bonds held in their reserves take place mostly in dollars and ongoing central bank purchases are in euros and yen, these effects compete in a global bond market”.

Actually, spillbacks “to advanced economies from EMEs ownership of specific advanced economy assets, such as sovereign bonds, have increased. The reduction in holdings of US bonds was arguably one factor contributing to moves in US yields over the past year[2015]” ( BIS 2016:57 ).

As a one-time change, this is striking, and as a directional shift, the longer term implications are huge. It’s a matter of fact that EM central banks are growing-up, and are more able at weighing more independent and discretionary policies, including a functional use of their countries’ riches.

In this new trend should be read gold purchases, and the redeployment of FX reserves in a more functional portfolio-like model.

Gold purchases, a long time vexata quaestio in economics, has recently gained momentum and legitimacy. Kenneth Rogoff has made a strong rationale for EMs central banks purchasing gold and exiting from overweight dollars’ FX reserves. EMs as a group, Rogoff writes, “Are competing for rich-country bonds, which is helping to drive down the interest rate they receive. With interest rates stuck near zero, rich-country bond prices cannot drop much more than they already have, while the supply of advanced-country debt is limited by tax capacity and risk tolerance”, so, he argues “a shift in emerging markets toward accumulating gold would [push up interest rate on rich-country bond and] help the international financial system function more smoothly and benefit everyone” (Rogoff 2016).

Actually, EM central banks, for securing FX reserves since they have massive dollar debts and want to reduce their dependence on the US dollar, are going to gold purchases. China and Russia over the past two years accounted for nearly 85% of gold purchases by central banks in a move to diversify reserves, while demand from other central banks has declined. Russia’s gold reserves increased by 45.8 tons in the first quarter 2016, 52% higher than first quarter 2015. China bought 35.1 tons of gold from January to March of 2016. That was in addition to the 103.9 tons it purchased in the second half of 2016 (IMF 2016).

In Asia, some 60 countries along the New Silk Road Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road identified as important reserve bases and consumers of gold are originating a new way to use their savings have invested in the China-led Shanghai Gold Exchange (SGE) fund. Expected to raise an estimated 100 billion RMB ( $16.1 billion), the fund seeks to assist a growing number of Asian central banks keen to diversify away from US and European assets in their foreign exchange reserves, and to increase the influence of RMB in gold pricing by opening the domestic gold market to international investors.

Though, its epicenter is mainly in Asia, the SGE is a game changer for the relevant implications on developed economies, especially the US-Treasury bond and German Bund.

Several critical intervening variables are drastically reducing the past FX reserves glut, and reserves managers are exploring a better, and more functional use of reserves’ allocation. The Donald Trump Administration, with TPP and TTIP trade deals put on ice, hints among other things to the end of US as the importer of last resort.

China’ s rebalancing towards domestic demand and services, and the ongoing monetary and financial liberalization no more need large FX reserves, and mostly US T-bonds.
In oil rich countries, the collapse of oil prices, and increasing budget deficits are unlikely fostering any return to previous highs, and, the US policy energy independence reduces petrodollar recycling.

As EMEs will face reduced exports to advanced economies, and they will have fewer dollars left to employ in purchasing US T-bonds, where are EMEs likely to reallocate their countries assets?

The strong commitment expressed by China’s leadership at continuing free trade, and the China-led large infrastructures’ investment deals in Asia and elsewhere should speak for EM central banks to put their moneys where the mouths are, clearly in the RMB.

Yet, for EMEs’ reallocating FX reserves into RMB it would be necessary that China ensures the ability and willingness to retain control over its currency’s depreciation. On this count China should fix the RMB foreign exchange rate policy, and avoid the steady devaluation started in August 2015 through 2016, which has trimmed down the currency value to the one in 2008 against the dollar.

Spillbacks from the periphery to the core central banks hint to a critical turn in international finance.

In 2014, at the height of China’s rush to its FX reserves buildup, Alan Greenspan anticipated that a redeployment of “ even a relatively modest part of China’s foreign exchange reserves into gold, the yuan[RMB] could take on unexpected strength in today’s international currency system. Buying gold bullion to displace the US from its position as the world’s largest holder of monetary gold, China would likely incur a penalty for being wrong, in terms of lost interest and the cost of storage. Yet it would be a modest cost, if in the end this clears the way to a multiple and more balanced international monetary regime, less at the mercy of U.S. domestic objectives”.

*Miriam L. Campanella, University of Turin. Senior Fellow ECIPE Brussels. This article has been edited from a version that appeared at China Policy Institute.

By David T. Jones*

(FPRI) — One of the classic descriptions of the U.S.-Canada bilateral relationship is that “We are best friends—like it or not.”  And all too often “not” has been in ascendancy.

The practical parameters of that simple characterization are relatively complex.  Trying for a good “fit” between the governing parties and personalities can be challenging:

• When both sets of leaders are “conservative,” (e.g., U.S. Republicans and Canadian Tories), relations are relatively smooth;
• Likewise, when both governing authorities are “liberal,” (U.S. Democrats and Canadian Liberals), relations are relatively smooth as well;
• Problems occur when U.S. Republicans are juxtaposed with Canadian Liberals or when U.S. Democrats encounter Canadian Conservatives.

That said, the bumps and grinds are probably greater when Canadian Liberals with “attitude” encounter conservative Republicans with significantly different worldviews.  We have seen such when Chretien Liberals clashed with GHW Bush in the early 1990s and again when Martin Liberals struggled with “Dubya” Bush.  For their part, to demonstrate independence, Liberals want the poorest possible bilateral relationship that will not prompt USG retaliation.  On the other hand, Canadian Conservatives want to have as good a relationship with the United States as possible (without giving Canadians the impression their prime minister is a poodle).

Thus, Tory PM Stephen Harper struggled through much of the Obama administration attempting to extract a positive USG response on the “no brainer” decision to approve the Keystone Pipeline to convey Alberta oil through the United States.  Concurrently, Harper’s foreign policy strongly supported Israel, backed Ukraine resistance to Russian aggression, participated in fighting against ISIS, and committed to purchase U.S. F-35s—all ostensibly USG priorities.  To no avail.  Obama wouldn’t even deign to offer Harper an official state visit (something he did instantly for PM Justin Trudeau).

Consequently, for much of a year, starting with Trudeau’s victory in October 2015, it was close to being the “best of all possible worlds” for Ottawa—characterized by a “bromance” between Obama and Trudeau.  Trudeau didn’t push Keystone, backed away from axiomatic support for Israel and Ukraine, and warmed to the UN (which Harper viewed with contempt).  Trudeau-Obama views on environment and energy coincided.  Obama overlooked Ottawa’s minimalistic defense/security commitments, including his rejection of the F-35 purchase.  And Trudeau got Harper’s official state visit in March 2016.

Doubtless, Trudeau anticipated a victory by Hillary Clinton in November 2016 and, consequently, a continuation of the congenial Democrat-Liberal relationship. But a funny thing happened on the way to the White House.  And the best laid plans…

For Canada’s Liberal government/Trudeau, the Trump victory meant a 180-degree pivot so far as anticipated personal congeniality was concerned.  And they hoped that palliative, nonconfrontational approaches could avoid or mitigate disasters anticipated from economic confrontation. How was Canada to manage that southern “elephant,” which in the best of times produced northern angst with every twist and twitch, from rolling over?

Already, President Trump had blithely blown past previous historical signposts by not having initial major meetings with foreign leaders of Canada or Mexico.  Instead, the first meetings were with UK’s PM Theresa May and Japan’s PM Shinzo Abe.

But Canada’s PM Justin Trudeau met with President Trump and separately with congressional leaders in a hurry-up meeting on 13 February. In truth, Trump and Trudeau are close to polar opposites.  If one could read minds, one might conclude:  “He’s a pinko twit who never met a payroll” vs “He’s a sexist, racist, braggart bully who lost the popular vote.” The likelihood of a “bromance” equivalent to that between President Barak Obama and Trudeau would be akin to anticipating Potomac River icebergs—or Rideau Canal palm trees.

Thus, we should not anticipate President Trump offering an official state visit to Trudeau (Obama covered that base after denying former PM Harper the honor).  Nor should we anticipate Trudeau will propose Trump visit Ottawa to address Parliament.  Indeed, Trudeau’s objectives were probably avoiding a shouting match blowup as media characterized Trump’s conversation with Australian PM Turnbull, sparked by differences over refugees.  Or the remarkable 19-second “handshake” with Japan’s PM Abe that video indicated ended with Abe’s obvious relief.

Consequently, the sides focused on areas of agreement.  Both desire to increase the prosperity of their middle class citizens (“…we will coordinate closely to protect jobs in our hemisphere and keep wealth on our continent…”).  They want to secure borders (“safe, efficient and responsible cross-border travel and immigration.”)   They value useful infrastructure by building “even more bridges and bridges of cooperation and bridges of commerce.”  And they look forward “to the expeditious completion of the Gordie Howe International Bridge” between Detroit and Windsor.

There was no NAFTA trashing.  President Trump spoke imprecisely of “tweaking” for the Canada portion of the Treaty, suggesting his primary concern was Mexico.  They dodged disagreements on refugee admission, where Trudeau-Canada policy is vastly more congenial to Syrian refugees with Trudeau somewhat disingenuously saying that he did not come to a foreign country to “lecture” others how to manage their politics.

And, in a stroke of genius, a prominent portion of the meeting revolved around creating a joint task force (The Canada-U.S. Council for Advancement of Women Entrepreneurs and Business Leaders) to “recommend ways to promote women-owned enterprises and boost economic growth.”  The session, apparently orchestrated by Trump’s daughter, Ivanka, met in the White House cabinet room, the first time Trump used that office.  It featured five prominent female business executive and leading entrepreneurs from each country.  Adroitly, it gave Trudeau a chance to reinforce his feminist credentials in Canada (and Trump the occasion to mitigate some sexist expletives directed against him).

To be sure there was some BOMFOG (Brotherhood of Man; Fatherhood of God) language in formal statements:  “Our two nations share much more than a border.  We share the same values…I pledge to work with you in pursuit of our many shared interests. … at the end of the day, Canada and the U.S. will always remain each other’s most essential partner…Our families have long lived together and worked together…the pillar of which our relationship is built is one of mutual respect…[ quoting Winston Churchill] the long …frontier from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans  [is] guarded only by neighborly respect and honorable obligations…”  (The preceding is material selected from Trudeau’s and Trump’s statements that could have been spoken by either.)

But, one can assume, that in more private conversation, there was potential discussion of more neuralgic topics:

Trade.  Reopening NAFTA is a baseline campaign commitment for President Trump.  He believes it to be one of the worst agreements we ever ratified and vows to improve it substantially.  Although more directed at Mexico and the belief that U.S. unemployment substantially derives from U.S. factories lured to Mexico, Canada is certainly in the gunsight as well.  “Tweaking” the Canada portion still could envision attack on Canadian dairy and poultry restrictions on U.S. imports.  Likewise, Canadian softwood lumber subsidies will be targeted.

Canada has a weak hand.  Ottawa can note the reality that it is easier to get into renegotiation of major agreements than to emerge satisfied.  And doubtlessly protracted negotiations will generate uncertainty and investor unease, damaging economic development.

Security.  In both domestic and international security efforts, Trump sees Canada as wanting.  Trudeau’s de facto open door refugee admission policy begs the possibility of border-crossing terrorists.  Implicit Canadian indifference to U.S. importuning over securing the border is a never-ending issue.  Ottawa believes Uncle Sam is paranoid when we should only be neurotic.

More specifically, so far as military expenditures are concerned, Canada is the classic underperformer.  Ottawa spends far below the 2 percent objective for NATO members; its naval shipbuilding program is in chaos, and its evasive failure to commit to F-35 purchase virtually a deliberate insult.  Continued unwillingness to commit to defeating ISIS by employing serious forces (beyond a token handful of Special Forces equivalents for “training” Iraqi Kurds) directly rejects Trump’s commitment to annihilate ISIS forthwith.  Obama carefully avoided such (justified) criticism, but current USG officials certainly will not.

Energy.  This could be a bilateral positive—if Trudeau chooses correctly.  Trump has revived the Keystone Pipeline; ostensibly both sides endorsed it.  Trudeau’s commitment to any pipelines, however, seems intellectual/political rather than visceral.  The Liberals owe little to Alberta as there are only four Liberal MPs from the province, and environmentalists are heavyweights in Liberal circles while oil producers/refiners beg for crumbs.

Next U.S. Ambassador.   The Twitter sphere identified former Alaska governor/VP candidate, Sarah Palin, as the prospective U.S. ambassador for Ottawa.  While probably a tongue-in-cheek trial/lead balloon, Palin would be the first woman as U.S. ambassador to Canada—and certainly not afraid of the cold.  Perhaps you would see her on a dog sled or Skidoo heading from the Residence to the Embassy or at least ice skating on the Rideau Canal.

Nevertheless, Trudeau entered the lion’s den and, with the equivalent of saying “nice kitty/nice kitty,” exited intact.  In short, to mix metaphors, “a successful first date.”

About the author:
* David Jones, an FPRI alumnus, is a retired senior Foreign Service Officer who was Minister Counselor for Political Affairs at U.S. Embassy Ottawa.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI.

Just over a week into the Trump Administration, the President issued an Executive Order giving Defense Secretary James Mattis 30 days to come up with a plan to defeat ISIS. According to the Order, the plan should make recommendations on military actions, diplomatic actions, partners, strategies, and how to pay for the operation.

As we approach the president’s deadline it looks like the military is going to present Trump with a plan to do a whole lot more of what we’ve been doing and somehow expect different results. Proving the old saying that when all you have is a hammer everything looks like a nail, we are hearing increasing reports that the military will recommend sending thousands of US troops into Syria and Iraq.

This would be a significant escalation in both countries, as currently there are about 5,000 US troops still fighting our 13-year war in Iraq, and some 500 special forces soldiers operating in Syria.

The current Syria ceasefire, brokered without US involvement at the end of 2016, is producing positive results and the opposing groups are talking with each other under Russian and Iranian sponsorship. Does anyone think sending thousands of US troops into a situation that is already being resolved without us is a good idea?

In language reminiscent of his plans to build a wall on the Mexican border, the president told a political rally in Florida over the weekend that he was going to set up “safe zones” in Syria and would make the Gulf States pay for them. There are several problems with this plan.

First, any “safe zone” set up inside Syria, especially if protected by US troops, would amount to a massive US invasion of the country unless the Assad government approves them. Does President Trump want to begin his presidency with an illegal invasion of a sovereign country?

Second, there is the little problem of the Russians, who are partners with the Assad government in its efforts to rid the country of ISIS and al-Qaeda. ISIS is already losing territory on a daily basis. Is President Trump willing to risk a military escalation with Russia to protect armed regime-change forces in Syria?

Third, the Gulf States are the major backers of al-Qaeda and ISIS in Syria – as the president’s own recently-resigned National Security Advisor, Michael Flynn, revealed in a 2015 interview. Unless these safe zones are being set up to keep al-Qaeda and ISIS safe, it doesn’t make any sense to involve the Gulf States.

Many will say we should not be surprised at these latest moves. As a candidate, Trump vowed to defeat ISIS once and for all. However, does anyone really believe that continuing the same strategy we have followed for the past 16 years will produce different results this time? If what you are hammering is not a nail, will hammering it harder get it nailed in?

Washington cannot handle the truth: solving the ISIS problem must involve a whole lot less US activity in the Middle East, not a whole lot more. Until that is understood, we will continue to waste trillions of dollars and untold lives in a losing endeavor.

This article was published by RonPaul Institute.

By Vikrant Deshpande

This article is inspired by the Annual Gorkha Brigade Conference held at New Delhi on 11 February 2017 and the unique model of military diplomacy it fosters between India and Nepal. The Gorkha Brigade is an association representing approximately 40,000 Indian and Nepali Gorkha soldiers as well as about 90,000 Indian Army pensioners in Nepal. The Brigade comprises seven regiments, viz, First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Gorkha Rifles. The missing serials were allotted to the British Army on India’s independence. Each regiment is further organised into five or six infantry battalions, which is the basic, fully independent, and functional unit of the Indian Army.

Thus 3/9 GR denotes the Third Battalion of the Ninth Gorkha Rifles, an exclusive classification which has baffled many within and outside the armed forces fraternity. The Gorkha Brigade also encompasses the Defence Wing of the Embassy of India in Nepal and the Gorkha Recruiting Depots of Gorakhpur and Ghoom (Darjeeling). The President of the Gorkha Brigade is always the senior most serving officer from amongst the seven regiments; presently, the Chief of Army Staff, General Bipin Rawat, a second generation officer of the Eleventh Gorkha Rifles, has that honour.

This year the Gorkha Brigade is also celebrating the bicentenary of one of its oldest regiments, the Ninth Gorkha Rifles. The First Battalion of the Ninth Gorkhas was raised by the British in 1817 as the ‘Fatehgarh Levy’. Contrary to popular belief that the British were the first to recruit Gorkhas, it was in fact Maharaja Ranjit Singh, who, impressed by the bravery and valour of these big hearted little men from the hills, raised a battalion of Gorkhas to serve in the Sikh Army in 1809.

As a result, all soldiers serving in the Indian Army are still called ‘Lahorey’ in Nepal, i.e., those who serve in Lahore – the capital of Ranjit Singh’s empire. The celebrations of the bicentenary commenced with a Motorcycle Rally of 1/9 GR flagged off by General Rawat on 30 January from Delhi. The motorcyclists drove through the traditional recruiting areas of the Regiment in Western Nepal honouring many ex-servicemen en route. Their arrival in Pokhra in Nepal on 4 February coincided with a massive rally where almost 3,500 ex-servicemen and widows had gathered to celebrate the bicentenary of the Regiment. The event was attended by General Rajendra Chhetri, Chief of Army Staff, Nepal Army, Shri Ranjit Rae, Ambassador of India to Nepal, and Lt. Gen. AK Bhatt, Colonel of the Regiment of the Ninth Gorkhas. India and Nepal share a unique tradition wherein their respective Chiefs of Army Staff are anointed as Honorary Generals of the other’s forces. General Rajendra Chettri is already an Honorary General of the Indian Army and General Bipin Rawat is likely to be conferred the reciprocal honour on his first visit to Nepal.

Ex-servicemen welfare is a state subject in India, with the Indian Army and the Ministry of Defence having only a limited role in it. However, Nepal being a Sovereign Nation, the welfare of Nepal-domiciled ex-servicemen of the Indian Armed Forces and pensioners of the Central or State Government including para-military forces is the responsibility of the Embassy of India in Nepal. The Government of India owes a debt to these citizens of Nepal for having dedicated their lives in service of our nation and the Defence Wing of the Embassy carries out this onerous task, a model without parallel in the world, with exemplary efficiency. Here, it would be pertinent to explain the range of its activities.

The Defence Wing of the Embassy has three Pension Paying Offices at Kathmandu, Pokhara and Dharan, each handled by a serving officer of the Indian Army under the Defence Attaché. Approximately 1,27,000 pensioners (90,000 of the Indian Army and 37,000 of the Central and State Governments as well as para-military) draw pensions from these offices. About 30,000 of these pensioners are paid pensions directly in their respective bank accounts. The rest reside in areas yet to be covered by banking infrastructure and draw their pensions in cash. The Pension Paying Offices carry out 36 payment camps every year in various remote locations, some accessible only on foot, to disburse these pensions. It is to the credit of this organisation that it has completed the payment of One Rank One Pension arrears to all pensioners in Nepal. The total amount disbursed as pensions and arrears in this financial year is likely to exceed INR 2,500 crore or Nepali Rupee (NR) 4,000 crore, and possibly reach INR 3000 crore or NR 4,800 crore per annum by 2018/19.1

At a conservative estimate, the 32,000 Nepal domiciled serving soldiers remit approximately INR 1,000 crore equivalent to NR 1,600 crore per year.2 This total at approximately NR 6,400 crore is almost equivalent of 63 per cent of the total foreign grant in aid received by the Government of Nepal from all donor countries for the year 2016/17at NR 10,689.64 crores and greater than its own allocation for Defence at NR 3601.80 crore.3 Further, this figure does not include remuneration received by Nepali citizens as other employees of the Indian Government; there is no definitive figure available for the numbers of such personnel. The pensioner’s ratio does offer some basis for extrapolation wherein these pensioners form approximately 21 per cent of the total pensioners of the Indian Government. It can therefore be assumed that a similar ratio is in service at any given point of time with the Government of India and, if their remittances were to be added, the figures would further increase.

The Indian Ex-servicemen Welfare Organisation in Nepal (IEWON) is an independent organisation chaired by the Ambassador of India with representation from senior officials from the Governments of Nepal and India. It functions under the aegis of the Defence Wing of the Embassy and is responsible for the welfare of the Nepal-domiciled pensioners of the Government of India. In an exceptional decision, the Government of India chose to execute its social welfare activities through its ex-servicemen residing in Nepal. These ex-servicemen have shown exemplary zeal, honesty and determination in executing these social welfare projects, most of which are drinking water projects in remote hilly areas where drinking water is an acute problem. This has not only empowered these ex-servicemen and enhanced their status in society but also created more than one lakh ambassadors for Brand India and the values that it stands for. The IEWON also carries out other welfare activities including the provision of educational scholarships and vocational training for the wards of pensioners through 22 District Soldier Boards manned by Ex-servicemen it employs all over Nepal. The total annual budget of these welfare schemes is approximately INR 5.5 to 6 crore.4

The Government of India also provides opportunity to any citizen of Nepal to serve as an officer in the Indian Armed Forces, a fact that goes unnoticed in the haze and smoke surrounding Indo-Nepal relations. Some Nepali citizens have already risen to the rank of Major/Lieutenant General or equivalent. This displays the amount of trust and faith that India has on the citizens of Nepal. A Nepali youth has twin opportunities compared to his Indian counterpart; he can either join the Nepal Army or the Indian Armed Forces. No country in the world has opened its armed forces to a neighbour in this manner besides the other aspects of this special relationship like the open border. Different studies estimate the number of Nepalis working or residing in India to be between one and 1.6 million. The Indo-Nepal Trade Treaty of 2009 provides special treatment to industrial products of Nepal to promote development of industry in that nation on a non-reciprocal basis.5 Many Indian industries like Dabur have shifted production to Nepal as it is cheaper to produce in Nepal and distribute in India. There have been occasions when this special arrangement has been questioned by myopic interests on either side: Indians questioning the need to recruit Gorkhas when an ample recruitable population exists in the country; and Nepalis objecting to the impropriety of sovereign citizens of Nepal serving another country. This petty squabbling ignores the geo-political reality of a land locked Nepal hemmed in by the Himalayas to the North and India to the South as well as India’s moral obligations therein. It also ignores the fact that Nepal does not have the wherewithal, infrastructure and industry to provide employment for its bulging youth population. India provides the only viable option for their gainful employment and for the remittances therein.

A comparison with the British Gurkhas6 is inevitable here as even Great Britain maintains this special bond. The British have reduced their four Gurkha regiments existing in 1947 to one and this has two infantry battalions. Though the exact strength of British Gurkhas has not been mentioned on their website, an approximation, given the units and subunits mentioned, would be about 3,500 men.7 The number of British Gurkha pensioners residing in Nepal is dwindling as the majority choose to settle down in Britain after the British parliament voted to offer British Gurkhas the right to settle in the UK in 2009.8 The contrasts with the Indian relationship are glaring if only because of the sheer numbers involved.

This author had the opportunity to meet several pensioners from Nepal at a regimental reunion at Ranchi.9 Each one was immensely proud of his service in the Indian Army and grateful for the pensions and welfare activities being provided to them. They were especially happy with the recent extension of the Ex-servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS) to private hospitals in Nepal as also the extension of canteen facilities to pensioners in Nepal. Similarly, every senior Indian Army officer of the Gorkhas at the Gorkha Brigade Conference spoke of the exemplary qualities of the Gorkha soldiers. One of the Generals said that the Nation was grateful to these citizens of Nepal for their service and no amount of pensions or welfare activities can truly repay the debt that India owes these brave warriors. This unique bond is the core of Indo-Nepal friendship. Irrespective of the noise and clutter that surrounds this relationship, both governments need to nurture this core and build on the foundation it offers so that the association contributes to the Comprehensive National Security of both nations.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India. Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/gorkhas-indian-army-and-india-nepal-relations_vdeshpande_140217

• 1. The 2016 issue of Bhu Puu, the annual journal of the Indian Ex-servicemen Welfare organization in Nepal, states that INR 1,974 crore were disbursed in FY 2015/16. Extrapolating an increase of 10 per cent, which is the average increase of dearness allowance every year, would put that figure for FY 2017/18 at approximately INR 2,400 crore. This does not include the arrears being paid for One Rank One Pension and Seventh Pay Commission, which would exceed Rs. 100 crore even by a conservative estimate of Rs. 10,000 per head and could reach 1,000 crore if the arrears were to the tune of 100,000 per head. The final figure disbursed is likely to rest at approximately INR 3,000 crores if not in FY 2017/2018 then definitely in FY 2018/2019.
• 2. The average Indian Soldier draws approximately INR 33,000 per month, out of which he remits approximately 25,000 per month.
• 3. “Summary of Expenditure Allocation for Fiscal Year 2016/17,” Red Book of Ministry of Finance Nepal, accessed on 13 February 2017.
• 4. Bhu Puu 2016, pp. 17-21.
• 5. Revised Indo–Nepal Treaty of Trade 2009, accessed on 17 February 2017.
• 6. The British still use ‘Gurkha’ while the Indian spelling has been amended to ‘Gorkha’ as per the correct Nepali pronunciation.
• 7. The official British Gurkhas website, accessed on 16 February 2017.
• 8. “Gurkhas Win The Right to Settle in UK,” BBC News, 21 May 2009, accessed on 17 February 2017.
• 9. The Regiment had hired several Luxury Coaches and all these pensioners traveled from Nepal by road to Ranchi to be at the reunion.

Preparing a year’s worth of events worldwide to commemorate the Reformation’s 500th anniversary, Germany’s main Protestant church has officially renounced its mission to convert Jews to Christianity. As a rabbi I applaud this statement, however I hope they will next stop trying to convert Muslims to Christianity.

In practice, the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD), mostly gave up efforts to convert Jews in the decades after the Holocaust, and closing that chapter should have been a formality. But still officially abandoning the “Judenmission,” or Mission to the Jews, turned out to be theologically complicated.

In Matthew’s Gospel, Jesus gave his Apostles the Great Commission to “make disciples of all nations.” And small groups of evangelicals in a few member churches have long opposed an official statement against conversion, despite calls from Jewish groups to issue one.

The EKD finally drew up a resolution that was passed unanimously on November 9, 2016 that stated Christians: “are not called to show Israel the path to God and His salvation.” “Since God never renounced his covenant with the Jews, his chosen people, they do not need to embrace the new Christian covenant to be saved”, it said. I also do not think Muslims need Christian salvation to go to heaven.

Perhaps Christians should follow the Qur’an injunction: “To each of you We prescribed a law and a method. Had Allah willed, He would have made you one nation [united in religion], but [He intends] to test you in what He has given you; so race to [compete in all that is] good. To Allah you all return together, and He will [then] inform you concerning that over which you used to differ. (5:48)

“All efforts to convert Jews contradict our commitment to the faithfulness of God and the election of Israel,” the resolution read. That Christians see Jesus as their savior and Jews don’t is “a fact we leave up to God,” it said. This can and should also be said about Muslims.

Although Martin Lither initially expressed concern about the Catholic Church’s discrimination against Jews in medieval Europe, and hoped to bring them into the Christian fold, Luther changed tack later in life when Jews did not start converting to his reformed form of Christianity,.

In a treatise titled “On the Jews and Their Lies,” he urged his followers to burn down the Jew’s homes and synagogues and confiscate their money. The EKD had already last year denounced the “undisguised hatred of Jews” in Luther’s writings; and acknowledged that his anti-Semitism had inspired the Nazis centuries later.

In fact, the EKD synod broke with traditional theological anti-Semitism in 1950 by declaring that God’s covenant with the Jews was still valid. But it wasn’t until the 1990s that most member churches came out clearly against evangelization efforts.

Will it take a large scale European Crusader massacres of Muslims, like what happened to Jews in 1096, for churches to accept the concept that Muslims do not need the Christian religion for their salvation?

The EKD wasn’t alone in changing its approach to Jews very slowly. The Roman Catholic Church renounced its theological anti-Semitism in 1965 at the Second Vatican Council. Yet it took another 50 years before the Vatican issued a clear statement in December 2015, that it “neither conducts nor supports any specific institutional mission work directed towards Jews.” Will Muslims be Next?

But the conservative Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, the second largest Lutheran denomination in the U.S., which has also denounced Luther’s diatribes against Jews, still follows the injunction of Jesus “to pray for them, so that they might become converted.”

By Pablo José Castillo Ortiz*

Democracy and human rights are British values as much as European ones. The EU has been a major force in the democratisation of the European continent, and has actively contributed to the promotion of democracy in other regions of the world. But this important task may become more difficult if Brexit finally occurs. The UK is a major diplomatic, military and economic power, and a consolidated democracy that provides political inspiration world-wide. Brexit has the potential to weaken the capacity of both the EU and the UK to promote their shared values. As with many other aspects, with regards to the promotion of democracy and human rights, Brexit would be detrimental to the interests of both parties.

Unlike in other areas, where the UK and the EU will unavoidably have conflicting interests, the protection of democracy and human rights is a field in which the values of the two parties fully match. Cooperation in this area should therefore be easy to achieve and be a matter of common interest. This Elcano Comment defends that such cooperation should be institutionalised by means of a ‘partnership for democracy’.

Furthermore, it considers that there are elements in the approach to external policy of both the EU and the UK that could facilitate this. The European Union Global Strategy recently made it clear that the promotion of democracy should be one of the guiding principles of EU action. At the same time, the Global Strategy document refers to ‘partnership’ with other ‘states, regional bodies and international organisations’ as key to the EU’s external action. Simultaneously, the recent White Paper of the British Government on ‘The United Kindgom’s exit from and new partnership with the European Union’ makes clear the will of the UK to ‘promote the values the UK and EU share – respect for human rights and dignity, democracy and the rule of law both within Europe and across the wider world’. There are therefore elements that point to a potential willingness on both sides to cooperate on issues of protecting and promoting democracy. However, potential cooperation has so far lacked concretion.

In this regard, at least five lines of action can be suggested as a starting point for discussing the potential ‘partnership for democracy’ between the UK and the EU. Nevertheless, this initial proposal should preferably be modified and improved through dialogue between academics, civil society organisations and policy-makers:

1. First, the UK should support the EU’s efforts to protect democracy and human rights in its Member States. During the eventual exit negotiations, the clearest expression of this support would be for the UK to abstain from using as a bargaining tool the tensions between the EU and Member States examined or sanctioned under Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union. Article 7 TEU allows the EU to determine the existence of a breach of democratic values in a Member State and to eventually sanction it for that reason. Art.7 TEU is a core tool for the protection of democracy in the continent. The EU should make it clear that such diplomatic support from the UK is a prior condition for negotiations in good faith and for post-Brexit good neighbourly policy. Democracy in the European continent is a hard-won achievement, to which the UK made a major and costly contribution. Any action detrimental to the maintenance of democracy aimed at maximising short-term benefits would imply a greater long-term damage for both parties. After a potential Brexit, any deal between the UK and the EU should include, as part of a ‘democratic partnership’, the commitment of the UK and the EU to work together to maintain democracy in EU Member States. To that end, the UK should use its diplomatic power to support, rather than hinder, the EU in any potential enforcement of Art.7.
2. During the Art.50 negotiations and following a potential Brexit, the UK should adopt a policy of democratic conditionality that complements the approach of the EU when negotiating with third countries. The principle of democracy promotion in external action is solidly anchored in the EU’s legal system. Article 3 of the Treaty on the EU establishes that ‘in its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold its values’ –which according to Art.2 TEU include democracy– and contribute to the protection of human rights. The EU has successfully used democratic conditionality when negotiating with States that are candidates for accession, and also in negotiating other types of agreements with third countries. This strategy has contributed to the expansion and consolidation of democracy in the world through peaceful means, but the UK’s exit would undermine the EU’s negotiating position vis-à-vis third countries. The UK’s negotiating position to promote democratic values through conditionality, for instance in trade deals, would be even much weaker. For that reason, both the UK and the EU should coordinate to maximise their joint bargaining power. While coordination, after a possible Brexit, would obviously be more difficult and less effective than it has been so far, coordination as part of a ‘democratic partnership’ could take the form of regular institutionalised meetings between the two parties and trilateral negotiations with third countries in which both the UK and the EU pushed for democratic conditionality.
3. More generally, the UK and the EU should adopt complementary diplomatic approaches in the defence of democratic institutions and values at a time when they seem increasingly questioned. Recently, Chancellor Angela Merkel offered the new US President Donald Trump cooperation based on ‘common values’ of democracy, freedom, rule of law and human dignity. This values-based approach to cooperation with other actors should be the structuring principle of the diplomatic action of both the EU –and its Member States– and the UK. So far, however, Theresa May seems to be emphasising economic interests rather than values in her approach to foreign policy, probably because of the UK’s weakness in the context of Brexit and its need to obtain trade deals. This British attitude, in turn, also weakens the EU’s capacity to promote those very values in the world. Again, this is detrimental to the world-view of both the UK and the EU, and an early example of the type of problems that Brexit will entail. In the long run, and more in general, the lack of coordination between democratic powers can only benefit the enemies of democracy. For that reason, some degree of foreign-policy coordination between the UK, the EU and its Member States in matters that affect democracy is more urgent than ever. Coordination should be institutionalised, including an explicit reference to these values in any post-Brexit deal and their discussion in the regular bilateral meetings to which reference has been made above.
4. There is also the important question of the European Convention of Human Rights. The ECHR plays a very important role in the preservation of human rights in the continent, and it is particularly relevant in countries dominated by authoritarian or semi-authoritarian political actors. A potential British withdrawal from the Convention would dramatically undermine the mechanism’s reputation and effectiveness, opening the door for authoritarian politicians to follow the move or simply ignore the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. For that reason, UK membership of the Convention is vital for its stability. The EU should include this membership as part of the negotiations with the UK under Article 50. There is a strong legal basis for this. First, if democratic conditionality and the promotion of human rights underpin the EU’s external action, there is no reason why that should not be the case when negotiating with a future third party such as the UK would be. Secondly, Article 6 TEU foresees accession to the Convention by the EU and considers the rights therein protected as a general principle of EU law, thus making clear its importance for the Union.
5. As a corollary, the potential post-Brexit economic and trade deals between the EU and the UK might be made conditional to respecting some or all of the provisions of the ‘democratic partnership’. In other terms, economic and political aspects could be negotiated separately, but then the former could be made conditional on respecting the latter. For the EU, this conditional approach would, again, simply be an expression of its general commitment to promoting democracy that the treaties foresee, and thus would be fully justified from a legal perspective and entirely legitimate from a political one. For the UK it would be an expression of its own values and its political interest in a democratic European order.

A ‘democratic partnership’ between the EU and the UK would be a win-win situation for both parties, as it would maximise their capacity to protect and promote their shared values. But it could also be the seed for even more ambitious projects. Democratic partnerships open up the possibility of creating solid, post-national institutionalised forms of democratic cooperation between nations and even between regional organisations. The EU-UK partnership for democracy would create the mould for similar agreements with other European countries, or even countries or organisations from other regions of the world. If successful, the EU-UK partnership for democracy could even be opened up to the accession of third countries. In the horizon, the ambition could be the creation of continental and even global partnerships for democracy, going beyond mere rhetorical declarations and committing international actors through enforceable rules and institutionalised practices. This would be in line with the Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy, which refers to an EU committed ‘to a global order based on international law, which ensures human rights’. In an era in which authoritarian populists have already started to cooperate, partnerships between democratic actors are more necessary than ever.

About the author:
*Pablo José Castillo Ortiz, Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies of the University of London and Lecturer at the School of Law of the University of Sheffield | @pj_castillo_

Source:
This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute

Vitaly Churkin, who served as Russia’s permanent representative to the United Nations since 2006, “died suddenly” in New York, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced.

The announcement “of the untimely passing away of Ambassador Vitaly Churkin this morning” was met with shock when it was delivered during a session at the UN headquarters.

“He was a dear colleague of all of us, a deeply committed diplomat of his country and one of the finest people we have known,” a UN official who delivered the news to her colleagues said.

The moment of silence in Churkin’s memory was announced at the UN.

President Putin has expressed his condolences to Churkin’s family and to all Russian diplomats.

“He was an outstanding person. He was brilliant, bright, a great diplomat of our age,” Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova told RT, adding that the news of Churkin’s death was “completely shocking.”

“He has been such a regular presence here that I am actually quite stunned. Our thoughts go to his family, to his friends and to his government,” Farhan Haq, deputy spokesman for the UN secretary-general’s office said, as quoted by Reuters.

Churkin’s former colleague, the former US ambassador to the UN, Samantha Power, wrote on Twitter she was “devastated” by the news, calling Churkin a “diplomatic maestro [and] deeply caring man who did all he [could] to bridge” the differences between the two powerful nations.

“He was a strong-willed, resolute, and dutiful person, who was admired by his colleagues and envied by his enemies,” Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov told RT.

Russia’s UN Ambassador spared no effort and devoted his life and strength “to the fight for a brighter future for this world,” Ryabkov said, adding that Churkin’s death is “a great loss not only for diplomacy, but for the country in general.”

The profession of a diplomat “has become much more hectic than it used to be in the past,” Churkin said earlier this month in an interview with RT, which was one of his last. “It is stressful,” he said.

“Unfortunately, the world has not become more stable than it used to be,” Churkin told RT’s Aleksey Yaroshevsky.

Before he was appointed to represent Russia at the UN in May 2006, the diplomat served as ambassador to Belgium, ambassador to Canada, and liaison ambassador to NATO and the Western European Union (WEU).

In the 2000s he was ambassador at large at Russia’s Foreign Ministry, while in the early 1990s he served as the special representative of the Russian president to the talks on the former Yugoslavia.

An online petition signed by around 17,000 people is requesting that President Donald Trump revoke the US citizenship of George Soros.

“We ask that George Soros’s naturalized citizenship be denaturalized and he be deported from our country and never be allowed to return again,” reads the petition, adding that,”We are asking he and his family members currently in America be stripped of any and all abilities to operate any businesses or have any financial dealings in our country. We ask any person found doing business with George Soros or his Alex Soros to the detriment of our country be arrested for committing crimes against America. We ask they be held accountable for accepting said payments.”

According to Change.org, the petition was begun by Vanessa Feltner, and who on RT has claimed that US mainstream media continues to dub anti-Trump protests as “spontaneous,” while it has turned out that more than 50 groups behind the marches received funding from Soros.

By Lisa Ferdinando

US Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said he will soon have an assessment to give President Donald J. Trump about the way ahead in Afghanistan.

Mattis spoke to reporters in Abu Dhabi yesterday, as part of his first Middle Eastern tour as secretary of defense.

He said he talked at length with both Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and U.S. Army Gen. John Nicholson, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and NATO’s Resolute Support mission, to “gain their political and military appreciation to the situation.”

Mattis said his plans to travel to Afghanistan during the current overseas trip were scrapped due to weather, but he was able to speak with Ghani while the two were in Munich last week for the Munich Security Conference.

“I had a very in-depth discussion about the way ahead in Afghanistan,” he said.

In addition, he said he talked via video conference for several hours with Nicholson.

“This is all part of my getting my feet on the deck in terms of getting current on the situations that the coalition faces in Afghanistan, both political and strategically, and identifying the way ahead,” he said.

Trump is waiting for the assessment from the Pentagon and from the intelligence community on Afghanistan, Mattis said.

Integrating Several Issues

The talks are part of the process in gathering information to formulate the assessment and find out what the other countries in the region are doing in Afghanistan “to help or hinder us in our efforts there,” Mattis said.

“Shortly I’ll have my thoughts collected,” he said. “It shouldn’t take too long, but I’ve got to integrate a fair number of issues in order to give a good recommendation for the way ahead.”

He pointed out that last year was “pretty disastrous” for the Taliban, saying they lost their leader, took no provincial capitals and were unsuccessful in gaining their tactical objectives.

“The Afghan Security Forces paid a very heavy price to keep the Taliban on their back foot, but they paid it, they’ve held, and the Taliban is in a worse position today, even though I do not equate that to success on our side,” he said.

The impending Himpunan 355 rally and the current discourse on hudud in Malaysia exemplifies the effects of religious outbidding between UMNO and PAS on the Muslim populace. To prevent Islam from being cast as a radical ideology, hudud must be contextualised to its past and present.

By Muhammad Haziq Bin Jani and Afiqah Binti Zainal*

UMNO HAS attempted the Islamisation of the Malaysian bureaucracy since the 1970s as part of its political contest with PAS, whose core mission is the implementation of the Islamic penal code or hudud. The Islamisation effort includes since 1984, the gradual increase of the jurisdiction and sentencing power of the Shariah courts. During the period around the 12th and 13th general elections in 2008 and 2013, when an inclusive Malaysian opposition coalition was briefly in ascendant, PAS had tamped down demands for hudud laws. However, the implementation of hudud in Brunei in 2014, and a splintering political opposition have renewed the pressure on PAS to demand for it to maintain its political relevance.

Not wanting to cede control of the Islamising agenda to PAS, UMNO has stymied PAS’ demands through its proposal for a joint PAS-UMNO technical committee to deliberate the matter. The committee has since reframed PAS’ call for hudud by seeking higher punishments in the Shariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965, also known as Act 355. Contrary to official public lines that they are ‘not about hudud’, elements within PAS have argued that the amendments do actually pave the way for its implementation. PAS has since called for the mobilisation of Muslims in a rally this weekend to support the amendments.

Imagining God’s Laws

The pro-hudud supporters in Malaysia are a growing constituency largely nurtured by the Muslim world’s politicisation of Islam and Malaysia’s communal politics. Indeed the call for the implementation of hudud has been for political Islam, a foremost agenda. Proponents who envision the utopia of an Islamic state argue, on the basis of a decontextualised reading of the Qur’an, that a state could only be truly Islamic if it implements hudud. Contemporary jihadism, political Islam’s violent strand, has taken this further through its legitimisation of force and violence against those who oppose its implementation.

For the pro-hudud constituency in Malaysia, the idea of its eventual implementation is a given, a religious unthought which cannot be questioned. UMNO and PAS are now competing to harvest this very unthought that they have helped cultivate in the first place. The only logical extension of the competition is a mainstreaming of political violence. Indeed the Malaysian ISIS member Muhammad Wanndy is on record for having cheered the Mufti of Pahang who cast the opposition DAP as kafir harbi (non-Muslims who ought to be fought for opposing Islam) on account of their rejection of hudud.

Is Hudud a Religious Unthought?

There are Muslims who believe that certain penal laws are Islamic simply because they are contained in the Qur’an and Hadith. Yet, penal punishments such as the cutting of hands for theft had existed long before Islam’s advent, as a careful reading of the Sunni scholars al-Mawardi (d. 1058) and Ibn Kathir (d. 1373) would show.

Scriptural references to corporal punishments must be read in context, with regard for tsawabit (permanent), mutaghayyirat (changing) elements, and the maqasid, the essential purpose of the message of the Qur’an. In the case of theft, the references in the Qur’an and Hadith are accompanied by explicit notions of deterrence, mercy, justice, incapacitation and retribution. It is these ends of morality and not the form of punishment, which were introduced by the Qur’an in 7th century Arabia.

In addition, the Prophet Muhammad introduced the notion of shubhat (doubt) – over the ingredients of the crime, occurrence of the offence and definition of “perpetrators” — that forced the stay of punishments. Indeed, the record of implementation of these punishments in Islam’s history suggests a strong tendency to avoid hudud punishment on account of shubhat.

Shariah’s Principle of Doubt and Hudud

It was this notion of doubt that was employed by the former Grand Mufti of Egypt, Sheikh Ali Gomaa, to argue why Egypt, home to the prestigious Al-Azhar University, had not implemented the hudud punishments in the last thousand years. To him, this contemporary era was one of shubhat, which effectively rendered hudud stipulations inoperable.

Many do not realise that even the very concept of thieving in the Qur’an (referenced through the use of the term Sariq) raises doubt on what constitute an offence to invite such punishment, be it the frequency of the act of theft or the amount stolen. It is for this reason that the different schools of jurisprudence of Islam in late antiquity had different interpretations regarding who was deserving of the punishments.

The issue of doubt to suspend hudud – a pre-Islamic form of punishment — is pertinent as the lack of integrity in any criminal justice system may result in gross injustice. Take the case of Pakistan. The zina (adultery) component of the 1979 Hudood Ordinance resulted in the increase in imprisonment of women mainly because they failed to prove they were victims of rape. The number of women imprisoned after the Hudood Ordinance increased from about 70 in 1979 to a staggering 6000 in 1988 and by 2004, an estimated 80% of the women consisted of such victims of sexual harassment or assault, accused of adultery or of making false claims.

Hudud and the Path to Radicalisation

The pro-hudud crowd in Malaysia may not be aware of such serious contradictions between the religious utopia promised by a decontextualised reading of the hudud provisions in the Qur’an and the reality of having hudud in place. That reality, with great potential for severe miscarriage of justice, is diametrically opposed to the essential message of the Qur’an.

Perhaps communal politics have caused an anxious Malaysian society to placate hardliners. If so, the politicisation of hudud has made the implementation of hudud seem like a religious obligation for an unsuspecting Muslim community and idealistic Muslims. It is the very expectation of fulfilling this obligation and its ideologisation that will pave the way for greater radicalisation and violence when faced with opposition.

The fight against today’s global terrorism — that has misused Islamic ideas and symbols — are at the crossroads insofar as its characterisation is concerned. The debate now is on whether the fight ought to be called countering “Islamist extremism” instead of “violent extremism”. As long as the implementation of hudud remains a religious unthought, there is a case to be made for calling a spade a spade.

*Afiqah Binti Zainal is currently completing the MSc in Political Theory at the London School of Economics. Muhammad Haziq Bin Jani is a Research Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has taken to crowdsourcing local attacks to make up for its losses in the Middle East. This has become a major plank of the group’s strategy to expand its radical reach and inflict global violence.

By Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff*

ISIS with a self-styled caliph has been hierarchical in its internal command within Iraq and Syria, and the management of its wilayats (provinces). The group has a rank-and-file structure that directly oversees its members’ activities. Yet somewhat paradoxically, it crowdsources for lone wolves to partake in violence in its name. Indeed its hierarchical approach and crowdsourcing endeavours are complementary. The weakening of its central command in the face of attacks will see a strengthening of its crowdsourcing strategy.

Crowdsourcing as a strategy fits well with the group’s current objective. It can rely heavily on ISIS’ transnational support network to obtain its needed service to inflict terror. Moreover, this mode of sourcing allows ISIS to divide the work between numerous participants to achieve an impactful cumulative result. The group can easily exploit its network by crowdsourcing from these radical milieus – those who share their perspective and objectives, who approve of certain forms of violence, and who (at least to a certain extent) support the violent group morally and logistically – to pursue its agenda.

ISIS’ Framework of Offence

In an article from the January issue of Rumiyah, the ISIS magazine, the group instructs its audiences the specific details of carrying out an attack. This includes how to leave evidence at the scene to so that ISIS can claim responsibility. Apart from military-grade weapons, ISIS additionally promotes the use of light weapons such as knives in conducting terror acts. This makes weaponisation easy for its crowd-sourced “terror activists”.

Following the group’s losses in recent months, it is not surprising to see how ISIS has changed its strategy to stay relevant. ISIS’ adoption of crowdsourcing will inevitably strengthen the reputation of the group for being the dominant terror organisation on the international stage. The crowdsourcing strategy can also be proven effective because its members are no longer restricted geographically, and can execute attacks far beyond the physical radius of ISIS central. After all, ISIS’ targets, choices of weapons and radical milieus are ubiquitous. It is only a matter of time before an attack could happen that consequently will be claimed by ISIS.

ISIS’ conventional strategy is to promote the use of asymmetrical and guerrilla tactics in conducting terror attacks. Rumiyah not only echoes the same tactics, but also introduces the element of crowdsourcing terror in these tactics. The magazine teaches its supporters how to communicate with the group to claim responsibility after attacks have been conducted, especially if the attack is not ordered directly by the group. An example would be to place a symbol related to the group – like the ISIS flag – at the scene of the attack. In this way, ISIS easily gains and maintains its terror name through its crowd-sourced supporters.

Nature of ISIS’ Targets

ISIS has explicitly declared and widely publicised their targets through their propaganda. Analyses of ISIS’ numerous publications (Dabiq, Rumiyah, and An-Naba’) and the group’s patterns in claiming responsibility for terror attacks show that four main points underpin what ISIS is essentially about:

• Religious intolerance. This manifests in attacks on religious shrines, places of worships, as well as places that are against the ISIS brand of religious values.

• Sectarian discrimination. ISIS espouses sectarian animosity among the Muslim and other communities. The group aims for a hegemonic presence, triumphing over other religious sects and communities.

• Anti-West. ISIS often blames the Euro-American power for the decline of Islam’s political position especially since the defeat of the Ottoman empire. This rhetoric is then compounded by its aversion to Western participation in any war in Middle-Eastern countries.

• “Taghut” (transgressor) governments. ISIS vilifies any government who are against them, and those who do not observe Islamic law according to the ISIS way. ISIS propagates the perspective of being victimised by these governments for obstructing its goal of erecting an Islamic Caliphate.

These four themes work collectively to imbue its audience with a clear order of ISIS’ targets. It is ominous that these targets are spread out and easily accessible in countries all over the world.

Implications of Crowdsourcing Terror

Countering ISIS is becoming more challenging. Its crowdsourcing strategy is blurring the lines between “lone wolves” terror acts and collective violence. The perpetrator is also not strictly bound by instructions from ISIS. Crowdsourcing of radicalism also accelerates the process of turning radicals into terrorists. ISIS members are no longer required to be attached to ISIS wilayats (provinces) or be present in Iraq and Syria.

Moreover, the association to the group through Bai’ah (pledging of allegiance) can also be done online. These easily manoeuvre around the tight security implementations by governments. They also highlight an emerging phenomenon where any ISIS supporter can conduct attacks anywhere and anytime without direct instructions or communications. Consequently, these will also increase ISIS’ recruitment rate.

Weaponisation of ISIS radical milieus is also becoming easier following ISIS’ numerous propaganda on self-made weapons – or any lethal weapons for that matter. The group’s current campaign of knife attacks facilitates the mobilisation of its crowd-sourced “terror activists” to strike. With this crowdsourcing strategy, radical milieus are more easily linked to the ISIS identity.

Going Forward

With the advent of ISIS crowdsourcing, countering ISIS will be an arduous task. ISIS is in dire need of support and manpower following its significant loss in and outside of Iraq and Syria. Policymakers thus need to discern any hint of changes in the group’s movement and strategy. Especially for the Southeast Asian region, the multi-religious and multi-ethnic societies are central to the ISIS’ framework of offence. Steps to preserve these societies’ social fabric are critical now that ISIS is expanding its radical milieus and tapping within them.

*Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff is a Senior Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Warming seawaters, caused by climate change and extreme climatic events, threaten the stability of tropical coral reefs, with potentially devastating implications for many reef species and the human communities that reefs support.

New research by the University of Exeter shows that increased surface ocean temperatures during the strong 2016 El Niño led to a major coral die-off event in the Maldives, and that this has caused reef growth rates to collapse. They also found that the rates at which some reefs species, in particular parrotfish, are eroding the reefs had increased following this coral die-off event.

Similar magnitudes of coral death have been reported on many other reefs in the region, including on the northern Great Barrier Reef, suggesting similar impacts may be very widespread.

Professor Chris Perry and Dr Kyle Morgan, of the University of Exeter’s Geography department, studied the impact of the 2016 El Niño event at sites in the southern Maldives and found that the event had not only caused widespread coral bleaching, a phenomenon whereby corals expel their photosynthesising algae when stressed by high temperatures, but that this had also led to extensive coral death in all shallow water reef habitats examined.

“A very major concern now is how quickly these reefs might recover. Recovery from similar past disturbances in the Maldives have taken 10-15 years, but major bleaching events are predicted to become far more frequent than this. If this is the case it could lead to long-term loss of reef growth and so limit the coastal protection and habitat services these reefs presently provide,” Professor Perry said.

“The most alarming aspect of this coral die-off event is that it has led to a rapid and very large decline in the growth rate of the reefs. This in turn has major implications not only for the capacity of these reefs to match any increases in sea-level, but is also likely to lead to a loss of the surface structure of the reefs that is so critical for supporting fish species diversity and abundance.”

Coral reefs are formed by the accumulation of coral skeletons (made of calcium carbonate) that builds up over 100’s to 1000’s of years, forming the complex structures that support a huge diversity of marine life. The so-called ‘carbonate budget’ of a reef, which represents the balance between the rate at which this carbonate is produced by corals and the rate at which it is removed (by biological or physical erosion or chemical dissolution), influences the development of these structures and how fast a reef can grow.

The effect these combined factors was a major decline in the carbonate budgets of these reefs, with an average reduction of 157%. Before the warming event, the reefs had been in a period of rapid growth, but after the period of higher sea temperatures a negative carbonate budget was recorded at all sites. Put simply, the structure of these reefs is now eroding at a faster rate that it is growing. Based on past studies the researchers suggest that given the severity of the bleaching impacts it may take 10 to 15 years for full recovery to occur.

The extent of the 2016 bleaching, which also affected reefs in other parts of the Indian Ocean and Pacific, was so severe that it was subsequently named the ‘Third Global Coral Bleaching Event’.

Dr Kyle Morgan said: “Coral reefs provide a wealth of benefits. They are vital habitats, essential for a vast number of species and they are also important for tourism and food provision. The reduction in carbonate budget threatens these benefits and may well also lead to the structural collapse of reefs. The key issue to consider now is whether, and when, these reefs will recover, both ecologically and in terms of their growth. Based on past trajectories, we predict recovery will take at least a decade, however it all depends on the extent of future warming events and climate change.”

University of Exeter scientists warned there could be further rises in sea temperatures owing to global warming with potentially devastating effects on coral reefs.

Professor Mat Collins, an expert in climate modelling at the University of Exeter, said: “We expect El Niño variability to continue into the future which, when combined with rising temperatures due to global warming, means we will see unprecedented sea temperatures and increasing incidence of coral bleaching.”

Bleaching drives collapse in reef carbonate budgets and reef growth potential on southern Maldives reefs is published in Scientific Reports.

By Maja Zivanovic

Serbian President Tomislav Nikolic announced he had given up plans to run for another term after a meeting on Monday with Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic.

After a tense few days, Serbian President Tomislav Nikolic has decided not to run for another term in this spring’s presidential elections.

The decision was announced after a meeting on Monday between Nikolic and current Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic, who emerged last week as the favoured presidential candidate of the Progressive Party to which they both belong.

“We have agreed to continue leading the state together. We are going to discuss posts after our victory in the elections,” Nikolic told the daily newspaper Kurir after the tete-a-tete.

“We will continue to raise Serbia up. Aleksandar will be the candidate for president,” Nikolic added.

The meeting was held after local media reported last week that Nikolic had decided to run for another term, despite his party having voted to nominate Vucic as its presidential candidate.

Although media reports since then have focused on an apparent conflict emerging between the two men, a joint statement released after the meeting emphasised their past cooperation and said they had agreed to work closely in the future to ensure the security of the region.

“The president and prime minister completely agree that Serbia is facing serious challenges and threats that require a joint and comprehensive response from the state leadership,” said the statement.

“The unity of all state officials in resolving regional problems and avoiding a large-scale crisis are the priority tasks of President Nikolic and Prime Minister Vucic,” it added.

It described a shared stance between Nikolic and Vucic on key topics such as the renewal of Bosnia’s lawsuit against Serbia for genocide, which was announced on Friday, and towards proposals for Kosovo’s “so-called membership” in UNESCO and the Council of Europe.

Serbia’s Progressive Party had confirmed Vucic, who is leader of the party, as its unanimously selected candidate for the country’s upcoming presidential elections, which will be held on April 30.

Vucic’s candidacy was backed by Serbia’s Socialist Party, coalition partner of the Progressives, following a party meeting on Saturday.

Nikolic won the presidential elections in 2012 as the Progressives’ candidate, and appears to have expected their support for another term.

Nikolic, who founded the Progressives but gave up leadership of the party when he became president, told Sputnik on Friday that he had asked Vucic to decide to either support his bid, or – if Vucic wanted to run himself – hand presidency of the party back to Nikolic.

Nikolic added that he could decide to run separately in the elections, depending on whether or not he could reach a deal with the prime minister.

Over the weekend, in response to Nikolic’s potential candidacy, the Progressives published a video on Saturday to promote Vucic.

The video shows pilots and air passengers on board an aircraft, in panic after heavy turbulence. The scenes are accompanied by the text “Serbia 2017”.

It then shows Vucic waking up on board the plane to tell viewers how he will deliver the country from such a “nightmare”.

“Our country, as well as this plane, was entrusted to the management of the two men: president and prime minister,” he says, adding that if those two men took the country in different directions, it would be impossible to maintain Serbia’s stable course.
– See more at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/still-no-agreement-between-serbian-president-and-prime-minister-02-19-2017#sthash.urKGkhHi.dpuf

By Ajit Kumar Singh*

‘Revengeful’ and ‘regrouped’ terrorists are again on the rampage across Pakistan. During a span of just seven days (February 13, 2017 to February 19, 2017) Pakistan accounted for at least 205 fatalities [100 civilians, 21 Security Force (SF) personnel, 84 terrorists) in 22 terrorism-related incidents.

In the worst attack, on February 16, 2017, at least 88 civilians were killed and more than 343 were injured when a suicide bomber blew himself up inside a historic Sufi shrine in the Sehwan town of Jamshoro District in Sindh Province. The shrine, built in 1356, was dedicated to Syed Mohammad Usman Marwandi, better known as Lal Shahbaz Qalandar. This is the worst attack, in terms of civilian fatalities, recorded in Pakistan since the December 16, 2014, Peshawar Army Public School attack which resulted in 150 fatalities, including 143 civilians. Daesh (the Islamic State) claimed the attack.

On February 15, 2017, a suicide bomber blew himself up outside a government office in the Ghalanai area of Mohmand Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), killing five civilians. Another attacker was killed by the guards before he could explode his suicide vest.

On February 13, 2017, at least 14 persons, including eight civilians and six policemen, were killed and another 85 were injured when a suicide bomber blew himself up outside the Punjab Assembly Building on Mall Road, Lahore, the provincial capital of Punjab. The attack was carried out during a protest by a large group of chemists and pharmaceutical manufacturers opposing a Government crackdown against the sale of illegal drugs. The dead included Captain (Retd.) Ahmad Mobin, Deputy Inspector General (DIG), Traffic, Lahore, and Zahid Gondal, Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP), Operations, Punjab Police. There was a significant presence of SFs in the area to manage the protest. The Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), a breakaway faction of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), claimed responsibility for both the February 13 and February 15 attacks.

Earlier, on January 21, 2017, in the first major attack of the year, at least 25 civilians were killed and more than 87 were injured in a bomb blast at the Sabzi Mandi (vegetable market) area of Parachinar in the FATA’s Kurram Agency. In a text message sent to journalists, the al-Alami (International) faction of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LeJ-A) claimed that it, along with the TTP-Shehryar Mehsud group, carried out the attack. The Shehryar Mehsud group did not independently claim the bombing.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), since the beginning of 2017, at least 284 terrorism-related fatalities (141 civilians, 32 SF personnel, 111 terrorists) have been recorded across Pakistan (data till February 19, 2017). In just these 50 days, at least five suicide attacks have been executed, resulting in at least 112 fatalities.

The dramatic surge in violence during the early days of the current year is significant, given the fact that through 2016, Pakistan had managed to maintain the declining trend of overall fatalities, on year on year basis, since 2010, barring 2014. [2014 recorded 5,496 fatalities as against 5,379 fatalities in 2013]. There were 1,803 fatalities (612 civilians, 293 SF personnel, 898 terrorists) in 2016, as against 3,682 (940 civilians, 339 SF personnel, 2,403 terrorists) in 2015. The number of major attacks (involving three or more fatalities) and resultant fatalities fell from 322 and 2,923, respectively in 2015, to 172 and 1,369, respectively, in 2016. The number of sectarian attacks and related deaths also declined – 276 fatalities in 53 incidents in 2015, as against 131 fatalities in 33 incidents in 2016.

Unsurprisingly, on December 21, 2016, a buoyant Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, Federal Minister of the Interior, claimed (inaccurately) that Pakistan was the only country where the terrorism graph had recorded a sharp decline. He further boasted, “I can say with complete responsibility that as of now no terrorist networks exist in Pakistan.” On the same day, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had declared that there was no presence of Daesh in Pakistan. More recently, referring to Operation Zarb-e-Azb, Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan’s permanent ambassador to the United Nations, told the UN Security Council on February 13, 2017, “This comprehensive approach has succeeded in expelling terrorist organisations from our territory and greatly constrained their ability to carry out lethal attacks, as evident from the dramatic decline in the number of such attacks, despite the cowardly attack in Lahore.”

These assertions were evidently premature and imprudent. Pakistan remains an extraordinarily dangerous place. Indeed, recent incidents demonstrate that several terror networks continue to thrive across the country, prominently including Daesh, JuA, and LeJ-A, among the domestically active formations, not to mention the many state-backed terrorist groupings that operate across international borders, into Afghanistan and India.

Meanwhile, reports indicate that the large number of TTP ‘commanders’ who were operating out of the tribal areas in Pakistan when the Operation Zarb-e-Azb [Sword of the Prophet] was launched and who had managed to cross over into the bordering areas of Afghanistan, have decided to come together and form a ‘united front’, joining hands with other terrorist outfits. These ‘commanders’ of rival factions of TTP were fighting each other to establish dominance in their respective areas of influence. In November 2016, leaders of eight terrorist groups held a meeting in Afghanistan’s Ghazni Province for this purpose. Arranged by Yousaf Mansour Khurasani, chief of LeJ-A, the meeting was attended by Javaid Sawati, a close aide of former TTP ‘chief’ Mulla Fazlullah (who was killed in March 2015); Wajid Mehsud of Jandullah; Maulvi Khatir of TTP-Sajna group; Shahryar Mehsud of TTP- Shahryar group; Abdul Wali of JuA; Mufti Ghufran of TTP-Khalifa Mansour group; and Mullah Daud of TTP-Qari Hussain group. On February 2, 2017, TTP-Sajna merged with the TTP-Fazlullah group.

In fact other parameters of violence registered in 2016 demonstrate that the crackdown against terrorists has failed to secure the nation beyond a point. Launched by the Pakistani forces in the aftermath of the attack on Karachi Airport on June 8-9, 2014, in which at least 33 persons, including all ten attackers, were killed, the crackdown has repeatedly been declared a success, but has also been repeatedly extended. Significantly, though overall civilian fatalities in Pakistan declined through 2016, Balochistan and KP registered increases in fatalities in this category. In the SF category, fatalities increased in the Punjab Province. The number of suicide attacks in 2016 remained the same, 19, as recorded in 2015, but the resultant fatalities recorded a sharp increase – 161 in 2015, spiking to 401 in 2016. Further, though Pakistan recorded 139 incidents of bomb blasts in 2016, as against 216 such incidents in 2015, the resultant fatalities increased from 495 in 2015 to 502 in 2016. Five suicide attacks resulting in 112 deaths have already been recorded in 2017.

On several accounts, Operation Zarb-e-Azb has been overhyped, and only targeted a few terrorist formations that had turned ‘rogue’, while allowing a multiplicity of other terrorist formations that operate out of Pakistani soil to thrive, with the attendant problem that there is little possibility of controlling one set without constraining the other. A more serious allegation, according to Arif Jamal, a US-based expert on political Islam, is that “actually, it [Operation Zarb-e-Azb] was aimed at weakening political parties and not eliminating terrorists.”

Meanwhile, the favorable environment provided to ‘pro-Government’ terrorist formations has resulted in a further radicalization of Pakistani society, helping groups like Daesh to mobilize and recruit. Daesh’s spread, in turn, has helped rogue terrorist outfits to regain lost ground, as most of these have now established some linkages with Daesh, resulting in a measure of unity, consolidation and effective coordination.

SAIR has repeatedly highlighted the fact that the Pakistani establishment has, for long, provided open support to terrorist formations which has served its purported strategic interests. Most recently, Islamabad, in connivance with Beijing, opposed the imposition of an international ban on the Jaish-e-Mohammad ( JeM) chief, Maulana Masood Azhar, who openly operates out of Pakistan. JeM has been one of the most lethal terrorist groups operating in India, particularly in the State of Jammu & Kashmir, and has been responsible for a large number of major attacks . The group is closely allied al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, and has been notionally banned in Pakistan since 2002, though it faces no visible restraints. On the other hand, there is no conclusive proof to suggest that any action has been taken against Haqqani Network and Afghan Taliban terrorists operating out of Pakistani soil and targeting the Afghan as well as Indian and other countries’ interests inside Afghanistan. Indeed, Abdul Raouf Ibrahimi, Speaker of National Assembly of Afghanistan, stated on February 18, 2017,

Terrorism remains a threat to the South Asian countries, including Pakistan but unfortunately rulers of Pakistan have always supported terrorism. This policy of Pakistan is not in the interest of the South Asian region. In the future it is going to be a big threat to Pakistan.”

It is widely believed that the aid which flows from the U.S. is one of the main sources of the Pakistani establishment’s capacities to carry on its with policy of exporting of terrorism. Indeed, a report titled A New U.S. Approach to Pakistan: Enforcing Aid Conditions Without Cutting Ties released by the Hudson Institute and The Heritage Foundation in February 2017 observed,

“The new Trump Administration must review its policies toward Pakistan in order to more effectively contain, and eventually eliminate, the terrorist threats that continue to emanate from the country… Accordingly, the objective of the Trump administration’s policy toward Pakistan must be to make it more and more costly for Pakistani leaders to employ a strategy of supporting terrorist proxies to achieve regional strategic goals… It no longer makes sense to waive the counterterrorism conditions on U.S. aid to Pakistan. The U.S. can and must better leverage U.S. military aid to encourage tougher policies against terrorists who operate from within Pakistan. While a grace period may have been merited for Pakistan seven years ago, it would be foolish to keep giving the Pakistanis a pass when it comes to taking action against terrorist groups that are directly undermining U.S. regional interests, not to mention killing U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan. Whereas U.S. government agencies were divided seven years ago over the nature and extent of Pakistan’s support to the Afghan Taliban and other terrorist and extremist groups, today no one in the U.S. government disputes that Pakistan provides such support.”

Regrettably, there is no immediate reason to believe that there has been any dramatic shift in U.S. policy towards Pakistan, though the broad theme of official pronouncements from the fledgling Trump administration suggests that such a shift is in the offing. In the absence of genuine and overwhelming international pressure, Pakistan is unlikely to alter its policy of ‘export of terror’ in its immediate and extended neighborhood, while it targets domestically active terrorist formations within Pakistan. Pakistani strategists continue to believe that such a policy has served the country’s strategic interests, and are inclined to ignore the devastating repercussions this policy has caused within the country.

*Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

By S. Binodkumar Singh*

On February 8, 2017, six employees of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were shot dead by terrorists of the Islamic State (IS, formerly, Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham, also Daesh) in the Qoshtapa District of Jawzjan Province. After the killing, ICRC suspended its operations in Afghanistan on February 9, 2017.

On February 7, 2017, at least 22 people were killed while more than 41 were injured in a suicide attack outside Afghanistan’s Supreme Court complex in the national capital, Kabul. Later, in a post on Twitter on February 8, 2017, Daesh claimed responsibility for the attack.

On January 10, 2017, at least 38 people were killed and another 72 were wounded in two back to back explosions in Kabul city. Kabul Police officials disclosed that the majority of those killed or wounded were civilians. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the explosions.

On January 10, 2017, in a separate incident in Kandahar Province, as many as 13 civilians were killed, including five United Arab Emirates (UAE) diplomats, in an explosion at the residence of the Kandahar Provincial Governor while he was hosting a dinner for visiting diplomats and dignitaries. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.

Civilian continue to bear the brunt of terrorism in Afghanistan. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) at least 121 civilians have already been killed in Afghanistan since the beginning of 2017 (data till February 12).

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which began systematically documenting civilian casualties on January 1, 2009, has recorded 70,188 civilian casualties (24,841 dead and 45,347 injured) up to December 31, 2016. Through 2016, UNAMA recorded 11,418 civilian casualties (3,498 civilians dead and 7,920 injured) as against 11,002 civilian casualties (3,545 civilians dead and 7,457 injured) in 2015. More disturbingly, the conflict severely impacted Afghan children in 2016. UNAMA recorded 3,512 child casualties (923 deaths and 2,589 injured), a 24 percent increase over 2015, and the highest number of child casualties recorded by UNAMA in a single year. The disproportionate rise in child casualties across Afghanistan in 2016 resulted mainly from a 66 per cent increase in civilian casualties from explosive remnants of war – most of these casualties were children.

The battle between the Security Forces (SFs) and the Taliban to establish effective control over areas across Afghanistan intensified further through 2016. According to the United States (US) Department of Defense (DoD), from January 1, 2016, through November 12, 2016, as many as 6,785 Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) service members were killed and an additional 11,777 members were wounded. The DoD reported that the majority of ANDSF casualties continue to be the result of direct-fire attacks, with IED explosions and mine strikes accounting for much lower levels of casualties. ANDSF includes the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan Air Force (AAF), and Afghan National Police (ANP).

In contrast, fatalities among the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Forces continued to decline, with 16 fatalities in 2016, as against 27 in 2015 and 75 in 2014. A total of 3,528 NATO personnel, including 2,392 US troopers, have been killed so far, since 2001. The increase in fatalities among ANDSF, on the one hand, and simultaneous decline in NATO fatalities, on the other, is primarily because NATO Forces have ceased operating as combat Forces (barring a few specific operations) since the beginning of 2015, and ANDSF has taken up the lead in fighting the terrorists.

Though there is no specific data on the number of terrorists killed in Afghanistan, according to partial data compiled by SATP, at least 11,469 terrorists were killed through 2016, as against 10,628 such fatalities in 2015. Most of the terrorists killed belonged to the Taliban.

According to US Force-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), as of November 26, 2016, the ANDSF assigned force strength was 322,585, including 174,950 of ANA and 147,635 of ANP. Meanwhile, according to US DoD, as of December 2016, the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) launched on January 1, 2015, to train, advise and assist the mission in Afghanistan, consisted of 13,332 U.S. and Coalition personnel. Of that number, 6,941 were U.S. forces and 6,391 were from 26 NATO allies and 12 non-NATO partners.

The office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), in its latest Quarterly Report released on January 30, 2017, offered bleak progress statistics about Afghanistan. An estimated 57.2 per cent of the country’s 407 Districts are under Afghan Government control or influence as of November 15, 2016, a 6.2 percent decrease from the 63.4 percent reported in the preceding quarter in late August 2016, and a nearly 15 percent decrease since November 2015. Further, Afghanistan’s largest independent news agency, Pajhwok Afghan News, on February 7, 2017, reported that as many as 704 people were killed and 563 others wounded in 137 attacks in January 2017 in 24 of the 34 Provinces of the country, showing a 10 per cent spike in attacks and a 17 percent rise in causalities compared to December 2016. Terrorists, SFs and civilians, including women and children, were among the casualties, but Pajhwok could not find the exact figures for each category. The Global Terrorism Index 2016 put Afghanistan at the second highest impact from terrorism, measuring 9.44 out of 10, after Iraq at 9.96 out of 10.

At this time, even though the Afghan Taliban has declared that it has no intention of participating in peace talks with the Afghan Government, despite international efforts, an attempt is being made to bring the rebels to the talks table. The first round of official peace talks between the Afghan Taliban and the Afghan Government had taken place in the intervening night of July 7 and July 8, 2015, in Murree in Pakistan, with an agreement to meet again on August 15 and 16, 2015, in the Qatar capital, Doha. Before, the second round of talks could take place, the Afghan Government disclosed, on July 29, 2015, “The Government… based on credible information, confirms that Mullah Mohammad Omar, leader of the Taliban, died in April 2013 in Pakistan.” Subsequent disclosures indicated that Omar died while he was under treatment in Karachi. Soon, the Taliban split into two factions – one led by Pakistan’s nominee, Mullah Akhtar Mansoor and another by Mullah Mohammad Rasool. The next round of talks failed to materialize. Mansoor was killed in a US air strike on May 21, 2016, in Pakistan, near the Afghan border. He was succeeded by Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada, but the possibility of talks ended at this stage.

Significantly, Tadamichi Yamamoto, head of UNAMA, in his quarterly briefing to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in New York on December 19, 2016, urged the Taliban to enter into direct talks with the Government, without preconditions, to prevent further bloodshed in the country. However, responding to the renewed call for talks by Yamamoto on December 23, 2016, Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, declared, “Our fight is for independence, and as long as foreign occupation forces are present here (in Afghanistan) any talk about peace and reconciliation is meaningless.” Further, on January 25, 2017, the Taliban group issued an open letter claiming, “The Afghans, as a nation ravaged by war for thirty eight long years, sincerely want to bring this war to an end. However they know – despite whatever reasons for previous wars – that the principle cause for the ongoing conflict is the presence of foreign occupying forces in our independent country.”

The fifth meeting of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States and China on the Afghan peace and reconciliation process had been held in Islamabad, Pakistan, on May 18, 2016. The QCG reiterated that violence served no purpose and that peace negotiations remained the only option for a political settlement, and member countries resolved to use their respective leverages and influence to secure an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace and reconciliation process. Separately, the third session of the trilateral “working group” of Russia, China and Pakistan on Afghanistan held in Moscow on December 27, 2016, discussed the current situation of Afghanistan decided to work towards delisting the Afghan Taliban from the world body’s sanctions list in a move purportedly aimed at launching peaceful dialogue between Afghanistan’s Government and the insurgent groups.

As talks with the Afghan Taliban hit a roadblock amidst a surge in violence, the Afghan Government signed a peace agreement on September 22, 2016, with the Hezb-e-Islami (HeI) led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, paving the way for the armed group’s commander to make a political comeback despite allegations of war crimes during the 1990s. Once branded the “butcher of Kabul”, Hekmatyar was a prominent anti-Soviet commander who stands accused of killing thousands of people when his fighters fired on civilian areas of the capital city during the 1992-1996 civil war. The draft of the peace agreement had been signed on May 18, 2016, by HeI representatives and High Peace Council (HPC) officials.

While the Taliban has regained significant ground, it has now entered into a fratricidal turf war with its own splinters. Several deadly clashes have taken place across the country, particularly in western provinces, following the announcement of the death of Taliban supreme leader Mullah Mohammad Omar. In the latest incident of infighting among the Taliban factions, on January 8, 2017, at least ten Taliban cadres were killed in Bakwa District in a landmine explosion orchestrated by a rival group in Farah Province. Indeed, the Islamic State (IS or Daesh) faction, which made inroads into Afghanistan subsequent to the June 2014 release of Daesh’s ‘world domination map’, has benefited from Taliban infighting, taking recruits from Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda defectors. But, the U.S. military and its Afghan partners have managed to push back Daesh’s presence in the country from nearly a dozen Districts to just two or three. Brigadier General Charles Cleveland, spokesman of US Army in Afghanistan, thus asserted, on December 22, 2016, “A year ago, U.S. commanders estimated the strength of the Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan at between 1,500 and 3,000 members. Today, it is about 1,000. We think we’ve significantly reduced that presence.”

Afghanistan’s principal problem, however, remains Pakistan. Exposing Islamabad’s role, Afghanistan’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Mahmoud Saikal, stated, on January 11, 2017, “The cycle of violence and insecurity in Afghanistan, and our part of the world is inextricably linked to the presence of sanctuaries and safe-havens in the region, from which extremist groups are sustained and enjoy an incessant flow of political, financial, material and logistical support for the continuation of their malicious activities.” Endorsing Afghanistan’s view that terrorists are able to strike whenever they want to because of the existence of terrorist safe havens inside Pakistan, US Defense Secretary General James Mattis declared, on January 12, 2017, “Sanctuaries and freedom of movement for the Afghan Taliban and associated militant networks inside Pakistani territory is a key operational issue faced by the Afghan security forces.” Further, on February 9, 2017, General John Nicholson, commander of the US forces and the NATO-led RSM in Afghanistan added, “The Taliban and Haqqani network are the greatest threats to security in Afghanistan. Their senior leaders remain insulated from pressure and enjoy freedom of action within Pakistan safe havens.”

No end is presently visible for Afghanistan’s crisis. Reaffirming US support to the Afghan Government and SFs on January 5, 2017, Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook noted, “Afghanistan is still dangerous and challenges there remain. We will continue to provide the kind of support we can to bolster the Afghan security forces.”

Afghan Forces are reeling under circumstances created by the withdrawal of an overwhelming proportion of NATO Forces, though the small remaining contingents continue to provide active support. There is, however, far greater recognition today of Pakistan’s enduring mischief in Afghanistan, and a growing willingness among engaged powers to impose costs on Islamabad for its malfeasance. With the change of regime in Washington, there is an expectation that this will translated into effective policy. It remains to be seen whether this will exercise sufficient pressure on Islamabad to act against the Taliban. Absent a conclusive defeat inflicted on the Taliban, there is little hope of peace in this war wracked nation.

* S. Binodkumar Singh
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

By Deepak Kumar Nayak*

On February 5, 2017, a group of about four to six armed Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres shot dead a tribal, identified as Parsika Pullaiah (40), at Alligudem village under Chintooru mandal (administrative unit) in East Godavari District. When the villagers tried to prevent the Maoists from killing Pullaiah, they were reportedly told, the Maoists would not spare any ‘informer’. This is the lone Naxal [Left Wing Extremism (LWE)]-linked violent incident reported in the State thus far in 2017 (data till February 12).

Indeed, the security situation in the State in terms of LWE violence has improved considerably over the past years, and these gains have been further consolidated through 2016. Significantly, the State recorded lowest number of civilian fatalities (five) in such violence since 1968, when three civilians were killed, according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database. The highest ever civilian fatalities in LWE-linked violence in Andhra Pradesh stood at 218 in 1991.

Significantly, as in 2015, there was no fatality among Security Forces (SFs) in 2016, though the number of Left Wing Extremists (LWEs) killed increased from two in 2015 to five in 2016. The highest ever fatalities, at 56, among SF personnel were registered way back in 1992, while LWEs had suffered their maximum loss, 275, in 1998. The dramatic decline in fatalities in both these categories clearly suggests that the Maoists are no more on the offensive in the State and have their backs to the wall. SFs also arrested 17 LWEs through 2016, in addition to 44 such arrests in 2015. Continuing SF pressure resulted in the surrender of 26 LWEs in 2016, in addition to 133 in 2015.

Other parameters of violence were also indicative of significant gains. According to data provided by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA), LWE-linked incidents in Andhra Pradesh decreased from 35 in 2015 to 17 in 2016. The State reported 577 such incidents in 2003.

There was no major incident (involving three or more fatalities) of civilian killing through 2016, as in the preceding two years (SATP data). The last such incident took place on February 19, 2013, when three tribals were killed by the Maoists in the Lakkavaram Forest area in G.K. Veedhi mandal in Visakhapatnam District.

The Maoists were involved in at least four incidents of exchange of fire with SFs in 2016, as against eight such incidents in 2015. There was just one attack on an economic target through 2016, as compared to five such attacks in 2015. Further, the Maoists were able to organise only one Praja court (Kangaroo Court) in 2016, in Visakhapatnam District; as against two in 2015. The Maoists gave bandh (total shut down) calls on three occasions in 2016, as against six such calls in 2015.

Unsurprisingly, on December 31, 2016, stating that Left Wing Extremism had declined to an all-time low in Andhra Pradesh, the one-time stronghold of the Naxalite movement, Director General of Police (DGP) Nanduri Sambasiva Rao noted, “The Left Wing Extremism (LWE) ideology is losing relevance and the Andhra Pradesh Police has succeeded in controlling Naxalite activities in the State.”

A residual threat, nevertheless, lingers. The State recorded more incidents of civilian killing in 2016 as compared to 2015 – four in 2015 and five in 2016 – though civilian fatalities declined from six in 2015 to five in 2016. Moreover, civilian killings were reported from three Districts: Vishakhapatnam (three), Vizianagaram (one), and East Godavari (one) in 2016, as compared to two Districts: East Godavari (three) and Vishakhapatnam (three) in 2015. Indeed, DGP Rao acknowledged, on December 31, 2016, “Naxalite movements are continuing in Visakhapatnam Rural, East Godavari and Vizianagaram Districts.” The DGP also disclosed that 105 extremists were operating in the State, of whom 45 were from Andhra Pradesh and 60 from other States.

In the meantime, according to the latest data provided by the Bureau of Police Research and Development [BPR&D], as on January 1, 2016, the police-population ratio (policemen per hundred thousand population) in the State stood at precarious 95.74 per 100,000, as compared to a national average of 137.11 which is, itself, abysmally low. [Over 220 policemen per 100,000 population are considered necessary for ‘peacetime policing’]. At least 9,587 Police posts are vacant in the State, against a sanctioned strength of 59,174. Also, the sanctioned strength of the apex Indian Police Service (IPS) Officers in the State is 144, but just 124 officers were in position, considerably weakening decision-making in the Force.

Though the Andhra Pradesh Police has done incredibly well against the Maoists over the past decade , despite existing deficits, it is imperative for the Governments, both at the Central and State levels, to strengthen and improve the quality of the SFs, and resources available to address potential threats. Andhra Pradesh Districts that border the Maoist-affected areas of Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra and Odisha, remain vulnerable to attacks from these relatively safe areas. The Maoists have demonstrated a historical tenacity that leaves no space whatsoever for complacence, especially since many proximate areas across the State boundary remain highly affected by the LWE threat.

* Deepak Kumar Nayak
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management