Bitcoin’s rocketing rise in value shows no sign of abating after breaking the $2,900 mark Tuesday, June 6, according to RT.
The digital payment reached a value of $2,967.48 at around 1.20pm UTC Tuesday, June 6 according to the Coindesk Bitcoin Price Index. The pricing is a record high for the cryptocurrency which has been hit with periods of volatility.
The spike has been linked to the legalisation of digital currencies in Asia in recent weeks. However, some financial observers suggest the hike is down to increasing confidence in the alternative currency.
“The biggest driver [of bitcoin] right now is you’re starting to see institutional investors take a keen interest in the entire sector,” financial commentator, Brian Kelly, said last month. “I don’t think this is hot money. This is real money that’s going to sit around and build the new internet.”
Bitcoin rival, ethereum, an open source platform providing ‘ether’ cryptocurrency, also received a boost this month.
The currency, which went live in 2015, reached an all-time high in value of $250.41 on Sunday.
(FPRI) — Monday, June 5 marked the official re-ignition of the intra-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) rift, centered once again on Qatari transgressions against the security of its neighbors. In fact, this time, unlike the spat from three years ago, the rift goes beyond GCC members Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, to include Egypt, Yemen, and even reportedly the Maldives—all of which announced they were cutting diplomatic ties and preventing travel (by land, air, and sea in varying degrees) to Qatar.
On what basis? Is it as some say that Saudi Arabia was emboldened by President’s Trump’s visit? Is it because of last week’s drama in which Qatar’s state-run news agency published comments by Qatari leader Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani praising Iran, criticizing Saudi Arabia, referencing good relations with Israel, and criticizing the Trump administration—a story that was quickly removed, refuted, and blamed on hacking? Or is it simply that Qatar violated its Saudi-imposed probationary period by once again providing material support to the Muslim Brotherhood, to the Houthis, and through indirect channels, to al-Qaeda and ISIS; and by using its media empire to defame and agitate against its neighbors. The answer is likely some combination of all of the above.
Qatar was engaged in all of these same activities in the wake of the Arab Uprisings and it was only through strong Saudi coercion, and not a little bit of American coaxing, that Qatar receded from the public stage and tamped down on its “subversive behavior.” Regional observers are unsurprised by this recent turn of events. It is no secret that Qatari loyalties have long lied with the Islamists of the region and that the Al-Thanis have long bridled under the Saudi yoke, but engaging in and funding activities that blatantly destabilize the region in an era when competition with the Iranians is at an all-time high seems to have been inviting disaster on Doha’s head.
Just from a practical standpoint, closing Qatar off in varying degrees by land, air, and sea will have ripple effects that will be felt in every corner of this small Gulf sheikhdom. For example, 40 percent of Qatar’s food supply arrives in the country via land transport from Saudi Arabia. There have already been reports of runs on supermarkets and ATMs. Qatar’s stock market index sank 7.5 percent thus far, and the cancellation of flights just from within the Gulf will have serious financial implications. And of course, there is also the related financial fall-out from interrupting the 2022 World Cup preparation timeline.
The Americans are not likely to be as involved in rapprochement efforts this time around. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson commented on the development saying, “We certainly would encourage the parties to sit down together and address these differences, and we – if there’s any role that we can play in terms of helping them address those, we think it is important that the GCC remain unified.” However, crafted diplomatic statements aside, observers of the region don’t see the Trump administration doing much beyond encouraging the Saudis to get their regional ducks in a row, so to speak. In fact, just hours ago, President Trump patted the Saudis on the back for their tough stance against Qatar writing:
So good to see the Saudi Arabia visit with the King and 50 countries already paying off. They said they would take a hard line on funding…
With comments like this one from the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, one wonders if American basing arrangements in Qatar are going to be rethought in the near future.
For its part, Qatar is blaming this current rift on a terrible misunderstanding stemming from the news agency “hack.” Accordingly, the Qatari foreign ministry said in its statement yesterday, “The campaign of incitement is based on lies that had reached the level of complete fabrications.” This attempt to underplay and divert attention away from this negative press is par for the course, and anyone who is expecting a public mea culpa may be waiting for a long time.
Three years ago when Qatar fell out with its Gulf neighbors, the most extreme public diplomatic stick was the recalling of the Saudi, Emirati, and Bahraini ambassadors. This time around, the situation is much more serious and will be much more difficult to resolve. In some sense, the Saudis and others are likely to abide by the “Fool me once, shame on you…” proverb. What’s more, the consequences of the ongoing proxy war with Iran and the chaos wrought by ISIS are known factors this time around. Leniency will no longer prevail—especially with Mohammad bin Salman holding the Saudi reins and Donald Trump in the White House. Qatar may be one of the richest countries in the world, but it’s not likely to buy its way out of this pickle.
About the author:
*Tally Helfont is the Director of FPRI’s Program on the Middle East. Her research focuses on regional balance of power, the Levant and the GCC, and U.S. policy therein. She is also a Contributing Analyst for Wikistrat’s Middle East Desk, a crowd-sourcing consultancy. Ms. Helfont has instructed training courses in Civil Information Management to U.S. Military Civil Affairs Units and Human Terrain Teams assigned to Iraq and Afghanistan.
A U.S. aircraft shot down an armed pro-Syria regime unmanned aerial vehicle today after it fired on coalition forces in southern Syria, Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve officials said in a statement.
The pro-regime UAV, similar in size to a U.S. MQ-1 Predator, was shot down after it dropped one of several weapons it was carrying near a position occupied by coalition personnel who are training and advising partner ground forces in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, officials said.
The shoot-down follows an engagement earlier in the day in which coalition forces destroyed two pro-regime armed technical vehicles that advanced toward coalition forces at At Tanf inside the established deconfliction zone, threatening coalition and partner forces, they added.
‘Appropriate Measures to Protect Forces’
“The coalition’s mission is to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria,” the statement said. “The coalition does not seek to fight Syrian regime, Russian or pro-regime forces partnered with them. The demonstrated hostile intent and actions of pro-regime forces near coalition and partner forces in southern Syria, however, continue to concern us, and the coalition will take appropriate measures to protect our forces.”
Noting that coalition forces have been located at At Tanf for more than a year, officials said the coalition presence in Syria addresses the imminent threat ISIS in Syria poses globally, which is beyond the capability of the Syrian regime to address. The garrison is a temporary coalition location to train vetted forces to defeat ISIS and will not be vacated until ISIS is defeated, they added.
“As long as pro-regime forces are oriented toward coalition and partnered forces, the potential for conflict is escalated,” the statement said. “Coalition forces are oriented on ISIS in the Euphrates River Valley. The coalition calls on all parties to focus their efforts in the same direction to defeat ISIS, which is our common enemy and the greatest threat to regional and worldwide peace and security.”
Fifty-nine Individuals, including members of the Qatari royal family and controversial Muslim Brotherhood cleric Yusuf Qaradawi, as well as 12 Qatari entities have been listed on a new terror list announced in a Saudi, Emirati, Bahraini and Egyptian joint-statement.
According to the statement — which was carried by the official Saudi Press Agency (SPA) — the list comes as a result of “the continuous and ongoing violations of the authorities in Doha of Qatar’s commitments and obligations, enshrined in agreements to which it is a signatory, have necessitated The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and the Kingdom of Bahrain to act to update their respective lists of designated terrorist organizations and individuals”.
As a result of these violations, 59 individuals and 12 entities have been designated by each of the four countries as part of their unified and ongoing commitment to combatting terrorism, drying up the sources of its funding, countering extremist ideology and the tools of its dissemination and promotion.
The statement added that the position of the four governments comes also as a result of “Qatar’s actions in contravention of its (previous) commitments include: supporting and harboring elements and organizations that threaten the National security of other States. The repeated ignoring of calls for the fulfillment of its obligations under the Riyadh Agreement of 2013 and its associated Implementation Mechanisms, and in addition the Comprehensive Agreement of 2014.”
The joint statement as concluded that, as a result of the above, the government of Qatar has “undermined the national security” of our the four concerned countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt) and exposed each of these countries to “threats, subversion, and the spread of instability by individuals and terrorist organizations operating from Qatar and or supported by it.”
The majority of those entities sanctioned are linked to Qatar and are “a manifestation of a Qatari Government policy of duplicity,” the statement added.
Describing Doha’s policy, the joint announcement characterized it as “One that calls for combating terrorism, whilst simultaneously overseeing the financing, supporting and harboring a vast array of terrorist groups and terrorist financing networks.”
The four concerned countries also declared their commitment to their responsibilities in enhancing all efforts to counter terrorism and to laying the foundations for security and stability in the region.
“Each (of the four countries) reaffirms their respective commitment to the pursuit of individuals and groups perpetuating acts of terror, regionally and globally,” the statement added.
“The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and the Kingdom of Bahrain will continue to work with partners around the world towards finding solutions to countering terrorist organizations and extremist groups whose activities must not and cannot be ignored by any state.”
In declaring this statement The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and the Kingdom of Bahrain “reaffirm their appreciation of partner states that have supported efforts to counter terrorism, extremism and violence, and call for continued and renewed efforts and cooperation in defeating the scurge of terrorism and its terrible impact on the global community.”
Political rows between countries happen every now and then. But in Qatar’s case, the disputes have proved enduring, harmful and inexcusable.
The disagreements were for a time viewed as fleeting and as short-lived inconveniences. But with over 20 years of not seeing eye-to-eye, Doha’s destructive policies grew inescapably consistent.
The first tangible difference took place in 1990 — the year Kuwait was invaded, uprooting at least a million citizens and residents and sending its government to exile.
Given that Kuwait is a key member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), regional leaders convened in the Qatari capital, Doha, for a summit devoted to freeing the GCC state from Iraqi aggression.
The then heir apparent of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, shocked Gulf leaders by leading discussions away from freeing Kuwait, and giving priority to a Doha-Bahrain quarrel over ownership of the Hawar Islands — which paled in comparison with Kuwait’s predicament at the time.
Gulf leaders, particularly the late Saudi King Fahd (may his soul rest in peace), were infuriated by the apparent conceit shown by the Qatari party to advance personal agendas at such a critical time.
King Fahd threatened Sheikh Hamad with withdrawing from the summit, and so did the rest of the GCC leaders.
From that day onward, Qatar’s rifts with everyone never ended.
They only worsened when Sheikh Hamad overthrew his father in bloodless palace coup d’état in 1995, and later appointed his son Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, the current emir of Qatar. Two decades worth of Sheikh Hamad policies have fed disagreement and undermined Gulf unity.
Doha increasingly began to be a backdoor to the region by playing host to Saudi Arabia’s enemies. It took in protesters who wanted coercive regime change, and sponsored the alliance between Iran, the Lebanon-based Hezbollah and Syria’s regime head Bashar Assad for a whole 10 years.
Qatar’s provocations left it at odds with most regional states. And in response to its exceedingly dangerous behavior, several major Arab countries have finally decided to sever diplomatic relations with Qatar. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain announced on Monday they were cutting all land, maritime and transport ties with Qatar.
The decision was not based on the long record of dispute, but a conviction of there being no hope in changing the irreversible course the Doha authorities have set out on.
The fights Qatar is picking are juvenile, but also very risky.
Doha’s continued funding of organizations, individuals, media channels and social media networks that are blatantly campaigning for violent anti-government movements has only destabilized the region.
Qatar has presented itself as an ally to groups like the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which is on a constant quest to establish a self-styled religious ruling system, resembling Iran’s theocracy. Despite the MB’s failures in Palestine, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, it resumed the agenda of spreading chaos across the region.
The final nail in the coffin of the Gulf-Qatar friendship was struck last week, when the Doha state-owned media agency carried a statement allegedly by Sheikh Tamim that apparently saw him endorse Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah.
Among Qatar’s most dangerous ploys is that which is being played out in Bahrain, where it has not stopped funding both armed and peaceful oppositions. Yet its pitch to overthrow Bahrain’s government remains a failure.
On the other hand, Doha’s investment in disrupting Lebanon received better results, where it frankly supported the Assad regime and Iran proxy Hezbollah during their assassination campaigns against Lebanese leaders and occupation of West Beirut. Until this very day, Hezbollah and its allies maintain the upper hand in Lebanon.
Taking things a step further, Doha recently embarked on reviving communications with Iran, an arch foe of the Gulf countries.
As for its endgame in Bahrain, Qatar might be deluded into believing that toppling the regime would play out positively for its expansionist ambitions. The same is evident with its attempt to spur chaos in Saudi Arabia, another neighboring state.
Qatar is apparently willing to go to great extremes in doing everything and supporting everyone without distinction. It backs religious extremist groups, Arab fascists and nationalist parties and leftist groups.
Paradoxically, while it hosts one of the largest US military bases in the region, Qatar did not hesitate in broadcasting videotapes in which Al-Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri openly called for American bloodshed. It is worth noting that US operations against Afghanistan and Iraq are launched from this base.
Qatar also funds paramilitary militias that attack American troops in Iraq.
Taking into consideration all of Qatar’s irrational policies, it is clear that the logic behind Doha’s decision-making is impossible to grasp, and arriving at a truce with its government impossible.
During what is perceived as a critical time, Doha’s approach threatens to dismantle the last of whatever stability the Middle East has known since World War II.
The methods adopted by Qatari authorities are nothing short of delirious — in what could loosely be termed as a “nut job” approach taken by Doha.
• Abdulrahman Al-Rashed is a veteran columnist. He is the former general manager of Al Arabiya News Channel, and former editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat, where this article was originally published.
If projections for melting Antarctic sea ice through 2100 are correct, the vanishing landscape will strip Emperor penguins of their breeding and feeding grounds and put populations at risk. But like other species that migrate to escape the wrath of climate change, can these iconic animals be spared simply by moving to new locations?
According to new research led by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution (WHOI), they cannot. Scientists report that dispersal may help sustain global Emperor penguin populations for a limited time, but, as sea ice conditions continue to deteriorate, the 54 colonies that exist today will face devastating declines by the end of this century. They say the Emperor penguin should be listed as an endangered species. The study was published in the June 6, 2017 edition of the journal Biological Conservation.
“We know from previous studies that sea ice is a key environmental driver of the life history of Emperor penguins, and that the fifty-percent declines we’ve seen in Pointe Géologie populations along the Antarctic coast since the 1950s coincide with warmer climate and sea ice decline,” said Stephanie Jenouvrier, WHOI biologist and lead author of the study. “But what we haven’t known is whether or not dispersal could prevent or even reverse future global populations. Based on this study, we conclude that the prospects look grim at the end of 2100, with a projected global population decline as low as 40 percent and up to 99 percent over three generations. Given this outlook, we argue that the Emperor penguin is deserving of protection under the Endangered Species Act.”
The relationship between Emperor penguins and sea ice is a fragile one: Too little sea ice reduces the availability of breeding sites and prey; too much sea ice means longer hunting trips for adults, which in turn means lower feeding rates for chicks. Only in the past few years have scientists become aware of the penguins’ ability to migrate to locations with potentially more optimal sea ice conditions.
“Before 2014, our studies of the impacts of climate change on these animals hadn’t factored in movement among populations,” said Jenouvrier. “But between then and now, a number of satellite imagery studies and genetic studies have confirmed their ability to disperse, so this was an important new variable to work into the equation.”
To determine whether migration will ultimately help Emperor penguins defend against population decline, Jenouvrier worked with mathematicians to develop a sophisticated demographic model of penguin colonies based on data collected at Pointe Géologie, one of the few places where long-term Emperor penguin studies have been conducted.
The model tracks the population connectivity between penguins as they take their chances moving to new habitats offering better sea ice conditions. “It’s like we’ve added roads between the cities the penguins live in and now get to see what happens when they travel between them,” she said.
A range of model inputs were used, including penguin dispersal distance, behavior and rate of migration. The model also factors in end-of-century sea ice forecasts from climate projection models to predict the fate of each colony.
According to Shaye Wolf, climate science director for the Center for Biological Diversity, the new modeling technique is key to informing policy around “much-needed protections” for the Emperor penguin.
“Dr. Jenouvrier’s research has been at the forefront of advancing our understanding of how climate change is impacting these animals now and into the future,” she said. “Emperor penguins capture our imaginations because they are devoted parents and tough survivors. This work is another wake-up call that we need to make rapid cuts in carbon pollution if emperor penguins are going to have a future.”
One surprising aspect of the study, according to Jenouvrier, was the wide range of penguin responses to various dispersal scenarios represented in the model. In some cases, dispersal boosted populations whereas in other cases, it led to dramatic declines.
“We saw sustained populations through 2036, at which point there was an ‘ecological rescue’ that reversed the anticipated decline expected without dispersion for about a ten-year period,” she explained. “During that time, the penguins made wise choices in terms of selecting the highest-quality habitat they could reach. But the ‘rescue’ was only short-lived, and started plummeting in 2046. When we averaged out all the scenarios, the model painted a very grim picture through 2100, regardless of how far penguins travelled or how wise their habitat selections were.”
The researchers conclude that while dispersal can be a very potent response to climate change in certain cases, the projected accelerated pace at which ice is melting in Antarctica makes for a tricky dynamic. Climate change isn’t stationary, so even if Emperor penguins move to locations with better sea ice conditions, those conditions could change dramatically from one year to the next.
The new findings will help inform a scientific status review launched in 2014 by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service aimed at determining if the Emperor Penguin should be protected under the Endangered Species Act. Wolf views the study as confirmation that climate change is putting the animals in danger, and as such, agrees with Jenouvrier that protection is in order. “Decisions to protect species under the Act must be based on science and not politics, so we hope the Fish and Wildlife Service will heed the science and give Emperor penguins the protections they deserve,” she said.
Jenouvrier agrees, and believes that adding Emperor penguins to the Endangered Species list could help accomplish a number of things. For example, it’s likely to trigger new fishing regulations in the Southern Ocean and highlight the need for new global conservation strategies. It may also help increase public awareness and “sensitize people to the impacts of climate change” which in turn could help reduce emissions. And, it may spur the need for more studies of Emperor penguins — something she’s already eyeing for the future.
“While we’ve learned that dispersal doesn’t change the ultimate fate of these animals,” she said, “we need to better understand the dynamics of what happens when they disperse. To do this, we’ll need to tag penguins from several colonies and monitor them. Eventually, we also want to understand if populations may eventually adapt to sea ice change, and more generally, how they will respond to the changing landscape in terms of breeding and other life history stages.”
The visual abilities of competitive football players are substantially better than those of healthy non-athletes, according to the first-ever comprehensive assessment of visual function in English Premier League players, published in Science and Medicine in Football.
Average visual clarity, contrast sensitivity, and near-far quickness of competitive footballers (both elite and intermediate) were significantly better than those of non-athletes. However, results showed there was no difference in visual function between the elite and intermediate players.
Interestingly, defensive players displayed faster near-far quickness than offensive players. According to the researchers, this visual function may be particularly helpful to defenders who are responsible for ensuring that the ‘offside trap’ is not broken and typically have to quickly switch their attention, and therefore eye gaze, between several opponents in near and far locations.
In the study, researchers from Liverpool John Moores University in the UK recruited 49 elite male players from an English Premier League football club as well as 31 intermediate male players (university level). They examined visual functions that are considered critical to sport performance in players of different skill levels and playing positions using the Nike SPARQ Sensory Station.
The assessments included visual clarity (ability to see detail at a given distance), contrast sensitivity (ability to detect an object against a background), near-far quickness (ability to change eye gaze and attention between near and far distances), and target capture. The researchers then compared these data to those from a study of 230 healthy non-athletic men and women using the same apparatus.
The study highlights the importance of good vision in football and the potential for gaining a competitive edge through vision support and training. However, the authors stress the limitations of the study and the need for further investigation to consider the specific visual demands of player position and the role for regular eye examinations.
According to the Professor Bennett: “While these findings add to the growing evidence that a good level of vision could be important in dynamic invasion sports, future studies need to determine the precise nature of the relationship with on-field performance.”
The Saudi Arabian football team refused to line up for a minute’s silence for the London terror victims on Thursday night because it is not in keeping with their culture.
A spokesman for Football Federation Australia explained they were told a minute of silence was ‘not in keeping with Saudi culture’ ahead of the match.
Fans were left outraged at the display ahead of the World Cup qualifier against Australia in Adelaide.
Pictures show the Australian team lined up at the halfway mark, with the Saudi players ignoring the gesture as they get in formation to start the game.
Saudi players on the bench refused to stand for the minute’s silence.
A spokesperson from the Football Federation Australia told Daily Mail Australia they had been advised prior to the match that the Saudi team would not be taking part.
“The FFA sought agreement from the Asian Football Confederation and the Saudi national team to hold a minute’s silence in memory of those lost in Saturday night’s terror bombings in London and in particular the two Australian women,” the spokesperson said.
“Both the AFC and the Saudi team agreed that the minute of silence could be held.”
‘The FFA was further advised by Saudi team officials that this tradition was not in keeping with Saudi culture and they would move to their side of the field and respect our custom whilst taking their own positions on the field.”
“The local broadcaster, FOXSPORTS, was informed of this prior to the minute’s silence taking place.”
Australian and British football fans on social media were furious, and lashed out against the Saudi team.
“Minutes silence for London terror, Saudi players wandering around like they don’t give a f***, Saudi fans shouting the whole time #AUSvKSA,” a man named Adam tweeted.
Others called for official measures to be taken against the team.
“I hope FFA call out Saudi Arabia on the clear lack of respect shown prior to KO. Not participating in the minutes silence is disgusting,” user PG3_12 wrote.
However, some Saudi fans claimed it was not within Islamic culture to take a moment of silence to respect the dead.
“They come from a different culture. They just don’t understand the point of being silence for a minute to show sadness.. we never do it in KSA,’ one fan wrote.”
The majority of the Saudi side are Muslim, and to honour the dead, it is understood they pray, give to charity and speak highly of the person, but rarely observe silence.
Minutes of silence are a common occurrence in the Premier League, and Muslim players are not known to boycott the mark of respect.
The game added extra tension to an already important match, but Australia came out on top with a score of 3-2.
Saudi FA, FFA, FIFA and the AFC have been approached for comment. Two Australians were killed in Saturday night’s terror attack on London Bridge and nearby Borough Market.
North Korean authorities have arrested a man on spying charges for having contact with Christians while visiting relatives in China, sources inside the isolated country said.
Kim Seung-mo, a 61-year-old resident of Hyesan city in Yanggang province, was arrested on June 3 after returning from visiting relatives in China, they said.
“I witnessed him being dragged by state security officials in front of Wiyon train station,” one source told Radio Free Asia.
Kim was shackled and tied with rope as he was dragged out from a town behind Wiyon brewery, said the source who spoke on condition of anonymity.
There were obvious signs of violent assault because the man had split lips and black eyes, and he appeared to have sustained an injury to one of his legs, the source said.
A second source who lives in Yanggang province said the man’s relatives are said to be residing in Antu, Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, in northeastern China’s Jilin province
“After he came back from China, he openly told his neighbors that his relatives attended a Christian church, and the church’s pastor collected many used clothes from parishioners for him,” said the source who requested anonymity.
“It seems like someone informed state security agents about him,” he added.
The Ministry of State Security, which reports directly to leader Kim Jong Un, is the regime’s secret police force. It is known for its brutality and human rights abuses, experts say.
“All North Korean travelers returning from China are required to report their whereabouts and details about their activities,” the source said.
“In Kim’s case, he was arrested on charges of spying because he did not report that his relatives are churchgoers and that the church pastor helped him,” he said.
North Korea views Christianity as a contemptible Western religion.
A prominent human rights defender in Armenia has received death threats, Human Rights Watch said. The authorities should immediately investigate the threats, made on the rights defender’s Facebook page, and ensure that he gets the protection he needs.
Artur Sakunts, the director of Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly Vanadzor Office (HCA-Vanadzor), reported that on June 2, 2017, a Facebook user threatened to kill Sakunts in a comment on his Facebook page. The threat appeared to be in response to Sakunts’ Facebook post the same day criticizing the Armenian government. The death threat was followed by a threat from another Facebook user. HCA-Vanadzor is a leading human rights organization in Armenia.
“The Armenian authorities should waste no time in meeting their obligations to investigate the death threat against Artur Sakunts and provide him with the protection he needs,” said Jane Buchanan, associate Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “No one should fear death for publicly criticizing the government.”
The June 2 Facebook post from a user named Ashot Avanesyan said, “Sakunts, I’ll kill you… [traitors] like you must have their heads [cut] off. Wait for me any moment. I am not one who shoots from the back; I’ll shoot from the front, two to three meters, with a 9mm caliber bullet. Wait for me, Sakunts.” Following Avanesyan’s post, a second Facebook user named Artur Ghazaryan also threatened Sakunts saying that, “The country should be cleaned of him.”
On June 5, Sakunts reported the death threat to the general prosecutor’s office, which is examining it to determine if there are grounds to initiate a criminal investigation.
Sakunts told Human Rights Watch that he has received threats in the past, but the June 2 threat alarmed him because it was very specific in terms of method, even to the caliber of the bullet.
Armenia’s human rights ombudsman also raised concerns about the threats and called for an investigation.
HCA-Vanadzor, operating since 1998, is based in Vanadzor, Armenia’s third largest city. The organization provides legal aid to victims of human rights abuses, makes policy recommendations to the government, monitors elections, and carries out peace-building activities.
Postdoc at the Department of Food Science at the University of Copenhagen Pia Snitkjaer has carried out a series of experiments with alcohol in liquid dishes to figure out how to control the alcohol content during cooking for the benefit of large kitchens, the food industry, the gastronomy and restaurant sector as well as in the kitchen at home.
“In the experiments I used 900 ml veal stock plus 150 ml beer or wine. At this mixing ratio, the alcohol concentration starts at approx. 2 %, but drops to 0.2% after a half an hour of cooking,” said Pia Snitkjaer, who underlines that this example is based on wine.
Precisely how much alcohol is left in, for example, a red wine sauce depends on three factors that you need to check if you want to control the alcohol content in a liquid dish or sauce, namely how much the dish is reduced, whether it is cooked with or without a lid and how much alcohol is added from the start (more about this in the facts section below).
“One should remember that you typically eat only 1/2-1 deciliter of sauce. If we, for example, assume that you eat 100 ml sauce, with a concentration of 2 vol % it corresponds to an intake of 2ml of alcohol. There are 15 ml in a unit of alcohol, so a pregnant woman would also be able to handle it,” said Pia Snitkjaer.
All other factors the researchers studied – including the dimensions of the saucepan and the cooking temperature – proved to only be significant because they could affect how quickly the sauce was reduced.
Using elementary physical chemistry, which has to do with understanding the volatility of alcohol when mixed with water and heated, Associate Professor Jens Risbo from the Department of Food Science at the University of Copenhagen has developed a model that shows how the alcohol behaves in liquid dishes. That it is the volume of the dish that is the best parameter for determining the alcohol content – and not the cooking time – matters in relation to which techniques you can use if you want to reduce the alcohol content in the finished dish.
“You can reduce the alcohol content quickly by bringing a dish to a rolling boil, because by boiling hard, the volume will also decrease rapidly. But if you do not want the food to boil down too much, you can keep adding water as water evaporates, which will also lower the alcohol content both by dilution and evaporation,” said Pia Snitkjaer.
Put the lid on for a reverse distillation
If you want to reduce the alcohol content, you can put the lid on the saucepan.
“By placing a lid on the saucepan, there is a kind of reverse distillation where the alcohol disappears even more rapidly from the saucepan than the water. This is because alcohol is more volatile than water and thus can more readily evaporate. This is the same effect you use when you distil alcohol – you heat it up, so the alcohol evaporates more than the water, after which you can condense the vapours and obtain more concentrated alcohol,” said Pia Snitkjaer.
The lid does not sit tightly on the saucepan, allowing the steam escape under the lid so that the alcohol evaporates, while the water condenses more preferential on the colder lid and runs back into the pan. As it cooks, more and more alcohol escapes under the lid, while the contents of the saucepan will contain a higher percentage of water. Experiments show that the use of a lid has a dramatic effect on obtaining a low concentration of alcohol.
Important for the calorie balance
The study has an impact on the calculation of the calorie content in recipes. Alcohol contains a lot of calories, but will probably be listed in a recipe with the calorie content the alcohol has as an ingredient before it is actually added to the dish, which results in a misleadingly high result.
“How many fewer calories there are depends on how much alcohol is evaporated. 1 gram of alcohol gives approx. 7 calories, so every time you evaporate 1 gram of alcohol, you have 7 fewer calories in the saucepan,” said Pia Snitkjaer, who plans to develop the model to make it even more practical.
“It would be nice to be able to say precisely what this means for a tomato soup, a meat dish, etc. There are many things that can vary the result, but you can get some ideas about what happens when some of the most important parameters are changed – for example, what happens if you have a lot of sugar or a lot of gelatine, like in a veal stock,” said Pia Snitkjaer.
Owning a dog may help older adults to meet physical activity levels recommended by the World Health Organisation, according to a study published in the open access journal BMC Public Health. Health professionals could encourage dog ownership or shared care of a dog to motivate older adults to be more physically active, researchers at Glasgow Caledonian University and WALTHAM Centre for Pet Nutrition, UK suggest.
Dr Philippa Dall, senior research fellow at Glasgow Caledonian University and lead author said: “We found that dog owners aged 65 and over spent on average an additional 22 minutes walking, taking an extra 2,760 steps per day when compared to people who didn’t own a dog. Over the course of a week this additional time spent walking may in itself be sufficient to meet WHO recommendations of at least 150 minutes of moderate to vigorous physical activity.”
The researchers also found that dog owners had fewer sedentary events – that is continuous periods of sitting down – than non-dog owners, although the total time spent sitting down did not differ between the two groups.
WALTHAM researcher Nancy Gee, a co-author of the study said: “Our results indicate that dog ownership may play an important role in encouraging older adults to walk more. Ultimately, our research will provide insights into how pet ownership may help older people achieve higher levels of physical activity or maintain their physical activity levels for a longer period of time, which could improve their prospects for a better quality of life, improved or maintained cognition, and perhaps, even overall longevity.”
The study used data on patterns of physical activity and sedentary behavior in 43 dog owners and 43 controls from three regions in the U.K. (Lincolnshire, Derbyshire and Cambridgeshire). Study participants were aged 65 years and over and wore an activity monitor continuously during three, one-week data collection periods between April 2013 and November 2014. The researchers monitored the time spent walking moderately, time spent standing, total time spent sitting, as well as the number of times people sat down and how long they sat down for. Dog owners and controls were matched on a range of variables such as gender, ethnicity and socio-economic status.
Dr Dall said: “Most of the research in this area has relied upon self-report measures of physical activity. The use of objectives measures of physical activity and sedentary behaviour, collected by using activity monitors, provides opportunities to gain greater insight by providing objective data on both the intensity and patterns of physical activity and sedentary behaviour. This allows closer scrutiny of the potential relationship between changes in physical activity due to dog ownership and health.”
As the study was observational, it could not establish cause and effect or allow for conclusions about whether more active people are likely to own dogs or whether dog ownership makes people more active. The researchers caution that all participants were volunteers and so may have been more physically active than the general population. All volunteers had white British ethnicity which limits the generalizability of the findings to wider contexts.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), by breaking off diplomatic relations and seeking to impose an economic boycott of Qatar, have opened the door to a rewriting of the political map of the Gulf, with potentially far-reaching consequences for nations across the globe.
The dilemma for non-Arab nations like Malaysia, Indonesia and Pakistan is most immediate. Qatar’s expulsion from the 41-nation, Saudi-led, Sunni Muslim Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism complicates their strenuous efforts to avoid being sucked into an increasing visceral power struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran. So does the fact that the crisis is likely to be prolonged given that Qatari acceptance of Saudi and UAE demands would not only humiliate the Gulf state, proud of a history of charting an independent course for decades, but also turn it into a vassal of its bigger Gulf brethren.
Political Fallout
The demands are believed to include the muzzling if not closing of Qatar-backed media such as Al Jazeera, expulsion of leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, the Palestinian group that controls the Gaza Strip, and the limiting of Qatar’s relations with Iran to issues associated with the fact that it shares the world’s largest gas field with the Islamic republic.
The fallout of the crisis in Asia is likely to be initially more political than economic. Saudi and UAE isolation of Qatar could push the Gulf state to draw closer to Iran, Turkey and Russia, a move that would increase regional polarization and could significantly weaken the Gulf Cooperation Council. The GCC groups the region’s six monarchies: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain.
Saudi soft power across the Muslim world is also complicating efforts by non-Arab Muslim states to remain on the side lines of the escalating Saudi-Iranian rivalry and an increasingly aggressive UAE-driven campaign against expressions of political Islam that is now also targeting Qatar.
Decades of Saudi funding in what amounts to the largest public diplomacy in history has bought the kingdom significant influences in branches of government in multiple Muslim majority countries.
The timing of the crisis in the Gulf was for Malaysia, for example, particularly unfortunate. It came weeks after Malaysian Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Anifah Aman visited Qatar to further enhance relations with Qatar. Malaysian defence minister Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Hussein had earlier announced that Malaysia and Qatar were elevating their diplomatic ties by forming a High-Level Committee (HLC) to focus on the structural framework of both countries’ defence institutions.
Responding to the rupture in diplomatic relations and the military suspension, sources close to the Malaysian foreign ministry said that the government was advising its agencies to remain neutral in the dispute. Some sources cautioned however that the defence and interior ministries may adopt a more independent approach.
A Global Boycott?
The dilemma for Pakistan is no less acute. Pakistan’s diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE initially soured after the Pakistani parliament in 2015 rejected a Saudi request for Pakistani military assistance in Yemen. The unprecedented decision ultimately left Pakistan with no choice when the kingdom two years later asked it to allow General Raheel Sharif, who had just retired as chief of army staff, to take over the command of the Saudi-led military alliance.
Despite insisting that Sharif would use his position to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Pakistan has seen violence along its volatile border with Iran increase, relations with the Islamic republic deteriorate, and prompted calls for Pakistan to recall Sharif.
Equally worrying for Muslim and non-Muslim countries like China and Singapore alike are indications that Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies may want to turn their cutting of air, land and sea links to Qatar into a more global boycott.
Saudi Arabia’s state-owned Saudi Press Agency reported that the kingdom would “start immediate legal procedures for understanding with fraternal and friendly countries and international companies to implement the same procedure as soon as possible for all means of transport to and from the State of Qatar for reasons relating to Saudi national security”.
The statement appeared to be referring to Saudi transport links with Qatar but seemed to hold out the possibility of Saudi Arabia pressuring its public and private economic and commercial partners to follow suit in cutting ties with the Gulf state. Leaked emails showed the UAE ambassador in Washington, Yousef Al Otaiba, campaigning against Qatar and supporting efforts to persuade US companies not to pursue opportunities in Iran. That approach could be also applied to Qatar.
Rewriting the Gulf Political Map
The crisis in the Gulf could also complicate implementation of China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) now known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). A potential effort to force countries to join the boycott adds to Chinese fears that Saudi Arabia intends to expand its proxy war with Iran into Balochistan, a key Pakistani node of OBOR, in a bid to destabilise Iran.
The crisis could also complicate Chinese efforts to keep its Middle East policy in sync with that of the United States, the major power in the region, if Washington were to side with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
From the perspective of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the confrontation with Iran as well as Qatar is an existential battle for survival of absolute monarchies. It increasingly threatens to become a battle in which they take no prisoners and adopt a “you are with us or you are against us” approach that would put Muslim and non-Muslim nations in a bind.
The outcome of the Gulf battle, irrespective of who wins, is likely to rewrite the political map of the region and force Muslim and non-Muslim nations to take stock. The map is already changing with Turkey and Iran coming to Qatar’s aid and Turkish troops being dispatched to the Gulf state. If Qatar survives the battle with its controversial policies and media assets intact, it will have put the limitations of Saudi and UAE power on public display. By the same token, a Qatari defeat would allow Saudi and UAE-inspired sentiment against Iran and political Islam to reign supreme.
Mid-way through 2013, Xi Jinping presented his government’s most ambitious foreign policy initiative, ‘One belt, one road’, also known as the new Chinese silk roads. It is a strategy that seeks to stimulate the trade, financial, cultural and educational exchanges between the countries of Eurasia and Africa by developing infrastructure and greater coordination of public policies in these regions.
Spain’s status as a founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank demonstrates that the country, like others in the EU, is much more interested in the initiative’s economic opportunities than in its geostrategic implications. Various state projects geared towards the private sector have taken this approach further, such as the Conference on Multilateral Partnerships organised by ICEX from 6-8 July 2016 in Beijing, which was aimed at companies in the transport, energy and environmental infrastructure sectors, especially water and the treatment of urban waste.
Conversely, other countries such as the US, Japan and India have shown a greater mistrust of the initiative, thereby hindering both their direct involvement and the success of the project as a whole. Despite the positive attitude of the Spanish political authorities and business leaders, the fact is that for the time being neither the hopes for investment in Spain nor the business opportunities for Spanish companies stemming from the new silk road projects, whether in Spain, China or other countries, have lived up to expectations.
The factors that account for the lack of inward investment in Spain linked to the silk roads are the secondary role that China bestows on Western Europe within the project and the fact that Beijing prefers to locate its Mediterranean anchor sites in places where desperate local needs for investment ensure especially advantageous conditions for their investments, such as in the ports of Piraeus in Greece and Cherchell in Algeria. A highly important factor in this context, which moreover considerably restricts business opportunities for non-Chinese companies, is the condition linked to a large part of the funding offered by Beijing, which makes it subject to the acquisition of products and services supplied by Chinese companies. Note the contrast between the US$40 billion of the Silk Road Fund and the generous bilateral loans granted by Beijing to many of the developing countries along the route of the new silk roads, notably the more than US$50 billion awarded to Pakistan, as opposed to the almost US$1 billion approved to date for multilateral projects by the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank.
This does not prevent there being cases, both in countries included in the ‘One belt, one road’ initiatives and in other regions, in which Spanish companies win contracts linked to projects benefiting from Chinese financing. This is feasible when the local authorities insist on internationally-accepted technical standards and processes. As long as the greater part of financing for new silk road projects continues being earmarked for projects where the contracts are not tendered for in a transparent and competitive way however, the prospects for Spanish companies’ participation will remain highly limited.
Such normative differences are also a concern to other European countries, as evidenced by the recent EU investigation into the high-speed train line between Belgrade and Budapest, financed by the Export-Import Bank of China, construction of which was awarded to the China Railway International Corporation without any form of public tendering. This is in breach of EU rules, which require public tender processes for large-scale transport projects.
The high-level forum held in Beijing on the new silk roads on 14 and 15 May will present an excellent opportunity to address these questions. The results obtained at the forum may determine the initiative’s prospects for success over the short term, and it is therefore to be hoped that the Chinese authorities are able to make a significant announcement designed to give it fresh impetus. If this does indeed prove to be the case, both the Spanish authorities and companies will undoubtedly be paying close attention in order to seek a greater role in the project.
About the author:
*Mario Esteban, Senior Analyst at the Elcano Royal Institute and Lecturer at the Autonomous University of Madrid | @wizma9
Saudi Arabia and its allies have broken off diplomatic ties with Qatar, but Iran may be their real target, a possibility reinforced by some recently leaked emails from a UAE diplomat.
By Amit Bhandari*
Six Arab states–Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya and Egypt, and two other countries, the Maldives and Mauritius, cut off diplomatic and commercial ties with the gas-rich emirate of Qatar on Monday, June 5, closing off their ports, airports and borders. They have also barred their residents from visiting Qatar and vice versa. The UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have also closed their airspace to flights to and from Qatar: flights from Mumbai to Doha are therefore taking longer now.
On Tuesday, June 6, President Trump weighed in on the issue in a series of tweets, claiming credit for the move: “During my recent trip to the Middle East I stated that there can no longer be funding of Radical Ideology. Leaders pointed to Qatar – look!” The U.S. stance was a surprise as Qatar is its ally and hosts a major U.S. base.
The whys of it
Saudi Arabia is driving this move against Qatar for its alleged support of terrorist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS and Al Qaeda–and Iran. Qatar’s foreign policy, especially on Iran, differs notably from that of the Saudis. As a small country sandwiched between larger rivals, Qatar cannot afford to make an enemy of either, and its decisions on Iran–and other matters–show that it often does not see eye to eye with Saudi Arabia. Consider the following:
–In 2006, Qatar was the only nation that voted against the UN Security Council Resolution 1696, which expressed concern at Iran’s nuclear programme. Saudi Arabia and the U.S. were completely opposed to the programme.
–In 2016, after Iran and the six global powers concluded the JCPOA (the Iran Nuclear Deal), Qatar was one of the countries to welcome it. Saudi Arabia continues to view Iran as a threat. The U.S. is party to the JCPOA, but the remaining American sanctions on Iran mean that the benefits of the JCPOA have not materialised for Iran. This is a way of undermining the agreement without actually violating it.
–In January 2016, Qatar recalled its ambassador to Iran after attacks on the Saudi embassy, but didn’t cut off diplomatic relations entirely: Saudi Arabia and Bahrain did.
–Iran and Qatar jointly share the world’s largest gas field, and have cooperated on its development. Natural gas exports from this shared field account for most of Qatar’s income from exports.
–Qatar had provided financial support to the Muslim Brotherhood-led Morsi government in Egypt while Saudi Arabia supported the 2013 coup that overthrew Morsi.
Following President Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, the emir of Qatar was quoted on May 23 by the official news agency as saying that there was “no wisdom in harbouring hostility towards Iran”. This was later denied, Qatar claiming that this was the work of hackers. On May 27, the emir of Qatar spoke to the president of Iran over the phone which was viewed very negatively in the rest of the Gulf.
Qatar has enormous influence within the Arab and Islamic World because of its media, the state-owned Al Jazeera, and Saudi Arabia thinks that it needs to be brought in line. The reason for its acting now may be that in the wake of President Trump’s visit to the desert kingdom, it feels it can count on the U.S.’s support to contain Iran. Saudi Arabia signed deals to purchase weapons worth up to $110 billion, while in his speech to the Arab states, President Trump called Iran the major source of terrorism and instability in the region.
What happens next?
This is the second time Saudi Arabia and its allies have recalled their diplomats from Qatar, the earlier instance being in 2014, but they had not cut off trade and other ties. On the escalation matrix, the current action looks like a 10/10, leaving no further scope for an endgame.
The Saudi action seems impetuous. From this point it will be difficult for them to step back—unless Qatar agrees to a major compromise. With the U.S. also signalling support for the Saudi move, Qatar may have no other option. The severity of the Saudi action—compared to 2014–may be due to there being a different king at the helm now and a different president in the U.S.
A long blockade will hurt Qatar’s economy, particularly the ongoing construction projects which will affect the 600,000 or so Indians, who work in the emirate. A slowdown will lead to job losses. India must not take sides in this dispute or try to weigh in in any manner: over seven million Indians live and work in the Gulf Cooperation Council member countries and any move may have repercussions on them too. India imports natural gas from Qatar, but this is unlikely to be affected.
Iran may be the intended target of this entire enterprise, through which Saudi Arabia could be sending out a message to countries and companies doing business with its rival.
The Saudi alliance is also working on other fronts to keep Iran economically isolated. A series of leaked emails between UAE’s ambassador to the U.S. and a pro-Israel think tank indicate that the UAE (and Saudi Arabia) are working behind the scenes to isolate Iran. These emails include a list of non-U.S. businesses with operations in Saudi Arabia or UAE that intend to invest in Iran, and offer them a ‘choice’.
For the U.S. too, the clampdown on Qatar is a way of keeping Iran in isolation. Presidential candidate Trump was critical of the Iran nuclear deal during his campaign, and therefore has reason to undermine it. The action on Qatar is a clear indication of the U.S.’s intent on Iran–without violating the letter of the JCPOA.
Indian businesses seeking to engage with Iran must be mindful of the potential ramifications and fall-out of this move by the Saudis.
About the author:
*Amit Bhandari is Fellow, Energy & Environment Studies, Gateway House.
So-called Islamic State has vowed to decapitate ‘infidels’ and kill Serbs, Croats and Muslim ‘traitors’ in the Balkans in a new threat to the region published in the Bosnian version of the jihadists’ magazine.
“No, we swear by Allah, we have not forgotten the Balkans,” the Bosnian version of ISIS’s magazine Rumiyah warned as the terror organisation issued a new threat to the region.
In an article entitled “The Balkans – Blood for Enemies, and Honey for Friends”, the terror group makes direct threats to Serbs and Croats over their roles in the Balkan wars, as well as to Muslim ‘traitors’ to the Islamic faith.
“Soon the soldiers of the caliphate will walk through Belgrade, Zagreb, Sarajevo, Tirana, Pristina, Skopje and other cities, ripping off heads and shedding the blood of infidels,” it warned.
The jihadists caution they have not forgotten that Serbs and Croats fought against Bosnian Muslims in the 1992-95 war.
“Did you think that when you returned home, your hands stained with the blood of Muslims, all that happened ended?” the terror group asked before issuing a warning that the 1990s war was the beginning of the end.
The article continues by saying that all traitors to the Islamic faith in Bosnia, Serbia’s Sandzak region, Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia will be “exterminated” with “sabres and daggers”, unless they return to Islam.
“Your blood is dearer and sweeter to us than that of the Serbs and Croats,” it says.
The authors of the article also make reference to ISIS-linked attacks in Britain, France, Germany and the US; countries that it refers to as stronger than the Balkans but still defenceless.
They say that ISIS has turned these countries from boastful powers into humiliated and scared nations.
“Do not think that you are safe and ready,” they warn.
The Bosnian version of the ISIS magazine has since September last year been justifying the attacks carried out by the terror group throughout the world.
The magazine was issued in several languages, including Arabic, English, Turkish, German and French, by ISIS’s media arm Al-Hayat. Its name means ‘Rome’ and is thought to allude to the fall of the Roman Empire.
Goran Kovacevic, a professor at the Faculty of Criminology and Security Studies at the University of Sarajevo, told BIRN last November that the magazine’s aim is to appeal to poor and unemployed Bosnian Muslims.
According to official data, Bosnia is one of the main regional exporters of jihadists to the Middle East.
The Georgian Foreign Ministry responded to the statement of its Russian counterpart on cargo transit through Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia, saying Moscow’s position “is a clear attempt” to avoid the implementation of the 2011 Swiss-mediated agreement between Tbilisi and Moscow on trade monitoring between the two countries, including the cargo passing through Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia.
The Russian Foreign Ministry said on June 6 that it welcomes “the constructive and responsible position” of new South Ossetian leader Anatoly Bibilov that Tskhinvali will have “no problems” with allowing international cargo transit through the region, and added that it hoped Tbilisi would demonstrate “an equally constructive spirit.”
In response to the statement, the Georgian MFA accused Moscow of “deliberately inhibiting the process” and stressed that “the aim of the agreement is monitoring of trade between Georgia and Russia.”
“The Russian side tries to present the occupied Tskhinvali Region as a party to the agreement, which obviously contradicts to the principles and the purpose of this agreement. Such interpretation of the agreement signed between the two countries in 2011 is categorically unacceptable for Georgia and this was clear to Moscow from the very beginning,” the MFA noted.
It then added that following the agreement signature, “important steps” were taken to implement it with the support of Switzerland, including the selection of a neutral company to administer customs monitoring, as well as a number of technical steps. As a result, the MFA added, “Georgia completed all preparatory procedures for signing the contract with a neutral company and for launching the agreement implementation.”
The Georgian MFA called on Russia to “review its unconstructive position and start unconditional implementation of its international commitments.” It also urged the member states of the World Trade Organization to give adequate assessment to Russia’s “destructive steps” and “prevent politicization of the agreement.”
Georgia agreed to give its go-ahead to Russia’s WTO membership only after Tbilisi and Moscow signed a Swiss-mediated agreement in November, 2011, envisaging the deployment of sophisticated systems for tracking and auditing of cargo passing through Abkhazia and South Ossetia. According to the agreement, “neutral private company” will carry out monitoring of cargo movement through three “trade corridors” two of which run through Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the third one on the Zemo Larsi-Kazbegi border crossing point on the undisputed section of Georgia-Russia border.
Monitoring should be carried out, among other means, also through the presence of company representatives at entry/exit points of these corridors, meaning that they will be present outside of the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
In assessing the underlying causes of the US’ significant trade deficits, the Trump administration’s focus appears to be on alleged unfair trade practices of foreign countries. This column argues that international trade policy has a negligible effect on trade balances. The aggregate US trade deficit results from macroeconomic pressures, while bilateral deficits are due to structural factors, supply chains, and how trade is measured.
By Caroline Freund*
At the end of March, President Donald Trump signed an Executive Order directing the Commerce Department and the US Trade Representative to assess the underlying causes of significant trade deficits, focusing on the alleged unfair trade practices of foreign countries.
This focus is misguided. While the aggregate US trade deficit may be of concern, it results from macroeconomic pressures. In contrast, bilateral deficits tend to be structural, and in recent years, some have become especially pronounced because of global supply chains and the way in which trade is measured. A report exploring the macroeconomic causes and consequences of the aggregate trade balance would provide more insight. Singling out individual countries according to bilateral deficits may be of political use because we often interact with individual countries, but it does not make economic sense.
In terms of trade practices, the US Trade Representative already produces a report on foreign trade barriers. The 2017 National Trade Estimate Report was nearly 517 pages long, featuring 20 pages on China and 16 pages on Japan (USTR 2017). While it is worthwhile to identify US trade policy concerns with individual countries and work to alleviate them, it is unclear how much value added there is from repeating this exercise in the context of bilateral trade deficits.
The US trade deficit is about saving and investment, not trade barriers
The US imports more than it exports, which has resulted in a trade deficit of roughly $500 billion, or 3% of GDP, in recent years. What causes this disparity? The US runs a trade deficit because its citizens spend more than they earn and finance the difference with foreign credit. In 2015 (the most recent year with full data), the households, firms, and government in the US earned $16.9 trillion and spent $17.4 trillion on goods and services, resulting in a disparity of $500 billion.
The trade deficit is a macroeconomic phenomenon – unless the US increases earnings and/or reduces spending, the disparity of $500 billion will not go away. In fact, trade policy has a negligible effect on the trade deficit. Changes in overall earnings or spending will be required to reduce the trade deficit.
The US trade deficit has grown over time because the country as a whole saves less than it did in the past. The personal saving rate fell from 8% in the early 1990s to 5.5% in recent years. At the same time, the government deficit expanded. Unless savings rise or investment falls, the aggregate trade deficit will not be reduced. From this perspective, policies that encourage people, businesses, or the government to save will have a bigger impact on improving the trade deficit than trade policy.
The overall imbalance must fall on some countries, creating significant bilateral deficits in some cases. These deficits are a symptom of the aggregate trade balance – not its cause.
Bilateral trade deficits mainly arise for structural reasons
Bilateral deficits have more to do with country characteristics than unfair trade practices. For example, the US has a large trade deficit with Germany and a large surplus with the Netherlands. Both countries have the same trade policy under the EU. Thus, the very same trade policy that is associated with Germany’s big surplus with the US is also producing a big deficit for the Netherlands.
So why does the US run a deficit with one country and a surplus with the other? There are several explanations, an important one of which is structural. Germany makes a lot of goods Americans want, like cars and machinery, while Americans make a lot of goods the Netherlands wants, like medical equipment and pharmaceuticals. The US tends to run bilateral deficits mainly with countries that produce things it likes or needs. For example, as long as the US uses more oil than it produces, it will run a trade deficit with some oil producers.
For similar reasons, industry- or sector-level imbalances do not indicate unfair trade practices. The US has a $250 billion surplus in services. The large surplus does not mean that the US engages in unfair trade practices. Instead, it results from the fact that the US is relatively more efficient at producing many traded services that other countries need, such as business services (which were a record $140 billion in 2016). As services continue to be increasingly traded, the US can expect the services trade surplus to grow.
Supply chains complicate bilateral deficits
Bilateral imbalances are also not a good indicator of trade frictions because they are magnified by global supply chains. Larger bilateral surpluses and deficits are an artifact of the way trade is measured. Trade is measured in gross terms, which means that even if the value added in a country is very low, the value of its exports can be large if it is the final stop in the production chain. Consider an iPhone assembled in China using US technology and Asian parts and exported to the US. The full value of the phone will be counted in Chinese export statistics, yet Chinese value added is less than 4% of its export value (Xing and Detert 2010).
The US benefits from global supply chains, even when they are associated with trade deficits. For example, US companies have developed a strong regional supply chain with Mexico. Labour-intensive inputs from Mexico allow US manufacturers to be more competitive in the global economy. In the transport sector, for example, three quarters of exports and half of imports are parts and components. Competitive US production is dependent on specialisation across countries by stage of production, where the US does the high-skill stages and Mexico performs the low-skill stages. Even a country like Germany, despite its large aggregate trade surplus, has a trade deficit with its sources of labour-intensive inputs in eastern Europe (Amiti et al. 2017). The US-Mexico supply chain helps make North American factories competitive with European and Asian factories.
Any study of bilateral deficits will thus have to consider carefully how global supply chains affect trade.
The aggregate deficit may be a cause for concern
While bilateral deficits are of little concern, there are reasons to worry about countries that run persistent aggregate surpluses and intervene to lower the value of their exchange rates.
Given that trade involves largely manufactured goods, the aggregate US trade deficit does mean that there are some lost jobs, though only a fraction of total loss in manufacturing jobs comes from trade – automation and technology are more important (e.g. Lawrence 2013, Hicks and Devaraj 2017). In good times, the trade deficit can help reduce growth and inflation and stabilise the economy, but in hard times it may be a concern.
There are also reasons to be concerned about the aggregate deficit because of long-run sustainability. The fact that the US is a net borrower could become a problem because it is accumulating debt. The US now has roughly $8 trillion in net debt, or about 45% of GDP (Bergsten and Gagnon 2017). The long-term causes and consequences of persistent trade deficits need to be better understood, and potentially will require a policy solution, but it is unlikely to be found in the unfair trade practices of foreign countries.
The one exception is when countries with large surpluses and ample foreign reserves intervene in currency markets to reduce the value of their exchange rates. The problem is that such ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies divert demand from the US and other countries with flexible exchange rates. The overvalued exchange rate makes imports relatively cheap and exports expensive, depressing the trade balance and placing a drag on GDP. On the financial side, as a result of stronger consumption and weaker production, savings are reduced.
While there are several causes for the dollar’s tendency towards overvaluation, the fact that the dollar is the world’s reserve currency is the most important. As global financial flows have increased, the dollar’s role has become ever more important and demand for dollars has grown. But some countries have used undervalued exchange rates to promote exports. Such policies have a negative spillover on the rest of the world and should be considered in the context of a report on the trade deficit.
Trade policy has a small effect on the trade balance
Unlike real exchange rates, trade policy changes have small effects on the trade balance.
Figure 1 below shows average applied tariffs and average trade balances from 2012 to 2015 (the most recent period) for 183 countries. The vertical axis shows the trade surplus or deficit as a percent of GDP, and the horizontal axis shows the simple average applied tariff. Average tariffs are negatively correlated with the trade balance. Countries with higher tariffs have, if anything, larger deficits. Even focusing on countries with relatively low tariffs, like the US, there is no evidence that openness expands the trade deficit.
Liberalising trade also does not affect trade balances. Countries with more free trade agreements and greater duty-free import coverage do not have larger trade deficits (Hufbauer and Lu 2017).
Figure 1 Countries with higher tariffs have larger trade deficits
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.
Concluding remarks
The aggregate US trade deficit may be of concern, but it should be considered in the context of macroeconomic, not trade policy. In contrast, bilateral deficits tend to be structural, and in recent years, global supply chains have changed the nature of trade, magnifying some bilateral imbalances. Thus, a report exploring bilateral trade deficits must also consider the macroeconomic causes and consequences of the aggregate trade balance and take into account trade in value-added – not only gross trade – flows. The report should also indicate how it differs from the one the US Trade Representative already produces, namely, the National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers.
About the author:
* Caroline Freund, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Hicks, M and S Devaraj (2017), “The myth and reality of manufacturing in America”, Ball State University, Center for Business and Economic Research.
Hufbauer, G C and Z (L) Lu (2016), “Free trade agreements and trade deficits”, Trade and Investment Policy Watch, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 31 March.
Xing, Y and N Detert (2011), “How the iPhone widens the US trade deficit with the People’s Republic of China”, Asian Development Bank Institute Working Paper No. 257.
The European Commission has finally published its much-awaited reflection paper on the future reform of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It is a good read. It reflects reasonably well the current debates on what needs to be done to strengthen the single currency. Unfortunately, it does not offer a reflection on why the Eurozone suffered more the effects of the global financial crisis than the US, which was the epicentre of the crisis. Perhaps doing so would have helped to set the right priorities.
I agree with much of what is written in the first sections of the paper. For instance, that ‘as robust as it is today, the EMU remains incomplete’ (p. 7), that ‘we simply cannot afford to wait for another crisis before finding the collective will to act’ (p. 7) and that the crisis ‘has had far-reaching social consequences, particularly in the countries having had to adjust most during the crisis. [Consequently], for the first time since the Second World War, there is a real risk that the generation of today’s young adults ends up less well-off than their parents’ (p. 12).
But, alas, in the paper there is no explanation about why the Eurozone ended up in the mess it got itself into. Arguably it had a lot to do with the (wrong) policies implemented in the member states before, and at a European level, during the crisis, rather than with the institutional set up of the eurozone itself. In any case, the past is past and it cannot be changed. Now the focus should be on the future and, in this regard, it is good to know that the Commission identifies the correct ‘guiding principles for deepening EMU’ (p. 18).
These are: (1) the pursuit of jobs, growth, social fairness, economic convergence and financial stability; (2) the inclusion of all member states (hence also the non-eurozone members) in the forthcoming deepening process; (3) finding the right balance between solidarity and responsibility, in other words, between risk reduction and risk-sharing; and (4), finally and perhaps more importantly, the need to make EMU decision-making more transparent, democratic and accountable.
This is all fine. Where I see problems, however, is in the sequencing of the reforms. The Commission is right that one of the first priorities should be to complete the single rule book of the banking union, undertake further risk reduction and develop a European-wide strategy to deal with the non-performing loans, which should include efficient supervision, the creation of secondary markets for distressed assets, quicker insolvency procedures and effective bank restructuring operations (p. 21).
But believing that from now till 2019 it will be possible to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme, a full capital-markets union and a risk-free sovereign bond-backed (synthetic) security is wishful thinking.
There will be very little progress on these issues because they all imply a fiscal and political commitment (essentially mutual trust) among member states that is —thus far— absent. The creation of a structured European sovereign-debt bond, even if it does not imply debt mutualisation (as the authors of the ESBies proposal argue), will not happen because Germany is opposed to anything which could remotely smell of eurobonds and because the credit rating agency Moody’s has already said it will not give it the AAA label, making it essentially a non-risk-free bond, which defeats the purpose of the exercise from the start.
The fact is that we have arrived at a point where the completion of the financial union first requires further steps in the integration of the other unions. This is the case of the economic union. Here the Commission makes a number of valid points. Convergence between the member states is absolutely necessary and a precondition to creating the trust necessary to build enhanced risk-sharing. Furthermore, convergence needs to be defined, not only on nominal macroeconomic indicators but also on improvements in key areas such as employment, education, welfare systems, product and services markets, public administration and the judicial system (p. 24).
This is a comprehensive and ambitious approach on reforms that is welcome. The objective should not be to create homogenised models of capitalism but rather having minimum common principles of good governance everywhere. Here, as rightly suggested by the Commission, the European semester and its benchmarking and country-specific reform proposals could be utilised in a much more efficient way. Since creating a common Eurozone treasury is very difficult for now, it is important to utilise the current European Structural and Investment Funds and design the next Multiannual Financial Framework so as to link the disbursement of funds to the successful implementation of productivity-enhancing reforms (p. 25).
Of course, to be successful these reforms need to count on the necessary ownership and legitimacy in the countries where they need to be implemented (this should be the most important reflection of the crisis). In order to improve this aspect, the Commission is right that the Eurogroup needs to be more transparent, have a permanent chair (as we proposed at Elcano some time ago) and be more accountable to the European Parliament (p. 28). The question, however, is whether this will be enough. As mentioned, the Commission’s euro reflection paper, by not reflecting on the real causes of the depth of the crisis in the Eurozone, fails to address perhaps the most fundamental problem in the EMU right now: the suboptimal organisation of its political union.
This is reflected in the paper. As with the two Presidents’ reports, the section on how to improve the Union’s democratic legitimacy is rather short and vague. The priority is on technical reforms and not on the politics of EMU, which are left underdeveloped and deferred to the future. But such a sequencing is problematic. Emmanuel Macron’s campaign pledges and subsequent election show that this is the time to discuss the creation of a eurozone parliament. If the (sometimes difficult and painful) reforms decided at the Eurogroup level are to be implemented at the national level —not least in Greece—, it is important that they are voted at the European level too. So why not have them voted by a eurozone parliament or at least a commission for eurozone affairs in the EU Parliament?
To sum up, at this stage it is important to think harder on how to improve and strengthen the political union. To generate trust. Only in this way will there be a greater momentum and willingness to introduce the technical solutions that most economists agree upon, whether a European Deposit Insurance Scheme, a macroeconomic stabiliser such as a European unemployment re-insurance fund, the right framework to have stable fiscal positions and productivity-enhancing reforms, or even Eurobonds and a European treasury. What is difficult to see is EMU member states agreeing on a joint representation at the IMF if they cannot even agree on how to make joint decisions more efficiently, democratically and cohesively in the EMU itself. That is why it is so important to get the sequencing right.
About the author:
*Miguel Otero-Iglesias, Senior Analyst, Elcano Royal Institute | @miotei
Saudi Arabia, egged on by the US president, targets Iran and resists Qatar’s soft-power approach.
By Dilip Hiro*
Long-simmering tensions between Saudi and Qatari rulers burst like a thunderclap. The Saudis and two Gulf allies suddenly moved to severe diplomatic ties by withdrawing diplomats, also cutting off land, sea and air access to Qatar and blocking Qatari websites and broadcasts.
Though the trigger for this crisis was reports of a speech by Qatar’s Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani on 22 May, its roots lie in the Arab Spring upheavals of 2011 and aftermath. Unlike his fellow Gulf monarchs, Tamim’s father Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani backed the popular uprisings, angering King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi dynasty, administering 2 million square kilometers of the Arabian Peninsula, could not tolerate a puny sheikhdom pursuing a foreign policy opposed to its own. Its latest dramatic step, orchestrated with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, is designed to bring Qatar in line with the Big Brother of the Gulf.
The state-run Qatar News Agency’s report of the speech delivered by Emir Tamim in Doha was instantly noted by the media in the region. As summarized by Saudi-owned, Dubai-based Al Arabiya TV channel, the Qatari ruler endorsed the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas and Hezbollah, noted that US President Donald Trump’s rule will not last long, adding “There is no wisdom in harboring hostility towards Iran.”
Within hours, condemnation poured in from social and traditional media outlets in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain. Qatar’s repeated explanations that its news agency had been hacked, that its emir made no such statements, were ignored. To prove its case, the Qatari government could have distributed the verbatim transcript of the ruler’s address, but did not.
In Washington, Trump tried to take credit for the blockade, tweeting, “They [Saudis] said they would take hard line on funding extremism and all reference was pointing to Qatar.” By contrast, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Defense Gen. James Mattis called for calm, offering to help defuse the crisis. After all, Qatar has hosted the Pentagon’s regional headquarters at Al Udeid Air Base since 2002, housing 10,000 troops and used to bomb Islamic State targets in Iraq and Syria.
It’s crucial to consider the context of Tamim’s speech. He had a cordial meeting with Trump in Riyadh on 21 May and during photos, Trump said that it was “an honor” to be with him, referring to Qatar’s plans to buy “some beautiful US military equipment.” The next day the emir addressed 650 National Service military graduates in Doha, an appropriate occasion to discuss military affairs. Therefore he may have referred to the US-Saudi military cooperation agreement and Trump urging Gulf States to build an alliance against Iran, described by the emir as an “Islamic power.”
Qatar’s Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani meets with US President Donald Trump. Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead.
Those spewing anti-Qatar rhetoric overlook that both the House of Saud and the Al Thani dynasty belong to the ultra-conservative Wahhabi subsect within Sunni Islam, the difference that Wahhabi preachers do not regulate Qatar’s social life. It’s also worth noting that Qatar joined the Saudi-led military coalition against the Shia Houthis in Yemen in March 2015.
Another material fact: Qatar shares the North Dome–South Pars gas field with Iran. At 9,700 square kilometers, the field is the largest of its kind in the world, with its South Pars section, about a third of the total, lying in Iran’s territorial waters. Aggregate recoverable gas reserves of this field are the equivalent of 230 billion barrels of oil, second only to Saudi Arabia’s reserves of conventional oil. Income from gas and oil provide Qatar with more than 60 percent of its GDP and roughly 85 percent of export income. Qatar’s population of 2.5 million has a per-capita GDP of $74,667, among the world’s highest.
Rising state revenue enabled Emir Hamad to financially help terns of thousands of Lebanese who lost homes and businesses during the Israeli-Hezbollah War in 2006. After the Hamas–Israeli War in the Gaza Strip in November 2012, he stepped in to aid Hamas and displaced residents of Gaza. By then, Hamas leader Khaled Mashal had moved the party headquarters from strife-torn Damascus to Doha. Emir Hamad’s generosity received massive publicity, thanks to the pan-Arab Al Jazeera satellite channel he had set up in 1996, much to the chagrin of Saudi royals.
Whereas Hamas is a terrorist organization, according to the United States and the European Union, that is not the case with Saudi Arabia. Only in March 2014 did Riyadh declare the transnational Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group, with the UAE following later that year.
From the mid-1950s to 1990, Saudi Arabia was the prime financial and ideological backer of the Brotherhood, which originated in Egypt in 1928. This stopped when Brotherhood leaders opposed the stationing of American troops on Saudi soil on the eve of the US-led coalition’s military campaign to oust occupying Iraqis from Kuwait in 1991.
Since then the Brotherhood has renounced violence. Its candidate, Mohamed Morsi, won the first free and fair presidential election in Egyptian history in June 2012. Though his first foreign trip was to Riyadh, his hosts never forgave him for visiting Tehran to attend the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in August. Two months later, Emir Hamad met Morsi in Cairo, and his government invested $6 billion in Egypt’s infrastructure projects.
The military coup against Morsi in 2013, denounced by Doha, was applauded by Riyadh. The hostility of Saudi and Emirati royals towards the Brotherhood stems from the fact that the Brotherhood’s leaders demonstrated that Sharia rule could be established in a Muslim country by ballot, reiterating that ultimate power lies with the people, not a dynasty. That explains why the Sunni Brotherhood feels at one with the Islamic Republic of Iran, a predominantly Shia country.
When Qatar, then ruled by Emir Tamim after his father’s abdication in June 2013, refused to abandon its pro-Brotherhood policy in March 2014, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Doha. They restored diplomatic ties in January 2015 after the emir compelled some foreign Brotherhood activists to leave for Turkey, which remains pro-Brotherhood, and silenced others.
A new element in this go-around is the Trump factor. “What is happening is the preliminary result of sword dance [of Trump],” tweeted Hamid Aboutalebi, deputy chief of staff of Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani, referring to Trump’s participation in a dance with Saudi King Salman.
However, the seed for Saudi-American love-in was laid in mid-March when Trump lunched with Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman at the White House. A glimpse of the joint Saudi-American plan for Iran could be gleaned during the prince’s 1 May television interview. “We know we are a main target of Iran,” he said. “We are not waiting until there becomes a battle in Saudi Arabia, so we will work so that it becomes a battle for them in Iran and not in Saudi Arabia.”
That statement, combined with the 2 June New York Times report, headlined “CIA Names the ‘Dark Prince’ to Run Iran Operations, Signaling a Tougher Stance,” signals that the US Central Intelligence Agency and the Saudi intelligence agency Al Mukhabarat al Aamah may be poised to launch a dirty-tricks campaign to promote regime change in Iran.
Riyadh’s latest action against Qatar seems to be a preamble to launching a regional cold war against Iran. But this move is likely to throw Qatar into Iran’s arms in order to survive. The Saudi press reports that Rouhani telephoned Emir Tamim, likely offering to meet Qatar’s need for imported food and medicine.
The growing cordiality between Qatar and Iran will jeopardize the future of the Pentagon’s Al Udeid Air Base. The ill-informed, impulsive Trump is opening a Pandora’s Box by aligning his administration unequivocally with an autocratic Saudi monarchy, which has no track record of showing strategic probity politically, diplomatically or in its use of military force on its own.
*Dilip Hiro is the author of A Comprehensive Dictionary of the Middle East (Interlink Publishing Group, Northampton, MA). Read an excerpt. His latest and 36th book is The Age of Aspiration: Power, Wealth, and Conflict in Globalizing India (The New Press, New York). Read an excerpt.
