Quantcast
Channel: Eurasia Review
Viewing all 73339 articles
Browse latest View live

When Bombay Was Home To The Aga Khans – Analysis

0
0

The Aga Khan IV, Prince Karim al-Husayni, the religious head of of the Ismaili Shia Imamat, celebrated the diamond jubilee year of his leadership earlier this week with the launch of many development projects. What is not very well known is that Bombay was a centre for the consolidation of the community and its religious leaders’ influence.

By Sifra Lentin*

Philanthropy has always flowered in Bombay, and the Ismailis—there are 15 million of them globally – owing allegiance to His Excellency Aga Khan IV, Prince Karim al-Husayni, practise it diligently, giving unobtrusively of their time and talent as and when sought by their leader. What is not widely known is that it was in 19th-century Bombay that the Aga Khans emerged as public figures and leaders of a community, dispersed across West and Central Asia, the subcontinent and East Africa.

This is the diamond jubilee year of His Excellency Aga Khan IV – anointed the 49th Imam of the Ismailis by his grandfather Sir Sultan Mahomed Shah Aga Khan III—who, on July 11, launched numerous non-denominational development projects[i], all with a primary focus on poverty alleviation, to mark the occasion. This is work that has already won him much appreciation.

These projects will, as always, combine astutely a business model–the Prince is an alumnus of Harvard University – with philanthropy,[ii] directed both at their own people and the communities in whose midst they live. This approach has worked particularly well both in multicultural, pluralistic societies, like India and Canada, but also in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where the Ismailis are regarded a peace loving community, integrating seamlessly into society, while also giving back to it.

The edifice that exists today sprang from certain foundational events in 19th-century Bombay, which effectively legalised the hereditary temporal and spiritual power of the Aga Khan. The first Ismaili Rule Book[iii] came about in 1905. Community institutions were established. This period also saw the beginning of an administrative structure that is today known as the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN). This is an umbrella organisation for the Aga Khan’s non-profit work, which is funded by businesses, such as hotels and airlines that it also runs. This is the largest private development organisation in the world, employing 80,000 people, and disbursing $925 million annually.[iv]

Aga Khan I comes to Bombay

According to historians[v], Hasan ‘Ali Shah, the 46th Imam and the first Aga Khan (an honorific bestowed on him by the Persian emperor, Fath Ali Shah), who settled in Bombay city in 1848, was the first Ismaili Imam to set foot in the Indian subcontinent. His arrival marked the beginning of the modern period in the community’s history. Prior to the 1800s, the Ismaili Shia Imams were based in Persia[vi] and had limited contact with the Ismaili communities that were scattered across Central Asia and Afghanistan – where they were concentrated along the Silk Road – the Middle East, and South Asia. With the Imamat shifting from the province of Kirman (Iran)[vii] to Bombay, the Ismaili Imam came into full public view, his presence having an invigorating effect on local Khoja Ismailis and many distant communities from Central Asia, who sent missions to the city to meet him.[viii]

According to historian Zulfikar Hirji[ix], many of the Ismaili communities on the Indian subcontinent (mostly in Sindh, Kutch and Saurashtra) adopted Ismailism sometime between the 14th and 15th centuries through the efforts of a succession of Ismaili pirs (missionary-saints) who had travelled here. “Upon their conversion the appellation Khoja was bestowed on some converts, the term being a Gujarati transposition of the Persian term Khwaja, meaning ‘lord and master’. Until the 19th century, these convert communities practised their faith in a dissimulated manner. Hence their Ismailism (religious beliefs and practices) displayed a complex interface with other traditions,” he writes.

Gathering a dispersed flock on the subcontinent and reforming their social institutions and religious practices was not easy. The authority of the Ismaili Imam was challenged in three cases that were adjudicated by the Bombay High Court. The first case of 1847[x] concerned female rights of inheritance of property, and whether, in the case of the Ismailis, it was governed by customary practices or the Sharia (Mohammedan law). In the Great Khoja Case (1851), a reform group (Barbhais or 12 brethrens) challenged the authority of the Aga Khan. But it was in the Aga Khan Case (1866) that the Ismaili Imam’s authority over British Indian Ismailis was legally delineated—and resulted in a schism within the community, with a breakaway faction being formed. This began a period of consolidation.

The oldest and chief jamaatkhana of the Ismailis in Mumbai, is Darkhana on Samuel Street (Dongri area)
The oldest and chief jamaatkhana of the Ismailis in Mumbai, India, is Darkhana on Samuel Street (Dongri area)

In Bombay, the oldest and chief jamaatkhana (congregational hall) of the Ismailis is Darkhana[xi] on Samuel Street, in the Dongri area, where most of the community originally settled. This is a grand structure, complete with a stately clock tower. It was during Sir Sultan Mahomed Shah’s leadership (1885-1957) that his travels through the subcontinent resulted in many jamaatkhanas being set up. The first Aga Khan School also opened in 1905 in Mundra (Kutch). [xii]

What is noteworthy during this period is his outreach to communities settled in East Africa, largely Kutchi-speaking Khoja Ismaili families, whose early pioneers had immigrated in the early 1820s much before Aga Khan I settled in Bombay.

The community’s first rule book, titled “The Rule Book of the Khoja Shia Imami Ismaili Council: Part 1&2, by Hussein Chapkhano” was instated for the local community by Aga Khan III in 1905, in Zanzibar.[xiii] It was here too that the first Supreme Council to regulate community life was set up.[xiv] Both the rule book and council governance are features of Ismaili community organisations worldwide. It was in Kisumu (Kenya) though, where the first jamaatkhana in Africa was inaugurated the same year. Well known Khoja merchant, Seth Allidina Visram, who made his fortune, building shops at every major station along the 580-mile long Uganda Railway Line, funded it.

Imamat’s shift from Bombay

After almost a century of the Imamat being headquartered in Bombay, Sir Sultan Mahomed Shah Aga Khan III took up residence in Switzerland, a neutral country, during the Second World War (1939-45). It was also a period when political turbulence due to the Indian nationalist movement and the inevitability of Partition, loomed over India. The seat of the Ismaili Imamat has been located in different parts of the world during its 1400-year-old existence.[xv] While its history in Bombay marked the beginning of its modernisation, these Geneva years, largely under the stewardship of the present Aga Khan IV, were marked by global outreach and major growth in its development work.

The Imamat has now indicated that the headquarters may shift from Geneva to Portugal: the Portuguese government granted it special status in 2015 to operate globally from its territory.[xvi]

The Aga Khan and his followers have worked selflessly across borders and communities – and his diamond jubilee celebrations will have reverberations across them.

About the author:
*Sifra Lentin
is the Bombay History Fellow at Gateway House.

Source:
This article was written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.

References
[1] According to an Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) press release, Diamond Jubilee priorities include the promotion of early childhood and primary education, strengthening institutions, and invigorating civil society.

Aga Khan Development Network, <www.akdn.org/press-release/update-aga-khans-diamond-jubilee-marks-60-years-of-commitments-faith-pluralism-and>, (Accessed on 13 July 2017)

[2] The Aga Khan does not consider his work as philanthropy but as his spiritual mandate. In the understanding of Imamat (office of Imam), the Imam (in this context the Aga Khan) is responsible for the improvement of the quality of life of his followers and also those among who they live and are in need.

[3] The historic meaning of Rule Book (Constitution) is that it outlines the spiritual relationship between the Imam and his followers, which is different from an Ismaili’s secular loyalty to the country in which he lives.

Today, the Global Constitution (rule book) additionally regulates the relationship between various community institutions globally inter se, and their relationship with the Aga Khan Development Network (the umbrella organization). This Constitution operates under the law of each country and also outlines the relationship of AKDN with various government institutions.

[4] Aga Khan Development Network, Update—Aga Khan’s Diamond Jubilee marks 60 years of a commitment to faith, pluralism and improved quality of life (Geneva, AKDN, 2017)

www.akdn.org/press-release/update-aga-khans-diamond-jubilee-marks-60-years-of-commitment-faith-pluralism-and (Accessed on July 12, 2017)

[5] Daftary, Farhad, Ed., A Modern History of the Ismailis : continuity and change in a Muslim community(London, I.B. Tauris Publishers in association with The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2011), p. 7.

[6] Prior to 1935, Iran was known as Persia. At the time Aga Khan I immigrated to Bombay, it was Iran.

[7] The Institute of Ismaili Studies, The Ismaili Imamat History (UK, IIS, 6 July 2015)

<iis.ac.uk/about-us/his-highness-aga-khan/ismaili-imamat-history> (Accessed on 13 July 2017)

[8] Ibid

[9] Hirji, Zulfikar, “The Socio-Legal Formation of the Nizari Ismailis of East Africa, 1800–1950”, Chapter 6 (Part 2), from Daftary, Farhad, Ed., A Modern History of the Ismailis : continuity and change in a Muslim community(London, I.B. Tauris Publishers in association with The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2011), p. 130.

[10] The 1847 case was actually two cases concerning whether customary practices or the Sharia law was applicable for succession (inheritance) in the case of the Ismailis. The Aga Khan was not party to the suits but was represented.

[11] The present building was inaugurated by H.E. Aga Khan III on January 22, 1915. It was built by Megji Mulji Mukhi. However, it appears that there existed an older jamaatkhana on this site. Heritage Society: Ismaili. Net, 74. Meghji Mulji, Mukhi <htpps://ismaili.net/heritage/node/20736> (Accessed on 11 July 2017.)

[12] The Aga Khan School, Mundra < www.agakhanschools.org/India/AKSM/Index > (Accessed on July 11, 2017)

[13] Hirji, Zulfikar, “The Socio-Legal Formation of the Nizari Ismailis of East Africa, 1800–1950”, Chapter 6 (Part 2), from Daftary, Farhad, Ed., A Modern History of the Ismailis : continuity and change in a Muslim community(London, I.B. Tauris Publishers in association with The Institute of Ismaili Studies 2011), p.146.

[14] Today, the Ismailis worldwide have national councils for each country, and depending on the size of the community,the number of administrative layers are determined. In India, the National Council has three administrative layers and covers the regions of Western India, Southern India, North Eastern Gujarat, Northern Saurashtra, Southern Saurashtra, and Central & Eastern India.

[15] The Ismaili, Imamat day Mubarak https://the.ismaili/imamat-day-mubarak-1 (Accessed on July 13, 2017)

[16] Aga Khan Development Network, Historic agreement establishes Global Seat of Ismaili Imamat in Portugal <www.akdn.org/event/historic-agreement-establishes-global-seat-ismaili-imamat-portugal> (Accessed on 12 July 2017)


The Dangerous Rush To Prosecute Donald Trump And His Associates – OpEd

0
0

No, no, no, no, and no, responds George Washington University Law Professor Jonathan Turley to the calls, arising out of the “Russiagate” fixation, to prosecute President Donald Trump and his campaign and presidential administration associates for a list of crimes — treason, espionage, conspiracy to commit a crime, obstruction of justice, and election fraud.

Considering each crime in turn in a Tuesday The Hill editorial, Turley finds the basis for the accusation lacking in each case. Further, Turley warns that “broadening the scope of the criminal code and handing the government wider discretion in criminalizing speech and associations” in order to take down Trump and his associates carries great danger.

The danger arises in part from creating expanded power for future presidents to use. Turley explains:

As satisfying as it may be to ‘get after the Donald’ or his progeny, the engorged criminal code that would be left would then be handed to the next president. That president would then have a less obstructed range for the investigation of opponents and critics.

Read Turley’s insightful editorial here.

Turley describes in his editorial a discussion in the 1966 movie A Man for All Seasons that culminates with Thomas More declaring: “Yes, I’d give the Devil benefit of law for my own safety’s sake.” You can watch here that excellently performed discussion.

This article was published by RonPaul Institute.

Facebook Blocks Two Dozen Catholic Websites, No Explanation Given

0
0

By Mary Rezac

In the last 24 hours more than twenty Catholic pages, some with millions of followers, have been blocked by Facebook for unknown reasons.

Of the known affected pages, 21 are based in Brazil, and four are English-language pages, with administrators in the U.S. and Africa. Most of the blocked pages had significant followings – between hundreds of thousands and up to 6 million followers each.

One of the blocked English-language fanpages was “Jesus and Mary”, which had 1.7 million followers. The page’s main cover photo was of the sacred hearts of Jesus and Mary.

Page administrator Godwin Delali Adadzie, a Ghanaian, told CNA he was on Facebook around 8 p.m. Central July 17 when he was asked to upload a photo of himself because his personal account had been “suspected of suspicious activities,” he said.

After several minutes, he was allowed back into his personal account, which had notifications informing him that his “Jesus and Mary” page had been disabled. He said every person who was approved as an editor on his page had to go through the same process.

Adadzie said he reviewed Facebook’s policies “and, honestly, I do not see any that I have violated in order for my page to be withdrawn.”

He has sent two appeals to Facebook but has yet to get a response.

Another blocked English-language page is “Catholic and Proud”, which had 6 million followers. Page administrator Kenneth Alimba of Nigeria told CNA his page was also blocked without explanation.

He has sent appeals to Facebook but is “not optimistic” about a response. He also told CNA that he noticed other Catholic Facebook pages that he runs, with fewer followers, are still online.

Another blocked English-language page is “Fr. Rocky,” belonging to U.S. priest Fr. Francis J. Hoffman, executive director of Relevant Radio, whose page had 3.5 million likes. Fr. Hoffman could not be reached for comment by press time.

Facebook has yet to respond to requests for comment on the blocked pages. Facebook is the largest social network in the world, having recently reached more than 2 billion users.

While it remains unknown why these pages were blocked, some of the page administrators have said they wonder whether they are being censored.

In 2016, Facebook came under fire for allegedly censoring trends to news deemed “conservative.”

On that occasion, Mark Zuckerberg rejected the allegations of censorship, and met with conservative U.S. leaders to assure them Facebook’s neutrality.

In the past, user accounts have also been inadvertently blocked on Facebook due to system glitches, or numerous complaints against the page in a short time period. In these cases, Facebook restored the accounts after reviewing their content.

Brantly Millegan contributed to this report.

Bolivia: Transgenic Corn Puts At Risk Native Varieties

0
0

Bolivia, with the indigenous emergence at different levels of the state apparatus since the arrival into power of President Evo Morales in 2006, enacted several laws and norms in defense of Mother Earth. In relation to the use of transgenic the Political Constitution, approved in 2008, specifically states in article 255, II 8, the “prohibition of importation, production and commercialization of genetically modified organisms and toxic elements, which damages the health and environment.” Added to this mandate are several laws and decrees that carry the same protectionist intent.

But, as a popular saying in the country goes, “hecha la ley, hecha la trampa” (laws are made to be broken). Miguel Ángel Crespo, director of Productivity, Biosphere and the Environment (PROBIOMA), a nongovernmental organization founded in 1990, tells Latinamerica Press that the best example of the infringement of the law is the case of maize. “Mexico —he says— has 69 registered varieties of this native cereal that have become part of its national identity. Surprisingly, Bolivia has 77 native varieties, but this diversity is now seriously threatened with the introduction of transgenic maize.”

Location of Bolivia. Source: CIA World Factbook.
Location of Bolivia. Source: CIA World Factbook.

In May, the Bolivia Free of Transgenics Platform denounced the existence of approximately 30,000 hectares (74,000 acres) of transgenic maize harvested by a Mennonite colony in the municipality of Charagua, in the south of the eastern department of Santa Cruz, after a team of specialists from the SOS Maíz Bolivia organization took samples in March in Field 20 of the Mennonite Pinondi Colony, detecting after conducting laboratory tests the presence of transgenic maize resistant to glyphosate, a herbicide catalogued in 2015 by the World Health Organization as “probably carcinogenic.”

According to Bolivian legislation, only soybean cultivation can use transgenic seeds, but only in one temporarily authorized event. However, several genetically modified varieties that have not been authorized are in use now. Soybean production, based on transgenic seeds having official permission, have increasingly inflated agribusiness. According to Crespo, the use of glyphosate-resistant varieties and the use of this herbicide have generated a vicious circle, generating new plagues and thus, demands for new agrochemicals.

“There is now in the market a variety that is resistant to the infamous Paraquat — used in the Vietnam War —, glyphosate, glufosinate and 2,4-D. This situation, rather than optimizing applications, promotes the indiscriminate use of the four herbicides. Later, when the soil loses fertility as a consequence of this abuse, the business owners offer fertilizers; and do the same with insecticides, generating a constant increase of the demand for these products,” with the consequent environmental impact, he states.

Migrant beekeeping

Natural sensors of this vicious circle are bees, pollinators by excellence. Not only voices coming from the scientific community are sounding the alarm.

Osvaldo Soruco, Agricultural Engineer and beekeeper from Santa Cruz — where the largest agro-industrial production of the country is concentrated —, confesses to Latinamerica Press that they do not have “scientific studies that prove certain phenomena in bees, because it is very expensive to do this and our association of ecological producers is reduced. But we have empirical findings. For example, years ago we sent our hives to sunflower cultivation fields, such as a temporary rental of bees, to pollinate the crop; but not now, because when we return them, we find that the population of each hive decreases significantly and the other survivors die a short time after.”

The thing is that insecticides do not discriminate; bees are the victims of the use and abuse in crops that use complete agrochemical packages, many of them, such as Paraquat, are already banned in other countries. “This has forced us to do a migrant beekeeping: we must find forests in areas far from agricultural crops; out there is where we transport the hives to produce a non-toxic product, but the agricultural frontier is right behind us, it expands and we have to go further and further,” says Soruco.

The cultivation of transgenics, synonymous with monoculture and extensive agriculture, also devastates communities, and local productive and food systems. Gizel Caballero, from the Center for Research and Promotion of Farmers (CIPCA), an organization founded in 1970, highlights the case of the Guarayos province, in the northwest of Santa Cruz, a traditional habitat of the ethnic group of the same name. By law, Native Community Lands (TCO) — geographic areas that constitute the habitat of indigenous peoples and communities where they maintain their own forms of economic, social and cultural organization — cannot be sold or ceded to third parties, but quick profits influence in the decision of not few.

“The lands are put up for rent or sold under the table; in this way, the natives are leaving their territories to swell the rings of poverty around the cities; or to become agricultural laborers. The presence of women is observed in the communities, especially mothers and children,” he says.

Labor rights cannot resist also the advance of this agricultural frontier. Caballero says that “more than 8,700 wage earners of the agro-industry sell their work skills without any labor protection. In the case of the sugar cane harvest, they are paid 30.00 bolivianos [US$4.31] per ton cut manually.” The owner of the property has a contractual relationship only with the intermediary; this person, in turn, hires laborers without regard to any legal labor considerations.

This so-called modernization of large-scale agriculture is a determinant factor of food insecurity. Official data confirms that the country now imports more food than ever before, because its agriculture is basically focused on exports and not to satisfy the local demands. According to the National Institute of Statistics (INE), food imports increased from $570 million in 2011 to $610 million in 2015.

Promote citizen awareness

The truth is that in Bolivia, nine years after the adoption of its new Constitution, which opened hopes of turning the country into an endogenous production model, respectful of the environment and its biodiversity, the picture is already less uncertain: by far the battle is being won by the powerful agribusiness transnational companies. This is confirmed by Reynaldo Díaz, president of the Bolivian Institute of Foreign Trade (IBCE), which reports, based on a report from the International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA), a new record “of the area cultivated with genetically improved seeds, surpassing 185 million hectares (457 million acres) in 19 developing countries.”

Bolivia contributes to this bleak picture with approximately one million hectares (2.5 million acres) of transgenic soybean crops, an area that continues to grow. Except that, from time to time, nature takes revenge, as in the last campaign when a persistent drought pushed back the production figures. As paradoxes of monoculture, transgenics also reproduce their own limits.

Faced with this evident inability to comply with and enforce laws, emerge citizen action movements. In a precarious way, and without support or official incentives, an Agroecological Platform has been organized, whose members promote organic agriculture, organizing fairs of clean products where they can, and generating information that is made available in social media.

As Soruco states, for now all they have left is to raise public conscience to promote the consumption of clean foods to rest importance to the impact of transgenics. “To do this we have developed a protocol of good agro-ecological practices and a regulation to certify with a quality stamp, that facilitate the appreciation of the consumers,” emphasizes the beekeeper.

US Threatens Sanctions On Venezuela

0
0

US President Donald Trump has stepped up his pressure on Venezuela, following the failed referendum, brokered by the Washington-backed Venezuelan opposition.

In a White House statement, issued on Monday it was said the US president noted the Venezuelan people went to the polls in order to prove how deeply they care about democracy, freedom and the rule of law. However, their strong determination and courage are still being ignored by a bad leader who is dreaming of becoming a dictator.”

The statement added that the United States will not stand idly and watch Venezuela collapsing, while also threatening that it will resort to strong economic measures, should an official vote for the new assembly, scheduled for July 30th, take place.

The White House concluded its statement by urging Venezuelan government to allow for the “fair and free” elections. The nonmeddling US State Department has already sent Venezuela’s opposition $60m in cash to keep protesting.

Trump’s rant comes right after the failure of a Sunday’s referendum, forced by the Venezuelan opposition.

Although the turnout of the referendum (whose only purpose was to degrade Venezuelan government and reduce president’s powers), was relatively high, results were nonetheless favorable for Maduro.

However, in legal terms, even a successful outcome would not provide for anything more than for the slight “moral boost” for the opposition, as referendum itself was only an unofficial one as it was not approved by Venezuelan Electoral Authority, a thing otherwise required by Venezuelan law.

The opposition has since announced that it will form a parallel government of national unity, while also calling for a general strike on next Thursday.

On Sunday, Venezuelans went to the polling stations in order to cast their votes in an unofficial referendum, whose only intent was to put pressure on Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro and members of his cabinet.

Maduro himself called the referendum “meaningless and illegal”, although he later called on his citizens to attend the referendum in a peaceful manner.

On May 18th, Venezuela rejected US attempts to put its crisis under the auspices of the UN Security Council, a thing which was also demanded by the US ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley.

Meanwhile, Moscow has expressed its willingness to participate in normalizing situation in Venezuela.

A day after the US called to discuss the Venezuelan situation in front of the UN Security Council, Russian and Venezuelan presidents held a telephone conversation on the situation in the country.

Venezuelan defense minister Vladimir Padrino López has since accused the opposition of trying to transform Venezuela into Syria with US assistance.

Space Cadets And Sex Changes: Our ‘Defense’ Budget Is A Bad Joke – OpEd

0
0

By Justin Raimondo*

The United States spends more on the military than the top eight countries combined – but that’s still not enough for our military-industrial-congressional complex. They want yet more tax dollars shoveled into that bottomless maw, and it looks like they’re going to get it.

The House of Representatives just passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2018, authorizing an all-time high of $696.5 billion. This is $72 billion over the budget cap required by sequestration legislation, and has to be reconciled with the $700 billion bill coming out of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Both bills spend more on the military than even the Trump administration – which pledged a massive military build up during the campaign – and the Pentagon proposed. The bill passed with bipartisan support: only 71 Democrats and 8 Republicans voted against it.

The sole objection the Democrats had to this budget-busting bill was that military spending did not achieve “parity” with domestic spending: with 60 votes required in the Senate to abrogate sequestration caps, the Democrats are using their leverage not to reduce military spending, but to increase domestic spending. As Rep. Adam Smith, the ranking Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, put it:

[T]o simply gut the nondefense discretionary budget, to plus-up defense does not make this country safer. I care enough about national security that I would raise taxes to pay for it.

Of course he would. That’s because the two parties have a symbiotic relationship when it comes to military spending: the Democrats go along with budget-busting “defense” bills as long as Republicans makes concessions insofar as domestic spending is concerned – and everyone gets to keep (and increase) their favorite boondoggles.

Speaking of which, an amendment offered by Rep. Tom McClintock (R-CA), that would have lifted a ban on another round of base realignment and closure measures, was defeated. While this is outrageous, it’s hardly surprising: obsolete bases on American soil that serve no military purpose do indeed serve a political purpose – keeping federal dollars flowing to those congressional districts. This outcome dramatizes the entire budget process, especially when it comes to the military: it has little to do with actually defending the country, and everything to do with defending the political interests of members of Congress.

Of course, the McClintock amendment got almost no publicity, while the Hartzler amendment – which would have defunded sex change operations for military personnel – hogged the spotlight. This amendment failed, with 24 House Republicans – including “libertarian” Justin Amash – voting to kill it. Rumor has it that Defense Secretary James Mattis called Rep. Vicky Hartzler and asked her to withdraw it. The Hartzler measure was characterized as the “anti-trans amendment,” but in reality it was nothing of the kind. Transgender women and men are permitted to serve in the military, and nothing in the amendment would’ve changed that: if passed, it would have simply required transgender military personnel to pay for their own surgery.

Another amendment that got some visibility was one that would have stripped the proposal to create a “Space Corps’ from the NDAA. The Trump administration, the Pentagon, and Mattis all oppose the Space Corps idea, but the House never got to a vote: instead, the amendment was tossed out by the Rules Committee. No doubt about it, there are some powerful interests at play here, all of which are major contributors to Rep. Mike Rogers’ campaign chest: GenCorp, Lockheed, General Atomics, General Dynamics, Northrup Gumman, Honeywell International, etc. etc. Rogers, an Alabama Republican and chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, is one of the chief Space Corps proponents.

The military-industrial-congressional complex would naturally welcome the addition of yet another bureaucratic structure designed to suck up tax dollars and expand the military contractor gravy train; and the nascent “space industry” is no doubt eager to open up new frontiers of political influence in order to subsidize their efforts – in the name of “national security,” of course. The Air Force, for its part, fears the addition of yet another rival for funding, one that could be expected to take a big chunk out of their own budget.

One ray of light in an otherwise dark procedure was the victory of two amendments that would prohibit any US involvement in the Saudi war on Yemen. It was a voice vote so we don’t know who voted how. I would expect that this will be stripped out of the reconciled version, but, hey, we celebrate such small victories in lieu of anything better to crow about.

The Trump administration asked for $603 billion in military spending: Congress upped the ante by $37 billion. The Senate version would up it by $40 billion. To update Everett Dirkson, and adjust for inflation: $40 billion here, forty billion there, and pretty soon you’re talking about some real money.

I seem to remember then joint chiefs chairman Admiral Mike Mullen telling us that the national debt is the single biggest threat to the security of the United States. Then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said the same thing. General Mattis agrees. It would be a typically American form of irony if our bloated-beyond-all-reason “defense” budget turned out to be a major factor in our ultimate undoing.

Around $75 billion is devoted to an “overseas contingency” reserve, i.e. the cost of possible new wars. To say nothing of the costs baked into the “official” budget emanating from our myriad of overseas commitments, from maintaining our far-flung empire of bases to subsidizing our shiftless NATO “allies.”

The burden of empire weighs heavily on our shoulders, and frustration with this state of affairs was expressed by none other than President Donald Trump recently, when he said:

We have to rebuild our country. Our roads, our bridges, our tunnels, our schools. We will have in another few months, have spent $7 trillion in the Middle East. Seven Trillion. And then if you want to spend two dollars on building a school in Iowa, or in Pennsylvania, or in Florida, they don’t want to give you the money. How ridiculous is this?

It’s pretty damn ridiculous, but then again it’s no less ridiculous than bombing Syria, threatening Iran, and sending more troops to Afghanistan – all of which have happened since the Trump administration took office. Is Trump campaigning against himself?

We are living under a President who proclaims “America First,” and yet we have a “defense” budget that does everything but defend this country’s borders from attack: our shipping is still as vulnerable as ever, and our borders aren’t any less porous than they were when Trump came to office. Oh, but don’t worry: our service members can change genders at will, and our Space Cadets will soon be bringing democracy to the red plains of Mars.

Republished from Antiwar.com.

About the author:
*Justin Raimondo
is the editorial director of Antiwar.com and author of Reclaiming the American Right.

Source:
This article was published at the MISES Institute

Can Japan End Its Easy-Money Addiction? – Analysis

0
0

By Brendan Brown*

The shock landslide defeat of PM Shinzo Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the recent Tokyo metropolitan elections — and the triumph there of Tokyo Governor Koike’s new party (Tomin First) — has lit a faint hope that the radical Japanese monetary expansion policy could be on its way out. The flickering light though is not strong enough to soothe the mania in Japan’s carry trades and so the yen continued to slide in the aftermath of the elections. Between mid-June and early July the Japanese currency depreciated by some 5% against the US dollar and 10% against the euro.

The perception in currency markets is that Japan will not be embarking on monetary normalization this year or next, in contrast to Europe where ECB Chief Draghi has hinted that the train (to monetary normalization) will start next year, even though the journey promises to be very slow. The US train to normalization continues at a glacially slow pace including some periods of reverse movement. Moreover the monetary climate prior to the journey commencing is even more extreme in the case of Japan than in Europe or the US.

It was possible to imagine that the shock election setback for the LDP could have caused Shinzo Abe to withdraw support from his money-printer in chief, Bank of Japan governor Haruhiko Kuroda (whose term ends in April 2008), thereby signaling an early end to negative interest rates and quantitative easing. But markets in their wisdom have concluded this is not to be. Many elderly Japanese are pleased with their stock market and real estate gains even though they complain about negative interest rates and the threat of inflation. In any case it was young voters, responding to the stink of alleged corruption scandals, who turned out en masse for Governor Koike’s new party.

In fact, the widespread prediction is that PM Abe will nominate an even more radical monetary experimenter to the head of the Bank of Japan along with two deputy governors of similar persuasion. Some political pundits in Tokyo suggest that Shinzo Abe could yet face a challenge in an LDP leadership election in September 2018 and that ex-Defence Minister Shigeru Ishiba (also on the nationalist right of the party) could prevail. Ishiba-san would favor, some speculate, a return to monetary orthodoxy. But in market terms this is a long time ahead and much further monetary damage will have been done first.

Three Risks to the Current Easy-Money Orthodoxy

Currency markets are not a one-way bet and there are three main risks confronting speculators on further yen depreciation.

First, Washington could yet get its trade and currency acts together (President Trump’s nominee for the role of Treasury Under-Secretary responsible for international affairs, David Malpass, has not yet been approved by Congress). The US would take aim at currency manipulation by Europe and Japan, now occurring under the camouflage of the global 2% inflation standard and deployment of non-conventional monetary policy tools. In particular the Bank of Japan’s policy of pegging long-term interest rates at barely zero is surely a means of keeping the yen cheap.

Second, the US economy could enter a growth cycle slowdown and even recession which in turn would narrow the yield gaps which draw capital out of Japan.

Third, the giant carry trades could suddenly go into reverse as global asset price inflation progresses toward its final deadly phase.

Booming carry trades are indeed a top symptom of asset price inflation. As income famine investors hunt for yield, or investors impressed by a series of capital gains become irrationally exuberant, they are unusually susceptible to speculative narratives, discarding normal healthy cynicism. These narratives justify risk-arbitrage positions implicit in all the various forms of carry trade (whether in search of premiums for exchange risk, or term risk, or credit risk, or illiquidity, or equity risk). Japan, due to the extent of monetary distortion there, has become the land of frenzied carry trading.

The Japanese War Against Deflation

The natural rhythm of prices has been unusually strong in a downward direction in Japan, meaning that the central bank’s targeting of positive inflation creates powerful monetary disequilibrium. The entry of China into the global economy in the case of Japan has meant an integration process which brings persistent strong downward pressure on prices (and on wages via offshoring). Adding to this pressure has been the growth of the “irregular” labor market (temporary contracts as against lifetime employment). And if we consider the core zone of the Japanese economy around Tokyo, productivity growth and technological change have been bearing down on prices (these trends are not apparent in the national data due to the falling behind of regions distant from the capital).

In the age of Abenomics (starting in 2013) the Bank of Japan ramped up the inflation target to the global 2% level. Accordingly, the carry trades in their various forms have boomed. The speculative hypotheses to justify these have waxed and waned through time. Some market critics think the latest to be waning is the FANMGs (equities in Facebook, Apple, Netflix, Microsoft, and Google) into which Japanese investors have poured funds in many cases via so-called structured products (notes which are a hybrid between fixed-interest paper and a kicker in the form of pay-outs related to the performance of a given index or stock price, in effect an option-type product).

The popularity of certain investment tools adds to the momentum of carry trades in Japan. Market practitioners (including hosts of retail investors) study charts and the trend lines there; the trend is the friend, make no mistake, until the trend brakes. Under monetary stability the flaws of such tools would most likely remain contained. But in the vast domestic and global monetary disorder such as now exists and which fans irrationality Japanese carry-trades become even more prominent.

Shinzo Abe if he thinks about this, and he has praised repeatedly the booming Tokyo stock market, must doubtless hope that global asset price inflation including its Japanese component will remain in its present sweet phase through the elections next year, first for LDp President and then for the Lower House of the Diet (December).

About the author:
*Brendan Brown
is the Head of Economic Research at Mitsubishi UFJ Securities International.

Source:
This article was published by the MISES Institute

Trump To Nominate Huntsman As Russia Ambassador

0
0

US President Donald J. Trump intends to nominate Governor Jon Huntsman Jr. of Utah to be Ambassador to Russia, the White House said late Tuesday.

Huntsman was a GOP Presidential candidate in 2012, and previously has served in the Administrations of five US presidents, including as an Ambassador to both Singapore and China.

According to the White House, Governor Jon Huntsman has had a distinguished career as a politician, diplomat, and businessman. He currently serves as Chairman of both the Atlantic Council, a premier foreign policy think tank, and the Huntsman Cancer Foundation.

“His robust record of public service includes service as U.S. Ambassador to China and to Singapore, Deputy United States Trade Representative, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Trade Development. He was also twice elected Governor of Utah,” the White House said.

In the private sector Huntsman is a director on numerous corporate boards including Hilton, Chevron, Ford Motor Company, and Caterpillar. Huntsman and his wife Mary Kaye are the parents of seven children.


Merkley: It’s Time To Improve, Not Destroy Health Care – Statement

0
0

With the Republican TrumpCare bill dead, President Trump is actively rooting for insurers to leave markets and raise premiums – problems his own administration’s actions are creating. This is cynical, immoral and deeply destructive to working Americans.

Instead, how about we bury once and for all this effort to decimate people’s health care, and talk about ways to lower costs and improve care?

Let’s talk on a bipartisan basis about strengthening the existing exchanges by restoring the risk-sharing payments that have been cut and building in reinsurance so insurers have more certainty around which to set premiums. We could strengthen subsidies to make sure insurance is affordable. We could explore ways to lower prescription drug costs — by allowing Medicare to negotiate prices, for example. And we should create a public option to expand consumers’ options.

Ultimately, the answer to a fairer, less complex, less stressful health care system is some form of Medicare for All. Meanwhile, while we build toward that goal, there is plenty Congress can do to actually improve the options available to Americans.

*Jeff Merkley is a US Senator, member of the Democrat Party and represents the State of Oregon.

Anti-Christian Bigotry Surges In UK – OpEd

0
0

Premier Christian Communications has released the results of a survey of 12,000 Christians in the U.K. assessing prejudice and discrimination against them. The findings are disturbing.

  • 93% say Christianity is being marginalized in society
  • 80% say Christianity is not given equal respect
  • 67% say they are unable to be open about their faith at work
  • 50% say they have experienced prejudice because of their Christian faith
  • 26% say they fear they will be persecuted for being open about their faith

Tim Farron, who resigned as the head of the Liberal Democrats last month, said that “we are kidding ourselves if we think we live in a tolerant liberal society.”

What is going on in the U.K. is also going on in the U.S.

The Catholic League website records an extensive example of anti-Catholic incidents, listing offenses stemming from activist organizations, the artistic community, business and the workplace, education, government, and the media. We have noted that the biggest spike in bigotry in recent years has emanated from government; it is also the most problematic venue of anti-Catholicism.

Evangelicals have also noted a surge in bigotry. The Family Research Council recently published “Hostility to Religion: The Growing Threat to Religious Liberty in the United States.” It noted a 76% increase in attacks on religious liberty over the past three years.
Earlier this year, First Liberty published “Undeniable: The Survey of Hostility to Religion in America.” It found there was a 133% increase in attacks on religious liberty over the past five years.

In February, the Public Religion Research Institute did a survey of white evangelicals and found that they believe they face more discrimination than Muslims.

What’s going on? Farron is right: There is no tolerance for practicing Christians in the U.K., and the same is true in the U.S. Yet both nations  prize their alleged open-mindedness. Much of the animus has to do with Christian sexual ethics: Christianity values restraint and the dominant culture in both nations values the abandonment of it.

But even this explanation is incomplete. Muslims are more in agreement with practicing Christians on sexual issues than they are with militant secularists. Yet in elite circles, the British and American high priests of tolerance are more accepting of Muslims than Christians. How can this be?

For one, Muslims are feared and Christians are not. Two, due to the corrupting influence of multiculturalism, elites in the West are more likely to embrace outsiders than they are their own, and this is especially true of practicing Christians. Three, those on the Left welcome everyone who seeks to undermine the basis of Western Civilization, namely the Judeo-Christian ethos. It’s a sick admixture of these three factors.

Christians in both nations need to hang tough and work together to combat anti-Christian bigotry. The alliances they forge must not be sidetracked by bigots, or by arrogant and boneheaded leaders in their own ranks who wish to crush such coalitions.

Militarizing Civilian Life: Australia, Policing And Terrorism – OpEd

0
0

It is far from unusual in recent times: a spate of terrorist activity, followed by police seemingly agog, then the call for cavalry, usually in the form of military forces to guard vital installations and furnish the public with a reassuring presence. Unfortunately, such moves tend to take place long after the horse has bolted, an ineffectual measure in terms of combating terrorism but pernicious in terms of dealing with distinctions policing.

Australia’s Turnbull government has promised new powers under a national security review conducted last year that will grant the Australian army powers to kill terrors suspects on sight. This is not all: the actual militarisation of Australian police personnel is set to take place with specialists from the ADF embedded in various teams. Training from elite SAS personnel is also slated to take place.

These measures are far from reassuring, suggesting that the military aspect of policing has been given not just a jolt but a terrific heave ho. The Prime Minister, showing he is far from mellowing in his role on the subject of defusing fear, insists on the authoritarian prerogative of streamlining and trimming the interaction between military and policing functions. Cut the strings, the heavy bound red tape, and the world will be a safe place.

According to Malcolm Turnbull, “The overhaul will make it easier for Defence to work together with federal, state and territory police in the event of a terrorist incident. State and territory police forces remain the best first response to terrorist incidents immediately after an attack starts.”[1]

Distinctions between the policing element of a state, and its military, are worth having. One, working within the boundaries of the law, targets and prevents crime; the other, focuses on the defence of the realm. These points are far from being the same thing. But the terrorist genie, floating about with menace, has been used to render these points theoretical, which is more than just a crying shame.

In another conspicuous area, military and defence functions have been obliterated to cope with refugee and asylum seeker arrivals by boat. Civilian functions more akin to traditional policing and processing have become the purview of the military, a move that was significantly advanced during the years of the Howard government. The signalling shot there was the deployment in August 2001 of the SAS against the Norwegian vessel, the MV Tampa. Its apotheosis is Operation Sovereign Borders.

Theories on how the Australian military interact with policing functions are far from sophisticated. There is, for instance, no equivalent Posse Comitatus Act, an 1878 US initiative passed by a Democratic-led Congress after troops were deployed two years prior ostensibly to maintain order at various polling places in southern states.

The Democrats were convinced that the measure was designed to fix the election for Republican Rutherford B. Hayes and pushed for provisions that would limit the role of the US military in terms of operating in civilian spaces, or to “execute the laws”.

This did not mean, of course, that the PCA would not be assailed with grubby hands indifferent to civil liberties. President Bill Clinton did his very best with the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Act of 1996, part of an omnibus of crime statutes that effectively pulled the carpet of law enforcement from under the GOP law-and-order hawks.

While Clinton did not get his wish initially (the final version did not contain an abolition of Posse Comitatus in terms of working with police), the writing was left to dry on the wall. The sheer power and pseudo-military aspects of much in current US policing has arguably rendered neat distinctions redundant.

The Australian constitution does provide for the following: “The Commonwealth shall protect every state against invasion and, on the application of the Executive Government of the State, against domestic violence.” Once declared by the Governor-General, “Permanent Forces” may be called out, with “Emergency Forces and Reserve Forces” sought in the event that numbers are insufficient.

In the past, Australia’s military has become the fall-back option for authorities, called upon as a grand clearing house to supply substitute civilian functions. At points, the authorities in Canberra have been cautious to blend military matters with civilian disputes.

In 1997, the National Farmers Federation urged Prime Minister John Howard to use troops to forcibly “reform” the waterfront and keep the docks running during a strike. “I don’t contemplate,” came Howard’s response, “the use of the military in civilian disputes. I’ve never advocated the use of troops.”[2]

The NFF’s request was perhaps understandable, given that a Labor prime minister, Bob Hawke, had used military personnel and material to replace lost manpower during the famed wage dispute of Australian pilots in 1989.

What is being contemplated in these new measures by Turnbull is the deployment of lethal measures and military control over civilian spaces. The ADF, as with other military arms, can provide heavy lifting in the event of natural disaster, emergencies and the like, but deploying it as a de facto police force is setting a vicious cat amongst the pigeons.

Conflating police and military functions is not only an insidious overreach, but blurs assumptions about justice and law enforcement. As a US federal court put it, “Military personnel must be trained to operate under circumstances where the protection of constitutional freedoms cannot receive the consideration needed in order to assure their preservation.”[3]

Even in the absence of a Posse Comitatus provision in Australia, the tendency to throw the book of evidence and prosecution out and favour summary rough handling, even execution in such cases, is genuine. In this sense, the Australian government risks pushing its domestic arena further down the pathway of a militarisation with grave consequences.

Notes:
[1] http://www.news.com.au/national/australian-army-to-take-terror-attack-lead-not-local-police-under-malcolm-turnbull-overhaul/news-story/6d4301a99b44a4d004db0a43a5e4f9ea

[2] http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/RP9798/98rp08#APPENDIXF

[3] https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/what-posse-comitatus

The US Presidency And Country Have Sunk To New Lows – OpEd

0
0

The revelation that top Trump campaign officials were attempting to get dirt on Hillary Clinton from a Kremlin-connected lawyer may not complete the legal case on the campaign’s alleged collusion with Russia during the 2016 election, but it certainly smacks of disloyal conduct, if not legal treason.

This bombshell combines with the Rupert Murdoch-owned Wall Street Journal’s discovery that a Republican “opposition researcher” (a Washington euphemism for a digger of dirt on the opponent in a political campaign), with apparent connections with Trump campaign, was attempting to get Hillary’s emails from Russian hackers.

Perhaps also relating to the latter caper, the Journal also reported that U.S. intelligence picked up talk among Russian hackers that they needed to get such emails to then-Trump campaign adviser (and later national security adviser) Michael Flynn through an intermediary.

President Trump’s acknowledged attempt to shut down the FBI’s investigation into Russian hacking and collusion by firing FBI Director James Comey, whether legally meeting the standard of obstruction of justice or not, always led to the suspicion that such a brazen act might eventually lead the trail of collusion going from smoke to fire. With Trump campaign officials trying to troll for dirt on Hillary from a Kremlin-collected lawyer, the smoke just got much thicker.

The Trump campaign’s actions communicating with agents of foreign powers to obtain electoral advantage is already beginning to look like the Nixon campaign’s attempt to do the same during the 1968 election. Fearing that President Lyndon B. Johnson’s peace negotiations with the North Vietnamese to end the Vietnam War would help Democratic candidate Hubert Humphrey and therefore hurt Republican Richard Nixon’s chances in the election, Nixon sent a prominent Taiwanese envoy to the South Vietnamese to get them to nix any deal with the North. Nixon communicated through the intermediary to the South Vietnamese that he would give them a better deal if he got elected president.

Nixon’s treasonous act for his own gain was one of his worst transgressions in a sordid political career, because it prolonged the futile carnage of the Vietnam War. The ultimate ramifications of any Trump collusion with the Russians are still out. It will probably never be possible to prove whether any collusion converted a Trump election loss to a win, but flipping only 77,000 votes in three states is not that big a hill to climb.

And the embarrassing dump of opposition emails came at a critical time for the Trump campaign—just when an “Access Hollywood” recording surfaced of candidate Trump admitting that he committed the crime of sexually assaulting women. If the Trump campaign did collude with Russia for help in the astonishing election victory—now evidence certainly exists of attempted collusion—the actual historical effect depends on how bad Trump’s presidency becomes.

It is always possible that by some stroke of luck—and he has been lucky all his life, given that his past business practices would have landed mere mortals in the slammer—Trump will save his presidency, by escaping the collusion cloud, dodging the obstruction of justice rap, and benefitting from some national crisis that he can parlay himself into the country’s savior.

If presidential history is any guide, he might reap advantage even if a war or other crisis is of his own making. However, his unhinged behavior, willful ignorance of policy or even of how government works, and thus general incompetence mitigate against the probability of this outcome. Also, the biggest reason that Trump may fear a special counsel investigation is that his questionable past business dealings might be exposed.

The American electorate, or at least the 46 percent of it that voted for Trump, thought they were electing a businessman who would bring commercial acumen to shaking up the federal government and solving its myriad of problems.

Unfortunately, the Founding Fathers purposefully did not create the government to function like a family business, where a single patriarch is czar. (The world already had such monarchies or dictatorships.) Perhaps that’s why businessmen, such as Herbert Hoover and George W. Bush, haven’t traditionally had much success as president.

The Founders originally intended that the system of checks and balances would constrain the chief executive—in fact, designing the system so that Congress would be the dominant branch. Trump seems genuinely surprised that things don’t just happens as he commands.

Shaking up the U.S. government, which is much bigger and more dysfunctional than the Founders intended, counterintuitively requires a politician familiar with the system—but one who is disaffected with its direction and can implement proper policies to fix it.

Trump’s protectionist trade policies, discouragement of immigration, and tax cuts without likely spending reductions—all of which will likely harm the economy and country—are not the answer. Unfortunately, politicians with such qualities are rare and those that have them—for example, Ron Paul—are often rejected by the national electorate. Sad!

This article was published at and reprinted with permission.

Simple Democracy Versus Racial Justice In The USA – OpEd

0
0

I spent a large amount of my research time in the 1970s and early 1980s engaged in studies of race and economics in the USA, especially in the South. Among the conclusions I reached as a result of this work is one that pertains to l’affaire Nancy MacLean.

MacLean loves simple majority rule, and of course she hates every aspect of racial discrimination and oppression.

Unfortunately for her, in U.S. history, she has to choose one or the other. In the South, where the great majority of U.S. blacks lived between 1865 and the 1960s, the general run of white people held views that adversely affected the well-being of black people—to put it mildly.

The best friends the blacks had among the Southern whites were members of the local ruling class—big landlords, merchants, manufacturers, railroad operators, and so forth. Absent the domination of local politics by these oligarchs, the economic conditions of blacks would have been much worse.

Given the operation of the type of simple democracy that MacLean adores, the South would have been an immeasurably worse hell for blacks that it was—and it was plenty bad as it was.

This article was published at The Beacon.

Why Chabahar Agreement Is Important For Iran? – Analysis

0
0

The Chabahar agreement which entails the development of free trade zone could be capitalised to generate employment and rope in investments.

By Paras Ratna*

Ever since Iran proposed the Chabahar port development project to India, there had been several articles and papers in the Indian media. Analysts interpreted the tripartite agreement, signed between India, Afghanistan and Iran in May last year to develop the strategic port and build a transport-and-trade corridor through Afghanistan that could halve the time and cost of doing business with Europe, based on their ideological situatedness. Notwithstanding the ideological rift, the “Indian” factor looms large over their interpretation while other aspects get overshadowed. Iran’s quest for developing Chabahar falls in the latter. Hence, it becomes pertinent to analyse the significance of Chabahar from the Iranian perspective.

Chabahar, Iran’s only oceanic-port and a coastal city and an ancient trading centre, is back in the limelight (after years of oblivion) post Chabahar tripartite agreement. Also known as Tiz, it is Iran’s only port with direct access to the Indian Ocean, and 800 Km more closer to Afghanistan than Pakistan’s Karachi port. Chabahar is located in the Sistan, Baluchistan province. With an area of 187,500 sq Km, it is one of the largest province in Iran, sharing a 1,600 Km joint border with Pakistan and Afghanistan with coastal boundary of around 300 Km.

The economic consideration in Iranian policy making, which used to be subservient to political ideology, is beginning to assert itself. Conservative ideologies are giving room for liberal agenda. The victory of President Rouhani in the recent election is a big boost to the reformist agenda. The domestic social liberalisation calls for greater engagement rather than confrontation. The Chabahar agreement is Iran’s call for “engagement”.

The agreement, if realised, could be a breather for Iran’s limping economy which has an unemployment rate of 12.4%. The vital aspects of agreement include the development of Chabahar port and a trade corridor and free trade zone. It entails massive foreign investment which has the potential to offset years of stagnation for Iran in general, and the Sistan-Baluchistan region in particular. A World Bank study reveals that gains from the easing of sanctions are largest for Iran as it would lead to an increase of per capita welfare of 3.7%.

Contextualising Chabahar agreement

Sistan-Baluchistan is one of the most backward and conflict ridden zone of Iran. Insurgent Sunni groups like Jundullah are waging an armed rebellion against the Shite state. Conservative governments in the past had viewed this region with suspicion. The demands for autonomy was met with resistance and were perceived as a threat to Iranian sovereignty. Locals allege that the demographic balance of the region has shifted in the favour of new-comers and natives are systematically excluded from political, administrative and economic apparatus. The demands of minorities were suppressed and the security consideration took precedence over developmental needs. As a result, the region fares poorly in comparison to other provinces of Iran. The blue coloured region (26) with least HDI ranging from 0.6-0.650 is Sistan-Baluchistan province. In 2001, Tehran (11) with 0.791 held the lead while in 2009, Khuzestan (21) with 0.891 topped the list and Tehran dropped to three. However, Sistan-Baluchistan consistently remained the least developed province of the region.

Iran provinces. Source: Sabermahani et.al (2013)
Iran provinces. Source: Sabermahani et.al (2013)
SI. NO STATUS Province
1.

2.

3.

Developed

Semi-Developed

Deprived

The most developed

The most Deprived

Yazd, Semnan, Esfahan, KhorasanRazavi, Manzandaran, Tehran, Qom, Qazvin, Eastern Azerbaizan, Fars, Markazi

Southern Khorasan, Zanjan, Golestan, Hamdan, Ardebil, Kurdistan, Gilan, Kermanshah, Ilam, Chahar-Mahal, Khuzestan.

Western Azerbijan, Kerman, Bushehr, Lorestan, Kokhiluye, Northern Khorasan, Homozagan, Sistan and Baluchistan

Yazd

Sistan and Baluchistan

Source: Biranvandzadeh.et.al (2015)

However, with the reformist agenda gaining currency, the region is viewed as an answer to Iran’s stagnating economy. Security considerations have given way to economic logic. Chabahar provides Iran access to the Indian Ocean. It is Iran’s only deep water port and will be able to handle cargoes of 2,50,000 ton vessels where Bandar Abbas can handle only up to 100,000 ton. As of now, cargoes in 250,000 ton ships, which are the international norm, are trans-shipped from Dubai.

Political realignment

The Chabahar agreement also symbolises realignment of Iranian domestic politics. It offers a window to reformist faction to consolidate their gains. The minority Sunni population had high electoral turn-out in Iran. Analysts are attributing Rouhani’s landslide victory to his minority base. President Rouhani has time and again reiterated his unwavering commitment towards equal treatment of its citizens.

This has a potential to decisively tilt the balance of domestic political scale towards moderates. On the flip side, increasing attention to minority demands might lead to pervasive anxiety in the conservative camps. They view regional/ethnic demands as a path to separatism. It can further polarise the contours of Iranian politics. Either way, realisation of the Chabahar agreement would substantially impact the political trajectory of Iran, more so in the favour of moderates.

Major takeaways for Iran

The Chabahar agreement could give tremendous boost to President Rouhani’s credibility in the country and could offset the ills of sanction era. Apart from accruing economic benefits, it will also boost Iran’s stature in South Asia as well as Arab world. Realisation of the Chabahar agreement would make the region as a transit hub, since major economic corridors like INSTC (International North South Transport corridor) can also pass through it. It would further diversify Iran’s economic engagements and would dilute the quasi monopoly of Chinese and Russian firms on crucial sectors like crude oil and petrochemical products.

Post embargo, the Indo-Iranian trade relation is witnessing an upward trajectory. India is Iran’s second most export destination. Top export destinations of Iran are tabulated below.

Source: MIT, 2015.
Source: MIT, 2015.

Indian export to Iran too has gone up by 5.33%, from 262,290.13 US$ million to 276,280.29US$ million. The import of items like iron and steel, minerals, fuels, iron ores etc. have shown tremendous surge in the current fiscal year.

Values in USD million

Items 2015-16 2016-17
Iron & Steel 6.99 15.32
Aluminium articles 0.00 4.93
Mineral fuel & oil 4461.57 9006.29
Ores, slag & ash 0.34 11.64

Source: Ministry of Commerce & Industry

Given India’s emphasis on the manufacturing sector, the import of aforementioned item is bound to increase leaps and bound, opening a door for Iran to earn much needed FOREX. In this context, Chabahar port best serves the Iranian purpose by linking it to India’s western coast. Oil is another vital component of the Indo-Iranian trade relationship. At the bilateral meeting in 2016, Prime Minister Narendra Modi expressed willingness to double the oil imports. As of May 2017, Iran replaced Iraq as India’s second biggest oil supplier. The imports from Iran rose to 647,000 barrels per day in February this year.

Reports suggest that the proposed corridor would reduce the transportation time by 50 percent and transportation cost by 60 percent. Thus, Iran is all set to become a transit hub. Chabahar agreement has the potential to offset the bottlenecks in Iranian economy and restore it to pre-sanction level.

Hence, it is pertinent for President Rouhani to maintain the ongoing momentum with respect to the Chabahar agreement and remove bureaucratic hurdles for swift realisation of the same. The attitude of the administration of US President Donal Trump towards Iran, however, could play a spoil sport. But, considering the benefits of Chabahar agreement for Iran and the region at large, it makes sense for President Rouhani to practise restraint rather than confrontation.


*The author is a research scholar at TISS

Moroccan Identity Entanglement – Analysis

0
0

For a foreigner who visits Morocco for the first time, listening to Moroccans converse and talk to each other and trying to understand them is an extreme challenge that requires an acute state of mental acrobatics.

What language or languages do Moroccans speak, after all?

To be honest, answering this question is, also, a quite challenging task because Moroccans, being schizophrenic as they are, use in their daily conversations plenty of idioms, at the same time and with much ease.

Linguistic Melting Pot

All in all, one finds oneself facing a mixture of languages that are of two levels:

Mother tongues:

  • Tamazight, with its three dialects: Tarifit, Tashelhit and Tamazight; and,
  • Darija (Moroccan colloquial Arabic) with its different regional interpretations.

European languages:

  • French;
  • Spanish; and
  • English.

The mixture of mother tongues with European languages is a second nature for most Moroccans. They tend to do it automatically and with ease, without paying attention to the degree of communication.i

If some critics see this phenomenon to be the result of some sort of insanity and acculturation, on the contrary, Moroccans believe that this linguistic phenomenon confirms their degree of openness and tolerance which is almost innate in their psyche and way of life. A Moroccan wants to communicate totally, and all the means to achieve this are good for him and he has no qualms about this.

Morocco has always been a cultural and linguistic crossroads of many civilizations and religions since the beginning of time, and this is magnificently reflected on the behavior of its people as well as their cultural legacy.

Identity Entanglement

Actually, the Moroccan imbroglio is that everyone in this country talks about identity and language as if this riddle is totally cracked and solved, however, in reality, it has never been and the majority of people are not even bothered to find an acceptable answer to the perpetual question: who are they?

A Moroccan-American Jew celebrating with pride his Tamaghrabit
A Moroccan-American Jew celebrating with pride his Tamaghrabit

In short, these identity questions remain with no answers due to the important priorities of development that the country has met with since independence.ii

It is obvious that this big and important interrogation puts in breach this wrong idea that certain demagogues spread, practically since the beginning of independence, which says that Morocco is an exception in the region and that there are no questions about identity or any philosophical observations concerning this topic.

Wrong! That is totally wrong, the questions are there and very persistent, and the pursuit of answer to these questions is in progress, a real race in order to define oneself and establish one’s place in the world, before starting the long and painful journey of establishing a society accepted by all the Moroccans of today.

What is more, Moroccan millennials are establishing new rules for nation-building, setting up new identities away from religious taboos, cultural patriarchy and political absolutism. They want to come out of the closet with new sexual, cultural and religious identities and live their lives in the open.iii

Nevertheless, every Moroccan ought to ask the following question at some point in his life: who am I?

For some people, there are pre-made answers of demagogical or ideological nature, for others the whole identity issue has to be tackled carefully away from religion and politics.

However, the questions that should be asked are made of two tiers:

Ethnic-linguistic tier:

  • Are Moroccans Amazigh?
  • Are Moroccans Arab?
  • Are Moroccans Amazigh-Arab?
  • Are Moroccans Arab-Amazigh?

Geographical tier:

  • Are Moroccans Mediterranean?
  • Are Moroccans African?
  • Are Moroccans Arab-Muslim?

Religious tier:

  • Are Moroccans Muslim?
  • Are Moroccans Muslim by culture only?

Cultural tier:

  • Are Moroccans Middle-Eastern?
  • Are Moroccans European?
  • Are Moroccans African?
  • Are Moroccans something else?

These questions are buzzing all day long in the heads of Moroccans, who want answers but bump into many obstacles, sometimes of nationalist, sometimes of political, sometimes of religious and sometimes of ideological nature. Many people give answers that they don’t really believe in, and this is the start of a state of schizophrenia that has been crafted to please to all members of society and the outside world.

Moroccan bride in traditional attire
Moroccan bride in traditional attire

In spite of the fact that Moroccans are faced with all these identities, yet they stick to one strongly: tamaghrabit “Moroccaness” which brings the Amazigh, the Arabs, the Sahrawi, the Jews, etc. all together under the same banner and keeps the country united.

As a matter of fact, the tamaghrabit identity is unique in many ways and it is probably the extreme level of linguistic and cultural schizophrenia accepted by all wholeheartedly and of course not considered at all as a health condition but as a state of mind showing tolerance and love of the other and acceptance of his otherness. In reality tamaghrabit is the extreme feeling of togetherness and belonging to the same ideal away from the lurking dangers of ethnicity, religion, color, power, wealth, etc.

For Aziz Rabbah, one of the leaders of the Islamist party PJD (Parti de Justice et Développement) in an interview with Jeune Afrique he approves of this concept even in religion:iv

« Vous mettez l’accent sur la marocanité (Tamaghrabit) en soulignant la spécificité de l’« islam marocain différent de l’islam algérien ou de l’islam égyptien ». Pourquoi ?

Je ne fais que rappeler une vérité d’évidence. Les fondements de l’islam sont les mêmes partout, mais leur application réelle a changé selon les contrées et les époques. Or, depuis des siècles, les Marocains ont vécu leur islam de façon particulière…

Mais pourquoi éprouvez-vous le besoin de le clamer ?

D’abord par fierté. Ensuite pour rappeler le rayonnement de l’islam marocain, qui a répandu le message du Prophète jusqu’au Nigeria. »

Since his accession to the throne, King Mohammed VI has recognized the Amazigh culture and set up Institut Royal de la Culture Amazigh (IRCAM) in 2001 and even went further to recognize in the Constitution of 2011 the Moroccan cultural diversity and inscribe in gold in its preamble:v

“A sovereign Muslim State, attached to its national unity and to its territorial integrity, the Kingdom of Morocco intends to preserve, in its plentitude and its diversity, its one and indivisible national identity. Its unity, is forged by the convergence of its Arab-Islamist, Berber [amazighe] and Saharan-Hassanic [saharo-hassanie] components, nourished and enriched by its African, Andalusian, Hebraic and Mediterranean influences [affluents]. The preeminence accorded to the Muslim religion in the national reference is consistent with [va de pair] the attachment of the Moroccan people to the values of openness, of moderation, of tolerance and of dialog for mutual understanding between all the cultures and the civilizations of the world.”

Besides of course recognizing Tamazight (the Berber language) as an official language besides Arabic:vi

Article 5

Moroccan Amazigh militants
Moroccan Amazigh militants
  • Protection of language use Arabic is [demeure] the official language of the State. The State works for the protection and for the development of the Arabic language, as well as the promotion of its use. Likewise, Tamazight [Berber/amazighe] constitutes an official language of the State, being common patrimony of all Moroccans without exception. An organic law defines the process of implementation of the official character of this language, as well as the modalities of its integration into teaching and into the priority domains of public life, so that it may be permitted in time to fulfill its function as an official language.
  • Integration of ethnic communities The State works for the preservation of Hassani, as an integral component of the Moroccan cultural unity, as well as the protection of the speakers [of it] and of the practical cultural expression of Morocco. Likewise, it sees to the coherence of linguistic policy and national culture and to the learning and mastery of the foreign languages of greatest use in the world, as tools of communication, of integration and of interaction [by which] society [may] know, and to be open to different cultures and to contemporary civilizations.
  • Right to culture A National Council of Languages and of Moroccan Culture [Conseil national des langues et de la culture marocaine] is created, charged with[,] notably[,] the protection and the development of the Arabic and Tamazight languages and of the diverse Moroccan cultural expressions, which constitute one authentic patrimony and one source of contemporary inspiration. It brings together the institutions concerned in these domains. An organic law determines its attributions, composition and the modalities of [its] functioning.

The Linguistic Schizophrenia

In fact, whether they want it or not, Moroccans are a schizophrenic nation, and they seem to take this diagnostic with great ease and even pride. Actually, no one seems to be preoccupied by this mental situation, and no one seems to suggest a group or individual therapy for a schizophrenic nation.
If this situation has, however, existed in another country, sociologists, anthropologists, psychoanalysts, psychiatrics, and others, will seriously take care of this social phenomenon, which is very interesting and worrying at the same time.

The state communicates with the Moroccan people through the means of two totally opposite languages. It uses Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) for:

  • News;
  • Politics;
  • King’s activities and his speeches; and
  • Religious celebrations and discussions, or any topic related to Islam.

However, it uses French for:

  • Technology;
  • Scientific and medical topics;
  • Financial and economic topics; and
  • Foreign politics.

The underlying message is that the language of the Koran and Islam is not capable of transmitting technological and scientific information to the Moroccan people. This clearly shows that the government underestimates the official language and that this langue is only official in appearance and doesn’t have any linguistic capacity that other European languages have, apparently.

The government understands that the language of the “Christian European colonizer” is better placed to deal with these serious topics. This is the first example of the linguistic schizophrenia, government mode.

The second part of the linguistic schizophrenia of the government shows clearly in education. The ministry of National Education use one quarter of the budget of the state, without satisfying people’s needs, since there are more and more students graduating but are unable to get any employment whatsoever.

The government doesn’t want to admit that the Arabization of the education undertaken in the 70s of the last century, for political and not for pedagogical reasons, has absolutely lead the educational system to total bankruptcy, that no one wants to admit, but that everyone talks about.

But of course, however, politicians, and well-to-do people prefer to pay a lot of money for the education of their children in the European and American universities, knowing the debacle of the national educational system and that only training their offspring in international western universities will allow them to continue to control the economy and thereby politics in the country.

For Rabia Redouane, the linguistic situation in Morocco remains very critical:vii

Even though Morocco has carried on for the past decade various reforms to establish a multilingual policy recognizing officially both national languages to preserve its identity and culture, and promoting foreign languages to be open to the Modern world and to strive in this era of globalization, there is no doubt that Morocco linguistic situation remains a complex one with conflict of these varied languages and their speakers. Both MSA and Tamazight are recognized in the constitutional reform as the two official languages of the country, but none of the two languages assumes this responsibility and portrays the reality.

Final Word

The Moroccan linguistic schizophrenia is a terrifying daily reality and a serious pathology that no one want to treat clinically and, as such, the true identity issue remains defuse and uncertain, in many ways, and maybe this situation, after all, is not a bad thing for Morocco and Moroccans because, to be honest, it strengthens their sense of tolerance and the acceptance of the other in his otherness and that is why Morocco has always being an open country to everyone irrespective of their color, creed or culture.

So, linguistic and underlying cultural schizophrenia is not at all bitter but, on the contrary, has a sweet after taste, after all.

Endnotes:
i. http://www.ircam.ma/sites/default/files/presse/Asinag%202%20Fr-Ar.pdf
ii. Cf. Chtatou, M. (1994), “Language Policy in Morocco” in Morocco: Occasional Papers, No. 1, p. 43-62.
iii. http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/culture/moroccos-silent-cultural-revolution_38562
iv. http://www.jeuneafrique.com/201790/politique/abdelaziz-rabbah-la-laecit-ca-se-discute/
v. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Morocco_2011.pdf?lang=en
vi. Op. cited
vii. http://ijehd.cgrd.org/images/Vol2No1/3.pdf

Further reading:
Ait El Caid. Hamid. (2014). Language Policy in Morocco: Real Crisis or Potential Transformation? Morocco World News http://www.Moroccoworldnews.com/2014/04/128456/language-policy

Benzakour, Fouzia, Gaadi, Driss, & Queffélec, Ambroise. (2000). Le français au Maroc : lexique et contacts de langues. Bruxelles : De Boeck Université.

B Bourhis, R.Y. (1982). Language policies and language attitudes: Le monde de la francophonie. In Bouchard Ryan and H.Gilles (eds.) Attitudes Towards Language Variation: Social and Applied Contexts. London: Edward Arnold.

Boukous, Ahmed. (2001). Language policy, identity and education in Morocco. Languages and Linguistics, 8, 17- 27

Chakrani, Brahim. (2011). Covert Language Attitudes: A New Outlook on the Sociolinguistic space of Morocco. Selected Proceedings of the 40th Annual Conference on African Linguistics,

Chtatou, M. (1994), “Language Policy in Morocco” in Morocco: Occasional Papers, No. 1, p. 43-62.

Eyamba G. Bokamba et al. (Eds.),168-177. Charte Nationale d‘Education et Formation, Royaume du Maroc, Commission Spéciale d‘Education Formation (COSEF) (Retrieved July 28, 2000 from http://81.192.52.38/NR/rdonlyres/CAF0FEC1-2E4D-4A-9C6A- 9CB26780C33F/0/Chartenationale.htm.

Ennaji, Moha. (1988). Language Planning in Morocco and Changes in Arabic. International Journal of sociology of Language, 123, 23-40

Ennaji, Moha. (1991). Aspects of multilingualism in the Maghreb.International Journal of the Sociology of Language. Vol. 1991, No. 87, 7–26.

Ennaji, Moha. (2002). Language Contact, Arabization Policy and Education in Morocco. In Language Contact and Language Conflict in Arabic Variations on a Sociolinguistic Theme, Rouchdy Aleya (Ed.), 3-9, London: Curzon.

Errihani, Mohammed.(2006). Language Policy in Morocco: Problems & Prospects of Teaching Tamazight. The Journal of North African Studies. 11(2), 143-154.


Health Insurance Costs Threaten Farm Viability

0
0

According to a new U.S. Department of Agriculture-funded study, lack of access to affordable health insurance is one of the most significant concerns facing American farmers, an overlooked risk factor that affects their ability to run a successful enterprise.

“The rising cost of healthcare and the availability of affordable health insurance have joined more traditional risk factors like access to capital, credit and land as a major source of worry for farmers,” said principal investigator Shoshanah Inwood, a rural sociologist at the University of Vermont, who conducted the study with colleagues at the Walsh Center for Rural Health Analysis at NORC at the University of Chicago.

“The study found that health-related costs are a cross-sector risk for agriculture, tied to farm risk management, productivity, health, retirement, the need for off-farm income and land access for young and beginning farmers,” said Alana Knudson, co-director of the NORC Walsh Center.

Study results were based on a March 2017 mail survey of farmers and ranchers in 10 study states and interviews with farm families in each of the study states in 2016.

Three of four farmers and ranchers (73 percent) in the survey said that having affordable health insurance was an important or very important means of reducing their business risk. And just over half (52 percent) are not confident they could pay the costs of a major illness such as a heart attack, cancer or loss of limb without going into debt.

Insights from the interviews supported the survey results. “During the course of interviews with farmers, many relayed stories about their family members or neighbors who had lost their farms or dairies due to catastrophic illness or injury when they were uninsured,” Knudson said.

Sixty-four percent report having pre-existing conditions

To meet the needs of farmers, changes in current health insurance law will need to be carefully considered, the survey suggests.

Two out of three farmers and ranchers (64 percent) reported having a pre-existing health condition. With an average age of 58, farmers and ranchers are also vulnerable to higher insurance premiums due to age-rating bands. And among farmers and ranchers 18 to 64 years old, one out of four (24 percent) purchased a plan in their state’s insurance marketplace.

“A number of farmers in their 50s we spoke with said they had left off-farm employment in the last five years to commit to full-time farming because they and their families would not be denied health insurance in the individual market due to pre-existing conditions,” Knudson said.

Health Insurance costs create barriers for young and beginning farmers

Health care costs also factor into farm succession issues, potentially denying young people access to land to farm.

Almost half (45 percent) of the farmers surveyed said they’re concerned they will have to sell some or all of their farm or ranch assets to address health related costs such as long-term care, nursing home or in-home health assistance.

“These findings indicated that many farmers will need to sell their land, their most valuable asset, to the highest bidder when they need cash to cover health-related costs,” Inwood said, “making it more difficult for young farmers to afford land and increasing the likelihood farmland is sold for commercial development.”

Lack of access to affordable health insurance could potentially drive young people away from farming, the research found. Young farmers who had taken advantage of the Medicaid expansion in their states said told the researchers in interviews that it allowed them to provide health insurance for their children and have time and energy to invest in the farm or ranch rather than having to seek a full-time off-farm or ranch job with benefits.

Most farm families have health insurance, over half through public sector employment

The vast majority of farmers and ranchers (92 percent) reported that they and their families had health insurance in 2016 but that it frequently came from off-farm employment. Over half (59 percent) of farm and ranch families received benefits through public sector employers (health, education and government).

“Public sector jobs, especially in rural areas often offer the highest wages and most generous benefits,” Inwood said. “Changes in public and private sector employment options or benefits affect the financial stability and social well-being of farm families with impacts reverberating through rural communities.”

Nearly three quarters say USDA should represent farmer interests

Given the pressing nature of their health insurance concerns, farmers are also seeking help from the federal government.

Nearly three quarters (73 percent) of farmers said USDA should represent farmers’ needs in national health policy discussions, particularly due to unique health needs of farmers and farm workers (e.g., coverage for blood tests to examine potential pesticide exposures).

The timing is right, Inwood said, the five-year update of the U.S. Farm Bill is due in 2018. The comprehensive Farm Bill deals with agriculture and all other issues under the jurisdiction of the USDA.

“We have a shrinking and aging farm population,” Inwood said. “The next Farm Bill is an opportunity to start thinking about how health insurance affects the trajectory of farms in the United States.”

Nothing is more important to the country’s food system than the viability of the farm sector, she said.

“It’s a matter of national security,” she said.

For the study, a total of 1,062 farmers and ranchers were surveyed in March 2017 in Vermont, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Nebraska, Mississippi, Kentucky, Washington, Utah and California. Study states were selected in each of the four Census regions and included a mix of those that had expanded or not expanded Medicaid. The study results were also based on interviews of up to 10 families in each of the study states.

Treated Hydraulic Fracturing Wastewater May Pollute Area Water Sources For Years

0
0

Given Pennsylvania’s abundant natural resources, it’s no surprise that the Commonwealth has become a mecca for hydraulic fracturing. Researchers, however, have recently discovered that releasing millions of gallons of treated hydraulic fracturing wastewater each year into area surface waters may have longer-lasting effects than originally thought.

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, hydraulic fracturing accounted for more than one-half of U.S. oil production and two-thirds of U.S. gas production in 2015. That percentage is expected to rise as more states begin to adopt the practice. Although studies show that hydraulic fracturing does produce less greenhouse emissions than older technologies like coal, it does come with other environmental concerns. At the top of that list is the wastewater it produces, which contains a multitude of potentially hazardous contaminants. In 2015 alone, Pennsylvania’s unconventional gas wells produced nearly 1.7 billion gallons of wastewater. While there are facilities dedicated to treating the wastewater before its release, they provide only limited treatment, leaving many of the pollutants intact.

To gain a better understanding of the impact of these contaminants on the environment, Penn State environmental engineering professor Bill Burgos and his colleagues studied sediment samples collected from a reservoir in western Pennsylvania. The study was published in the most recent issue of Environmental Science & Technology.

“There wasn’t a water keeper who was sitting in these rivers collecting these samples at a great continuous clip, so in a way, a lot of information just flowed by,” Burgos said. “But in certain reservoirs, where sediments collect over time, there are layers of sediment that are like rings of a tree; you can look into the sediments and capture time and spatially composite samples.”

The objective of the study was to use the sediments that had built up to reconstruct the industrial oil and gas activity that was happening during the boom of the Marcellus Shale development in Pennsylvania, from roughly 2008 to 2015, in order to gain a better understanding of the historical impact of oil and gas wastewater disposal.

“You need a lake or a reservoir that allows sediments to lay down undisturbed in those layers,” said Burgos. “The words we use are a ‘coherent temporal record.’ You only get a coherent temporal record if it’s a lake that continuously accumulates sediments and isn’t subject to a flood or scour.”

Xiaofeng Liu, assistant professor of civil engineering, developed a computer model to reconstruct the layers of sediment in order to identify the best sampling location. The researchers chose the Conemaugh River Lake in western Pennsylvania. This site offered high wastewater concentration and low wastewater dilution, as well as a dam-controlled reservoir.

Once the location was decided, the team began collecting samples.

“We inserted a tube in the sediment like you would put a straw in a Slurpee or a slushy,” Burgos said. “You put your thumb over the straw, and you pull it out.”

In this case, they used agricultural drainpipe, plastic caps and tape, rather than a straw and a thumb, to collect the sediment samples, which were immediately frozen to preserve the content and then brought back to the Kappe Environmental Engineering laboratory at Penn State.

Once in the lab, the researchers pushed out the samples like a push-up ice pop, cutting them into slices.

“We split them up into different sections so that we could run different analyses on them,” said Nathaniel Warner, assistant professor of environmental engineering at Penn State and co-author on the study.

Warner said the researchers, in collaboration with Colorado State University, looked for high radioactivity signatures and measured the pore water and the radioisotopes to determine the age of the sediments. They also tested the major mineralogy, particle size and grain size, in an effort to develop a full profile.

The results determined that the discharge of oil and gas wastewater did impact water quality and sediment quality on a larger scale than previously thought. Large quantities of oil and gas wastewater with high loads of chloride, barium, strontium, radium and organic compounds left high concentrations in the sediments and pore water.

Specifically, two important types of organic contaminants were found: endocrine disrupting chemicals (nonylphenol ethoxylates) and carcinogens (polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons). The highest concentrations coincided with sediment layers deposited five to 10 years ago, during the peak of Marcellus Shale activity.

“The isotopes confirm these are unconventional oil and gas wastes,” said Burgos.

Some isotope ratios, such as strontium and radium, are rather unique to the Marcellus formation. A previous study conducted by Warner found that radium levels immediately downstream from one plant were roughly 200 times greater than in sediments located upstream of the facilities. This current study demonstrates that elevated levels were found as far away as 12 miles downstream from the treatment plants.

“These are contaminants that passed through these centralized waste treatment plants, and they can be transported great distances,” Burgos said.

Though the findings show long-term contamination of Pennsylvania watersheds, the researchers say the effects on the environment and human health are still unknown and difficult to assess.

“It’s kind of an unknown, unquantified risk,” Burgos said. “The thing that you don’t know is the synergistic effect of all of these things together, the combined effect of radium and lead and surfactants and salt, all together. Does the combined effect of those things ratchet up the toxicity?”

The study did show a significant drop in the amount of contaminants released into surface waters following the voluntary ban on discharge of Marcellus waste requested by the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, which began in 2011, suggesting that tighter regulations of wastewater do help.

The researchers now want to use the materials they’ve collected to measure the biological toxicity of sediment layers throughout time. They also plan to test sediment samples at locations farther downstream toward Pittsburgh to see how far the contamination has spread and to what extent.

“Maybe they never make it to Pittsburgh,” Burgos said. “But the thing is, you look at a map and there are other plants upstream of Pittsburgh on the main stem of the Allegheny River and there’s no reason to suggest that these plants aren’t contributing the same thing.”

Defining Protection Of ‘Public Core Of Internet’ As A National Interest – Analysis

0
0

By Dennis Broeders*

Introduction

This brief engages with some of the arguments and discussions about the concept of ‘the public core of the internet’ and the proposed norm to protect it that were coined in the 2015 report, The Public Core of the Internet: An International Agenda for Internet Governance by the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid or WRR). [1] Since then, this author has debated the concept in various venues and conferences across the world, and can now offer answers to some of the questions and criticisms that have been raised. Section 2 will briefly set out the concept of ‘the public core of the internet’ as introduced in the WRR report and will highlight how the concept has been taken up in other initiatives and by other public and private actors. Section 3 outlines two modes of operationalising what the public core is or, more accurately, what should be covered by the concept. It describes a layered approach and a functional approach to defining the public core of the internet. Section 4 deals with two of the main objections to the idea of the public core that this author has encountered in recent debates: the sovereignty objection, i.e., the public core of the internet is part and parcel of the Westphalian world and is not truly global in a legal sense and thus subject to national sovereignty; and the national security objection, i.e., why would states limit their sovereignty by agreeing to a norm of non-intervention when there is no certainty that others will adhere to that norm as well? This brief addresses these objections and offers suggestions to mitigate them. The brief closes with some conclusions in Section 5.

The protection of the public core of the internet: A call for norms

In March 2015 the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid or WRR) published a report entitled, The Public Core of the Internet: An International Agenda for Internet Governance. This report called for the establishment of an international norm stipulating that the Internet’s public core — its main protocols and infrastructure, which are a global public good — must be safeguarded against unwarranted intervention by states. This global public good does not comprise the whole of the internet or even enter into the content layer of the internet but is limited to the logical and physical infrastructural layers of the core internet. It is deliberately a ‘lowest common denominator approach’ that aims to keep the concept of the public core close to the minimum that is needed to protect the functionality of the internet. This minimalist approach should help secure as much international support for this norm of non-intervention as possible. Support would have to be grounded in a common understanding that safeguarding the integrity and functionality of the core internet is in the interest of all countries that have digitised their economy, government and society. Their common digital vulnerability and need for a functional internet to sustain growth and innovation should underpin their interest in collectively protecting the core of the internet and should transcend their many other political differences in internet-related issues. As every national digital economy, society and government ultimately rests on top of this public core, its functionality and integrity is indispensable for digital survival and growth. The protection of this global public good therefore aligns with the national interest and could be considered an ‘extended national interest’. [2] The national interest thus aligns with the protection of the global public good.

Since the WRR report was published, the idea of the public core has gained more traction. In 2016 the Internet Society (ISOC) published a beta version of its Policy Framework for an open and trusted Internet in which it states that the technical community shares “a sense of collective stewardship towards the public core of the Internet and the open standards on which its technologies and networks are based”. [3] Also in 2016, the Global Commission on Internet Governance (or the Bildt Commission) published its final report called One Internet, which included a policy recommendation that resonates with the idea of the protection of the public core: “Consistent with the recognition that parts of the Internet constitute a global public good, the commission urges member states of the United Nations to agree not to use cyber weapons against core infrastructure of the Internet”. [4] In 2017 the Dutch government made the protection of the public core of the internet a cornerstone of its International Cyber Strategy, as it declared: “The economic and social advantages associated with the internet require the ‘public core’ of the internet to function in a reliable, predictable, stable and safe way. This core possesses elements of an international public good that transcends individual sovereign and private interests. The Netherlands recognises that, given our dependence on the internet, it is necessary to exercise restraint when engaging in activities that can affect that public core”. [5] The Dutch government has submitted a proposal for such a norm to the deliberations of the 2016-2017 UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) and aims to pursue the establishment of such a norm in other international fora as well. Most recently, in June 2017, the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, in some regards the successor of the Global Commission on Internet Governance, held its first full commission meeting in Tallinn and put the issue of protecting the public core of the internet at the top of its research agenda. [6]

From concept to norm

The 2015 report did not contain a blueprint of the public core of the internet. While it identified key parts of the logical and technical infrastructure as being part of the core, the report allowed for ambiguity in certain areas. After all, determining what is and what is not covered by the concept will influence the extent to which states and other parties see it as being aligned with their own (national) interests. The more the the concept of the public core is limited to the minimum requirements for the internet to function, the easier it is to get broad political support for a norm of non-intervention. Demarcating the edges of the concept and turning it into language fit for international diplomatic use required consultation with other parties, such as the technical community, civil society and state representatives from various corners of the globe.

In discussions with various stakeholders since publication of the report, two basic approaches emerged to determining what the public core ‘is’, or better, what is understood to be covered by the concept. The first approach to defining the public core is layered. There are three basic layers — namely, logical, physical and organisational — that have elements that may be considered part of the core:

(1) The logical infrastructure (e.g., TCP/IP, DNS, Routing protocols)

(2) The physical infrastructure (e.g., DNS servers, sea cables)

(3) The organisational infrastructure (e.g., Internet Exchanges, CERTs)

In this approach it is evident that key elements of the logical and physical infrastructure are part of the core of the internet, even when it is less evident where inclusion would stop. TCP/IP, DNS and routing are included even with the most limited definition of the concept. However, other protocols could be considered as well. The physical infrastructure is more complicated due to issues with sovereignty that will be discussed later. The organisational level is also complicated, even though there is some precedent for naming organisations that should be exempt from state interference in the cyber domain. The 2015 UN GGE consensus report emphasised that states should not attack the CERT of another country nor use their own CERT(s) to attack a country. [7] It is a most basic attempt by the participating states to differentiate organisations that are responsible for internet security — i.e., the security and functionality of the internet as a network — from organisations that are responsible for national security. [8] The former may be considered to be part of the public core.

The second approach to defining the public core is functional. Instead of listing what should or should not belong to the public core of the internet, it emphasises what the core of the internet does and stipulates that this should not be interfered with by states. This approach came up during a 2016 workshop that the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs organised to prepare the country’s position on the public core of the internet for the 2016-2017 round of the UN GGE. In this meeting—which included representatives from the technical community and NGOs from various countries of the world—‘protection of the public core’ was defined as the protection of the general availability and integrity of the core forwarding and naming functions of the global internet. [9] Obviously, this approach does not fully eliminate the necessity to determine what the vital components of the core forwarding and naming functions are, but does facilitate a different conversation about setting a norm to protect that global functionality from unwarranted state intervention.

Lastly, it is worthwhile to note that diplomatic terminology does not always require razor-sharp definitions that are universally ascribed to in order to be useful and successful. Some concepts remain useful even as they are under-defined. For example, the UN GGE uses the term ‘critical infrastructure’ repeatedly in its 2015 consensus report even though it provides no definition. Moreover, the drafters were undoubtedly well aware of the wide variety among the participating states in what they understand to be critical infrastructure. The concept of the public core of the internet — the global critical infrastructure underlying most national critical infrastructures — could very well function in a similar manner. Getting the concept into diplomatic play may initially be more important than its precise demarcation. The interaction between diplomatic norms and real-life events may also shape the particulars over the course of years.

Aligning the protection of public core of the internet with sovereignty and national security

The idea of the public core of the internet has been questioned mostly from the perspective of national security. Bringing the global internet ‘in line’ with the international system of sovereign states is an ongoing process in which national security actors tend to emphasise national sovereignty over (parts of) the internet and downplay its international character and functionality. Even though national security actors usually are not against a functioning internet in itself, there are also pressures and temptations to use the internet in an instrumental way to forward national security goals. As far as national security communities are concerned, the internet is both a source of threat as well as a possibility to build new capabilities for intelligence gathering and warfare. Their interventions on and in the internet can, however, damage the public core of the internet, creating (unforeseen) effects that will damage or compromise the availability and integrity of the core forwarding and naming functions. As such they are considered ‘unwarranted interventions by states’ that are declared off-limits by the proposed norm for the protection of the public core of the internet.

The rules of the road for state behaviour in cyber space are, however, far from fully crystallised. The fact that the 2016-2017 round of the UN GGE failed to produce a consensus report is a pertinent illustration. The formal point of departure is that international law applies online as it does offline [10] — although reportedly that principle was also a key disagreement in the most recent UN GGE [11] — but that does not cover all real-life situations in cyber space. This is in itself the basis of the norms process: one of its aims is to clarify larger (legal) principles and translate them into rules of the road and confidence-building measures (CBMs). Moreover, the development of cyber norms will be dynamic, they will evolve over time, and the content will differ in various forums. Finnemore and Hollis therefore argue that the norms process is in important ways the product when it comes to cyber norms. [12] This is also true for the protection of public core that engages with various debates in cyber security and internet governance. Since the publication of the WRR report, the argument for establishing an international norm for the protection of the public core of the internet has been questioned on two related grounds: its tension with sovereignty and its tension with national security. Both objections will be addressed below.

The public core of the internet and the sovereignty objection

The sovereignty objection runs as follows. The widely held idea that the internet is a truly global phenomenon is false as the internet, in the end, consists of cables, server farms and other technical infrastructure that rest somewhere on or under the ground of a sovereign nation. It is territorial. The internet is therefore embedded in sovereign nations, covered by national legal systems; it is not a global public good.

The following is the counter-argument. The public core includes both core logical and core technical infrastructure of the global internet. In the logical layer — the protocols and standards that make naming and forwarding possible — the argument of territoriality does not apply. Protocols and standards are not territorial in any real sense and therefore it would be hard to apply the concept of sovereignty to them. However, at the level of the physical infrastructure, the argument of territoriality does hold for much of the core infrastructure. DNS servers are located within national borders and sea cables come ashore in sovereign nations. The question is whether that means that sovereignty should be applied without any limits on what governments can and cannot do with them.

As these core infrastructures facilitate the flow of global internet traffic, one could argue that intervening in them can have such adverse effects in other countries that it would create obligations for the first state to show restraint. If the United States, for instance, were to turn off all the DNS root servers within its sovereign territory, the repercussions for the global internet would be more than harmful. How this resulting transboundary harm should be characterised in terms of international law or international norms is less clear. It might constitute an international wrongful act if the results violate obligations under international law, such as perhaps the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) provisions on ‘avoiding harmful interference’ in other signatory states’ communication networks and/or the general obligation to ‘avoid technical harm to the telecommunication facilities of third countries’. [13] It might also be covered under the notion of the ‘no harm principle’ that comes from environmental law but may turn out to be applicable in the cyber domain as well, [14] or the notion of due diligence that is still very much under debate in the international law of cyber space. [15] All of these would create an obligation for the state to self-limit its sovereignty with regard to those physical elements of the public core of the internet that are within its territory.

A useful analogy to the organisation of such sovereign self-restraint might be with pooled resources such as rivers. Even though no one disputes that the river Rhine runs through the sovereign territories of Switzerland, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the application of sovereignty to the water flowing through this river is more problematic. The downstream effects of, for example, dumping toxins into the water are so severe that they have become subject of international norms that aim to govern the joint stewardship of rivers, such as the 2004 Berlin Rules on Water Resources. These lay down rules and restrictions for states in both peace and wartime with regard to internationally shared water resources such as rivers that flow through multiple countries. Even though the international frameworks are not legally binding, [16] the framework governing the joint stewardship of the Rhine is. Cooperation between the signatory states is laid down in the Convention for the Protection of the Rhine — and administered and overseen by the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine — and is also covered by the European Water Framework Directive. [17] In other words, states have chosen to set themselves norms that limit their sovereignty in recognition of the fact that the river constitutes an international shared resource. This could be a viable model to mediate between the need to protect the public core of the internet, on the one hand, and the concept of sovereignty on the other.

The public core and the national security objection

The national security objection argues that cyberspace is both a source of threat to national security — for example, hostile actors using the internet and vulnerable critical infrastructures connected to the internet — and at the same time presents an opportunity to build military and intelligence capabilities. High-end military and intelligence capabilities in cyber space give some states a strategic advantage in relation to less advanced nations. [18] Currently, there are no norms prohibiting the build-up of cyber capabilities or the use of the logical and physical core internet infrastructure as a target or a carrier for an attack. It therefore makes perfect sense to build up capabilities in cyber space, and it makes no sense to subscribe a norm of non-intervention when there is no certainty that other states will adhere to such a norm. The state that does limit itself will create its own strategic disadvantage to those states that do not subscribe to the norm, or even those that subscribe to the norm but do not act accordingly. In other words: states that are first movers on such a norm will damage their national security.

The counter-argument is that national security can be threatened in more than one way and that these require different, even contrary, responses. In International Relations theory, the concept of the security dilemma is well known. A security dilemma exists when “many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security, decrease the security of others.” [19] And how those others react to their decreased security can, in turn, decrease the security of the first state. In other words, building up offensive capabilities to protect yourself may spiral into an arms race that results in less individual and collective security. In that light it is important to note that cyber conflicts are often considered extremely escalatory conflicts. [20] The potential for a conflict to spin out of control is huge in the cyber domain and this may easily drag countries into a higher level of conflict than intended.

Cyber security lends itself well to the dynamics of the security dilemma. The number of states that are, on the record, building up military cyber capacity is growing steadily and it is safe to assume that not all states are open about their investments, capabilities and intentions. Moreover, many countries will have upgraded their technical cyber capacity considerably within a few years, giving a much larger group of states capacities that are currently reserved for only a few superpowers. What is considered cutting-edge today will be much more commonplace in five years’ time. This will add to an already insecure landscape. [21] The blurring of lines between cyber intelligence operations and cyber offensive operations further exacerbates uncertainty and the possibilities to misread the other’s intentions. [22] Some authors are therefore talking about the emergence of a cyber security dilemma. [23] Give these dynamics, it is not surprising that the debate about norms for state behaviour in cyber space goes hand in hand with debate about confidence-building measures to decrease the possibilities for misreading state behaviour. [24]

There are no easy answers to national security in the cyber age, but it seems evident that the risks to national security associated with self-limitation when others may defect from such a norm have to be weighed against the risks of the cyber security dilemma and the escalation of cyber conflict. As Schmitt argues, “legal clarity breeds international stability.” [25] Reducing ambiguity in cyberspace — even though it harbours temptations of short-term strategic advantages — is to the benefit of all states. Lifting the public core of the internet out of that ambiguity would be a good starting point.

Conclusion

The call to establish an international norm to protect the public core of the internet, as originally advocated by the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, has been taken up in various forms in different fora. Translating the concept into a viable international norm is an ongoing process that requires specifications of the concept and should also answer some of the objections that have been raised since the report’s publication in 2015. This paper proposes two possible approaches to defining the public core of the internet: a layered approach and a functional approach. Both provide productive ways to discuss safeguarding the functionality and integrity of the core logical and physical infrastructure of the internet. However, it is also important to recognise that diplomatic terminology does not always require definitions that are universally ascribed to in order to be useful and successful. The unproblematic and productive use of ‘critical infrastructures’ in the context of the UN GGE is a case in point.

This paper further discusses two objections to the concept of the public core of the internet from the perspectives of (1) state sovereignty and (2) national security. The sovereignty objection, reasoning that core internet infrastructure is covered by territorial sovereignty and is therefore not global in a legal sense, can be overcome by focusing on potential transboundary harms that may result from interference with the public core and may create obligations for states. The paper discusses the model of the norms and laws for the joint stewardship of rivers such as the Rhine as a way to reconcile the simultaneous territorial and transboundary character of the core of the internet. The national security objection, meanwhile, reasoning that a state that subscribes to a norm that calls for self-restraint when others may not subscribe will damage its national security, has to be meditated by taking into account the parallel risk of an emerging cyber security dilemma. These different risks to national security have to weighed against each other and — given that cyber capabilities are likely to spread to a much larger group of states quite fast — the best route to international stability in the long run will go through increased legal clarity about responsible state behaviour. The route to that legal clarity will have to be paved by a dynamic, multi-forum norms process.

About the author:
*Dennis Broeders is a senior Research Fellow at the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy and professor of Technology and Society at Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands. He is the author of the 2015 report, The Public Core of the Internet: An International Agenda for Internet Governance.

Source:
This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.

Notes:
[1] Dennis Broeders, (2015) The Public Core of the Internet. An international Agenda for Internet Governance. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015). https://english.wrr.nl/publications/reports/2015/10/01/the-public-core-of-the-internet See also Dennis Broeders, “The public core of the internet. Towards an international agenda for internet Governance”, Global Policy – Digital Debates (2016): 24-30. http://www.orfonline.org/expert-speaks/the-public-core-of-internet/

[2] Broeders, The Public Core of the Internet, 42-43.

[3] Internet Society, A policy framework for an open and trusted Internet An approach for reinforcing trust in an open environment, (2016): 7. http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/bp-Trust-20170314-en.pdf

[4] Global Commission on Internet Governance, One Internet, (Ontario and London: Centre for International Governance Innovation and Chatham House, 2016): 75, see also 58.https://www.ourinternet.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/GCIG_Final%20Report%20-%20USB.pdf

[5] Government of the Netherlands ‘Building Digital Bridges’. International Cyber Strategy. Towards an integrated international cyber policy, (2017): 5. See: https://www.government.nl/documents/parliamentary-documents/2017/02/12/international-cyber-strategy

[6] https://cyberstability.org/news/the-global-commission-on-the-stability-of-cyberspace-holds-first-full-commission-meeting-in-tallinn/

[7] United Nations, “Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security” July 22, 2015, UN Doc. A/70/174, see p. 8/17 (art. 13k). https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/documents/UN-150722-GGEReport2015.pdf

[8] Broeders, The Public Core of the Internet, 96-99. This is in line with the policy recommendation to disentangle ‘internet security’ and ‘national security’.

[9] This international workshop on ‘The Public Core of the Internet’, was held in The Hague on 11 July 2016.

[10] United Nations, “Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security” July 22, 2015, UN Doc. A/70/174. https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/documents/UN-150722-GGEReport2015.pdf, see also: Michael Schmitt, ed., Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/356296245.pdf

[11] Arun Sukumar,”The UN GGE Failed. Is International Law in Cyberspace Doomed As Well?”, Lawfare Blog, 4 July 2017, https://lawfareblog.com/un-gge-failed-international-law-cyberspace-doomed-well

[12] Martha Finnemore and Duncan Hollis, “Constructing norms for global cybersecurity”, American Journal of International Law 110(2016): 477. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2843913

[13] Anthony Rutkowski,“Public international law of the international telecommunication instruments: cyber security treaty provisions since 1850”, Info 13 (2011): 13-31.

[14] Scott Shackelford, Scott Russell and Andreas Kuehn, “Unpacking the International Law on Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons from the Public and Private Sectors,” Chicago Journal of International Law 17 (2016). Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol17/iss1/1

[15] For a concise overview on this point see: Michael Schmitt, “Grey zones in the International Law of Cyberspace”, The Yale Journal of International Law Online, (2017): 11-13.

https://campuspress.yale.edu/yjil/files/2017/05/Schmitt_Grey-Areas-in-the-International-Law-of-Cyberspace-1c52av8.pdf

[16] See for an overview of the development of the international norms: Salman Salman, “The Helsinki Rules, The UN watercourses Convention and the Berlin Rules: Perspectives on International Water Law”, Water Resources Development 23(2007): 625-640. http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/bibliography/articles/general/Salman-BerlinRules.pdf

See: http://www.iksr.org/en/index.html

[18] See for example: James Lewis, “Confidence-building and international agreement in cybersecurity”, Disarmament Forum (2011): 57-58. http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/confronting-cyberconflict-en-317.pdf

[19] Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma”, World Politics 30 (1978): 169.

[20] Jason Healey’s testimony before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services Hearing on “Cyber Warfare in the 21st Century: Threats, Challenges, and Opportunities” 1 March 2017, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20170301/105607/HHRG-115-AS00-Bio-HealeyJ-20170301-U1.pdf

[21] Broeders, The Public Core of the Internet, 94.

[22] Dennis Broeders, “The hybridization of cyber security governance: the emergence of Global Cyber Security Assemblages”, Global Policy – Digital Debates (2017, forthcoming).

[23] Myriam Dunn Cavelty, “Breaking the Cyber-security Dilemma: Aligning Security Needs and Removing Vulnerabilities”, Science and Engineering Ethics, 20 (2014): 701-715. Ben Buchanon, The Cybersecurity Dilemma. Hacking, Trust, and Fear between Nations. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

[24] [24] Lewis, “Confidence-building”, 57-58.

[25] Schmitt, “Grey zones”, 21.

Rouhani Says US Sanctions Defy Spirit Of Nuclear Deal, Iran To Respond

0
0

Following US sanctions on 18 Iranian individuals and entities on Tuesday, AFP report that Iranian President Rouhani says Tehran will “respond appropriately”, whilst remaining committed to its nuclear deal with world powers.

The US administration imposed new sanctions on Iran on Tuesday over its ballistic missile program, claiming that “malign activities” from Iran in the Middle East outweigh any “positive contributions” coming from nuclear deal in 2015.

Speaking on Iranian state television, Rouhani said that “Some of the actions of the Americans are against the spirit and even the letter of the (nuclear accord). We shall resist these plans and actions.”

Original source

US Senator John McCain Diagnosed With Brain Tumor

0
0

The announcement follows a procedure to remove a blood clot from above his left eye at the Mayo Clinic Hospital in Phoenix last Friday, where a pathology report revealed the glioblastoma, a malignant brain tumor.

Treatment options may include a combination of chemotherapy and radiation.

A statement from McCain’s doctors say he is recovering from his surgery, but it is unclear when the 80-year-old Republican would return to the Senate.

“Further consultations with Senator McCain’s Mayo Clinic care team will indicate when he will return to the United States Senate,” the statement read.

Because glioblastomas can grow rapidly, the most common symptoms are usually caused by increased pressure in the brain. These symptoms can include headache, nausea, vomiting, and drowsiness.

Depending on the location of the tumor, patients can develop a variety of other symptoms such as weakness on one side of the body, memory and/or speech difficulties, and vision changes, according to the American Brain Tumor Association website.

Glioblastoma can be difficult to treat because the tumors contain so many different types of cells, the association says.

About 20,000 people in the U.S. each year are diagnosed with a glioblastoma. The American Cancer Society puts the five-year survival rate for patients over 55 at about 4 percent.

The tumor digs tentacle-like roots into normal brain tissue. Patients fare best when surgeons can cut out all the visible tumor, which happened with McCain’s tumor, according to his office.

That isn’t a cure; cancerous cells that aren’t visible still tend to lurk, the reason McCain’s doctors are considering further treatment including chemotherapy and radiation.

The senator and chairman of the Armed Services Committee had been recovering at his Arizona home. His absence had forced Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., to delay action on health care legislation.

In a statement, McConnell said: “John McCain is a hero to our Conference and a hero to our country. He has never shied from a fight and I know that he will face this challenge with the same extraordinary courage that has characterized his life. The entire Senate family’s prayers are with John, Cindy and his family, his staff, and the people of Arizona he represents so well.”

U.S. Rep. Martha McSally, R-Arizona, said McCain is “one of the bravest men I know — a hero, a warrior and a survivor.”

“I am confident he will defeat this foe as well,” she said in a statement. “Senator McCain has been a personal mentor for me. I have been honored to serve alongside him in the Arizona delegation in Congress, and I look forward to continuing to do so. My thoughts are with him and his family, and my prayers are for his health and full recovery.”

Doctors say McCain is recovering from his surgery amazingly well and his underlying health is excellent, according to the statement.

McCain was the GOP’s presidential nominee in 2008, when he and running mate Sarah Palin lost to Barack Obama. A Navy pilot, he was shot down over Vietnam and held as a prisoner for 5½ years.

The senator’s daughter, Meghan McCain, tweeted about how the news of her father’s cancer shocked the family.

“It won’t surprise you to learn that in all this, the one of us who is most confident and calm is my father. He is the toughest person I know. The cruelest enemy could not break him. The aggressions of political life could not bend him. So he is meeting this challenge as he has every other. Cancer may afflict him in many ways: but it will not make him surrender. Nothing ever has,” she wrote.

Viewing all 73339 articles
Browse latest View live




Latest Images