US President Donald J. Trump. in a step that could embolden Saudi Arabia to move ahead with plans to destabilize Iran, has instructed White House aides to give him the arguments for withholding certification in October that Iran has complied with its nuclear agreement with world powers.

Mr. Trump, long critical of the agreement that strictly limits the Islamic republic’s nuclear program and requires the president to certify Iranian compliance every three months, has reluctantly done so twice since coming to office in January. At the same time, the president has twice imposed new US sanctions on Iran to penalize it for its development of ballistic missiles. Iran argues that it missile program does not fall under the agreement.

Arguments that Iran has failed to comply with the agreement that lifted crippling international sanctions and opened the door to Iran’s return to the international fold, are likely to focus on allegations that the Islamic republic has failed to comply with the spirit rather than the letter of the accord.

Mr. Trump’s decision to task hard-line White House aides rather than the State Department signalled, according to Foreign Policy, the president’s mounting frustration with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s failure to provide him with the arguments he needed. Foreign Policy quoted Trump administration officials as saying that Mr. Trump wanted options, but had yet to decide whether to de-certify Iran in October.

Critics of the Iran agreement argue that it has enabled Iran since the accord was inked in 2015 to increase its capacity to strike Gulf states with ballistic missiles and support proxies, including Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Shia militias in Iraq, and rebels in Yemen.

Some critics argue that tearing up the agreement would not solve the problem, but that Iranian compliance with the agreement is not enough. These critics have yet to detail what Mr. Trump could do to use the nuclear agreement to counter Iranian policies.

LobeLog reported that emails, allegedly stemming from a hacked email account of Yousef Al-Otaiba, the high-profile UAE ambassador in Washington, suggested that the UAE and a Washington-based Saudi lobbyist were supporting two US groups, headed by former Senator Joseph Lieberman and former Bush administration officials, that advocate a tougher US policy towards Iran.

Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said Iran would exhaust the agreement’s mechanisms to oppose any US move to undermine the accord, but warned that “Iran has other options available, including withdrawing from the deal.”

Irrespective of what Mr. Trump decides, his move, much like his statements during a visit to Riyadh in May contributed to the eruption of the Gulf crisis and the UAE-Saud-led boycott of Qatar, could encourage Saudi Arabia to step up its long-standing existential battle with Iran.

Lowering relations with Iran, with whom Qatar shares the world’s largest gas field, was one of the demands initially put forward by the UAE-Saudi-led coalition. Kuwait, the lead mediator in the Gulf crisis and one of the Gulf states that has long balanced its relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran, this week expelled the Iranian ambassador and 14 other diplomats for alleged links to a “spy and terror” cell.

Saudi Arabia has felt emboldened by Trump’s hostility towards Iran as well as his focus on combatting terrorism even though the US administration appears to be wracked by policy differences between the president and some of his key aides.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who earlier this month cemented his position in a palace coup, has proven to be a brash 31-year old, willing to take risks to establish the kingdom as the Middle East and North Africa’s dominant power.

Prince Mohammed has in the last year been laying the groundwork for an effort to destabilize Iran by fomenting unrest among the Islamic republic’s restless ethnic minorities. The plans have resonated with some quarters in the Trump administration, populated by officials known for their antipathy towards the Islamic republic even if they differ in their attitudes towards the nuclear agreement.

A memo drafted by Mark Dubowitz, CEO of the UAE-backed, Washington-based Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, that recently circulated among Trump’s aides concluded that “Iran is susceptible to a strategy of coerced democratization because it lacks popular support and relies on fear to sustain its power. The very structure of the regime invites instability, crisis and possibly collapse.”

The very fact that Mr. Trump is considering denying Iran certification in October irrespective of what he decides, is likely to encourage Prince Mohammed to at the very least further finetune his plan and ensure that the kingdom has the building blocks in place.

Against the backdrop of a history of failed US efforts to destabilize Iran, Prince Mohammed’s plan, if implemented, could have consequences that reverberate across Eurasia. “Destabilizing Iran would be like shaking up a kaleidoscope and hoping to get a Titian. It is far from clear that the outcome would be better than what we have now,” warned Michael Axworthy, a scholar and a former British Foreign Office official who worked on Iran.

Using the Pakistani province of Balochistan, already wracked by nationalist and militant Islamic strife, as a spring plank could, moreover, undermine Pakistani efforts to get a grip on at least some of the violent groups operating in the country and could rekindle sectarian strife.

Balochistan borders on the Iranian province of Sistan and Baluchistan. Militant groups believed to enjoy Saudi backing have long launched cross-border attacks, prompting Iranian counter-attacks against the militants on Pakistani soil. Intelligence sources said that Pakistan had detained in early May a commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) who was on a recruiting mission in Balochistan.

The US Treasury designated at about the same time Saudi-backed Maulana Ali Muhammad Abu Turab, a militant Pakistani Islamic scholar of Afghan origin as a specially designated terrorist while he was on a fund-raising tour of the Gulf. Mr. Abu Turab is a leader of Ahl-i-Hadith, a Saudi-supported Pakistani Wahhabi group that operates a string of religious seminaries in Balochistan along the Pakistan-Afghan border.

Mr. Abu Turab is moreover a board member of Pakistan’s Saudi-backed Paigham TV and heads the Saudi-funded Movement for the Protection of the Two Holy Cities (Tehrike Tahafaz Haramain Sharifain), whose secretary general Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil has also been designated by the Treasury. He serves on Pakistan’s Council of Islamic Ideology, a government-appointed advisory body of scholars and laymen established to assist in bringing laws in line with the Qur’an and the example of the Prophet Mohammed.

Militants in Pakistan and sources close to them have asserted in recent months that Saudi funds are pouring into religious seminaries in Balochistan that are operated by often banned, virulently anti-Shiite groups.

“The ASWJ is a proscribed organisation, legally but it still arranges rallies in the country and takes part in elections. We do not have any clear policy from the federal government on how to deal with them,” a senior Karachi police officer told Geo-tv.

The officer was referring by its initials to Ahle Sunnat wal Jamaat, one of the groups with a significant presence in Balochistan that is believed to have received funding channelled through Saudi nationals of Baloch origin. The officer was responding to a question about law enforcement’s lack of response to ASWJ’s recent creation of a new fund-raising vehicle, the Al-Nujoom Welfare Foundation.

The Trump administration this week refused to pay Pakistan $300 million as a reimbursement for the cost of its fight against militant groups, some of which are believed to be supported by Pakistani intelligence. The US Defence Department said the funds were being withheld because Pakistan had failed to take “sufficient action” against the Haqqani Network, a Pakistan-based offshoot of the Afghan Taliban.

Instability in Iran as well as increased violence in Baluchistan would further complicate China’s One Belt, One Road initiative. China is already worried that the Gulf crisis could endanger its crucial energy imports from the region as well as Gulf investment in the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank that is slated to fund some One Belt, One Road projects.

Chinese nationals have repeatedly been targeted by militants in Balochistan, a crown jewel of the Chinese project that includes the People’s Republic more than $50 billion investment in what has been dubbed the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Prince Mohammed appeared earlier this year appeared to set the stage for an effort to destabilize Iran by declaring that the fight between the two Middle Eastern powers would be fought in the Islamic republic, not the kingdom.

Prince Mohammed did not specify what he had in mind but a Saudi think tank, the Arabian Gulf Centre for Iranian Studies (AGCIS) that is believed to have his backing, argued in a study in favour of Saudi support for a low-level Baloch insurgency in Iran. “Saudis could persuade Pakistan to soften its opposition to any potential Saudi support for the Iranian Baluch… The Arab-Baluch alliance is deeply rooted in the history of the Gulf region and their opposition to Persian domination,” the study concluded.

Saudi Arabia further signalled its support for Iranian dissidents with former intelligence chief and ambassador Prince Turki al-Faisal attending for the past two years rallies in Paris organized by the exiled People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran or Mujahedin-e-Khalq, a militant left-wing group that advocates the overthrow of Iran’s Islamic regime and traces its roots to resistance against the shah who was toppled in the 1979 revolution. “Your legitimate struggle against the (Iranian) regime will achieve its goal, sooner or later. I, too, want the fall of the regime,” Prince Turki told one of the rallies.

Pointing to what he sees as the writing on the wall, former German foreign minister and vice-chancellor Joschka Fischer warned that “the next chapter in the history of the Middle East will be determined by open, direct confrontation between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran for regional predominance. So far, this long-smouldering conflict has been pursued under cover and mostly by proxies… Any direct military confrontation with Iran would, of course, set the region ablaze, greatly surpassing all previous Middle East wars.,” Mr. Fischer said.

By James Bovard*

Barack Obama campaigned for the presidency in 2008 as a peace candidate. He signaled that he would fundamentally change America’s course after the reckless carnage unleashed by the George W. Bush administration. However, by the end of Obama’s presidency, the United States was bombing seven different foreign nations.

But Obama’s warring rarely evoked the protests or opposition that the Bush administration generated. Why did so many Bush-era anti-war activists abandon the cause after Obama took office?

One explanation is that the news media downplayed Obama’s killings abroad. Obama was nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize less than 12 days after taking office — not because of anything that he had achieved, but because of the sentiments he had expressed. Shortly after he accepted the Peace Prize, he announced that he would sharply increase the number of American troops in Afghanistan. Much of the media treated Obama’s surge as if it were simply a military campaign designed to ensure that the rights of Afghan women were respected. The fact that more than 2,000 American troops died in Afghanistan on Obama’s watch received far less attention in the press than did the casualties from Bush’s Iraq war.

In early 2011, popular uprisings in several Arab nations spurred a hope that democracy would soon flourish across North Africa and much of the Middle East. Violent protests in Libya soon threatened the long-term regime of dictator Muammar Qaddafi, who had become a U.S. ally and supporter in recent years. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and other advisors persuaded Obama to forcibly intervene in what appeared to be a civil war.

In March 2011, Obama told Americans that “the democratic values that we stand for would be overrun” if the United States did not join the French and British assault on the Libyan government. Obama declared that one goal of the U.S. attack was “the transition to a legitimate government that is responsive to the Libyan people.” Qaddafi, who was dealing with uprisings across the nation, sent Obama a personal message: “As you know too well, democracy and building of civil society cannot be achieved by means of missiles and aircraft, or by backing armed members of al-Qaeda in Benghazi.”

Even before the United States began bombing Libya, there was no sober reason to expect that toppling Qaddafi would result in a triumph of popular sovereignty. Some of the rebel groups had been slaughtering civilians; black Africans whom Qaddafi had brought into Libya as guest workers were especially targeted to be massacred. Some of Qaddafi’s most dangerous opponents were groups that the United States had officially labeled as terrorists.

Obama decided that bringing democracy to Libya was more important than obeying U.S. law. The War Powers Act, passed by Congress in 1973 in the waning days of the Vietnam War, requires presidents to terminate military attacks abroad after 60 days unless Congress specifically approves the intervention. Immediately after the bombing commenced, Secretary of State Clinton declared during a classified briefing for members of Congress that “the White House would forge ahead with military action in Libya even if Congress passed a resolution constraining the mission.” Echoing the Bush administration the Obama administration indicated that congressional restraints would be “an unconstitutional encroachment on executive power.”

According to the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, Obama “had the constitutional authority” to attack Libya “because he could reasonably determine that such use of force was in the national interest.” Apparently, as long as presidential advisors concluded that attacking foreigners is in the U.S. “national interest,” the president’s warring passes muster — at least according to his lawyers. Yale professors Bruce Ackerman and Oona Hathaway lamented that “history will say that the War Powers Act was condemned to a quiet death by a president who had solemnly pledged, on the campaign trail, to put an end to indiscriminate warmaking.”

The U.S. attack on Libya evoked almost no protests across the nation. After Qaddafi was killed, Secretary Clinton laughed during a television interview celebrating his demise: “We came, we saw, he died.” But U.S. missiles and bombs begat chaos, not freedom. Five years later, when asked what was the worst mistake of his presidency, Obama replied, “Probably failing to plan for the day after what I think was the right thing to do in intervening in Libya.”

Syria

In 2013, Obama decided to attack the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. The Obama team alleged that the Assad regime had carried out a chemical weapons attack on Syrian civilians.

A front-page Washington Post headline blared, “Proof Against Assad at Hand.” But that hand remained hidden. On a Sunday talk show, White House Chief of Staff Denis McDonough admitted that the administration lacked evidence “beyond a reasonable doubt” proving that the Syrian regime had carried out the gas attack. But McDonough asserted, “The common-sense test says [Assad] is responsible for this. He should be held to account.” Obama administration officials also insisted that attacking Syria would boost American “credibility.” But unless “credibility” is defined solely as assuring the world that the president of the United States can kill foreigners on a whim, that is a poor bet. This type of credibility is more appropriate for a drunken brawl in a bar than for international relations.

The administration never provided solid evidence to back up its claim. Even Obama ally Sen. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) characterized the evidence presented in a Capitol Hill classified briefing as “circumstantial.” Rep. Justin Amash (R-Mich.) commented, “The evidence is not as strong as the public statements that the president and the administration have been making. There are some things that are being embellished in the public statements. The [classified] briefings have actually made me more skeptical about the situation.”

Seeking to rally the nation behind the cause, Obama called on Congress to authorize bombing Syria. But the American people had little stomach for another adventure abroad. There were a few protests — including one outside the White House on the Saturday when Obama was expected to announce that he had commenced bombing. I was there that day, along with a smattering of conservative and libertarian opponents to another war. The protest was a bit anemic until a couple busloads of ANSWER Coalition activists arrived from Baltimore. They had great signs — “Bombing Syria Doesn’t Protect People — It Kills Them” —and they marched and chanted in unison better than most high-school bands. The U.S. Park Police were unhappy with the protest and rode their horses into the middle of the group. Federal officials came up and threatened to arrest anyone who did not clear away from the street behind the White House. A handful of arrests were made and the crowd simmered down.

But when Obama made his a radio speech to the nation that afternoon, the chanting from the protest could be heard in the background. Obama announced that he was postponing a decision on bombing.

However, in the summer of 2014, the ISIS terrorist group released videos of the beheading of hostages. That provided sufficient cover for Obama to commence bombing that group — and other targets in Syria. The media played its usual lapdog role. A Washington Post headline proclaimed, “Obama the reluctant warrior, cautiously selling a new fight.” So we’re supposed to think the president is a victim of cruel necessity, or what? A New York Times headline announced, “In Airstrikes, U.S. Targets Militant Cell Said to Plot an Attack Against the West.” “Said to” is the perfect term — perhaps sufficient to alert non-brain-dead readers that something may be missing (e.g., evidence). By mid 2016, the Obama administration had dropped almost 50,000 bombs on ISIS forces (or civilians wrongly suspected to be ISIS fighters) in Syria and Iraq. A September 2016 Daily Beast article noted, “In January, the Pentagon admitted to bombing civilians on at least 14 different occasions. In July, an off-target airstrike in northern Syria killed more than 60 people.”

Obama acted as if he was doing God’s work by again bombing the Middle East. But the supposed beneficiaries were not persuaded. On the eve of the 2016 U.S. November election, independent journalist Rania Khalek (who was visiting Syria) tweeted, “I’ve been asking Syrians who they want to win for president. The vast majority say Trump because they feel he’s less likely to bomb them.” Presidential rhetoric was not sufficient compensation for the lives and homes that would be destroyed by the increased onslaughts that Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton seemed to promise.

Anti-War or Anti-Republican?

Thousands of innocent foreigners were killed by U.S. bombings and drone attacks during the Obama administration. In his 2016 State of the Union address, Obama scoffed at “calls to carpet bomb civilians.” Perhaps he considered it far more prudent to blow up wedding parties instead (as happened during his reign in Yemen and Afghanistan). As long as White House or Pentagon spokesmen announced that the United States was using “precision bombing,” media controversy over innocent victims was blunted, if not completely avoided.

Why did Obama suffer far less backlash than George W. Bush? Salon columnist David Sirota summarized an academic study released in 2013: “Evaluating surveys of more than 5,300 anti-war protestors from 2007 to 2009, the researchers discovered that the many protestors who self-identified as Democrats ‘withdrew from anti-war protests when the Democratic Party achieved electoral success’ in the 2008 presidential election.”

Sirota noted that the researchers concluded that “during the Bush years, many Democrats were not necessarily motivated to participate in the anti-war movement because they oppose militarism and war — they were instead ‘motivated to participate by anti-Republican sentiments.’”

There have been plenty of stout critics of U.S. warring in recent years — including Antiwar.com, The Future of Freedom Foundation, Ron Paul, the Mises Institute, and some principled liberals and leftists such as CounterPunch and Glenn Greenwald and The Intercept. But overall, the media spotlight rarely shone on U.S. carnage abroad, as it did in earlier times. Perhaps the anti-war movement will revive if Donald Trump commences bombing new foreign nations. But it is clear that too many Americans have not yet learned the folly of “kill foreigners first, ask questions later.”

Originally published by the Future of Freedom Foundation. 

About the author:
*James Bovard is the author of ten books, including 2012’s Public Policy Hooligan, and 2006’s Attention Deficit Democracy. He has written for the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Playboy, Washington Post, and many other publications.

Source:
This article was published at the MISES Institute

By Kurt W. Tidd and Tyler W. Morton*

Latin America and the Caribbean is the region most closely connected to our own stability, security, and economic prosperity. This is important despite the fact other regions often figure more prominently in U.S. foreign policy and national security strategy. Given our shared values, culture, geography, heritage, and history, security challenges in Latin America and the Caribbean often become security challenges for the United States. Previously, U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) efforts were heavily devoted to one of these challenges: narcotics smuggling into the United States. While USSOUTHCOM—along with our interagency and regional partners—continues to be invested in the counterdrug mission, the threats in our region continue to evolve and so must we. Today’s challenges are much more likely to be transregional, multidomain, and multifunctional. This new era calls for increased cooperation across the U.S. Government and, more importantly for USSOUTHCOM, increased cooperation with U.S. allies and partners.

In the USSOUTHCOM area of focus, transregional and transnational threat networks (T3Ns) increasingly challenge the sovereignty of states across the region. Through the exploitation of the permissive environments they deliberately seek to create, these illicit networks carve out geographical areas of impunity in which they can operate without fear of law enforcement interference. Characterized by fragile rule of law, porous borders, and weak governance, these open zones are riddled with illicit pathways that T3Ns use to move anything and anyone across borders for great profit. Driven by the insatiable demand for their products, this lucrative business provides T3Ns with vast resources that they subsequently use to further erode the efficacy of law enforcement agencies. Through endemic corruption and, at times, the outright co-opting of governmental services and agencies, T3Ns have the ability to destabilize societies, exacerbating the lawlessness that often creates the conditions that prompt mass migration.1 This destabilizing effect represents a direct threat to the U.S. homeland and a national security risk. The USSOUTHCOM region also faces a threat from violent extremist organizations. While not a major area of extremist activity, the same permissive environment, created and taken advantage of by the T3Ns, allows these organizations to operate with relative impunity.

In addition to the threat posed by T3Ns and extremist organizations, Latin America and the Caribbean are extremely vulnerable to natural disasters and infectious disease outbreaks. Uneven prevention, management, and response capabilities in the region—coupled with underlying challenges such as poverty and weak governance—amplify the impact of disasters, extend human suffering, and exacerbate existing developmental challenges. Additionally, while overall the region is politically stable, the aforementioned gap between public expectations and governmental performance frequently manifests itself in social protest. Though generally peaceful, the potential exists for violent demonstrations; a downward turn in the most at-risk countries has the potential to compel a regional response and requests for U.S. engagement or support.

While threat networks and potential crises pose the nearest and most pressing danger, the United States also faces direct competition in the region from several external state actors (ESAs). Latin America and the Caribbean present strategic opportunities for Russia, China, and Iran to achieve their respective long-term objectives and advance their global interests, which are often incompatible with ours and those of our partners in the region. The influence of these external actors presents a transregional problem set that connects our region to the rest of the world. To counteract this evolved global challenge requires close synchronization of effort across the affected geographic combatant commands (GCCs). As such, USSOUTHCOM is diligently working with many of the other commands to ensure unity of effort. Additionally, the expanding presence—and influence—of ESAs in the region is concerning, particularly in the sphere of human rights and the promotion of regional peace and stability. Keep in mind, none of these ESAs have the Leahy Law,2 restrictions on security assistance, or any independent domestic media to scrutinize their external activities. Their arms sales are not tied to international protocols, and they are not subject to human rights vetting. Additionally, the loans they provide often do not come with requirements to follow anti-corruption standards or even clear repayment terms and conditions. These occasionally unscrupulous business practices and disregard for transparent rule of law facilitate corruption and pose challenges to the shared norms and values that have brought prosperity and security to millions of people across the hemisphere.

As outlined above, the threats to the region are complex and often go overlooked given the increasingly crowded national security agenda. To better confront them, USSOUTHCOM is currently undergoing a sea change in the way we think about, analyze, and address these national security concerns. Beginning in summer 2016, the command established a series of cross-functional teams to dissect the problems we face and forge new ways to confront and overcome the challenges. These teams were focused on three areas that comprise the bulk of our main efforts: countering T3Ns (C-T3Ns), rapid response, and building relationships. After extensive work, the teams produced a series of actions that will drive the tasks, initiatives, and strategic planning as we move forward.

Countering Transnational and Transregional Threat Networks

To keep pace with the challenges posed by T3Ns, we must do more than simply target the illicit commodities they move.3 Though we are not walking away from our statutorily mandated support to the counterdrug mission, to truly degrade the T3Ns requires a shift away from isolated efforts aimed at stopping the commodities they traffic and a refocus on dismantling the networks themselves. This shift in thinking has been the biggest change at USSOUTHCOM. By employing a networked approach that integrates the command’s capabilities with those of U.S. allies and partners across the region, we hope to stop the threats—whatever they may be—as far away from the U.S. homeland as possible. To that end, we are working ever more closely with our interagency and regional partners to affect the networks that control the pathways in the region. While we have always cooperated with teams from across the region, what has changed is how we are now working as a team to maximize effects.

Building a Joint, Interagency Team. To better enable efforts to disrupt, degrade, dismantle, and, ultimately, defeat the T3Ns, we have created multiple communities of interest (COIs) that bring together various U.S. Government stakeholders. The members of these COIs meet weekly to share information and intelligence; expand understanding and awareness about the networks and our activities to counter them; and guide our efforts to ensure maximum disruption of T3N activities. In 2016, information-sharing and support to tactical operations generated by our Central America COI (CENTAM COI), which is hosted by our Joint Task Force–Bravo (JTF-Bravo) and includes over 700 participants from various U.S. Government agencies, helped dismantle several T3N nodes and subnetworks. By sharing information in the CENTAM COI, interagency participants are better prepared to apply pressure at points that force the T3Ns to modify their operations and change their tactics; this shift exposes, or illuminates, the network and makes them vulnerable. The CENTAM COI continues to grow and recently expanded to include representatives from U.S. Northern Command. This collaboration between the two commands charged with defending the U.S. homeland has already yielded results and strengthened the seams along the commands’ boundaries.

Building on the CENTAM COI success, we have also established a counter-T3N cross-directorate team at the command’s headquarters in Doral, Florida. This team is a group of dedicated analysts and operators who work directly with our interagency partners to improve the fusion of intelligence analysis and operations. Through network mapping and enhanced collaboration, this team will lead the command’s C-T3N efforts. Though the initial focus of the team will be to stem the flow of special interest aliens (SIAs) and foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), we expect their roles to expand as the team’s capability matures.4 Additionally, we have partnered with the greater Intelligence Community to pursue innovative approaches to integrate unclassified open source, social media, and publically available information into our shared knowledge base. By doing so, we will better characterize the regional security environment and facilitate increased information and intelligence exchanges with regional and interagency partners.

To complement these efforts and fill a requirement identified in the National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel Act of 2016, we have greatly expanded our support to the Department of Homeland Security effort to counter the migration of SIAs.5 In 2016, in a combined effort with U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Special Operations Command, we dedicated analysts and resources to Homeland Security Investigation’s Operation Citadel—a multiyear, multiagency effort to dismantle human-smuggling networks and identify migrants who may present security threats. In fiscal year 2017, our increased planning support, intelligence capabilities, and airlift will significantly enhance Homeland Security Investigation’s ability to prevent persons of interest from transiting the region, reaching the U.S. border, and potentially gaining entry into the United States.

Further C-T3N efforts include broadening the detection and monitoring mission of the USSOUTHCOM-subordinate Joint Interagency Task Force–South (JIATF-S) in Key West, Florida. Often recognized as the model for interagency cooperation, JIATF-S was countering threat networks long before the term became vogue.6 While its core detection and monitoring mission will continue to support interagency law enforcement efforts to stem the ever-increasing flow of drugs, JIATF-S is also broadening its scope by targeting global money laundering, bulk cash smuggling, and other facilitator-based illicit activities that enable narcotics trafficking.

Teaming with Partner Nations. We have also worked diligently with our allies and partners to increase the entire region’s ability to counter threat networks. Though the Colombian government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) recently signed a peace agreement ending over 50 years of armed conflict, our cooperation with Colombia remains vital as powerful, illegally armed groups will undoubtedly seek to fill the power vacuum created by the FARC’s agreement to abandon the drug trade.7 With coca cultivation and production in the Andean region increasing almost 40 percent in 2016 alone, these networks could complicate Colombia’s post-FARC transitional period.8 To preempt this, USSOUTHCOM is leveraging our unique relationship with Colombia to synchronize the delivery of counter-T3N capability-building efforts with our continued training and equipping of key units across the Colombian armed forces and law enforcement.9 We believe these efforts will continue to help Colombia as it transitions into the post-FARC era.

Elsewhere, USSOUTHCOM joined other Defense Department and U.S. Government agencies to team with Brazil during the 2016 Rio Olympics. This successful partnership provided new opportunities to work with Brazil in the areas of C-T3Ns, counter–weapons of mass destruction, cyber, space, and information-sharing. In the Caribbean, we work bilaterally and multilaterally with partners such as the Caribbean Community’s Implementing Agency for Crime and Security and the Regional Intelligence Fusion Center to facilitate greater information-sharing and to close our capability gaps in addressing illicit flows of drugs, SIAs, and FTFs. We also support the Caribbean Community as it develops a regional counterterrorism strategy and work with key partners such as Trinidad and Tobago to illuminate and degrade extremist networks with global ties to the so-called Islamic State and other dangerous groups.10

Working with our allies and partners, USSOUTHCOM counternarcotic programs (including train and equip, infrastructure, and building partner-nation capacity and capability) play an important role in stabilizing the region from the effects of T3Ns. Central American partners are increasingly capable, playing a role in nearly 50 percent of JIATF-South’s maritime interdiction operations and conducting operations on their own, and with each other. USSOUTHCOM has also helped enhance land interdiction capabilities across the region by providing training, infrastructure, and communication equipment. As a result, there has been significant improvement across Central American security and military forces. Guatemala’s Interagency Task Forces combine the best of military and law enforcement authorities and capabilities; these organizations unite at the task forces to reduce the flow of drugs, people, and other illicit goods. Honduras has also made a concerted effort to dismantle threat networks, expedite suspected drug traffickers to the United States, and eliminate corruption.11 Panamanian efforts to counter a wide spectrum of threats showcase them as an increasingly capable partner that is positioned at a critical geographic chokepoint.12 In 2017, USSOUTHCOM will expand its support to Panama and Costa Rica to help dissuade T3Ns from moving into the southern portion of Central America’s isthmus.

Building Public-Private Collaboration. Finally, as T3Ns exploit socioeconomic vulnerabilities in the region, USSOUTHCOM is integrating the efforts and expertise of the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and civil society to mitigate the conditions that contribute to the social service vacuum. The command routinely conducts community support activities in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean where we work alongside our partners in civil society to expand the skills necessary to demonstrate state presence and reduce the malign influence of T3Ns.

Enabling Rapid Response. While countering threat networks receives the preponderance of our effort, USSOUTHCOM faces other challenges. Given the inevitability of natural disasters in the Caribbean and Latin America, we continually work with our allies and partners to improve the region’s collective preparedness and response capabilities. Within the USSOUTHCOM enterprise, we are focused on institutionalizing our own capabilities to provide agile and effective support to our interagency and regional partners. In the region, we are strengthening our linkages to the very network of militaries, civilian agencies, and experts with whom we will cooperate during a crisis.

Strengthening Interagency Partnerships. Cooperation starts with trust; it is the linchpin of USSOUTHCOM’s ability to rapidly respond and work seamlessly with our allies and partners. We build this trust during routine exercises and deepen it during crisis response operations. This was most apparent during our response to Hurricane Matthew in October 2016. By leveraging forward-deployed forces, Joint Task Force–Matthew (JTF-Matthew) provided a tailored rapid response that was critical during the early stages of relief operations. Utilizing our presence at Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras and the U.S. Naval Station–Guantánamo Bay, the command moved elements from JTF-Bravo and a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) to Haiti within 24 hours of notification from the lead Federal agency, in this case, the U.S. Agency for International Development. JTF-Bravo and the SPMAGTF team—which had previously been conducting security cooperation activities in Central America—provided unique U.S. military capabilities that significantly aided the delivery of humanitarian supplies and alleviated the suffering of tens of thousands of Haitians.

Additionally, the rapid deployment of elements from the U.S. Transportation Command’s Joint Enabling Capabilities Command was critical to the success of JTF-Matthew. U.S. forces deployed aboard the USS Mesa Verde and USS Iwo Jima provided robust relief from the sea as they moved hundreds of tons of supplies to the hardest hit areas. During the relief mission, we also coordinated with our U.S. Coast Guard partners to deter potential migration in the aftermath of the hurricane and supported the Department of State’s outreach to regional partners seeking to contribute to the response effort.

Working with Allies and Partner Nations. Exercises like Panamax, Integrated Advance, Tradewinds, and Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias test multinational responses to diverse scenarios such as the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, terrorist acts, and natural disasters. Multinational exercises are the most important way we train with our partner nations’ military forces, law enforcement agencies, and civil society aid organizations. These exercises improve our interoperability, institutionalize preparedness and response measures, and build confidence in the United States as a reliable partner. The trust built during these exercises helps reduce the scope and duration of a crisis and increases the likelihood our partners can respond to crises on their own if necessary.

Regionally, the command’s health and medical readiness engagements build partner-nation capacity and capability to prevent, detect, and respond to disease outbreaks. USSOUTHCOM does this through a series of in-country engagements. Taking the spotlight this year is Continuing Promise 2017 (CP-17), a USSOUTHCOM-sponsored humanitarian aid mission that will bring medical, dental, and veterinary assistance to Guatemala, Honduras, and Colombia. During CP-17, U.S. personnel work hand-in-hand with their host-nation counterparts, local government officials, health professionals, nongovernmental organizations, and private volunteer organizations to respond to the medical needs of the local populations. Additionally, at the early stages of the Zika outbreak, the U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit 6 based in Lima, Peru, established research sites in partnership with Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Peru to actively support partner-nation response efforts. This quick reaction was critical to slowing the spread of Zika in Central and South America.

Many of these building partner-nation capacity and capability efforts would not be possible without the dedication of our Total Force partners from the National Guard and Reserves. The National Guard’s State Partnership Program has been especially valuable to building trust and cooperation in the region as illustrated by the following examples. In 2016, the relationship between the Florida National Guard and Barbados strengthened the Barbadian government’s ability to respond to national disasters with a focus on critical infrastructure and interagency collaboration.13 Additionally, the Massachusetts National Guard’s partnership with Paraguay has allowed for the training of over 2,000 Paraguayan military personnel as peacekeepers and observers. Now, Paraguay supports United Nations missions in Africa, Haiti, Cyprus, and Colombia.14 This commitment further highlights the desire of many of the region’s nations to contribute globally to the common good.

Collaborating with Civil Society. In addition to collaborating with our interagency and regional partners, we seek to build a culture of crisis management and trust across our network of nongovernmental partners. During the lead-up to the Rio Olympics, we teamed with international cruise lines and law enforcement agencies to share information about potential threats and ensure security protocols were in place. We are beginning work with the College of William & Mary’s Violent International Political Conflict and Terrorism laboratory to help predict violence in partner nations, assess deterrence option effectiveness, and forecast tactical successes. We also regularly join chaplains in our partner-nation militaries to engage religious leaders in the region about their role in disaster recovery and potential opportunities to work together when crisis hits.

Led by U.S. Army South and U.S. Air Forces Southern, the Beyond the Horizon and New Horizons humanitarian and civic assistance exercises incorporated more than 2,000 U.S., partner-nation, and public/private participants from seven nations. This network treated nearly 30,000 patients, conducted 242 surgeries, and constructed schools and clinics in remote areas. Similarly, our training missions such as JTF-Bravo’s medical engagements and CP-17 bring together U.S. military personnel, partner-nation forces, and civilian volunteers to treat tens of thousands of the region’s citizens. We are also building basic infrastructure like schools, medical clinics, and emergency operations centers and warehouses for relief supplies. These activities provide training opportunities for our own personnel, while also improving the ability of our partners to provide essential services to their citizens and meet their humanitarian needs during a disaster or emergency response.

Building Relationships to Meet Global Challenges

Whether we are remaining vigilant against the activities of ESAs, fostering greater regional and multinational cooperation against shared challenges, or reinforcing the rules-based international order, security partnerships are the foundation of everything we do. These relationships—based on shared values, mutual respect, and principled U.S. and regional leadership—ensure our Hemisphere remains a beacon of peace and prosperity.

Solidifying Interagency Partnerships. Over the past year, we have expanded our collaboration with the interagency community, our allies and partners, and fellow GCCs to address the global challenges posed by ESAs. We work with the Intelligence Community to build a better shared understanding of ESA intentions and how their activities in Latin America and the Caribbean advance their respective global strategies. We routinely share information with U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Special Operations Command on issues of mutual interest and concern. In 2017, USSOUTHCOM and USPACOM will cohost a meeting with our allies and partners in Southeast Asia and South America to share information on Asia-Pacific security and T3Ns.

Increasing Partner Capacity and Capability. While our capacity- and capability-building efforts help partner nations address immediate threats, over time we seek to encourage a network of willing partners who contribute to international security and advance shared principles like good governance and human rights. Chile is a regular participant in USPACOM’s annual Rim of the Pacific exercise and will assume a greater exercise leadership role in the future. Colombia is leading an effort to integrate a block of Pacific alliance nations into the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and is expanding defense cooperation with South Korea, Japan, and potentially Vietnam. Brazil is deepening its maritime security cooperation with West Africa and focusing on countering illicit trade between the South American and African continents. These nations join many other regional leaders in supporting United Nations peacekeeping operations around the world, including the mission in Haiti.

Military Imperatives. The institutionalization of jointness, respect for human rights, development of professional noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps, and integration of gender perspectives are interconnected and interdependent characteristics of capable, modern defense forces.15 These characteristics are military imperatives for national defense forces that seek to maintain legitimacy and gain the trust of those they exist to serve. Militaries that fail to advance in these areas risk finding themselves at a distinct competitive disadvantage in the modern security arena.

Integrating Gender Perspectives. At USSOUTHCOM, we recognize that, as an inter-American defense community, we can attain a competitive, and even asymmetric, advantage by unlocking the full potential of our security and defense workforce. To be the most effective team we can be, we simply cannot afford to cut ourselves off from 50 percent of our population, 50 percent of our talent, and 50 percent of our capabilities. Gender integration is much more than simply numbers, however. The quest for gender integration is about finding the right teammates; those people—both men and women—with the irresistible drive to contribute to mission success, who have the right team ethos, and who possess a diverse way of looking at problems. Effective gender integration is really part of a larger question: how do we attract, develop, and retain the best people, with the right skill sets, to meet the ever-accelerating demands of military operations in the 21st century? Gender integration needs to evolve from beyond a simple argument of whether women can meet standards to a full acceptance that female military professionals want to be judged on the basis of their grit, their determination, and their tenacity. Women want the opportunity to compete, just like their male counterparts. At USSOUTHCOM, we are committed to instilling this way of thinking throughout our partner-nation military forces and law enforcement organizations. To ensure maximum integration of gender perspectives, we have included several objectives in our strategic planning documents and country-specific strategies that commit our staff to assisting our partners in incorporating fully qualified women into their defense sectors, countering trafficking in persons, and protecting vulnerable populations during military operations. USSOUTHCOM has also hired a full-time Gender Advisor, a U.S. Navy master chief petty officer with combat experience in Iraq, to work with and advise our partners. These initiatives have already yielded results: from exchanging best practices with Paraguay regarding women in peacekeeping operations to hosting a visit by Argentinean leaders to discuss ways to integrate women into operational military units, the region’s militaries are steadily capitalizing on diversity and moving forward as one integrated team.

Institutionalizing and Achieving Enhanced Jointness. Operating jointly is fundamental to our ability to confront challenges in today’s complex world. Conflict now happens in a transregional, multidomain, multifunctional environment that is evolving daily. For militaries to keep pace, they must incorporate the unique capabilities that each service brings to the fight. The USSOUTHCOM approach to jointness includes learning about and leveraging complementary service-specific capabilities and subsequently exchanging lessons learned with our various partners across the region. We truly embrace the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) principles in our approach as we integrate the capabilities of allies and partners from across the region.16 This was evidenced in our response to Hurricane Matthew as forces from the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, and Jamaica all contributed aid. Their contributions were critical to success in Haiti and were a direct reflection of the jointness, or JIIM, mindset.

Human Rights. One of USSOUTHCOM’s highest priorities is the promotion of respect for human rights, a mission it has integrated into its activities and engagements since the 1990s. The Latin American region has made great strides in democracy and human rights in recent decades, and today our hemisphere is interconnected by shared democratic principles. Respect for human rights is a critical military imperative in order for defense and security operations to be successful. Without it, we lose our legitimacy, the trust and confidence of the people we aim to protect, and the effectiveness of the security missions entrusted to us. To date, USSOUTHCOM remains the only combatant command with a dedicated Human Rights Office, which has both an internal and external focus. This means that we ensure our own personnel are properly trained and educated on this military imperative while supporting our partners’ efforts to build strong human rights programs within the armed forces. The USSOUTHCOM-sponsored Human Rights Initiative (HRI) is a fundamental tool that drives this imperative. HRI brings together representatives of military, security forces, civilian government, and civil society to develop a model human rights program for military forces focused in four areas: doctrine, education and training, internal control systems, and cooperation with civilian authorities. Currently, USSOUTHCOM supports the efforts of 11 nations in the USSOUTHCOM area of operations and 1 regional organization that have formally committed to implementing HRI within their militaries. HRI also creates a network of partner nation militaries formally committed to respecting human rights.

Development of Professional NCO Corps. Long referred to as the “backbone of the Army,” the NCO remains exactly that and much more.17 Today’s NCOs play critical roles in the institutional advancement and operational effectiveness of our Armed Forces. Understanding this, USSOUTHCOM has partnered with regional defense institutions to improve NCO development and education across the Hemisphere. Our Noncommissioned Officer Development Partnership Program (NCODP) assists our partner nations as they develop their NCO corps and professionalize their militaries. The NCODP integrates unique capabilities and perspectives from across the U.S. joint force and delivers those to partner nations through NCO exchanges, exercises, and hands-on training. NCOs from the U.S. Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and from across the National Guard work directly with NCOs from the partner nations to train, execute, and build the capability of their NCO corps. This investment in partner-nation enlisted leadership yields improved readiness and field forces capable of exporting security in support of regional and global security operations. To date, the NCODP has interacted with 16 hemispheric partners and has been involved in more than 50 events. Highlighting the impact of the program, during the last 24 months, USSOUTHCOM NCOs have been directly involved in the creation and/or support of an NCO Corps and Senior NCO Course in the Dominican Republic; the first designated Sergeant Major of the Army for Brazil and Chile; and the first Joint Senior Enlisted meetings in Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, El Salvador, Honduras, Argentina, and the Dominican Republic.

These four imperatives are hallmarks of modern professional militaries. While each has a separate meaning, we must remember that they are interdependent and interconnected—without any one of the four, a military’s competence is incomplete. All four must function simultaneously as each supports, facilitates, and ensures the success of the other three. As we train, exercise, and conduct operations with our partners, USSOUTHCOM seeks to inculcate the imperatives into the culture of each partner military. Sometimes quite challenging, we believe embracing the imperatives is critical for each nation’s legitimacy and ultimate success.

Conclusion

From interconnected, ruthless threat networks to the malign influence of ESAs, the national security threats we face in the Western Hemisphere are vast. Add the inevitability of natural disasters across the region and the result is a complex, diverse mixture of challenges that requires USSOUTHCOM, our allies, and our partners to be ready to react at a moment’s notice. With our nation’s priorities oriented to more prominent global challenges, maximizing the limited resources we have and working hand-in-hand with our allies and partners are absolutely essential to our success. We do this through a networked approach that focuses on optimizing what each contributor can supply to the overall task. This was most recently apparent in the response to Hurricane Matthew, where many of our interagency, allied, and partner nations contributed everything from food and building supplies to medical care. The result was a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational solution that provided care and services across the affected parts of Haiti. Moving forward, we expect the response to Hurricane Matthew to become the norm, regardless of the nature of the challenge. Whether we are confronting the threat posed by T3Ns or reacting to another natural disaster, our first response will always be to rally a coalition of contributing partners.

Fortunately, USSOUTHCOM has created a legacy of trust. Our way forward is to use that trust to enhance the relationships we have and to help us build new ones. Together we will move past simple synchronization and coordination to a truly integrated, collaborative effort. We have been charged with defending our nation’s southern approaches; only by working together will we be able to unite our efforts to produce a faster, flatter, and more agile network of diplomatic, law enforcement, Intelligence Community, and military teammates. Here at USSOUTHCOM, we are doing just that.

*About the authors:
Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, USN, is the Commander of U.S. Southern Command. Lieutenant Colonel Tyler W. Morton, USAF, Ph.D., is the U.S. Air Force Special Assistant to the Combatant Commander. Many of the themes in this article were first posited in Admiral Tidd’s 2017 Posture Statement before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee.

Source:
This article was published in the Joint Force Quarterly 86, which is published by the National Defense University.

Notes:
1 Kenneth Rapoza, “Immigrants Fleeing Increasingly Violent Latin America, Study Suggests,” Forbes Magazine, January 28, 2016, available at <www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2016/01/28/immigrants-fleeing-increasingly-violent-latin-america-study-suggests/#1194a5d64ba7>.

2 The Leahy Law is a U.S. human rights law that prohibits the Department of State and Department of Defense from providing military assistance to foreign military units that violate human rights. For further information on the Leahy Law, see the “Leahy Fact Sheet,” available at <www.humanrights.gov/dyn/03/leahy-fact-sheet/>.

3 Joint Publication 3-25, Countering Threat Networks (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, December 21, 2016), GL-4, defines countering threat networks as “the aggregation of activities across the Department of Defense and United States Government departments and agencies that identifies and neutralizes, degrades, disrupts, or defeats designated threat networks.”

4 The Department of Homeland Security defines special interest aliens (SIAs) as “aliens from specially designated Countries that have shown a tendency to promote, produce, or protect terrorist organizations or their members.” See Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, “Supervision of Aliens Commensurate with Risk,” December 23, 2011, 5, available at <www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-81_Dec11.pdf>. The United Nations (UN) defines foreign terrorist fighters as “terrorist fighters, namely individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict.” See UN Security Council Resolution 2178, September 24, 2014, available at <www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2015/SCR%202178_2014_EN.pdf>.

5 The National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel Act of 2016 directs U.S. Government agencies to identify and address security vulnerabilities in the U.S. defense against terrorist travel. See House Resolution 4408, National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel Act of 2016, February 24, 2016, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., available at <www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr4408/BILLS-114hr4408rfs.pdf>.

6 For background information on JIATF-South’s long history of excellence, see Evan Munsing and Christopher J. Lamb, Joint Interagency Task Force–South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success, INSS Strategic Perspectives 5 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, June 2011).

7 Rogerio Jelmayer, Kejal Vyas, and Samantha Pearson, “Brazilian Gang Enlists FARC Rebels for Drug Trade,” Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2017, available at <www.wsj.com/articles/brazilian-gang-enlists-farc-rebels-for-drug-trade-1485858609>.

8 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “Colombia: Monitoreo de Territorios Afectados por Cultivos Ilícitos 2015,” July 2016, 11.

9 For additional information on the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation, see “Joint Press Release on the United States–Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation,” media note, Washington, DC, April 15, 2012, available at <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/04/187928.htm>.

10 Former U.S. Ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago John Estrada estimates that 100 to 130 Trinidadians have traveled to Syria to join the so-called Islamic State; that number represents the highest number per capita of all Western Hemisphere nations. Frances Robles, “Trying to Stanch Trinidad’s Flow of Young Recruits to ISIS,” New York Times, February 21, 2017.

11 As testament to Honduras’s commitment to C-T3Ns, they will reportedly extradite Atlantic Cartel head Wilter Blanco to the United States to face trial on drug trafficking and racketeering charges. See Mike LaSusa, “Alleged Honduras Kingpin Wanted by U.S. Captured in Costa Rica,” Insight Crime, November 23, 2016, available at <www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/alleged-honduras-kingpin-wanted-by-us-captured-in-costa-rica>.

12 As law enforcement has increasingly clamped down on traditional south-north migration routes, Panama’s Darién Gap has become a pathway of choice for the majority of the SIAs traveling north from South America. See Sara Schaefer Muñoz, “Global Migrants Brave Panama’s Vipers, Bats, Bandits to Reach U.S.,” Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2015.

13 For further information, see The State Partnership Program: FY 2015 Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 26, 2016), available at <www.nationalguard.mil/Portals/31/Documents/J-5/InternationalAffairs/StatePartnershipProgram/FY15%20SPP%20Annual%20Report.pdf>.

14 Marta Escurra, “The United States Ratifies Military Cooperation with Paraguay,” Diálogo Digital Military Magazine, July 19, 2016, available at <https://dialogo-americas.com/en/articles/united-states-ratifies-military-cooperation-paraguay>.

15 As part of enhanced jointness, we encourage our partners to embrace joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) mindsets.

16 For further information on the JIIM principles, see Matthew Wade Markel et al., Developing U.S. Army Officers’ Capabilities for Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Environments, RAND Research Brief (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, December 6, 2011), available at <www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/2011/RAND_RB9631.pdf>.

17 The English poet Rudyard Kipling made the first reference to the noncommissioned officer (NCO) being the backbone of the army in his famous poem “The ’eathen,” which was his ode to British NCOs, available at <www.poetryloverspage.com/poets/kipling/eathen.html>.

By Ana Maria Touma

Moldova’s parliament has passed a declaration asking Russian troops to leave Transnistria, a day before Russian Deputy PM Dmitry Rogozin’s planned visit to the breakaway region.

Moldova’s parliament adopted a declaration on Friday, asking Russia to withdraw its troops from the breakaway region of Transnistria where they have been deployed for 25 years.

The move came a day after the Moldovan Foreign Ministry warned Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister, Dmitry Rogozin, that the country would not allow him to land by military plane in Chisinau for a visit to mark the 25th anniversary of the Russian peacekeeping mission in Transnistria.

A majority of 61 MPs out of 65 MPs present at the session backed the motion after opposition Socialist Party deputies left the chamber in protest against the decision to include the document on the agenda without enough time for the MPs to evaluate its impact.

“This is a serious violation of common sense. At least allow us to look at it properly,” Socialist MP Vlad Batrancea said in parliament. “We believe this is a geopolitical provocation,” he added, before he left the hall with his fellow party members.

Moldova’s pro-Russian President, Igor Dodon, condemned the document in a message on his Facebook account, accusing the pro-EU dominated parliament of trying to “worsen relations with the Russian Federation and undermine all the breakthroughs in Moldovan exports to the Russian Federation, regional cooperation, education and humanitarian programs.”

He also claimed that such a decision could only come from “outside Moldova”, presumably referring to Romania.

Romania’s Prime Minister, Mihai Tudose, and several Romanian ministers were in Chisinau on Friday for a joint government meeting with the Moldovan executive.

Dodon confirmed that Rogozin was due to arrive in Chisinau on Saturday and argued that adopting the declaration a day ahead of his visit would only fuel regional tensions.

“I want to restate my position: I support a comprehensive dialogue with the Transnistrian representatives to solve all problems of, most of all for the ordinary people on both sides of the Dniester [river boundary],” he added.

Parliament Speaker Candu confirmed that Rogozin was likely to land in Chisinau, despite the Foreign Ministry’s warning. “Yes, I understood he is coming, despite not being welcome,” Candu said.

Russia has stationed about 2,000 troops in Transnistria since the 1992 truce that ended a war between pro-Russian separatists and the Moldovan military.

Since 2014, after conflict erupted in Ukraine, Moldova has banned Russian military from crossing its territory and the Russian Airforce from landing on the airport in Chisinau.

In 2008, NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly also adopted a resolution urging Russia to “withdraw its illegal military presence from the Transnistrian region of Moldova in the nearest future”.

The Kremlin took no notice but in 2016, Russia announced it would withdraw its troops once the weapons depots of the 14th Army were liquidated.

(EurActiv) — The European Central Bank left its ultra easy monetary policy stance unchanged as expected on Thursday (20 July), keeping rates at record lows and even leaving the door open to more asset buys if the outlook worsens.

After ECB chief Mario Draghi raised the prospect of policy tightening last month, he signalled that any policy tweaks would come only gradually, setting the scene for a possible discussion in September about a long-awaited tapering of its asset buys.

“We need to be persistent and patient because we aren’t there yet, and prudent,” Draghi told his regular news conference after a meeting of ECB policy-makers in Frankfurt.

He stressed that the bank’s governing council were unanimous both on the decision to keep its guidance unchanged and to avoid setting a precise date for a discussion of future policy, noting only that it would occur in the autumn.

With the euro zone economy now growing for the 17th straight quarter, its best run since before the 2007-08 global financial crisis, that at least suggested the ECB is starting to contemplate easing off the accelerator, preserving some firepower after printing nearly 2 trillion euros to jump start growth.

The prospect of reduced monetary stimulus has kept financial markets edgy, with investors sifting through clues to gauge how big central banks around the globe will unwind unconventional policy that have kept borrowing costs at rock bottom.

The euro and government bond yields across the bloc initially slipped after the statement. But as Draghi spoke, the euro edged back above $1.15 and euro zone bond yields gained, ostensibly on his confirmation of expectations that the taper would be discussed in autumn.

The ECB earlier kept its deposit rate deep in negative territory and maintained monthly bond purchases at €60 billion, in line with the expectation of most analysts in a Reuters poll.

“If the outlook becomes less favourable, or if financial conditions become inconsistent with further progress towards a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation, the Governing Council stands ready to increase the programme in terms of size and/or duration,” it said.

September?

Draghi sent bond yields and the euro sharply higher last month when he argued that improved growth on its own would provide accommodation so the ECB would tighten its own policy to keep the overall level of accommodation broadly unchanged.

The euro firmed more than 3% and German 10-year yields doubled since Draghi’s policy hint. Indeed, the euro’s 11%t rise this year will weigh on inflation, compounding the impact of a more than 10% drop in crude oil prices.

“As core inflation remains subdued, the ECB will likely prefer to err on the side of caution, that is moving more slowly rather than faster than many observers project,” Holger Schmieding at Berenberg noted.

Still, the ECB is unable to kick the can down the road indefinitely as its asset buys are set to run until the end of the year and policymakers argue that a decision on an extension or a gradual wind down must be taken in September or October.

Policymakers told Reuters earlier that they would not want to put an end date on the buys or a schedule on tapering, maintaining flexibility and avoiding a perception that it was on a preset course.

The biggest headache for the ECB is the apparent disconnect between inflation and growth.

Having bought trillions of euros worth of government and corporate debt for years, the ECB has rekindled growth and the euro zone is creating jobs faster than expected.

But wage growth remains anaemic, keeping a lid on inflation, which is likely to undershoot the ECB’s target of almost 2% at least through 2019. This suggests that easy monetary policy will have to continue for years to come.

On Friday, Sean Spicer, President Trump’s spin master, a.k.a. the White House press secretary, resigned after telling President Trump that he vehemently disagreed with his appointment of Anthony Scaramucci, a New York financier, as his new communications director. After offering Scaramucci the job on Friday morning, Trump asked Spicer to stay on as press secretary, reporting to Scaramucci. But Spicer rejected the offer.

Scaramucci is a Long Island-bred former hedge fund manager who is currently the senior vice president and chief strategy officer at the Export-Import Bank.

Spicer had an almost impossible, if not, very difficult, task to answering questions from the press on the president’s erratic or irresponsible conducts, statements and positions that changed more frequently than the sand dunes of the Sahara. He had very little clue on his boss’s latest position on anything – either local or international – except that he was expected to do the devil’s job of ‘damage control’ for the POTUS.

It is not difficult to understand why Spicer became such a butt of the joke amongst late night TV talk show hosts. His role at the White House has so far been brilliantly played by actress Melissa McCarthy in the Saturday Night Live. With his departure, we shall surely miss McCarthy.

Spicer’s top deputy, Sarah Huckabee Sanders (the daughter of Christian fundamentalist, ex-governor Huckabee), will serve as the press secretary instead.

Twitter is having a field day with Scaramucci’s old tweets, which he is trying to delete fast before they catch the eyes or draw the ire of his new boss. “Full transparency: I’m deleting old tweets,” Scaramucci wrote on Saturday, adding that his “past views” have “evolved.”

Those “past views” include endorsements of gun control, (ex-president) Barack Obama and even Hillary Clinton, who he called “incredibly competent.” In the same 2012 tweet, he expressed hope that she would run for president in 2016. “I like Hillary,” he said in one tweet. And in another: A “Hillary run makes everyone better.”

Other tweets indicated a clear lack of support for then-candidate Trump, whom he called an “odd guy.” During a 2015 appearance on Fox News, he called Trump a “hack politician” and said his rhetoric is “Anti-American and very, very divisive.”

Now that Scaramucci has been named the new Goebbels for the White House, surely, his mental ‘evolution’ will be needed to keep his job under a president who cares only about himself and his family, and likes to be surrounded by sycophants and not honest advisers.

It is worth noting here Trump’s 50-minute interview with The New York Times, published Wednesday, when he said that he would not have chosen Jeff Sessions to be his attorney general (AG) had he known Sessions would recuse himself over matters related to the 2016 presidential campaign. In his interview, Trump had harsh words for the Justice Department investigation into potential coordination between his associates and Russia to influence the 2016 election, suggesting the probe was unfair due to conflicts of interest. [Note: Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein had selected former FBI Director Robert Mueller to take over the investigation as special counsel after Trump fired Comey.]

Trump suggested it would be wrong for Mueller to investigate his family’s finances. The Times reported that when asked if that would be a red line, Trump responded in the affirmative, but would not say what action, if any, he would take.

According to the legal experts in the CNN, Trump’s remarks represent an extraordinary rebuke from the President toward the nation’s top law enforcement official who happens to be one of his earliest political allies. The relationship has cooled down in recent months. But Sessions and his deputy said that they intend to remain in their posts and are not stepping down voluntarily.

Sessions has not been truthful during his AG confirmation hearing. Sessions met Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak at least two times in 2016: once at the Republican National Convention in July, and once at his Senate office in September.  A third meeting, during a reception the Mayflower hotel in Washington, has also been reported, but Sessions has denied having private meetings at that reception. Sessions did not disclose any of those meetings on his security clearance forms, and during his confirmation hearing denied any “communications with the Russians.” The meetings were only publicly disclosed following a CNN report in May.

There is little doubt that the Trump administration is in a mess. It tried to write a premature obituary for the Obamacare, but that attempt miserably failed. The Republican Senate majority leader failed to put the death nail on the Obamacare.

On Saturday, the Congressional leaders reached an agreement on sweeping sanctions legislation to punish Russia for its election meddling and aggression toward its neighbors. This defies the White House’s argument that President Trump needs flexibility to adjust the sanctions to fit his diplomatic initiatives with Moscow.

According to the NY Times, the new legislation would sharply limit the president’s ability to suspend or terminate the sanctions — a remarkable handcuffing by a Republican-led Congress six months into President Trump’s tenure. It is also the latest Russia-tinged turn for a presidency consumed by investigations into the Trump campaign’s interactions with Russian officials, including conversations between Trump advisers and Russian officials about prospective sanctions relief.

Mr. Trump may be forced to either veto the bill, which would fuel accusations that he is doing the bidding of President Putin of Russia, or sign legislation imposing sanctions his administration has opposed.

On Saturday in a series of early morning messages on Twitter, President Trump asserted that he has the “complete power to pardon” relatives, aides and possibly even himself in response to investigations into Russia’s meddling in last year’s election although he had no need to use the pardon power at this point.

It is true that the POTUS has the authority to pardon others for federal crimes, but legal scholars debate whether a president can pardon himself. If that happens, it would be the first of its kind, and that too, only in Trump’s America!

What a messy six months’ record of ‘making America great again’!

Public choice analysis shows, among many other things, that organized political interests will tend to dominate the political process at the expense of the unorganized members of society.

This is not a claim that “the rich” will necessarily dominate “the poor” in the political process, although the rich obviously have an advantage in influencing politics, other things being equal.

“The rich” and “the poor” are not standard categories in public choice analysis. In empirical public choice studies, one finds, for example, that groups such as the National Education Association exert disproportionate influence on legislation and regulation related to the public schools. Are school teachers members of “the rich”? Hardly. Likewise, labor unions such as the Service Employees International Union pack substantial political punch. Do the members of this union belong to “the rich”? Hardly.

By Paxton Duff*

The FSLN: Hope

In 1979, the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) overthrew dictator Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, replacing the regime with the left-wing revolutionary party, commonly known as the Sandinistas. This event cast Nicaragua into rarified air: due in part to pressure from the United States, alternatives to democratic systems in twentieth-century Latin America were normally right-leaning (i.e. fascist) authoritarian regimes. Nicaragua, as a socialist regime, was “one of the very few exceptions” to the dominance of the political Right.¹ This revolution spawned hope for the implementation of a progressive social agenda, including universal health care. Mired in a decade of civil war against the Contras, the FSLN domestic agenda gradually declined until the party was unseated in 1990; however, one of its leaders, Daniel Ortega, returned as president in 2006. To this day, the Nicaraguan health care system, a beacon of hope for the future of Nicaragua in 1979, has never achieved the expected level of success, especially in light of the socialist healthcare success of Latin America’s revolutionary predecessor, Cuba. Nicaragua’s healthcare system has struggled immensely due to internal dissension, misaligned government incentives, and a failure to emulate the pattern of success demonstrated by other socialist countries, such as Cuba.

Internal Dissension

Contributing to Nicaragua’s unstable political climate for almost forty years, the United States immensely impeded the country’s development — and opportunity for healthcare success — through its Cold War actions. The United States’ fear of a socialist domino effect led to a preference for right-wing authoritarian dictators — hence its thinly-veiled funding and support for the Contras in the Nicaraguan Civil War of the 1980s. While the socialist regime of Cuba successfully prevented U.S.-led military opposition, the FSLN could not stop the United States’ large financial support of the Contra movement; in 1986 alone, the U.S. provided the Contras with $100 million in aid.² The FSLN’s inability to thwart U.S. intervention debilitated the regime’s ability to focus on internal improvement during the decisive nascent years following the Revolution. The possibility of universal healthcare, a system ideally emulating the state-led model in Cuba, largely dissipated in 1990; the economy, in shambles, contributed to the shift toward the center and away from the FSLN— a party that has been irrevocably divided since 1994. The modern-day version of the FSLN returned to power under President Ortega, who was democratically elected in 2006. Ortega promised to implement a progressive social-development model (poder ciudadano) that was the antithesis of the neoliberal globalization model that the country followed for sixteen years.⁴

The extreme political and economic volatility during and after the Nicaraguan Civil War prevented the implementation of necessary infrastructure and proper resource allocation.⁵ This instability plunged Nicaraguan citizens into poverty that has been largely inescapable to this day. Following the FSLN’s loss of power in 1990, an economic and humanitarian crisis befell Nicaragua. An estimated 29 percent of the population was undernourished for the remainder of the decade; from 2000–2002, Nicaragua had a poverty rate of 69 percent, 23 percent above the Latin-American average.⁶ This widespread poverty and malnourishment arose due to the failure of multiple Nicaraguan regimes to install basic measures to protect the citizens most in need. Even today, about 30% of health facilities nationwide do not have access to electricity, and 45% lack necessary water access — equally disturbing are the more than 60% of facilities that have no sterilization systems.⁷ The alternating socialist and neoliberal regimes also caused Nicaraguan leadership to waver between public and privately funded healthcare pathways. Presently, only 54% of Nicaragua’s healthcare is publicly funded, compared to an average public funding of over 90% in countries that have implemented socialist systems.⁸ Since the 1979 revolution, Nicaraguan social spending has been inefficient and poorly targeted; on the rare occasions that the health industry is prioritized, capital has been allocated to expensive, curative medicine that, according to scholar Jennifer Pribble, does “less for poverty levels than investment in basic education and primary health care.”⁹ Simply put, the Nicaraguan health care system failed to evolve after the 1979 revolution due to the government’s failure to address the root of most medical issues, such as the establishment of a diverse, decentralized system.

Modern Health Failures

The Nicaraguan Constitution spells out the desired state-led healthcare system: “Every Nicaraguan has an equal right to health. The State shall establish the basic conditions for its promotion, protection, recuperation and rehabilitation” (sec. 3 art. 59).¹⁰ With Ortega’s return to the presidency in 2007 and his socialist agenda, Nicaragua finally had the chance to enact these Constitutionally promised health policies. Despite this opportunity, the system remains rampant with glaring structural failures. Data highlighting inequality in health care accessibility are quite stunning. At the time of Ortega’s return, Nicaragua had 32 hospitals, yet only three existed in the country’s rural Caribbean region, which covers 55 percent of the national territory.¹¹ In 2015, 30 percent of Nicaraguans lived below the poverty line — a figure that is especially dangerous for rural residents of the east coast.¹² In this impoverished climate, twenty percent of Nicaraguan children suffer from chronic malnutrition, a condition that has lasting developmental effects.¹³ Eighty percent of the economically-active population, comprising nearly two million people in 2006, have no health insurance at all.¹⁴ In a country where the government leads half of all healthcare and only 10% of the GDP is allocated to address the growing health concerns, universal healthcare is far from a reality.¹⁵

Maternal and infant mortality is a pressing issue that continues to this day, a situation that is worsened by confounding legal decisions. The administration decided, in 2006, to outlaw abortion without exception, including cases where the fetus poses a danger to the mother — or even in situations involving rape.¹⁶ This ban on abortion, according to Human Rights Watch, led to the death of at least 80 mothers during childbirth within the first year of the law’s implementation.¹⁷ Additionally, the numerous childbirths that occur without the observation of medical professionals in Nicaragua not only contribute to the struggles of maternal and infant health, but run counter to the eradication of unsupervised births that is a staple of successful healthcare systems. In a country where maternal health issues account for four times more hospital admissions (29%) than the second leading cause (pneumonia), the enacted policies continue to foster perverse results.¹⁸ Abortion restrictions and inequality of medical access exemplify the larger failure to implement preventative and educative solutions into the Nicaraguan system.

The prevalence of HIV in Nicaragua and the ensuing cultural response epitomize Nicaragua’s unsuccessful, inverted approach to major healthcare issues. In the 1990s, the rate of HIV skyrocketed, and the epidemic never ceased; from 2009 to 2010, an 11 percent increase in HIV diagnoses highlighted the failure to address a disease of grave national concern.¹⁹ In a 2011 study by Henry Espinoza et al., women of reproductive age in Nicaragua reported a condom usage rate between 4–12%.²⁰ The study cites “gender norms tolerating male sexual irresponsibility,” an inhibition “of women from actively speaking to their male partners about safe sex,” “discrimination against homosexuals and people living with HIV,” and widespread ignorance about condom use as challenges to controlling the disease.²¹ Nicaragua’s Ministry of Health (MINSA) handles the epidemic with highly centralized treatment, almost entirely in Managua. Addressing the root causes of HIV — investing in basic, decentralized health facilities and focusing on preventative education instead of costly treatments — is the only clear path forward, yet it is a path that has been frustratingly ignored by both MINSA and the government as a whole.

The lack of preventative approaches in Nicaragua is exacerbated by blatant, misaligned government incentives that block potential progress. Although the Nicaraguan government has attempted to implement a state-centric and vertically-integrated system, issues abound throughout MINSA, the chief health provider and regulatory body of Nicaragua.²² While MINSA has established a vertically-integrated system with three levels — a central system, a local comprehensive healthcare system (SILIAS), and a municipal system— the lack of adequate financing has weakened an already-underserved population; this dearth of finance has also worsened both cyclical poverty and the failures of preventative medication and community-health education.²³ In addition to a scarcity of hospitals (one per 213,000 people) and doctors (4.5 per 10,000 people), MINSA propagates the distributional issues that affect rural areas by “not providing financial incentives for staff to work in remote and difficult-to-access areas, such as the Caribbean Region.”²⁴ Adding insult to injury, Nicaraguan health workers are the lowest paid of any Central American country.²⁵ Thus, MINSA provides little incentive to become a doctor, and even less incentive to help the areas most in need, a pattern that will impede progress until fundamental changes are made.

Conclusion

For Nicaraguans seeking a better healthcare future, signs of hope exist. Although it was never able to stabilize and implement a successful state-led health care system due to its internal dissension and intervention from the U.S. against the FSLN, Nicaragua’s comparatively stable (to previous decades) and autonomous political situation provide the opportunity to overcome the repeated mistakes and ill-advised policies of the past. In addition to improving infrastructure, preventative care, and the education of both youth and adults in topics such as sexual health, the government is already taking concrete, cost-reducing steps. A system known as community-case management (CCM), implemented after Ortega’s return, provides access to curative services to poor children with pneumonia, diarrhea, or dysentery by “five to six-fold” over facility-based services.²⁶ The CCM model also addresses issues such as caregiver knowledge, community mobilization, and social relations that strengthen the health system and improve pediatric care.²⁷ Through community-based programs like CCM, MINSA is implementing creative solutions to patch up the longstanding structural and financial systemic flaws. Although a laborious and costly redressing of the Nicaraguan health system is necessary, hope of a better future persists.

*Paxton Duff, Extramural Contributor at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

Additional editorial support provided by Francisco J. Ugás Tapia, Senior Research Fellow, Haley Wiebel, Extramural Contributor, and Blake Burdge and Alex Rawley, Research Associates at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

Notes:

1. Pribble, Jennifer, Evelyne Huber, and John D. Stephens. “Politics, Policies, and Poverty in Latin America.” Comparative Politics 41, no. 4 (2009): 388. Accessed May 29, 2017. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40599215.
2. “The Iran Contra Affairs: The Counterrevolutionaries (The Contras)” Brown University. Accessed May 29, 2017.

http://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/n-contrasus.php.

4. Ibid., p. 84.
5. Sequeira, Magda, Henry Espinoza, JJ Amador, et. al. “The Nicaraguan Health System.” Path. Seattle: 2011. P. 32. Accessed May 30, 2017.
6. Pribble et. al. “Politics, Policies and Poverty.” p. 387-88.
7. Sequeira, et. al. “The Nicaraguan Health System.” p. 17.
8. Willis, Katie, and Sorayya Khan. “Health Reform in Latin America and Africa: Decentralisation, Participation and Inequalities.” Third World Quarterly 30, no. 5 (2009): 995. Accessed May 29, 2017. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40388163.
9. Pribble et. al. “Politics, Policies and Poverty.” p. 392.
10. “Nicaragua’s Constitution of 1987 with Amendments through 2005.” Oxford University Press. Translated by Max Planck Institute. 6 June 2017. Accessed July 5, 2017. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Nicaragua_2005.pdf.
11. Sequeira, et. al. “The Nicaraguan Health System.” p. 16.
12. “Nicaragua Overview.” The World Bank. 10 April 2017. Accessed May 30, 2017. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nicaragua/overview#1.
13. “Health Situation Analysis.” Organización Panamericana de la Salud. Managua, Nicaragua (2006). Accessed May 30, 2017.
14. Sequeira, et. al. “The Nicaraguan Health System.” p. 7.
15. “Nicaragua.” World Health Observatory. 2017. Accessed May 31, 2017. http://www.who.int/countries/nic/en/.
16. Boseley, Sarah. “Nicaragua refuses to lift abortion ban.” The Guardian. June 11, 2010. Accessed May 29, 2017.
17. Khaleeli, Homa. “Killer Law.” The Guardian. 8 October 2007. Accessed May 31, 2017.
18. Sequeira, et. al. “The Nicaraguan Health System.” p. 16.
19. Espinoza, Henry, Magda Sequeira, Gonzalo Domingo, Juan José Amador, Margarita Quintanilla, and Tala de los Santos. “Management of the HIV epidemic in Nicaragua: the need to improve information systems and access to affordable diagnostics.” Bulletin of the World Health Organization 89, no. 8 (2011): 619. Accessed May 30, 2017. http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/.
20. Ibidem.
21. Ibidem.
22. Sequeira, et. al. “The Nicaraguan Health System.” p. 11.
23. Ibidem.
24. Ibid., p. 12, 16.
25. Ibid.
26. George, Asha, Elaine P. Menotti, Dixmer Rivera, Irma Montes, Carmen María Reyes, and David R. Marsh. “Community Case Management of Childhood Illness in Nicaragua: Transforming Health Systems in Underserved Rural Areas.” Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved 20, no. 4 (2009): 99-115. Accessed May 29, 2017. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/364527/summary.
27. Ibidem.

The very sad news emanating out of San Antonio Texas today relates to a semi-tractor trailer filled to the brim with scores of illegal aliens from Mexico who literally died from heat exposure where their heart rates were reported to be over 130 beats per minute and their bodies were “hot to the touch” as reported by Texas law enforcement.

How is this possible?

Why do we read stories countless times per year about countries such as China, Vietnam, Mexico, or other nations having people who would literally risk death and dismemberment to illegally cross over their borders/shores to enter the United States and Europe?

While countries like Libya, Syria and Yemen have an immediate excuse in that their countries were recently bombed to demolition by the evil forces behind NATO and other greedy Western Intelligence agencies who wanted to stunt those countries’ growth, movement toward sovereign non-IMF/World Bank currencies, or to topple their duly elected sovereign leaders, what excuse does Mexico and other nations, not having been immediately attacked or demoted by the Western nations have?

The answer is no excuse, whatsoever.

Mexico, for example, is literally loaded to the brim with cash – much of it ill-gotten gains from their massive illegal opioid, cocaine, marijuana, ecstasy, crystal meth, and painkiller trade – but also the vast majority of their economy is in the legal trade such as through coffee, avocados, produce, building materials, minerals, aerospace, electronics, food, beverages, tobacco, chemicals, iron, steel, petroleum, mining, textiles, clothing, motor vehicles, consumer durables, and tourism.

The economy of Mexico is the 13th largest in the world in nominal terms and the 11th largest by purchasing power parity, according to the International Monetary Fund.

Their GDP is $1.5 trillion (nominal 2016) and $2.5 trillion (PPP 2016).

Their GDP has been growing at 3% per year and is stable.

In 2016 Mexico exported $359.3 billion in drugs, automobiles, electronics, televisions, computers, mobile phones, LCDs, oil and oil products, silver, fruits, vegetables, coffee, cotton, all over the world.

So where is all this money going?

Why are their people routinely being forced to “jump the border” and literally risk their lives, and the lives of their small children, to illegally enter the United States and other nations?

The answer can be found in the Mexican oligarchy/plutocracy, which is obviously greedy and selfish beyond reproach.

Mexico should be a lesson to the United States and other nations which allow their internal oligarchs/plutocrats to grow without any pruning or trimming by their general population, or their corrupted governmental agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).

While the Mexican upper class literally “swims” in money, their poorest classes must die like animals within trailer trucks in places like San Antonio Texas, or languish in prisons both in Mexico (or in the United States) trying to desperately escape their horrific poverty and hellish living conditions.

The USA must not only punish and jail those illegal aliens who brave the elements to escape into the USA by jailing them or turning them back to Mexico, but also come down like a hammer on the heads of those greedy bastard oligarchs in Mexico who do not give a damn about their own people and young children, rather allowing (and encouraging) them to sneak into the USA and other countries to risk their freedom, and very lives.

A US-based Hindu group is highly critical of Taiwan’s reportedly proposed restrictions on burning incense.

Hindu statesman Rajan Zed, in a statement in Nevada (USA) said that incense restrictions would be an unnecessary obtrusion on Hindu devotees, who had been waving incense in front of the images of deities for ages as an act of homage to the divine manifestation.

Zed, who is President of Universal Society of Hinduism, indicated that attempts at regulating incense usage would be a religious infringement as incense was very important part of offerings in Hinduism and used in daily puja rituals while worshiping deities.

Religious use of incense had ancient origins and incense burners were said to have been found in Indus Valley Civilization (2500-1800 BCE). Taiwan was a diverse society now and there were considerable numbers of adherents of Hinduism, Rajan Zed noted.

Zed urged Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen, Premier Lin Chuan and Environmental Protection Administration Minister Ying-Yuan Lee to relook into the incense restrictions proposals so that all Taiwanese could continue practicing their religious traditions freely and without any unnecessary government regulations.

By Diana Moukalled*

The battle of Jaroud Arsal, launched by Hezbollah on the Lebanese-Syrian border, has multiple goals.

This battle was waged after a primary Russian-US agreement regarding safe zones in Syria. Iran apparently did not welcome this agreement, thinking it marginalized Tehran; its discontent was manifested in efforts to assert its influence in Syria and Lebanon, where the Arsal battle is taking place.

The Iran-backed Hezbollah paved the way for this battle through a large political media campaign in Lebanon supported by political forces, either because they are Hezbollah’s allies or have decided to surrender to its power. Behind the fabricated speeches about “protecting Lebanon,” they are in fact working to create a safe zone for future repatriated Syrian refugees. Iran also wants to strengthen its areas of influence in Syria and tighten the safety belt around these areas.

Hezbollah knows that no one in Lebanon can object to this battle because no one wants to keep Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham (JFS), the militant group formerly known as Al-Nusra Front, controlling the barren areas on the borders. Hezbollah knows very well how and when to take advantage of decisive moments.

Hezbollah waged these battles, supported by shallow patriotic feelings, and undermining the role of the military institution on the borders. Hezbollah was able to get the needed compassion and support by launching a campaign of hatred against the Syrian refugees by spreading racist videos, in which Lebanese were seen beating Syrians, following the killing of Syrian detainees tortured by the Lebanese army. Hezbollah sowed misperceptions about Syrian refugees and the terrorists.

Patriotism in Lebanon today is just blind, ignorant hatred, and allows for the depiction of what is going on in Jaroud Arsal as a battle against terrorism. It is in fact a battle to confirm regional Iranian influence and undermine Lebanon even more.

What homeland are they defending, when the citizens’ feelings are being fueled with hatred against refugees, who are portrayed as terrorists?

The Lebanese have accepted the army’s killing of four Syrian detainees because they believed that this will pave the way for a stronger state fighting terrorism. However, it is really about preparing the soil for a wider regional sectarian plan.

Hezbollah is today the sole decision-making power in Lebanon. The government has to secure the party’s mission in Syria, in return for trivial rewards. No one cares about refugee camps being set on fire, detainees being tortured and killed, a journalist being arrested for commenting on Facebook or a lawyer being threatened because she dared to defend victims of torture. All this no longer offends anyone in Lebanon, and we cannot escape the fact that Lebanon is now a state ruled by Hezbollah.

What is happening in Arsal is that Hezbollah is expanding its influence, with the Lebanese army remaining mute. When there is no value to borders, sovereignty and citizens, the end of Lebanon becomes a crystal clear reality.

• Diana Moukalled is a veteran journalist with extensive experience in both traditional and new media. She is also a columnist and freelance documentary producer. She can be reached on Twitter @dianamoukalled.

North Korea faces severe food shortages as a result of the worst drought to hit the reclusive country since 2001, the United Nations food agency says.

An acute lack of rainfall from April to June in key crop growing areas has severely damaged staples such as rice, maize, potatoes and soybean, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) said in a report.

Most at risk of starvation are children and the elderly, the report says.

Increased food imports or relief aid will be needed over the next three months to help make up the shortfall, the report added.

The worst affected crop growing areas areas include South and North Pyongan, South and North Hwanghae and Nampo City, which normally account for about two-thirds of the overall main season cereal production, according to Vincent Martin, the FAO Representative in China and North Korea.

“Immediate interventions are needed to support affected farmers and prevent undesirable coping strategies for the most vulnerable, such as reducing daily food intakes,” said Martin.

“It is critical now that farmers receive appropriate and timely agricultural assistance, including irrigation equipment and machinery.”

The report says it is also essential to immediately start rehabilitating and upgrading irrigation schemes to reduce water losses and increase water availability.

By Manpreet Sethi*

Recent videos from North Korea – or Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) – show their Supreme Commander of the Army, Kim Jong-un, chuckling away as he watches his country’s missile launches. Indeed with the recent test of the claimed ICBM, which has been justified by the country as a legitimate right to self defence, the ‘Dear Leader’ has several reasons to smile. It is the US that is fuming, faced as it is with rather grim options. Exasperated, US President Donald Trump has not been shy of accusing China of not living up to its responsibility to help defang North Korea of its nuclear weapons. US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson warned that the US was at the end of its strategic patience.

Cheekily, China advised him to undertake proactive diplomacy with the DPRK instead. Refusing to accept American allegations, China has hit hard at what it calls the “China responsibility theory.” It maintains that the core of the problem is the security conflict between the US and the DPRK and that the two should handle it themselves. As stated by the Chinese Foreign ministry spokesman, “China is neither the focus of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, nor the one that escalates the tension.” Rather, it claims to have played a “constructive role” in trying to find a solution and accuses vested interests of “confusing public opinion.”

Indeed, the North Korean nuclear imbroglio is far more complicated for any one country to solve. But, China is punching far below its weight on the DPRK when it shirks its responsibility on the matter by dismissing it as a ‘theory’. After all, China was responsible for the creation of the problem when it provided tacit support to the Kim dynasty’s nuclear efforts, including facilitation of cooperation through other beneficiaries of its own nuclear weapons largesse. And, it is China that still wields the maximum amount of leverage through its economic and political relations with an otherwise isolated Communist regime. While China has gone along on some of the more recent UN Security Council resolutions that sanction the DPRK, it has been careful not to take any measures that destabilise the regime. The US, though, alleges that China ignores/condones/allows some Chinese enterprises to continue working with North Korea. In fact, one Chinese bank was cut out of the American financial system for allegedly being involved in laundering money for North Korea.

Is there a way out of these allegation and counter-allegations of the big powers? It is clear that Kim Jong-un would like to leverage his nuclear and missile programme as a bargaining chip. The key lies in finding what he would be willing to settle for.

China has seconded the DPRK’s suggestion of a halt of US-South Korea military exercises in exchange for a moratorium on missile launches and nuclear tests by the DPRK. This might not be a bad idea especially since South Korea’s President, Moon Jae-in, has taken a first step in indicating his willingness to have talks with his neighbour. But the time so gained through this double suspension and the ultimate objective of the talks would have to be to provide a sense of security to the regime.

This would only be possible through some sort of an acceptance of its nuclear status, an issue that has evoked much indignation in the US and South Korea since any hint of grant of such status to a ‘rogue’ nation is deemed anathema to the non-proliferation hardliners.

While this is understandable, it is often forgotten that other nations described as rogue at another point of time in history have been accommodated in the past. China itself was one of them. In 1966, two years after China tested its nuclear weapon, it was described as a rogue regime when the then Chairman of the Communist Party of China, Mao Zedong, began the bloody Cultural Revolution in which millions of Chinese died and when it aggressively sought to export its revolution to other countries. But within five years of the Chinese nuclear test, the US had engaged the country in a dialogue, though covertly at first.

The point of the above paragraph is not to condone the actions of North Korea, but to provide a perspective. It must be accepted that denuclearisation of the DPRK is not a possibility. Even a military offensive has little chance of success, but it would certainly extract a very high cost on human life. The next best thing then to do would be to engage the country in such a way as to enhance its sense of security to eventually reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons, enmesh it in an architecture of verifiable safeguards, and nudge its nuclear thinking and behaviour along more acceptable norms. Then, in time, if universal nuclear disarmament was ever to become a reality, North Korea could also join in as another nuclear possessor.

It does not behove China, and nor is it in its regional security interest, to dismiss its responsibility in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis as mere theory. Countries become great powers by taking responsibility for matters of international concern, not merely by announcing huge projects, counting only ‘rogue’ regimes amongst their best friends, and winning over smaller nations only with money and military muscle.

* Manpreet Sethi
Senior Fellow and Project Leader, Nuclear Security, Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS), New Delhi

Expressing deep concern about the escalating tensions and violent clashes taking place in and around the Old City of Jerusalem, the United Nations and its diplomatic partners in the Middle East peace process have called on all to demonstrate maximum restraint and work towards de-escalating the situation.

In a statement issued late Saturday, the envoys of the so-called Middle East Quartet – comprising the UN, Russia, the United States and the European Union – strongly condemned acts of terror, and expressed regret for all loss of innocent life caused by the violence, and hope for a speedy recovery to the wounded.

The statement comes in the wake of a series of deadly stabbings, other violent incidents and rising tensions in and around Jerusalem’s Old City since mid-June, particularly near the holy site known as the Temple Mount and as Haram al-Sharif.

Noting the particular sensitivities surrounding the holy sites in Jerusalem, and the need to ensure security, the Quartet envoys called on all to demonstrate maximum restraint, refrain from provocative actions and work towards de-escalating the situation.

Through their statement, the envoys welcomed the assurances by the Prime Minister of Israel that the status quo at the holy sites in Jerusalem will be upheld and respected. Further, the Quartet encouraged Israel and Jordan to work together to uphold the status quo, noting Jordan’s special role as recognized in its peace treaty with Israel.

The Quartet envoys reiterated that violence deepens mistrust and is fundamentally incompatible with achieving a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the statement concluded.

Like their Russian counterparts, Kazakh experts have long debated the relative strength of civic and ethnic attachments, Gulmira Ileuova says; but in many ways doing so has distracted attention from a far more important development: the rise and intensification of a wide variety of identities from familial and local to more global ones.

Commenting on a recent Almaty roundtable on “Traditional Mentality and Modernization: Pitfalls and Possibilities,” the Kazakh sociologist says her colleagues in the 1990s focused primarily on how strong Soviet identities had remained in Kazakhstan and only later on the balance between civic and ethnic ones (365info.kz/2017/07/kuda-idet-kazahstanskaya-natsiya-ili-kem-sebya-schitayut-kazahstantsy/).

In the first decade after independence, Kazakhs shifted from identifying with “one large identity” – as Soviets – to another one – as Kazakhstantsy. But over time, “significant changes occurred, migration increased, and local identities strengthened. As a result, the most important question became “’where are you from?’ not ‘who are you?’”

She argues that this diversity of self-identifications will only increase, something that may open the way to “consolidation on some entirely new basis. But this will happen only after another ten years.”

In 2004, Ileuova says she found that 57 percent of citizens of Kazakhstan identified in the first instance as such, 26 percent listed their local identity first, and only 4.9 percent listed ethnic identification. Religion was only rarely a primary identity.

Civic national identity rose to 71 percent in 2012 before falling back to 62 percent in 2016; local identity fell to 17 percent in the first of these years and then recovered to 23 percent in the latter. Ethnic and religious identities remained relative low, the sociologist reports. But she does note that Kazakhs more than other ethnic groups there are interested in how people identify.

Ileuova concludes with the following observation: “With time we may encounter definite challenges from the point of view of issues of integrating various groups of the population of the country. At the same time, one cannot fail to note that the developing multiplicity of identities still hasn’t changed interethnic relations.”

But clearly identities will continue to change rather than shift permanently from one thing to another, the sociologist suggests.

Climate change campaigns that focus on correcting public beliefs about scientific consensus are likely to backfire and undermine policy efforts, according to an expert commentary published today in Environmental Communication.

The six authors of the commentary argue campaigns which emphasize variations on messages such as, “97% of climate scientists have concluded that human-caused climate change is happening,” hold several serious drawbacks.

Firstly, the difficulties involved in statistically quantifying consensus and what is included in the climate science literature have generated intense disagreement. The messaging strategy has also promoted confusion over whether consensus extends to various impacts such as extreme weather events. Rather than ending conflict over the reality of human-caused climate change, these efforts have fueled further debate.

Secondly, the studies evaluating the impact of consensus messaging on public attitudes have been published by a relatively small group of affiliated researchers and challenged by other social scientists, resulting in an uncertain evidence-base around which to invest funding on behalf of expensive communication campaigns.

Thirdly, past scholarship suggests that acceptance of scientific consensus is not needed for the public to support solutions to environmental problems. For example, the Montreal Protocol for the protection of the ozone layer was signed in the face of the shocking discovery of the ozone hole. However, a decade earlier the US public had already started to shift from using spray cans containing ozone destroying chemicals, at a time when no scientific consensus on ozone layer protection existed.

The final point discussed highlights how narrowly focusing on scientific consensus displaces debate over the wider issues posed by climate change, which involve many different, and often conflicting, policy options.

Co-author, Reiner Grundmann, from the School of Sociology and Social Policy at University of Nottingham in the UK, commented: “The ‘97% consensus’ has become a popular slogan for climate campaigners, but the strategy is self-defeating. There is a danger of overreach in that numbers like the 97% consensus are implicitly extended to all areas of climate science, and used to close down debate over complex topics like extreme weather events. This approach also makes the implausible assumption that publics will follow the correct policy path once given the relevant scientific information, and that acceptance of scientific consensus is needed to support specific solutions.”

People who carry a genetic susceptibility to Alzheimer’s disease appear to be at greater risk of diminished cognition from sleep-disordered breathing than those without the susceptibility, according to new research published online, ahead of print in the Annals of the American Thoracic Society.

In “Greater Cognitive Deficits with Sleep-Disordered Breathing among Individuals with Genetic Susceptibility to Alzheimer’s Disease: The Multi-Ethnic Study of Atherosclerosis,” researchers report that study participants carrying the apolipoprotein ε-4 (APOE-ε4) allele showed greater cognitive deficits with the various indices of sleep-disordered breathing compared to those without the allele.

APOE is a major cholesterol carrier that supports injury repair in the brain. Other studies have shown that those carrying the alternate form of the gene, ε4 allele, are at increased risk of Alzheimer’s disease. Estimates are that 20 percent of the population carries the ε4 allele.

“Previous studies have shown inconsistent findings between sleep-disordered breathing and cognition, which may be due to the different tests used,” said lead study author Dayna A. Johnson, PhD, MPH, MS, MSW, instructor of medicine at Brigham and Women’s Hospital and Harvard Medical School.

Dr. Johnson and colleagues investigated the association in a diverse sample using several indicators of sleep-disordered breathing and cognition. They also evaluated whether the presence of the APOE-ε4 allele, which is known to increase risk of Alzheimer’s disease, influenced the link between sleep-disordered breathing and cognition.

The authors analyzed data from 1,752 participants (average age 68) in the Multi-Ethnic Study of Atherosclerosis (MESA) who underwent an in-home polysomnography (sleep) study, completed standardized sleep questions, and a battery of tests to measure their cognition. The authors defined sleep-disordered breathing as an apnea-hypopnea index (AHI), which measures the number of stopped or shallow breaths per hour, as AHI > 15, and sleep apnea syndrome as AHI > 5 (below 5 is normal) plus self-reported sleepiness (based on a standardized scale).

The study found:

• Increased overnight hypoxemia (oxygen saturation below 90 percent) or increased daytime sleepiness was associated with poorer attention and memory.
• More daytime sleepiness was also associated with slower cognitive processing speed.
• Sleep apnea syndrome was associated with poorer attention and processing speed.
• These associations were strongest in APOE-ε4 carriers.

The researchers adjusted for race, age, body mass index, education level, smoking status, hypertension, diabetes, benzodiazepine use, and depressive symptoms.

Dr. Johnson said that, overall, the effects of the various sleep factors they measured on cognition were small, but in the range previously reported for several other lifestyle and health risk factors for dementia. Screening and treating sleep-disordered breathing, she added, may help reduce a person’s risk of dementia, especially if that individual carries APOE-ε4.

“Our study provides further evidence that sleep-disordered breathing negatively affects attention, processing speed and memory, which are robust predictors of cognitive decline,” said senior study author Susan Redline, MD, MPH, Peter C. Farrell Professor of Sleep Medicine, Harvard Medical School.

“Given the lack of effective treatment for Alzheimer’s disease, our results support the potential for sleep-disordered breathing screening and treatment as part of a strategy to reduce dementia risk.”

Vast swaths of Pennsylvania forests were clear-cut circa 1900 and regrowth has largely been from local native plant communities, but a team of researchers in Penn State’s College of Agricultural Sciences has found that invasive, non-native plants are making significant inroads with unconventional natural gas development.

The spread of invasive non-native plants could have long-term negative consequences for the forest ecosystem in a region where the ubiquitous woods provide timbering revenue, wildlife habitat and ecotourism, warns team member David Mortensen, professor of weed and applied plant ecology.

In recent years, he and other researchers at the University have been tracking the ecological impact of hundreds of well pads, access roads and pipelines built to extract gas from the Marcellus shale.

“Studies have shown that when invasive plants such as Microstegium vimineum (Japanese stiltgrass) move into an area, it changes the plant community, and native plants tend to decline,” Mortensen said. “Soon we will see a ripple effect in the forest ecosystem that will affect organisms that depend on the native plants. Ultimately, economic factors such as timber harvests may be affected, and wildlife and bird communities likely will change.”

This most recent Penn State study documents that non-native plants are rapidly invading Pennsylvania’s northern forests and establishes a link between new invasions and shale gas development activity. In findings published today (July 20) in the Journal of Environmental Management, researchers show a direct correlation between the extent of non-native plant invasion and distinct aspects of shale gas development.

To investigate, researchers conducted invasive plant surveys on and around 127 Marcellus shale gas well pads and adjacent access roads in seven state forest districts in the Allegheny National Forest. Study sites were distributed across the Allegheny High Plateau, which is dominated by mixed-oak and Northern hardwood forests; the Pittsburgh Plateau; and the Ridge and Valley regions of central Pennsylvania, dominated by mixed-oak forests.

Sixty-one percent of pads had at least one invasive, non-native plant species, and 19 percent of those had three or more species. Reed canary grass, spotted knapweed, creeping thistle, Japanese stiltgrass and crown vetch were the most common invasives found.

The study provides striking evidence that invasive plant presence on well pads is correlated with the length of time since pad construction; the number of wells drilled per pad; invasive plant abundance on adjacent well pad access roads; and the density of roads in the area of the pad prior to construction. Using field data from the 127 well pads, researchers created a model to evaluate direct and indirect relationships between mechanisms and conditions that could account for invasive plant presence.

Surrounding plant communities were also surveyed on a randomly selected set of 32 well pads in the study. Non-native plant cover was greater on the disturbed well pad edges than in the surrounding plant communities.

Researchers found evidence that invasive plants were introduced in gravel delivered to build pads and roads, and in mud on the tires and undercarriages of trucks traveling those roads, noted lead researcher Kathryn Barlow, a doctoral degree candidate in ecology. She pointed out that previous Penn State research demonstrated Japanese stiltgrass seeds were moved by road-grading equipment on gravel roads in forests.

“Given the fact that, on average, 1,235 one-way truck trips delivering fracturing fluid and proppant are required to complete an unconventional well, the potential to transport invasive plant propagules is significant,” she said. Propagules are parts of a plant that can generate a new plant, such as seeds, spores and roots.

“Material and equipment used for road construction and maintenance can play an important dispersal role. Road development can create pathways for invasive plant establishment and spread,” Barlow added.

Non-native plant invasion into forests can lead to the demise of native plants in surprising ways, Mortensen pointed out, referring to a study his lab conducted at the Penn State Deer Research Center that was published in April 2016. That research demonstrated that white-tailed deer prefer native plants and seem to avoid eating invasives.

“So if we have Microstegium filling the forest understory and deer are looking for something to eat — since they don’t feed much on Microstegium at all — the deer clip off any native plant growth that manages to get through the invasives,” he said. “That allows the invasives to further dominate the plant community.

“As a result, the recruitment of economically important tree species will be curtailed. This process can be really damaging to the health of the forest in the long run, and even in the short term.”

A Cairo criminal court on Saturday, July 22 sentenced to death 28 people over the 2015 killing of Egypt’s top prosecutor after the death penalty was approved by the country’s top religious authority, and it also jailed 15 others for 25 years each, Reuters reports.

Public prosecutor Hisham Barakat was killed in a car bomb attack on his convoy in the capital, an operation for which Egypt blamed the Muslim Brotherhood and Gaza-based Hamas militants. Both groups have denied having a role.

The court had in June recommended passing the death penalty to Egypt’s top religious leader, the Grand Mufti, who can approve or reject the recommendation. The mufti’s guidance is required when a court seeks the death penalty but his decision is not binding..

The sentences, confirmed by the court in Saturday’s hearing, can be appealed.

“The verdicts were shocking today,” said one of the defense lawyers, Ahmed Saad. “Others who had nothing to do with the assassination of martyr Hisham Barakat received life sentences. They had nothing to do with the incident.”

Egypt’s Interior Ministry released a video last year showing several young men confessing and admitting going to Gaza for training from Hamas, but some later denied the charges in court.

The defendants said they were forced to confess under torture and their lawyers asked that they be medically examined.

Egypt faces an Islamist insurgency led by Islamic State in North Sinai, where hundreds of soldiers and police have been killed. But the group has increasingly targeted Egypt’s Christians with church bombings and shooting.

For the eighth consecutive day since Israeli authorities installed increased security measures at the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound in occupied East Jerusalem, hundreds of Muslim worshipers on performed prayers outside of the compound gates in protest on Sunday, as Palestinian political and religious officials expressed their strong opposition to the new Israeli restrictions.

In the wake of a deadly shoot-out between Palestinian assailants and Israeli police officers on July 14, Israeli forces shut down the Al-Aqsa compound for two days, only to reopen it after having installed security cameras, metal detectors, and turnstiles at the entrances of the compound.

Palestinians have said the move is the latest instance of Israeli authorities using Israeli-Palestinian violence as a means of furthering control over important sites in the occupied Palestinian territory and normalizing repressive measures against Palestinians.

Palestinians have protested the measures by praying outside of Al-Aqsa’s gates, with mass demonstrations across the occupied territory on Friday erupting into violent clashes that left three protesters killed.

Witnesses told Ma’an that hundreds of worshipers prayed outside of the Lions’ Gate and the Council Gate to the compound during midday prayers on Sunday, in the presence of dozens of Israeli police officers who prevented the call to prayer and forced journalists to leave the area.

A funeral prayer was also performed outside of the compound for a deceased Jerusalemite man, after his family refused to go the metal detectors to enter Al-Aqsa, which is the third holiest site in Islam after Mecca and Medina.

Following midday prayers, Israeli forces detained a young Palestinian man, identified as Ahmad al-Shawish, and questioned several others.

Israeli police spokeswoman Luba al-Samri reported that two Palestinian residents of the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Shuafat were detained on Sunday morning near the illegal Israeli separation wall for being in possession of fireworks, which police officers suspected they were planning on using against Israeli forces during demonstrations.

Meanwhile, the Palestinian Red Crescent reported that Israeli forces injured at least 21 Palestinians on Sunday evening following the isha night-time prayer — 15 of whom were hit by rubber-coated bullets, while at least six were injured after being hit with batons.

Al-Aqsa Mosque compound director Sheikh Omar al-Kiswani confirmed to Ma’an that he would continue to oppose all procedures that could eventually result in “changing the historic and religious status quo in Jerusalem and its holy sites, including the Al-Aqsa Mosque.”

Meanwhile, Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Sabastiya Atallah Hanna stood in solidarity with Al-Aqsa during a speech outside of the compound on Sunday.

“As Jerusalemites, in spite of all the pain, grief, suffering, and injustice, we will continue to hold on to our city and defend our holy sites,” he said. “Jerusalem is the city of national unity between Muslims and Christians. It is a city that unites us as children of one Palestinian people.”

“Targeting Al-Aqsa and plundering our Christian endowment properties are two faces of one policy targeting us all as Palestinians in this holy land,” Hanna stated, adding that Israeli policies in the city sent a message that “you Palestinians are unwelcome in Jerusalem.”

“Our response to that racist policy is that the occupation is unwelcome in Jerusalem and must disappear from our city and our holy sites.”

In the besieged Gaza Strip city of Rafah, demonstrators marched in solidarity with Palestinian Jerusalemites on Saturday evening, as Haidar al-Hout, a leader of resistance committees in Gaza, hailed Palestinians’ “determination and toughness” in standing up to Israeli measures in East Jerusalem.

Meanwhile, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas reiterated the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) opposition to the security measures at Al-Aqsa, stating that “sovereignty of the mosque is our right, and it is us who should be standing at its gates.”

Abbas said on Friday that he had decided to suspend all contacts with Israel until the latter lifted recent security measures in occupied East Jerusalem — including, allegedly, ceasing security coordination with Israel, through which the PA has been accused of carrying out a “revolving door” policy funneling Palestinians from PA jails to Israeli prisons.

The move, Abbas said, was “not an easy decision at all, but they (Israeli authorities) have to do something about it.”

While Abbas said that the PA opposed terrorism, he countered that Israel had long depended on Palestinian security forces to carry out the bulk of efforts to quash possible attacks against Israeli targets.

Both the PA and the Hamas movement, the de facto ruling party in the besieged Gaza Strip, called for Palestinian national unity on Sunday to face Israeli aggression in Jerusalem — albeit on starkly different terms.

In a statement released on Saturday, the Middle East Quartet — consisting of the United Nations, the European Union, Russia, and the United States — said that it was “deeply concerned” by the developments in Jerusalem.

The Quartet said it “strongly condemn(ed) acts of terror, express their regret for all loss of innocent life caused by the violence,” while calling on all parties to work to de-escalate tensions.

“The Quartet envoys reiterate that violence deepens mistrust and is fundamentally incompatible with achieving a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” the statement added.