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Merkley Agrees NAFTA Needs Renegotiated, But Wary Of Trump Administration

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The Trump Administration has formally issued a notice to Congress beginning the process of renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

Commenting on the news, Oregon Democrat Senator Jeff Merkley said, “The key question for trade deals is whether they create good-paying jobs for working Americans, or destroy good-paying jobs.”

Merkley admitted that for the last two decades NAFTA has clearly failed this test.

“Trump’s actions to renegotiate NAFTA will only deliver a better result, however, if he operates with a ‘workers first’ perspective – and so far, he hasn’t,” said Merkley in a statement.

As an example, Merkley said, the Trump Administrations health care plan destroys care for millions of workers while delivering $600 billion to the wealthiest Americans.

In the opinion of Merkley, “If Trump’s wealthy and powerful friends dictate the terms of the renegotiation, NAFTA could easily become worse, not better, for working Americans. That’s unacceptable. If we don’t make things in America, we won’t have a middle class in America.”

The post Merkley Agrees NAFTA Needs Renegotiated, But Wary Of Trump Administration appeared first on Eurasia Review.


EU-Korea Trade Deal Review Calls For Action On Labor Rights Violations

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By Hermine Donceel

(EurActiv) — Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) voted Tuesday to support a motion for a resolution on the outcomes of a five-year-old free trade agreement with South Korea, which praises the agreement for its positive effect on trade and integration between the two countries. But it also calls on the Commission to act on labour right violations in the Asian country.

The EU South Korea chapter on labour and environment enjoins the parties to respect core International Labour Organisation conventions. Seoul has not ratified all core ILO conventions.

MEPs say that there are “still cases of violation of freedom of association, including troubling examples of imprisonment of trade union leaders, and interference in negotiations, which should rest within the autonomy of the bargaining partners”. Recent revisions of labour law undertaken by Korea’s outgoing government has led to an intensification of the repression over labour and civil society, critics say.

The report “urges the Commission to take up formal consultations with the Korean Government” and to “prepare adequate measures in case of breaches”.

Since its entry into force five years ago the free trade deal with the South Korea generated a 47% increase in EU exports to Korea, a performance said to have exceeded expectations.

The resolution drafted by MEP Adam Szejnfeld (EPP, Poland) also points to a number of shortcomings in addressing technical barriers to trade, such as a direct transport clause, a clause on repaired goods and certificate-related issues, as well as in the area of intellectual property rights. Korean phyto-sanitary measures also harm EU beef and pork exports, MEPs deplore.

Malmström commits to talking to Seoul

“I agree that Korea needs to do more on trade and sustainable development, particularly labour rights,” EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström admitted in her address to the plenary on Wednesday (17 May). “To this end we need to use all the available channels that we have to insist on the need for progress.”

Civil society mechanisms established in the deal, and the government-to-government dialogue did not suffice to induce Korea to keep its promises. “It is not enough,” agreed Malmström.

MEP Alessia Mosca, S&D spokesperson on trade, said that “a failure to act on the side of the Commission could undermine the effectiveness of Sustainable Development Chapters in EU’s trade agreements, and of the EU trade policy in general”. The centre-left political group criticises the absence of sanctions foreseen in the deal’s sustainable development chapter in case of non compliance

Cecilia Malmström has said she is waiting for a Korean government to enter into office in June 2017. “This would be a matter of priority with the new government” she promised. “Hopefully they will be more open to cooperation and more forthcoming to human rights. There are indications that this is the case,” she added.

Elusive trade pact amendments

Malmström said the Commission would submit amendments to the agreement. “We have indicated to Korea that we will look at legal means if necessary if we do not see progress on these issues,” the trade commissioner said.

Korea has indicated it was interested in including an investment protection chapter investment in the agreement. That matter is turning out to be complicated.

MEPs say such a chapter cannot be discussed before the difficulties in the sustainable development chapter are addressed. In addition, the parliament’s resolution also says that using investment arbitration – also known as ISDS – is out of the question. However, Seoul is hesitant about the EU’s plans to replace private arbitration with the ICS, or a system of pre-nominated judges, in its new free trade agreements.

“This makes rapid progress on an amendment package unlikely,” concluded Malmström.

The European Parliament resolution – a non binding document – was adopted by a majority of 418 MEPs on Thursday.

The post EU-Korea Trade Deal Review Calls For Action On Labor Rights Violations appeared first on Eurasia Review.

New Nuclear Posture Review: Can It Break New Ground? – Analysis

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By Manpreet Sethi*

As was expected with the arrival of President Trump to the White House, he put all US foreign policy issues under review. He has also called for a new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that is likely to be announced in 2018. The last NPR was brought out under the watch of former President Barack Obama in 2010 and much has changed since then, particularly in US-Russia relations. The last NPR had downgraded the threat from near peers such as Russia, reducing the need for retaining the kind of deterrence strategies that had been pursued during the Cold War years. Instead, the challenge of securing available nuclear material and technology worldwide in order to minimise, if not obviate, the risk of nuclear terrorism had been upgraded to the highest level.

Accordingly, President Obama invested in Nuclear Security Summits even as he reduced the role of nuclear weapons in his national security strategy. In doing so, Obama had reversed some of the recommendations of the earlier NPR brought out by his predecessor in 2002. Drafted under President Bush, the previous NPR had promoted a unilateralist US posture premised on the idea of nuclear pre-emption, support for development of new types of nuclear weapons, retention of the option of nuclear testing, and pursuit of missile defence. While it had reduced the number of US nuclear weapons, it had contributed significantly to increasing the salience of these weapons. President Trump might end up taking the US down that path again as he has mandated the Pentagon to get him a nuclear arsenal that is “safe, secure, effective, reliable and aptly tailored to deter 21st century threats and reassure allies.”

While presidential preferences reflect significantly in the nature of the NPR, it is also influenced by the opposing pulls and pushes arising from the interests and concerns of the many stakeholders in the US nuclear arsenal. Concluded after several rounds of inter-agency deliberations, the NPR encapsulates many interests. Prima facie it appears that the Trump NPR will not draw away from the modernisation of the US arsenal that President Obama had approved before demitting office. It is likely to retain a strong focus on US nuclear weapons in order to handle the new threats that have emerged in the form of a more muscular Russia, a more assertive China, a more unpredictable DPRK and an Iran whose long-term intentions the US is still worried about. Given his own proclivity for military might, Trump is unlikely to change course unless some real breakthroughs become possible in the relationships with Russia, China and DPRK. Such possibilities look absolutely bleak at this time. Rather, all indications are that nuclear weapons states are moving towards modernising their arsenals and showcasing nuclear capabilities – in military parades and through cavalier statements. Not surprising then that several analysts are arguing in favour of retaining nuclear capability as a means of credible deterrence and dissuasion against proliferation. Amassing unlimited nuclear power is seen as being more effective to deter enemies, reassure allies, and to dissuade potential proliferators by giving them no hope “of ever achieving nuclear parity with the US.” Trump has made it clear that he is willing to race anyone on nuclear weapons and remain “on top of the pack.”

While such bluster appears to be the order of the day, these arguments certainly have an adverse impact on international security. As officials prepare the NPR, it may help to remember three things. One, enemies are definitely deterred by the other side’s military might but there is no proof that the promise of unlimited nuclear power deters more. Deterrence is a function of many sources and influences including, most importantly, the value at stake. Therefore, when a country attaches a great value to something – territory, survival, or stature – it is unlikely to be deterred even by the threat of nuclear devastation. The desire to possess unlimited nuclear power is a meaningless exercise since for those who want to be deterred, even a few would be enough; and for those who cannot be deterred, even an unlimited nuclear arsenal would be futile.

Two, nuclear parity is hardly a pre-requisite for credible nuclear deterrence. Deterrence is based on the ability to inflict ‘unacceptable damage’ and hence is dependent on the unacceptability threshold of a country. There can never be symmetry in these thresholds and some countries could be willing to allow more damage to themselves – including accepting visions of more ‘dying beautifully’ – than others. Equivalence is not required in the nuclear game; not between US and Russia, or US and China. Therefore, an arms race in nuclear warheads is not only unnecessary but also damaging.

Three, far from dissuading proliferation, a commitment to hold on to nuclear weapons infinitely is certain to fuel more proliferation. History illustrates that in order to deter nuclear weapons, a rival has but to acquire the same class of weapons. How then can proliferation be stopped? This is especially so when countries like DPRK have demonstrated that very few weapons are actually needed to achieve a range of objectives such as guarding against regime change, driving a hard bargain, or altering even a big nuclear power’s foreign policy. Did the US not say early in 2006 that the “US would never live” with a nuclear DPRK? In fact, it has been doing so for the last decade and more.

The dangers arising from the presence of nuclear weapons are many: the risk of nuclear exchange, inadvertent escalation, miscalculation, unauthorised use, the threat of loose nukes, and above all, nuclear proliferation with its attendant risks. Moving to nuclear infinity means living with them in perpetuity.

The US would do well to heed these risks and recognise the need for accepting and imposing certain mutual limits on weapons and testing. President Obama’s dictum was no new nuclear warheads, capabilities, or missions. Retaining this basic thought would not only indicate fiscal prudence, which should appeal to the business-minded Trump, but also lead to better international security. Even if the international climate is averse to the idea of the elimination of nuclear weapons right now, attempts at reducing their salience through a number of bilateral and multilateral initiatives should be the priority. Moving towards more and more advanced capabilities to counter the adversary’s actions could only lead to more security dilemmas. Political dialogue coupled with downplaying military might can be the only win-win solution for the current slew of challenges.

* Manpreet Sethi
Senior Fellow and Project Leader, Nuclear Security, Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS), New Delhi

The post New Nuclear Posture Review: Can It Break New Ground? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Modi Redefines India’s Palestine Policy – Analysis

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By P. R. Kumaraswamy*

Redefining is perhaps the best way to capture the nuanced changes introduced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in India’s Palestine policy. Behind the media hype about India’s ‘unwavering support’ for the Palestinian cause,1 there is a subtle but unmistakable shift in policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This was clearly manifested during the recent visit of Palestine President Mahmoud Abbas to New Delhi – his fifth since being elected as the successor to Yasser Arafat in January 2005, and his first after Modi became Prime Minister. Both leaders met in September 2015 during the annual session of the UN General Assembly.2 Modi had, however, met his Israeli counterpart the previous year during the UN General Assembly in 2014.

Abbas’ latest visit had all the customary trappings associated with a head of state visit: ceremonial reception in Rashtrapati Bhavan, wreath laying at Rajghat, courtesy calls from Vice-President, Minister of External Affairs and a formal meeting with the Prime Minister. Despite the pageantry, courtesy and pleasantries, India has signalled a new approach towards Palestine as well as the wider Arab-Israeli conflict. Modi’s press statement with Abbas at his side was the giveaway. How does one read and interpret Abbas’ four-day visit during May 14-17?

The Déjà Vu Moment

Though not his first visit to New Delhi, this would have been a difficult moment for Abbas and not very different from the one undertaken by Arafat in January 1992. When Prime Minister Narasimha Rao hosted Arafat, it was clear to Mr. Palestine that India was planning to abandon its four decades old policy of non-relations and follow the footsteps of the major powers like the then Soviet Union and China in normalising relations with Israel. At that time, the politico-diplomatic cards were heavily stacked against Arafat especially after his ill-advised support for Saddam Hussein during the Kuwait crisis. The Rao-Arafat meeting in late January removed the last little hurdle to normalization of relations with Israel, and the Palestinian leader had no option but to accept India’s sovereign right to determine its foreign policy priorities.3

Modi, who often expresses his admiration for Rao, took a leaf out of the latter’s diplomatic manual and put Abbas in the same predicament. Ever since the idea first emerged in January,4 there are unmistakable indications that Modi’s impending visit to Israel would be a stand-alone one, that is, without the customary visit to Ramallah.5 Until now, most of India’s political engagements with Israel also included the areas under the control of the Palestine National Authority (PNA); initially the Gaza Strip and afterwards Ramallah when Arafat moved his headquarters in 2003. The itineraries of all the three visits by External Affairs Ministers Jaswant Singh (June-July 2000), S M Krishna (January 2012) and Sushma Swaraj (January 2016) included Ramallah. The itinerary of President Pranab Mukherjee who visited Israel in October 2015 had Palestine as well as Jordan.6 Hence, hosting Abbas just weeks before his visit to Israel is a clear indication that Ramallah will not be on Modi’s itinerary.

Abbas recognized the reality of the Indian summer and, when asked about Modi also visiting Palestine, he did not go beyond saying: “Prime Minister Modi is always welcome to visit Palestine, a country loved by hundreds of millions of Indians.”7

Decisive Shift

Modi not planning to visit Ramallah while engaging with Israel is a remarkable shift. In the early 1920s and amidst the Khilafat struggle, Indian nationalists made common cause with the Arabs of Palestine and adopted a position that was unsympathetic to the Jewish aspirations for a national home in Palestine.8 Adopting an identical position, the Indian National Congress opposed the idea of religion-based partition in India as well as in Palestine. Politics pose strange challenges, and the immediacy of independence resulted in the Congress leadership accepting the communal partition of the British Raj. But geographical distance and domestic competition with the Muslim League resulted in the Congress party adopting a different position vis-à-vis Jewish nationalism. Despite its opposition to the partition of Palestine and eventual recognition of Israel in September 1950, India did not establish diplomatic relations with the latter.

So long as India did not formalize relations with Israel, its leaders could invoke Mahatma Gandhi’s 1938 statement – “Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same sense that England belongs to the English and France to the French” – and highlight India’s consistent and steadfast support for the Palestinian cause.9 Even a modicum of relations with Israel was seen as anti-Palestinian. This zero-sum approach ended in January 1992 when Rao chose to reverse the four decades old recognition-without-relations policy of Jawaharlal Nehru and established diplomatic relations with Israel. Rao was principally responding to structural changes in the international order following the end of the Cold War and was signalling India’s willingness to make a break with the past. And he chose to do this through the normalisation of relations with Israel.

Normalisation of relations undermined India’s ability to evoke historical positions and consistent support for Palestinians to explain and justify the new-found bonhomie with Israel. How to explain the new situation within the Gandhian paradigm and moral arguments, especially when Realism was seen as a plague to be avoided? India muddled along by seeking a balance between its traditional positions on Palestine and its bourgeoning relations with Israel. 10

Since Modi’s election, change was definitely in the offing. The BRICS summit in Fortaleza, Brazil, was his first multilateral exposure. Coming weeks after his inauguration, the Fortaleza Declaration inter alia reaffirmed the member-states’ commitment to “a two-State solution with a contiguous and economically viable Palestinian State existing side by side in peace with Israel, within mutually agreed and internationally recognized borders based on the 4 June 1967 lines, with East Jerusalem as its capital.” Ignoring the popular protests and regional turmoil in the Arab world, it identified “the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a fundamental component for building a sustainable peace in the Middle East.”11 However, much water has flown in the Ganga since then.

The first sign came in July 2015 when India chose to abstain in the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) vote on alleged ‘war crimes’ being committed by Israel as well as by Hamas during the 2014 war, referred to by Israel as Operation Protective Edge. Only a year earlier, India had voted with others in the Council to institute an international inquiry into the Gaza violence and attributed its shift to a reference to Israel being taken to the International Criminal Court.12 India once again abstained in March 2016 when the UNHRC voted on a similar resolution.13 Interestingly, a few days after the first UNHRC vote in July 2015, Secretary East Anil Wadhwa visited Ramallah and met President Abbas.14

Thus, it took more than a year after Modi’s election for the government to begin to spell out its policy shift on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and redefine its parameters. While it is keen to further bilateral relations with Palestine, India is no longer willing to view its Israel policy through the traditional Palestinian prism. After his talks with the visiting Palestinian leader, Modi reiterated India’s support for “a sovereign, independent, united and viable Palestine, co-existing peacefully with Israel.” This is an extremely powerful and loaded phrase with far-reaching implications.

While ‘independent and viable’ are self-explanatory, ‘united Palestine’ has become an uphill task, especially since the onset of the Middle East peace process in Madrid in October 1991. The militant Palestinian group Hamas, established in the wake of the first intifada in 1988, has been challenging the legitimacy of the internationally recognized Palestinian leadership. Indeed, even as the western powers were moving towards recognising the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the ‘sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people’, Hamas challenged, and in the process undermined, the political accommodation that Arafat sought through the Oslo accords. Besides carrying out a virulent campaign of suicide attacks, the militant group also challenged and weakened all the Palestinian institutions headed by Arafat, namely Fatah, PLO and ultimately the PNA. Indeed, internal schism exploded into a full-fledged confrontation following the electoral victory of Hamas in January 2006 and its military takeover of the Gaza Strip in July 2007.

As a result, during the past decade, the Palestinians have been living under two political controls: the internationally recognised PNA headed by Abbas whose authority is limited to the West Bank, and an increasingly isolated Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip. Ironically, while Abbas has visited India five times since becoming President, during the same period he could not set foot in the Gaza Strip, the other half of Palestine. Thus, even occupation and a common fight against Israel could not bring about internal unity and cohesion among the Palestinians. This situation says a lot about the foresight and vision of the Palestinian leadership.

By calling for a ‘united Palestine’, Modi also differs with the current Israeli government which is gravitating towards a one-state solution, namely, Israel without a Palestinian state. For decades, Arabs and Palestinians adopted this approach and sought a Palestinian state instead of Israel. And frustrated by the failure of the Oslo process, some in the West view one-state as a possible solution to the Israeli-Palestinian problem. In suggesting a one-state solution, both sides seek to negate the legitimate rights of the other; that is, Israel without Palestinian statehood and Palestine without Israel. However, most of the international community including India is committed to a two-state solution, with both Israel and Palestine co-existing side by side with peace and security.

Modi and the Middle East

Ever since Benjamin Netanyahu became the first world leader to congratulate Modi on his impending victory even as Lok Sabha results were being announced, there were speculations that Israel would be among the first countries that the new prime minister would visit. Writing in June 2015, a former diplomat observed:

a visit has been on the cards ever since Modi’s government came to power a year ago. Not only does the Bharatiya Janata Party leader have a strong personal relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, he also exemplifies the deep and abiding camaraderie that has existed between the hard right of the Zionist movement and our own right-wing Hindutva elements, brought together by the shared sentiment of retrieving some notion of historic destiny.15

Modi, however, had other ideas and has been actively engaging with the Arab-Islamic Middle East. His first formal meeting was with the then Crown Prince (now King) Salman of Saudi Arabia during the Brisbane G-20 meeting in November 2014. Since then, he has met the Saudi King twice, first in Belek, Anatolia, at the G-20 meeting in November 2015 and later during his state visit to Saudi Arabia in April 2016.

Modi’s diplomatic forays into the region began with a visit to the UAE in August 2015, which was followed by visits in 2016 to Saudi Arabia (April),16 Iran (May) and Qatar (June). In January 2017, India hosted UAE Crown Prince as the chief guest of the Republic Day celebrations.17 In between, Modi hosted Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi twice; first during the India-Africa Forum Summit in October 2015 and subsequently during a state visit in September 2016. Modi’s visit to Turkey for the G-20 meeting November 2016 was followed by the state visit of Recep Tayyip Erdogan earlier this month.18 With the visit of Abbas, the prime minister has hosted or visited all the major leaders of the wider Middle East.

Furthermore, there were presidential visits to Jordan, Palestine, and Israel in October 2015 and Vice-Presidential visits to Morocco (May-June), Tunisia (June) and Algeria (October) in 2016. Keeping pace with Modi’s diplomatic journeys, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj visited almost all the countries of the wider Middle East, with Minister of State M J Akbar making it to troubled areas such as Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. One could say that except for war-torn Libya and Yemen, there were high-level political engagements with all the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region since Modi became prime minister.

Thus, the deck is clear for Modi’s visit to Israel. Disproving the conventional wisdom, he had laid an elaborate ground work to remove all possible domestic hurdles. And hosting Abbas was his last move.

Jerusalem, the Real shift

As with inter-personal relations, what is ‘missing’ is often more interesting than what is ‘present’. This is true for the Palestinian leader’s visit, and the highlight was Modi’s statement outlining India’s policy, rather India’s redefined Palestine policy. In his public statement with Abbas standing next to him, Modi observed:

The relationship between India and Palestine is built on the foundation of long-standing solidarity and friendship since the days of our own freedom struggle. India has been unwavering in its support of the Palestinian cause. And, we hope to see the realization of a sovereign, independent, united and viable Palestine, co-existing peacefully with Israel. I have reaffirmed our position on this to President Abbas during our conversation today.19

There is, however, an interesting catch. This measured statement stands in contrast to the traditional Indian position on Palestine. Partly to balance its relations with Israel and partly to reiterate its pro-Palestinian credentials, during the past decade Indian leaders have been expressing support for the Palestinian narrative of the final settlement, namely, “a sovereign Palestinian state with east Jerusalem as its capital.” For example, speaking on the occasion of the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinians in 2009, Minister of State for External Affairs Shashi Tharoor observed,

… a just and comprehensive solution can be achieved resulting in a sovereign, independent, viable and united State of Palestine living within secure and recognized borders with East Jerusalem as its Capital, side by side and at peace with the State of Israel, as endorsed in the Quartet Road Map and the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1397& 1515.20

Unfortunately for India, however, neither the Quartet Road Map21 nor UNSC resolutions22 describe East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state. This, nevertheless, did not prevent Prime Minister Manmohan Singh repeating the same formulation in his speech before the UN General Assembly in September 2011.23

This formulation has been repeated by other Indian leaders as well. Until last Tuesday, this was the position of the NDA government as well, with Modi himself accepting this formulation during the Fortaleza Declaration in July 2014. During his visit to Palestine in October 2015, President Mukherjee also referred to East Jerusalem being the capital of the future Palestine state.24 The same position was maintained by Vice-President Hamid Ansari during a book event held in January 2016.25

This week, however, Modi has irreversibly transformed this position and, by not making any reference to Jerusalem, he has recognised the ground realities. Jerusalem, especially the Eastern part of the city, has layers of theological, historical, political and archaeological claims and contestations and has to be resolved through negotiations and mutual respect and accommodation.

Indeed, Modi’s position comes against the backdrop of India’s shifting position in UNESCO over the city of Jerusalem. On April 15, 2016, the 58-member Executive Board of UNESCO adopted a resolution that explicitly endorsed exclusive Islamic claims and narratives over the city of Jerusalem without any reference to the Jewish history or the erstwhile presence of two Jewish temples in the city. India voted for this resolution sponsored by six Arab countries, including Egypt and Qatar, and the Indian position came under criticism.26 However, in two subsequent votes held on October 13, 2016, and May 2, 2017, India chose to abstain. Commenting on the Indian shift, one Israeli commentator observed:

India’s vote is also seen as significant in Jerusalem. India is a country that only of late has sporadically taken to changing what for decades was a reflex to vote against Israel in all international forums, and this is an indication that a new pattern of abstaining is setting in. What is even more significant is that India was willing to abstain, even though at first they argued to vote for the resolution because it was so watered down.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is due to visit Israel in July, and this vote is partly seen as an Indian gesture before that visit, but is also a sign of how significantly relations with New Delhi have developed.27

As with his domestic agenda, Modi’s primary focus in foreign policy is also on development. Political issues were confined to and compressed in three sentences: “We had extensive exchange of views on the situation in West Asia and the Middle East Peace Process. We agreed that the challenges in West Asia must be addressed through sustained political dialogue and peaceful means. India hopes for early resumption of talks between Palestinian and Israeli sides to move towards finding a comprehensive resolution.”28 In short, no unilateralism, violence or imposed settlements from outside.

In contrast, much of Modi’s focus has been on developmental issues such as ‘capacity-building’, ‘information technology, youth and skills development’, ‘Techno-park’, ‘our cultural exchanges’, and ‘Yoga exchanges.’ Five MoUs signed during the Abbas visit pertained to the field of agriculture, sports, health, IT and visa exemption for diplomatic passports. Surprisingly, India did not announce any special financial aid, assistance or major projects.29

For his part, Abbas was measured in expressing his views. In his exclusive interview to The Hindu, he thanked the people of India who “stood tall for the universal rights of freedom, justice and peace” and its leaders “for their generous economic support.”30 Making pleasantries about India’s involvement in the peace process, he blamed the Israeli government for the stalled peace negotiations.

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992, India has been ‘balanancing’ its relations with Israel and Palestine. Modi has now de-hyphenated it. Besides being unapologetic about engaging with Israel, he is prepared to deal with both the parties independently and bilaterally. In practical terms, this means more economic engagements than political platitudes. Above all, by not referring to East Jerusalem as the capital of the future Palestinian State, he has signalled a major departure from the past. India is no longer prepared to endorse the exclusive Palestinian claims over the City but desires a negotiated political settlement based on mutual respect and accommodation. As one commentator remarked, the “Abbas visit signals a shift”.31 Yes, indeed, but not for the reasons commonly understood or explained.

*Professor P R Kumaraswamy teaches contemporary Middle East in Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and is the author of India’s Israel Policy. He also serves as the Honorary Director of Middle East Institute, New Delhi (www.mei.org.in).

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India. Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://idsa.in/issuebrief/modi-redefines-india-palestine-policy_prkumaraswamy_180517

The post Modi Redefines India’s Palestine Policy – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Steering Cooperation Across Oceans – Analysis

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By Asanga Abeyagoonasekera*

“We should not develop a habit of retreating to the harbour whenever we encounter a storm, for this will never get us to the other side of the ocean.” — Xi Jinping, President, People’s Republic of China

The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson, which is the size of three football fields and holds the capacity to launch 75 fighter jets at any given time, sailed to the Korean peninsula several weeks ago. US President Donald Trump speaking to the media claimed, “We are sending an armada. Very powerful, we have submarines. Far more powerful than the aircraft carrier. That I can tell you.” It looks like Trump has taken a leaf out of Kissinger’s limited war strategy.

In a 1958 interview, Kissinger advocated the importance of limited warfare and why the US should adopt it. What we are witnessing today is significantly different from 1958 when nuclear deterrence was at the top of the agenda with the erstwhile Soviet Union.

Asia is going through profound transformations. China is in the process of expanding its blue water navy and seeks domination of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This resonates a familiar chord with the US, which had a similar two ocean strategy in the past that sought US domination over the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.

US Vice President Mike Pence’s first visit to Asia took place against the background of mounting tensions. Its objectives included to reaffirm the US commitment to the region. Pence also wanted to clarify and ensure that the US is compensated as the arbiter of regional security and stability. Finally, the visit was also meant to discuss China’s continued effort to expand its maritime capability in the region, especially in the South China Sea.

Pence described the Pacific situation as “just a very serious time” during his discussion with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull. He further explained that “The US and Australia face this threat and every other one together, because we know that our security is the foundation of our prosperity.” Both nations agreed to raise pressure on North Korea and seek China’s support.

The author, as a participant at last year’s Shamgri-La Dialogue, raised a question from the Indian minister of defence regarding the circumstances of another Chinese submarine’s visit to Sri Lanka. Although defence strategies should be considered keeping broader strategic implications in mind, the Indian defence minister replied that they would take this up on a case-by-case basis.

As China witnesses geopolitical developments, there is a high probability of a sudden appearance of another Chinese submarine in the future. In October 2006, when USS Kitty Hawk was sailing through the East China Sea between southern Japan and Taiwan, a Chinese submarine surfaced without prior warning. The Americans were amazed when the Song-class Attack Submarine surfaced at a torpedo distance. The same sentiments applied when the last Chinese submarine’s appearance in Sri Lanka created tensions between Colombo and New Delhi. According to some experts, Indians exaggerated the event for political purposes to remove the pro-Chinese Rajapaksa government of that time.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Sri Lanka for the UN international Vesak celebrations, a day recognised by the UN after the tremendous effort of late Lakshman Kadirgamar, Sri Lanka’s truly visionary former foreign minister. Modi’s second visit is a clear indication of the friendship between the leaders of India and Sri Lanka.

After this celebration, Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe headed to China for the country’s largest One Belt, One Road (OBOR) conference. Sri Lanka’s strategic role in the Maritime Silk road is an important area, which will be addressed. This happens at a time when the Sri Lankan government is in discussions with India to lease out the tank farm in the east coast harbour of Trincomalee.

136 countries, and 28 heads of states are in Beijing for this large-scale high powered summit. Of the South Asian countries, India will not participate. It is a clear indication of India’s reservations. As explained by Indian Finance Minister Arun Jaitley, “I have no hesitation in saying that we have some serious reservations about it, because of sovereignty issues.” In an expert commentary written for the Institute for National Security Studies Sri Lanka, Swaran Singh explained tensions within India’s neighborhood, especially the USD 62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, in his article titled ‘OBOR: Getting India Onboard as a Partner.’

With such developments, Sri Lanka’s geopolitical role in the Indian Ocean remains crucial and essential to regional and extra regional nations. The OBOR could be seen by some as a platform to side with China. While China is promoting OBOR, the US is seeking to demonstrate to the whole region that it is in China’s best interest to side with Washington. In 1907, US President Theodore Roosevelt sailed his 16 battleships as ‘the great white fleet’ to 20 ports, a mixture of hard and soft power – depicting the military term ‘force projection’ – a factor even proven today from the visit of USS Carl Vinson.

The OBOR project will be welcomed by many countries, particularly to uplift the economies and social conditions of third world states. Countries absent from the processes and events of OBOR could limit global benefits of the Chinese State-led initiative, and as explained by Chinese President Xi Jinping, perhaps, will not see the other side of the ocean.

* Asanga Abeyagoonasekera
Director General, Institute of National Security Studies (INSS), Sri Lanka & Columnist, IPCS

The post Steering Cooperation Across Oceans – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

US-Sri Lanka Navy Staff Talks Held

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The second Staff talks between US and Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) officials were held at the Sri Lankan Navy headquarters in Colombo on 16th and 17th May.

According to Sri Lankan Navy media sources, discussions were held between senior officers of SLN and US 7th Fleet.

The SLN delegation was led by Director General Operations, Rear Admiral Piyal De Silva while the US delegation was led by Captain Brian Anderson of the US 7th Fleet.

During the discussions, the importance of similar dialogue for furthering mutual cooperation between the two navies was highlighted. Captain Brian Anderson expressed contentment over the range of matters including bilateral cooperation, training and ports of call made over the past years.

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Georgia: Politicians Outraged Over EU Representative’s Remarks

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(Civil.Ge) — Various Georgian politicians sharply criticized the statement by the EU special representative for South Caucasus and Geneva talks co-chair, Herbert Salber, who congratulated Tskhinvali leader Anatoly Bibilov on his victory in the presidential election held by Tskhinvali authorities on April 9.

Georgian MP and former foreign minister (2004-2005), Salome Zourabichvili said that the statement revealed Salber’s “ignorance of the subject,” besides being unacceptable. Zourabichvili said that in response Georgia should declare him persona non grata.

Another former foreign minister of Georgia (2008-2012) and the United National Movement (UNM) member Grigol Vashadze called Salber’s statement “extremely ignorant, inappropriate and damaging.”

Vashadze said that Salber distorted Brussel’s and Berlin’s positions on Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, when he congratulated Bibilov while being “in the region that is occupied as a result of the aggression by the Russian Federation, where the Russian Federation and the occupation regime have expelled tenths of thousands of Georgian citizens of various ethnic origins.”

Vashadze added that when talking about non-use of force document issue in Tskhinvali, Salber sounded as if he represented a side, rather than being a co-chair. Vashadze demanded that the Georgian Foreign Ministry achieve “a relevant statement” from Brussels, as well as disavowal by Salber of his Tskhinvali comments.

The UNM also issued a separate statement, expressing “extreme concern” regarding Salber’s statement, and saying it was not the first time he made comments that were detrimental to the national interests of Georgia.

The UNM added that since Salber’s statements disregarded Georgia’s territorial integrity and “radically differed from the official position of the European Union,” his continuation in his position as the EU representative would be damaging for the Georgian interests and Georgia-EU strategic relationship. The UNM demanded from the Georgian government to request Salber’s removal from his position.

The Movement for Liberty – European Georgia party, which had split from the UNM in January 2017, commented through its press service that Salber’s statement contradicted Georgian interests, and that there were “no elections on the occupied territory, since an ethnic cleansing occurred there and thousands of local residents were forcibly expelled.”

The European Georgia added they were sure Salber’s comments were not an official position of the EU, but such statements should not be left without the sharpest diplomatic reaction, including “personnel related changes.”

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New Ukrainian Legislation About Religion Will Finalize Divorce Between Kyiv and Moscow – OpEd

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Two pieces of draft legislation about religious organizations in Ukraine scheduled to be taken up by the Verkhovna Rada today will do far more to complete the divorce between Ukraine and Russia than any other step Kyiv has taken so far. And not surprisingly, Moscow and its agents in Ukraine are aghast.

The first draft law gives to parishioners the right to decide on their own whether they want to change from one jurisdiction to another and requires the registration of those believers, two steps that Yekaterinburg commentator Aleksey Shaburov will strike at the foundations of the Moscow Patriarchate’s empire in Ukraine (politsovet.ru/55332-ukrainskiy-urok-dlya-rpc.html).

On the one hand, giving parishioners the legal right to change from one jurisdiction to another will allow Ukrainian Orthodox to decide to leave the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and join the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, something Moscow explicitly forbids without its approval.

And on the other, the required census of parishioners will allow for the determination of just how strong each of these jurisdictions is in Ukraine. The Moscow church has more parishes and bishoprics, but the Ukrainian one has larger and more rapidly growing church organizations, something Moscow routinely denies.

The second draft law, Shaburov says, “hits the Moscow Patriarchate still more strongly.” It introduces limitations on the activities of churches whose leadership is situated “in ‘an aggressor state.” In the current circumstances, that church is the one subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate.

If this bill is passed, he continues, “the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate will be required to get the agreement of the Ukrainian authorities for appointments to senior church positions and for invitations issued to “foreign,” again in this case, Russian, “religious officials.”

Further, and still more of a challenge to Moscow, the draft law says that if it is found that a church with headquarters abroad is cooperating with terrorists, “that is, with the LNR and DNR, then, according to Saburov, “that religious organization can be banned,” at least in principle.

Such regulations will put before the Moscow Patriarchate’s church in Ukraine a stark choice: “either to live under such restrictions or to seek autocephaly, that is, complete separation” from Moscow. Neither is something that the Moscow church or the Kremlin is prepared to accept as legitimate and inevitable.

Yesterday, Patriarch Kirill appealed to foreign leaders the UN secretary general “and even the Pope” to take steps to block Ukraine from adopting these measures. Today, the Moscow media echoed his points (e.g., izvestia.ru/news/708563, izvestia.ru/news/708569, ng.ru/faith/2017-05-18/6_6990_hram.html and stoletie.ru/obschestvo/russkije_v_rassejanii_601.htm).

Moscow hardly has the moral right to issue such appeals, Shaburov says. It has invaded Ukraine and no victim of aggression can be expected to tolerate the kind of actions the Moscow church on Ukrainian territory has routinely taken. And Ukraine is doing no more than Russia, a country Ukraine hasn’t invaded, has done with respect to religion.

Indeed, the commentator continues, “Ukraine has not done anything that the Russian authorities would not have done,” although Moscow will deny that and many may accept its denials as credible.

At the same time, Shaburov says, “it may seem sad that instead of becoming a European country, Ukraine is converting itself into an analogue of the Russian Federation.” But “for Russians, this represents a chance to view itself from the side: We in the eyes of the world in recent years have looked exactly as Ukraine now looks in ours.”

That could provide the Moscow Patriarchate with a valuable lesson, the commentator concludes, as could the inevitable consequences for it of becoming too closely integrated in the state machine to serve its religious purposes. Unfortunately, Shaburov says, there is no reason to expect that these lessons will be learned.

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Forthcoming NSG-Plenary Meeting: Prospects For Pakistan-India Candidacy – OpEd

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The Trajectory of Non- Proliferation regime is most likely to be determined in forthcoming (27th) plenary session of NSG.

The nuclear cartel of 48-member states deals with the export of nuclear material and nuclear related technology. According to the NSG guidelines, membership of group requires that states should be a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to get the membership of group. Both India and Pakistan are aspirants to NSG membership. The membership application of India and Pakistan, debated over inclusion of Non-NPT, has been intensified.

The support of of the major powers by providing a waiver by US, India’s intensive diplomatic efforts and introduction of the discriminatory Grossi formula to support the Indian bid for NSG membership has shaken the India-Pakistan’s bilateral dialogue on nuclear matters and such discriminatory approach has undermined the spirit of global Non-Proliferation regime.

Despite presenting a discriminatory proposal on December 6, 2016, the support of the major powers and China’s demand for an unbiased non-discriminatory approach, India’s inclusion in NSG has reached a critical stage. In this regard the question arises that what will be the prospects for the Pakistan and India candidacies in the forthcoming NSG-plenary meeting? And what are the policy options for Pakistan to promote its stance to counter the resistance on gaining the NSG-membership.

Both India and Pakistan are determined to get the membership of NSG for three significant reasons: economic, political and strategic. Membership in NSG is a top priority of India as it will enhance that country’s prestige in global affairs, as well as allowing India to actively play its role in the international arena for the export and import of nuclear related technology. On the other side, NSG membership will ensure economic, political and technological benefits for Pakistan.

Secondly, providing any special exemption fromthe NSG principle to India and ignoring Pakistan’s bid will disturb the strategic balance in South Asia. Due to these multiple dimensions both Non-NPT states are making rigorous efforts to obtain membership in the nuclear cartel.

Trends have revealed that both India and Pakistan will face resistance in gaining NSG membership in the 27th plenary meeting. This is because, the NSG works on a consensus and member states have remained dividend on the matter of NSG membership. It has remained divided on the US and Chinese positions,  despite India’s extensive lobbying with the countries since last meeting of NSG.

Notwithstanding the proactive lobby, India has failed to win Chain’s support for NSG membership as China is sticking to its stance and demand for a non-discriminatory criteria-based approach.

On the other side, the US claims that India is a like-minded country that deserves to be included in the group just to serve its own defence and strategic objectives. So despite the US backing and Indian proactive diplomatic efforts, global politics and recent developments have indicated that India may not receive a special benefit against the mandate and the spirit of NSG in forthcoming plenary.

This will be another setback for India, as such obtaining the membership of group will be a difficult task for both India, as well as Pakistan. It is also perceived that the US and India will increase their efforts to convince member states, including China ,without considering the impact of such policies for region and global efforts of Non-proliferation.

Subsequently, the significance of  the forthcoming plenary for Pakistan cannot be ignored and it is imperative that it should not give up its quest for membership. Despite China’s official stance of support for Pakistan’s candidature, it is important for Pakistan to maintain its resilience and sustainability in its strategy regarding membership in the nuclear cartel.

For this purpose policy options for Pakistan includes:

  • First, economic engagement and a need to project itself as a great economic incentive for other states.
  • Second, Pakistan needs to adopt more a proactive foreign policy and diplomacy to cater the support for Pakistan’s bid in nuclear group.

Although debate over membership of Non-NPT states has reached a critical stage despite improved nuclear credentials, Pakistan is facing a discriminatory attitude and a country-specific approach has been followed by the US to support India. Nevertheless, Pakistan should not give up its efforts and need sto constantly move towards its ambitions. Such a strategy will send the message to the international community that Pakistan is not in hurry, it is working and has maintained a balanced pace to gain recognition as a responsible member of the nuclear cartel.

*Asma Khalid, Writer is Research Associate at Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) Islamabad. Asmaakhalid_90@hotmail.com

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Trump And The New Militarization Of Middle East – OpEd

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On the eve of US President Donald Trump’s much-anticipated trip to the Middle East, anonymous White House officials have already leaked publicly the news of impending mega US arms sales to Saudi Arabia totaling 100 billion dollars and up to 300 billion over the coming decade.

These astronomical figures are certainly good news for the US military-industrial complex, but quite the opposite for regional and global peace and stability. Saudi Arabia is already world’s largest importer of weapons and the 4th largest military spender, and one out of every 7 dollars spent on defense imports in the world is spent by Saudi Arabia.

Adding to the 60 billion dollars arms sold to Riyadh by the previous Obama administration, Trump’s planned arms sales to the Kingdom will spur dangerous arms race by introducing massive new disparity, e.g., between Iran and the Saudi-led bloc of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states that routinely outspend Iran by a ratio of more than 10 to 1.

Apparently, Trump’s other intention of his Saudi visit, to cement relations with an important client state, is to clinch the Saudis’ commitment to spend tens of billions of dollars on US infrastructure projects, thus making the Saudi royal family into solid partners for Trump’s “America First” vision. To achieve all these objectives, US is accommodating Riyadh in its Iranophobic strategy and framing the arms sales in terms of a new “Arab NATO” that integrates forces from a number of other Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Thus, we must expect to hear more of Trump’s anti-Iran rhetoric in his Middle East trip.

At a time when the European Parliament has voted to block arms sales to Saudi Arabia over its on-going atrocities in Yemen, and some leading European politicians such as Jermy Corbyn, head of British Labor Party, vowing to end UK’s lucrative arms sale to the Saudis if victorious at the upcoming elections in June, the Americans are singing a completely different tune, oblivious to the need to couch their arms sales policy in a coherent Middle East policy. There is, in fact, a vacuum of a sound US Middle East policy, and Washington’s one-dimensional and short-sighted Persian Gulf policy runs the risk of undermining its Syria policy, as well as putting it on a collision course with Iran.

With respect to the planned arms sales to Saudi Arabia, the list of high-tech weaponry includes THAAD missile interceptor system, combat ships, latest jet fighters, attack helicopters, laser-guided bombs, long-range artillery, etc. Various US experts, such as Anthony Cordesman, are falling over backward trying to rationalize these destabilizing arms sales that pose a new level of threat to Iran’s national security and even implicate Russia’s national security since an “Arab NATO” would inevitably integrate the Persian Gulf-based defense system with the NATO system in Europe and elsewhere. In other words, the creation of an “Arab NATO” is in line with the post-Cold War NATO’s “eastern expansion” that poses risks to both Russia and China.

Not only that, US’s carte blanche for the Saudi military wish list is closely linked to (a) their known arms shipments to Syria, and (b) their current atrocities in Yemen, condemned by world’s rights organizations. The Saudis have been operating their US-made F-15 in the Yemen conflict, as well as the UK-made cluster bombs, and are now planning an amphibious assault on the Houthi-controlled Hodeidah Port, with the help of their partners-in-crime UAE, which will certainly add to the present humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen and, also, further increase US’s direct military involvement, which is presently limited to providing logistical support for the Saudi air campaign.

In addition to Saudi Arabia, the oppressive sheiks running Bahrain have also received fresh military imports from the US, decried by their jailed human rights activist, Nabeel Rajab, in his recent column in the New York Times. At long last, the US had dropped even the pretension of human rights concern, with Trump chummying with various Middle East dictators in the Oval Office, thus putting on display the US’s “imperialist hubris at its worst,” to paraphrase a poem from Kipling.

An important question is if, indeed, such a militaristic US approach in the Middle East actually benefits the security of its own network of client states such as Saudi Arabia? Lest we forget, the internal economic woes of Saudi Arabia, grappling with the plummeting oil prices, corruption, and mismanagement, are multiplying. The Kingdom has a 30 percent youth unemployment and it has been tapping into its strategic reserve to buy political loyalty through handouts that are untenable in the long run.

Instead of devoting its precious resources to the priorities at home, the Saudi puppets are now appeasing Uncle Sam by pouring money into US economy and bringing broad smiles on the CEO’s Lockheed Martin, General Dynamic, Northrop Grumman and other major US defense contractors. Of course, the latter are more than thrilled about the depletion of Saudi arms stockpile after two years of assault on poor Yemen, which provides the necessary justification for more arms to the Saudis.

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Jakarta’s Election And Alternatives To US Policy Towards Muslims – OpEd

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By Asna Husin*

U.S. Vice President Mike Pence arrived in Jakarta near midnight on April 19 just hours after Anies Baswedan won Jakarta’s heated gubernatorial election against the incumbent Basuki Tjahaya Purnawa (better known as Ahok). Outsiders viewed the loss by Ahok, who is the ethnic Chinese and Christian governor of this important province, as “a victory for conservative Islamists and a defeat for pluralism in the world’s largest Muslim nation” (in the Financial Times). The New York Times regarded Anies’ victory as a test of the country’s religious and ethnic tolerance, while Reuters declared that it cast “a shadow over Indonesia’s reputation for practicing a tolerant form of Islam.”

To attribute the results of this Jakarta election merely to the conflict between the religious and secular or the role of passionate Muslims in toppling Ahok fails to understand the complexity of this election, the entrenched system governing it, and the many actors involved. With nearly 90 per cent Muslims among its 250 million people, Indonesia is not a secular country in the sense of a clear separation between religion and state. The first principle of the national ideology of Pancasila (Five Principles), after all, is “belief in one God.” According to this principle, Indonesia is a religious nation, with the government responsible for promoting and safeguarding the six officially recognized religions: Islam, two forms of Christianity (Catholicism and Protestantism), Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism.

Thus, Indonesia possesses a Ministry of Religious Affairs dealing with these religions, while parliament makes laws treating specific issues of faith and the government publicly celebrates religious events and holidays. Furthermore, public servants openly associate themselves with their particular faith, religious education is obligatory at all school and university levels, and citizenship identity cards identify the holder’s religion. Technically, an atheist has no place in the Indonesian socio-political system, and no laws contradicting religion can be promulgated. In the context of its democratic system, selecting a leader based on religious considerations is constitutionally permitted. At the same time, Indonesia is proud of its ethnic and religious pluralism, and its national slogan “unity in diversity” reflects such multiculturalism.

Nevertheless, throughout Indonesia’s modern history there have always been groups who wished Indonesia to be purely secular, while others seek it to be an explicitly Islamic nation. Although Islam plays a very important role in nation-building and development, these two contradictory persuasions represent small minorities, since the majority views their country to be neither secular nor Islamic.

For many Indonesians across the archipelago avidly focused on this recent Jakarta election, the clash between the populist egalitarian platform of Anies rooted in Islamic social values with the big moneyed interests of Ahok’s business backers symbolized the dilemma inherent in Indonesia’s modernization. Religion was indeed an important issue during this gubernatorial election, and Anies as a Muslim contesting the Christian Ahok clearly benefited from it. This was no surprise since the question of faith always comes to the fore in every national and local election, and all candidates have to justify their own religiosity, even when they are all Muslim, as in the case of Aceh province.

Rather the question is how did Ahok, whose reign as governor was satisfactory to over 70 percent of Jakarta residents, lose by a margin of nearly 18 per cent? And how did Anies, who took his MA from the University of Maryland and Ph.D. from Northern Illinois University, win with such a large majority? Many factors put the incumbent in a shaky position, yet three were most critical: his personality, his gubernatorial policy, and his campaign team’s strategy and political base.

Ahok’s Declining Popularity

Ahok was a polarizing governor who ruled in an “all-right & no-wrong” fashion, antagonizing people around him from the politicians in parliament and his own public officials to the general public including the urban poor and Muslim hardliners. His short temper and imprudent responses using discordant expressions were showcased in his controversial speech last September in Thousand Islands outside Jakarta, which led to a legal charge of blasphemy—based on his pejorative citing of the Quranic verse al-Ma’idah 5:51 in order to elicit Muslim votes. The court ruled on May 9 that Ahok had violated the nation’s blasphemy law and awarded him a two-year prison sentence (out of a maximum five years). Regarding his impulsive spontaneity, he remarked: “When I speak I don’t think.” This unwise mistake was repeated over and again irritating many others who would otherwise be neutral and could have been won over to his side.

Ahok’s policies were also divisive. Many, particularly in the upper class, appreciated his efforts to normalize Jakarta’s river floods and ease chaotic traffic jams. In doing so, however, he ordered the mass evictions of slum dwellers, often without constructive dialogue and proper planning for their wellbeing. His plan for the reclamation of Jakarta Bay, in some cases against existing laws and at the expense of environmental considerations, led to perceptions of him as governor for the rich and powerful. “It didn’t matter to us Ahok was Christian and Chinese, we never cared about race and religion. Now we have this problem [of evictions] because of Ahok himself. He is a troublemaker,” said a woman as quoted in The Sydney Morning Herald. Actually, Ahok initiated a number of programs that benefited the disadvantaged and deprived, but the overwhelming symbolism of evictions and reclamation made him unpopular among the poor.

Ahok’s campaign team and political base were also problematic. From the beginning, the ruling Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP)’s support for him generated internal protest: several key Jakarta leaders resigned from the party, crossed over to Anies, and became his dedicated volunteers. Likewise, other parties that backed the incumbent were not entirely united, as many of their grassroots leaders abandoned Ahok to support the challenger. These deserters all argued that Ahok’s controversial character and unpopular policies made him unfit to be a leader. His political campaign team also made unnecessary strategic blunders less than a week before people went to the polls.

Two gaffes clearly decided the results of this crucial election, giving Anies the surprising result of an 18 percent margin. One was Ahok’s final video campaign to attract voters, which presented images of protesters in Muslim garb acting violently. This sophisticatedly crafted video, by insensitively demonizing Muslims, generated protests from many segments of the Muslim society, which forced Ahok’s team to remove it just one day after its release. But the damage was done.

The second mistake was even more damaging and indeed illegal. Ahok’s team and supporting parties overtly indulged in money politics by massively attempting to buy votes through distributing packages of basic staples (known as “sembako”) and live cows during the three days before residents cast their ballots. The media widely reported this illegal practice of sembako-giving, alienating undecided voters, and this may explain Anies’ impressive final gain.

The Rise of Anies

In addition to benefiting from his rival’s evident weakness, Anies Baswedan stood on very solid ground. He consciously presented himself as a moral champion whose message was unity and social justice. He tagged his campaign with the theme: “Wellbeing for all, Advance of the city, Happiness of its people.” This message was translated into a number of important programs including quality education, health care, inexpensive prices for basic staples, affordable housing for low-income residents, and small-business job creation. Anies’s unequivocal rejection of his opponent’s land reclamation and unlawful evictions of slum dwellers strengthened his standing as the candidate for national unity and social justice. His evident quality as a thinker who delivered his ideas and campaign speeches with clarity and eloquence, as well as his personal integrity and calm dispassionate nature, all helped his candidacy.

Anies’s embrace of diverse groups ranging from the conservative Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) to Christian Synods, Catholic leaders, Buddhist, and Hindu organizations, not to mention a Chinese Confucian group, showed him to be a true bridge-builder. Anies defended his meeting with the FPI master: “Jakarta needs a leader who could embrace and make peace with everyone. Dialogue…and interaction is the first step to develop Jakarta which respects and honors one another.” Thus Anies’s campaign messages were well received, and Indonesians understand his victory as an achievement of populist Islamic egalitarian aspirations against the wealthy interests of entrenched elites.

Jakarta’s April election is significant as an early step toward the next presidential contest in 2019. Anies received the support of the former general Prabowo Subianto, while Ahok was backed by President Joko Widodo, nicknamed Jokowi. Prabowo himself narrowly lost the last presidential election in 2014 to Jokowi. Both men will most likely compete again for the country’s top post in 2019, so winning Jakarta is an important index of their prospective popularity. Religion as well as populist Islamic egalitarian messages will reemerge again, even though these two men share the same faith.

Visit by Pence

When Vice President Pence arrived in Indonesia, Ahok had just conceded defeat and congratulated Anies on his victory. Although keenly disappointed, Ahok’s followers did not protest on the street, while Anies’s camp engaged in restrained celebrations through prayers and thanksgiving. If he had the eyes to see, Mike Pence could observe a mature political culture and dignified democratic process practiced by this largest Muslim nation. Indeed, Pence praised Indonesia’s democratic values and religious tolerance after meeting with President Jokowi: “Indonesia’s tradition of moderate Islam is frankly an inspiration to the world and we commend you and your people. In your nation as in mine, religion unifies, it doesn’t divide.” Such distinct praise of religion by Pence reflects his understanding of the importance of faith to many Indonesians.

The vice president discussed his visit on the official U.S. government website being “a sign of the high value that the United States places on our strategic partnership with Indonesia.” Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi described this strategic partnership as cooperation in the area of business and investment, combating terrorism, increased understanding of religious tolerance, and promoting a moderate Islam.

Pence’s visit may also be seen as an important effort to soften President Trump’s recent placement of Indonesia on his trade “hit list,” as well as an opportunity to explain to the Indonesian public about Trump’s proposed travel ban against certain Muslim countries. Undoubtedly Washington is looking for a commitment to fair trade and further access to Indonesian markets. So a prosperous and peaceful Jakarta as promised by Governor-elect Anies Baswedan would increase the consumption for high-end American products.

Islam and Terrorism

The issue of moderate Islam is directly related to both religious tolerance and to radicalism as the background for terrorism. Ömer Taspinar presents two types of analysis that have emerged in the West regarding terrorism: the development camp and the security camp. The first maintains that economic deprivation and social frustration are the root causes of terrorism, and thus social and economic development is a way to combat terrorism. The second camp holds that most terrorists are neither poor nor uneducated for the majority come from the middle class with ordinary backgrounds. Therefore, terrorism is “perceived almost exclusively as a ‘security threat’ with no discernible socioeconomic roots or links with deprivation.” It should be fought with counter-intelligence and coercive action.

Taspinar argues that both approaches, although valid in certain ways, possess important shortcomings. “The root causes of terrorism and violent radicalism are extremely complex, multifaceted, and often intertwined. They resist simplification and easy categorization,” he writes. “There is no unique panacea or simple formula to ‘end’ terrorism and radicalism.” He reminds us that “attempts to create a single typology of terrorism or generic profiles for terrorists are often misleading” since “an ideal breeding ground for recruitment emerges when various social, cultural, economic, political, and psychological factors come together.”

Understanding this complexity should enlighten nations such as Indonesia and the United States to engage in a long-term and multipronged strategy aimed at strengthening the institutional underpinnings of development, democracy, and security. The focus on human development—not just economic growth—should emerge as a new public narrative and long-term objective of strategic counter-terrorism. In other words, instituting socio-economic justice is an important mechanism for combating terrorism. Human security trumps military or conventional security. In the context of Jakarta, Anies’s campaign theme—“Wellbeing for all, Advance of the city, Happiness of its people”—is related to human development, human security, and the establishment of justice. It should be a beneficial remedy for preventing economic deprivation and social frustration.

The idea of moderate Islam is controversial among counter-terrorism experts in the West, but it has been embraced by both religious and political Indonesian leaders. The Indonesians often use Islam wasatiyyah, which derives from the Quranic ummat wasat, signifying a moderate, just, and balanced community of Islam (ummah). Islam wasatiyyah is understood to comprise a tolerant religious system that embraces religious diversity, engages in interfaith dialogue by promoting a culture of constructive exchange, and protects the minority “:other” as well as cherishing peaceful coexistence. Moderate Islam also refers to the Muslim values accepting the Indonesian political order based on Pancasila rather than on Islam alone, honors and respects different cultures and civilizations, sees diversity as strength rather than an obstacle, and develops constructive religious ethics for coexistence in a multi-religious and ethnically pluralist country.

Islam wasatiyyah, rooted in Quranic tradition, emphasizes that the Prophet Muhammad was sent “as a mercy to the entire world.” Its principles are inherent in Islam’s normative value structure and were not alien to Muslims in the past. Therefore the view of Islam “as naturally violent” is shallow and misleading. As a major Muslim nation, Indonesia is an example of Islam’s compatibility with modern universal norms. For instance, Indonesian Vice President Yusuf Kalla asks: “Which country in the world like Indonesia formally celebrates all religious holidays?” In other words, moderate Islam is a dignified and humane Islam, not an emotionally reactive violent faith. It is, in the words of Jakarta’s governor-elect Anies Baswedan, “An Islam that promotes peace and upholds justice.”

In light of the new US administration’s approach to the Islamic world through unilateral military strikes in Yemen and Syria, Pence’s conciliatory statement in Jakarta offers an alternate model for its relations with Muslim peoples. The world expects to see more of such nuanced responses in place of kneejerk reactions to the complexity of Muslim societies. The Jakartan election facilitated a more mature civic engagement that could point a way towards a balanced and realistic search for mutual benefits between the US and Muslim nations worldwide.

*Dr. Asna Husin teaches at Ar-Raniry Islamic University in Banda Aceh. She is currently a visiting researcher at Nonviolence International in Washington, D.C.

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What Does NATO Need To ‘Project Stability’ In Its Neighborhood? – Analysis

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At NATO’s Warsaw Summit in 2016, allied leaders announced not only major changes to their collective defence posture but also their commitment to ‘projecting stability’ beyond their borders.

By Rubén Díaz-Plaja*

commitment to ‘project stability’ constitutes an important step in the Alliance’s ongoing adaptation to an increasingly convulsive security environment in the European neighbourhood. This ARI will take stock of NATO’s ‘projecting stability’ agenda, outline some of the potential challenges associated with it and identify some of the initiatives the Alliance can build on. To do so, it will provide an overview of some of the main decisions taken at the Warsaw Summit, analyse how they matter in the context of the Alliance’s stability agenda and discuss the potential of partnerships and capacity building in particular.

Analysis1

The many faces of NATO’s ‘projecting stability’ agenda

At Warsaw, Allied leaders declared that ‘if NATO’s neighbours are more stable, NATO is more secure’, highlighting the interdependence between Allied security and that of the wider European neighbourhood. As part of this approach, Allied leaders decided on a series of immediate steps: they agreed to step up in-country capacity building efforts in countries to the South of NATO; offer enhanced assistance to Georgia and Ukraine; launch a new maritime security operation in the Mediterranean (Operation Sea Guardian); and provide AWACS support to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. Therefore ‘projecting stability’ is in part an agenda of tangible projects, activities and operations designed to shape and influence the stability of NATO’s immediate security environment.

In this context, what is interesting about this approach is that ‘projecting stability’ is seen as a spectrum of engagement, running from partnerships with key states, including capacity building, to crisis management measures relying on military capabilities. This represents an innovation, given the distinction made in NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept between the core tasks of Collective Defence, Crisis Management and Cooperative Security. Allied leaders have set themselves the objective of thinking holistically across these tasks and using NATO’s instruments in a more coherent manner. In order to do this, it is necessary to make sure that institutions, processes and working cultures are able to support a whole-of-NATO approach.

In line with this, Allied Heads of State and Government also tasked work to review whether NATO’s institutions and processes are adequate to this ambition, looking at how efforts could become ‘more sustainable, better organised and supported’, ‘with adequate and sustainable resources and structures’. Therefore, ‘projecting stability’ also opens up an agenda of institutional change within NATO –to which we will return below–.

Why ‘projecting stability’ matters

To understand why this approach matters we need to look at the wider context. Ever since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO has been paying increased attention to high-end, collective defence responsibilities –and updating capabilities and plans to meet these responsibilities after more than two decades of expeditionary operations–. Initiatives like the Readiness Action Plan and Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (adopted at the Alliance’s 2014 Summit in Wales) and the Enhanced Forward Presence (adopted at the 2016 Warsaw Summit) bear witness to the Alliance’s ability to adapt its collective defence posture to the current threat environment and to strengthen deterrence. However, some observers have speculated whether this change in posture or ‘pivot’ towards deterrence and defence might not spell a more inward-looking, fortress-like NATO, ie, less deployed out of area and less interested in engaging its partners.2

The Warsaw commitment to ‘project stability’ counters this ‘fortress NATO’ narrative. Notwithstanding the renewed importance of defence and deterrence in the context of the Warsaw summit, NATO leaders also chose to make ‘projecting stability’ one of the summit’s key themes. In fact, the Alliance recognises that it does not have the luxury of being able to choose one over the other. As argued by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at Harvard University in September 2016, NATO is now in a phase in which it has to undertake both collective defence and crisis management and partnerships.3

NATO is not merely ‘rewinding the clock’ to Cold War-style collective defence and deterrence in the European continent, ie, by abandoning more than 25 years of experience in cooperative security and crisis management out of (NATO) area. In fact, the Alliance’s emphasis on stability is a tacit recognition of the dangers that can come from state weakness or collapse. In this context, the Warsaw Summit also presided over the Alliance’s commitment to look both at its Eastern Flank and its Southern neighbourhood.

One interesting development in NATO’s agenda is the increasing association of the ‘projecting stability’ theme with the Southern neighbourhood. Traditionally, NATO’s efforts to ‘project stability’ through partnerships and defence reform have focused on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. This has not gone away: at Warsaw, the Allies agreed on new steps to support Ukraine and Georgia build up their capabilities and resilience. However, since the so-called Arab Spring, NATO has seen a gradual but steady increase in work with its Middle East and North Africa partners. A lot of this has been through the channels of its individual partnerships with countries in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue. For instance, since 2014 Jordan has been one of the first recipients of an integrated package of defence capacity building (DCB) consisting of enhanced training, assistance and advice.

Many of NATO’s southern partners have also been brought together in a new partnership forum, the Interoperability Platform, which is designed to maintain and deepen operational connectivity between NATO and its partners for future crisis and stability operations.

The Warsaw decisions confirmed this trend and produced new initiatives such as the launch of a training and capacity building activity in Iraq. Building on this trend, the Allies and Kuwait inaugurated earlier in 2017 a centre in Kuwait to serve its Gulf partnerships. Some of these decisions show the Southern neighbourhood’s newfound importance in the context of the Alliance’s stability agenda.

What NATO can build on

NATO is not a stranger to ‘projecting stability’. Indeed, the Alliance can point to a strong, post-Cold War track record of contributing to stabilisation beyond its core task of collective defence. Its crisis management operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (plus Iraq until 2011) were essentially stabilisation missions, often with a strong training component. Furthermore, NATO has more than a quarter of a century’s experience in advising, supporting and mentoring partner states to achieve defence and institutional reform, build capabilities and strengthen interoperability. Its network of partners is now more than 40 strong, and reaches around the world. Beyond political dialogue, the practical reality of these relationships is often focused on building capacity, through strategic advice, education, training, exercising and evaluation, both at the level of institutions and of individual units.

Every year, NATO offers thousands of opportunities for education and training –and dozens of NATO officer teams fly out to partner states to conduct on site tailored training–. NATO has a rich toolkit of programmes for this work, as well as dedicated civilian and military staffs to carry it out and track it over time. For instance, NATO participates in a dense network of cooperation between defence academies to help support nations who wish to transform their defence and military education. NATO has also established a unique programme to build integrity and fight corruption in the defence sector.

To do this work NATO can count on established relationships of trust as well as on the ‘soft power’ of its credibility as the world’s premier military alliance, bringing together 28 of the most militarily and technologically advanced countries in the world. NATO and its partnerships also act a platform through which Allies and partners have established advanced networks of cooperation, such that many partners choose to help other NATO partners through NATO-associated programmes, trust funds and other channels.

NATO’s cooperation and capacity-building programmes are actually quite modestly resourced in relative terms to its overall budget and certainly in absolute terms in comparison to the aid and capacity-building programmes managed by national bilateral programmes or those managed by the UN and EU. Likewise, programmes are administered by a relatively small number of staff, again both in relative and absolute terms. However, the ‘networked’ nature of NATO’s partnerships and cooperation programmes enables Allies, partners, civil society and educational institutions to ‘plug in’, thus generating a resource multiplier effect.

These programmes deliver, for two reasons. First, despite their small size they are relatively concentrated –they focus largely on defence, military and security matters–. Secondly, the nature of the programmes is geared towards encouraging the recipient nations to do most of the resource-heavy lifting. Partner recipients have to meet the goals and objectives set by NATO programmes, but NATO offers relatively little –with a few exceptions– in terms of funding or in-kind aid to meet those standards.

Finally, these programmes have all contributed to and supported NATO’s ‘Open Door’ policy of enlargement and integration, which has arguably been one of the most powerful factors of stability projection of the 1990s and 2010s. The prospect of NATO accession provided a powerful ‘conditionality anchor’ to support reforms in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.

Projecting stability: a way forward?

The Alliance’s renewed commitment to projecting stability opens a series of questions about the sustainability, structures and capabilities it has to carry out such activities. These questions will need to be addressed in the months and years ahead.

At Warsaw, NATO leaders set in motion a process to review how well prepared NATO is to ‘project stability’, tasking work at NATO HQ on how to ensure that efforts could become ‘more sustainable, better organised and supported’, ‘with adequate and sustainable resources and structures’.4 This commitment was confirmed in December 2016 when Allied Ministers of Foreign Affairs agreed on a roadmap to consider how to develop NATO’s capacity to project stability.

To understand this task, it is important to consider the spectrum of tasks covered by NATO’s ‘projecting stability’ mission. These range from political engagement with third states, through partnerships, capacity building and training, to military deployments in the context of crisis management operations.

When it comes to crisis management, the Warsaw commitment to ‘projecting stability’ confirms that the Allies wish to retain NATO’s ability to conduct crisis management operations rather than just refocusing only on high-spectrum collective defence. This is in itself significant –for reasons of defence and force planning and capability development– but this paper will not dwell deeper on this aspect of ‘projecting stability’. However, the reality is that crisis management approaches (ie, involving deployed military forces) will always be the subject of ad hoc case-by-case decisions by the Allies in a particular political and military context.

Setting crisis management aside, the bread and butter of NATO’s work to ‘project stability’ in the future will continue to revolve around prevention: the patient, slow, upstream work of building partnerships through political engagement, cooperation and the strengthening of institutional capacity in its neighbouring states.

This will never be as visible as other aspects of NATO’s engagement –but it remains essential–. Indeed, former SACEUR General Breedlove said as much in July 2016, when he argued that when it came to the Middle East NATO’s ‘main strategy should be to invest in institution building and education, among other measures, to stabilise the poorly governed spaces that give rise to terrorism and displaced populations’.5 Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has also consistently argued for investing in developing local institutions and forces as a cost-effective and preventive means to fight terrorism and destabilisation.

Building on these advantages, NATO will need to reflect on the overall ends, ways and means that it will use to ‘project stability’ through partnerships and capacity building in the years to come.

Ends

‘Projecting stability’ through partnerships and capacity building projects will need to be based on, and serve, an overall political project, some kind of finalité. In the 1990s and early 2000s NATO’s Partnership for Peace and its enlargement were underpinned by the overarching notion of a ‘Europe whole and free’: a cooperative, peaceful, post-Cold War European order. This vision is still relevant and guides NATO’s relationship with all or some of NATO’s European partners, especially in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans. But the question must be posed: does NATO –or the West as a whole for that matter– have an equivalent vision or finalité for its regional partners in North Africa and the Middle East? Surely creating the conditions for defeating terrorism would be part of an answer, but is it enough? In any case, political visions matter for a number of reasons.

First, the nature of the ‘neighbourhood’ has changed. Much of NATO’s focus on ‘projecting stability’ in the 1990s and 2000s was on a relatively homogeneous group of countries, bound by their post-Communist heritage and common desire to join –and prospect of joining– Euro-Atlantic structures. In the 1990s NATO and EU enlargement worked in tandem, creating a powerful mix of conditionality and incentives to shape the transformation of states and societies in Eastern and Central Europe, which by and large worked.

Now, NATO’s neighbourhood is a much more diverse –and contested– environment. The milieu matters –geopolitics is back–. Unlike the 1990s, the environment is marked by the rise of powers (on the international scene) and movements (domestically) that contest the liberal rules-based order that NATO has defended. When it comes to the Middle East, the very nature of the regional order is perceived to be in play, and many outside powers are investing significantly in building and deepening relationships with some of NATO’s partner states. At the same time, enlargement –and its powerful conditionality machine– is not on the table for most of these partners. After Montenegro joins, only three of NATO’s 40+ partners remain official candidates for membership: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The overall diversity of NATO’s partner relationships means that some of the more ‘wholesale’ mechanisms of partnership and capacity building of the 1990s –designed to guide more than a dozen states into NATO– will need to become more ‘niche’ to suit a much more diverse set of circumstances in each of NATO’s partner countries, and where conditionality could be much more elusive.

In this, political relationships will continue to be key, because transforming institutions and mentoring change is not a technocratic project but one that needs to make political sense to decision-makers in recipient states. Transforming state institutions so that they are effective providers of security to their citizens requires significant political capital. All the more so because NATO’s model of capacity building relies heavily on national ownership of adjustment costs. This is a deeply political project –and will need to be finely calibrated to the prevailing circumstances in each of these countries–. In some countries, elites and public opinion will embrace NATO; in others, a subtler, arms-length relationship will need to be cultivated.

As with any relationship, this must be a two-way street. While the notion of ‘projecting stability’ provides an overarching concept, it may not be enough to describe relationships with certain partners only in these terms –they need to appeal to the security interests not only of NATO but also of the partner concerned–. The vision needs to appeal to both sides of the equation. As Sven Biscop has pointed out in the case of the EU, focusing on ‘resilience’ alone in partnerships with third states risks raising the spectre of countries being used merely as ‘buffer states’.6

NATO would do well to take a page out of its own history book: the 1994 ‘Partnership for Peace’ is not only an effective programme but also a strong brand, summing up the notion of partnership for something greater. For many of NATO’s partners, that brand still matters –as a way to explain why they cooperate with NATO–. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue –launched in 1994 to create confidence-building dialogue around the Oslo Peace process– while worthy, may not quite capture the heightened level of ambition of NATO’s deepened relationships with Southern partners. Could an effective narrative be found for the kinds of deepened relationships that NATO will want to develop in the years to come, especially to its South? This remains one of the key challenges going forward.

Ways and means

As noted above, NATO has a wealth of experience and expertise to draw on. On the flipside, 25 years of partnerships and capacity building programmes have created a complex set of programmes and procedures. Lightening and streamlining these could result in administrative cost and time savings. That said, one-size fits all solutions or programmes will not necessarily help –given the diversity of countries and relationships that NATO now enjoys, as explained above–. What will matter is the degree to which NATO’s instruments can be tailored to the unique circumstances of the established and emerging relationships it will need to nurture to its East and South.

NATO’s partnerships and capacity-building programmes are not resource intensive. This resource use is not likely to change in the near future. In an era of tight budgets, and increased pressure for defence spending, making a case for resource increases is not easy; but at the same time, there is a case to be made for some funding increases will probably be necessary, especially if NATO is to complement its mature support and capacity-building programmes for Eastern European and Balkan nations with increasing attention towards the Middle East and North Africa.

NATO’s integrated command structure is one of its unique assets. Already, a large part of the day-to-day advisory and training work with partners is conducted by teams of military officers operating out of NATO’s commands. As ‘projecting stability’ is taken forward as an approach, it will be important to think about how this Command Structure’s role in ‘projecting stability’ can evolve. Already, in February 2017, NATO Defence Ministers agreed a new ‘Hub for the South’, to be based in Naples, which will support NATO’s deeper engagement with its Southern flank. Future work on the NATO Command Structure will no doubt provide other opportunities for adjustment.

Finally, two key tests for this approach will lie in NATO’s ability to work well with others- in particular with national programmes and the programmes of the EU.

There are significant cost savings and synergies that could be generated by aligning NATO programmes more effectively with bilateral capacity-building and defence assistance programmes offered by Allies and some partners. Some of these programmes might plug well into NATO programmes. NATO already has a very well developed network of national education, training and research centres. A good use of new NATO structures and human resources would be to invest them into managing clearing houses and networks of cooperation, thus acting as multipliers for national efforts.

How NATO can develop links with the EU’s institutions and agencies in this area will be a key test. ‘Projecting stability’ is an ideal area for deeper cooperation with other organisations, notably the EU. Both organisations have established partnership programmes with countries in their neighbourhood. The joint declaration signed by EU leaders and the NATO Secretary General in Warsaw lists closer cooperation on capacity-building for a common neighbourhood among its seven priority areas. Finding ways to align NATO’s defence and security sector expertise with the EU’s programmes and funding instruments could reinforce political conditionality when it comes to engaging partners.

Conclusions

‘Projecting stability’: putting it all together

As we have seen, NATO’s emerging ‘projecting stability’ approach makes sense given the current threat landscape. It provides a powerful vision that can be used to focus a variety of its activities in pursuit of a proactive agenda of stabilising the neighbourhood. NATO can also build on solid foundations –the experience and expertise of a quarter century of partnerships and capacity-building–.

At the same time, this is only the beginning. Making ‘projecting stability’ an effective project will mean investing deeply in political relationships with neighbouring states, in a much more tailored manner, and perhaps shaping new narratives and political projects; it will require further adaptation of NATO’s resources and structures, enabling them to provide targeted advice, capacity building and training to a variety of countries. Finally, it will require exploring how to network with what Allies and partners are doing in the field of stabilisation, as well as seeking synergies with the EU.

About the author:
*Rubén Díaz-Plaja
, Policy Officer on NATO’s International Staff | @rdiazplaja

Source:
This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute

Notes:

1 The views expressed in this paper are solely the author’s.

2 See, for instance, Markus Kaim (2017), ‘Reforming NATO’s partnerships’, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Research Paper, January; and Trine Flockhart (2015), ‘Preparing for NATO’s Warsaw Summit’, Danish Institute of International Studies Report, 2015.

3 ‘The Three Ages of NATO’, speech by the NATO Secretary General, Harvard University, 23/IX/2016.

4 NATO Heads of State and Government (2016), ‘Warsaw Summit Communiqué’, 9/VII/2016, para. 85.

5 Philip Breedlove (2016), ‘NATO’s Next Act’, Foreign Affairs, July, p. 105.

6 Sven Biscop (2017), ‘A strategy for Europe’s neighbourhood: keep resilient and carry on?’, ARI nr 4/2017, Elcano Royal Institute, 16/I/2017.

The post What Does NATO Need To ‘Project Stability’ In Its Neighborhood? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Covering Russia: What CNN And Fox News Media Review Shows Omit – Analysis

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US attitudes towards Russia bring to mind the overall poor coverage of that country on the leading American TV news networks. A certain preferred slant regularly gets the upper hand. This month has seen some occurrences of that ongoing trend, which don’t (at least for the most part) get reviewed on the Sunday morning aired Fox News show “Media Buzz“, hosted by Howard Kurtz, and its CNN rival (aired at the same time) “Reliable Sources“.

RT picked up on the Fox News utilized “Democratic strategist” Julie Roginsky in a bully pulpit segment, where she stated a series of negatively inexact comments against Russia. In response, some of the posted comments at the online RT piece in question, derisively noted her Jewish former Soviet background. At play are some stereotypes which aren’t accurate.

In some circles especially, the anti-Jewish posted comments will conjure up the inaccurate image of Russia as a Jewish unfriendly place – never minding the noticeable number of Jews who’ve returned to Russia from Israel and elsewhere, as well as the Jews inside and outside Russia who’ve a positive image of Europe’s largest country. This observation isn’t intended to gloss over past discriminatory instances and some (stress some) present negatives in Russia (as if other countries are so pristine.) Rather, it’s to put things in a truer perspective.

Keep in mind that the ethnicity and nationality of the commenters isn’t known. RT’s English version is primarily geared to an English speaking audience outside Russia. RT’s staff is multi-national, with a strong non-Russian contingent. It’s not out of line for a pro-Russian advocate to respectfully caution RT on which posted comments get approved. Comments deemed as bigoted and associated with RT (in one form or another) don’t help that network’s reputation, which has been unfairly portrayed as is.

Roginsky, Masha Gessen and Julia Ioffe don’t represent all Jewish people with roots from the former USSR. Relying mainly on US mass media can subconsciously influence perceptions. US mass media focuses on the negatives in Russia. Hence, there’s a top heavy reliance on anti-Russian leaning sources, regardless of their ethno-religious origin.

Over the years, I’ve had numerous discussions with Jewish people from Brighton Beach (and elsewhere in the US) with former Soviet roots, who differ with the preferred US mass media slant. Likewise with those having a non-Jewish former Soviet and/or former Russian Empire background from other parts of the US – mostly ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians, as well as those of mixed backgrounds.

On another matter, the May 15 Washington Post (WaPo) article, claiming that Donald Trump faultily gave Intel to Russians at his recent Oval Office meeting with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Ambassador to the US Sergey Kislyak, drew much coverage on Fox News, MSNBC and CNN.

In an exchange with CNN’s Wolf Blitzer, longtime Vermont Democratic Senator Pat Leahy, conveyed apprehension about that claim. Shortly thereafter on Fox News, Laura Ingraham, expressed astonishment that Tennessee Republican Senator Bob Corker, appeared more willing to believe The WaPo story than Leahy. Later on in the evening, CNN’s Jim Sciutto suggestively gave a kudos to Corker.

Sciutto carrying on as such is no surprise given his track record. Ingraham shouldn’t be so amazed. Corker is very much a foreign policy establishment type, as evidenced by the suggestive approval he received from Sciutto. Leahy has ample reason to second guess the latest WaPo story in question. Recall the not so distantly hyped WaPo story which (as later revealed) had erroneously claimed that Russia hacked the power grid in Leahy’s home state. CNN was all over that story until it was shown to be a nothing burger. I don’t recall this matter noted on the weekly CNN media review show hosted by Brian Stelter.

The following day (May 16) saw the claim that Israel was the Intel source which Trump (as claimed) gave to the Russians. Very much downplayed are the very high level Russian-Israeli discussions over the past few years, which have been known to involve Intel matters. The heavily influenced neocon/neolib US mass media is prone to not second guess some questionable claims that don’t fit their preference concerning Russia related matters. Don’t be surprised if the spin on Trump compromising a US ally turns out to be bloated sensationalism, as seems true with some earlier instances.

During a May 10 Brian Williams hosted MSNBC segment, Ioffe brought up how happy Trump looked with Lavrov and Kislyak, in comparison to Trump’s meeting with Angela Merkel. Hint: the Russian government has people who aren’t such ogres when compared to their Western counterparts. Merkel downplays the level of violent nationalism and corruption in Kiev regime controlled Ukraine – contrasted with her pious scorn against Russia. Besides this ethical inconsistency, perhaps Merkel isn’t as interesting and enjoyable a guest as Lavrov and/or Kislyak. In any event, it’s problematical to pursue better relations with Russia, when one is criticized for appearing friendly with that nation as others (like the US UN Ambassador Nikki Haley) carryon in an opposite manner, with limited high profile criticism.

Former Soviet spy Jack Barsky is making the rounds on CNN and MSNBC. He doesn’t offer much, if anything, in terms of new and interesting insight. His clear purpose is to (supposedly) show how present day Russia and the USSR are much the same. In actuality, there’re noticeable differences that include savvy Russians (government affiliated and otherwise) who don’t shy away from the likes of Sciutto and Blitzer.

A truly fair and balanced mass media would feature the intelligent opposites to Barsky, Ioffe and Michael McFaul. The former grouping include some folks who aren’t regular JRL (Johnson’s Russia List) court appointed Russia friendlies.

Michael Averko is a New York based independent foreign policy analyst and media critic. This article was initially placed at the Strategic Culture Foundation’s website on May 17.

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Erectile Dysfunction Medicines Don’t Cause Melanoma

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Use of the erectile dysfunction drug Viagra does not cause the development of melanoma, a deadly form of skin cancer.

This is the main finding of new research led by investigators at NYU Langone Medical Center and its Perlmutter Cancer Center and published online May 19 in the Journal of the National Cancer Institute.

While the researchers found an overall 11 percent increase in the risk of developing melanoma among erection medication users, they found no evidence that erectile dysfunction medicines cause melanoma. Instead, the study authors attribute the risk to “detection bias,” where the group of patients likely to take erection medicines also happens to be more health conscious, more likely to see a doctor, and so more likely to get diagnosed with melanoma than other men of similar age.

“Physicians should still screen for melanoma risk, but they do not need to add the use of Viagra and similar drugs to the list of screening criteria specifically,” says urologist Stacy Loeb, MD, MSc, an assistant professor at NYU Langone. “In general, men should continue to be careful about the risk of any kind of skin cancer from excessive sun exposure and use sun protection.”

In 2016, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration placed Viagra and other erectile dysfunction drugs collectively known as phosphodiesterase type 5 (PDE5) inhibitors on its watch list of medications with possible safety issues. The FDA action followed a 2014 report in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) that linked an increased risk of melanoma with Viagra use. Loeb’s team, in 2015, published a detailed analysis in JAMA of the medical records of 20,000 men in Sweden that found no evidence that Viagra or similar medicines cause melanoma.

In response to the FDA’s action, Loeb and her colleagues analyzed data from five large-scale studies of erectile medication users and melanoma published between 2014 and 2016, which included a total of 866,049 men, of whom 41,874 were diagnosed with melanoma.

The researchers found an overall increase in melanoma risk among men who used PDE5 inhibitors, but they hypothesized that if a cause and effect exists, higher use of erection medications would be associated with higher risk of developing the disease. Loeb and her colleagues found the opposite: there was an increase in risk among men who had a small amount of exposure to these medications, and men who took larger amounts of erectile dysfunction medications had no significant increase in melanoma risk.

The researchers also reasoned that if erectile dysfunction medications cause melanoma, they would expect to find more aggressive disease among people who take the medications, but that was not the case. They did find an increased risk of early stage melanoma among erection medicine users, but those who took such medications were at a lower risk for aggressive melanoma than non-users.

“Overall, Viagra and other PDE5 inhibitors are safe medications as long as men are not taking nitrates, which carry a risk of reducing blood pressure,” Loeb said. “Physicians and patients should not be concerned about taking these medications on account of worry about melanoma.”

The post Erectile Dysfunction Medicines Don’t Cause Melanoma appeared first on Eurasia Review.

100-Year-Old Fertility Technique Reduces Need For IVF

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Infertile couples have a major opportunity to achieve a successful pregnancy without the need for IVF, thanks to new research into a 100-year-old medical technique.

The now lesser known technique — which involves flushing the woman’s fallopian tubes with an iodised poppy seed oil — has been proven to have significant benefits for fertility, according to the largest study undertaken by a team involving researchers in the Netherlands and Australia.

The results of the study will today be published in The New England Journal of Medicine. They will also be presented at the 13th World Congress on Endometriosis in Vancouver, Canada, by project leader Professor Ben Mol, from the University of Adelaide’s Robinson Research Institute, and a member of the South Australian Health and Medical Research Institute’s Healthy Mothers, Babies and Children theme.

Known as the H2Oil study, the project compared the benefits of flushing the fallopian tubes with either an oil-based or water-based solution in 1119 women. With Professor Mol, this work was conducted by Dr Kim Dreyer and Dr Velja Mijatovic from the Department of Reproductive Medicine, VU University Medical Centre, Amsterdam, and a research team from 27 medical centres in the Netherlands.

100-year-old technique

The procedure, known as hysterosalpingography (HSG), is a dye test of the fallopian tubes conducted under X-ray. The procedure was first carried out in 1917, and since the 1950s both water-based and oil-based solutions have been used.

“Over the past century, pregnancy rates among infertile women reportedly increased after their tubes had been flushed with either water or oil during this X-ray procedure. Until now, it has been unclear whether the type of solution used in the procedure was influencing the change in fertility,” said Professor Mol, who himself was conceived after his mother underwent such a procedure.

“Our results have been even more exciting than we could have predicted, helping to confirm that an age-old medical technique still has an important place in modern medicine,” he says.

Results show clear benefits of oil-based solution

Almost 40% of infertile women in the oil group and 29% of infertile women in the water group achieved successful pregnancies within six months of the technique being performed.

The oil-based product used in the study was Lipiodol® Ultra-Fluid, an iodised solution of fatty acids from poppy seeds. This product is currently available in 47 countries around the world.

“The rates of successful pregnancy were significantly higher in the oil-based group, and after only one treatment. This is an important outcome for women who would have had no other course of action other than to seek IVF treatment. It offers new hope to infertile couples,” Professor Mol said.

The big question: why?

“It was long believed that testing a woman’s fallopian tubes could have fertility benefits through ‘flushing out’ the kind of debris that hinders fertility. The reality is, we still don’t really understand why there is a benefit, only that there is a benefit from this technique, in particular for women who don’t present with any other treatable fertility symptoms,” Professor Mol said.

“Further research would need to be conducted into the mechanisms behind what we’re seeing. For now, and considering the technique has been used for 100 years without any known side-effects, we believe it is a viable treatment for infertility prior to couples seeking IVF.

“Not only is there a known benefit, but this flushing procedure is also a fraction of the cost of one cycle of IVF. Considering that 40% of women in the oil-based group achieved a successful pregnancy, that’s 40% of couples who could avoid having to go through the huge costs and emotions associated with IVF treatment,” he said.

Turning around infertility – a family history

Until he embarked on this study, Professor Mol had no idea that he himself was the result of a successful pregnancy following such a procedure.

In the 1960s, after being considered infertile for nine years, Professor Mol’s mother underwent an HSG which, coincidentally, also used Lipiodol®. “It was only after I started researching this technique that my family told me what had happened,” Professor Mol said.

“My mother went from being infertile for many years to becoming pregnant, and I was born in 1965. I also have a younger brother. So it’s entirely possible – in fact, based on our team’s research, it’s highly likely – that my brother and I are both the result of this technique helping my mother to achieve fertility.”

What can infertile couples do?

“The use of used Lipiodol® itself is not currently practiced widely, so the first thing couples need to do is to speak with their doctor about it,” Professor Mol said.

“Professional bodies responsible for guidelines, funders of health care, and fertility clinics all have a role to play in assisting infertile couples to make this intervention available to couples before IVF is started,” he said.

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Jordan, Not Israel, Was Original Intelligence Source For ISIS Bomb Plot – OpEd

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Boy, what a difference a day makes.

On Monday, I published an article in Middle East Eye in which I speculated that Jordan was the likely source of the intelligence which Donald Trump relayed to the Russians about an ISIS airplane bomb plot.  I wrote then:

*****

None of the media stories reveal the name of the foreign nation whose operation Trump exposed. Some have speculated that it might be Israel or Turkey. But my guess is that it is Jordan, because it has one of the best intelligence agencies in the Arab world and is highly motivated to penetrate ISIS since it poses a grave danger to Jordan, whose neighbor, Syria, is a key refuge for the Islamist group.

Jordan’s King Abdullah has a vested interest in currying favor with Pres. Trump, as the former seeks to be a broker for Israeli-Palestinian peace. Abdullah understands that if the U.S. administration gets this wrong, then it could have disastrous consequences for Jordan itself, as the guardian of the Haram al-Sharif Muslim holy site. Jordan also has a very large Palestinian population and has always played a major role in Palestinian affairs.

It’s noteworthy that the King rushed to the U.S. at the beginning of Trump’s term, when statements about moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem and abandoning the traditional U.S. two-state formula were bandied about the U.S. media. The Arab monarch’s mission was to warn the administration of the damage it could do to U.S. relations with the Muslim world should it pursue such a radical. His visit seemed to have the desired effect, as the administration began to dial back its previous enthusiasm for Israeli far-right talking points.

Now, Trump may have to explain in person to the King how and why he compromised a major Jordanian intelligence operation. It’s noteworthy that given Russia’s own interests in propping up Syria’s Pres. Assad, it very well might sabotage the Jordanian project. Thus, years of intelligence work and millions of dollars’ worth of operational investment could go down the drain. All due to the foolhardiness of Donald Trump seeking to impress his Russian friends.

*****

Later that same day, American media first reported that Israel, not Jordan, was the source.  I dutifully backtracked, updated that article and published a revised version here.  Now, in the past few hours Al Jazeera has published a new account based on Jordanian intelligence sources stating that my original hunch was right all along.  Jordanian spies infiltrated ISIS and gleaned the information.  The chief of Jordanian intelligence then passed this information on to the Israelis with whom it has an exceedingly close security relationship.  Israel in turn passed it on the Washington.

There are several interesting complications involved in this scenario.  While Israeli and Jordanian security services are closely tied (as the Dirar Abusisi case showed) that does not necessarily mean the Jordanians gave approval to the Israelis to pass it along to the Trump administration.  They may have or may not have.  If they didn’t, then Trump’s leak is doubly damaging–both to Israel and Jordan.  It could cause the Israelis to back off future sharing of such information.  It could also cause the Jordanians to be angry with Israel and back off future collaborations.  Even more importantly, it could and likely has endangered the Jordanian agent who infiltrated ISIS and learned of the laptop bomb plot.

There is an even more peculiar explanation that may be possible.  In all the discussion, most analysts have speculated the source of the information was human intelligence (HUMINT), a physical source on the ground.  Few have acknowledged that Israel has the best SIGINT operation in the region, almost on a par with the NSA: Unit 8200.  So it’s possible that the latter has been listening to internal communications by ISIS.  Or it may be listening to Jordanian intelligence communication with its own spy within ISIS.  That means that Jordan may not have even known that Israel was aware of the plot and that it was passing it on to Trump.

The media have noted how beleaguered Trump appears and that he’s not looking forward to his Middle East trip.  One major reason is that he will have to look King Abdullah in the face and explain why he endangered an agent and agency which had invested so much to help undermine ISIS’ foul plots.  Then he will have to explain to Israeli intelligence why and how he let it down in sharing the information with the Russians.

As an aside, it’s comic in a very dark way that Avigdor Lieberman is downplaying the significance of the Trump leak and the possibility that the President is a Russian asset.  That’s rich coming from a figure who much of the Israeli public, media and intelligence apparatus believes is himself a Russian asset.

Bibi’s Manufactured Dust-Up over Trump Kotel Visit

Yesterday, I critiqued the Israeli claim regarding coördination meetings between the Israeli and American advance teams for Pres. Trump’s visit to the Kotel (Western Wall).  I derided the claim by the prime minister’s men that an American diplomat had yelled that the Kotel was occupied territory and that Israeli sovereignty over it was not recognized by the U.S.

I suspected that the real reason for the dust-up was that the Israelis saw a presidential visit to Israel’s holiest site as a prime hasbara opportunity.  It was likely Bibi Netanyahu himself wanted to horn in on the action, get a joint photo with the president at the site, and broadcast to the entire world that the U.S. president affirms Israel’s claim to this conquered land.  I should add that no Israeli prime minister has ever accompanied a U.S. president to the Kotel.  Nor has one accompanied a presidential candidate there.  Indeed, Trump is the first sitting president to visit the sacred site.  Which is in itself controversial since it implies tacit American recognition of Israeli sovereignty over it.

Indeed, I was right.  This was the Israeli plan all along.  And the U.S. diplomat, whose name is David Berns, now has his job in jeopardy.  He appears to have taken down his entire LinkedIn profile no doubt due to venom being spewed at him by Israel uber alles types.  But he was absolutely right in rejecting Israel’s importuning.  Such a photo image transmitted around the world would enrage most of the Muslim world with which Trump is attempting to reconcile following his barring of the doors to Muslim refugees.  Israel would not have to deal with this fallout (except in a tertiary way).  The U.S. would.  The flag would burn.  Muslims would riot.  Americans would die.  All to give a propaganda and political boost to Bibi Netanyahu.

This article was published at Tikun Olam.

The post Jordan, Not Israel, Was Original Intelligence Source For ISIS Bomb Plot – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Resurrecting Identities In The Andes

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Who are you? A parent? An artist? A veteran? There are lots of different aspects of identity, and it takes more than just one to make you you. Ancient people were just as complex, but until recently, archaeologists didn’t have a clear way to capture all the nuances of human identities from the past outside of broader labels like gender and social status.

Individual people are an important part of the bigger human puzzle, because their unique actions accumulate to power cultural changes. Understanding them in detail gives researchers better insight into shifts that take place over generations, said Kelly Knudson.

Knudson is a professor with Arizona State University’s School of Human Evolution and Social Change and director of its Center for Bioarchaeological Research.

Together with Christina Torres-Rouff of the University of California Merced, Knudson has created a new model that brings together multiple lines of investigation to understand ancient lives on a microscale through the clues left behind in the grave.

A forum paper outlining the model and its application, “Integrating Identities: An Innovative Bioarchaeological and Biogeochemical Approach to Analyzing the Multiplicity of Identities in the Mortuary Record,” will be published in the June edition of Current Anthropology.

“One of the things I’m excited about is our ability to simultaneously study large populations over many generations and the very intimate details of individual lives in the past,” Knudson said.

If tombs could talk

Termed a “contextualized multiscalar bioarchaeological approach,” this model explores individual identity using a mix of biological and cultural data from grave sites. The authors used it to investigate northern Chilean society during an environmental and political shift from the Middle Horizon (AD 500 – 1100) to the Late Intermediate Period (AD 1100 – 1400). Details examined included:

  • Cranial characteristics, which helped determine genetic relatedness at the population level.
  • Modified head shapes, which demonstrated community identities, as skull shape was culturally dictated in the Andes.
  • Isotopic analyses, which revealed individuals’ geographic origins and whether they moved during their lifetimes.
  • Grave goods and construction, which shed light on how people were perceived and remembered by others.
  • The relationships these features had to an individual’s sex, which expanded on understandings of social identity.

In a comparison of two Middle Horizon-era cemeteries, the researchers found that even though the burial populations were related, they identified differently; one was much more cosmopolitan than the other, with the grave goods from distant regions like Bolivia and Argentina.

Similarly, even individual graves from the same cemetery advertised unique identities. A detailed look at three neighboring tombs revealed three very different, though nearly contemporary, lives. Using their innovative blend of methods, Knudson and Torres-Rouff were able to piece together the identities of a wealthy young tradesman, a middle-aged spiritual leader and a young woman who spun colorful textiles.

These graves stood in sharp contrast to graves from the Late Intermediate Period. Analysis of a burial from this time revealed a herdsman who, although honored by his community with a rare circular stone arrangement over his tomb, was buried with only a few, locally made items.

Knudson and Torres-Rouff argue that as Andean society transitioned from the Middle Horizon to the Late Intermediate Period, they moved the emphasis from individual identity to community identity and from foreign connections to local isolation, likely as a response to the time’s characteristic uncertainty due to widespread drought.

“I was surprised to find that people hunkered down and stayed put rather than moving to better regions where it wasn’t so dry,” Knudson said. “I expected to see environmental refugees, but we didn’t see that at all.”

Knowing how people were impacted by a changing climate 1,000 years ago informs not only our understanding of ancient people, but of ourselves as well. Society’s response to today’s challenges happens one person at a time; with this new model, we have the tools to see how that process works and how everyday lives shape history.

“I think this long-term perspective is one of bioarchaeologists’ very valuable contributions to the past and present,” Knudson added.

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T-Shirt Monitors Wearer’s Breathing Rate In Real Time

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A smart T-shirt that monitors the wearer’s respiratory rate in real time has been created by researchers at Université Laval’s Faculty of Science and Engineering and its Center for Optics, Photonics, and Lasers.

This innovation, the details of which are published in the latest edition of Sensors, paves the way for manufacturing clothing that could be used to diagnose respiratory illnesses or monitor people suffering from asthma, sleep apnea, or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.

Unlike other methods of measuring respiratory rate, the smart T shirt works without any wires, electrodes, or sensors attached to the user’s body, explained Younes Messaddeq, the professor who led the team that developed the technology.

“The T shirt is really comfortable and doesn’t inhibit the subject’s natural movements. Our tests show that the data captured by the shirt is reliable, whether the user is lying down, sitting, standing, or moving around,” Messaddeq said.

The key to the smart T shirt is an antenna sewn in at chest level that’s made of a hollow optical fiber coated with a thin layer of silver on its inner surface. The fiber’s exterior surface is covered in a polymer that protects it against the environment.

“The antenna does double duty, sensing and transmitting the signals created by respiratory movements,” added Messaddeq, who also holds the Canada Excellence Research Chair in Photonic Innovations. “The data can be sent to the user’s smartphone or a nearby computer.”

As the wearer breathes in, the smart fiber senses the increase in both thorax circumference and the volume of air in the lungs, explained Messaddeq. “These changes modify some of the resonant frequency of the antenna. That’s why the T shirt doesn’t need to be tight or in direct contact with the wearer’s skin. The oscillations that occur with each breath are enough for the fiber to sense the user’s respiratory rate.”

To assess the durability of their invention, the researchers put a T shirt equipped with an antenna through the wash–literally. “After 20 washes, the antenna had withstood the water and detergent and was still in good working condition,” said Messaddeq.

The post T-Shirt Monitors Wearer’s Breathing Rate In Real Time appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Honduras: A Country That Prioritizes Profit Over Indigenous Rights – Analysis

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By Myra Miranda*

Since 2013, two hydroelectric dam projects have been installed illegally on indigenous land, after the Honduran authorities neglected to inform local communities about the harmful impact that these projects were bringing with them. In 2013, the mayor of the Santa Elena municipality, Alexis Ventura, allowed the company Encinos to explore the area. In turn, this led indigenous groups to organize protest efforts to block the project[i]. The dam project would represent a clear threat to rural communities and it would also affect the local water supply. Additionally, it is clear that there is an undeniable conflict of interest that involves a well-known government official and her husband. All of those opposed to the projects have not chosen to remain silent. Instead, a number of them have organized peaceful protests in order to demand respect for their lands and natural resources, which ended up facing retaliation in the form of mounting violence. Protesters of all ages have been incarcerated, threatened, tortured and killed. In 2016, environmental activist Bertha Caceres was assassinated while protesting a similar project, the Agua Zarca dam. The bodies of other indigenous activists who had taken a stand against the hydroelectric projects have been found mutilated. They all belonged to the Independent Indigenous Movement of Lenca de la Paz (MILPAH).

Who is involved?

According to a 2 year investigation by a U.S. NGO, Global Witness, the projects raise serious concerns of illegal conflict of interest in the region[ii]. Arnold Castro, the owner of the Encino hydroelectric company, who also owns its sister company, Aurora, intends to sell energy to the state produced from these dam projects. He is the husband of one of Honduras’s most powerful members of its elite: Gladis Aurora Lopez. Lopez is the Vice-President of the Honduran National Congress and president of Partido Nacional, Honduras’ ruling party. Under Honduran law, the government is forbidden to extend contracts or grant concessions to members of Congress and their spouses.[iii] Global Witness links the murders and the abuse of environmental activists and indigenous communities to Lopez and Castro, who have not been held accountable for their crimes. According to Billy Kyte, a Global Witness campaign leader, those tasked with committing the crimes are rarely arrested, while those who contract them normally go unpunished.

“We have documented countless chilling attacks and threats, including the savage beating by soldiers of pregnant women, children held at gunpoint by police, arson attacks on villagers’ homes, whilst hired assassins still wander free among their victims’ communities.”[iv]

Washington has also been indirectly involved in the oppression of certain indigenous groups through the large amounts of monetary aid given to the country despite Honduras’ long history of horrendous human rights abuses. In 2016 alone, the United States allocated $100 million in bilateral aid, money that could have been used for social and economic development. Instead, tens of millions of aid dollars were given to its military and police, often to the same groups that have been regularly inflicting the violence and assassinating environmental activists. Barack Obama’s 2017 budget request asked to increase aid for the Honduran police and military. In addition, the Inter-American Development Bank loaned out $60 million to the Honduran police after it was approved by U.S officials.[v] According to Washington, Honduras can do no wrong, despite possessing one of the worst human rights records in the Americas.

Efforts to fund police and military in Honduras would be ideal if they operated in accordance with the rule-of-law. Instead, the Honduran police is widely known for being extremely corrupt as well as ineffective, and has raised serious concerns for its tendency to engage in unspeakable criminal activities and human rights infractions. For example, a questionable case emerged in 2009, when 100 agricultors were murdered in the Bajo Aguan region, while the Honduran government turned a blind eye to the perpetrators of these killings. Another victim at the hands of law enforcement agents was activist Tomas Garcia, who was murdered in July 2013. In December 2015, two indigenous men were assassinated as they were working to pull a vehicle out of a sandbank.[vi]

President Juan Orlando Hernandez has been silent regarding the attacks taking place in rural communities. Instead of investigating these repeated major infractions committed by the police, he authorized the military to perform police functions, which is a violation of the Honduran constitution. This decision has resulted in numerous civilian deaths. Militarised police forces have been accused of killing unarmed civilians while passing through perilous checkpoints, arresting and beating activists such as Guadalupe Ruedas, a fervent advocate for children.[vii]

Who has been affected?

Indigenous communities residing in remote areas of Honduras have suffered the most from the dam projects, including members of the Lenca and Tolupan peoples. Not only have entire communities experienced illegal evictions from their homes, many of which were destroyed, but military officials also burnt down their crops and threatened children at gunpoint. Dissident Ana Miriam Romero claimed the first time that she learned about the project was after she saw heavy construction equipment invade her community and commence operations. Quickly surrounded, communities began organizing peaceful protests in hope that the dam project would inform and consult with those who were about to be adversely affected by it. Instead, the riposte came in form of threats and acts of intimidation. Soon after, protesters received death threats and unsolicited visits by police officers who proceeded to use excessive force in order to evict them from their homes. Communities suggested to Global Witness that many of these evictions were connected to Gladis Lopez.[viii]

The so-called “consultation”, occurred a month after the attacks began, operating behind the scene after they were found to be fraudulent. Witnesses informed Global Witness that Gladis Lopez had gathered a group of 600 indigenous people and promised them that some would be needed to work on the dam. She had them sign agreements to falsely establish that they would be the most affected communities of the Encinos project. However, the list of signatories was almost immediately removed from the official website, and Mayor Ventura’s office then refused to release the documents to the public as requested by MILPAH. Three years later, MILPAH was informed that, in fact, the file had been lost, making the false signatories even more suspicious.

In October 2015, it was reported at the time that a group of 30 soldiers, police and civilians broke into Romero’s home, who was then beaten brutally along with her sister. She was pregnant at the time of the incident, and her children were threatened with guns aimed at their heads. Miriam became a target after she publicly opposed the Encinos hydroelectric project, after this she continued to receive death threats for reporting the initial attack.[ix]

Communities affected by the Aurora dam experienced similar dire consequences. Locals claimed they were never given much of a chance to express their concerns on the impacts of the project, and how it was going to negatively affect their lives, as well as their local water supply. The Aurora dam has left eight indigenous communities without water, and it was also established during the investigation that a municipal councillor had been offered a bribe in exchange for halting the opposition to it. In addition, a senior government official has been charged with illegally providing an environmental licence for the construction of the dam.[x]

Gladis Lopez replied in a letter to Global Witness, denying any connections to the violent attacks launched against the indigenous communities opposed to the project. She also accused Honduran dissidents for allegedly putting the country’s economy at risk with their alleged false claims:

“It cannot be possible that Hondurans are capable, some of them pushed by their ideologies or for their own agenda to win the November elections in an illegitimate way, to put the country’s economic investment at risk” [xi].

The Honduran government must put an end to the atrocities committed against indigenous groups as well as the environment. Since the 2009 coup d’etat, the de facto regime has waged a war against environmental activists, and has been responsible for the assassination of 120 of them.[xii]

Indigenous communities must no longer remain in the shadows, and their participation and consideration in projects need to be taken into account. The threats, arrests, illegal evictions and assassinations should not be an issue that the indigenous people need to be concerned about on a daily basis; instead, they must be allowed to exercise their freedom of speech through peaceful protests without any violence in return. These communities must no longer live fearing that they will be stripped of their territories, while corporations tip off elected officials in order to authorize the sizing of indigenous land. As of today, there are more than 20 hydroelectric projects that are being built on indigenous land, affecting groups such as the Lenca, Pech, Tawahka, Miskito, Tolupan and Garifuna. [xiii] On its end, The United States must ensure that not a single dollar of bilateral aid is used to facilitate the repression and violence of rural communities, otherwise their silence will be misread as indifference to their ill treatment.

*Myra Miranda, Extramural Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs Additional editorial support provided by Tobias Fontecilla and Alex Rawley, Research Associates at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

[i] Staff “Un Proyecto Hidroeléctrico Genera Un Conflicto En Un Pueblo Indígena Hondureño”. 2017. VICE News. https://news.vice.com/es/article/proyecto-hidroelectrico-genera-conflicto-pueblo-indigena-hondureno.

[ii] Kyte, Billy. 2017. “Honduras: The Deadliest Country In The World For Environmental Activism”. Global Witness. https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/honduras-deadliest-country-world-environmental-activism/..

[iii] Ibid

[iv] Ibid

[v] John James Conyers, Jr, Keith Ellison, Marcy Kaptur, Jan Schakowsky, Jose Serrano, and Hank Johnson. 2017. “America’s Funding of Honduran Security Forces Puts Blood On Our Hands”. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jul/08/american-funding-honduran-security-forces-blood-on-our-hands#img-1.

[vi] Ibid

[vii] Ibid.

[viii] Staff. Case Study 1: The National Party President and Her Links to Illegal Dams. Global Witness, 2017. Accessed April 12, 2017.

[ix] Ibid

[x] Ibid

[xi] Staff. “Gladis Aurora López Niega Acusaciones De Violencia Contra Ambientalistas”. 2017. Diario La Tribuna Honduras. http://www.latribuna.hn/2017/02/02/gladis-aurora-lopez-niega-acusaciones-violencia-ambientalistas/.

[xii] Tramel, Salena. 2017. “People, Policy, And Power: Envisioning A New Honduras”. The Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/people-policy-and-power-envisioning-a-new-honduras_us_58d8ee69e4b0c0980ac0e7d1.

[xiii] Staff. “Lesbia Yaneth, La Última Víctima De La Persecución A Los Ambientalistas En Honduras”. 2017. La Marea. http://www.lamarea.com/2016/07/08/lesbia-yaneth-la-ultima-victima-del-activismo-honduras/.

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Once Shunned, Bulgaria’s United Patriots Joins Governing Coalition – Analysis

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By John R. Haines*

Want to bet exactly which Euro-Atlantic powers are whispering denunciations in Daul’s ear about the Patriotic Front? — Ognyan Minchev[1]

(FPRI) — Several weeks after winning a plurality in Bulgaria’s late March parliamentary election, Prime Minister Boyko Borissov did something unprecedented: he brought the nationalist United Patriots (Obedineni Patrioti) into his coalition government. The United Patriots is an electoral alliance of three parties, the IMRO[2]-Bulgarian National Movement (VMRO-Bulgarsko Natsionalno Dvizhenie), the National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (Natzionalen Front za Spasenie na Bulgaria), and Attack (Attaka). Their inclusion in the coalition government has given rise to concern among Bulgaria’s NATO allies (and many Bulgarian themselves) about what the Bulgarian Socialist Party’s Korneliya Ninova called Mr. Borissov’s “floating majority, his unprincipled alliance”[3] (plavashti mnozinstva, bezprintsipni sŭyuzi).

(l-r) Deputy PM Valeri Simeonov, Prime Minister Boyko Borissov, and Deputy PM Krassimir Karakachanov (Credit: The Sofia Globe)
(l-r) Deputy PM Valeri Simeonov, Prime Minister Boyko Borissov, and Deputy PM Krassimir Karakachanov (Credit: The Sofia Globe)

That concern is well placed for several reasons. Only a few years ago, even the nationalist IMRO-BND and NFSB excluded the radical Ataka[4] from their electoral alliance dubbed the “Patriotic Front” (Patriotichen front) because of Ataka’s positions on Russia and NATO.

Even then, however, the Patriotic Front’s “nationalist profile” (natsionalisticheskiyat profil) was so far to Bulgaria’s political right to cause Mr. Borissov to exclude the Patriotic Front from his coalition government. He did so with the active encouragement of his center-right European People’s Party allies across the European Union. “Nothing against the PF, but unfortunately the things Valeri Simeonov [a PF leader, more about whom anon] proposes do not correspond to our Euro-Atlantic orientation,” said Mr. Borissov at the time.[5]

Ataka’s well-earned pariah status among pro-NATO, pro-EU political parties reflects its stridently pro-Russia—even the Patriotic Front’s Mr. Simeonov once said Ataka “must abandon its Russophilia” as a precondition to alliance—and virulently anti-Muslim stance. Given this, one might think aligning with Ataka now would drive the Popular Front even farther from Mr. Borissov.

And yet on 3 May, Mr. Borissov announced that the United Patriots—which won 27 National Assembly seats (out of 240) in the late March parliamentary election, finishing third with about nine percent (9.07%) of votes cast—would join his coalition government. The United Patriots now controls two of four deputy prime minister posts along with portfolios for the internal security, defense, environment, and economy ministries. Mr. Borissov’s deal with United Patriots allowed him to cement his governing coalition with a 133-100 vote in the National Assembly. It remains to be seen what this will cost Mr. Borissov at home and among Bulgaria’s allies.

He named Krassimir Karakachanov Deputy Prime Minister in charge of internal security and national defense. Mr. Karakachanov has been a fixture of Bulgarian politics for some three decades. He served in the National Assembly from 1997-2001 and again from 2005-2009; and as IMRO-BND’s presidential candidate in 2011, when he won less than one percent (0.99%) of the popular vote.

Deputy PM Krassimir Karakachanov (Credit: dnevnik.bg)
Deputy PM Krassimir Karakachanov (Credit: dnevnik.bg)

According to one published report, he was recruited while a student by Bulgaria’s Communist-era state security service.

Some parliamentary members from Mr. Borissov’s own party (GER[6]) insisted Mr. Karakachanov was inappropriate for the internal security and defense portfolios “because he will have trouble getting access to classified information from NATO because of his past in the DS.”[7]

Mr. Borissov named Valeri Simeonov Deputy Prime Minister in charge of economic and demographic policy.

First elected to public office as an Ataka candidate in 2007, Mr. Simeonov chaired the Burgas[8] municipal council until January 2009, when he resigned to protest its approval of a permit to construct a new mosque.[9]

Deputy Prime Minister Valeri Simeonov (Credit: 24chasa.bu)
Deputy Prime Minister Valeri Simeonov (Credit: 24chasa.bu)

In November 2009, Mr. Simeonov resigned from Ataka and in May 2011 cofounded the NFSB with two colleagues. “The future of Boyko Borisov is tied to the future of Valeri Simeonov,” he declared.[10]

Some suggest Mr. Borissov will quickly regret ceding these important portfolios to the United Patriots, with at least one commentator going so far as to say that Mr. Simeonov would most likely use his position for political blackmail.

The 27 April coalition agreement signed by Mr. Borissov and the three United Patriots leaders established a six-person political council that includes the three United Patriot co-chairs, the IMRO-BND’s Mr. Karakachanov, the NFSB’s Mr. Simeonev, and Ataka’s Volen Siderov.[11]

What role Ataka will play in Mr. Borissov’s government is unclear although the party’s ambitions are not.

“We are now really an unbeatable force in politics,”[12] declared Ataka deputy chair Yavor Notev.

The United Patriots indulged in unabashedly nationalist and racial appeals to Bulgarian voters. Mr. Karakachanov had this to say in a mid-March address to IMRO-BND supporters in Dobrich:

It’s important in this election that the Bulgarian people come out en masse and vote, because that’s the only way to stop the Gypsy vote that is bought and paid for, to stop those who voice is controlled by others, and to stop those from Turkey [note: the reference is to Bulgarian Muslims] whom the Turkish government uses to interfere directly in Bulgaria’s internal affairs. Don’t expect people from somewhere else to solve your problems, bet on local people from the United Patriots. We have no rulers in Brussels, Washington, or Moscow. Our boss is the Bulgarian people.[13]

Cover of “10 Priorities of the United Patriots – ATAKA, NFFS & IMRO” (10 prioriteta na Obedinenite patrioti- ATAKA, NFSB i VMRO) (Source: http://www.ataka.bg)
Cover of “10 Priorities of the United Patriots – ATAKA, NFFS & IMRO” (10 prioriteta na Obedinenite patrioti- ATAKA, NFSB i VMRO) (Source: http://www.ataka.bg)

The United Patriots’ ten-point electoral platform is unambiguous vis-à-vis Bulgaria’s ethnic communities [read: Roma and Bulgarian Muslims] and the country’s relationship with its NATO ally, Turkey.

In case the platform’s plain language proved insufficient, Ataka paired each of the ten United Patriots planks with a graphic to drive home the message. Consider this crude racial image that Ataka paired with the seventh plank, “Attitude toward ethnic communities” (otnoshenie kŭm etnosite).

Or this one paired with the tenth plank on “External Policy” (Vŭnshna Politika) with the tagline “NO: Against Turkey in the EC.”

The language of the respective planks disabuses any suggestion that the accompanying graphics are somehow misrepresentative. Consider the seventh plank “Attitude toward ethnic communities:”

We call for a national strategy for the integration of ethnic communities in compliance with the law. This includes the removal of illegal structures, prohibiting marriage between minors, linking eligibility for social benefits with real work, and children’s education. Bulgarian law must be modified such that the right to vote is limited to those with at least a primary education and fluency in Bulgarian.[16]

(Source: Ataka website[14])
(Source: Ataka website[14])
These nationalist dog-whistles are preconditions set by the United Patriots’ constituent parties to support Mr. Borissov. Their language about “removing illegal structures” is code for prohibiting the construction of mosques, and in some well-known instances, to demolish mosques built after local officials refused approval or withdrew it retroactively under political pressure.

So, too, the language about marriage between minors, a seemingly a mainstream view—Bulgarian media closely reported how the contentious question was handled within German political circles after that country’s recent immigrant influx—but one invariably that is linked in Bulgarian nationalist circles to Bulgarian Muslims and the Turkish government.

(Source: Ataka website [15])
(Source: Ataka website [15])
The United Patriots’ animadversion for Bulgarian Muslims carries into its next plank, “State and Religion” (Dŭrzhava i Veroizpovedaniya). It calls for the Bulgarian government to require all religious services to be conducted solely in the Bulgarian language, and to further require that the Bulgarian national flag appear in front of all religious buildings. Ominously, it calls on the government “to stop the sounds of terror coming from minarets.” That is hardly a case in which Ataka forced words on its IMRO-BND and NFSB coalition partners. In November 2014, Ataka’s Mr. Sideov angrily accused the IMRO-BND’s Mr. Karakachanov of expropriating his line about “stopping sounds of terror coming from minarets.” Mr. Karakachanov was challenged at the same time from the political center by the Bulgarian MEP Chetin Kazak, who asked:

What is all this about stopping the sound of terror from the minarets, banning circumcision, banning the DPS,[17]stopping aid for families with more than three children. Is this the partner with which you shook hands?[18]

The United Patriots’ social policy planks carefully omit the virulently anti-LBGQT language it otherwise employs on a daily basis. Consider this from the head of its Sofia chapter, who in June 2016 demanded the city’s mayor ban a planned “Pride Day” parade. Condemning it as “a political rally, the demands of which are an assault on traditional Bulgarian values, morality and good manners, and a provocation against families,” he continued:

I consider it abnormal and foreign to Bulgarian traditions, spirit and culture, and not for anything else, because these people want to impose a way of thinking and acting that’s alien to our society.[19]

The United Patriots’ tenth platform plank extends the anti-Turkish diatribe into the realm of foreign policy:

Bulgaria’s foreign policy must be subordinate to and serve the national interest. We are opposed to foreign military bases on our territory and against Turkey’s EU accession. We support the creation of a cabinet-level department responsible for demographics and the interests of Bulgarians abroad.[20]

“Demographics” is another racial code word, one used to suggest Orthodox Bulgarians risk being overwhelmed by the combined effect of Muslim immigration and a high birth rate among Bulgarian Muslims. Many Bulgarians are baffled that United Patriots leader Mr. Simeonov, was given control of something as contentious as “demographic policy” notwithstanding how it might serve as a political exegesis in forming Mr. Borissov’s governing coalition.

Difficult times may lie ahead for Bulgarian Muslims. So predicts a senior Bulgarian political figure, Osman Oktay,[21] in a mid-March essay he penned in Glasŭt Na Mladite Khora (“The Voice of Youth”):

Bulgarian Muslims will be an easy target for exploitation by Erdogan and company. They will be forced into a corner between dictatorial rule in Ankara and near-fascist rule in Bulgaria.[22]

What influence the United Patriots can ultimately exert over government policy remains to be seen, but Bulgaria’s neighbors and NATO allies have reason for concern, especially given the United Patriots’ control of the internal security, defense and “demographic” portfolios. Its platform unambiguously calls for “the removal of all Bulgarian troops from foreign countries” (izvezhdane na vsichki bŭlgarski voĭski ot chuzhdi dŭrzhavi) and as mentioned earlier, is opposed to “foreign military bases on our territory.” The platform is largely silent on Russia, save one plank that calls for “construction of two new units at the Kozloduy NPP,” a reference to Bulgaria’s sole nuclear power plant, which covers more than one-third of the country’s total annual electricity generation. Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy enterprise Rosatom is closely tied to the Kozloduy NPP, where it is working to upgrade two units.

Observers question whether—and if so, to what extent—the United Patriots “tail” will wag the Borissov government “dog.” Despite obtaining control of important ministerial portfolios, United Patriots candidates were supported in the March parliamentary election by fewer than one-in-ten Bulgarians. Turkish observers are particularly keen to see whether, and if so, how quickly and how far Mr. Borissov distances himself from their abjectly anti-Turkey rhetoric. This widely quoted Turkish media report captures the cautious optimism of some that Mr. Borissov will succeed in marginalizing his United Patriots coalition partners.

[W]ith GERB’s coalition partner, the racist and extreme nationalist United Patriots, supporting the government . . . Mr. Borisov, who is serving for the third time as Prime Minister, denied allegations that his government is ultra-nationalist and discriminatory, adding “There is no nationalism and discrimination in our party, we have tens of thousands of Muslim members. Ethnic peace and tranquility is essential for us, and there is no reason to worry about these peoples’ rights and freedoms.”[23]

Mr. Borissov’s newfound tolerance of the formerly intolerable partner,[24] the United Patriots, is a function of political necessity, in this instance to form a coalition government capable of commanding a parliamentary majority. Whether Bulgaria’s NATO partners will take a comparably tolerant view of the United Patriots control of Bulgaria’s defense and internal security portfolios remains to be seen. It also remains to be seen whether the United Patriots—especially its Ataka component—will long tolerate the dilution of its radical electoral platform by Mr. Borissov’s centrist policies.

The defense portfolio inherited by Mr. Karakachanov brings with it some formidable near-term challenges. The Bulgarian armed forces are woefully undermanned—good estimates are by at least 20%, or 5000 troops—and inadequately equipped. To remedy the former, the United Patriots propose to reinstate conscription. Bulgaria has a rising problem with recruits that do not have adequate language competency (in Bulgarian) and that cannot meet the requisite physical and health standards. As to the latter, Mr. Karakachanov is pushing a three-point rearmament program—a new fighter jet for the air force; new patrol craft for the navy; and new fighting vehicles for the army. Chronic underfunding of maintenance and repair has mpaired the Bulgarian armed forces’ readiness. Naval tactical exercises have been cancelled because vessels were not seaworthy, and tactical air exercises have been cancelled because too many aircraft were grounded for maintenance.

Mr. Borissov shrank Bulgaria’s defense budgets during his first administration, derailing modernization. The defense minister during his second administration, Nikolay Nenchev, spent much energy in a protracted public dispute with the country’s air force commander, Rumen Radev, about Bulgaria’s fighter aviation force—“the Bulgarian armed forces have as many aircraft as needed,”[25] Mr. Nenchev steadfastly insisted—and over joint policing of the country’s air space with Bulgaria’s NATO partners. Major General Radev is now President Radev; he won the November 2016 election as an independent candidate supported by the Bulgarian Socialist Party (Bulgarska sotsialisticheska partiya) with nearly sixty percent (59.7%) of votes cast.

Former Bulgarian Air Force Commander Major General Rumen Radev, now Bulgaria’s President (Credit: Novinte)
Former Bulgarian Air Force Commander Major General Rumen Radev, now Bulgaria’s President (Credit: Novinte)

If the United Patriots leaderships’ reaction to President Radev’s inaugural address to the National Assembly is any indication, the relationship is unlikely to improve during Mr. Borissov’s third administration. Mr. Karakachanov suggested much of what Mr. Radev said merely echoed United Patriots themes on curbing illegal immigration, border security, and what he called “a balanced foreign policy.”[26] His United Patriots co-leader, Mr. Simeonov, was less diplomatic, calling Mr. Radov’s remarks “ridiculous.” “We haven’t heard what’s most important—what are the President’s priorities?” he said, “Instead, we heard fairy tales.”[27]

It appears that Mr. Borissov’s intends to contain Mr. Karakachanov by putting deputy defense ministers in place from his own GERB party, so it is unclear yet whether the United Patriots have actually captured the defense portfolio as definitively as some think. Another factor is that now President Radev is closely tied to the armed forces, whereas his predecessor, Mr. Plevneliev, was largely disengaged on defense matters.

Two matters seem likely to remain contentious and to test how far the United Patriots can exercise real political power in the areas of defense and internal security. The first is the United Patriots platform plank to remove Bulgarian armed forces from foreign countries in which they are now deployed. While Bulgaria has only about 140 troops stationed abroad, mostly on in NATO operations in Afghanistan, Mr. Borissov has positioned it as a test of Bulgaria’s commitment to full and active NATO membership, which he supports. The second is more problematic and concerns the United Patriots’ call to re-open missile bases in southern Bulgaria to, in Mr. Simeonov’s words, defend Bulgaria against an unstable Turkey.

We cannot exclude a Turkish invasion of Bulgaria. Being a NATO member does not protect us and does not reduce the danger to our country. So it is a good thing to have tactical missile bases in southern Bulgaria.[28]

The United Patriots appear resolute on the questions of reinstating conscription—a subject closely connected to its interests in the “demographic question,” a euphemism for marginalizing Bulgarian Roma and Muslims, and creating a powerful ethnic center of gravity—and reopening missile bases in southern Bulgaria targeting Turkey. A key element of the United Patriots’ approach to conscription is to require proportional distribution of different regions of the country in the ranks, a categorically anti-Roma, anti-Muslim policy. While Bulgaria is highly unlikely to target missiles at Turkey—in truth, much more a United Patriots slogan than a real plan—the issue nonetheless sharpens the United Patriots’ anti-Turkey rhetoric without incurring the risk of actually doing anything.

The implication of all of this for Bulgaria’s standing within NATO remains to be seen, but one thing is clear: the once-unthinkable possibility of a hot conflict between NATO member-states is put at risk—along with his country’s standing within the Alliance and the EU—by Bulgarian President Borissov deciding to tolerate the once intolerable United Patriots.

The translation of all source material is by the author unless noted otherwise.

About the author”
*John R. Haines is a Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and Executive Director of FPRI’s Princeton Committee. He is also a Trustee of FPRI.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI

Notes:
[1] Ognyan Minchev is a Bulgarian political scientist and frequent commentator. According to his biography on the German Marshall Fund (GMF) website, Dr. Minchev “is a non-resident fellow with GMF’s Balkan Trust for Democracy and the executive director of the Institute for Regional and International Studies, an independent think tank, providing policy analyses on regional and international security and cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe. Minchev is also Chair of the Board of Transparency International-Bulgaria, an anti-corruption organization. He is a professor of political science at the University of Sofia-Bulgaria.” See: http://www.gmfus.org/profiles/ognyan-minchev. Last accessed 5 May 2017.
Dnevnik, op. cit. (14 October 2014).

[2] IMRO is an acronym of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (Vatreshna Makedonska Revolyutsionna Organizatsiya or “VMRO”), a late 19th century anti-Ottoman national liberation movement. “[T]he political use of IMRO symbols emerged in the post-Communist period” writes . “Several political parties adopted the legacy of IMRO; a number went so far as to name themselves after the movement” including in Bulgaria, IMRO–BNM. See: James Frusetta (2004). “Common Heroes, Divided Claims: IMRO Between Macedonia and Bulgaria.” In Ideologies and National Identities: The Case of Twentieth-Century Southeastern Europe, John Lampe and Mark Mazower, eds. (Budapest: CEU Press) 118.

[3] “Ninova: Tova e pravitelstvo na podmyanata.” Cross.bg [published online in Bulgarian 4 May 2017]. http://www.cross.bg/nyama-bulgariya-programa-1541994.html#.WQ93FVKZPjA. Last accessed 7 May 2017.

[4] For s detailed discussion of Ataka’s politics, see the author’s August 2016 essay, “The Suffocating Symbiosis: Russia Seeks Trojan Horses Inside Fractious Bulgaria’s Political Corral.” http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/08/suffocating-symbiosis-russia-seeks-trojan-horses-inside-fractious-bulgarias-political-corral/.

[5] “Borissov: Pravya cabinet sam, ako reformatorite ne shtat.” 19’ [published online in Bulgarian 30 October 2014] 3. http://19min.bg/download.php?id=838&module=content. Last accessed 5 May 2017.

[6] GERB is an acronym of Grazhdani za evropeĭsko razvitie na Bŭlgariya or “Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria”. Its literal meaning is “coat of arms,” an intended patriotic reference to the Bulgarian coat of arms (Gerb na Bŭlgariya).

[7] “Noviyat ministŭr na otbranata Krasimir Karakachanov – patriot, istorik, agent ot DS.” Dnevnik.bu [published online in Bulgarian 3 May 2017]. http://www.dnevnik.bg/politika/2017/05/03/2964594_noviiat_ministur_na_otbranata_krasimir_karakachanov_-/. Last accessed 4 May 2017. The acronym DS stands for Darzhavna sigurnost (“State Security”), a popular truncation of Komitet za dǎržavna sigurnost. (“Committee for State Security”).

[8] Burgas is on the Black Sea coast and Bulgaria’s fourth largest city.

[9] In March 2009, the Burgas municipal council revoked its December 2008 approval to construct a new mosque in the city’s Meden Rudnik (“Copper Mine”) district.

[10] “Valeri Simeonov obyasni zashto stana vitsepremier i razkri za edno taĭno sŭbranie na Patriotite Sofiya, Bŭlgariya.” Blitz.bu [published online in Bulgarian 4 May 2017]. http://www.blitz.bg/politika/valeri-simeonov-obyasni-zashcho-stana-vitsepremier-i-razkri-za-edno-tayno-sbranie-na-patriotite_news509921.html. Last accessed 4 May 2017.

[11] “GERB i “Obedineni patrioti” podpisakha koalitsionno sporazumenie.” Dnevnik [published online in Bulgarian 27 April 2017]. http://www.dnevnik.bg/politika/2017/04/27/2960692_radev_shte_vruchi_mandata_za_tretiia_kabinet_na_boiko/. Last accessed 5 May 2017.

[12] http://www.vestnikataka.bg/2017/05/явор-нотев-зам-председател-на-нс-от-ат-2/. Last accessed 5 May 2017.

[13] “Liderŭt na VMRO Krasimir Karakachanov v Dobrich.” Dobrudzhanska tribuna [published online in Bulgarian 15 March 2017]. http://www.dobrichmedia.com/news/politika_2/obedinenite-patrioti-shte-provezhdat-nezavisima-i-natcionalno-otgovorna-politika_17612.html. Last accessed 6 May 2017.

[14] http://www.ataka.bg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7293&Itemid=66. Last accessed 7 May 2017.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid. The original text reads as follows: “Natsionalna strategiya za priobshtavane na etnosite pri spazvane na zakonite. Premakhvane na nezakonnite postroĭki, brakovete mezhdu maloletni, obvŭrzvane na sotsialnite pomoshti s realno polagan trud i obrazovanieto na detsata. Zakon za bŭlgarskiya ezik – pravo na glas da imat samo zavŭrshilite osnovno obrazovanie i vladeeshti bŭlgarski ezik.”

[17] See fn(20).

[18] Novini [published online in Bulgarian 7 November 2014]. https://www.novini.bg/news/248296-каракачанов-и-сидеров-в-челен-удар-наричахте-националистите-мръсни-потни-хора-(видео).html. Last accessed 7 May 2017.

[19] “Obshtinarite ot VMRO i “Ataka” prizovakha Fandŭkova da zabrani “sborishteto “Sofiya praĭd”. Dnevnik [published online in Bulgarian 9 June 2016]. http://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2016/06/09/2774351_obshtinarite_ot_vmro_i_ataka_prizovaha_fandukova_da/. Last accessed 7 May 2017.

[20] Ibid. The original text reads as follows: “Vŭnshnata politika na Bŭlgariya da bŭde podchinena na polezniya za Rodinata balans v polza na natsionalniya interes. Nie sme protiv chuzhdi voenni bazi na nasha teritoriya, kakto i protiv priemaneto na Turtsiya v ES. Sŭzdavane na Ministerstvo na demografiyata i bŭlgarite v chuzhbina.”

[21] Osman Ahmed Oktay was the deputy chair of Bulgaria’s Movement for Rights and Freedoms until December 2003, when he and a number of party leaders broke with the party leadership to form the Democratic Wing Movement. The Movement for Rights and Freedoms is known by the acronyms DPS [Bulgarian: Dvizhenie za prava i svobodi] and HÖH [Turkish: Hak ve Özgürlükler Hareketi].

[22] “Osman Oktaĭ: Dnes e tŭzhen den za demokratsiyata v Bŭlgariya.” Glasŭt Na Mladite Khora (“The Voice of Youth”) The text reads as follows in the original Bulgarian: “Bŭlgarskite myusyulmani shte bŭdat lesna mishena za upotreba ot Erdogan i kompaniya. Myusyulmanite shte bŭdat natikani v ŭgŭla mezhdu Ankara – diktatorsko upravlenie i pochti fashistko upravlenie v Bŭlgariya.”

[23] “Bulgaristan’da yeni hükümet göreve başladı.” Anadolu Ajansı [published online in Turkish 4 May 2017]. http://aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/bulgaristanda-yeni-hukumet-goreve-basladi/811505. Last accessed 8 May 2017.

[24] Joseph Daul is a Member of the European Parliament where he leads the center-right European People’s Party. In October 2014, he described the Bulgarian two-party nationalist electoral coalition known as the Patriotic Front (Patriotichen front) as “an intolerable partner” (nedopustim partn’or) from a “Euro-Atlantic” perspective. See: “Bez Fronta v pravitelstvo – triumfalno zavrŭshtane na Saraya.” Dnevnik [published online in Bulgarian 29 October 2014]. http://www.dnevnik.bg/analizi/2014/10/29/2408943_bez_fronta_v_pravitelstvo_-_triumfalno_zavrushtane_na/. Last accessed 4 May 2017]. In advance of the country’s 2017 parliamentary elections, the Patriotic Front formed a tripartite “United Patriots” (Obedineni Patrioti) electoral coalition with the far right Attack (Ataka) party, which the Patriotic Front had previously shunned.

[25] “Nenchev: Vŭorŭzheni sili imat tolkova samoleti, kolkoto sa neobkhodimi.” Novinte [published online in Bulgarian 2 August 2016]. http://www.novinite.bg/articles/118204/Nenchev-Vaorajeni-sili-imat-tolkova-samoleti-kolkoto-sa-neobhodimi. Last accessed 9 May 2017.

[26] “ Karakachanov kharesa rechta na Radev, Valeri Simeonov – ne.” Actualno [published online in Bulgarian 19 January 2017]. https://www.actualno.com/politics/karakachanov-haresa-rechta-na-radev-valeri-simeonov-ne-news_588520.html. Last accessed 12 May 2017.

[27] “Politicheski reaktsii sled slovoto na Rumen Radev.” btv Novinte [published online in Bulgarian 19 January 2017]. http://btvnovinite.bg/article/bulgaria/politika/politicheski-reakcii-sled-slovoto-na-rumen-radev.html. Last accessed 12 May 2017.

[28] “Valeri Simeonov: Bŭlgariya tryabva da ima raketni bazi, nasocheni sreshtu Turtsiya.” Faktor [published online in Bulgarian 13 March 2017]. http://www.faktor.bg/bg/articles/novini/balgariya/valeri-simeonov-balgariya-tryabva-da-ima-raketni-bazi-nasocheni-sreshtu-turtsiya-8736. Last accessed 12 May 2017.

The post Once Shunned, Bulgaria’s United Patriots Joins Governing Coalition – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

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