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Philippines: UN Members Should Denounce Killings, Abuses, Says HRW

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United Nations member countries should denounce the Philippines’ brutal “war on drugs” that has killed more than 7,000 people since President Rodrigo Duterte took office in June 2016, Human Rights Watch said Thursday. The Philippines will appear for the third cycle of the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) on May 8, 2017, in Geneva.

UN member countries should urge the Philippines to support an international investigation into the killings, given the Philippine government’s own failure to impartially investigate or prosecute those responsible, Human Rights Watch said. Various UN bodies, the media, and Human Rights Watch and other nongovernmental organizations have reported on the extrajudicial killings, which may amount to crimes against humanity.

“The UN review of the Philippines is critical because of the sheer magnitude of the human rights calamity since President Duterte took office last year,” said Phelim Kine, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Duterte’s ‘war on drugs’ has been nothing less than a murderous war on the poor.”

At the UPR, the human rights progress of each UN member country is reviewed every four years. Members and observers of the UN Human Rights Council will raise the Philippines’ past human rights pledges and new concerns. The previous reviews of the Philippines were in 2008 and 2012. This year’s review covers the last four years of the administration of President Benigno Aquino III and the period since Duterte took office.


Tarantino Reveals Behind-The-Scenes Secrets About ‘Reservoir Dogs’

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To mark the 25th anniversary of the tragic tale of Mr. White, Mr. Orange, Mr. Blonde, Mr. Pink, and Mr. Brown, director Quentin Tarantino revealed some never-before-heard secrets about the cult classic ‘Reservoir Dogs’, NME said.

Speaking at the Tribeca Film Festival, Tarantino reunited with cast members Harvey Keitel, Tim Roth, Michael Madsen and Steve Buscemi.

Across the panel conversation, certain secrets were brought to light – as Variety report.

Reservoir Dogs was almost a play

During a section of the talk, Keitel brought up how rigorous the rehearsal process was for this film. “We had two weeks of rehearsal, which is unheard of in Hollywood,” he said. “We actually almost went to four, because Quentin thought at one time about doing a play.”

Michael Madsen’s ‘Stuck In The Middle With You’ dance was entirely spontaneous

One of the most standout moments of the film is when Mr. Blonde tortures a captured police office while dancing to the Stealers Wheel’s classic. However, that dance came out of nowhere. “I didn’t know what to do. In the script, it said, ‘Mr. Blonde maniacally dances around.’ And I kept thinking, ‘What does that mean? Like Mike Jagger, or what? What am I gonna do?’”

In one screening, 33 people walked out of the theatre

This is by no means a film for weak-stomached. The audiences of 1992 weren’t ready for the viscera of ‘Reservoir Dogs’ as Tarantino remembers: “I started counting the walkouts during the torture scene. 33 was the largest walkout.”

Tom Waits almost starred in the film

The director recalled. “A lot of really wild people came in and read the parts. Tom Waits came in and read. I had Tom Waits read the Madonna speech, just so I could hear Tom Waits say those lines.”

Last year, Tarantino (once again) confirmed that he plans to retire after his 10th movie. It’s not etched in stone, but that is the plan,” he said in 2014. “If I get to the 10th, do a good job and don’t screw it up, well that sounds like a good way to end the old career.”

Myanmar: Ruling Party Mulls Legal Action Over Rumor About President’s Resignation

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Myanmar’s ruling National League for Democracy party may take legal action against individuals or the group responsible for posting online rumors that the country’s figurehead president is resigning, the party’s spokesman said Thursday, in the latest indication of a clampdown on free speech in the Southeast Asian nation.

Recent posts on Facebook indicated that President Htin Kyaw would step down due to poor health and be replaced by Shwe Mann, the former speaker of the lower house of parliament who is close to State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi—the country’s de facto leader.

NLD spokesman Win Htein said action will be taken against those who are “spreading rumors” that the country’s President Htin Kyaw is being replaced.

“As far as I’m concerned, this was done by people who are trying to politically destabilize the country while Daw [honorific] Aung San Suu Kyi is away,” he said, referring to the state counselor’s current official visit to Europe, where she was in Italy on Thursday.

“I called Home Affairs Minister Lieutenant General Kyaw Swe yesterday to tell him to find the person responsible for the original post and take legal action against him,” Win Htein said. “We will find out whether it is an individual or an organized group, and I might file a lawsuit against them, or I will ask someone else to do that.”

The NLD’s central executive committee will discuss whether or not to file a lawsuit against those responsible for the post at the body’s next meeting, he said.

In the meantime, the State Counselor’s Office urged the public to disregard the rumor.

Htin Kyaw is serving as a proxy for Aung San Suu Kyi, who is constitutionally barred from the presidency because her sons are foreign-born as was her late husband.

‘Leaking state secrets’

In a related development, Myanmar’s Ministry of Industry said on Thursday it will sue a U.S.-based Facebook blogger for posting what it called a rumor.

Aung N Htwe wrote that former Major Ko Ko Aung asked Khin Maung Cho, the current industry minister, to transfer about 20 officials in positions above that of Ko Ko Aung, and that the minister agreed.

Aung N Htwe included photos of the minister and his wife along with his Facebook post.

In response, the ministry issued a statement that it will investigate those involved and take action against them for “leaking state secrets.”

“We transferred 22 staff due to job needs,” said Ko Ko Lwin, the ministry’s permanent secretary. “There is no other reason for it. People can accuse us of what they want to online, [but] we need to check these rumors and respond as needed according to law.”

Revision of Article 66 (d)

Also on Thursday, Nu Nu Yin, permanent secretary of the country’s Attorney General’s Office, said during a press conference reviewing the NLD government’s accomplishments during its first year in office that controversial Article 66 (d) of the Telecommunications Law will be revised.

The article prohibits use of the telecom network to “extort, threaten, obstruct, defame, disturb, inappropriately influence or intimidate” people and carries a jail sentence of up to three years and a fine for those who violate it.

“We were advised that we should consider bailing out people charged under Article 66 (d),” Nu Nu Yin said, responding to a question about a request her agency received from the Ministry of Communication to amend the article.

Some rights groups have criticized Aung San Suu Kyi, widely touted as a democracy icon in the West, for failing to live up to expectations for increased freedom of the press under the NLD administration.

The number of defamation suits filed under Article 66 (d) have soared under Aung San Suu Kyi’s administration, with 56 people charged for social media posts deemed inappropriate—12 of whom were journalists.

During the previous military-backed government of former president Thein Sein, only seven people were charged under Article 66(d), five of whom received prison sentences.

Reported by Win Ko Ko Latt, Thet Su Aung and Win Naung Toe for RFA’s Myanmar Service. Translated by Khet Mar. Written in English by Roseanne Gerin.

Erdogan Visits India: Cooperation, Triangulation – Analysis

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The newly powerful Turkish president’s visit led to both sides committing to a stronger economic relationship and boosting people-to-people contact, but it had its unacceptable moments, and India had prepared for its unpredictability of outcome.

By Rajendra M. Abhyankar*

The first visit to New Delhi–from 30 April to 1 May 2017–of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, after winning formidable executive powers by scraping through in a referendum, was marred, predictably enough, by his unacceptable comment on Kashmir. Nonetheless, it was remarkable that the visit went through, with both sides committed to a stronger economic relationship and bolstering of people-to-people relations.

Erdogan last visited India in 2008 as Prime Minister. This trip, India was the first stop on his visit, followed by Russia, China and the United States. Apart from ironing out crinkles in Turkey’s relations with the major powers, Erdogan also seeks validation of his win which many in his country dispute—more so, because it enthrones him as an undisputed leader, at least for the next five years.

On the face of it, Erdogan and Modi share many commonalities. Both are religious nationalists, governing vast multicultural democracies and emerging economies. They espouse majoritarian politics in large multi-ethnic and multi-religious countries. Yet, in a nod to the secularists in both countries, it was no surprise that their joint statement speaks of “the richly diverse and secular democracies of both nations”.

While the visit was not substantive on the spread of the bilateral agreements it was nevertheless high on optics for a variety of reasons. Erdogan was given an honorary degree by the Jamia Milia Islamia where, speaking in Turkish, he said that India and Turkey shared a common perspective on international developments, particularly on the restructuring the United Nations Security Council, to better reflect today’s reality.

India is Turkey’s second largest trading partner in the Asia-Pacific, although bilateral trade was down 28% to $4.91 billion in 2015-16. The two sides agreed to boost trade to at least $10 billion by 2020, with emphasis on information technology, infrastructure, pharmaceuticals, health and tourism. To encourage people-to-people relations, a new cultural exchange programme for 2017-20 was signed, together with agreements on cooperation between news agencies and training institutions. They also agreed to improve cooperation in the field of hydrocarbons and renewable energy, particularly solar and wind energy.

A 150-member trade delegation accompanying Erdogan attended the India-Turkey Business Forum, which is expected to take these ideas forward. Turkish industry was invited to participate in infrastructure projects in India and in the ‘Make in India’ programme.

On both the Nuclear Suppliers Group and on Kashmir, there was a reversion under the Islamic government to Turkey’s earlier position. Until 2002, when Erdogan took office, Turkey had come round to a bilateral resolution of Kashmir, realising that the Indian position was akin to their own on the Cyprus issue with Greece, which, like Pakistan, has always called for international resolution.

Therefore, by calling for a ‘multilateral dialogue’ on Kashmir, a day before his arrival, and offering to mediate, he raised India’s hackles with its known position on the exclusivity of a bilateral dialogue under the Shimla Agreement. He received an accordingly firm response from Prime Minister Modi. The Indian side explained the matter in bilateral discussions besides expressing displeasure at Turkey’s participation in infrastructure projects in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

Erdogan’s activism, evident from his statement, calling for mediation through his good offices, resembled a position he had taken on Syria, one that alienated the Assad regime. The Kashmir offer was, however, not made formally, but through a news channel. In the joint press statement, both sides “urged all countries and entities to work sincerely to disrupt terrorists’” networks and their financing and stop cross-border movement of terrorists. Yet, on terrorism too, while Erdogan pledged his full support for India’s fight, it was its left-wing terrorism that he had in mind.

India was looking at the visit not only for its economic potential but also for support for its membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) of which Turkey is a member and had earlier supported India’s membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR). In the end it was not to be. Turkey said that it would like to see both India and Pakistan in the NSG, thereby aligning Turkey’s position with China’s. There being no support for Pakistan, it was a negative in different words.

In recognition of the unpredictability of the outcome,[1] India had triangulated the Erdogan visit by inviting the Cyprus President to New Delhi a few days prior. Cyprus has been a steadfast supporter of India on Kashmir and is also an NSG member. Furthermore, Vice President Hamid Ansari made a state visit to Armenia earlier, visiting the Armenian genocide museum, an accusation that Turkey has not lived down.

With international relations in a state of flux, accepted relations between countries are being reviewed and new bilateral relations, not earlier considered possible, are being established, for example, one between Israel and Saudi Arabia. In a scenario of uncertainty and change, perhaps this is the way to go.

Foreign policy under Modi is certainly exhibiting this dynamism with the goal being to pull out mutually beneficial synergies with our partners even though we do not agree across the board. Turkey is one example while relations with China have also moved along this groove.

About the author:
*Rajendra Abhyankar
, former diplomat, was Ambassador to Turkey from 1996 to 1998 and High Commissioner to Cyprus from 1987 to 1990. He teaches at Indiana University, Bloomington.

Source:
This feature was written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.

References:
[1] As Toby Dalton, an expert on non-proliferation and nuclear energy at the Washington-based think tank, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says: “Although it makes sense for India to be a member of the group, it could take another one or two years for the group to discuss all of the issues and implications of bringing India in. It isn’t a simple political matter, but has many legal, technical and policy implications that the group has not yet discussed.”

The PKK’s Fateful Choice In Northern Syria – Analysis

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Six years into Syria’s civil war, the military and political map in the north has been dramatically redrawn. The most dynamic local actors, the political affiliates of the Iraq-based Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey – the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Democratic Union Party (PYD) – control major portions of the Syria-Turkey border, have announced a federal region and established local rule.

But YPG military success is hitting significant geopolitical and demographic barriers, placing the PKK before a stark choice: continue to subordinate its Syria project to its fight against Turkey or prioritise more Kurdish self-rule in Syria.

Given recent regional realignments, the latter option is best: for the YPG-PYD to become what it professes to be: a Syrian Kurdish party ideologically linked to the PKK and its founder, Abdullah Öcalan (imprisoned in Turkey), but operationally detached. Turkey’s 25 April attacks on PKK bases in northern Syria and northern Iraq augur dangerous escalation of its conflict. To avoid this, other actors, notably the U.S., should tailor their assistance to the YPG-PYD to promote that objective.

After the PKK deployed cadres in Syria in July 2012, it cooperated with the West in fighting the Islamic State (ISIS), advancing westward from the majority-Kurdish districts of Jazeera and Kobani in north-eastern Syria to the majority-Kurdish district of Afrin north of Aleppo. By seeking to create this land bridge, the PKK and its affiliates had a dual objective: to control a contiguous militarised belt along the Syria-Turkey border and establish what they call democratic self-administration comprising both Kurdish and non-Kurdish communities. When the YPG, under the umbrella of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), took the majority-Arab city of Manbij in August 2016, it appeared close to realising its strategic goals.

Today, however, regional realignments are stymying the YPG-PYD ambitions and rendering the PKK’s twin objectives incompatible. Since mid-2015, after a Turkey-PKK ceasefire broke down, Ankara has worked to strangle the YPG-PYD-run region. Its rapprochement with Moscow enabled Turkish troops to enter Syria in August 2016 without fear of Russian or regime airstrikes (Operation “Euphrates Shield”).

Fighting beside Syrian rebel allies, their aim was to defeat ISIS, but especially, to halt the YPG’s expansion west of the Euphrates. In February 2017, they succeeded, leaving the YPG surrounded and dependent on Damascus for movement between majority-Kurdish districts.

Meanwhile, because the PKK views northern Syria essentially as a recruiting ground and potentially a launching pad for attacks in Turkey, with local governance not worth heavily investing in, those, especially in the YPG-PYD, willing to consider a Syrian solution have been unable to strike local roots or set up governing institutions with broad legitimacy.

For the YPG’s self-rule project to survive, overcome the embargo on it and cease relying on the regime, it will need support from more powerful outside actors. Yet, finding a reliable protector will be challenging. The most capable candidates are Russia and the U.S.; the YPG has forged relations with both, but they may prove fickle friends. Moscow’s top priority remains the Assad regime’s survival and recovery of sovereignty. It also appears to prize rapprochement with Turkey. At this rate, the YPG-PYD may soon become a victim of a Russian change of heart.

That leaves the U.S. The question is whether the YPG-PYD and PKK leadership are agile enough to correct course to help their Syrian self-rule project survive. If the former want the U.S. to give longer-term guarantees and commit against abandonment to Turkey, the Syrian regime or both, the PKK almost certainly must adjust to allow Washington to do so without imperilling its Turkish ties. The most effective means would be a return to a Turkey-PKK ceasefire and peace talks. But this does not appear realistic in the short term.

Instead, while the U.S. still needs the YPG to fulfil its anti-ISIS objectives, the PKK should ask Washington to mediate a compromise with its Kurdish rivals in northern Syria and northern Iraq. As part of such a deal:

  • the PKK and its affiliates would agree to withdraw from Sinjar just inside Iraq in exchange for the Iraqi Kurdish authorities fully opening the Syria-Iraq border to trade. While Sinjar does not directly relate to developments in northern Syria, the U.S. could help de-escalate a local conflict there between two groups with which it has close ties, the YPG and Masoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party. This may not be sufficient to also de-escalate tensions in northern Syria, but it could be a critical first step that is relatively more doable;
  • in northern Syria, the PKK would forego ambition to connect the two eastern majority-Kurdish districts with Afrin and allow the YPG-PYD to seek a Syrian solution for Syrian Kurds. This would entail diluting its political dominance by giving other Kurdish and non-Kurdish parties a viable local governance role, especially in budget management and appointing senior officials, and removing the YPG from governing responsibility. This could render the one-party YPG-PYD “democratic self-administration” less undemocratic; and
  • the YPG should refrain from actively supporting PKK violence in Turkey, whether through arms supplies or providing personnel and tactical skills, and establish an SDF military operations room through which both YPG and non-YPG commanders can interact with the U.S.

In return, the U.S. would:

  • coordinate with, and give military aid and advice through, the SDF operations room to be established by the YPG; recruit and train local fighters exclusively through the SDF; give stabilisation support and reconstruction funds to local administrations in Jazeera and Kobani, provided the PYD makes its rule more inclusive, as stated above; and support the PYD’s bid to be included at the Geneva negotiations along with other Syrian Kurdish parties; and
  • continue patrols in the YPG-PYD self-rule area east of the Euphrates instituted following the 25 April 2017 Turkish air strikes there, and commit to using influence with Ankara to prevent further Turkish attacks in that area. The latter entails exchanging assurances with Ankara that YPG-PYD rule in Syria is indeed being diluted as described.

Jointly, these efforts could improve YPG-PYD chances to set up a workable governance structure and build alternative trade routes not dependent on Damascus; transform its military role from servicing the PKK’s anti-Turkey agenda to a legitimate effort to protect the northern Syrian populations in the absence of central-state control; gain some outside protection; and potentially help give the PYD a role in Syria peace talks and drafting of a new constitution.

The U.S. should have a powerful interest in pursuing this: under the current trajectory, its efforts to defeat ISIS in Raqqa risk being complicated; the Turkey-PKK conflict could be pushed into new theatres, with risks to wider regional stability; and the U.S.-Turkey partnership could be compromised.

As long as the PKK requires its offshoots to prioritise fighting Turkey, it stands to lose much if not all that the YPG has gained in northern Syria. If it allows its local affiliates to strike roots in Syria in a way both acceptable and meaningful to the diverse population, it has some hope, however narrow, of turning a new page.

Click here to read the full report

Empty Values: The Australian Concept Of Citizenship – OpEd

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It has been a lowering conversation, and one that Australia’s politicians have been engaging in with various degrees of discomfort. The Australian prime minister, for one, doesn’t seem to know where to place his feet on this one, showing considerable trouble in navigating the term “Australian values” before probing questions.

Would such values, posed Leigh Sales of the ABC to the squirming Malcolm Turnbull, include those traditionalists celebrating Hanukkah? Could you still pass muster as an Australian wearing the headscarf? “Of course!” retorted a clearly exasperated prime minister.

Left stranded on high ground, Turnbull has had to propose a kindergarten list of what those values would look like: “respect, the rule of law, commitment to freedom, democracy.”[1] His colourful deputy, Barnaby Joyce, adds the “fair go” and a form of attire: shorts.

The topic of “Australian values” need never have arisen, given the sheer paucity of detail as to what they entail, but the Turnbull government is that desperate for electoral mileage it is liable to politicise the air if it senses a chance for survival. Political desperation is palpable, and can either place you into a coma of boredom or befuddle the strategists.

To that end, proposals that may never make it to the bureaucrat’s desk have been spun suggesting that the Australian citizenship test incorporate a greater component of “Australian values”. Highly problematic to begin with, it is a chance for committees and challenged experts to concoct an arbitrary list of what, exactly, these might be.

The absurdity of the suggestion becomes clearer on an examination of some proposed values potential candidates for citizenship will be queried upon. Would you, for instance, gleefully approve the practice of genital mutilation? Would you have been involved or propose to engage in acts of genocide?

This meaningless debate tends to spike when the emotional barometer is jarred on special occasions. When that great, murderous folly known as Anzac Day finds expression in marches and rum-laced milk in the morning, a call is made to refine the nature of those values and apply them to prospective Australians.

One Australian MP with much time on his hands, Andrew Laming, has gone so far this year as to argue that a new national anthem should reflect those “values”. At the very least, there should be a new verse reflecting “our jocular sense of humour”, how we “come from blends of many backgrounds”, and how Australia is “a young nation”.[2] (Presumably, when longer in the tooth, the Australian state would have to find a new verse.)

The social psychologist fraternity has also made efforts to identify what it terms “cultural values”, though treating these as objective indicators of anything can be problematic. Shalom Schwartz has a stab at a finite number, coming up with seven dimensions or orientations: harmony, embeddedness, hierarchy, mastery, affective autonomy, intellectual autonomy and egalitarianism.[3]

Unsurprisingly, there are two that stand out for the pundits: that of embeddedness, where the whole is valued more than the individual; and autonomy, which is pretty straight forward in its individualistic suggestiveness. Schwartz’s work is praised to the heavens as being “the outcome of decades of empirical research around the globe.”[4]

Playing around in such academic undergrowth enables Professor Nick Haslam of University of Melbourne to suggest that Australia is far from distinctive, let alone exceptional its paraded values. By the metric of how far Australia deviates “from the international average over seven dimensions”, the seekers of exceptionalism will be disappointed. Australia “is the second least distinctive culture of all, beaten to the gold medal by Brazil” (The Conversation, May 1).

The debate has also provoked some much needed satire. Ben Pobije insists that the PM and his colleagues have missed the key points. One is the “gift of the nature strip”, the innate Australian tendency to recycle appliances and items abandoned on the grass in front of a house. “Council regulations might say otherwise, but the freedom to gather up strangers’ garbage whenever opportunity knocks is a vital Australian value and one we do well to safeguard.”[5]

Pobije suggests other value indicators that could be codified: a deep suspicion of the imagination, a latent anti-Americanism despite surface affection for those from the land of the free, and any chance “to take a day off from work for literally any reason.”

Unfortunately, this particular issue tends to be less one to satirise than one to observe with mute insensibility. This is bound to lead to humbug, where values become less a matter of virtue than sin, a facile and shallow assertion of crude patriotism. As a letter to The Age put it, “It might be hard to wax lyrical about our treatment of asylum seekers, the reduction in foreign aid or the growing divide between rich and poor, for example.”[6] On the point of values, take your pick.

Notes:
[1] http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-04-20/migrants-to-face-tougher-tests-for-australian-citizenship/8456392

[2] http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/coalition-mp-andrew-laming-calls-for-new-national-anthem-verse-to-reflect-australian-values-20170425-gvs49l.html

[3] http://kodu.ut.ee/~cect/teoreetiline%20seminar%2023.04.2013/Schwartz%202006.pdf

[4] http://theconversation.com/australian-values-are-hardly-unique-when-compared-to-other-cultures-76917

[5] http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-04-28/these-are-our-core-australian-values/8476902

[6] http://www.smh.com.au/comment/smh-letters/plenty-of-suggestions-for-australian-values-addition-to-anthem-20170426-gvsk8e.html

In Yemen, Shocked To His Bones – OpEd

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The ruins carpeted the city market, rippling outwards in waves of destruction. Broken beams, collapsed roofs, exploded metal shutters and fossilized merchandise crumbled underfoot.

In one of the burnt-out shells of the shops where raisins, nuts, fabrics, incense and stone pots were traded for hundreds of years, all that was to be found was a box of coke bottles, a sofa and a child nailing wooden sticks together.

This is Sa’ada, ground zero of the 20-month Saudi campaign in Yemen, a largely forgotten conflict that has killed more than 10,000, uprooted 3 million and left more than half the country short of food, many on the brink of starvation. — Gaith Abdul-Ahad in The Guardian, 12/9/16

Yemen stands as the worst-threatened of four countries where impending famine conditions have been said to comprise the single-worst humanitarian crisis since the founding of the U.N.  On May 2nd, 2017, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs published a grim infographic detailing conditions in Yemen where 17 million Yemenis — or around 60 percent of the population — are unable to access food.  The U.S. and its allies continue to bomb Yemen.

Jan Egeland, who heads the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), says that seven million Yemeni people are on the brink of famine. “I am shocked to my bones,” said Egeland, following a five day visit to Yemen. “The world is letting some 7 million men, women and children slowly but surely be engulfed…” Egeland blames this catastrophe on “men with guns and power in regional and international capitals who undermine every effort to avert an entirely preventable famine, as well as the collapse of health and educational services for millions of children.” Egeland and the NRC call on all parties to the conflict, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, the U.S. and the U.K. to negotiate a cease fire.

This weekend, the situation stands poised to become dramatically worse with the apparently imminent bombing, by Saudi Arabia, one of the U.S.’ closest allies, of the aid lifeline which is the port of Hodeida.

Egeland stresses the vital importance of keeping humanitarian aid flowing through Hodeida, a port which stands mere days or hours from destruction. “The Saudi-led, Western-backed military coalition has threatened to attack the port,” said Egeland, “which would likely destroy it and cut supplies to millions of hungry civilians.”  U.S. congress people demanding a stay on destruction of the port have as yet won no concessions from the Saudi or U.S governments.

The U.S. Government has as yet sounded no note of particular urgency about ending or suspending the conflict, nor has its close ally in the Saudi dictatorship.  Saudi Arabia’s Defense Minister, Prince Mohammed bin Salman recently gave “a positive view of the war in Yemen.” (New York Times, May 2, 2017). He believes that Saudi forces could quickly uproot the Houthi rebels, but rather than endanger Saudi troops he says “the coalition is waiting for the rebels to tire out.”

“Time is in our favor,” he added.

Even if Hodeida is spared, reduced import levels of food and fuel from the Saudi-imposed naval blockade puts the price of desperately needed essentials beyond the reach of the poorest.  Meanwhile prolonged conflict, dragged out by a regime that feels “time is on its side” and punctuated by deadly airstrikes, has displaced the needy to those areas where food insecurity is the highest.

Refugees from three North African countries where conflict is also threatening to impose terrible famine have Yemen on their route to escaping the continent, so they have fled conflict and famine only to be trapped in the worst of this dreadful year’s arriving tragedies.

The UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, describes the present situation, two years since Saudi airstrikes escalated the conflict:

“The violent deaths of refugees fleeing yet another war, of fishermen, of families in marketplaces – this is what the conflict in Yemen looks like two years after it began…utterly terrible, with little apparent regard for civilian lives and infrastructure.

“The fighting in Hodeida has left thousands of civilians trapped – as was the case in Al Mokha in February – and has already compromised badly-needed deliveries of humanitarian assistance. Two years of wanton violence and bloodshed, thousands of deaths and millions of people desperate for their basic rights to food, water, health and security – enough is enough. I urge all parties to the conflict, and those with influence, to work urgently towards a full ceasefire to bring this disastrous conflict to an end, and to facilitate rather than block the delivery of humanitarian assistance.”

Time is on no-one’s side as regards the crisis in Yemen. As nightmare visions of living skeletons with bloated bellies and pleading eyes once more appear on the planet’s TV screens, we in the U.S. will have missed a vital chance to avert a world in which untold millions are to be shocked to their bones.

Life After Guantánamo: Yemeni Freed in Estonia Says, ‘Part Of Me Is Still At Guantánamo’– OpEd

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For some months now, I’ve been meaning to post a handful of articles about former Guantánamo prisoners resettled in third countries, as part of my ongoing efforts not only to tell the stories of the men still held in Guantánamo and to call for the prison’s closure, but also to focus what has happened to released prisoners, especially those resettled in third countries, as part of an ongoing process of encouraging people to reflect on what the United States’ responsibilities ought to be towards men resettled in third countries without any internationally agreed arrangements regarding their status. In recent months, I have written about Mansoor al-Dayfi, a Yemeni released in Serbia, and, earlier this week, Tariq al-Sawah, an Egyptian released in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In a handful of new articles, I’ll be catching up on some stories that were published last year, but that I didn’t get the opportunity to cover at the time, and the first of these is about Ahmed Abdul Qader, a Yemeni who was given a new home in Estonia in January 2015.

Last spring, Charlie Savage of the New York Times visited Estonia to meet with Qader and to interview him, over a number of days, for a story, “After Yemeni’s 13 Years in Guantánamo, Freedom for the Soul Takes Longer,” which was published in the New York Times at the end of July.

Savage described how he spoke to Qader “in his apartment, strolling through Tallinn’s medieval Old Town, and riding a city bus to Estonia’s Islamic Center,” and he painted a powerful portrait of a young man deprived of almost half his life in Guantánamo, who never had any involvement with terrorism, and who he found trying hard to make a new life for himself in a country with a supportive government, but with few Muslims (and with no other former Guantánamo prisoners), and, of course, with no members of his own family.

As Savage described it, Qader was “about 17,” and “an overweight Yemeni teenager suspected of being a terrorist” when he was taken to Guantánamo in June 2002. “When he left,” he added, “he was past 30, his hair thinning, and about to start a new life in Estonia, a tiny Baltic country he had never heard of before it had decided to resettle a detainee a few months earlier.”

In the Estonian capital, Tallinn, he was provided with “a modestly furnished studio apartment,” but, as Savage described it, “the past, he soon realized, was not so easy to escape. Snow was falling, and he was eager to touch it. He started for the door, then suddenly panicked, fearful that something — he was not sure what — could go wrong if he went outside.”

This fear is commonplace amongst from prisoners, who fear, after years of threats, that they could be picked up and “disappeared” again. As Qader explained, “Any trouble I get myself in now — even an honest mistake — will be a hundred times worse than if any normal person did it.” he added, “I thought that after two months’ release, I’d be back to normal, but I cannot live my life regularly. I try, but it is like part of me is still at Guantánamo.”

As Savage described it, Qader “expressed gratitude to Estonia for taking him in,” and he noted that it is the country’s refugee program that “provides him with the apartment, health care, language classes, a small monthly stipend and a mentor to help him navigate daily life.”

Savage added that Qader “smiled often and spoke with optimism about the future” when they talked, but “also lapsed into despondency about his separation from his family, his lost youth, and his ‘hurt’ when people call him a terrorist.”

He also noted that Qader “portrayed himself as paralyzed by anxiety about what others — the police, potential friends or employers — will assume about him.” As Qader said, “Thirteen years of my life I wasted, and it’s not because of something I did. It’s because something went wrong around me, and I got the blame for it.”

Charlie Savage then ran briefly through Guantánamo’s history, particularly focusing on how “ambiguity” continues to surround the release of men like Qader, “deemed safe enough to transfer, but never proven guilty or innocent,” and the focused on the circumstances surrounding his capture.

As I have explained in detail over the years, Qader was seized with around 16 other men — many of whom “claimed to be religious students” — at a guesthouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan at the end of March 2002, at the same time that another raid led to the capture of Abu Zubaydah, a supposed “high-value detainee,” for whom the Bush administration’s torture program was first developed, even though his supposed significance has evaporated over the years.

In June 2002, he was flown to Guantánamo, and, as Savage noted, he “vividly recall[ed] the ‘long, long, long’ flight to Cuba — limbs immobilized, eyes and ears blocked, destination unknown.” On arrival ,he said, the guards “were often rough.” As Savage explained, an Estonian doctor “is treating him for ligament damage in his knees and shoulder — the result, he said, of treatment like being kicked into the kneeling position or being forced to kneel on concrete with his arms extended.”

When Savage asked what provoked his punishment, Qader sang a lyric from ‘Les Misérables,’ as sung by a prisoner: “Look down, look down / Don’t look ’em in the eye.”

Every few months, Qader said, he “was brought to a trailer and questioned,” telling interrogators that, “after completing the ninth grade in Yemen in 1999, he had traveled to Pakistan intending to study religion and computers, and to do charitable relief work.” He claimed that, “With the financial support of his father, he traveled around, staying for several months at a time in different guesthouses.” He also crossed into Afghanistan, where, he said, “he met several Taliban members who invited him to an area north of Kabul behind the front lines in their war against the Northern Alliance,” where he stayed for “about 10 months.”

As Savage described it, “Reports summarizing his early interrogations say he was ‘issued’ a rifle and ‘trained’ to use it, but Qader, claimed that translators “had put an exaggerated gloss on his words.” He told Savage that “a Taliban member spent a few minutes showing him how to hold and shoot a rifle, and he never ‘owned’ one.” He also “insisted, then and now, that he never fought or enlisted with any group, and in late 2001, he returned to Pakistan, where he was eventually arrested.”

Crucially, in January 2003, an interrogator, writing about Qader’s case, stated, “As unusual as this source’s story sounds, I don’t think he is hiding the truth.”

However as so often at Guantánamo, “when the interrogators showed his photograph to other detainees, some claimed he was involved with Al Qaeda,” allegations that fall away when scrutinized, as most of those making the allegations have, over the years, been unambiguously identified as unreliable witnesses. Of more relevance was his behavior in Guantánamo, and in the 2008 file released by WikiLeaks he was described as “noncompliant and hostile to the guard force.” However, as he explained to Savage, “in 2007, believing certain guards treated him unfairly, he ‘pushed back’ by refusing for a while to obey orders, like to leave a yard when his outdoors time was up.”

Speaking of his time at Guantánamo, Qader said that his initial “bewilderment” at being there “gave way to routine,” and Savage added that conditions “gradually improved,” as well as noting that, “[b]y reading books and talking to guards, he learned English.”

In 2009, he was approved for release by the Guantánamo Review Task Force, a high-level, inter-agency review process established by President Obama. Savage noted that, “according to someone who read its report,” the task force “concluded he had not conducted or facilitated any terrorist activity against the United States or its allies.”

However, after a failed attempt by an al-Qaeda recruit to detonate a bomb on a Detroit-bound plane in December 2009, all releases to Yemen were halted, and an effort to secure his release via a habeas corpus petition also failed. As Savage described it, “The moratorium spurred the Justice Department to appeal government losses in habeas corpus lawsuits, and in 2010, an appeals court instructed judges to interpret ambiguous evidence more toward the government.”

Victories by prisoners came to an end, after successful habeas petitions in over three dozen cases, and Qader’s petition, brought by Wesley Powell, a New York lawyer, was turned down in October 2011.

After that, Qader said, he “lived on a cellblock for the most compliant and westernized detainees — those who liked watching American movies despite actresses with uncovered heads,” and when the prison-wide hunger strike took place in 2013, “they did not participate, he said, although he had sometimes participated in earlier such protests.”

By 2014 the Obama administration finally “stopped waiting for Yemen to stabilize and began pressing other countries to resettle stranded Yemenis,” as Charlie Savage described it, leading to Estonia’s offer to take Qader. Jeffrey Levine, the US ambassador to Estonia at the time, said, “Estonia understood the value in demonstrating its reliability as a friend and ally and was willing to help us.”

Ian Moss, the chief of staff in the State Department office involving in negotiating the transfer of prisoners out of Guantánamo, recalled when Qader was interviewed by Estonian officials. Asked when he was born (he says his date of birth is November 1984, though some US some files say 1983), he replied, instead, “My birthday will be the day I leave Guantánamo.”

On arrival in Estonia, Qader recalled that he initially “processed everything in his new country ‘like a newborn,’” although the timing of his release was unfortunate — just a week after a terrorist attack in Paris and with anti-immigrant sentiment mounting as the Syrian refugee crisis unfolded, and Europeans began to turn their back on the charitable impulses their religions expected them to hold. Qader said he remembered thinking, “I will never be free until I get my name cleared. I will always be ‘that guy who was in Guantánamo.’”

However, he decided instead “to keep a low profile, declining interviews and telling few people about his past.” That first summer, he was given an apprenticeship by a shop in Tallinn, and, to his surprise, the owner later told him “how he came to suspect that the refugee” he gave a job to “was the Guantánamo detainee he had read about in the news media.” The man said he had looked up his file online, but “concluded that its terrorism accusations were ‘all bullshit.’” One day, he told Qader he was “famous.” Qader said he “acknowledged who he was, expecting to be told to leave,’ but instead the owner “invited him to visit his mother on an Estonian island.” Qader said he was “apprehensive about leaving Tallinn,” and “hesitated for days,” but eventually made the visit.

Savage noted, however, that not every Estonian had welcomed Qader. In the fall of 2015, “a drunken neighbor began hassling him about being a foreigner,” and when the situation escalated, when “the neighbor threatened him with a gun and put garbage at his door,” he was obliged to call the police. Fortunately, the harassment ceased, but two police officers then turned up and questioned him, “asking where he came from” and how he had money. When he explained, he said, “they conferred in Estonian; he understood the word ‘Cuba.’” Although they told him “not to worry,” Qader “said he could not sleep for four days.”

Now, he said, when he “contemplates the future,” he “feels like a man holding a ‘small candle.’” He said, “People tell me ‘don’t look back, look forward,’ but the problem is when I look forward, it is dark. That is what scares me the most.”

As Savage noted, at the time of his visit the Estonian government had “recently extended his residency permit by two years,” although he was still struggling to adapt. Estonia’s population of 1.3 million people “includes only a few thousand Muslims and fewer Arabs,” halal food is hard to come by, and Qader, understandably, was “interpret[ing] stares on the bus as hostile.” He told Savage he “would like to return home,” but “feared that Yemeni or American security forces might mistakenly decide he was working with terrorists and jail him again — or kill him with a drone.”

Asked what he thought about the US, Qader told Charlie Savage that “he understood why, after Sept. 11, it would detain him,” but added that the US “should have freed him after a year or two.” Holding him for so long, he said, “hurt me very bad.”

As Savage put it, he emphasized that he is “not out for revenge,” but “begged” US officials “to consider helping him move on by clearing his name.” As he described it, “Now you let me go. Thank you very much. No hard feelings. But just let me go for real. Say, ‘This guy, we hold him this long and we were mistaken, we’re sorry,’ and show people the truth.”

To my mind, that is an entirely reasonable request. However, lawyers advising the US government would never agree, as admitting responsibility for any kind of wrongful detention would open the floodgates to compensation claims. Whether consciously or not, Lee Wolosky, the State Department’s special envoy for the closing of Guantánamo in President Obama’s last few years in office, told Savage that “no apology is warranted” for Qader’s imprisonment. “The United States was correct to pick him up when and where we did and to detain him for a period of years,” he said, adding, “We were also right ultimately to release him subject to security assurances.”

At the time of Charlie Savage’s visit, Qader was still alone in Estonia. He described how the Estonian government “will permit family visits, but obtaining travel documents has proved difficult.” He added that Qader’s father, “who had a heart attack after finding out he was at Guantánamo, calls him daily, and his mother has taught him to cook over Skype.”

He also got married. In 2015, his family “helped arrange for him to become engaged to one of his sisters’ friends.” and “they were married in December by a Yemeni judge over Skype.” Qader said they “talk daily,” although at the time his wife had not managed to join him, even though Estonia “permits spouses to join refugees.”

Savage also noted how, in theory, “he could visit nearby European countries — he is supposed to consult Estonian officials first — but he has not dared leave,” because of the fears he mentioned above. Although he feels “[c]omforted by the thought that the Estonian government is monitoring him,” he said, “he fears that if he travels abroad and a bomb goes off nearby, he might be unable to prove his innocence and would be scapegoated and imprisoned again.”

In any case, as Savage concluded, Qader “knows some things are up to him.” He said he had “heard a story about elephants who died in a circus fire,” who “were tied with a flimsy rope but had been trained in chains as babies, learning not to try to break free.” As he said, “When this story hit me, I was thinking, ‘I don’t want to be locked inside my own Guantánamo.’ I promised myself that I have to break free from myself. And I told my wife, ‘I will take you to Paris.’” He added that “his wife, who has never left Yemen, replied that when she finally reached Estonia: ‘I will explore the world with you. I will hold you to your word.’”

In following up on this story, I spoke to Qader’s attorney, Wesley Powell, who gave me a number of pieces of very good news. Firstly, Qader had recently been allowed to visit Egypt for a month to meet up with his parents and other relatives. Furthermore, his wife has now joined him in Estonia, so perhaps that visit to Paris will now finally come true.

As Powell explained to me, the Estonian government has been very supportive of Qader, who, he believes, was a perfect candidate for resettlement — westernized, non-extreme, and able to fit in because of being short-haired and clean-shaven. He told me Qader had complete freedom of movement within Estonia, and had also begun to avail himself of the opportunities to travel abroad — beyond the visit to Egypt, which, to my surprise, proceeded without a hitch. I had feared that the taint of Guantánamo, which clings so many former prisoners, would have made a visit difficult, but Powell told me that, as an officially accepted refugee, he had been treated as an Estonian citizen would have been. Powell also explained that, since Savage’s visit, he had found the courage to visit Norway by boat, and as a result I now expect, one day, to receive a postcard from Paris, from Ahmed Abdul Qader and his wife.


Belt And Road Initiative: An Impetus To Sino-Israeli Strategic Partnership – Analysis

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By Wang Li and Bokang Malefane Theoduld Ramonono*

Since the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Israel (1992), a steady and rapid development of mutual ties characterized contemporary interactions.

Israel’s export of sophisticated technologies involving controversially dual-used know-how of civilian products remains one of the key providers for China. Israel has been aware of China as a huge market and Chinese talents and capabilities. The bilateral recognition idea with China will make it easier for commerce to occur between the two countries, guarantee the highest standards of legal compliance. In 2013, Prime Minister Netanyahu indicated that if Israeli innovation in technologies would combine with Chinese prowess in manufacture, it would be an extraordinary union of the two competitive, innovative and advance economies. Recent conditions indicate the implementation of the previously delivered announcements.

In 2013, President Xi Jin-ping initiated the concept of the “One Belt & One Road” (OBOR) which aimed at creating a belt of railroads, highways, pipelines and broadband communications stretching from China, headed westwards through the Arabian plans and finally into Europe, whilst simultaneously embarking on the “Maritime Silk Road” initiative combining prominent sea routes with port infrastructure from the Indian Ocean to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. This project has proven captivating as the image of the United States in the Middle East continues to decline in the post-Gulf war period, and thus it would be in China’s aspirations to assume a greater role in the region. Turkey is an undisputedly big power in the Middle East, but Israel’s geo-strategic location and its technological advances have shored up its hard and soft power capabilities, essentially amassing the state with the appearance and strength of a micro-superpower with the ability and the opportunity to shape Beijing’s strategic concerns in the region for decades to come.

Firstly, Israel is associated with creative, advanced technologies and military capacities in the Middle Eastern milieu. Despite, the geopolitical challenges to Israel, the “Red-Med” rail project was a necessary essential and therefore, Israel is responsive to “OBOR” for China has plenty of seasoned labors and approximately $2 billion investment in this 300 km rail line linking Ashkelon with the Red Sea. With the specific role of Israel in the Middle East, Chinese policy-makers seek a broad swath of opportunities to build high-speed rail lines in Southeast Asia, Africa and the Middle East as well as China aims to double its 12,000 kilometers of railway track by 2020, with high-speed lines comprising most of the expansion.

Secondly, some Chinese strategists propose the “Red-Med” rail as emblematic of a more ambitious design for the region. In words of President Xi, “A peaceful, stable and developing Middle East meets the common interests of all parties including China and Israel”. And to that end the Sino-Israeli collaboration efforts include counterterrorism and anti-piracy operations, as well as economic support for Arab countries. Beijing looks toward Tel Aviv to provide advanced technologies, such as in agriculture and manufacture, to secure the industrialization and social stability of the region in the context of “One Belt and One Road.” Additionally, PLA Navy seeks assistance from Israeli counterparts in anti-piracy missions in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. This indicates, the “Red-Med” project accentuates the dramatic shift in China’s perceptions of regional security in the Middle East. Given the China’s dependence on Middle Eastern oil; for instance, China’s net oil imports have nearly tripled in the past decade, with a 150% increase in tons per month spanning a decade imported from the Persian Gulf, the leaders and their security advisors in Beijing must pursue innovative avenues in order to “enhance regional security presence without, attempting to play a superpower role in the region”, as David Goldman argued recently.

Third, there is a new consensus in China that as a rising power with the second largest economy in the world, China will have to take more responsibilities in the world including the Middle East. However, the suddenness of America’s lesser role in the region has left China unprepared and unsure of its next steps; a fact, Chinese analysts quick to acknowledge. On one hand, China has proactively joined the P5+1 negotiations with Iran and offered to become a fifth member of the Quartet (UN, US, Europe, Russia), but these are pro forma proposals to assert China’s interest in the region rather than a policy per se. but on the other hand, China has voted with the Palestinians at the United Nations according to the “two states” formula over the past years, and it will not alter its diplomatic position in the foreseeable future.

Yet, there is an increasing level of interest in the features and characteristics of the “One Belt One Road” initiative devised by China. It sounds attractive that the transformation of the Eurasian landmass by high-speed transport and communications will lift large parts of the continent out of backwardness, as China sees the matter. But, building the transnational rail lines, though, demands the suppression of security threats that could disrupt trade flows. It is generally held that “OBOR” stems from China’s confidence in its rapidly-growing economic strengths while it also requires making long-term political stability possible. As China doesn’t want to rock the boat with any prospective adversary, Beijing’s Middle East stance is in the midst of a grand reconsideration. In the absence of overriding American influence in the Middle East, the risks of regional war and an interruption of China’s oil supplies will rise above the threshold of acceptability to Beijing. Taking the above-mentioned into consideration, The U.S. and European economies are still recovering from the 2008 crisis and growing at anemic rates. At the same time, Europe’s relationship with the Jewish state is becoming increasingly colored by anti-Israel sentiments. In this context, an Asian pivot makes sense. Israel’s desire to establish a reliable commercial corridor with the Far East dates back to the David Ben-Gurion (Israeli Prime Minister) administration. But now in both respects, Beijing sizes up Israel as a strategic partner since it clearly has an important prowess in the regional security and in meeting China’s technological needs.

Frankly speaking, China still has a long way to go in view of completion of the grand “OBOR, as the potential challenges are from both the Islamist extremism and the common practices of the geopolitical game. First, as the largest power adjunct to China’s Tibet, how India will interact with the “OBOR” is not yet clear, though it seems increasingly likely that India and China will collaborate rather than quarrel. After President Xi’s state visit to India in 2014, the new government headed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi may draw on Chinese expertise and financing to alleviate critical infrastructure bottlenecks. The two countries are negotiating a $33 billion high-speed rail scheme, for example, the first major improvement in a rail system built by the British in the 19th century. Economics trumps petty concerns over borders in the mountainous wasteland that separates the world’s two most populous nations. Yet, there is also a strategic dimension to the growing sense of agreement between China and India. From India’s vantage point, China’s support for Pakistan’s military has been a grave concern, but it cuts both ways. First, Pakistan remains at perpetual risk of tipping over towards militant Islam, and the main guarantor of its stability is the army. China wants to strengthen Pakistani army as a bulwark against the Islamic radicals, who threaten China’s Xinjiang province as much as they do India, and that probably serves India’s interests as well as any Chinese policy might.

The more dangerous prospect to China comes from the rise of Islamist extremism that has evidently worried Beijing. At least a hundred or even many more Chinese Uyghurs are reportedly fighting with Islamic State, presumably in order to acquire terrorist skills to bring back home to China’s homeland. Chinese analysts have a very low opinion of the Obama administration’s approach to dealing with IS, but they did not have an alternative policy. Hopefully, there is an opportunity for low-profile but significant security cooperation between Israel and China.

In foreign affairs, China’s policy-making is careful, conservative and consensus-driven, for its overriding concern is its own economic growth which has been seen as the fundamental issue to the security of the country and the legitimacy of the ruling party. The pace of transformation of the Middle East has surprised it, and it has tried to decide what to do next. China’s short-term intension remains largely unknown. But it seems inevitable that China’s basic interests will lead it to far greater involvement in the region, all the more so as the US withdraws. Israel will remain an American ally, and this alliance strictly delimits the scope of Sino-Israeli collaboration. Within these limits, though, Israel has greater room to maneuver, and the opportunity to assist in the formation of Chinese conceptions and strategy in the region for decades to come. Chinese leaders are clearly aware of this reality.

During his second visit to China in March 2017 at the invitation of China’s President Xi Jinping, Prime Minister Netanyahu signaled at an occasion marking the 25th anniversary of diplomatic relations that Israel is cordial in taking a more prominent role to build the “OBOR” in the region of the Middle East and the Mediterranean. The visit to China of the Israeli PM had the anticipated positive results with regard to the development of the two sides’ financial relationship, since the Chinese government views Israel, despite its small size, as a producer of natural resources and a potential contributor to China’s grand design of the “OBOR”. For sure, several non-financial subjects also occupied the leaders during their meetings, including relations with the US, the role Russia is playing in the Middle East and terror threats from Islamic sources. As China sees matters, the Chinese government, which strives for global stability that will support its economy, wants to see the peaceful restoration in the whole region.

True, unlike Western foreign policies, which generally prioritize political issues and normal relations, Chinese foreign policy pays attention to economic issues. This is consistent with China’s adherence to nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other countries. China and Israel have worked closely with the enhancement based on terms of “innovation and cooperation”. They are asymmetrical in view of the territorial sizes and the population, but the Chinese government regards as advantageous, Israel’s potential assumption of a non-replaceable participant in the “OBOR” initiative. Due to this consideration, China and Israel provided as joint statement declaring the establishment and promotion of bilateral relations based on a “comprehensive innovative strategic partnership”.

(*) Bokang Malefane Theoduld Ramonono, PhD Candidate in International Relations at the School of International and Public Affairs,  Jilin University China

Source: This article was published at Modern Diplomacy

Swearing Can Make You Stronger?

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Swearing out loud can make you stronger, at least that is the conclusion of research that was presented by Dr Richard Stephens from Keele University to the Annual Conference of the British Psychological Society in Bright.

In the research, Dr Stephens and his team conducted two experiments. In the first, 29 participants completed a test of anaerobic power — a short, intense period on an exercise bike — after both swearing and not swearing. In the second, 52 participants completed an isometric handgrip test, again after both swearing and not swearing.

The results showed that the participants produced more power if they had sworn in the first experiment and a stronger handgrip if they had sworn in the second.

According to Dr Stephens, “We know from our earlier research that swearing makes people more able to tolerate pain. A possible reason for this is that it stimulates the body’s sympathetic nervous system — that’s the system that makes your heart pound when you are in danger.”

“If that is the reason, we would expect swearing to make people stronger too — and that is just what we found in these experiments,” Dr Stephens said, adding, “But when we measured heart rate and some other things you would expect to be affected if the sympathetic nervous system was responsible for this increase in strength, we did not find significant changes.”

“So quite why it is that swearing has these effects on strength and pain tolerance remains to be discovered. We have yet to understand the power of swearing fully,” said Dr Stephens.

Trump’s Executive Order On Religious Liberty Welcomed – OpEd

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President Trump is to be commended for extending his support to religious liberty as the preeminent constitutional right. Regrettably, the executive order is lacking in the kind of teeth that we expected; the leaked draft that became available in February offered greater detail.

The most specific part of the executive order deals with the Johnson Amendment. This provision allows the IRS to challenge the tax-exempt status of churches and religious non-profit organizations if they endorse candidates for public office, or become directly involved in the political process. Evangelical leaders pushed to have this ban repealed.

Some observers note that the IRS rarely strips a religious organization of its tax-exempt status, so this issue is overblown. That misses the point—it seeks to intimidate these groups, often rather selectively. I know.

In 2008, right after Barack Obama was elected, the IRS sought to bully me: I was accused of violating its code on political activity. In fact, I did nothing of the sort, which is why its effort was a monumental failure. I stood my ground and nothing of any substance came of it. But the fact that the IRS tried to silence me (and others like me) cannot be dismissed as inconsequential.

It is up to the Congress to overturn the Johnson Amendment, though what Trump did is hardly meaningless. His initiative makes it clear that his Cabinet will not enforce this IRS code, thus vitiating its essence. Moreover, he nicely teed this issue up for repeal by the Congress. In short, Trump did what he could, and for that we are grateful.

On the other hand, there is an underside to the repeal of the Johnson Amendment. Many of the faithful do not want to turn their churches into a venue for political theater, nor do religious leaders like myself want to be lobbied by Republicans and Democrats to get on board. Church should be about worship, not politics.

On the issues most important to Catholics—ensuring conscience rights, and allowing Catholic non-profit organizations to exercise their doctrinal prerogatives with impunity—the executive order does not provide the kind of detail that is needed. In comparison to the leaked draft version, it is considerably watered down. Nevertheless, it sends the right signal to executive agencies: religious liberty must be given a priority status when implementing legislation.

We certainly expect that the Trump administration will ensure that Catholic non-profits, such as the Little Sisters of the Poor, will finally be free of the pernicious pressures brought to bear on them by attorneys out to sunder their mission. The nuns should not have to comply with any mandate that forces them to be complicit in immoral acts.

At the heart of this controversy is something that transcends an executive order. To be exact, no government agency should have the right to strip Catholic organizations of their religious exemption merely because they hire and serve large segments of the population that are not Catholic. Catholic schools and social service agencies should be congratulated for not discriminating in their services, not condemned for doing so.

Much more is needed to guarantee religious liberty: the Congress must act, and the federal courts must uphold the First Amendment rights of religious individuals and entities. But we can at least thank President Trump for pointing these branches of government in the right direction. His leadership is very much appreciated.

Zika Virus Could Cost US Billions Of Dollars

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As United States policymakers debate how to devote money and resources to the Zika virus outbreak, understanding the potential economic impact of the virus in the US is key.

Now, using a new computational model described in PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases, researchers have calculated that Zika, depending on the rate at which it infected people in at-risk states, could result in total costs ranging from $183 million to over $1.2 billion.

Since 2015, a strain of Zika virus originating in Brazil has been spreading internationally, with cases now confirmed in more than 40 countries, including the US. Six states — Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas — are at greatest risk of local Zika emergence. Zika can lead to a range of symptoms including fever, muscle pain, and headaches that have repercussions on medical costs and productivity. In addition, the virus has been linked to more serious Guillain-Barré Syndrome and severe birth defects.

In the new work, Bruce Lee of Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Alison Galvani of Yale School of Public Health, and colleagues developed a computational model of the economic burden of Zika in the six most at-risk states under a range of hypothetical scenarios. They were able to calculate economic costs to the country under different infection rates, and determine what infection rates would be needed to reach certain cost thresholds.

Across the six states, they calculated that an attack rate of 0.01% would cost society $183.4 million, including both direct medical costs and lost productivity. An attack rate of 0.025% would cost $198.6 million, 0.1% would cost $274.6 million, 1% would cost $1.2 billion, and 2% would exceed $2 billion.

For comparison, the attack rate of Zika in French Polynesia and that of chikungunya — a similar virus–in Puerto Rico have both exceeded 10%. The numbers reported in this new study did not include any potential impact on tourism or travel, any impact beyond the six most at-risk states, nor lost productivity and medical costs associated with fear of Zika or infected family and friends.

“As we aimed to be conservative in our estimations, our model in many ways may underestimate the economic burden of Zika,” the researchers said. “Our analyses indicate that the health and economic burden of even low attack rates of Zika in the Continental US would be both substantial and enduring.”

Egypt: Discovered 4,000-Year-Old Funerary Garden

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The Djehuty Project, led by research professor, José Manuel Galán, from the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC), has discovered a 4,000-year-old funerary garden — the first such garden ever to be found — on the Dra Abu el-Naga hill in Luxor, Egypt. The discovery comes during the 16th year of archaeological excavations which are sponsored this year by Técnicas Reunidas and Indra.

The discoveries made by this project shed light on a key epoch when, for the first time, Thebes (now Luxor) became the capital of the unified kingdom of Upper and Lower Egypt about 4,000 years ago.

Dr. Jose Galán explains, “We knew of the possible existence of these gardens since they appear in illustrations both at the entrances to tombs as well as on tomb walls, where Egyptians would depict how they wanted their funerals to be. The garden itself consisted of a small rectangular area, raised half a meter off the ground and divided into 30 cm2 beds. In addition, next to the garden, two trees were planted. This is the first time that a physical garden has ever been found, and it is therefore the first time that archaeology can confirm what had been deduced from iconography. The discovery and thorough analysis of the garden will provide valuable information about both the botany and the environmental conditions of ancient Thebes, of Luxor 4,000 years ago”.

Galán continues, “The plants grown there would have had a symbolic meaning and may have played a role in funerary rituals. Therefore, the garden will also provide information about religious beliefs and practices as well as the culture and society at the time of the Twelfth Dynasty when Thebes became the capital of the unified kingdom of Upper and Lower Egypt for the first time. We know that palm, sycamore and Persea trees were associated with the deceased’s power of resurrection. Similarly, plants such as the lettuce had connotations with fertility and therefore a return to life. Now we must wait to see what plants we can identify by analysing the seeds we have collected. It is a spectacular and quite unique find which opens up multiple avenues of research”.

“Digging in a necropolis not only allows us to discover details about the world of funerals, religious beliefs and funerary practices, it also helps us discover details about daily life, about society and about the physical environment, both plant and animal. The necropolis thus becomes, as the ancient Egyptians themselves believed, the best way to understand and embrace life”, concludes the CSIC researcher.
The garden, or funeral garden, was unearthed in an open courtyard at the entrance of a Middle Kingdom rock-cut tomb very probably from the Twelfth Dynasty, circa 2000 BCE. The garden, measuring 3m x 2m, is raised and is divided into a grid arrangement of 30 cm2 beds distributed in rows of five or seven beds.

View of the funeral garden with a bowl of dates and seeds found in the orchard. / CSIC

According to experts, these small beds may have contained different types of plants and flowers. In addition, at the centre of the raised garden there two beds which are set higher than the others where small trees or shrubs probably grew.

In one corner, the researchers recovered a still upright tamarisk shrub complete with its roots and 30cm-long trunk, beside which was a bowl containing dates and other fruit which may have been given as an offering.

In addition, attached to the facade of the tomb, which the garden is related to for the time being, a small mud-brick chapel (46cm high x 70cm wide x 55cm deep) with three stelae, or stone tombstones, in its interior was also uncovered. These are dated later than the tomb and the garden, coming from the Thirteenth Dynasty, around the year 1800 BCE. One of them belongs to Renef-seneb, and the other to “the soldier (“citizen”) Khememi, the son of the lady of the house, Satidenu.” On each, reference is made to Montu, a local god from ancient Thebes, and to the funerary gods Ptah, Sokar and Osiris.

“These finds highlight the importance of the area around the Dra Abu el-Naga hill as a sacred centre for a wide range of worship activities during the Middle Kingdom. This helps us understand the high density of tombs in later times as well as the religious symbolism that this area of the necropolis holds”, concludes the CSIC researcher.

Decades Of Data On World’s Oceans Reveal Troubling Oxygen Decline

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A new analysis of decades of data on oceans across the globe has revealed that the amount of dissolved oxygen contained in the water – an important measure of ocean health – has been declining for more than 20 years.

Researchers at Georgia Institute of Technology looked at a historic dataset of ocean information stretching back more than 50 years and searched for long term trends and patterns. They found that oxygen levels started dropping in the 1980s as ocean temperatures began to climb.

“The oxygen in oceans has dynamic properties, and its concentration can change with natural climate variability,” said Taka Ito, an associate professor in Georgia Tech’s School of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences who led the research. “The important aspect of our result is that the rate of global oxygen loss appears to be exceeding the level of nature’s random variability.”

The study, which was published April in Geophysical Research Letters, was sponsored by the National Science Foundation and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The team included researchers from the National Center for Atmospheric Research, the University of Washington-Seattle, and Hokkaido University in Japan.

Falling oxygen levels in water have the potential to impact the habitat of marine organisms worldwide and in recent years led to more frequent “hypoxic events” that killed or displaced populations of fish, crabs and many other organisms.

Researchers have for years anticipated that rising water temperatures would affect the amount of oxygen in the oceans, since warmer water is capable of holding less dissolved gas than colder water. But the data showed that ocean oxygen was falling more rapidly than the corresponding rise in water temperature.

“The trend of oxygen falling is about two to three times faster than what we predicted from the decrease of solubility associated with the ocean warming,” Ito said. “This is most likely due to the changes in ocean circulation and mixing associated with the heating of the near-surface waters and melting of polar ice.”

The majority of the oxygen in the ocean is absorbed from the atmosphere at the surface or created by photosynthesizing phytoplankton. Ocean currents then mix that more highly oxygenated water with subsurface water. But rising ocean water temperatures near the surface have made it more buoyant and harder for the warmer surface waters to mix downward with the cooler subsurface waters. Melting polar ice has added more freshwater to the ocean surface – another factor that hampers the natural mixing and leads to increased ocean stratification.

“After the mid-2000s, this trend became apparent, consistent and statistically significant — beyond the envelope of year-to-year fluctuations,” Ito said. “The trends are particularly strong in the tropics, eastern margins of each basin and the subpolar North Pacific.”

In an earlier study, Ito and other researchers explored why oxygen depletion was more pronounced in tropical waters in the Pacific Ocean. They found that air pollution drifting from East Asia out over the world’s largest ocean contributed to oxygen levels falling in tropical waters thousands of miles away.

Once ocean currents carried the iron and nitrogen pollution to the tropics, photosynthesizing phytoplankton went into overdrive consuming the excess nutrients. But rather than increasing oxygen, the net result of the chain reaction was the depletion oxygen in subsurface water.

That, too, is likely a contributing factor in waters across the globe, Ito said.

Pakistan Caught In The Middle As China’s OBOR Becomes Saudi-Iranian-Indian Battleground – Analysis

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Pakistani General Raheel Sharif walked into a hornet’s nest when he stepped off a private jet in Riyadh two weeks ago to take command of a Saudi-led, 41-nation military alliance. Things have gone from bad to worse since.

General Shareef had barely landed when Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman dashed the Pakistani’s hopes to include Iran in the alliance that nominally was created to fight terrorism rather than confront Iran.

The general’s hopes were designed to balance Pakistan’s close alliance with Saudia Arabia with the fact that it shares a volatile border with Iran and is home to the world’s second largest Shiite Muslim community. General Sharif’s ambition had already been rendered Mission Impossible before he landed with Saudi Arabia charging that Iran constitutes the world’s foremost terrorist threat.

In a recent interview with the Saudi-owned Middle East Broadcasting television network, Prince Mohammed, who also serves as the kingdom’s defense minister, has toughened Saudi Arabia’s stance. Prince Mohammed appeared in line with statements by a senior US military official to hold out the possibility of exploiting aspirations of ethnic minorities in Iran to weaken its Islamic regime.

In doing so, Prince Mohammed and General Joseph L. Voltel, head of US Central Command, seemed to raise the spectre of increased violence in Balochistan, a volatile, once independent region that straddles both sides of the Iranian-Pakistani border, as well as in the Iranian province of Khuzestan, the Islamic republic’s oil-rich region that is home to Iranians of Arab descent.

Ethnic and sectarian proxy wars could embroil rivals China and India in the Saudi-Iranian dispute. The deep-sea port of Gwadar in Balochistan is a lynchpin of China’s One Belt, One Road initiative, and a mere 70 kilometres from the Indian-backed port of Chabahar in Iran, viewed by Saudi Arabia as a potential threat to one of the most important sea routes facilitating the flow of oil from the Gulf to Asia.

The risk of China’s initiative as well as its regional rivalry with India becoming a Saudi-Iranian battleground appeared to increase with Prince Mohammed’s warning that the battle between the two regional powers would be fought “inside Iran, not in Saudi Arabia.”

In his interview, Prince Mohammed not only ruled out talks with Iran but painted the two countries’ rivalry in sectarian terms. The prince asserted that Iran, a predominantly Shiite country, believes that “the Imam Mahdi (the redeemer) will come and they must prepare the fertile environment for the arrival of the awaited Mahdi and they must control the Muslim world…. “How do you have a dialogue with this?” Prince Mohammed asked.

Saudi Arabia had already signalled its support for Iranian dissidents when last July former Saudi intelligence chief and ambassador to the United States and Britain, Prince Turki al-Faisal, attended a rally in Paris organized by the exiled People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran or Mujahedin-e-Khalq, a militant left-wing group that advocates the overthrow of Iran’s Islamic regime and traces its roots to resistance against the shah who was toppled in the 1979 revolution. “Your legitimate struggle against the (Iranian) regime will achieve its goal, sooner or later. I, too, want the fall of the regime,” Prince Turki told the rally.

Since then, General Voltel, avoiding any reference to sectarianism, told the US Senate Armed Services Committee, that “in order to contain Iranian expansion, roll back its malign influence, and blunt its asymmetric advantages, we must engage them more effectively in the ‘grey zone’ through means that include a strong deterrence posture, targeted counter-messaging activities, and by building partner nations’ capacity… (We) believe that by taking proactive measures and reinforcing our resolve we can lessen Iran’s ability to negatively influence outcomes in the future.,” General Voltel said.

Prince Mohammed did not spell out how he intends to take Saudi Arabia’s fight to Iran, but a Saudi think tank, the Arabian Gulf Centre for Iranian Studies (AGCIS) argued in a recent study that Chabahar posed “a direct threat to the Arab Gulf states” that called for “immediate counter measures.”

Written by Mohammed Hassan Husseinbor, identified as an Iranian political researcher, the study, published in the first edition of AGCIS’ Journal of Iranian Studies, argued that Chabahar posed a threat because it would enable Iran to increase greater market share in India for its oil exports at the expense of Saudi Arabia, raise foreign investment in the Islamic republic and increase government revenues, and allow Iran to project power in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

Mr. Husseinbor suggested Saudi support for a low-level Baloch insurgency in Iran could serve as a countermeasure. “Saudis could persuade Pakistan to soften its opposition to any potential Saudi support for the Iranian Baluch… The Arab-Baluch alliance is deeply rooted in the history of the Gulf region and their opposition to Persian domination,” Mr. Husseinbor said.

Noting the vast expanses of Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan Province, Mr. Husseinbor went on to say that “it would be a formidable challenge, if not impossible, for the Iranian government to protect such long distances and secure Chabahar in the face of widespread Baluch opposition, particularly if this opposition is supported by Iran’s regional adversaries and world powers.”

The conservative Washington-based Hudson Institute, which is believed to have developed close ties to the Trump administration, has also taken up the theme of ethnic minorities in Iran. The institute has scheduled a seminar for later this month that features as speakers Baloch, Iranian Arab, Iranian Kurdish and Iranian Azerbaijani nationalists.

Saudi Arabia may already have the building blocks in place for a proxy war in Balochistan. Saudi-funded ultra-conservative Sunni Muslim madrassas operated by anti-Shiite militants dominate Balochistan’s educational landscape.

“A majority of Baloch schoolchildren go to madrassas. They are in better condition than other schools in Balochistan. Most madrassas are operated by Deobandis and Ahl-i-Hadith,” said one of the founders of Sipah-i-Sabaha, a virulent anti-Shiite group that is believed to enjoy Saudi and Pakistani support.

Although officially renamed Ahle Sunnah Wa Al Jamaat after Sipah was banned in Pakistan, the group is still often referred to by its original name. The co-founder, who has since left the group but maintains close ties to it, was referring to the Deobandi sect of Islam, a Saudi backed ultra-conservative, anti-Shiite movement originally established in India in the 19th century to counter British colonial rule, and Ahl-i-Hadith, the religious-political group in Pakistan with the longest ties to the kingdom. The co-founder said the mosques funnelled Saudi funds to the militants.

The co-founder said the leaders in Balochistan of Sipah and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), a Sipah offshoot, Maulana Ramzan Mengal and Maulana Wali Farooqi, enjoyed government and military protection because their anti-Shiite sentiments made them targets for Iran. He said the two men, who maintained close ties to Saudi Arabia, travelled in Balochistan in convoys of up to ten vehicles that included Pakistan military guards. Policemen stand guard outside Mr. Mengal’s madrassa, the co-founder said.

“Ramzan gets whatever he needs from the Saudis,” the co-founder said. Close relations between Sipah and LeJ, on the one hand, and pro-government tribesmen in Balochistan complicate irregular government efforts to reign in the militants. So does the militant’s involvement in drugs smuggling that gives them an independent source of funding.

Iran has accused the United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistani intelligence of supporting anti-Iranian militants in Balochistan, including Jundallah (Soldiers of God), an offshoot of Sipah. Jundallah, founded by Abdolmalek Rigi, a charismatic member of a powerful Baloch tribe, was one of several anti-Iranian groups that enjoyed US and Saudi support as part of US President George W. Bush’s effort to undermine the government in Tehran.

Mr. Rigi was captured when a flight he took from the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek to Dubai was diverted at Iran’s request to Sharjah in 2010. He was executed in Iran. Pakistani forces have at times cooperated with Iran in detaining militants, including Mr. Rigi’s brother, Abdolhamid Rigi, but have often insisted that they are overwhelmed by internal security problems, and could not prioritize securing the border with the Islamic republic. “Our policy has been consistently anti-Iran,” said Khalid Ahmad, an author and journalist who focuses on militants.

Jundullah’s US contact point in the early 2000s was reported to be Thomas McHale, a 56-year-old hard-charging, brusque and opinionated Port Authority of New York and New Jersey detective and former ironworker, who had travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan as part of his work for a Joint Terrorism Task Force in Newark. Known for his disdain for bureaucratic restrictions, Mr. McHale maintained contact with Jundallah and members of the Rigi tribe in an off-the-books operation.

Mr. McHale, a survivor of the 1993 attack on New York’s World Trade Towers, had made a name for himself by rescuing survivors of the 9/11 attack on the towers. He played himself in Oliver Stone’s movie, World Trade Center, in which Nicolas Cage starred as a Port Authority police officer.

Jundallah ambushed a motorcade of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 but failed to kill him. Mr. Rigi’s boyish, grinning face became as a result of the ambush the defining image of Baluch jihad in Iran. A year later, the group bombed a bus carrying Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Jundallah and associated groups such as Jaish al-Adly (Army of Justice), another Sipah offshoot, have since targeted Iranian border posts, Revolutionary Guards, police officers, convoys and Shiite mosques.

General Sharif and Pakistan’s position were not made easier with the recent killing by Jaish al Adl militants operating from Pakistani Balochistan of ten Iranian border guards and with Iran’s expressions of displeasure with the general’s appointment as commander of the Saudi-led military alliance.

US officials insisted in Mr. McHale’s time that government agencies had not directed or ever approved Jundallah operations. The US designated Jundallah as a terrorist organization in 2010, but that did not stop Sunni Muslim militant anti-Iranian operations. In what analysts see as an indication of Saudi influence, Jaish al-Adel issues its statements in Arabic rather than Baluchi or Farsi.

In response, Iran has attacked the militants and raided villages in Balochistan. Arif Saleem, a 42-year old villager recalls being woken in the wee hours of the morning in November 2013 when bombs dropped just outside the mud walls that surround his family compound in Kulauhi, 67 kilometres from the Pakistani border with Iran. Located in a district that is an epicentre of a low-level proxy war with Iran, Kulauhi’s residents survive on subsistence farming and smuggling. “Some buildings collapsed. Luckily, none of the kids were inside those. The blast was so strong, we thought the world was ending,” said Saleem, convinced that Iranian planes from an airbase on the Iranian side of the border carried out the bombing.

The spectre of ethnic proxy wars threatens to further destabilize the Gulf as well as Pakistan. The Baloch insurgency in Pakistani Balochistan has complicated Chinese plans to develop Gwadar and forced Pakistan to take extraordinary security precautions. A stepped-up proxy war could embroil Indian-backed Chabahar in the conflict. The wars could, moreover, spread to Iran’s Khuzestan and Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province.

Writing in 2012 in Asharq Al Awsat, a Saudi newspaper, Amal Al-Hazzani, an academic who has since been dropped from the paper’s roster after she wrote positively about Israel, asserted in an op-ed entitled “The oppressed Arab district of al-Ahwaz” that “the al-Ahwaz district in Iran…is an Arab territory… Its Arab residents have been facing continual repression ever since the Persian state assumed control of the region in 1925… It is imperative that the Arabs take up the al-Ahwaz cause, at least from the humanitarian perspective.” Other Arab commentators have since opined in a similar fashion.

Fuelling ethnic tensions risks Iran responding in kind. Saudi Arabia has long accused Iran of instigating low level violence and protests in its predominantly Shiite oil-rich Eastern Province as well as being behind the brutally squashed popular revolt in majority Shiite Bahrain and intermittent violence since. Rather than resolving conflicts, a Saudi-Iranian war fought with ethnic and religious proxies threatens to escalate violence in both the Gulf and South Asia.


Wealth Gap Overshadows Brexit, Populism As Threat To Global Economy

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Volatility in the exchange rate of South Africa’s rand did not emanate from the recent reshuffle in the cabinet, said Malusi Gigaba, Minister of Finance of South Africa, at the World Economic Forum on Africa Thursday.

Speaking in a CNBC Africa televised debate on Africa’s economic outlook, Gigaba said the rand was volatile for some time before recent cabinet changes made by President Jacob Zuma. “The exchange rate is okay – it is appreciating and showing some stability,” noted the minister. He conceded that major changes in the finance ministry over the past two years might have temporarily affected the rand’s value, but this was not the primary driver of the currency’s volatility.

“South Africa is a democratic country and markets should not panic,” said Gigaba. “We will have a general election and there will be a new president in 2019. There will be a peaceful transition. We will continue to strengthen our institutions for political predictability and stability.” These institutions include the courts and the country’s legal framework, he said.

Wolfgang Schäuble, Federal Minister of Finance of Germany, said European elections and Brexit are not major geopolitical risks in the global context. By contrast, the growing wealth gap between the rich and poor has the potential to create “major problems” for the world.

This gap is epitomized by the disparity between African economies and those of the developed world. Alarm over the potential for violent social upheaval across the globe has prompted the G20 group of nations, along with South Africa, to launch a Compact with Africa to try to rapidly improve the continent’s growth path and thereby stabilize the political environment.

So far, five nations – Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal Rwanda, Morocco and Tunisia – have committed to working with the G20 to build infrastructure and attract considerable new investment. The G20 will facilitate and fund projects as well as encourage major private-sector investors to throw their weight behind the effort.

One demonstration of confidence in the future of Africa and of investor commitment to making a difference on the continent is the investment of $1.5 billion in Johannesburg by Swiss conglomerate ABB. Ulrich Spiesshofer, President and Chief Executive Officer of ABB, Switzerland, said his group has shown its faith in Africa over many decades. This long-term commitment has been well rewarded.

Spiesshofer said the challenge for Africa now lies in mobilizing investment to add value to its resource wealth. The continent has enormous untapped wealth and a vast indigenous market, and bringing these two phenomena together offers Africa a way out of its poverty trap.

Frédéric Lemoine, Chairman of the Executive Board of Wendel, France, and a Co-Chair of the World Economic Forum on Africa, said the risk factors for investors in Africa are often overstated. Companies in the developed world simply do not know enough about conditions on the continent to make informed decisions. The challenge for Africa is to prove that investments can work over time and not be disrupted by political instability and policy uncertainty.

The 2017 World Economic Forum on Africa takes place on 3-5 May in Durban, South Africa, under the theme Achieving Inclusive Growth through Responsive and Responsible Leadership. The meeting convenes regional and global leaders from business, government and civil society to explore solutions to create economic opportunities for all. It will also provide insight from leading experts on how Africa will be affected by the onset of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, particularly in terms of safeguarding the region’s economies from negative disruption and exploiting opportunities for further growth and development.

Politics, Not Religion, Is Source Of Sunni-Shia Conflict – OpEd

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Lately, it has become a habit of Orientalist apologists of Western imperialism to offer reductive historical and theological explanations of Sunni-Shi’a conflict in the Middle East region in order to cover up the blowback of ill-conceived Western military interventions and proxy wars that have reignited the flames of the internecine conflict in the Islamic World.

Some self-anointed “Arabists” posit that the division goes all the way back to the founding of Islam, 1400 years ago, and contend that the conflict emerged during the reign of the fourth caliph, Ali bin Abi Talib, in the seventh century A.D. I wonder what would be the American-led war on terror’s explanation of such “erudite” historians of Islam – that the cause of “the clash of civilizations” can be found in the Crusades when Richard the Lionheart and Saladin were skirmishing in the Levant and exchanging courtesies at the same time?

In modern times, the Sunni-Shi’a conflict in the Middle East region is essentially a political conflict between the Gulf Arab autocrats and Iran for regional dominance which is being presented to lay Muslims in the veneer of religiosity. Saudi Arabia which has been vying for power as the leader of Sunni bloc against the Shi’a-dominated Iran in the regional geopolitics was staunchly against the invasion of Iraq by the Bush Administration in 2003.

The Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein constituted a Sunni Arab bulwark against Iran’s meddling in the Arab World. But after Saddam was ousted from power in 2003 and subsequently when elections were held in Iraq which were swept by Shi’a-dominated parties, Iraq has now been led by a Shi’a-majority government that has become a steadfast regional ally of Iran. Consequently, Iran’s sphere of influence now extends all the way from territorially-contiguous Iraq and Syria to Lebanon and the Mediterranean coast.

Moreover, during the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Bush Administration took advantage of ethnic and sectarian divisions in Iraq and used the Kurds and Shi’as against the Sunni-led Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein. And during the occupation years, from 2003 to 2011, the once dominant Sunni minority was politically marginalized which further exacerbated the ethnic and sectarian divisions in Iraq.

The Saudi royal family was resentful of Iranian encroachment on the traditional Arab heartland. Therefore, when protests broke out against the Shi’a-dominated Assad regime in Syria in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, the Gulf Arab States along with their regional Sunni allies, Turkey and Jordan, and the Western patrons gradually militarized the protests to dismantle the Iranian axis.

According to reports, Syria’s pro-Assad militias are comprised of local militiamen as well as Shi’a foreign fighters from Lebanon, Iraq, Iran and even the Hazara Shi’as from as far away as Afghanistan and Pakistan. And similarly, Sunni jihadists from all over the region have also been flocking to the Syrian battlefield for the last six years. A full-scale Sunni-Shi’a war has been going on in Syria, Iraq and Yemen which will obviously have its repercussions all over the Islamic World where Sunni and Shi’a Muslims have coexisted in relative peace for centuries.

More to the point, the Islamic State, al-Nusra Front and the majority of Syrian militant groups are also basically anti-Shi’a sectarian outfits. Though the Islamic State has carried out a few acts of terrorism against the Western countries, such as the high profile Paris and Brussels attacks, but if we look at the pattern of its subversive activities, especially in the Middle East, it generally targets Shi’a Muslims in Syria and Iraq. A few acts of terrorism that it has carried out in the Gulf Arab States were also directed against Shi’a Muslims in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia and Shi’a mosques in Yemen and Kuwait.

Regarding the Syrian opposition, a small fraction of it has been comprised of defected Syrian soldiers who go by the name of Free Syria Army, but the vast majority has been comprised of Sunni Arab jihadists and armed tribesmen who have been generously funded, trained, armed and internationally legitimized by their regional and international patrons.

The Islamic State is nothing more than one of numerous Syrian militant outfits, others being: al Nusra Front, Ahrar al-Sham, al-Tawhid brigade, Jaysh al Islam etc. All the Sunni Arab militant groups that are operating in Syria are just as fanatical and brutal as the Islamic State. The only feature that differentiates the Islamic State from the rest is that it is more ideological and independent-minded.

The reason why the US has turned against the Islamic State is that all other Syrian militant outfits have only local ambitions that are limited to fighting the Assad regime in Syria, while the Islamic State has established a global network of transnational terrorists that includes hundreds of Western citizens who can later become a national security risk to the Western countries.

Notwithstanding, in order to create a semblance of objectivity and fairness, the American policymakers and analysts are always willing to accept the blame for the mistakes of the distant past that have no bearing on their present policy, however, any fact that impinges on their present policy is conveniently brushed aside.

In the case of the formation of Islamic State, for instance, the US policy analysts are willing to concede that invading Iraq back in 2003 was a mistake that radicalized the Iraqi society, exacerbated sectarian divisions and gave birth to an unrelenting Sunni insurgency against the heavy handed and discriminatory policies of the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi government.

Similarly, the “war on terror” era political commentators also “generously” accept that the Cold War era policy of nurturing al-Qaeda, Taliban and myriads of other Afghan so-called “freedom fighters” against the erstwhile Soviet Union was a mistake, because all those fait accompli have no bearing on their present policy.

The mainstream media’s spin-doctors conveniently forget, however, that the formation of the Islamic State and myriads of other Sunni Arab jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq has as much to do with the unilateral invasion of Iraq back in 2003 under the Bush Administration as it has been the legacy of the Obama Administration that funded, armed, trained and internationally legitimized the Sunni militants against the Syrian regime since 2011-onward in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa region.

In fact, the proximate cause behind the rise of the Islamic State, al Nusra Front, Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam and numerous other Sunni jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq has been the Obama Administration’s policy of intervention through proxies in Syria.

Apart from Syria and Iraq, two other flashpoints of Sunni-Shi’a conflict in the Middle East region are Bahrain and Yemen. When peaceful protests began against the Sunni monarchy in Bahrain by the Shi’a majority population in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011, Saudi Arabia sent thousands of its own troops across the border to quell the demonstrations.

Similarly, when the Iran-backed Houthis, which is an offshoot of Shi’a Islam, overran Sana’a in September 2014, Saudi Arabia and UAE mounted another ill-conceived Sunni offensive against the Houthi militia. The nature of the conflict in Yemen is sectarian to an extent that recently, the Yemeni branch of al-Qaeda’s leader, Qasim al-Raymi, has claimed that al-Qaeda has been fighting hand in hand with the Saudi-led alliance against the Iran-backed rebels for the last couple of years.

The revelation does not comes as a surprise, however, because after all al-Qaeda’s official franchise in Syria, al-Nusra Front, has also been fighting hand in glove with the Syrian opposition against the Assad regime for the last six years of the Syrian civil war.

Now when the fire of inter-sectarian strife is burning on four different fronts in the Middle East and the Sunni and Shi’a communities are witnessing a merciless slaughter of their brethren in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Bahrain, then what kind of an Orientalist shill would have the time and luxury to look for the cause of the conflict in theology and history? If the Sunni and Shi’a Muslims have been so thirsty for each other’s blood since the founding of Islam, then how come they managed to survive as distinct sectarian groups for 1400 years?

Fact of the matter is that in modern times, the phenomena of Islamic radicalism, jihadism and the consequent Sunni-Shi’a conflict are only as old as the Soviet-Afghan jihad during the late seventies and eighties when the Western powers with the help of Saudi money and Pakistan’s intelligence agencies trained and armed Afghan jihadists to battle the Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

And the conflict has been further exacerbated in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 when the Western powers and their regional client states once again took advantage of the opportunity and nurtured militants against the Arab nationalist Qaddafi regime in Libya and the anti-Zionist Assad regime in Syria.

Africa’s Prosperity Tied To South Africa And Nigeria

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Tackling Africa’s massive social challenges is impossible without harnessing and coordinating the power of its two largest economies, South Africa and Nigeria, said Kuseni Douglas Dlamini, Chairman of Massmart Holdings, South Africa, at the World Economic Forum on Africa, which opened Thursday in Durban.

Dlamini pointed out that the two economic powerhouses together contribute 60% of the gross domestic product of sub-Saharan Africa. “Africa cannot succeed unless they succeed,” he added.

However, neither South Africa nor Nigeria is currently on a high-growth path. The global slowdown has clearly had a profound effect, but the countries’ leaders need to consider whether they have fully applied the principles of inclusive and sustainable growth.

One example of effective leadership would be a redoubled effort at regional integration. At present, only 10% of all Africa’s trade is intra-African – the lowest ratio of all continents in the world. If this could be boosted to 20% it would make meaningful inroads into creating jobs and tackling poverty.

Haruki Hayashi, Executive Vice-President and Regional Chief Executive Officer, Europe and Africa, Mitsubishi Corporation, United Kingdom, said that South Africa and Nigeria should be “leaders, drivers and role models” for other African countries. This does not necessarily mean they shouldn’t be competitive – after all, the African market is a huge one with many trade and development opportunities for both. Hayashi said that policy consistency, political stability and turning back the tide of corruption are imperatives to South Africa and Nigeria assuming a leadership and mentoring role on the continent.

Danladi Verheijen, Co-Founder and Chief Executive Officer of Verod Capital Management, Nigeria, said that diversification of economies is a priority for many countries, but particularly for Nigeria, given its heavy reliance on its oil resources. He said oil has been seen as fuelling the Nigerian economy, but it should instead be seen as “lubricating” it. “Quick wins” are important to kick-starting growth away from current low levels.

Geoffrey Qhena, Chief Executive Officer of the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa, said that Africa’s larger economies could, counter-intuitively, benefit from global moves towards protectionism. Rather than remaining reliant on imports in many sectors, countries like South Africa and Nigeria with the capacity to build new industry and manufacturing sectors could do so – with obvious long-term benefits for themselves and their neighbours. It might be important to collaborate on such initiatives and leaders need to engage and iron out their differences regarding impediments to cooperation.

One-Third Of Americans Are On Government Healthcare

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By Ryan McMaken*

The US House of Representatives voted to day to “repeal and replace” Obamacare. Unfortunately, those who use the phrase “repeal and replace” are greatly exaggerating the extent to which the Affordable Care Act is actually repealed.

While perhaps a tiny step in the right direction, the new legislation signals no departure whatsoever from the long-established trend of expanding the role of government programs in subsidizing the regulating the health care industry.

Perhaps worst of all, since this is being called a “repeal,” many may be prompted to think that the US health care system is a “free market” system, or that government spending has only a very small role in the industry.

This couldn’t be further from the truth.

In fact, the US is fourth in the world in terms of per capita government spending on health care, behind only Norway, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. That’s government spending,  not overall spending:

In fact, those numbers from the World Health Organization (WHO) are from 2014, and with the expansion in Medicaid spending under Obamacare, it’s entirely plausible that the US has moved into third place in the past two years.

But how does this translate into actual persons on government programs? Viewed this this angle, we find that full one-third of all Americans are either currently enrolled in a government health program, or have recently been enrolled in one.

There are approximately 55,504,000 Americans on Medicare, which covers the elderly. But there is also an additional 74,506,000 Americans on Medicaid or CHIP. About 11 million of those are dual-enrolled, which means they’re on both Medicare and Medicaid. If we pull the 11 million out of the Medicaid count to avoid double counting, we find that there is a total of 119 million Americans on government programs — or about one-third.1

“But, wait!” you might say. “Obamacare expanded the number of people on Medicare, so maybe if we remove all of those people, the numbers will be smaller.”

Yes, it’s true, the numbers will be smaller, but as the Kaiser Family Foundation’s research shows, the pre-Obamacare average for Medicaid/CHIP enrollment was 56.8 million. So, if we go back to that pre-Obamacare number, we end up with about 31 percent of Americans on government healthcare — still a hefty number.2

Moreover, given the way the Obamacare “repeal” is written, we shouldn’t expect any sizable long-term decline in Medicaid enrollment. That upward trend is going to continue unless major reforms takes place.

As an additional illustration of the outsized role of government agencies in the industry, we might also look to the fact that government programs are starting to eclipse private sector insurance within the health insurance industry:

Here’s a nugget that encapsulates the health insurance industry, despite all the noise surrounding the future of the Affordable Care Act: In the first quarter of this year, Aetna collected more premium revenue from government programs (namely Medicare and Medicaid) than it did from commercial insurance for the first time ever.

Why this matters: Most people get their health coverage from their employer, and that historically has been the bread and butter of the insurance industry. But the aging population and expansion of Medicaid managed care means insurers are investing more time and money in the lower-margin (but still lucrative) government programs. Aetna, in particular, has invested heavily in Medicare Advantage.

This “free-market” health care system of our doesn’t seem to have much in the way of freedom or markets.

And finally, let’s take a look at growth in federal government spending on health care over time. This is only federal spending and doesn’t include state spending, such as the state-funded portion of Medicaid.

Between 1980 and 2014 — that is, before Obamacare — health care spending by the federal government increased many times over.. Yes, there has been a surge in spending thanks to Obamacare, but it’s a surge above what was already an immense amount of spending growth that already took place during the George W. Bush years and before. It was Bush, after all, who gave us an immense expansion of Medicare coverage into prescription drugs ten years before Obamacare.3

If we look at federal health care spending in terms of growth compared to GDP, we find that health care spending has been outpacing GDP for many years4: If the GOP plan passed in by the House today ends up doing anything to restrain these costs, then we might say it’s a small victory. But let’s not pretend that government programs are not the single biggest driver of spending in the health care industry. Indeed, when it comes to spending on welfare programs, the US is a typical Western welfare state. Even with the “repeal” of Obamacare, the myth of the “free-market” American economic system will remain exactly that: a myth.

About the author:
*Ryan McMaken is the editor of Mises Wire and The Austrian. Send him your article submissions, but read article guidelines first. (Contact: email; twitter.) Ryan has degrees in economics and political science from the University of Colorado, and was the economist for the Colorado Division of Housing from 2009 to 2014. He is the author of Commie Cowboys: The Bourgeoisie and the Nation-State in the Western Genre.

Source:
This article was published by the MISES Institute

  • 1. The enrollment and benefiary estimates come from the Kaiser Family Foundation. The Medicaid numbers can be found here: http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/total-monthly-medicaid-and-chip-enrollment/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D
    The Medicare numbers are here: http://kff.org/medicare/state-indicator/total-medicare-beneficiaries/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Total%20Medicare%20Beneficiaries%22,%22sort%22:%22desc%22%7D
    Stats on dual-enrollment are here: https://www.cms.gov/Medicare-Medicaid-Coordination/Medicare-and-Medicaid-Coordination/Medicare-Medicaid-Coordination-Office/Downloads/DualEnrollment20062013.pdf.
    Total US population numbers from February 2017 are here: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/POP
  • 2. For some similar comparisons, see here: http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/medicaid-and-medicare-enrollees-now-outnumber-full-time-private-sector-workers
  • 3. This graph uses data from Table 3.2 of the historical OMB tables: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/budget/Historicals
  • 4. This graph combines Table 3.2 OMB data (https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/budget/Historicals) with GDP totals (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPA)

India: Chhattisgarh Police Cannot Hold Back And Fight Naxals In Their Stronghold Through Proxies – OpEd

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By K.P.S. Gill*

The Burkapal attack in Sukma District is disturbing not only because of the high number of Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel (25) who lost their lives, but because a similar pattern of apparent neglect of basic procedure had resulted in the significant loss of 12 troopers on March 11, at Bhejji, less than 30 kilometres away from the location of the Burkapal incident, and in circumstances that were comparable on several parameters. Yet, this failed to alert forces in the wider region to the daily risks that confronted them.

Both incidents were avoidable, and there is an urgent need for the CRPF to study and understand what is going wrong, and to address the visible failures of orientation, training and leadership that lie at the source not just of these two, but of the long succession of incidents in which the Maoists have been able to successfully target our forces. Significantly, while other forces have also fallen to Maoist ambushes – for instance, in February, eight personnel of the Odisha Police were killed in a landmine blast in the Koraput district – CRPF losses have been disproportionate. This is only partly because the CRPF is, in fact, the largest force deployed for ‘anti-Naxalite’ operations. Structural and operational deficiencies of the force, including irrational and protracted deployments, inadequate training, almost no retraining, poor leadership, strategic and tactical stasis, fatigue and indiscipline, and an overwhelming posture of passive defence, have also played a crucial part.

Nevertheless, the idea that India’s counterinsurgency campaigns against the Maoists are failing is false, as is the idea that the Police and Central Paramilitary Forces (CPMFs) currently deployed are incapable of delivering (and the corollary, often voiced, that the Army needs to be called in). The Maoists have suffered massive reverses over the past years, and are now fighting for survival in the last of their erstwhile ‘bastions’. In 2010, the Maoists were rampaging across 223 of the country’s 640 Districts; by 2016, they had been restricted to just 106 Districts (of 707), of which no more than 25 – overwhelmingly at the tri-junction of Andhra Pradesh, Odisha and Chhattisgarh – were in the ‘highly affected’ category.

Crucially, a large proportion of the top Maoist leadership has been arrested, a few have been killed. Through the middle leadership and lower ranks, surrenders and arrests have been endemic, forcing the Maoists into what they describe as a ‘tactical retreat’, and into a surge of violence against civilians who are branded ‘collaborators’ or ‘police informers’, tortured and killed. These are desperate measures in an organisation that is under deep stress. The state’s successes, here, have overwhelmingly been the result of the only successful counter-insurgency (CI) paradigm across theatres – narrowly targeted intelligence based operations – and not the clumsy ‘area domination’ or ‘clear and hold’ exercises that rely on massive deployments of Force.

In this, Chhattisgarh has remained problematic, first, because the Maoists have been most deeply entrenched in its forest areas, with a very substantial and sustained tribal recruitment over the past two decades; and second, because the State Government has sought the illusion of success rather than its substance. Despite significant augmentation of Police resources, and tens of thousands trained in the State’s Counter-insurgency and Jungle Warfare College at Kanker, the Police has failed to take the lead in the fight against the Maoists, and prefers to thrust the CPMFs to the helm. The latter, operating on limited or poor intelligence, with little understanding of local conditions, having been bloodied again and again, have retreated into their camps, to carry out occasional and tentative forays into their proximate surroundings. Most of their ‘regular’ duties are now static, an interminable and inactive waiting that saps the will. The State Police boasts of thousands of Maoist ‘surrenders’ and arrests, but these rarely include identifiable leadership elements, and State Police leaders admit in private that a bulk of these are ‘fake’.

There is a surfeit of experience in theatres across India that has demonstrated clearly that the essential template of successful CI response is police-led. As long as the State Police holds back and seeks to fight through proxies – whether these are undisciplined tribal irregulars or CPMFs unfamiliar with local population and environment – enduring success will remain elusive, though occasional operational victories may reinforce a false belief that gains are being made. Such convictions, however, are quickly undermined when the other side orchestrates a major incident.

CI is a long war; its core principle is attrition, not an abrupt and dramatic overwhelming of the adversary. CI campaigns demand tremendous tactical adaptation within an enduring strategic framework. Unless the state demonstrates determination, and an unwavering commitment to a well-defined CI strategy, operational gains are quickly lost. The Maoists are presently in great difficulty, and there are wide opportunities for state consolidation. It must, however, be abundantly clear that they will not go down without a fight.

K.P.S. Gill, the writer, former DGP, Punjab, is president, Institute for Conflict Management, and publisher, ‘South Asia Intelligence Review’.

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