By Deepak Kumar Nayak*

On January 31, 2017, four Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres were arrested by the Security Forces (SFs) from the Hanamkonda area in Warangal District.

On January 13, 2017, the District Police arrested a suspected Maoist from his house in Karimnagar town, Karimnagar District. Police recovered 50 rounds of ammunition of different weapons, five rifles, one Carbine 9 mm, and one .32 pistol from the hideout.

According to partial data collated by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least 24 Maoists were arrested in 2016 in Telangana, in addition to 33 arrested in 2015 and seven in 2014. Five Maoists have been arrested in the current year (data till February 19, 2017).

Mounting SF pressure also led to the surrender of 11 Maoists in 2016, in addition to 13 in 2015, according to SATP data. Importantly, on December 7, 2016, Uyka Dulaiah aka Joga (24), a senior leader of the rank of ‘deputy commander’ of the CPI-Maoist’s Savithri Dalam (armed squad) operating in the restive Sukma District of Chhattisgarh, and carrying a reward of INR 300,000, surrendered before the Police in the Bhadradri Kothagudem District; on November 19, 2016, Sunnam Sridevi aka Nirmala (35), an ‘area committee member’ of the Charla Local Operating Squad (LOS) of the CPI-Maoist, carrying a reward of INR 100,000, surrendered before the Police in Bhadradri Kothagudem District; and on July 8, 2016, Goli Srinivas aka Praveen (39), carrying a cash reward of INR 400,000, surrendered before the Police in Warangal District.

Significantly, Maoist-related violence in the State recorded a decline through 2016 even in comparison to the low levels in the preceding year. According to the SATP database, Telangana registered just one fatality, a Maoist cadre, through 2016, as against four fatalities, including two civilians and two Maoists, in 2015. Since the State’s formation on June 2, 2014, Telangana has recorded eight fatalities, including four civilians and four Maoists. There has, so far, been no casualty in 2017 in Telangana in Left Wing Extremism (LWE)-related violence.

The lone fatality was reported from Mehboobnagar District of Telangana on August 8, 2016. In 2015, fatalities were reported from three Districts of the State – one civilian each from Adilabad and Khammam; and two Maoists in Warangal.

Further, according to data provided by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA), LWE-linked incidents in Telangana decreased from 11 in 2015 to seven in 2016. The State registered 14 such incidents in 2014. Similarly, attacks on economic targets by the Maoists also decreased from two in 2015 to one in 2016. There were no abduction incidents reported in 2016, as against two in 2015.

Nonetheless, the inherent danger from the Maoists persists in Telangana. According to SATP data, the Maoists were engaged in three reported exchange of fire incidents in 2016, the same as in 2015; five bandh (general shutdown) calls were issued in 2016, as against two such calls in 2015; and two incidents of arson were recorded in 2016, as against one such incident in 2015.

Moreover, according to SATP data, LWE-related violent incidents were reported from nine Districts (Khammam, Mehboobnagar, Warangal, Adilabad, Bhadradri Kothagudem, Jayashankar Bhoopalpally, Nalgonda, Nirmal and Rajanna Sircilla) in 2016. In 2015, violent incidents were reported from eight Districts (Khammam, Adilabad, Karimnagar, Medak, Mehboobnagar, Nalgonda, Warangal, and Nizamabad). Eight of the nine Districts which witnessed violence in 2016 were also listed by UMHA among the 106 Maoist-affected Districts across 10 Indian States.

Further, dubbing the ruling TRS (Telangana Rashtra Samithi) as a “feudal and capitalist” political formations, similar to all other parties which protected properties of landlords and capitalists belonging to undivided Andhra Pradesh, the CPI-Maoist Telangana State committee ‘official spokesman’ Jagan, in a release (media report published on May 22, 2016), appealed, “We are calling upon people and democratic forces to wage a struggle till the problems of drought, drinking and irrigation water and fodder are resolved.” It is significant that TRS was seen to be close to the Maoists during the agitation for a separate State, prior to the division of Andhra Pradesh in 2014.

Worryingly, at least 17,061 Police posts are vacant in the State, against a sanctioned strength of 64,489, a 26.46 per cent deficit, according to the latest data provided by the Bureau of Police Research and Development [BPR&D], as on January 1, 2016. Moreover, the sanctioned strength of the apex Indian Police Service (IPS) Officers in the State is 112, but just 94 officers were in position, considerably weakening decision-making in the Force. The police-population ratio (Policemen per hundred thousand population) in the State was 130.71 per 100,000, as compared to an appallingly low national average of 137.11 [over 220 Policemen per 100,000 population are considered necessary for ‘peacetime policing’].

Despite the fact that the influence of the Maoists has reduced over the last few years across the country, their residual capacities and capabilities, cannot be ignored. The Maoists’ revival plan in Telangana demonstrates clearly that the rebels have not given up. It is imperative that the lacunae in the enforcement apparatus be addressed, before the Maoists are able to gather sufficient force to make a serious attempt to resurrect their fortunes.

* Deepak Kumar Nayak
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

Earlier today, President Trump selected Gen. H.R. McMaster to be his National Security Advisor, replacing the short-lived Gen. Michael Flynn. Those breathing a sigh of relief that the rumored favorite John Bolton didn’t get the nod may want to hold that thought — and their breath. McMaster is not the man to guide President Trump toward better relations with Russia and less US interference in the internal affairs of others.

In fact, he believes the opposite.

In a speech delivered at the Center for Strategic and International Studies just last May, Gen. McMaster blamed the lack of sufficient US military presence overseas for what he calls a more aggressive Russian geostrategic posturing.

Said the General:

Even though it may have been apparent, at least since 2008, that Russia was changing its geostrategic behavior and engaging in…probing, probing at the far reaches of American power, our strategic response was to accelerate our withdrawal of…army forces from Europe. And what we’re seeing now is we’ve awakened to obviously this threat from Russia who is waging limited war for limited objectives. Annexing Crimea. Invading Ukraine. At zero cost. And consolidating gains over that territory, and portraying the reaction by us and partners as escalatory. … What is required is forward deterance. To be able to ratchet up the cost at the frontier.

The General also made the completely fallacious assertion that Russia invaded Georgia in 2008. Even the highly critical if not overtly anti-Russia European Union concluded that Georgia was to blame for launching an ill-advised attack on Russian peacekeeping forces that were part of an international mission in South Ossetia.

Does this sound like someone who is going to work to help President Trump improve relations with Russia?

No wonder neocons Max Boot and Sen. John McCain are absolutely thrilled with Trump’s choice of McMaster to be National Security Advisor.

Sen. McCain, who just returned from attacking President Trump at the Munich Security Conference for not being harder on Russia, said today that McMaster:

…knows how to succeed. I give President Trump great credit for this decision, as well as his national security cabinet choices. I could not imagine a better, more capable national security team than the one we have right now.

Max Boot had a similar reaction:

H.R. McMaster is one of the most impressive army officers of his generation—a rare combination of soldier and scholar.

McMaster’s claim to fame was the 1997 Dereliction of Duty, which is billed as a brave attack on the mistake of the Vietnam war, but was in fact largely focused on the failure to devote enough resources to actually winning the war — a typical neocon critique of failed military interventions.

Is McMaster a worse choice than John Bolton? Perhaps. Whereas Bolton would have been under the microscope, McMaster may just be able, due to his military history, be able to avoid close scrutiny.

Whatever the case, McMaster is all about conflict with Russia. Will his boss keep him in check?

This article was published by RonPaul Institute.

In comments about the two Russian revolutions of 1917, Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, says that the Russian liberals who carried out the February revolution were responsible for the terror that followed the October one, because their “rocking the boat” of the Russian state led ineluctably to disaster.

Such an interpretation, as the editors of Nezavisimaya gazeta point out in a lead article today, is emblematic of the church’s position of condemning the terror that was visited upon the religious and everyone else by the Bolsheviks without denouncing the Soviet state that the latter produced (ng.ru/editorial/2017-02-20/2_6933_red.html).

“At first glance,” the paper says, denouncing the terror that followed October by blaming the overthrow of stardom carried out by the form would appear to be a fundamental contradiction. But a deeper consideration shows that it is consistent not only with how the church and its Kremlin allies view the past but also how they think about the present.

Kirill’s suggestion that “October is the logical continuation of February, and the victory of the Bolsheviks became possible thanks to the liberal opposition which ‘rocked the boat’” allows the powers that be in Moscow to have it both ways: to denounce liberals then and now while avoiding any serious criticism of the Bolsheviks and the Soviet system.

In recent times, the paper points out, “the Russian Orthodox Church has been very cautious about the theme of communist symbols.” One of its hierarchs recently declared that it was premature to think about burying Lenin, for example. And Vladimir Legoyda, head of the Synod’s department for church-society ties, offered an even clearer denunciation of those who overthrew stardom.

“The state could have developed further if the revolutionary opposition had sought a compromise with the authorities,” he declared, words that could be extended to the Bolsheviks but that the churchman did not.

This treatment of “’liberal traitors’” in 1917, of course, “more closely corresponds to current political needs than to historical truth.” Kirill like Putin views liberals as the enemy then and now, and consequently, “the Russian Orthodox Church equates its critics to enemies of the state by asserting that political formations change but Orthodoxy remains constant.

A tiny snail may offer an alternative to opioids for pain relief. Scientists at the University of Utah have found a compound that blocks pain by targeting a pathway not associated with opioids. Research in rodents indicates that the benefits continue long after the compound have cleared the body. The findings were reported online in the February 20 issue of the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

The opioid crisis has reached epidemic proportions. Opioids is highly addictive and according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 91 Americans die every day from an opioid overdose. The medical community is in need of alternative therapies that do not rely on the opioid pathways to relieve pain.

“Nature has evolved molecules that are extremely sophisticated and can have unexpected applications,” begins Baldomera Olivera, Ph.D., professor in biology at the University of Utah. “We were interested in using venoms to understand different pathways in the nervous system.”

Conus regius, a small marine cone snail common to the Caribbean Sea, packs a venomous punch, capable of paralyzing and killing its prey.

In this study, the researchers found that a compound isolated from snail’s venom, Rg1A, acts on a pain pathway distinct from that targeted by opioid drugs. Using rodent models, the scientists showed that ?9?10 nicotinic acetylcholine receptors (nAChR) functions as a pain pathway receptor and that RgIA4 is an effective compound to block this receptor. The pathway adds to a small number of nonopioid-based pathways that could be further developed to treat chronic pain.

Interestingly, the duration of the pain relief is long, greatly outlasting the presence of the compound in the animal’s system.

The compound works its way through the body in 4 hours, but the scientists found the beneficial effects lingered. “We found that the compound was still working 72 hours after the injection, still preventing pain,” said J. Michael McIntosh, M.D., professor of psychiatry at the University of Utah Health Sciences. The duration of the outcome may suggest that the snail compound has a restorative effect on some components of the nervous system.

“What is particularly exciting about these results is the aspect of prevention,” said McIntosh. “Once chronic pain has developed, it is difficult to treat. This compound offers a potential new pathway to prevent pain from developing in the first place and offer a new therapy to patients who have run out of options.”

The researchers will continue to the next step of pre-clinical testing to investigate the safety and effectiveness of a new drug therapy.

Testing a new nonopioid compound

Previous research had shown that RgIA was effective in rodents, but the scientists wanted to ensure they had a compound that would work in people. To do this, they used synthetic chemistry to engineer 20 analogs of the compound. In essence, the scientists started with a key (RgIA) that fits into a lock (the pain pathway receptor ?9?10 nAChR). Using the key as a template, they developed new keys (analogs) with slightly different configurations.

The scientists found one key that best fit the lock: the analog RgIA4 tightly bound to the human receptor.

To test whether the compound relieved pain, the scientists administered it to rodents that were exposed to a chemotherapy drug that causes extreme cold sensitivity, as well as hypersensitivity to touch. “Interactions that are not normally painful, like sheets rubbing against the body or pants against the leg, becomes painful,” said McIntosh.

While the untreated rodents experienced pain after exposure to the chemotherapy drug, rodents given the compound did not experience pain. Nor did rodents that were genetically altered rodents to lack the pain pathway receptor. This work demonstrates that ?9?10 nAChR acts as a pain pathway receptor, and that RgIA4 prevents the receptor from being activated.

Most pain medications available today work through a limited number of pathways and are not sufficient to alleviate chronic pain. “RgIA4 works by an entirely new pathway, which opens the door for new opportunities to treat pain,” said McIntosh. “We feel that drugs that work by this pathway may reduce burden of opioid use.”

A new paper published in Digital Scholarship in the Humanities reveals and quantifies dramatic differences in the speaking styles of candidates in the 2016 United States presidential election. Lexical analysis indicates that President Donald Trump had a distinct communication style, and it was far more direct than any of the other candidates.

The most frequently used thematic words are very similar across politicians, with ‘people’ appearing in the top 4 for 7/9 candidates, and ‘say’ for 5/9. Trump and Hillary Clinton had 3 out of 4 most-used words the same.

Researchers here analyzed the transcripts of the TV debates involving Jeb Bush, Hillary Clinton, Ted Cruz, John Kasich, Martin O’Malley, Rand Paul, Marco Rubio, Bernie Sanders, and Donald Trump.

According to several overall stylistic indicators, candidate Trump used a simple communication style, avoiding complex formulation and vocabulary. The authors analysed lexical density – or how much actual information there was in the words spoken. Trump scored the lowest for lexical density, and he also reused the same phrases more than other candidates.

Former governors (Bush and Kasich) tend to use “we” more frequently than “I.” Usually Senators (Cruz, Paul, Clinton, and Sanders) tend to prefer using the pronoun “I.”

Donald Trump presents an atypical figure, employing short sentences, a reduced vocabulary, repeating the same arguments with simple words. He is the single candidate to have the pronoun “I” in the second rank (after the article “the”).

Hillary Clinton can also be characterized by a large use of the pronoun I. The candidates who stayed longer in the campaign had a clear preference for “I” over the “we.” When considering overall stylistic indicators, Clinton, O’Malley, and Sanders presented a high lexical density value as well as a higher number of long and complex words than the mean.

Long sentences were preferred by O’Malley, Clinton, and Sanders. A relatively high lexical density percentage indicates a more complex text, containing more information. Using the transcripts of the TV debates, the lexical density values varied from 36.6% (Trump) to 44.6% (Cruz).

The percentage of long or complex words varied from 18.3% (Trump) to 26.4% (Cruz, and Sanders). Senators Cruz and O’Malley had a more sophisticated communication style, employing longer sentences, and a more complex lexicon.

An analysis of the top ten most specific terms per candidate reveals interesting specifics about their campaigns. Top terms used by Jeb Bush included “proven,” “status,” and “brother.” Top terms used by Martin O’Malley included “actually” and “Maryland.” Sanders preferred “Wall Street,” “wealth,” “class,” and “billionaire.” Top Clinton words included “comprehensive,” “affordable,” and “try.” Among the top ten specific words used by Trump in the course of his campaign were “I,” “Mexico,” “deal,” and “tremendous.”

“As Trump won the primaries and the general election, does that mean that efficient communication must be based on tweet-like rhetoric and this form will dominate the future elections?” asked lead author Jacques Savoy. “Clearly the rhetoric evolution goes towards to short communication messages, but this also implies simplistic analysis and solutions? If the answer is affirmative, I see a real risk of the democracy.”

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) said it is concerned by President Donald Trump’s latest attacks against American media outlets accusing them of reporting “fake news”. These attacks set a dangerous precedent for the world’s press freedom predators, many of whom have had journalists imprisoned on charges like “reporting false information.”

During a press conference last Friday, United States President Donald Trump attacked the press for what he deemed dishonest and hostile reporting since he took office: “we have to talk to find out what’s going on, because the press honestly is out of control. The level of dishonesty is out of control.” He proceeded to claim that recent articles in the press concerning former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn’s contacts with Russia which ultimately led to his resignation were “fake news”. However President Trump insisted that the real story that needed coverage was the leaks regarding Flynn’s ties to Russia: “Russia is fake news…the leaks are absolutely real. The news is fake because so much of the news is fake.”

Trump also singled out CNN during an exchange with White House correspondent Jim Acosta and claimed he wanted to “turn in CNN for not doing a good job.” Trump then claimed that FOX News morning show “Fox & Friends” has “the most honest morning show.”

After the press conference, Trump sent the following message to his supporters, asking them to complete a survey:
“You know that I don’t trust the media to report on anything we achieve.

Instead, you — the American people — are our last line of defense against the media’s hit jobs.

You are our greatest asset in helping our movement deliver the truth to the American people.

Which is why I need you to take the Mainstream Media Accountability Survey to do your part to fight back against the media’s attacks and deceptions.”

The survey asked Trump supporters to assess the “mainstream media’s performance in its coverage of Trump during the campaign and since he took office. Some of the questions asked about specific topics covered in the media: “Do you believe that the mainstream media has reported unfairly on our movement? Do you trust CNN/FOX News/MSNBC to report fairly on Trump’s presidency? Do you believe that the mainstream media does not do their due diligence fact-checking before publishing stories on the Trump administration?”

“These verbal attacks on American journalists are very concerning as they come from the President of the United States, the country which is supposed to have a strong free press protected by the First Amendment, says Margaux Ewen, Advocacy and Communications Director for RSF North America. This sends a dangerous message to the world’s most authoritarian leaders that blaming the press for publishing false information, when that information is detrimental to a leader’s reputation, is an acceptable tactic. The world’s worst press freedom predators have already imprisoned journalists and bloggers for ‘disseminating false information’.”

Just last week, RSF reported that 6 journalists in Ivory Coast were detained for several days on charges of “publishing false news” and “inciting army personnel to insubordination and rebellion.” The journalists – including three newspaper editors and one publisher – were arrested for reporting that bonuses were paid to members of the army’s special forces who staged a mutiny in the southeastern town of Adiaké. Though they were released on February 14, the charges against them are still pending.

Saudi blogger and co-founder of the “Liberal Saudi Network” Raif Badawi was sentenced in 2014 to 10 years in prison, 1,000 lashes and a 10-year travel ban for “disobeying and breaking allegiance with the sovereign,” “lack of respect for the authorities,” “contempt of court,” “preparing, storing and circulating information that undermines public order,” “inciting rebellion,” and “publishing false information with the aim of harming the state”. The winner of the 2014 RSF Press Freedom Prize in the Netizen category and the European Parliament’s 2015 Sakharov Prize, Badawi has now been detained for more than four years.

The United States ranks 41 out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2016 World Press Freedom Index.

From the US withdrawal from the TPP to the Brexit negotiations, the tide of trade policy is turning towards protectionism. This column outlines how this could create a vicious cycle of lower productivity and closed economies, and what Japan, as the world’s third largest economy, can do to prevent it. A combination of trade and investment liberalisation and inclusive policies will enable all citizens to enjoy the fruits of growth under globalisation.

By Yasuyuki Todo*

New US President Donald Trump has announced the country’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and his intention to impose a heavy tariff on imports from Mexico. A wave of protectionist policies is rising around the world, as evidenced by Britain’s decision to leave the EU and Indonesia’s imposition of export restrictions on raw mining resources. Against this background, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting held on 20 November 2016, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stressed that free trade is the wellspring of growth in the world economy, and expressed his opinion that protectionism should be opposed by economic policies that promote inclusive growth.

A great deal of empirical research supports Abe’s contention that free trade promotes economic growth. This is not merely because free trade leads industries with a comparative advantage to efficient production, as David Ricardo claimed. Engaging with overseas ‘outsiders’ via trade enables domestic businesses to absorb new knowledge, which promotes innovation.

The development of Silicon Valley is a good example showing the role of ‘outsiders’, or immigrants, most notably Indians and Chinese, in innovation (Saxenian 2002). Keller and Yeaple (2009) shows that the US firms’ productivity improves substantially due to knowledge spillovers from inflows of foreign direct investment and imports. My own estimates, taking into consideration the effect of knowledge diffusion from abroad on innovation, indicate that the TPP had the potential to boost Japan’s per capita GDP by 1.5% (Todo 2013).

But because establishing and sustaining ties with outsiders entails costs, individuals and corporate networks tend to remain closed. New knowledge does not flow into a closed economy, and the economy becomes stagnant. Then, it can be the case that people seek the cause of this situation in outsiders, for example, in imports or capital flows from overseas, with the result that the economy becomes even more closed. If this situation of network closure and economic stagnation sparks a vicious cycle, it will be difficult to correct the increasing depth of economic insularity. History shows us that this situation on a global scale led to the formation of economic blocs in the 1930s, eventually triggering the start of WWII.

It is essential that both President Trump’s protectionism policies and Brexit do not initiate a vicious cycle that leads to this type of chaos. As Japan is still the third largest economy in the world, it is expected to play the vital role of preventing this direction.

To do so, however, Japan itself must become more open. During the presidential campaign, Trump declared that the TPP was unfair because it would lower US tariffs on Japanese automobiles, while Japan’s tariffs on US beef would remain in place (Tanaka 2016). This is not a wholly misguided argument. As a result of Japan’s establishment of ‘sanctuaries’ during the TPP negotiations, import barriers for products including rice, dairy products and meat were to remain.

In fact, the benefits of the TPP to the US were not particularly large. According to Gilbert et al. (2016), US GDP would only increase by 0.02% as a result of the TPP as it was agreed upon. Compared to estimated increases of 0.3% for Japan and 1.6% for Malaysia, the benefits to be reaped by the US were very small.

This is because while US agricultural production would increase, production in industries like textiles and automobiles would decline. The widespread support for Trump, an opponent of the TPP, can be understood as the result of dissatisfaction with the idea that the agreement would take jobs from US manufacturers, and that the majority of US citizens would not adequately benefit from it.

Thus, to convince President Trump of the benefits from free trade agreements, Japan must liberalise trade in agriculture more (and at the same time, the US must liberalise trade in manufacturing more to create win-win situations). Politically speaking, the liberalisation of the industries that have been protected so far as sanctuaries will not be an easy matter. Naturally, the people involved in the protected industries are opposed to liberalisation. But as already noted, the liberalisation of trade and investment between Japan and the US will considerably boost Japanese and US GDP as a whole. Therefore, if liberalisation of trade and investment is associated with inclusive policies such as redistribution of income, it would be more than possible for all Japanese and US citizens to enjoy these benefits brought by the liberalisation.

But these inclusive policies must not involve protectionism. Protectionist policies, such as those to protect particular industries like agriculture in Japan and the automobile sector in the US, could dampen incentives for producers and cause economic stagnation, cancelling out the benefits of trade and investment liberalisation. For example, because the Japanese government currently restricts transactions in and entries to agriculture, Japanese agriculture is extremely unproductive (Fukao and Miyagawa 2007). Instead, the provision of a fixed amount of subsidies to farmers for specific periods would enable the redistribution of income in a manner that would not rob farmers of the incentive to engage in productivity improvements, making Japanese agriculture internationally competitive in the medium term.

Policies that support the establishment of a diverse range of ties are also inclusive. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and micro-enterprises lack the manpower and the information required to establish connections with outsiders including foreign partners. Support from the government for the provision of information, or for business networking in order to assist SMEs in expanding sales channels overseas, and engaging in innovation can ensure that the benefits of liberalisation extend to every area of the economy.

The combination of trade and investment liberalisation and inclusive policies will enable all citizens to enjoy the fruits of growth under globalisation. Hopefully, Japan and the Abe administration will take a lead in implementing such policies in order to prevent the destruction of the world economy due to protectionism.

Editor’s note: This is the updated version of a column which first appeared on RIETI’s website in November 2016.

About the author:
* Yasuyuki Todo, Professor in the Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University

References:
Fukao, K, and T Miyagawa (2007), “Productivity in Japan, the US, and the Major EU Economies: Is Japan Falling Behind?”, RIETI Discussion Paper Series, 07-E-046.

Gilbert, J, T Furusawa, and R Scollay (2016), “The economic impact of Trans-Pacific partnership: What have we learned from CGE simulation?”, Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade, Working Paper no. 157.

Keller, W, and S R Yeaple (2009), “Multinational Enterprises, International Trade, and Productivity Growth: Firm-Level Evidence from the United States”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, (91) 4, 821-831.

Saxenian, A-L (2002), “Silicon Valley’s New Immigrant High-Growth Entrepreneurs”, Economic Development Quarterly, 16 (1).

Tanaka, H (2016), “Trump and the future of the US–Japan alliance”, East Asia Insights, 11 (2), July.

Todo, Y (2013), “Estimating the TPP’s Expected Growth Effects”, RIETI Policy Update, no. 048, April.

Ralph Fiennes will direct The White Crow, a biopic of Russian dancer Rudolf Nureyev, The Hollywood Reporter reveals.

The new project by Fiennes, whose previous directorial efforts are Coriolanus and The Invisible Woman, will be based on Julie Kavanagh’s book Rudolf Nureyev: The Life.

David Hare, nominated for Oscars in the best screenplay category for The Hours and The Reader, will write the script.

The White Crow is being developed by the BBC Films and produced by Oscar-nominated Gabrielle Tana through Magnolia Mae Productions, with Francois Ivernel through the French branch of his company Montebello Productions.

“This is a story of an uncompromising spirit, of homeland and ideologies that restrict, and of friendship,” said Fiennes. “It is equally, a tale about the life and ballet culture he left behind in Russia.”

Russian dancer Oleg Ivenko will play the lead alongside Adele Exarchopoulos (Blue Is the Warmest Color) as Clara Saint, a French woman who assisted Nureyev’s defection from the Soviet Union.

Russian dancer Sergei Polunin and actress Chulpan Khamatova are also joining the cast.

Production is set to begin in the summer, with shooting on location in St. Petersburg and Paris.

Crop breeders grow thousands of potential varieties at a time; until now, observations of key traits were made by hand. In a new study, unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, were used successfully to remotely evaluate and predict soybean maturity timing in tests of potential varieties. The use of drones for this purpose could substantially reduce the man-hours needed to evaluate new crops.

When plant breeders develop new crop varieties, they grow up a lot of plants and they all need to be checked. Repeatedly.

“Farmers might have a 100-acre field planted with one soybean variety, whereas breeders may have 10,000 potential varieties planted on one 10-acre field. The farmer can fairly quickly determine whether the single variety in a field is ready to be harvested. However, breeders have to walk through research fields several times in the fall to determine the date when each potential variety matures,” explained University of Illinois soybean breeder Brian Diers.

“We have to check every three days,” masters student Nathan Schmitz added. “It takes a good amount of time during a busy part of the year. Sometimes it’s really hot, sometimes really muddy.”

To make things easier, an interdisciplinary team including breeders, computer scientists, engineers, and geographic information specialists turned to unmanned aerial vehicles – commonly known as UAVs or drones.

“When drones became available, we asked ourselves how we could apply this new technology to breeding. For this first attempt, we tried to do a couple simple things,” Diers said.

One goal was to predict the timing of pod maturity using images from a camera attached to the drone, along with sophisticated data and image analysis techniques. “We used multi-spectral images,” Schmitz explained. “We set up an equation in the program to pick up changes in the light frequency reflected off the plant. That color change is how we differentiate a mature plant from an immature one.”

The researchers developed an algorithm to compare images from the drone with pod maturity data measured the old-fashioned way, by walking the fields. “Our maturity predictions with the drone were very close to what we recorded while walking through the fields,” Diers noted.

Predictions made by the model achieved 93 percent accuracy, but Diers said they might have done even better without some of the inherent limitations of flying drones. For example, they could only fly it and obtain good images on sunny days with little wind.

Drones are increasingly recognized for their potential to improve efficiency and precision in agriculture—especially after new FAA rules went into effect in August 2016—but this is one of the first studies to use drones to optimize breeding practices. Diers notes that the application could be particularly useful to large breeding companies, which test hundreds of thousands of potential varieties annually. If breeders can save time and effort using this technology, new varieties could potentially be developed and made available to farmers on a faster timeline—a welcome improvement.

By Ashok Malik

Located in the Sindh town of Sehwan, Lal Shahbaz Qalandar is among Pakistan’s best-regarded Sufi shrines. It is associated in popular culture with the haunting voice of Reshma, the late artiste whose family migrated at Partition from the deserts of Rajasthan to Sindh and who shot to fame as both a devotee of Shahbaz Qalandar and the singer who gave us Dama Dam Mast Qalandar. Ironically many Indians first heard that devotional song not in the voice of Reshma, but of Runa Laila, a Bangladeshi icon, establishing how culture, music and faith link the subcontinent in more ways than we can imagine.

All this makes the terrorist bombing of the Shahbaz Qalandar shrine on 16 February 2017 that much more poignant. It is an act of infamy for which the Islamic State (IS), or Daesh as it is known, has claimed responsibility. It has been suggested, correctly, that Daesh’s puritan version of an Islam practised in the medieval desolation of Arabia cannot fathom or sanction divergent and regional practices of Islam, specially in South Asia. As such, targeting a Sufi shrine that is, frankly, beyond just Islamic in its appeal is entirely in keeping with the IS worldview.

Yet, while not discounting IS, it needs to be kept in mind that attacks on Sufi shrines, on Shias, on Ahmediyyas and on forms and modes of subcontinental Islam that are considered “deviant” and “blasphemous” by Wahhabi and similar interpretations of the faith are not new in Pakistan. They have been sanctioned and supported by the ideologues of Pakistan, by a state-back religious police, and even by sections of the military.

It is worth recalling that the outrage felt earlier this week was similar to the response to the suicide bombing of the Data Darbar shrine in Lahore in 2010. That shrine too is a landmark in the city and was seen to be above controversy and safe from terror threats. Sufi shrines, Shia mosques, dargahs, and so on have been systematically attacked in the past decade, in Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan.

In fact, one fears for the Hinglaj Mata temple in Las Bela, Balochistan. This is the westernmost of the Shaktipeeths so sacred to Hindus. It is a location that attracts local Muslims too. They associate it with not Shiv and Sati, but with a divine calling going back to before the advent of Islam, but accepted and incorporated even after the embracing of and conversion to Islam. This is a complex reality that unsophisticated, black-and-white zealots can never comprehend.

One need not even discuss here the predicament of Pakistan’s Hindus, Christians or its once-sizeable Jewish community; their story is in another category altogether. Spin doctors in Islamabad argue the challenge comes from the IS. In 2010, when Data Darbar was bombed, there was no IS. The villain then was the Tehreek-e-Taliban or Pakistan Taliban. In recent years, as the IS has strived to gain a foothold in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, it has taken in former Tehreek-e-Taliban cadre. Many militants have changed labels in expectation of better pay and logistics.

Recruitment to the Pakistan Taliban and the fledgling IS, is carried out in the same Pakistani Punjab rural heartland where the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, the anti-Shia Sipah-e-Sahaba, its affiliate the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and the Jaish-e-Mohammed seek to swell their numbers. Of course, each of these groups has different tactical motivations. One may focus on attacking Indian soldiers and civilians in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere, another may prioritise a genocide of Pakistani Shias.

Nevertheless a Sunni supremacism and a distaste for so-called unauthorised rituals in Islam is common to them. Ultimately, the syncretic appeal of a Data Sahib or a Lal Shahbaz Qalandar is antithetical to this jihadist spectrum. As such, rather than inspired by IS actions in Iraq and Syria, the bombing of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar follows a history of state-backed Sunni extremists and state-condoned Sunni militia systemically annihilating supposed “heretics” within Pakistan’s own Muslim community.

The IS has exploited this environment; it has not created it. That toxic atmosphere pre-existed IS and can be traced back to at least the Zia-ul-Haq decade, from which Pakistan has not recovered and perhaps may never recover.

Lashkar and similar militia are loyal to the Pakistani state and usually listen to the generals. Tehreek-e-Taliban and IS fantasise about taking over Islamabad, overthrowing the Pakistani state and building a pan-national Caliphate. The Afghan Taliban sees the Pakistani state as an ally in its effort to recapture Kabul.

Not surprisingly, Islamabad-Rawalpindi have presented IS as beyond the pale and the principal problem, but the Afghan Taliban as part of the solution. As a former Pakistani foreign secretary said at a closed-door conference a few months ago, “Tehreek-e-Taliban and IS are brigands and terrorists. (Afghan) Taliban are Afghan nationalists.” He didn’t bother mentioning Lashkar or its parent, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa.

Strategically, all these militia are a threat to India. Tactically, IS and/or Tehreek-e-Taliban is a threat to Pakistan. It may one day become a direct threat to India but at the moment, it is Pakistan that is facing the heat. That is why it is using this chance to try and mainstream the Afghan Taliban as “not-so-bad guys” who can help take on the IS.

This is poppycock. Those maverick voices in India urging that the Narendra Modi government to send troops to fight IS should know better. What they are in effect suggesting is that India walk into somebody else’s war, and somebody else’s trap.

This article originally appeared in The Asian Age.

By C. Alexander Ohlers*

(FPRI) — As the U.S.-backed forces in Iraq move to reclaim west Mosul, the Islamic State’s (IS) final territorial stronghold in Iraq, U.S. policymakers are certain that the group will be eradicated, but are uncertain as to what will follow.

As retired U.S. Army General David Petraeus notes: “There is no question that the Islamic State will be defeated in Mosul; the real question is what comes afterward. Can the post-Islamic State effort resolve the squabbling likely to arise over numerous issues and bring lasting stability to one of Iraq’s most diverse and challenging provinces? Failure to do so could lead to ISIS 3.0.[1]”

Accordingly, the Islamic State has executed a string of attacks in Baghdad, including January bombings in the Shiite neighborhood of Sadr City and other parts of Baghdad that killed over fifty-six Iraqis. IS also retains operational units in liberated areas of Anbar province and, in November of last year, used a car bomb to kill seventeen Iraqis attending a wedding in Amiriyah, Al-Fallujah and exploded two car bombs near a government building, killing nine. [2] In Diyala, which is dominated by more extremist Shiite militias, such as the Badr Organization, IS has resurfaced using guerrilla style tactics. More recently, attacks have taken place in Ramadi, Tikrit, Samarra, Kirkuk, Najaf, and elsewhere. While many IS attacks may be attempts to divert resources from the campaign to retake Mosul and create political turmoil in Baghdad, they also demonstrate the potential for a residual insurgent movement. As stated by Iraqi parliament Speaker Salim al-Jabouri, the Islamic State “will not follow the same tactic once defeated in Mosul and will seek to reinvent itself to produce a new generation of terrorists with the ability to cope with the post-defeat phase and meet the resulting challenges.”[3]

Other groups could also rise after the liberation of Mosul. Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia (JRTN), for example, is a less ideologically extreme Iraqi insurgent group that was formed in 2006 to challenge the U.S. occupation and thereafter opposed the Nouri al-Maliki government and Iranian influence in Iraq. JRTN allied itself with the Islamic State until disagreements and conflicts between the two groups forced JRTN into hiding in 2015. If the Islamic State is weakened, defeated, or no longer controls territory in Iraq, JRTN and other similar groups may emerge as a less extreme resistance to perceived Shiite and Iranian aggression.[4] At the same time, the proliferation of Iranian-backed militia groups and the presence of Turkish troops and Sunni militias in Iraq could foment intra- and inter-sectarian fighting or even regional Sunni-Shia proxy conflicts.

Post-conflict destabilization redux

As is currently the case in Iraq, post-conflict stabilization can pose a greater challenge than the main conflict.[5] The United States and NATO, for example, expelled the Taliban in Afghanistan in less than a year, only to face an extended counterinsurgency and state-building endeavor that marks the longest war in U.S. history. Similarly, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq overthrew Saddam Hussein in a period of months, but precipitated an arduous counterinsurgency and state-building project that lasted almost a decade. In Libya, NATO air support enabled rebels to successfully remove Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi, but left the country in disarray. Hence, as forces armed by the United States and the wider Global Coalition to Counter ISIL (Coalition) defeat the Islamic State as a territorial insurgency in Iraq, it is critical to understand what causes this “destabilization redux” and what strategic measures might generate stability.

A couple of factors help to explain the specter of post-conflict destabilization in modern warfare. First, as expounded upon by many theorists, the overall capabilities of insurgencies have been growing through advancing methods (in part through technology) and increasing integration into transnational networks. Transnational insurgent networks can involve outside states, non-state actors, and criminal organizations that expand the resources and scope of insurgent groups and intensify the threat of internal armed conflicts or internationalized internal armed conflicts. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, for example, al-Qaeda in Iraq generated funds through outside actors and international criminal networks and quantities of foreign fighters from regional states, while Shiite militias, although engaged in less prolific networks, received support from Iran. [6] More recently, the Islamic State has benefited from regional and international streams of fighters and illicit funds, and subsequent insurgencies in Iraq will likely utilize transnational networks and could even again involve al-Qaeda.

A second and less discussed cause of post-conflict stabilization is that outside states are increasingly “delegating,” or “outsourcing,” combat to local groups. Tactics of outsourcing seek to reduce the costs, risk, and casualties incurred by an outside state or states, while also benefiting from the knowledge and legitimacy of local groups.[7] In what Jeffery Record refers to as the “new American way of warfare,” foreign interventions by larger states often outsource ground operations to local surrogates while providing air power, training, intelligence, and other support, and may even contribute troops.[8] In Afghanistan, for example, Operation Enduring Freedom partnered with a loose affiliation of warlords, or the Northern Alliance, and the 2011 NATO-led coalition provided air support to rebel forces in the Libyan civil war. Similarly, the current Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq allies with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Kurdish forces, and other groups on the ground to liberate areas from the Islamic State.

One of the drawbacks of outsourcing is that it forfeits some portion of control to local groups whose skills and interests may not align with those of the outside actors. As a result, outside states generally must apply influence over local actors or concede certain objectives. Additionally, outsourcing to local surrogates will likely empower those same groups after the conflict. During the 2001 U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, for example, the warlords of the Northern Alliance that helped overthrow the Taliban were later instituted into the government and nation-building project that followed. Although certain local actors may be effective in defeating a common enemy, they may be incapable or inimical regarding the task of stabilization. At the same time, the leverage gained from exogenous military support often diminishes after the critical conflict phase. Hence, as Record noted in 2002, “our new way of warfare may be of limited value in situations requiring the conquest, occupation, and administration of territory.”[9]

As such, conflicts that outsource to local actors in unstable terrain must design strategies that incorporate the short-term objectives of the initial conflict (e.g. liberation from the Islamic State) with long-term goals (e.g. inclusive governance and security). First, outside states should attempt to identify and support local surrogates and political actors that have similar interests (or that can be influenced during and after the initial conflict). Developing such a force may increase the required costs and risks to an outside state or states before and during the initial conflict, but can raise the likelihood of a successful stabilization agenda. Second, a post-conflict plan for governance and security is best established prior to the conflict and made a condition of exogenous support. Such planning helps to abate post-conflict power competitions (as was the case after the overthrow of the Qaddafi regime in Libya) and also lays the groundwork for reprisals if some actors attempt to renege. Finally, the formulation of a pre-established framework for post-conflict security and (if necessary) reconstruction can calm domestic strife and extend the influence of outside states into the post-conflict theater.

In Iraq, the U.S. strategy remains centered on the short-term and narrow objective of defeating the Islamic State as a territorial insurgency but does not sufficiently address long-term goals of post-conflict stabilization. In particular, policymakers have not leveraged their external support in Iraq to enforce the development of a stable security force, promote essential political inclusion and reforms, or establish sufficient post-IS stabilization and reconstruction plans. As a result, there is a heightened risk that a successful territorial defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq will be followed by fighting between armed groups and a potential guerrilla insurgency.

Local partners in Iraq

We don’t want Sunni tribes armed, Shiites armed, because the second day after liberation you will see inter-Sunni fight, inter-Shiite fight, Sunni-Shiite fight, everyone will be fighting each other. You have to institutionalize and this is the job of the government who refused to listen to us (former deputy prime minister and former finance minister of Iraq Rafe al-Essawi, 2016).[10]

This multiplex of forces is cooperating reasonably well in the fight against the Islamic State, but lacks the necessary structure to avoid post-conflict volatility. First, while Shiite groups are well represented within Iraqi Security Forces and the Popular Mobilization Front, and Kurds retain local security as a semi-independent region, Sunnis are vulnerable to outside groups. In the case of Iraqi Security Forces, the once more inclusive security apparatus has been transformed into a more sectarian force since the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 2011. Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki replaced competent leaders with political cronies, marginalized the Sons of Iraq (Al-Sahwa or Awakening Councils)­­, which consisted of groups of Sunni fighters that had fought and nearly defeated al-Qaeda in Iraq, and used the ISF as a sectarian instrument against Sunnis. In Mosul, for example, Michael Knights explains:

From the outset of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s second term, Baghdad tinkered with command and control in Mosul, undoing the reasonably depoliticized security structure that existed until that point. The constant shuffling of commanders destroyed the ISF’s remaining cohesion.^[12]

As such, Iraqi Security Forces are suspect to many non-Shiite groups in the wake of post-IS devastation. Kurdish forces offer an alternative to ISF for post-IS security, but are also viewed by some Sunnis as occupiers. In certain cases, Kurdish forces that hold liberated Sunni areas have been reported by Human Rights Watch to engage in some human rights violations and Kurdish favoritism and have refused to allow some displaced persons to return to liberated areas if they belong to tribes that have cooperated with IS.[13]

While U.S. congressional support for training and advising in Iraq requires the development of Sunni participants, Iraqi Security Forces and the Shiite-led government have been leery of Sunni fighters. Instead, the Iraqi government augments its strength through the predominately Shiite militias of the Popular Mobilization Front. Following a call to arms in 2014 by Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the PMF multiplied to approximately 110,000 fighters by the end of 2016, of which only about 8% are Sunni. The failure to develop moderate Sunni forces within Iraqi security institutions escalates concerns for Sunnis in (or returning to) liberated areas and could engender sectarian clashes and renewed insurgencies under the banner of Sunni resistance. Sunni groups, which were involved in the liberation of Ramadi and Fallujah, are also needed for legitimate post-IS security as well as critical counterinsurgency operations.

Popular Mobilization Front militias differ: less extreme groups, such as the Imam Ali Brigade, Ali al-Akhbar Brigade, and Abbas Division lean more towards Iraqi nationalism; others, such as Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, and the Badr Organization are loyal to Iran and in some cases directed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the more extreme groups are accused of extreme human rights violations. Recently, the Iraqi government has fully legalized the PMF state-sanctioned militia groups (including those engaged in war crimes) as an official, but separate, wing of Iraqi Security Forces, which has paved a path for Sunni groups, such as the Nineveh Guards. In January 2017, the deputy commander of the PMF, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, also confirmed that the Iranian-backed militant Shiite group, Lebanese Hezbollah, was in Iraq with the consent of the Iraqi government. These partially independent groups lack the structure of a fully institutionalized National Guard and could devolve into post-IS power competitions and acts of retribution between and also within sects. Local Sunni groups, for example, have a history of disagreements that may be further polarized by recent tribal cooperation or resistance to the Islamic State, and there are divergent loyalties within the expansive Popular Mobilization Front militias.

Furthermore, the integration of Iranian-supported PMF units and, to a lesser extent, Turkish-backed Sunni militias, misaligns Iraqi security with those of outside states. Although PMF groups are officially under the authority of Iraq, National Security Advisor Faleh al-Fayad’s relationship with PMF leaders is more that of coordination.[14] Similarly, the Nineveh Guards are trained and supported by Turkey and headed by former Nineveh governor Atheel al-Nujaifi, who has an arrest warrant from Baghdad for collaboration with Turkey and the facilitation of Turkish troops in Iraq. These outside state ties threaten to advance Iran’s influence in Iraq, engender fears that Iraq is becoming an Iranian client state, interpose Turkish interests in Iraqi security, and could even cultivate Sunni-Shiite proxy conflicts.

Iraqi political progress

We do not have the ability to simply solve this problem by sending in tens of thousands of troops and committing the kinds of blood and treasure that has already been expended in Iraq. Ultimately this is something that is going to have to be solved by the Iraqis (President Barak Obama, 2014).[15]

The rise of the Islamic State in Iraq can be largely attributed to divisive politics, which, if unaddressed, could again incubate violence and instability. The degeneration of Iraqi politics began after the Iraqi 2010 national election rendered a narrow victory for Iraqiyya, a moderate Sunni and Shiite alliance, over Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition. The election was followed by a nine-month negotiation in which Maliki, supported by Iran, maintained power while attempting to form a government, and eventually agreed to a power-sharing arrangement under the Erbil agreement and retained his position as prime minister. Maliki later reneged on the power-sharing accords and instead centralized control of Iraqi institutions, engaged in sectarian abuses against Sunnis, and forced key Sunni leaders into exile.[16]

Prime Minister Maliki was succeeded by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi in 2014 with the political support of Iran and the United States. The shift marked a point of significant improvement that was viewed by the U.S. administration as a sufficient sign of political progress to initiate Operation Inherent Resolve. As such, the U.S. administration has taken a position of limited involvement in Iraqi politics and the promotion of political inclusion and reforms.

Abadi’s premiership initially appeared promising. Following a humiliating defeat in Saqlawiya, Anbar in 2014, in which the Islamic State surrounded Iraqi Security Forces, Abadi removed two Maliki loyalists, General Abboud Qanbar and General Ali Ghaidan, that were culpable of using ISF as a sectarian instrument. Later, the prime minister abolished the Office of Commander-in-Chief, an office instated by Maliki to centralize his power over the military. Additionally, after demonstrators protested a lack of basic services and excesses of corruption in 2015, Abadi pursued several reforms. For example, he moved to abolish the offices of three vice president posts, including that of former Prime Minister Maliki; institute anti-corruption initiatives, such as curtailing payments to ISF members that were not performing service; and replace Iraqi politically-aligned ministers with technocrats. He also supported the development of a National Guard law to enable groups similar to the former Sons of Iraq that fought against the Islamic State’s predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Many of Abadi’s reforms, however, have not succeeded and have instead been used by adversaries to undermine his power and counteract political reconciliation. In November 2015, the parliament voted to restrict Abadi’s powers to enact reforms. A year later the Federal Supreme Court of Iraq overturned his attempt to eliminate the vice presidential posts. In May 2016, Muqtada al-Sadr, head of the Sadrist Movement and the Saraya al-Salam militia, organized a protest following a failed attempt by the Council of Representatives to replace ministers from political parties with technocrats. Sadr’s supporters overran the Green Zone in Baghdad, Iraq’s political center, and entered the parliament building. Additionally, former Prime Minister Maliki organized the Reform Front: a political block of about one hundred representatives. The group led the Council of Representatives to impeach Abadi’s Sunni Defence Minister and key supporter, Khaled al-Obeidi, over corruption allegations, and later to withdraw confidence from Abadi’s Finance Minister, Hoshyar Zebari.

As Abadi’s power weakens, there is an increasing risk of a “no confidence” vote in the Council of Representatives, which threatens to empower, and possibly reinstate, a resurging Nouri al-Maliki. Abadi’s National Guard law has also been eclipsed by the formal integration of Shiite and even Iranian-backed PMF militias, which arouse Sunni fears of a repeat of former political marginalization and sectarian security. There are also concerns over expanding influence from Iran, which has interfered in the past three elections and may be consolidating its political support in Iraq in anticipation of post-IS power competitions.[17]

Iraqi political discord is also parlous to stability the day after Mosul’s liberation. Iraq’s leaders have not finalized a definitive framework for security, governance, and decentralization after the Islamic State. For example, Shiite leaders in Baghdad prefer to retain Nineveh, the home of Mosul, as a province and delegate greater local control; the President of the Kurdistan region in Iraq, Massoud Barzani, has proposed partitioning Nineveh into three separate provinces that may independently choose to align with Baghdad or the Kurdish region; and Atheel Nujaifi, the former governor of Nineveh and leader of the Nineveh Guards, supports the creation of a separate region for Nineveh. Additionally, Kurdish forces have reclaimed and hold disputed territories in Iraq while, at the same time, some Kurdish leaders call for independence.

Post-Islamic State planning

Since August, more than 200 United Nations programs have ceased operations in Iraq because of funding shortfalls in the 2016 U.N. Humanitarian Response Plan. The cost of humanitarian operations in Iraq in 2017 will climb still higher, reflecting the potential for a rise in the number of Iraq’s internally-displaced population as a result of the intensified conflict (Office of the Spokesperson for the Small Group of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, 2016).[18]

Iraq’s devastated post-IS territories, destroyed infrastructure, and lack of essential services threaten to breed animosity and violence. As much as 80% of Ramadi was in ruins when liberated in 2015, and some estimates for its reconstruction are as high as $10 billion. The deputy governor of Anbar province, which contains both Ramadi and Fallujah, predicts that $22 billion will be required for reconstruction. The costs for Mosul are uncertain, but some estimates are in the tens of billions of dollars. The number of internally displaced Iraqis also rose to over three million in January 2017, representing escalating humanitarian costs, and in 2016, the United Nations estimated that over $100 million would be needed for demining over the course of one year. At the same time, civil war and declining oil prices have left Iraq with an estimated deficit close to $20 billion for 2017.[19]

Although stabilization and reconstruction costs are expected to be daunting, the U.S. administration’s nine lines of effort under its Strategy to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) does not include post-conflict stabilization.[20] The existing international efforts to provide stabilization include a group of over twenty nations under the Coalition Working Group on Stabilization (CWGS) within the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. The CWGS primarily raises funds for two autonomous U.N. Development Program (UNDP) stabilization channels: 1) the Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization (FFIS) to address the immediate post-liberation needs of populations; and, 2) the Funding Facility for Expanded Stabilization (FFES), which will attempt to restore Iraqi institutions and infrastructure. Thus far, the international community has pledged over $2.3 billion to Iraq, the majority of which was allocated to immediate stabilization and demining; however, significantly more resources will be required to meet the needs of displaced Iraqis and returnees that lack basic infrastructure and essential services.

Conclusion

Modern tactics of foreign intervention are increasingly outsourcing ground operations to local partners while, in many cases, there is often an increased threat of internal uprisings and transnational insurgent movements. As such, many U.S.-led conflicts, such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, have succeeded in the main conflict, but were followed by post-conflict destabilization. Hence, changing tactics and circumstances require new approaches to foster long-term stability. These strategies should design the conflict and post-conflict phases in tandem to formulate a coordinated long-term strategy and employ methods to extend outside state(s) influence and succor beyond the initial conflict phase. In Iraq, the U.S.-led coalition should address three main areas.

First, military and economic support should be conditioned on the establishment of a cohesive and multi-sectarian force, the development of an institutionalized National Guard that incorporates Sunni forces, and illegalization of unauthorized or independent militia groups. The United States should also establish a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to extend Combined Joint Task Force–Oper­ation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR). The extension of forces will temper concerns of post-IS sectarian strife, allow a multinational force to promote stability by training and advising Iraqi forces, and further extend the Coalition’s influence in the critical post-conflict stabilization period.

Second, as Congressman Seth Moulton, a veteran of Operation Enduring Freedom in Iraq,  stated at the U.S. Institute for Peace: “Iraq is dependent on American weapons to fight ISIS, and that leverage should be used to demand political reform as a stepping-stone to long-term stability.”[21] Political influence could include strengthening the current government; supporting critical political and institutional reforms; promoting the reintegration of Sunnis into Iraq’s political system (pressure could even be applied to the goal of reinstating exiled leaders); and resisting and counterbalancing Iranian influence in Iraq.

Finally, the United States should include post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction in its lines of efforts. Through this mechanism, the U.S. and its Coalition partners should work with the government of Iraq to resolve issues of decentralization, governance, security, and territorial control and establish a comprehensive economic and reconstruction plan. Furthermore, U.S. and Coalition partner funds for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction would be best implemented by the U.S.-led Coalition and not channeled separately through an autonomous international body; this will enable the United States and its partners to build upon leverage already gained through military support and extend its influence into the post-conflict stage.

About the author:
*C. Alexander Ohlers, Ph.D. specializes in warfare and politics with a focus on transnational insurgent movements. He is also a former Senior Analyst and diplomatic liaison for the U.S. Department of State in Baghdad, Iraq, under the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office, and holds a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI.

Notes:
[1] David Petraeus, “David Petraeus Op-Ed: The Main Challenge in Mosul Won’t Be to Defeat ISIS. It Will Be What Comes After,” The Washington Post, August 15, 2015; ibid.

[2] Mustafa Saadoun, “Is Cells Lurking in Iraq’s Anbar Continue to Strike Liberated Areas,” Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East, November 29, 2016.

[3] Ali Mamouri, “New Generation of Jihadis Poised to Replace Is in Iraq,” ibid., November 2, 2016.

[4] Emily Anagnostos et al. “Anticipating Iraq’s Next Sunni Insurgency.” Institute for the Study of War, 2016 (http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/anticipating-iraq’s-next-sunni-insurgency).

[5] The post-conflict stage here refers to the period after the initial or main conflict, but often involves counterinsurgency operations and armed conflict.

[6] For data on regional foreign fighters in Iraq, see: JH Felter and B Fishman, “Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records,” (West Point, NY: Technical report, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2007).

[7] See: Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and K. Beardsley, “Nosy Neighbors, Third-Party Actors in Central American Conflicts,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 3 (2004); and, Idean Salehyan, “The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations,” ibid.54(2010).

[8] Jeffrey Record, “Collapsed Countries, Casualty Dread, and the New American Way of War,” Parameters 32, no. 2 (2002); see also: “Force-Protection Fetishism,” Aerospace Power Journal 14, no. 2 (2000).

[9] “New American Way of War,” p. 20; also, for a description of the Nothern Alliance in the post-conflict Afghan state, see: Antonio Giustozzi, “‘Good’ State Vs.’Bad”Warlords? A Critique of State-Building Strategies in Afghanistan,” (London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2004).

[10] Ayub Nuri. “Self-Governing Sunni Regions without Baghdad Interference the Only Solution for Iraq.” Interview, October 30, 2016 (http://rudaw.net/english/interview/30102016).

[11] Al Jazeera Media Network, “David Petraeus: Trump Must Prioritise ISIL over Assad,” in Talk to Al Jazeera (November 16, 2016).

[12] Michael Knights. “How to Secure Mosul: Lessons from 2008-2014.” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Reserach Notes 38, October, 2016, p. 2 (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-to-secure-mosul-lessons-from-2008-2014).

[13] “Marked with an “X”: Iraqi Kurdish Forces’ Destruction of Villages, Homes in Conflict with ISIS,” (Human Rights Watch, 2016).

[14] Jack Watling, “The Shia Militias of Iraq,” The Atlantic, December 22, 2016.

[15] “Political Solution Needed in Iraq, Obama Says.” National Public Radio, Morning Edition, June 20, 2014 (http://www.npr.org/2014/06/20/323844570/political-solution-needed-in-iraq-obama-says).

[16] C. Alexander Ohlers, “Iraq’s Insurgency Reinvigorated,” The Majalla: The Leading Arab Magazine December 21, 2013.

[17] Emily Anagnostos. “Iran Positions for Reset in Iraq after Recapture of Mosul.” Institute for the Study of War, 2017 (http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-positions-reset-iraq-after-recapture-mosul).

[18] Office of the Spokesperson. “Joint Statement by the Small Group of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL.” Press Release, April 27, 2016 (http://theglobalcoalition.org/joint-statement-small-group-global-coalition/).

[19] Gregory Aftandilian, “Reconstruction Costs of Damaged Iraqi Cities Another Looming Crisis,” The Arab Weekly, October 23, 2016.

[20] “Fact Sheet: The Administration’s Strategy to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Updated FY 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations Request.” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Nov. 7, 2014 (https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/07/fact-sheet-administration-s-strategy-counter-islamic-state-iraq-and-leva); see also: Hardin Lang and Muath Al Wari, “After Liberation: Assessing Stabilization Efforts in Areas of Iraq Cleared of the Islamic State,” (Center for American Progress, 2016).

[21] Fred Strasser. “Ex-Marine Lawmaker Seeks Diplomatic ‘Surge’ in Iraq.” September 14, 2016 (http://www.usip.org/publications/2016/09/14/ex-marine-lawmaker-seeks-diplomatic-surge-in-iraq).

By Scott Douglas Applegate, Christopher L. Carpenter, and David C. West*

During the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. military delivered a crushing defeat to the Iraqi army in one of the most one-sided battles in history.1 A concept known as net-centric warfare was partially responsible for this victory and marked the first real integration of information technology (IT) into combat systems on a large-scale basis. Net-centric warfare is characterized by the integration of computer and networking technologies into every functional area of operations, which can increase performance, enhance intelligence, and improve efficiencies in order to greatly increase combat power.2 While still in its infancy, net-centric warfare increased commanders’ situational awareness and enhanced their ability to deliver overwhelming combat power to decisive points on the battlefield. However, the pervasive introduction of IT into combat systems has created both opportunities and vulnerabilities. The need to defend or exploit these systems eventually led the Department of Defense (DOD) to designate cyberspace as a new warfighting domain through which combatants are able to conduct a new breed of military operations.

Just as planners must characterize the operational environment in the physical domains, cyberspace operators and planners must do so in this new warfighting domain. Defining the operational environment includes identifying critical assets, centers of gravity, avenues of approach, decisive points, and key terrain. Particularly problematic issues such as the misidentification of key terrain in cyberspace, the absence of effective cyberspace doctrine that defines concepts and terms in coordination with the other warfighting domains, and the lack of cyberspace knowledge by operational planners within the joint force have greatly stymied the ability of the U.S. military to operate effectively in this domain. To do so, the military must create a common lexicon and clarify the concepts and processes of identifying key terrain in cyberspace within joint doctrine.

Background

Cyberspace is different from the physical warfighting domains of land, sea, air, and space. It is a nonphysical realm consisting of the interdependent networks of IT infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems and embedded processors, controllers, and even the individuals who interact with these systems.3 It is home to a new kind of warfare that seeks to disrupt, deny, degrade, distort, or destroy the information and/or systems necessary to employ military power in the physical domains. As IT creates a more interconnected world, operations in cyberspace are shifting from a secondary defensive role to an alternate means of applying military power parallel to or in conjunction with the other warfighting domains. A new battlespace is emerging where attribution is difficult and the players range from nation-states and military commands to criminal organizations and lone operators. The relatively low cost of entry to this battlespace compared to the physical warfighting domains can allow small nation-states and even nonstate actors to compete. Additionally, cyberspace operations (CO) asymmetrically favor the attacker. Defenders must secure their entire infrastructure and every system, whereas an adversary need only find a single weakness in a target’s defenses to employ cyberspace effects.

CO can deliver unique capabilities and combat power through cyberspace, but the U.S. military does not act in a unified manner when conducting these operations, especially when acting in concert with other warfighting functions.4 The U.S. military concentrates offensive efforts under U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), while Defensive Cyberspace Operations are spread at echelon between the Defense Information Systems Agency and the Services’ chains of command.5 This dispersed responsibility requires coordination in order to be successful, but the inability to identify key terrain in cyberspace and the lack of mature joint cyberspace doctrine create gaps, redundancies, and confusion between the Services and across the different echelons of command. Ultimately, the absence of a common CO lexicon and multiple interpretations of operational concepts lead to a waste of resources and an overall degraded operational posture in cyberspace. We now turn to an examination of overlooked and misunderstood aspects of cyberspace operations.

Previous Efforts to Identify Key Terrain in Cyberspace

Numerous researchers, planners, and practitioners have attempted to define cyber key terrain in cyberspace as the military has increasingly integrated cyberspace into its operations over the last three decades. These previous efforts suffered from three key flaws or omissions in their methodologies. First, in almost every case, the researchers focused on what items should be considered key terrain rather than on how to identify key terrain in a contextual manner. Second, previous efforts omitted the planning concepts of objective and mission, which are essential to identifying key terrain for a military operation. Finally, these efforts often confused or misidentified key terrain with critical assets. These flaws left planners struggling to grasp the concept of key terrain in cyberspace and, more importantly, grappling with how to implement this concept in an efficient and effective manner during planning and operations.

The most consistent trend noted across the research efforts to identify key terrain in cyberspace was a desire to create lists of devices, logical constructs, personas, and processes that constitute cyber key terrain. In the article “The Key Terrain of Cyber,” John Mills identifies eight areas of focus in his efforts to define the terrain of cyberspace: data centers, commercial Internet service providers, undersea cables, international standards bodies, basic input/output systems, supply chains, cyber workforce, and innovation. Mills identifies all of these focus areas as key terrain, which leaves the reader with the impression all terrain is key.6 In the article “Key Terrain in Cyberspace: Seeking the High Ground,” the authors argue that key terrain exists in the geographic, physical, logical, cyber-persona, and supervisory planes of cyberspace. Furthermore, the authors define cyber key terrain as systems, devices, protocols, data, software, processes, cyber-personas, or other network entities, the control of which offers a marked advantage to an attacker or defender.7 The problem with these laundry lists of items is that they lack context and leave the reader with the impression, again, that absolutely everything in cyberspace is key terrain. The lists tell a reader what to look at rather than teaching them how to look for key terrain. A planner cannot determine what constitutes key terrain in cyberspace outside the context of the mission and the objectives of that mission.

A critical omission in previous research efforts is the failure to tie key terrain to objectives or missions. Researchers consistently attempt to identify key terrain in a vacuum. Key terrain is only key because it gives an advantage to an attacker or defender in relation to the achievement of mission objectives. Deborah Bodeau, Richard Graubart, and William Heinbockel touch on the need to identify “key cyber terrain, critical assets, or crown jewels” and discuss the importance of context in their 2013 work on the subject. However, they never define that context in terms of specific military missions or mission objectives. Instead, they suggest a series of questions and potential sources for information that planners could use across a variety of topics to identify key terrain.8

The third flaw noted is the lack of a common lexicon and the consistent misuse of doctrinal terms in relation to key terrain in cyberspace. A number of authors use the terms critical assets and key terrain synonymously, implying these terms are interchangeable when they are not. Bodeau, Graubart, and Heinbockel discuss the importance of identifying “key cyber terrain,” yet when they describe their process, they substitute the term critical assets for key terrain and lump together “key terrain, critical assets or crown jewels” as though they have identical meanings.9 IdeaScale, a commercial vendor training DOD Cyber Protection Teams to identify key terrain during their missions, also uses the terms key terrain and crown jewels interchangeably.10 The imprecise use of these terms by academics and trainers implies a lack of understanding of the difference between critical assets and key terrain. DOD defines a critical asset as “a specific entity that is of such extraordinary importance that its incapacitation or destruction would have a very serious, debilitating effect on the ability of a nation to continue to function effectively.”11 There are almost certainly assets in the cyberspace domain that could be defined as critical, and their identification should be prioritized due to the potential impact on national security. However, defining and protecting critical assets should not be confused with identifying key terrain. Understanding how the identification of critical assets shapes the identification of key terrain during a mission is important to the success of our cyberspace planners. This process allows planners to prioritize critical assets, create a Critical Asset List, determine which assets should be defended, develop a Defended Asset List, and then identify key terrain in relation to these assets and mission objectives. Defining these terms and imparting a common understanding to practitioners and planners will better enable the identification of key terrain in the context of mission objectives. To that end, this article provides a list of key joint doctrinal definitions of the relevant terms to the reader (see sidebar).12

Flaws and omissions in previous research efforts imply that planners and practitioners working in cyberspace may lack understanding or knowledge of doctrinal planning processes used in the physical domain. Planners in these other domains, especially Army and Marine Corps planners, have efficient and effective processes for identifying key terrain that are integrated into both the Services’ and the joint planning processes. It is thus important for planners working in cyberspace to understand how these processes are accomplished in the physical warfighting domains. Often, simply removing the cyber concept from complex problems in the cyberspace field leads to better understanding and better solutions to seemingly wicked problems.

Key Terrain in the Physical Domains

It is important to define key terrain and the process for identifying it in the physical domain. One of the best tactical explanations for identifying key terrain can be found in Army Field Manual 3-21, The Infantry Rifle Company. The manual first discusses key terrain in the third step of the company commander’s Troop Leading Procedures (TLP), which is the planning process conducted by tactical-level commanders. The TLP process runs parallel to the higher echelon’s military decisionmaking process. Because company commanders lack a planning staff, the TLP process is tailored to simplify the planning process without missing the necessary steps for mission accomplishment.13

One of the most important aspects for any commander is to understand their operational environment. Army commanders have historically used the acronym OAKOC, which stands for Observation and Fields of Fire, Avenues of Approach, Key Terrain, Observation, and Cover and Concealment, to help in identifying the categories needed to analyze terrain.14 Commanders must understand what terrain is important to their mission accomplishment. Properly identifying key terrain can mean the success or failure of missions at all levels of war. Focusing on the tactical-level doctrine best explains the process of identifying key terrain, as strategic-level doctrine tends to tackle this process too abstractly and assumes a level of understanding that is often absent.

Once commanders are given their mission and begin their analysis to understand the operational environment in which their element will fight, they will naturally focus on certain areas of terrain. A continued analysis will lead the commanders to determining whether there is key terrain to their mission success. The other factors of OAKOC will help commanders gain a better understanding of their environment and will ultimately aid them in their ability to define what terrain is worth fighting to control. The commanders will continue planning but at all times will ensure that they are protecting or dominating the areas that they defined as key. They will tie these pieces of terrain to objectives and task their subordinate elements to ensure that their force owns these areas or a combination of these areas throughout the operation.

Context Matters

When defining key terrain, planners must understand that context matters. Key terrain is situation- and context-dependent, or relative to specific objectives of a given mission. Understanding this point will aid in joint planners’ ability to remain involved throughout the entire Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP). It is important for planners, regardless of function or expertise, to understand where they fit into the planning process. It is equally, if not more, important for planners to be able to transition from strategic and operational to tactical objectives and vice versa.

When planners receive a mission, the planning process begins with gaining an understanding of the operational environment. This step is critical throughout all levels of war, but one can argue that depending on the level at which the operation occurs, the key terrain will be different. The major difference originates in the narrowing scope, span of control, and objectives resident at each level of war: strategic, operational, or tactical.15 Tactical-level operations will identify specific requirements and capabilities needed to achieve their objectives, which are nested under the achievement of the operational and strategic objectives. Although the desired endstates may be similar, if not the same, the objectives will be substantially different as commanders at each level of war focus on objectives within their scope and areas of responsibility and influence. The difference in the objectives at each level of war will result in the identification of different critical assets and key terrain at each level. In many instances, the key terrain identified at the tactical level may be some of the same features identified at the operational level, but tactical-level commanders will always focus on terrain within their areas of operation specifically identified to increase their advantages for mission accomplishment.

Key Terrain Is Key Terrain

The importance of context highlights two key problems in the cyberspace domain. First, there is significant confusion in terminology within the CO community. The definition for key terrain is specifically defined in joint doctrine, but the CO community as a whole has spent a substantial amount of time and effort trying to create a separate definition just for cyberspace. Additionally, there is a tendency to use terms such as critical assets and key terrain interchangeably. Second, there is a tendency to focus on tactical terrain at all levels within the CO community. USCYBERCOM, a subunified command that should arguably be operating at the operational and strategic levels of war, is often focused at the tactical level. The technical complexity and vast size of cyberspace push one to think that key terrain must be more complicated. This leads to a single organization trying to define key terrain across an entire warfighting domain. That belief is flawed and could be simplified if the community focused on specific, mission-related objectives within its span of control. These efforts must be decentralized and pushed down to the appropriate headquarters at each level of war.

Defining key terrain in cyberspace should follow the same doctrinal processes as the identification of key terrain in any of the other warfighting domains. There is no need to create a separate definition for cyber key terrain, as the joint definition for key terrain is adequate and applicable across all domains. Planners at the appropriate levels should seek to identify key terrain in relation to the specific objectives of their missions. This involves developing an understanding of the operational environment, to include the cyberspace aspects of that environment, evaluating terrain from an OAKOC perspective, determining critical assets, and identifying terrain that gives the attackers or defenders a marked advantage in relation to achieving their mission objectives. What makes key terrain key terrain is the context of the feature in relation to mission and objectives. The terrain may be any of the features listed earlier, but it is the context that really matters. Approaching the problem of identifying key terrain in cyberspace from this perspective should help planners at all levels to better understand and frame the problem.

Recommendations

The Joint Chiefs of Staff should add guidance to Joint Publication 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, to assist planners in the identification of key terrain within the context of missions and objectives. This will prevent cyberspace planners from operating in a vacuum and failing to align their operations to the overall mission. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs should consider updating doctrine to emphasize the use of the joint functions to evaluate operations in cyberspace at all levels of planning, just as they do in the physical domains.

A joint lexicon should be immediately established to enable the synchronization of CO across the joint force. This would include updating the definition of the Critical Asset List to include cyberspace threats. A suggested definition is: a prioritized list of assets or areas, normally identified by phase of the operation and approved by the joint force commander, that should be defended against air, missile, and cyberspace threats.

A final recommendation is that CO should be integrated into both the joint education process and JOPP as a standard part of an operations planning team. Cyberspace operations affect all the physical domains and every joint function. Planners must be familiar with the effect that cyberspace consequences can have on their domain and with how the operations in their domain can affect CO. While CO may be a highly technical field, a joint planner only needs to understand the what to look for of CO and not the how to look. When CO is properly represented in the joint planning process, the planning group will rely on its cyberspace planner to determine the how. Only when planners firmly understand the role and potential impact of cyberspace in the planning process can the true value of CO be leveraged.

Conclusion

Although the technology and environment of cyberspace are vastly different from those of the physical domains, the process of identifying key terrain in cyberspace is the same as the process used in the other domains. Cyberspace planners mistakenly try to create a process isolated from the other domains and ignore key integrated planning concepts. Instead, the foundations of JOPP must be used during cyberspace planning and the identification of key terrain to ensure that cyberspace operations are aligned with the objectives throughout the levels of war. While the first inclination of cyberspace operators is to defend everything, the context of the mission should be the driving factor that determines the allocation of efforts and resources.

In addition to adhering to the principles of the planning process, cyberspace operators must have a common lexicon across the joint force. Planners must understand the difference between key terrain and critical assets in order to synchronize efforts between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of planning. They must also realize that key terrain at one level of war may be different from that of another.

The lack of a common CO lexicon and the misidentification of key terrain in cyberspace indicate that the real problem is that the planning process lacks unification and the inclusion of CO representation. The JOPP forces planners to consider the joint functions during plan development but does not go beyond command and control when considering cyberspace. Since cyberspace touches all the joint functions, serious consideration must be given to cyberspace operations to create a truly comprehensive plan. This can only be done if cyberspace operators have a seat at the planning table from beginning to end of the joint planning process.

*About the authors:
Lieutenant Colonel Scott Douglas Applegate, USA, is a Joint Action Officer and Strategic Planner for the Cyber Policy Division, Joint Staff J5. Major Christopher L. Carpenter, USA, is a Joint Staff Officer, J35, United States Forces, Korea. Lieutenant Commander David C. West, USN, is an Information Professional serving as the N6 to Naval Special Warfare Group One.

Source:
This article was published in the Joint Force Quarterly 84, which is published by the National Defense University.

Notes:
1 Frederick W. Kagan, Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy (New York: Encounter Books, 2006).

2 Jeffrey R. Witsken, “Network-Centric Warfare: Implications for Operational Design,” U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2002.

3 Joint Publication (JP) 3-12 (R), Cyberspace Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2010).

4 Ben FitzGerald and Parker Wright, “Decentralizing Cyber Command and Control,” Disruptive Defense Papers, April 2014.

5 Jared Serbu, “U.S. Cyber Command Wants DISA to Take Greater Role in DOD Cyber Defense,” Federal News Radio, May 29, 2014.

6 John R. Mills, “The Key Terrain of Cyber,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, March 23, 2013, 99–107.

7 David Raymond et al., “Key Terrain in Cyberspace: Seeking the High Ground,” 6th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, 2014, Tallinn, Estonia, 287–300, available at <www.westpoint.edu/acc/SiteAssets/SitePages/Publications/06916409.pdf>.

8 Deborah Bodeau, Richard Graubart, and William Heinbockel, “Mapping the Cyber Terrain: Enabling Cyber Defensibility Claims and Hypotheses to Be Stated and Evaluated with Greater Rigor and Utility,” MITRE, February 2014, available at <www.mitre.org/publications/technical-papers/mapping-the-cyber-terrain-enabling-cyber-defensibility-claims-and>.

9 Ibid.

10 IdeaScale, “Design Defense Around Your Mission or Business Cyber Key Terrain,” ACT-IAC Cybersecurity Innovation Initiative, September 2015.

11 JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, November 2010, as amended through February 15, 2016).

12 Ibid.

13 Field Manual 3-21.10 (7-10), The Infantry Rifle Company (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2006).

14 Ibid.

15 George J. Franz, “Effective Synchronization and Integration of Effects Through Cyberspace for the Joint Warfighter,” U.S. Cyber Command, 2012.

Saudia Arabia has reasserted support for a Palestinian state after US President Donald Trump said Middle East peace does not depend on a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Speaking on Monday after talks with his Italian counterpart, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir said: “You have a peace deal which essentially calls for a settlement based on two states living side by side in peace and security.”

He added: “(A) Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and the just settlement of refugees and just sharing water resources. This is the settlement that we believe is a fair and just settlement.”

Trump said last week he could accept a two-state solution or a single-state arrangement if it is agreed upon by all sides. Administration officials later said the US absolutely supports a two-state solution.

Following talks with his Italian counterpart Angelino Alfano, Al-Jubeir pointed to the long history of Saudi-Italian relations.

Both discussed challenges to the Middle East peace process, Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Libya, in addition to the Kingdom’s Vision 2030 and the role Italy may play in this regard.

Meanwhile, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, hosting a visit by his Israeli counterpart, Benjamin Netanyahu, said his country believes in a “two-state solution.”

Lee explained his stand at a joint news briefing with Netanyahu, who does not endorse the two-state approach. Lee said he realizes a two-state solution is difficult to achieve, but said it is the only way to achieve peace.

“We have consistently believed that a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine, however hard to achieve, is the only way to bring peace and security to both peoples,” Lee said.

Netanyahu did not mention tensions in the Middle East in his remarks at the news briefing, after which questions were not allowed.

But afterward, at a state dinner, he said he believes there is an opportunity to seek peace now “because I sense a great change in the Arab world, in many Arab countries, and I hope … to be able to use that newfound attitude toward Israel to help us solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as well.”

By Hassan Ahmadian*

The Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign policy has been subject of many disputes. Some of these disputes have reached a final conclusion and have guided Iranian diplomats in the form of consensual policies. Some other disputes, however, are still far from a domestic consensus despite the fact that they have been underway for a long time. Among age-old disputes in this field is the difference of viewpoints about the country’s interaction preferences in foreign relations. The two sides of this dispute can be summarily explained as such:

The first side is a regionalist group, which gives priority to the policy of détente through interaction with Iran’s neighboring countries, especially its southern neighbors. From the viewpoint of this group, reduction of tensions with neighboring countries is the best way to promote Iran’s regional and international standing. The second group is made up of internationalists who argue that ending international challenges is the best way to improve regional conditions for the Islamic Republic of Iran and its allies. This latter group believes that Arab countries lack necessary independence from the global power structure. There is also a third side, which has been entering this dispute gradually and believes that Iran must work with all sides at the same time. This group can be considered as being committed to multilateralism.

Following election of President Hassan Rouhani, the old dispute among regionalists and internationalists, and this time along with their multilateralist critics, rekindled again. The administration of President Rouhani came up with multilateralist arguments and gave the main priority to working with international community in order to do away with the strategic deadlock, which had surrounded Iran’s nuclear case. However, the output of Rouhani’s foreign policy was by no means multilateral and the nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was an international agreement without any equivalent at the regional level. Therefore, the question is why Rouhani’s multilateralism did not lead to any change in Iran’s relations with Arab countries.

Two major arguments have been given here. Firstly, critical conditions in the region and uncontrollable rivalries between Iran and Saudi Arabia have practically aborted Rouhani administration’s regional discourse and Arab policy. Secondly, in comparison to the administration’s international activities, its presence and plans for the region have not been remarkable as a result of which, it has not acted strongly in this regard. Apart from these two arguments, the negative impact of the tense atmosphere in the Middle East on Iran’s relations with Arab countries has been considered as a basis on which all parties have consensus.

Absence of mutual determination as a necessity factor can be considered as the main impediment to promotion of Iran’s relations with Arabs. There are many reasons for this situation. In fact, Saudi Arabia saw increasing power of Iran in the tense environment of the Middle East as a foreign threat to itself. This issue not only made improvement of bilateral relations very difficult, but also led to a basic change in the model of Iran’s relations with Arabs. According to the old model, when Iran’s relations with international powers moved toward détente, Iran’s relations with Arabs also underwent a period of calm and improvement and vice versa. Rouhani’s tenure was a time for a major change in the old model. In other words, Iran’s agreement with international community and even the United States’ encouragement for improvement of Iran’s relations with Arabs did not convince Riyadh and its Arab allies to move toward “constructive interaction” with Rouhani’s administration. In fact, unlike the past, Arab countries tried more to convince international community that constructive interaction with Iran was very harmful and even dangerous. After Donald Trump was elected as president of the United States, this discourse found its way into the White House and it seems that we must expect similar arguments from some other Western countries as well.

Therefore, in the new period, internationalism cannot be a good solution for doing away with regional challenges that face Iran. The fear that Saudi Arabia has about further increase in Iran’s regional power and possible withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East have been two main pillars of the aforesaid major change in the way that Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies interact with Iran. Of course, the priority given by the Iranian government to internationalism can be defended on the one hand, because Iran had to get out of the strategic deadlock caused by tough sanctions, which were imposed on it as a result of its nuclear program, and that program should have been taken out of the Security Council’s agenda. However, following the JCPOA, further emphasis on internationalism despite continuation of tensions with Arab neighbors cannot be considered in line with Iran’s national interests for a good reason. The reason is that regional issues and the Iranophobic discourse used by Iran’s regional rivals could, and has been relatively able to, undermine economic interests and international potentialities, which have been activated as a result of the JCPOA.

Election of Trump made the impact of the relationship between regional and international developments on Iran’s interests and national security more evident. During the new period, Iran must regulate its foreign policy on the basis of the necessity of reducing tensions in its relations with Arab countries. Doing away with differences with Arab countries is a must, so that, in addition to promoting regional security and stability, any negative impact of regional developments on positive outcomes of the JCPOA and termination of Iran’s strategic deadlock would be reduced. Of course, this does not mean forgetting about constructive interaction with international community and global powers. However, it is important to redefine the relationship that exists between Iran’s regional and international ties under new conditions, which have been brought about by Trump’s rise to power.

The best foreign policy model for Iran in the new period is one, which would consist of multilateralism with a preference for regional relations. In other words, Iran’s multilateral foreign policy has been so far more inclined toward internationalism, but must now tilt more toward regionalism. Adoption of this model will reduce the negative impact of regional tensions and confrontations on Iran’s interaction with international community. In this way, the JCPOA’s positive outcomes would not be affected by Iranophobic policies, especially with regard to economic issues, and Iran can hope to live in a safer region at a lower cost and with more profits.

* Hassan Ahmadian
Ph.D. Senior Researcher; IRI Expediency Council’s Center for Strategic Research (CSR)

By Matthew McCaffrey*

Eugenics has haunted the social sciences for the better part of two centuries. Historically, as a social movement, its most ardent advocates were the progressives, while in economics its most famous champion was John Maynard Keynes. Recently, the history of the eugenics movement has been studied in detail in Thomas Leonard’s masterpiece, Illiberal Reformers: Race, Eugenics, and American Economics in the Progressive Era (you can read a review here, and Leonard’s own survey of the topic here). Yet although the rhetoric of public policy has changed since the heyday of eugenics a century ago, economic policies with eugenic implications persist almost unnoticed in the 21^st century.

It’s no surprise that Mises, an expert on the economics of socialism and interventionism, perceived the evils of this movement, especially its close connection with authoritarianism. In the early 1920s, for example, when Mises was beginning to outline his critique of socialist economic planning, he observed that total state control of the economy also requires control over reproduction:

Without coercive regulation of the growth of population, a socialist community is inconceivable. A socialist community must be in a position to prevent the size of the population from mounting above or falling below certain definite limits… And since in it those motives, which in a society based on private ownership of the means of production harmonize the number of births with the limitations of the means of subsistence, would not exist, it will be obliged to regulate the matter itself. (1951, p. 198)

This regulation manifests as political rule of the private lives of citizens, against their own wishes:

He who would make man the material of a purposeful system of breeding and feeding would arrogate to himself despotic powers and would use his felIow citizens as means for the attainment of his own ends, which differ from those they themselves are aiming at. (1949, p. 244)

Historically, such total reproductive control was a feature of several socialist regimes, including China and Romania. Yet it was not the communists but the fascists who brought the logic of eugenics to its ultimate conclusion:

The Nazi plan was more comprehensive and therefore more pernicious than that of the Marxians. It aimed at abolishing laisser-faire not only in the production of material goods, but no less in the production of men. The Führer was not only the general manager of all industries; he was also the general manager of the breeding-farm intent upon rearing superior men and eliminating inferior stock. A grandiose scheme of eugenics was to be put into effect according to ‘scientific’ principles.

It is vain for the champions of eugenics to protest that they did not mean what the Nazis executed. Eugenics aims at placing some men, backed by the police power, in complete control of human reproduction. It suggests that the methods applied to domestic animals be applied to men. This is precisely what the Nazis tried to do. The only objection which a consistent eugenist can raise is that his own plan differs from that of the Nazi scholars and that he wants to rear another type of men than the Nazis. As every supporter of economic planning aims at the execution of his own plan only, so every advocate of eugenic planning aims at the execution of his own plan and wants himself to act as the breeder of human stock. (1951, p. 581)

Race is a common theme in historical discussions of eugenics. Then as now, supporters of eugenics claim to rest their case on scientific results. As Mises puts it, “The mass slaughters perpetrated in the Nazi horror camps are too horrible to be adequately described by words. But they were the logical and consistent application of doctrines and policies parading as applied science” (1951, pp. 581-582). He repeatedly pointed out the failure of such pseudoscience to distinguish mental and moral characteristics based on race or social status (1944, pp. 170, 172; 1951, p. 324; 1957, p. 336).

Rather than science, eugenics is instead based on the unscientific values of eugenicists themselves, which inevitably imply the need to impose their plans on others:

Such judgments are reasonable if one looks at mankind with the eyes of a breeder intent upon raising a race of men equipped with certain qualities. But society is not a stud-farm operated for the production of a definite type of men. There is no “natural” standard to establish what is desirable and what is undesirable in the biological evolution of man. Any standard chosen is arbitrary, purely subjective… The terms racial improvement and racial degeneration are meaningless when not based on definite plans for the future of mankind. (1949, p. 165)

In others words, central planning implies eugenics, and eugenics in turn is a kind of central planning. And like all central planning, it cannot ultimately succeed, but it can lead society to ruin by removing free choice and the free, innovative minds that go with it: “It is impossible to rear geniuses by eugenics, to train them by schooling, or to organize their activities. But, of course, one can organize society in such a way that no room is left for pioneers and their path-breaking” (1949, p. 140).

Of course, eugenics supporters also claim their plans will improve society by eliminating criminal or other undesirable elements, which they often associate with race and ethnicity. This too is an arbitrary and vain effort to improve the “quality” of humanity:

The eugenists pretend that they want to eliminate criminal individuals. But the qualification of a man as a criminal depends upon the prevailing laws of the country and varies with the change in social and political ideologies… Whom do the eugenists want to eliminate, Brutus or Caesar? Both violated the laws of their country. If eighteenth-century eugenists had prevented alcohol addicts from generating children, their planning would have eliminated Beethoven. (1951, p. 581)

Today, policies are rarely labelled as eugenics-based. Nevertheless, eugenic effects are among the many terrible consequences of interventionist policies. The minimum wage is a useful example. Historically, it was a favorite policy of progressives, who freely admitted that its purpose was to prevent immigrants and other “unemployables” from competing in the job market, the better to manage their reproduction (Leonard, 2005, pp. 212-215). Even though today many of its advocates are unaware of this history, these laws still selectively victimize groups based on factors like race and ethnicity.

Importantly, eugenics is only one consequence of illiberal ideology. Throughout his career, Mises explained that other weapons of illiberalism, including racism, nationalism, protectionism, and war are all related, and mutually reinforce each other. Eugenics is simply one implication of these ideas, especially inasmuch as it fuels and results from economic intervention.

Given the implications for liberty and economy, it’s astonishing that anyone associated with the ideas of liberty could embrace eugenics, or treat eugenicists as legitimate scholars worthy of attention and debate. It’s doubly unfortunate that there is a need to point out that eugenicists, racists, nationalists, and protectionists are no friends of Mises or his ideas, the liberal tradition, or the Austrian school.

About the author:
*Matt McCaffrey is assistant professor of enterprise at the University of Manchester.

Source:
This article was published by the MISES Institute

By Mitchell Blatt*

Milo Yiannopoulos’s brief history as an invited speaker to the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) lasted less than a week. Given that Yiannopoulos is who he is, an attention seeker and an expert at victimization politics, he is sure to try to turn this into a discussion about free speech.

But make no mistake: This is no war on free speech, and it is nothing like the violence at Berkeley, which caused his speech to be shut down, or other attempts by anti-free speech radicals to silence invited speakers through intimidation or disruption.

CPAC, given that they are putting on the event, makes the decision over who it invites, and CPAC attendees decide whether to purchase a ticket or not. Even before videos of Yiannopoulos praising the potential of relationships between older men and minor children went viral, many conservatives were disappointed with the decision to invite Yiannopoulos, which was reportedly not made with the full approval of the CPAC board. CPAC, after all, is a “conservative” event, and Yiannopoulos offers no deep insight into conservative thought–or much of anything besides showmanship.

Free speech does not imply inviting anyone and everyone to give a speech. After all, CPAC had not extended invitations to Black Lives Matter activists, Lena Dunham, Barack Obama, Bernie Sanders, DeRay Mckesson, Shaun King, Brianna Wu, Anita Sarkeesian, or any other identity politics-supporting left-wingers.

They don’t have to extend invitations to anyone and everyone. CPAC, like the College Republicans, is a private group with its own viewpoints and agenda. In the past, CPAC has barred conservative-affiliated groups from being cosponsors for ideological disagreements (GOProud for its support of gay rights) and because of their radicalism (the John Birch Society). Those decisions can be debated, but its well within CPAC’s right to make them.

That many of their attendees and sponsors didn’t want to hear Yiannopoulos speak anymore than they wanted to hear DeAndre “Soulja Boy” Cortez Way speak doesn’t make them opponents of free speech–just people with values. In the end, the market place of ideas (and of money–CPAC sells tickets) determined Yiannopoulos’s fate.

About the author:
*Mitchell Blatt moved to China in 2012, and since then he has traveled and written about politics and culture throughout Asia. A writer and journalist, based in China, he is the lead author of Panda Guides Hong Kong guidebook and a contributor to outlets including The Federalist, China.org.cn, The Daily Caller, and Vagabond Journey. Fluent in Chinese, he has lived and traveled in Asia for three years, blogging about his travels at ChinaTravelWriter.com. You can follow him on Twitter at @MitchBlatt.

China says it respects the principles of freedom of navigation and overflight, but “opposes” when other states undermine its sovereignty using this pretext. The statement comes after a US aircraft carrier group began patrols in disputed South China Sea waters.

“China always respects the freedom of navigation and overflight all countries enjoy under international law,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said at a daily news briefing on Monday, as cited by Reuters.

“But we are consistently opposed to relevant countries threatening and damaging the sovereignty and security of littoral countries under the flag of freedom of navigation and overflight. We hope relevant countries can do more to safeguard regional peace and stability,” the spokesman said.

The statement was China’s first official comment on the latest US patrol mission. The US Navy made the announcement on its website last Saturday, stating that the strike group, including Nimitz-class aircraft carrier ‘USS Carl Vinson’, together with aircraft from the ‘Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 2’, and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer ‘USS Wayne E. Meyer’ started “routine operations” in the South China Sea.

The deployment came a day after China completed war games with an aircraft carrier in the disputed waters and less than a week after Beijing issued a stern warning for the US to stay away from the area, stating that “China has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and their adjacent waters.”

The US last conducted a similar freedom of navigation operation in the area in October, when it sailed the guided-missile destroyer ‘USS Decatur’ near the Paracel Islands, which are under Chinese control.

China slammed the October operation as “illegal” and “provocative,” but US officials denied wrongdoing, stating that America was exercising its right to sail through international waters.

Beijing has laid claim to nearly all of the resource-rich South China Sea, through which some $5 trillion worth of trade passes each year.

Yet Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam also claim parts of the waterway, which have abundant fishing grounds as well as oil and gas deposits.

The Spratly Islands, or Spratlys, comprising more than 750 islets, atolls, and reefs, have also been caught up in the multinational dispute, with the claimants having their own national names for the archipelago.

The United States has repeatedly criticized China’s construction of man-made islands in the Spratly chain as well as the latter’s buildup of military facilities on these islets, voicing concern they could be used to restrict free movement in the area. China has brushed off the criticism, however.

Relations between the two countries were not eased after Donald Trump’s inauguration as president, with both Trump and James Mattis, the new US secretary of defense, vowing to protect main regional ally Japan in any territorial disputes it has with China in the nearby East China Sea.

By Joyce Karam

If ousted former national security adviser (NSA) Gen. Michael Flynn was Russia’s point of contact in the Donald Trump White House — receiving, a week before he resigned, an outside proposal to lift sanctions on Moscow — then he will likely be missed by the Kremlin as his replacement Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, who has fundamentally different views on the issue, takes office.

Unlike Flynn, McMaster, 54, is cautious in reading Russian behavior across Europe and the Middle East. He is also wary of the Iranian role in the region, but does not view it in ideological terms like his predecessor. McMaster is known in military circles for his strategic and critical thinking. He is a believer in smart US counterinsurgency tactics which could be visible in a more aggressive strategy against Daesh.

Respected US army intellectual

In announcing the appointment of McMaster, US President Donald Trump touted that “he is highly respected by everyone in the military and we’re very honored to have him.”

Within the military, McMaster “is one of the few Generals alive who is as highly regarded as (Defense Secretary Gen. James) Mattis,” said Tobias Schneider, a defense analyst based in Washington, DC.

McMaster fought in the first Gulf War, and served in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Across his career, he is known for his critical thinking, questioning the performance of the US military leadership during the Vietnam War, and later scrutinizing the post-war planning by former President George W. Bush in Iraq.

His book “Dereliction of Duty” is “an impressive study about the failure of civil-military relations during the Vietnam War and an absolute mainstay for everybody involved in security policy,” Schneider told Arab News. His questioning of the military in both the Vietnam and Iraq wars gives the impression that he would challenge Trump as well.

Schneider described the core argument in his book as “how military experts and national security advisers failed to adequately advise and challenge the president and his team.”

Politically, McMaster is the anti-Flynn in his approach and strategic thinking. He is known to get along and work as a team player, unlike Flynn who was known for being confrontational and was fired from both the Defense Intelligence Agency (2014) and the White House (2017). The team player attributes could help McMaster immensely in a White House reportedly marred by divisions between Trump aides Steven Bannon and Reince Priebus.

In contrast to Flynn, who advocated closer relations with Russia, Schneider sees McMaster as someone who is “conscious of Russia’s threat”. “He is very much aware of Russian machinations in Ukraine (where he spent some time) when he was tasked to develop a counter strategy to Russian ground forces in Eastern Europe,” the expert said.

Writing in the Wall Street Journal last March, McMaster pointed to “isolated Russian, Chinese and Iranian actions” becoming “part of a geopolitical realignment that cuts against US interests.” He cautioned that “US rivals from Europe through the greater Middle East to East Asia are on the move, annexing territory, intimidating allies, and using proxy armies and unconventional forces to challenge the post-World War II political order.”

McMaster saw in Russia’s, China’s and Iran’s actions a test to “America’s willingness to defend its interests and its allies.” He cited “Russia’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of Ukraine, China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, and Iran’s support for terrorist groups and militias across the Middle East” as key examples.

These views set him apart from Flynn’s outlook on Russia as a potential ally against Daesh, and from Trump’s opinions calling the invasion of Ukraine “so smart”. It puts him, however, closer to Mattis and Vice President Mike Pence in countering Russia’s behavior and supporting NATO. On Iran, McMaster is expected to be more strategic in how he addresses its threat, bringing focus back on Iraq, Syria and Yemen in attempting to push back its proxies.

While McMaster was not Trump’s favorite to take the job — which was offered after both Admiral Robert Harward and Gen. David Petraeus declined or “showed no interest” in taking the position — he is seen as less controversial than former ambassador John Bolton, also a former candidate for the role.

McMaster’s appointment marks a departure from Flynn’s short-lived, controversial and rocky tenure at the National Security Council. It is too early to tell, however, if the new General will enjoy enough influence and leverage within the White House to turn the page on the internal divides, the operational dysfunctions and Flynn’s ideological outlook.

Black girls are disproportionately punished in American schools – an “overlooked crisis” that is populating the school-to-prison pipeline at rising rates, two education scholars argue in a new paper.

Dorinda Carter Andrews, associate professor at Michigan State University, and Dorothy Hines-Datiri, assistant professor at the University of Kansas and former doctoral student at MSU, cite various examples of black girls in elementary school being handcuffed and taken away in police cars for classroom disruptions such as temper tantrums.

These zero tolerance policies unfairly target students of color and should be abolished, Carter Andrews said. But while a wealth of research and public discussion has focused on black male students, little attention has been paid to the mistreatment of black girls in U.S. classrooms, she said.

“Zero tolerance constructs these young girls as criminals,” Carter Andrews said. “It’s a criminalization of their childhood, and it’s a very prison-type mentality for schools to take.”

The paper, which appears online in the journal Urban Education, notes that zero tolerance is defined as a form of school discipline that imposes removal from school for an array of violations, from violence to truancy to dress code violations. Black students are two to three times more likely to be suspended than white students and are overrepresented in office referrals, expulsions and corporal punishment, the paper says.

Black female students in the United States receive out-of-school suspensions at higher rates (12 percent) than female students across all other racial and ethnic categories, according to the U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights. Only black boys (20 percent) and American Indian/Alaska native boys (13 percent) have higher suspension rates than black girls.

Black girls are also more likely to receive harsher discipline than their white peers for minor offenses, such as talking back to the teacher, Carter Andrews said.

“The research shows that teachers and other adults may give a pass to certain students for the ways in which they talk back,” she said. “Teachers may view some girls, particularly African-American girls, as attitudinal or aggressive, even though they may be using the same talk-back language as a white female student.”

In addition to the abolishment of zero tolerance policies, the researchers call for the establishment of culturally responsive professional-development training for educators that would raise their awareness of the experiences of girls of color.

“We cannot afford to have more black girls’ identities snuffed out by disciplinary policies and ultimately the educational and criminal justice systems,” the study says.

In not so merry old medieval England, wrongful injuries between people either were suffered in silence or provoked revenge. Cooler heads began to prevail and courts of law were opened so such disputes over compensation and other remedies could be adjudicated under trial by jury.

Taken across the Atlantic to the colonies, this system – called tort law or the law of wrongful injuries – evolved steadily to open the courtroom door until the nineteen seventies. It was then that the insurance industry and other corporate lobbies began pushing one restriction after another through state legislatures– not restrictions on corporations’ rights to sue, but restrictions on the rights of ordinary people to have their day in court.

Lawmakers, whose campaign coffers were  stuffed by corporate lobbyists, were not  concerned about advancing their passing rules that arbitrarily tied the hands of judges and jurors—the same judges and jurors who were the only people to see, hear and evaluate individual cases in their courtrooms. Legislation imposing caps on damages – as with California’s $250,000 lifetime cap on pain and suffering – was especially cruel for those victims of medical malpractice who were  young, unemployed or elderly and thus do not  have significant enough wage losses to receive sufficient damages.

In recent decades, the nonsense about our society being too litigious  (except for business vs business lawsuits) has become even more extreme. Not only do we file far fewer civil lawsuits per capita than in the 1840s, according to studies by University of Wisconsin law professors, but jury trials have been declining in both federal and state courts, with trials down by 60% since the mid-1980s.

My father used to say that “if people do not use their rights, they will over time lose their rights.”  This truism brings us to a new book by University of Connecticut Law Professor Alexandra Lahav, with the title In Praise of Litigation (Oxford University Press). The title invokes the necessity of legal recourse in a society whose ordinary people are being squeezed out of their day in court, being denied justice, and are becoming cynical enough to want to get out of jury duty—a right for which our forebears demanded from King George III.

Professor Lahav makes the point we should have learned in high school, or at least college. The right to litigate is critical to any democratic society. Imagine living in a country where no one can sue powerful wrongdoers or the government. We have names for countries like that. They’re called dictatorships or tyrannies.

Here is author Lahav’s summary: “Litigation is a civilized response to the difficult disagreements that often crop up in a pluralist society. The process of litigation does more than resolve disputes: it contributes to democratic deliberation. This is the key to understanding what this process is supposed to be about and what should be done to improve it. By appreciating the democratic values people protect and promote when they sue – enforcement of the law, transparency, participation and social equality – reformers can work toward a court system that is truly democracy promoting.”

It would be more reassuring if more judges reflected those words. Were that the case, they would be fighting harder to expand the shrinking court budgets (about two percent of state budgets) that are increasingly causing civil trials to be deferred or courtrooms to be temporarily closed. Tighter budgets lead judges to excessively pressure lawyers to settle or go to arbitration. The latter is a malicious inequity between consumers, workers and other people unequal in power vis-a-vis big corporations like Wells Fargo, Exxon/Mobil, Pfizer and Aetna, who force consumers to sign fine print contracts that limit people’s rights to use the courts.

The usual sally against praising civil litigation is the claim of too many frivolous suits. Whenever Richard Newman, the Executive Director of the American Museum of Tort Law, hears that asserted, he asks for examples. They are not forthcoming. For good reason. Litigation is expensive; lawyers have to guard their reputations and judges, who largely lean to the conservative side, are in charge of their courtrooms. They are quite ready to approve motions to dismiss a case or summary judgments.

We have to take a greater interest in our courts. They are open to the public for a reason. Students need to visit them and understand what the burdens are on courts, and how our civil justice system can be improved. When I ask assemblies of students if they have ever visited a court as a spectator, hardly one in ten raise a hand.

Courts should not be places of case overloads and long delays. They should be welcoming temples of justice where judge and jurors engage in reasoned deliberation for the advancement of justice as part of a functioning democracy. The demands for justice are such in our country that courts should have more judges, more juries and more trials.

As the great judge, Learned Hand, wisely wrote “If we are to keep our democracy, there must be one commandment: Thou shalt not ration justice.”