By K. P. Fabian*

By Elizabeth Yeh*

If you were to read Dorothy Sayers’ The Lost Tools of Learning and thereafter read the curriculum of Veritas Classical Academy, you would find that the “lost tools” have been found in the small town of Marietta, Ohio.

The curriculum at Veritas is based on the Trivium. In her book, novelist and essayist Sayers explains that the genius of the Trivium is that it coincides with the natural stages of a child’s development.

First is the grammar of learning, taking place at what Sayers names the “Poll-parrot stage” of youth, when students willingly memorize fundamentals that will be foundational for subsequent thought. Next is the dialectic, which corresponds to the “Pert Age,” when students undoubtedly love to argue, but necessarily need to be taught how to make logically sound arguments. Finally, rhetoric is taught in high school during the restless “Poetic Age” of life, in which the creative and increasingly philosophical mind of youth is trained in its expression, i.e. speaking and writing. The schooling culminates in an individually chosen senior thesis, which taps into both the skills and moral development of the earlier stages and is orally delivered to an audience.

These are the timeless tools of learning.

In an interview, Kevin Ritter, a cofounder and teacher of Veritas, said that he and two other families founded the school after their local Catholic school announced that it would be adopting Common Core. As Ritter explains, and The Washington Post reported, many Catholic schools feel they need state funding they can only receive if they adopt Common Core. To this, Ritter asks, “Is there not a place for faith … will God not provide?”

And that He did.

With a laugh, Ritter relays such a time: He and the other founders realized just days before classes began that they had been so focused on developing the school and its curriculum that they had forgotten to buy desks. As the panic set in, one of the founders suggested that they pray. That very day a man called to say that he was a part of a group that was closing an elementary school and was wondering if they needed any desks. When Veritas opened in the fall of 2014, those desks were filled with 38 students in grades preschool through six; last year they had 113 students. They now have a growing waitlist and will be officially opening grades 11 and 12 in the fall of 2017.

Through its curriculum, Veritas teaches students how to think, instead of what to think: as C.S. Lewis would say, “propagation” rather than “propaganda.” As Ritter affirms, knowing how to think will ultimately help students be more flexible and adaptable in a world where people rarely keep the same job during the whole of their working life.

The founders of Veritas are not alone in their project of restoring classical education. Parents and educators around the country are realizing their freedom and duty to develop schools for their children dedicated to faith, excellence and values. Veritas is just one of the many schools exercising its call to educational entrepreneurship: Throughout the United States, classical schools are appearing in the form of diocesan classical schools, such as Acton cofounder Father Sirico’s own Sacred Heart Academy, or as independent private schools teaching the tradition, such as the Chesterton Model.

While the “tools of learning” can be found in the Veritas curriculum, something else is lost — purged, rather — in Veritas: acedia. Acedia is a Greek word that describes spiritual or mental apathy. One of the dangers of public schools, Ritter says, is that students lack an enthusiasm for learning: mediocrity is often the product of boredom. He believes that under Common Core, students are not able to study at their appropriate level and lack meaningful material to keep them engaged.

In The Abolition of Man, C.S. Lewis says, “the task of the modern educator is not to cut down jungles but to irrigate deserts…to inculcate just sentiments.” Veritas Classical Academy fosters a genuine joy of learning in its students through three principal means: the family, the faculty and the moral imagination.

Family: When the board of Veritas decides to admit a student, they are “accepting not just the student, but the whole family.” To ensure that the “family’s values match up with the virtue [they] are trying to teach in school,” Veritas conducts individual interviews with each family. Because of this, Ritter says that “school does not end on June first,” but rather students pursue knowledge inside and outside of the classroom year-round.

Teachers: The teachers at Veritas are not only well-trained through programs like Circe — the kind of training Dorothy Sayers deemed absolutely necessary — but “are lifetime learners …. always reading, always writing, and always learning.” Ritter sees “this behavior rub off on the kids … they want to be like the faculty.”

Moral Imagination: On the sign outside of the school, it is written “Veritas Classical Academy: Taking young minds seriously.” To prevent students from becoming “cynical and jaded,” the Veritas curriculum holds that students need to “not only have their minds expanded but also their souls enriched by…the great moral efforts of human beings.” This enrichment of the soul strengthens the moral imagination, the source of the “superadded” ideas that its curriculum expects the student to constantly ponder: “love and hate, victory and defeat, justice and injustice, beauty and ugliness, temperance and intemperance, courage and cowardice, glory and shame, magnanimity and pusillanimity.”

In these ways, Veritas not only develops the tools of learning that teach students how to think, but also gives them a question worth thinking of: “What is the good life?” In doing so, Veritas cultivates that which makes us uniquely human: “A wonder and love for all that is genuinely true, good and beautiful.”

About the author:
*Elizabeth Yeh is an author at the Acton Institute.

Source:
This article was published by the Acton Institute

US warships fired several warning shots at Iranian patrol boats in the Persian Gulf in what Tehran calls another “provocative and unprofessional move.” A similar incident involving the US and Iran took place in the region on Tuesday.

The US Nimitz-class aircraft carrier and another warship fired warning shots at Iranian vessels in the middle of the Persian Gulf on Friday, according to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as cited by local media.

With only a few days since a provocative move in the northern end of the Persian Gulf in which the US Navy ships fired warning shots at an Iranian vessel, the American warships have once again taken the same action in the middle of the Persian Gulf,” the IRGC said in a statement.

The US Navy ships were intercepted by IRGC missile boats near the Resalat gas-oil field, when they approached the Iranians and dispatched a helicopter at 4pm on Friday, according to the statement. Then American warships opened fire in what the IRGC described as “a provocative and unprofessional move.” The Americans then left the area, the IRGC added, while the Iranians went on with their patrol.

“The US warships in a provocative and unprofessional move began firing warning shots at the Iranian vessels, to which the IRGC Navy’s ships paid no attention and continued with their mission.”

It is the second confrontation between US and Iranian navies in the Persian Gulf this week. On Tuesday, the USS Thunderbolt fired several warning shots from a heavy machine gun in response to an Iranian vessel’s “provocative actions,” according to Pentagon officials. Tehran challenged the statement, saying that the warship moved towards an Iranian vessel of the 3rd Naval Division and fired two rounds in an attempt at intimidation.

In March, Washington said that Iranian fast-attack boats came dangerously close to a US aircraft carrier in the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran dismissed the allegations and warned that Americans “would be responsible for any unrest in the Persian Gulf,” and urged it to “change its behavior.”

By Ana Maria Touma

Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister was forced to cancel his visit to Moldova on Friday, after Romania banned his airplane from flying into their airspace, forcing it to land in Minsk instead.

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin was forced to cancel a controversial visit to Moldova on Friday, after Romania reportedly denied his S7 plane access to its airspace, forcing it to land in Minsk, Belarus.

The Russian official has been banned from traveling to the European Union since March 2014, when he backed the Russian annexation of Crimea.

Romanian aviation authorities refused to confirm or deny that they had refused access to the Russian plane.

The visit had also caused controversies in Moldova, where the pro-European government in Chisinau had warned Rogozin that he would not be welcome.

The Russian official was scheduled to arrive in Chisinau on Friday at the invitation of Moldova’s pro-Russian President, Igor Dodon.

The two dignitaries had planned on Saturday to mark the 25th anniversary of the Russian peacekeeping mission in Moldova’s breakaway region of Transnistria together with separatist leader Vadim Krasnoselsky.

However, Rogozin’s flight was delayed for two hours because airport authorities in Chisinau notified Moscow that they would not permit the S7 airplane with the Russian delegation to land.

The plane took off nevertheless, but, after it reached Hungarian airspace, started to circle and was later redirected to Minsk, Belarus, to refuel, according to the Moscow Airport authorities.

Ukraine, which is the other option for a Russian aircraft to reach Moldova, has also banned Russian military aircraft from flying over its territory since conflict broke out in its eastern regions.

The Moldovan Democratic Party-led government warned Rogozin last week that his visit to Moldova would be inappropriate and that any Russian military delegation would be prevented from landing at Chisinau airport.

The Moldovan government banned Russian military from transiting its territory in 2014, after the annexation of Crimea. However, commercial flights are allowed.

On Thursday night, Moldovan border authorities at Chisinau airport also refused to allow entry to ten Russian artists on their way to Transnistria, where they said they were on a “charity mission”. Police also refused entry to Moldova to Russian MP Pavel Shperov, a member of Russia’s nationalist Liberal Democrat Party, led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky.

The Transnistrian Foreign Ministry said the ban on the entry to Moldova of Russian artists and politicians highlighted the provocative attitude of the Moldovan authorities towards Russia and its peacekeeping role in the region.

Moldovan President Dodon has condemned the ruling party and government for its attitude and had announced that he intended to receive Rogozin.

He met the Russian ambassador, Farit Muhametshin, on Friday morning to reassure him after the incidents at the airport and discuss the schedule of Rogozin’s visit, which included a joint press conference on Friday night.

“This type of behaviour is inacceptable. All those who engage in undermining bilateral relations with the Russian Federation will be identified and there will be a time when they will answer for what they did. Nothing is forgotten and nothing will be forgotten,” Dodon said after the meeting the Russian ambassador.

Having poured scorn and not an indecent amount of bile upon the refugee deal between the Obama administration and Canberra last year, US President Donald Trump was never going to make things easy for the resettlement of various groups held on Nauru and Manus Island.

Repeated emphasis has been made on the issue of how the anti-terrorism regime outlined in the USA Patriot Act disqualifies potential entrants, given the sheer scope of how “support” is defined. This is particularly applicable to the Tamils, numbering some 100, who might have been sympathetic to the cause of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam.

The true sufferers remain the refugees, who continue being shuffled and disposed in a broken international system that Australia insists on further fracturing. (It might be argued, with good grounds, that Australian governments have been instrumental in ensuring its failure.)

Another troubling feature of Canberra’s obstinacy lies is its inventive approach to the factual record. Both sides of the political aisle insist that the people-smuggling “market” model must be confronted, with a hammer wielded in determination against its workings. All done in the spirit of humanitarian sensibility, we are told.

Yet Amnesty International has noted instances where members of the Australian navy have paid those very smugglers to move their human cargo away from Australian waters. The model, in other words, thrives under the colluding eyes of states who prefer borders and regulation over humans and rights.

The tail in Canberra has continued to twist on this score. For one, where would those rejected by the US vetting process go? Even if some had passed muster under those “extreme vetting” procedures, what would it do to those with ties to Australia?

Disputes have emerged. One backer for the US-Australia resettlement deal was the United Nations through its various organs dealing with refugees. But conflicting claims between the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, and the Turnbull government about the resettling those captives on Manus Island and Nauru have surfaced.

We are long accustomed to the usual charge and counter-charge in these squabbles over how best to use and abuse a refugee debate. Enter milksop Grandi: “Australia’s policy of offshore processing in Papua New Guinea and Nauru, which denies access to asylum in Australia for refugees arriving by sea without a valid visa, has caused extensive, avoidable suffering for far too long.”

Grandi then gets to the crux: an explanation as to why the UNHCR, not exactly the most persuasive organisation, committed to the Australian-US agreement on resettling refugees. “We agreed to do so on the clear understanding that vulnerable refugees with close family ties in Australia would ultimately be allowed to settle there.”

Cue Grandi’s perplexed response to being “informed by Australia that it refuses to accept even these refugees, and that they, along with the others on Nauru and Papua New Guinea, have been informed that their only option is to remain where they are or to be transferred to Cambodia or the United States.”

Canberra’s UNHCR mission was also baffled. “We’ve maintained from the beginning,” claimed Catherine Stubberfield, “that allowing people with close family being able to come to Australia is a minimum, and unfortunately that’s not being honoured.” According to Stubberfield, this understanding would prevail even of those accepted by US authorities.

UN Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, Volker Turk, also added his name to the inventory of the deluded that families with ties to Australia would be prioritised. “We were hoping very much, based on the understanding, that Australia would be part of the solution, that we would find an agreement that would allow them to settle in Australia.”

Why Grandi and the UNHCR grandees should be puzzled is itself puzzling. The official policy from Canberra on refugees has been well minted for some years. In the dying days of an election campaign, a desperate Labor prime minister, Kevin Rudd, turned over a leaf on countering naval arrivals by declaring that any unprocessed individuals heading to Australia by boat would never be permitted settlement on the mainland.

A more reactionary, but consistently brutal Prime Minister Tony Abbott merely militarised the response, cloaking it with a secrecy that any authoritarian leader would be pleased with. The “never settle in Australia” approach persists with grim determination.

Last week, Rudd attempted to throw a dose of humanitarianism on the policy by insisting that, when he re-commenced the offshore processing system in July 2013, he had only intended a 12-month limit on operating the Manus Island centre. Rudd remains immaculately disingenuous on this score.

What we have on record is a clear case of double narratives, one spun for political convenience to an electorate hardened to Fortress Australia, and to diplomats charged with negotiating the resettlement program. Caught between two chairs, those on Manus and Nauru will fall between them, doomed to a comical and vicious solution that will see those rejected by the United States and Australia find testy homes in third, vastly inappropriate states.

The increasing sympathy and support Russians show for the figure of Stalin, psychiatrist Vyacheslav Tarasov says, reflects their sense that local officials aren’t preventing but rather promoting injustice and that a strong hand is needed to restore both order and justice. And that those ends are so important that they justify almost any means.

He tells Mikhail Karpov of the Lenta news agency that calls to Vladimir Putin during his Direct Line program showed that Russians now see that “the local authorities are extremely inert and inactive,” that they are very much upset about this, and that they want justice imposed by “a strong hand” (lenta.ru/articles/2017/07/29/stalin_good/).

It is that feeling and nothing else that explains why Russians increasingly view Stalin in a positive light and want to see his statue up in their cities and towns, Tarasov continues. For them, Stalin was someone who embodied just such strength and willingness to use force against all the little bosses. He is for them “the enemy of the enemies of the people.”

But it is important to remember that what Russians support about Stalin is not the actual historical figure but rather the picture they have of him, a picture that has been established artificially. This trend, the psychiatrist says, is “very worrisome” because no one knows just how far this “demand for a strong power and a strong hand” will go.

That two-thirds of Russians don’t want to be remined of Stalin’s crimes is completely logical, the psychiatrist says. They are ready “to forgive everything done by a strong and willful leader,” on the basis of the principle “’the end justified the means’” or as Stalin put it, “’when a forest is cut down, the chips fly.’”

Right now in Russia, Tarasov continues, “we can live until the moment when someone will come and say: ‘I free you from the chimera of conscience. Do everything for the good of the nation.’ This has all happened before in history and to what consequences it can lead is very well known.”

Most Russians justify their affection for Stalin by saying that he should be remembered as part of our history. But here as often is the case, “people are masking their true motives with noble ones.” No one wants to say directly: I want someone to come and kill all the evil dealers. But that is what he really means and wants.

Russians have been approaching this “gradually,” he says. “About five years ago, the figure of Leonid Brezhnev began to appear in a positive key,” even as “the best leader of the Soviet state for all the period of its existence.” But now there has been a change in landmarks as it were.

“In Brezhnev, the people valued stability, comparable well-being and a peaceful life without terrorist acts or social upheavals. But now that is not enough. Given the lengthy economic crisis and the broken relations with other countries, the former model has receded into second place, freeing the space for the model of Comrade Stalin.”

Not surprisingly, young people are among the most enthusiastic Stalinists, Tarasov says. “The young are always radical, they always need slogans and very simple answers to the most complicated questions. An understanding that there are no simple answers to complicated questions comes only with the passing of time.”

Today, the psychiatrist says, “Russia wants great deeds. The population has a demand for them. A monument to Stalin makes an individual feel attached to victory in the Great Fatherland War, to Stalin’s construction projects, and to many other achievements. That this was accompanied by repressions is something hardly anyone wants to think about.

As one good Russian film put it, “’No one ever remembers the victims; everyone always remembers the murderers.”

‘Omnipresent’ signs demonstrating the effects of human impact on England’s landscape have been revealed by researchers from the University of Leicester.

Concrete structures forming a new, human-made rock type; ash particles in the landscape; and plastic debris are just a few of the new materials irreversibly changing England’s landscape and providing evidence of the effects of the Anthropocene, the research suggests.

The research, which is published in the journal Proceedings of the Geologists’ Association, has been conducted by geologists Jan Zalasiewicz, Colin Waters, Mark Williams and Ian Wilkinson at the University of Leicester, working together with zoologist David Aldridge at Cambridge University, as part of a major review of the geological history of England organised by the Geologists’ Association.

Professor Jan Zalasiewicz, from the University of Leicester’s Department of Geology, said: “We are realising that the Anthropocene is a phenomenon on a massive scale — it is the transformation of our planet by human impact, in ways that have no precedent in the 4.54 billion years of Earth history. Our paper explores how these changes appear when seen locally, on a more modest scale, amid the familiar landscapes of England.”

Professor Mark Williams, from the University of Leicester’s Department of Geology, said: “These changes taken together are now virtually omnipresent as the mark of the English Anthropocene. They are only a small part of the Anthropocene changes that have taken place globally. But, to see them on one’s own doorstep brings home the sheer scale of these planetary changes — and the realisation that geological change does not recognise national boundaries.”

The Anthropocene — the concept that humans have so transformed geological processes at the Earth’s surface that we are living in a new epoch – was formulated by Nobel Laureate Paul Crutzen in 2000.

The research suggests that some of the changes surround us in the most obvious and visible way, though we rarely think of them as geology.

Examples include the concrete structures of our cities, which have almost all been built since the Second World War, and are just one small part of steep rise in the global prominence of this new, human-made rock type.

Other changes need a microscope to see, such as fly ash particles that have sprinkled over the landscape — a fossil signal of the smoke that belched out during industrialisation – or the skeletons of tiny algae in ponds and lakes across England, the types of which dramatically changed as the waters then acidified too.

Larger future fossils include the shells of highly successful biological invaders such as the zebra mussel and Asian clam, which now dominate large parts of the Thames and other river systems.

There are subterranean rock changes too, as coal mines, metro systems and boreholes have riddled the subsurface with holes and caverns.

The research also shows how the chemistry of soils and sediments has been marked by an influx of lead, copper and cadmium pollution – and by plastic debris, pesticide residues and radioactive plutonium.

For the first time, a team of scientists have calculated the distribution of all light energy contained within the Milky Way, which will provide new insight into the make-up of our galaxy and how stars in spiral galaxies such as ours form. The study is published in the journal Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society.

This research, conducted by astrophysicists at the University of Central Lancashire (UCLan), in collaboration with colleagues from the Max Planck Institute for Nuclear Physics in Heidelberg, Germany and from the Astronomical Institute of the Romanian Academy, also shows how the stellar photons, or stellar light, within the Milky Way control the production of the highest energy photons in the Universe, the gamma-rays. This was made possible using a novel method involving computer calculations that track the destiny of all photons in the galaxy, including the photons that are emitted by interstellar dust, as heat radiation.

Previous attempts to derive the distribution of all light in the Milky Way based on star counts have failed to account for the all-sky images of the Milky Way, including recent images provided by the European Space Agency’s Planck Space Observatory, which map out heat radiation or infrared light.

Lead author Prof Cristina Popescu from the University of Central Lancashire, said: “We have not only determined the distribution of light energy in the Milky Way, but also made predictions for the stellar and interstellar dust content of the Milky Way.”

By tracking all stellar photons and making predictions for how the Milky Way should appear in ultraviolet, visual and heat radiation, scientists have been able to calculate a complete picture of how stellar light is distributed throughout our Galaxy. An understanding of these processes is a crucial step towards gaining a complete picture of our Galaxy and its history.

The modelling of the distribution of light in the Milky Way follows on from previous research that Prof Popescu and Dr Richard Tuffs from the Max Planck Institute for Nuclear Physics conducted on modelling the stellar light from other galaxies, where the observer has an outside view.

Commenting on the research, Dr Tuffs, one of the co-authors of the paper, said: “It has to be noted that looking at galaxies from outside is a much easier task than looking from inside, as in the case of our Galaxy.”

Scientists have also been able to show how the stellar light within our Galaxy affects the production of gamma-ray photons through interactions with cosmic rays. Cosmic rays are high-energy electrons and protons that control star and planet formation and the processes governing galactic evolution. They promote chemical reactions in interstellar space, leading to the formation of complex and ultimately life-critical molecules.

Dr Tuffs added: “Working backwards through the chain of interactions and propagations, one can work out the original source of the cosmic rays.”

The research, funded by the Leverhulme Trust, was strongly interdisciplinary, bringing together optical and infrared astrophysics and astro-particle physics. Prof Popescu notes: “We had developed some of our computational programs before this research started, in the context of modelling spiral galaxies, and we need to thank the UK’s Science and Technology Facility Council (STFC) for their support in the development of these codes. This research would also not have been possible without the support of the Leverhulme Trust, which is greatly acknowledged.”

By Amir Hossein Estebari

The recent conflict between Qatar and three members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is the toughest of its kind. Even though Saudi Arabia properly is in no doubt over the power of the new economic and political sanctions imposed on Qatar – supported by ten Islamic countries – so as to modify Qatar’s behavior in foreign policy, the hypothesis of this article predicts Saudi Arabia, as the dominant state in Arabian Peninsula and the leading rival for Iran in the Persian Gulf, is subject to a number of unintended but profound adverse consequences in medium and long term for its harsh policy towards Qatar.

The Reasons Underlying the Conflict

Discovering the deep roots of the recent Qatar diplomatic crisis is not the main focus of this article. However, if a glance at these roots is regarded necessary for a compelling final analysis, two primary reasons behind the crisis can be articulated:

• After the coup d’état in 1995 – by which Hamad bin Khalifa successfully deposed his father to become the new Emir of Qatar – the United Arab Emirates (UAE) granted asylum to the deposed Khalifa bin Hamad, which was considered a malevolent plot, developed by UAE, along with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, against the new Emir.
• This alleged conspiracy, plus the eye-catching economic growth in Qatar, which made it the richest country per capita in the world, were enough to hearten the new Emir to make unprecedented shifts in foreign policy towards more independence in decision making and seeking expansion of his regional and global influence in order to step out from the shadow of Saudi Arabia [1]. Relations with the enemies or rivals of Saudi Arabia – such as Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas and Iran – along with the increasing controversial influence of Aljazeera on the Arab world are adequate justifications for Saudi Arabia to regard new Qatar as a credible threat, capable of modifying the regional status quo in the Arabian Peninsula, the Persian Gulf and even the Middle East – where Saudi Arabia has had an upper hand for at least three decades.

Miscalculations by Saudi Arabia

The decision of intensifying pressure on Qatar – implemented by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and some other countries – for the sake of a behavioral change in Qatar, must have been provoked by two main incentives:

• Arab public opinion would support the decision: Amidst a similar diplomatic crisis between Qatar and the same three members of GCC in 2014, a pervasive hatred for Qatar was discernible in many parts of Middle East and North Africa, mainly in Egypt, Libya, UAE and Palestine (West Bank) on the grounds of Qatar’s support in favor of Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic groups [2].
• Pressures would be strong enough for a behavioral change: Qatar is highly integrated with its Arab neighbors. Approximately 80 percent of its food resources are imported through the border with Saudi Arabia and the ports in UAE. In 2015, the value of Qatar’s trade flows totaled over $2 billion with Saudi Arabia, $7 billion with the UAE, and $500 million with Bahrain. Qatar exports more to those three countries than it imports. Moreover, the banking sector’s exposure to Qatar is estimated to be around $60 billion by Saudi Arabia and UAE [3].

Notwithstanding the fact that Qatar will be a big loser of abundant economic opportunities, it seems Saudi Arabia and its allies have miscalculated their expected returns:

• The public opinion support is apparently lower-than-expected: Despite the fact that the majority of UAE citizens are very skeptical of Qatar’s foreign policy as their main competitor in the region, an online survey by a former advisor to Abu Dhabi government – asking if it was right to cut ties with Qatar – was deleted after 65 per cent of respondents decided it was not. Moreover, governments in UAE and Bahrain have warned anyone who expresses sympathy with Qatar on social media to face lengthy jail terms [4]. If sanctions on Qatar had an adequate amount of support, no warnings like these were required.
• Qatar is not isolated yet: Iran and Turkey are competing to fill Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain’s shoes in Qatar. Oman and Kuwait – as GCC members – have taken a more moderate position towards Qatar, making efforts to resolve the crisis in GCC as mediators. The US secretary of states and officials in Qatar, merely a month after the crisis, signed a new memorandum on tracking the flow of terrorist financing in the region, followed by France foreign minister and Turkey president’s trip to Doha.

Apart from incurring losses, the crisis is likely to bring new business opportunities and introduce new geopolitical alliances for Qatar. The solidification of alternative channels over time might replace current ties with the GCC members [5].

Potential Implications for Saudi Arabia

Missing anticipated returns should not be the only concern for Saudi Arabia. There is every likelihood that their rush in decision making to maintain the status quo in Arabian Peninsula will take its toll on Saudi Arabia’s regional influence in a couple of ways:

1. Strategic Vision: Since “national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another” [6], the GCC members came up with the idea of a common defense force called ‘Peninsula Shield Force’ during the chaotic years of the battle between Iran and Iraq in 1980s, as a collective response to any potential threats from Iran on the borders of Kuwait. Although this shield has not been fully developed due to lack of sufficient military and logistic capabilities plus the members’ continuous dependency on great powers such as the USA, the UK, and France on the subject of security issues [7], any opportunities for further security interdependence between GCC members will be definitely lost in the aftermath of the halt in food supply to Qatar by Saudi Arabia and its allies, threatening the life of every citizen in this little country. This ‘moment of truth’ reminds Qatar and even other GCC members of what John J. Mearscheimer calls ‘the False Promise of International Institutions’ [8]. Therefore, not only rulers in Qatar perceive their giant neighbor as an undependable ally, but also a credible threat in the region from now on, which highly encourage them to assume the regional system in Persian Gulf totally ‘anarchic’ resulting in stronger ‘self-help’ policies and more dependency on great powers rather than reliance on Saudi Arabia in the framework of Peninsula Shield.
2. Regional Integration: There are numerous factors enhancing the Gulf Cooperation Council ‘capacity’ to be a successful example of regional Integration in international politics: common race, common language, common religion, and similar culture are among the determining factors that even the European Union as the most successful case of regional integration lacks. However, Saudi Arabia adversely affects ‘perceptual conditions’ needed for motivating Qatar to stay active in the process of integration within GCC like before [9].The history of international relations has proved serious divisions in regional or international organizations is usually to the detriment of the remaining members; and unquestionably, Gulf Cooperation Council is not an exception.
3. Shaping an Unprecedented History: As Alexander Wendt writes “the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces” [10]. Saudi Arabia is definitely in the process of shaping a new history in the Persian Gulf by shaping a sort of ‘Historical’ or ‘Collective Memory’ among the citizens in Qatar, and even in other Arab countries. Collective memory is understood as a representation of the past shared by a group or community [11]. Amities, animosities, and wars have been frequently legitimated by the historical memory of the people in the Middle East: Iranians’ aversion to Britain and Russia since Persian Constitutional Revolution (1905 – 1911) and the coup d’état against Mohammad Mosadegh (1953); Saddam Hussein’s ‘Qadisiyyah’ [12] against Iran (1980 – 1988); the Kingdom of Oman’s long-lasting gratitude towards Iran for its substantial assistance during Omani Civil War (1963-76). These examples imply how Saudi Arabia will be subject to the negative consequences of its new picture, being formed in the Collective Memory of the citizens in Qatar, which can last for a long time and legitimates potential conflicts between two countries in the long run.
4. Arab Gulf Identity: The dream and considerable political efforts to unite Arab nations under the name of a common ‘Arab Identity’ against western imperialists, peaking during the tenure of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, gradually came to a tragic end after Arab armies’ defeat in six-day war with Israel in 1967, Anwar Sadat’s signing of Camp David Accords in 1978, and was totally demolished following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. However, owing to the historical ‘Social Interactions’ [13] between Arab states of the Persian Gulf, a new ‘Arab Gulf Identity’ was created for their security concerns during Iran-Iraq war, which led to the establishment of Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981. The inconceivable invasion of Kuwait necessitated the protection of this common identity more than before. Unexpectedly, for the time being, this is Saudi Arabia who is threatening this common identity by imposing sanctions on Qatar. This encourages Qatar to work more on constructing its own national identity, which can be easily regarded as a deviation from the common identity of Arab states in Persian Gulf. After the recent crisis, a motto was observable everywhere in Qatar saying “all of us Tamim, all of us Qatar” which implies the public support for Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani the current Emir of Qatar and reveals a sort of patriotic reaction against the sanctions. Needless to say, scholars believe all Arab states of Persian Gulf are in high demand of building a national identity among their citizens for two main reasons: Firstly, the large number of immigrants in these countries outnumbers the citizens. As an example, merely less than 10 percent of residents in Qatar are citizens. Secondly, rapid cultural changes due to the high-speed modernization in these countries will definitely bring cultural and identity issues among citizens. The same reason exactly led to the collapse of the previous regime in Iran in 1979 with many lessons for the monarchies of Persian Gulf. The main problem is Arab identity has been repeatedly exploited by Arab leaders like Nasser or Saddam for the sake of following merely their own personal or national interests, not the Arab world. Apparently, the same story applies to Arab Gulf Identity by Saudi Arabia.
5.  Leadership: Leadership defines what the future should look like, aligns people, with that vision, and inspires them to make it happen, despite any obstacles [14]. According to this definition, Saudi Arabia needs to align its neighbors with a clear vision of the regional system and inspire them to shape it. Leadership is never about the leader but always about team building, leading change, good listening, and developing a vision. Evidently, these characteristics cannot be seen in Saudi Arabia’s policy towards Qatar. It seems the giant player of Arabian Peninsula merely prioritizes its hegemony over its neighbors’ interests; it plays against a team member (Qatar); it is not a good listener; and hence, it cannot lead a new change in the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia has called its leadership competencies in Arabian Peninsula into question. Saudis might have hegemony in the region thanks to their hardware and software elements of power, but leadership demands recognition by the members of a team. Such a strategic mistake heartens Iran and Turkey to boost their roles in the region.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that Qatar is under a lot of economic and political pressure after the sanctions, but all the demerits are not only Qatar’s: There are numerous consequences for Saudi Arabia of which the authorities in this country ought to be cautious. It seems Saudis suffer from a sort of rush in formulating their foreign policy and they had an impetuous reaction towards their rivals, something which is unhappily pervasive in the Middle East.

References:
1.     For more information on the new roles Qatar is playing in global politics, see: Mohammed Nuruzzaman, “Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Qatar and Dispute Mediations: A Critical Investigation”, Contemporary Arab Affairs (2015)

2.     The writer presents it as a fact according to the reports delivered by observers in Egypt, Libya, UAE and West Bank, published via news agencies including BBC, AFP and AP.

3.     Nader Kabbani, “The High Cost of High Stakes: Economic Implications of the 2017 Gulf Crisis” (Brookings Institution, June 2015): https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/06/15/the-high-cost-of-high-stakes-economic-implications-of-the-2017-gulf-crisis/

4.     “Qatar Crisis Spills onto Social Media”, The Straits Times, (Jun 13, 2017): http://www.straitstimes.com/world/middle-east/qatar-crisis-spills-onto-social-media

5.     Nader Kabbani, Ibid.

6.     Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda For International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1981), p. 190

7.     Yoel Guzansky, “Defence Cooperation in the Arabian Gulf: The Peninsula Shield Force Put to the Test”, Middle Eastern Studies (Vol. 50, Issue 4, 2014), pp. 640 – 654

8.     John J. Mearscheimer: “The False Promise of International Institutions”, International Security (Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49

9.     For more information on the terms ‘capacity’ and ‘perceptual conditions’ in regional integration theories, see:

Joseph S. Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971) p. 83-86

10.    Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.1

11.    Wulf Kansteiner, “Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies,” History and Theory (Vol.  41, May 2002), p. 180.

12.   ‘Al-Qadisiyyah’ was the climactic battle between Arab Muslims and Sassanid Empire which led to the historical conquest of Persia by Arabs. Saddam Hussein referred frequently to this battle, to cast the contemporary hostilities between Iraq and Iran as a replay of the ancient encounter.

13.     Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (New York: Cornell University Press, 1996), p.2

14.    J. P. Kotter,  Leading Change (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1996).

A lawmaker has caused a storm in Malaysia for saying that women who deny sex to their husbands were committing a form of “psychological and emotional abuse.”

Che Mohamad Zulkifly Jusoh from the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition was speaking during a domestic violence debate in parliament.

The Malaysian government is mulling whether to amend laws against domestic violence.

Mohamad Zulkifly, 58, from Terengganu state said men “suffered emotional rather than physical abuse.”

“Even though men are said to be physically stronger than women, there are cases where wives hurt or abuse their husbands in an extreme manner,” the BBC quoted him as saying.

“Usually, it involves wives cursing their husbands: this is emotional abuse. They insult their husbands and refuse his sexual needs. All these are types of psychological and emotional abuse.”

The politician’s stand sparked widespread outrage, including condemnation from Marina Mahathir, a women’s rights activist and daughter of former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed.

“This is an old notion, that when you marry a women you own her body. It does not work that way,” she told the AFP news agency.

“Women have a right to say no to sex. It is ridiculous to say men are abused if women say no.”

Online anger flared, following Mohamad Zulkifly’s comments on July 26.

“Social illness and corruption are problems to tackle first. Lawmakers can be sex therapists later,” said Sharkawi Lu from Labuan Island. “What a joke Malaysia has become.”

“Women are not sexual tools,” said Gopenatan Madaven. “You need to respect and share their feelings.”

By Elise Harris

During his six-day visit to Colombia in September, Pope Francis will beatify martyrs Bishop Jesús Emilio Jaramillo Monsalve and Fr. Pedro María Ramírez Ramos, who provide a potent testimony as the country heals from decades of conflict.

Bishop Jaramillo was killed by Colombian Marxist guerrillas forces in 1989, while Fr. Ramirez was murdered at the start of the Colombian Civil War in 1948.

The two were recognized as martyrs by the Vatican earlier this year, and will be beatified during the Pope’s Sept. 6-12 visit to Colombia, which he is making largely to encourage efforts for peace and reconciliation after more than 50 years of violent conflict that has left some 200,000 people dead.

Given the nature of their deaths, the two can be seen as belonging to a new wave of “modern martyrs” Pope Francis has often referred to, killed by oppressive regimes of their time such as Nazism, communism and brutal dictatorships.

Born in Santo Domingo, Colombia, in 1916, Bishop Jamillo was one of the many thousands of victims of the 52-year-long civil war between the government and guerrilla rebels.

After intensive seminary studies in philosophy, humanities and theology, in 1940 he was ordained a priest with the Xaverian Missionaries of Yarumal at the age of 24. Just four years later, in 1944, he received his doctorate in theology.

Immediately after his ordination Jamillo was sent to serve in the Sabanalarga municipality in the northern most tip of Colombia. Part of the Barranquilla Archdiocese, the area was known at the time to be hostile, and the people had very primitive religious knowledge.

Although the assignment only lasted four months, it cemented in the future martyr a love for both the priesthood and his vocation as a missionary.

In a letter to his rector at the time, Fr. Aníbal Muñoz Duque, Jamillo said “I think that now my spirit is more capable of appreciating the greatness of my missionary vocation, I feel like Christ; I feel in the depths of my being the great love for my sheep.”

After finishing the assignment, Jamillo was then appointed at a professor at the Order’s seminary, where he quickly became known for his clarity, spiritual depth and love for the priesthood. During this time, he also served as a spiritual director at the seminary and worked at the Women’s Prison in Bogotá.

He was named director of novices at the age of 30, and in the year 1950 was named Second Assistant to the Secretary General of the Order and Rector of the seminary. He was easily recognized by those around him for his smile, good humor and pastoral advice.

In 1959 Jamillo was elected Superior General of the Order, guiding them through the years of the Second Vatican Council and the many changes that ensued.

Eight years into his 10 year mandate, he asked permission to step down as Superior General, and began working for the bishops conference as and adviser to the National Council of the Laity.

Not long after, in 1970, Bl. Pope Paul VI named him Apostolic Vicar of Arauca, and he was ordained a bishop in 1971. Just 13 years later, the vicariate was elevated to a diocese, and Jamillo became the first residential bishop of the area.

He quickly gained a reputation as a selfless servant who was close to his people, and launched several pastoral projects aimed at helping the local population.

Jamillo became an outspoken critic of the violence that was being committed by the National Liberation Army (ELN) at the time, however, he was also unafraid to call out what he referred to as a climate of fear among the people that often prompted them to retaliate against the guerrillas.

It was his public criticism of violence that led to his kidnapping Oct. 2, 1989, as he was making a pastoral visit to local parishes in Fortul. According to his biography, he celebrated Mass and administered some Sacraments before setting out for the city on foot when he and his delegation were stopped by armed militants dressed as peasants.

They asked for the bishop, telling him they were members of the ELN and that he was being kidnapped in order to “send a message” to the national government. One of the priests traveling with Jamillo, Fr. Helmer Muñoz, realized what was happening and refused to leave the bishop’s side.

The two were driven for several hours before stopping in a remote location. After praying together and absolving each others’ sins, Jamillo ordered Fr. Muñoz to leave out of obedience when the captors demanded that he go. As he was walking away, Muñoz heard the the bishops’ last known words, when he said: “I will speak to whoever you want me to, but please, don’t do anything to my son.”

Despite reassurances from the captors that Bishop Jamillo would not be hurt, when Fr. Muñoz returned to the spot the following morning he found the bishop’s body. Jamillo was lying on his back in the form of a cross, having been shot in the head twice; his episcopal ring was gone, and his pectoral cross had been broken.

He was buried shortly after and dubbed by the faithful of Arauca as “prophet and martyr of peace,” which is engraved on his tombstone.

The murder of Fr. Pedro María Ramírez Ramos also came at another contentious point in Colombia’s history, when the country was facing divisions after the death of left-wing presidential candidate Jorge Eliecer Gaitan.

Born in La Plata, Colombia Oct. 23, 1899, Ramirez was just 12-years-old when his brother, Luis Antonio, invited him to join the seminary. He was officially enrolled in the seminary of Mayor de Garzon in 1915, but left in 1920. However, he entered the seminary again in 1928, this time in Ibague.

Ramírez was ordained a priest just three years later on June 21, 1931. He then served as pastor in various cities until 1946, when he was assigned to Armero just as political conflict in the country began to intensify.

After Gaitan’s death, tensions between liberals and conservatives reached a fever pitch, eventually leading to Colombia’s 10-year civil war, which lasted from 1948-1958 and is commonly referred to as “La Violencia,” or “the Violence.” It was out of this conflict that many of the left-leaning guerrilla groups who have fought against the government for the past 50 years rose.

Amid the chaos of the war, many liberal party groups in Armero protested Gaitan’s death by taking up arms, widely accusing the Church of joining forces with the conservative party; accusations they backed with the Church’s alleged support for conservatives and their frequent appeals to nonviolence.

It was in this atmosphere that an angry mob, alight with anti-religious sentiments, stormed Fr. Ramirez’s parish and a nearby convent April 9, 1949, in an attempt to arrest him.

They started throwing stones and eventually broke into the curial house and went to the chapel, where Fr. Ramirez was praying. He managed to escape with the help of one of the nuns.

The next morning, Ramirez continued his schedule as normal, celebrating Mass and visiting a wounded man in prison. Despite numerous pleas from parishioners and even the city’s mayor to leave town, Ramirez refused, insisting that he would not leave the sisters or the Blessed Sacrament alone.

After returning from the prison, the priest created an escape plan for the sisters, and had them consume all the consecrated hosts, leaving just one for himself. He then stayed in the convent to pen his last will and testament before the mob returned.

In the letter with his testament, Ramirez wrote that “I want to die for Christ and for his faith.” He thanked the bishop for allowing him to become a priest for the people of Armero, “for whom I want to spill my blood.”

“To my family, I will go ahead so that they follow the example of dying for Christ. With special affection, I will look at them from heaven,” he wrote.

Later that afternoon, as the mob returned, he consumed the last host and left his stole and serving vestments with a statue of Our Lady so they would not be desecrated before going out to meet the crowd.

The mob took Fr. Ramirez and beat him with sticks and their fists before bashing his head with a machete. As he fell to the ground, the priest shouted “Father, forgive them! All for Christ!” He was then decapitated, however, his body was later recovered and preserved from further desecration.

Pope Francis has often said that there are more martyrs now than in the early Church, and has praised them as sources of life and strength for the faith.

In an April 22, 2017, liturgy honoring the “new martyrs” of the Church, the Pope noted how in many communities around the world Christians are “objects of persecution.” However, he also noted that it is in difficult moments that people frequently call for “heroes.”

The Church today also needs the heroic witness of martyrs and saints, he said, explaining that this includes “the saints of everyday life,” who move forward with coherency, but also those who “have the courage to accept the grace of being witnesses until the end, until death.”

“All of them are the living blood of the Church. They are the witnesses who carry the Church forward,” he said. By demonstrating with their lives that Jesus is alive and risen, they also “attest with the coherency of their lives and with the strength of the Holy Spirit that they have received this gift.”

(RFE/RL) — Pakistan’s deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has named his brother, Shahbaz, as his successor and nominated former Oil Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi as an interim premier.

“I support Shahbaz Sharif after me, but he will take time to contest elections, so for the time being I nominate Shahid Khaqan Abbasi,” Sharif said on July 29 in a televised speech to his party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N).

The move comes following the resignation of Sharif on July 28 that was announced shortly after the country’s Supreme Court ordered his removal from office in connection with corruption charges stemming from the Panama Papers leak in 2016.

Abbasi is set to be rubber-stamped as placeholder in a parliamentary vote, with the ruling PML-N party holding a strong majority in the 342-seat legislature. Abbasi, 58, is seen as a staunch Sharif loyalist. It was not immediately clear when the vote would take place.

The interim leader would be in power for at least 45 days until Shahbaz Sharif steps down as the head of the Punjab government and contests a by-election to the National Assembly.

Shahbaz Sharif, 65, has been in charge of Punjab since 2008. He has built a reputation as a competent administrator and has so far been unscathed by the corruption allegations engulfing his brother’s family.

Opposition leader Imran Khan, who spearheaded the corruption complaint against Sharif, condemned the ousted premier’s choice of his brother to eventually succeed him.

Sharif “is insulting the nation’s intelligence” and “making a mockery of democracy” by nominating his brother, Khan tweeted on July 29.

The Supreme Court court ruling came immediately after an investigative panel alleged that Sharif’s family could not account for what it said was vast wealth in offshore companies.

Sharif has denied any wrongdoing.

The five-judge panel’s unanimous decision, issued amid tight security in the capital, Islamabad, and Sharif’s immediate resignation has plunged the nuclear-armed nation into a political crisis.

Raja Zafarul Haq, a top leader of Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) party, said that the deposed prime minister will attend the meeting on July 29.

Geo TV reported that Sharif recommended his brother as his replacement as prime minister in a meeting held with senior party leaders after the Supreme Court’s verdict.

Among possible allies to replace Sharif in the short term are members of his outgoing cabinet, including Defense Minister Asif Khawaja and Petroleum Minister Shahid Abbasi.

If elected, the interim leader would be in power for at least 45 days until Shehbaz steps down as the head of the Punjab government and contests a by-election to the National Assembly.

Shahbaz Sharif, 65, has been in charge of Punjab since 2008. He has built a reputation as a competent administrator.

Pakistani media report that Shahbaz has in recent years presented his country at several international forums, including the United Nations.

No prime minister has completed a full term in power in Pakistan since the country gained independence from British colonial rule in 1947.

Sharif, 67, is among the major political casualties of the Panama Papers leaks that brought offshore finance under the spotlight.

Documents from the Panama-based Mossack Fonseca law firm that were made public in April 2016 revealed that three of Sharif’s four children owned offshore companies and assets not shown on his family’s wealth statement.

Sharif’s son Hussain Nawaz at the time acknowledged owning offshore companies but insisted they used legal money to set up businesses abroad.

In 2016, Icelandic Prime Minister Sigmundur David Gunnlaugsson stepped down amid public outrage that his family had sheltered money offshore.

One of Sharif’s two previous stints as prime minister was cut short by a military coup in 1999.

He returned from exile to win a convincing victory in parliamentary elections in 2013.

By Sam Morgan

(EurActiv) — The first half of 2017 saw 6.1 gigawatts of extra wind power capacity installed in Europe. But a lack of long-term political commitment has hit investment and market concentration remains problematic.

Wind power now tops 160GW and satisfies over 10% of the EU’s power needs, firmly placing it among one of the bloc’s main energy sources.

Last year, wind overtook coal to become the EU’s second largest power capacity, behind only natural gas, which still provides just under 200GW of European power supply, according to figures provided by WindEurope.

That growth is reflected in the 6.1GW of extra capacity that was added in the first six months of 2017 alone, including 4.8GW of onshore and 1.3GW of offshore.

But new asset financing took a hit compared to a record six-month-period in 2016. The first half of 2017 saw €8.3bn pumped into wind power, down from the €14bn of the same period last year.

Market concentration has also emerged as a concern, after 53% of investments were made in Germany. No offshore investment was made in the United Kingdom.

After the UK government decided to end existing subsidies for new onshore windfarms as of April the sector has taken a hit and several experts, including the head of Scottish Power and the chair of the Energy Transitions Commission, have called on Westminster to rethink the decision.

Offshore wind has actually made impressive progress in relying less and less on support though and as of 2017 the market now largely self-funds the power source. In 2010, offshore still relied on subsidies for nearly 50% of its costs.

WindEurope Chief Policy Officer Pierre Tardieu said wind growth “is driven by a handful of markets” and warned that “at least ten EU countries have yet to install a single MW so far this year”.

In 2016, the market was equally concentrated as an overwhelming proportion of new capacity was installed by Germany, followed at a distance by France and the UK.

Offshore capacity remains focused on Northwest Europe, due to the suitability of the North Sea for windfarms and the lower construction costs involved. As a result, WindEurope has rated the offshore outlook of the UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany as positive.

It is a different story in terms of onshore, due to concerns about slow-downs in key markets. The predictions were made based on regulatory signals, turbine orders and investment trends.

Tardieu insisted that “member states should come forward as soon as possible with their National Energy and Climate Plans to 2030”, which will “give sorely needed visibility to the wind energy supply chain”.

On Wednesday (26 July), Spain held a renewables auction that saw 1.1GW awarded to wind projects, on top of the 3GW that was earmarked in May.

The Spanish Wind Energy Association revealed that these projects, coupled with those awarded last year, will translate into investments worth over €4.5bn and create over 25,000 hobs during construction.

WindEurope’s Tardieu welcomed the development but warned that “due to the four-year market standstill, we’re playing catch-up”. He added that “these types of stop- and go policies are extremely disruptive for the wind supply chain”.

The European Commission has proposed a three-year visibility requirement for renewables auctions in order to provide more stability for the sector. The EU executive maintains that regular awards is the most effective way to secure the energy transition.

Aficionados use words like “oaky” to describe some wines, or “hoppy” when talking about certain beers. But for rum—a product with over 1,000 different varieties—putting the words together to describe what imbibers are smelling and tasting is a bit more difficult.

Consequently, researchers at the University of Illinois were interested in creating a rum flavor lexicon, but needed to find a way around the biggest problem with tasting rum—sensory fatigue.

Having a set of terms, or a flavor lexicon, helps manufacturers and consumers communicate about what sets each variety of a food or beverage apart using a standardized vocabulary. But when it comes to tasting rum or other high-alcohol content beverages, in order to describe and classify what they are experiencing, tasters run into “sensory fatigue” after just a few samples because of the alcohol. This makes it difficult to accurately describe the nuances found in all the different varieties of the product.

In a recent paper published in the Journal of Food Science, “flavor scientists” in the Department of Food Science and Human Nutrition at the U of I present a novel rum flavor lexicon by turning to what rum experts were already saying on the internet. Using rum enthusiast blogs, company websites, and product reviews for over 1,000 varieties of rum online, theirs is the first study to create a rum flavor lexicon using web-based materials.

Keith Cadwallader, a professor of food science at U of I, says despite the popularity of rum right now, not much research has been done, in terms of the flavor chemistry or flavor science of the product. “Rum is an unexplored area, especially considering the diversity of the product. There are over 1,000 kinds of rum, which makes it hard to define.”

Unlike other types of distilled spirits, such as whiskey, rum has few limitations on what defines it as a product—what makes a rum, a rum, so to speak. The only production requirement is that the distillate must be produced from a sugarcane by-product.

In Cadwallader’s lab, he and others study all aspects of flavor, particularly aroma. “We’re interested in compounds that have some kind of odor impression that can be detected by humans,” he says. They have studied products like whiskey and cheese in the past.

But Cadwallader says curiosity led them to find a way around the problem with tasting rum.

Chelsea Ickes, a doctoral student in Cadwallader’s lab, says typically a descriptive analysis panel is used to describe what the tasters are smelling and tasting in a product. “You would need to taste rums representative of all the different categories. With so many types of rums available you would need to first screen nearly all of them and then choose ones representative of different categories or classes, and just evaluate those subsets of rums to create a lexicon. This could still be 50 or more different rums due the huge diversity of the spirit,” she explains.

But after just a few samples, tasters experience sensory fatigue. “If you drink distilled spirits, the alcohol content can be a little overwhelming and it becomes hard to pick out all the different attributes that are present. A panel may only be able to analyze two to four samples a day. Additionally, you have to use a trained or experienced panel, and samples must be evaluated multiple times. So, it takes a long time, a lot of training, and it’s an expensive product as well.”

Considering the time, cost, and limitations due to sensory fatigue, Ickes and Cadwallader began scouring the internet for reliable sources of rum descriptors.

“For rum, because so many people are enthusiasts, there are lots of reviews and descriptions online. So the information is readily available,” Ickes says. “Instead of having a panel drink and evaluate all of those rums, we just took the data from people who are already interested in rum and who have taken the time to review, rate, and describe the product. We then collected all of those data to create a lexicon from the terms enthusiasts are already using.”

Overall, the researchers collected data from 17 websites and 57 companies (product descriptions), comprising over 3,000 individual reviews. Rum evaluations were coded for aroma, aroma-by-mouth, and taste attributes.

Ten individuals participated in a sorting exercise to categorize all the unique terms that were identified in the online search. The final lexicon, organized in a wheel by categories, and color-coded, includes 147 terms and 22 categories.

So, what does rum taste like, according to the internet?

Some of the categories include caramel, baking spices, fruity, woody, sugar, and dried fruit to name a few. More specific descriptors within those categories include words like vanilla, coconut, molasses, walnut, and smooth, as well as others not as clearly defined or understood.

“These are terms used by people in the industry, and some are not common English words,” Cadwallader says. “These are terms that maybe people in the industry understand and already use. But, you have to figure out what they mean. Though, I think this approach is sometimes more useful than just having 12 people come to a lab and develop new terms that aren’t used by industry professionals.”

Lexicons have been developed for other products like cheeses, spices, bread, olive oil, beer, and wine. “What’s limiting with the web-based rum lexicon is that it only describes finished products. Distillers may want a lexicon to evaluate the product throughout the process,” Ickes says. “You would probably need to add more terms that better describe intermediate products, like the distillate or the fermentation broth that are not going to be covered by the terms used to describe only the finished rum.”

In addition, Ickes notes that, “Trained panelists, people who have been trained to perceive odors and aromas, may pick up on notes that the average consumer does not notice, or off notes that are in the final products that distillers might need to be aware of and don’t want in their final products. Those terms might need to be added to better evaluate samples.”

Rum enthusiasts and manufactures will certainly find the lexicon useful, but Ickes is already using it to train sensory panels to analyze premium rums and find the driving sensory attributes that distinguish these from mixing rums.

The paper, “Novel creation of a rum flavor lexicon through the use of web-based material,” is published in the Journal of Food Science. Co-authors include Chelsea M. Ickes, Soo-Yeun Lee, and Keith R. Cadwallader, all in the Department of Food Science and Human Nutrition in The College of Agricultural, Consumer and Environmental Sciences at the U of I.

By Erik Ribeiro

On June 26, Brazil’s acting President Michel Temer was formally charged of passive corruption, weeks after the JBS SA bribery case was leaked to the public. Headquartered in São Paulo, JBS is Brazil’s leading agri-business company and the world’s top meat processer and packer. President Temer’s indictment comes on top of his controversial austerity measures – budget, labour and pension reforms – that were put to vote in 2017. Temer’s popularity level has since fallen to seven per cent and more charges are expected to be pressed against him in the near future. This is the lowest popularity rating of any Brazilian president since the democratic transition in 1989.

In fact, all major political parties in Brazil today stand discredited because of their implication in cases of corruption. Following more than three years of investigations by the Federal Police, very few mainstream politicians have managed to maintain a sound reputation. This seems to be opening the way for alternate leadership to emerge from among the country’s influential judicial, corporate and even conservative religious elite. The ongoing leadership crisis has exposed the several fault lines in the country’s political system. Thus, the next general elections scheduled in October 2018 will be held amidst a deepening legitimacy crisis in the Brazilian politics.

The Crisis

The formation of broad-based coalitions with multiple and divergent interests has been a common feature of Brazil’s multi-party system. In general, the leading party seldom has a majority even within the coalition, and alliances are not based on political ideologies but bargaining and quid pro quo measures. One of the traditional ways of gathering support is to distribute key positions in ministries and public companies. Until 2014, political pacts were respected and usually remained outside the public domain. A notable exception was the Mensalão scandal (2006). It can be translated as “big monthly payment”, which was given by the central government to allied Congressmen to get the proposed bills approved.

From 2003 to 2016, Brazil was ruled by a left-centre coalition led by the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores – PT). Luis Inácio Lula da Silva’s government (2003-2010) led during a period of sustained economic growth, improved social standards and high popularity ratings. Unlike his successors, Lula was able to conciliate the interests of the executive and the legislative, although it came at the expense of his ambitious economic and political reform programmes. After the 2008 global crisis, Dilma Rousseff’s government (2010-2016) could not sustain the same levels of economic growth, with public debt and inflation rising in the last years of her rule.

Since June 2013, the Workers’ Party’s popularity was on decline in view of growing charges of corruption and political impunity coupled with a huge spending amounting to more than USD seven billion for hosting the 2014 World Cup. Meanwhile, the student protests in São Paulo over the rise in transportation fares were harshly repressed by the government, leading to an escalation in violence and popular demand for political change throughout the country. This provided an opportunity for the national media, opposition parties and conservative groups to further propagate their own agenda, blaming the Workers’ Party for institutionalising corruption and indulging in high public spending. The plebiscite on electoral reforms proposed by President Rousseff was also rejected by Congress, which preferred a more moderate anti-corruption bill. The Federal Supreme Court, however, declared funding of election campaigns by private companies as unconstitutional. This new rule came into force during the 2016 municipal elections.

In 2014, the Brazilian Federal Police began to investigate cases of corruption under Operation Lava Jato (or Car Wash). They found that executives of Petrobras SA were overpaying in contracts with all major construction companies such as Odebrecht, Camargo Correa, Andrade Gutierrez, and OAS. This extra-profit was being distributed to key people involved in the scheme, including mainstream politicians from all major parties, who used the money to fund their electoral campaigns.

From a geopolitical angle, there was also interference from the United States (US). On September 2013, the US National Security Agency (NSA) was caught spying both on President Rousseff and Petrobras. Later in 2015, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) exchanged some information with the Brazilian Federal Police. Soon thereafter, US courts began to prosecute Brazilian companies under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In December 2016, the biggest engineering and petrochemical companies of South America – Odebrecht and Braskem, respectively – pleaded guilty in a USD three billion deal with the US Federal Court in Brooklyn.

At the end of 2014, Rousseff was re-elected as president amidst looming political uncertainty. This time she won by a smaller margin, with her party securing lesser number of seats, making her government more dependent on coalition partners than before. With the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro – PMDB) being the biggest coalition partner, Eduardo Cunha of PMDB was elected as president of the Chamber of Deputies (or the Lower House) in February 2015. Cunha resented President Rousseff’s way of pushing and implementing policies through decrees rather than building consensus in the National Congress. Though Rousseff tried to pacify Cunha and smaller coalition partners by giving more powers to them, the lack of dialogue continued to widen the rift within the coalition. Cunha subsequently was able to shift the opinion within PMDB in favour of leaving the coalition, thus opening the door for further political instability.

Rousseff’s Impeachment

Amidst corruption charges and investigations, the impeachment process was finally initiated by Cunha against President Rousseff in December 2015. His decision to put the impeachment to vote was in retaliation to attempts by the Workers’ Party to have him removed from the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies by instituting a parliamentary inquiry commission. However, the allegations levelled against Rousseff during the impeachment process were not related to charges of corruption but delay of payments to public banks in order to avoid larger primary deficits. Apparently, the National Congress was more worried about the growing public demand for action against politicians involved in the Car Wash scandal than financial mismanagement. It saw an easy scapegoat in Rousseff, whose position was greatly weakened by the withdrawal of PMDB from her coalition. A significant section of the business class, represented by the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP), which had expected more liberal economic policies, was also actively campaigning for Rousseff’s impeachment.

Interestingly, in May 2016, during the course of the impeachment process, a leaked conversation between Romero Jucá, former PMDB senator and planning minister, and Sérgio Machado, former Petrobras executive, revealed a plan to replace Rousseff with the then Vice-President Michel Temer from PMDB. As per the leaked conversation, Temer’s group was to be part of a larger political pact to limit the Car Wash investigations in order to “staunch the bleeding”.1

In May 2016, Rousseff was suspended from office and Vice-President Temer was appointed as interim president. In August 2016, Rousseff was finally impeached and Temer was confirmed as president. As per the constitutional provision in this regard, Temer is supposed to serve until the end of the ongoing presidential term (January 01, 2019). However, in case he is impeached or he resigns, the next in line of succession would be the president of the Chamber of Deputies (currently Rodrigo Maia) or president of the Senate (currently Eunício Oliveira) or president of the Federal Supreme Court (currently Carmen Lucia). Temer’s successor would also have to contest an indirect election in the National Congress.

Temer’s Woes

As delations moved forward in the courts, it became clear that all major parties were involved in corruption, including many top politicians. In April 2017, a list of investigations being conducted was released by the Federal Supreme Court containing the names of eight ministers in Temer’s government, 24 senators, 39 deputies and three governors. Among former presidents, José Sarney, Fernando Collor and Lula are being investigated, while Rousseff and Fernando Henrique Cardoso have been cited in the delations. The current president of the Chamber of Deputies, Rodrigo Maia, from the Democrats party or DEM, who would be the next in the line of succession after Temer, is also under investigation in Car Wash.2

Even Temer was recently caught in a scandal involving JBS SA. Since May 2017, he has been under tremendous pressure to resign. There are several impeachment processes going on against him, though none have been put to vote in the Congress so far. After the JBS scandal, a Datafolha poll in June showed that 69 per cent disapprove of Temer’s government, 76 per cent believe he should resign and 81 per cent see his impeachment as a viable option.3

Besides corruption scandals, two other factors explain Temer’s lack of popularity: lack of improvement in socio-economic indicators and continuing controversy over austerity measures undertaken to contain the economic crisis. GDP fell by 3.8 per cent in 2015 and 3.6 per cent in 2016, turning into the biggest crisis ever for the country. Industry was the most affected sector, with growth rate falling by 6.6 per cent in 2016.4 The unemployment rate went up from 10.9 per cent in January 2016 to 13.7 per cent in the first quarter of 2017.5 The public sector’s primary deficit reached R$ 155.8 billion (USD 48 billion), which represented an increase of 40.1 per cent in comparison to the previous year.6 Though annual inflation fell to 6.29 per cent from 10.67 per cent, it is still high for an economy in recession.7

To deal with the economic crisis, Temer had first proposed to limit government spending for the next 20 years, which was later approved. Social spending on education and health can only be increased to adjust for inflation, but no further investment would be allowed without reorganising the Union budget. Labour reform was also approved in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate in April and July 2017, respectively. Though the pension reforms bill was earlier cleared by one of the congressional committees, it remains stalled since May in view of the JBS scandal involving Temer. Most of the reforms are being executed against the popular will. In April-May 2017, polls by Datafolha showed that 71 per cent of interviewees were against pension reforms and 64 per cent believed that labour reforms would benefit mostly the companies.8

More worrying is the growing tension among the country’s key institutions. The Federal Police and the Public Prosecutor’s Office have been jockeying to acquire the lead role in the Car Wash scandal, which is hampering the pace of investigation. The Supreme Federal Court too has been mired in controversies this year. First, Teori Zavascki, the presiding judge in Car Wash, passed away in a plane crash in January. Later, in June, there were reports alleging surveillance by the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Agência Brasileira de Inteligência-ABIN) on Edson Fachin, member of the Supreme Court and presiding judge in the JBS case. Temer’s government, however, denied the accusation.9

Towards the 2018 Elections

The ongoing political crisis has severely impacted the state structures in Brazil. Between 2012 and 2017, mistrust of both the National Congress and presidency has grown among the people, from 52 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively, to a common 65 per cent. Major political leaders and parties have lost their credibility among the masses. Five years ago, popular mistrust of political parties stood at 52 per cent; now it has risen to 69 per cent.10 In contrast, only 15 per cent distrust the armed forces, which have made it clear that they will not interfere in the political process as happened in 1964.11

To ensure their political survival, political actors are now increasingly prone to striking pacts across the ideological spectrum, rather than restoring the legitimacy of the political class. Since both Rousseff and Temer have very low popularity ratings, they are not likely to be considered by their respective parties as viable candidates for the 2018 presidential election. Currently, it is not clear what kind of political arrangement will help restore political stability. Nevertheless, all three major political parties – PSDB, PMDB and PT – would be playing a key role in shaping the outcome of the 2018 elections. PSDB has emerged as a leading social-democratic party, though it followed a neoliberal agenda during Cardoso’s two presidential terms (1994-2002). It had received strong support from the right-wing Democrats party (Democratas –DEM), the Progressive Party (Partido Progressista –PP) and the PMDB.

At the centre of the political spectrum is PMDB, which has been part of various coalition governments with both leftist and rightist leanings. The left in Brazil is led by the Workers’ Party (PT), which has always been strongly supported by the Communist Party of Brazil (Partido Comunista do Brasil – PC do B) and by the Democratic Labour Party (Partido Democrático Trabalhista – PDT). When the economy was stable, PT governments received support from some minor conservative parties as well.

The left-centre parties have not followed a single orientation and remain divided on several issues. The Brazilian Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Brasileiro – PSB) and Solidarity Party (Solidariedade – SD) differ over labour reforms. The Rede Sustentabilidade (REDE) has an environmentalist agenda and chose to oppose both the Rousseff and Temer governments. The Socialism and Liberty Party (Partido Socialismo e Liberdade – PSOL) represents the anti-capitalist view and is averse to alliance politics.

Recently, the Brazilian Republican Party (Partido Republicano Brasileiro – PRB) and the Christian Social Party (Partido Social Cristão – PSC) have emerged as notable conservative forces, gathering support especially from among protestant religious groups. There are many other smaller political parties that prefer to remain neutral and bargain for ministerial positions when coalitions are formed. Prominent among them are: Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democratico – PSD), the Republic Party (Partido da Republica – PR) and the Brazilian Labour Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro – PTB).

The PMDB has suffered major losses due to the arrest of its leaders Eduardo Cunha and Geddel Lima. Renan Calheiros, leader of PMDB in the Senate, also recently abandoned his role owing to differences with Temer over labour and pension reforms. Another PMDB leader, Roberto Requião, had gone against his party to oppose both Rousseff’s impeachment and the austerity measures later undertaken by Temer. Thus, support for Temer’s presidency is declining even within his own party. Its major ally PSDB is considering leaving the coalition, basically trying to salvage its image by disassociating itself from an unstable interim government.12

PSDB leaders believe that, after losing four elections to PT, they now have a better chance of winning the presidency as their rival’s image stands marred by corruption scandals. However, Geraldo Alckmin (PSDB), Governor of São Paulo, who is a pre-candidate, has also been indicted in Car Wash. Similarly, Aécio Neves, former president of PSDB, who lost by a narrow margin to Rousseff in the October 2014 presidential run-off election, was caught in a covert operation by the Federal Police, which led to his removal from the Senate, though he was later reinstated. João Doria (PSDB), the current mayor of São Paulo, is another possible contender for a centre-right coalition. His background as a businessman and a political novice is seen as an electoral leverage by his party, since most career politicians are discredited or under investigation. However, both do not enjoy high popularity ratings outside their home region.

Even with the weakening of the Workers’ Party, former President Lula remains the leading pre-candidate for the 2018 presidential election. However, he too is being investigated in Car Wash. On July 13, Lula was sentenced to nine years in prison in his first trial. If his conviction is maintained in the next trial by a higher court, he will be arrested and considered ineligible for elections.

Ciro Gomes, former governor of Ceará, has been a strong ally of the Workers’ Party for the last few years, and could be the leader of a new left-centre coalition in 2018. Fernando Haddad (PT), former mayor of São Paulo, is another possible name, but he recently lost his bid for re-election to João Doria in the first round. Similarly, Marina Silva from Rede Sustentabilidade could be seen as the potential third force. She had secured more than 20 per cent votes in the 2014 presidential election. She was second to former President Lula in the recent polls. However, Rede probably would not be able to build a strong and cohesive coalition in the National Congress.

There are also potential contenders from outside the political mainstream, such as Joaquim Barbosa (former Supreme Court President), Sérgio Moro (presiding judge of Car Wash) and Jair Bolsonaro (far-right congressman of the Social Christian Party). Marina Silva from Rede is already exploring the prospect of an alliance with Barbosa, who is seen by a section of voters as symbolising the fight against corruption. Some of them have received a positive response in recent polls. They may have been ranked below former President Lula, but are ahead of PSDB candidates.13

There is also a conservative wave in the Brazilian social media (which might be an indicator of overall public opinion) after almost two decades of social-democratic governments. The rise of racist and sexist discourse has been highlighted in recent surveys conducted by civil society groups. Increased prejudice against the poor, who depend on social welfare programmes, could also be noted.14 The growing polarisation between left and right-wing political views is quite palpable, with conservative activists accusing leftist governments of pursuing populist policies and privileging minorities’ rights. Observing the growth of conservative anti-mainstream movements in the US and Europe, coupled with lack of options amongst the political class, it is possible that new candidates and alignments might emerge in the run up to the 2018 elections.

Loss of faith in the political class will probably further stratify the plurality of the National Congress, currently made up of 28 out of 35 registered parties. New factions may emerge from within the traditional political parties, making conciliation among diverging interests a more complicated exercise. In the given environment, forming broader coalitions could lead to even more clientelism and cronyism in Brazilian politics.

No End to Crisis

After three years of intense political turmoil, there seems to be no end to the crisis in Brazil. Since mainstream political parties have largely lost their credibility among the people, the 2018 elections could present a more complex and uncertain scenario. This apparent leadership vacuum could lead to the emergence of new political alignments and actors in the coming months.

As stated earlier, among possible new players could be former or current members of the judiciary, emerging religious conservative groups and powerful business lobbies. The highly influential business class in São Paulo may shift its support from the old leadership of PSDB to João Doria, the current PSDB mayor of São Paulo, who is seen as a business-friendly presidential candidate. Although the Workers’ Party has lost much support in the relatively developed parts of the country, it will probably continue to receive strong backing in the poorer regions.

Another possible outcome could be a political pact to “staunch the bleeding” since the judiciary, Federal Police and Public Prosecutor’s Office appear set to carry Operation Car Wash forward as part of a broader anti-corruption effort. Thus, in the backdrop of various corruption scandals marring the political scenario, the 2018 general elections in Brazil will probably be marked by uncertainties and contradictions of competing coalition politics.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Rubens Valente, “Emdiálogosgravados, Jucáfalaempacto para deter avanço da Lava Jato”, Folha de São Paulo, May 05, 2016.
• 2. Breno Pires, “EXCLUSIVO: A lista de Fachin”, Estadão, April 11, 2017.
• 3. Gustavo Simon, “Maioria dos brasileirospedesaída de Michel Temer, afirma Datafolha”, Folha de São Paulo, June 24, 2017.
• 4. Anay Cury and Daniel Silveira, “PIB recua 3,6% em 2016, e Brasil tem pior recessão da história”, G1 Globo, March 07, 2017.
• 5. Daniel Silveira and Marta Cavallini, “Desemprego fica em 13,7% no 1º trimestre de 2017 e atinge 14,2 milhões”, G1 Globo, April 28, 2017.
• 6. Mariana Branco, “Setor público consolidado tem déficit de R$ 155,8 bilhões em 2016”, Agência Brasil, January 31, 2017.
• 7. Nielmar de Oliveira, “Inflação oficial fecha 2016 em 6,29%, abaixo do teto da meta, diz IBGE”, Agência Brasil, January 11, 2017.
• 8. “Datafolha: 64% dos brasileirosacham que reformatrabalhistabeneficiaospatrões”, Jornal do Brasil, May 01, 2017.
• 9. Aécio Amado, “GovernojamaisacionouAbin para espionarFachin, diz nota do Planalto”, Agência Brasil, June 10, 2017.
• 10. Thais Bilenky, “Forças Armadas lideramconfiança da população; Congresso tem descrédito”, Folha de São Paulo, June 26, 2017.
• 11. Eliane Cantanhêde, “Exércitodiz que ‘malucos’ apoiamintervenção”, Estadão, December 10, 2016.
• 12. “Líderes do PSDB adiamdecisãosobredesembarque do governoTemer”, G1 Globo, July 11, 2017.
• 13. “Lula tem 30%, Bolsonaro, 16%, e Marina, 15%, apontapesquisa Datafolha para 2018”, G1 Globo, June 26, 2017.
• 14. Sérgio Matsuura, “Brasil cultiva discurso de ódio nas redes sociais, mostra pesquisa”, O Globo, August 03, 2016.

By Felix Corley

One year on from the introduction of penalties in Russia for ill-defined “missionary activity” – which the Russian authorities also impose in Crimea, which they occupied in March 2014 – Forum 18 found 13 such administrative cases brought in Crimea against individuals (Article 5.26, Part 4). Eight of these – including Jehovah’s Witnesses, Protestants and a Muslim – are known to have been fined about ten days’ average local wages each. Some were punished for participating in religious meetings of a community they belonged to.

Forum 18 found a further 14 Administrative cases brought in Crimea against 7 religious communities and 7 individuals to punish them for failing to use the full legal name of a registered religious community (Article 5.26, Part 3). Eight of the cases have ended with fines of 30,000 to 50,000 Russian Roubles. The communities known to have faced administrative cases are: 2 Jehovah’s Witness, 1 Pentecostal, 1 Hare Krishna, 1 Catholic and 1 Lutheran.

A full listing of known cases – based on court decisions and court records seen by Forum 18 – is at the foot of this article.

One human rights defender complained that the punishments not only violate the rights to freedom of religion or belief enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, but also the Geneva Convention which enshrines the rights of civilians in occupied territories (see below).

Meanwhile, the Russian authorities in Crimea continue to hunt for religious literature which has been banned as “extremist” in Russia. Individuals continue to be fined. Muslims and Jehovah’s Witnesses complain the authorities plant such literature during raids (see below).

All 22 registered Jehovah’s Witness communities in Crimea were liquidated in May following the 20 April Russian Supreme Court decision to ban and liquidate their communities in Russia and seize their property. Jehovah’s Witness communities in Crimea have particularly been targeted in the last two years for inspection as to whether they meet fire safety standards. One was fined 150,000 Russian Roubles (see below).

Tight Russian religious restrictions

Since the March 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, local religious communities which wanted to continue to function had to re-register under Russian law. Many were forced to restructure themselves to meet Russian requirements. This usually entailed cutting ties to their fellow-believers elsewhere in Ukraine.

Individuals and religious communities were also subjected to the web of restrictions on religious activity enshrined in Russian law. They have faced raids, fines, religious literature seizures, government surveillance, expulsions of invited foreign religious leaders, unilateral cancellation of property rental contracts and obstructions to regaining places of worship confiscated in the Soviet period.

One year of Administrative Code Article 5.26

Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014 and since then has imposed its laws on the peninsula.

On 6 July 2016, President Vladimir Putin signed amendments imposing harsh restrictions on ill-defined “missionary activity”, including where and by whom beliefs may be shared, and increased “extremism” punishments, introduced with alleged “anti-terrorism” changes. There were widespread Russian protests against the suddenly-introduced changes, which were both extremely wide ranging and unclearly defined, and allow much scope for arbitrary official actions.

Individual Russian citizens who violate any of the amendment’s restrictions and requirements are liable for a fine of 5,000 to 50,000 Roubles under Administrative Code Article 5.26, Part 4 (“Russians conducting ‘missionary activity'”). For organisations (legal entities), the fine stands at 100,000 to 1 million Roubles. Religious groups are not legal entities – their members are therefore subject to prosecution as individuals.

For the same offence, foreigners may be fined 30,000 to 50,000 Roubles under Article 5.26, Part 5, with the possibility of expulsion from Russia. Forum 18 cannot find that Part 5 has been used in Crimea.

Offences under Article 5.26, Part 3 – “The implementation of activities by a religious organisation without indicating its official full name” – incur a fine of 30,000 to 50,000 Roubles and the confiscation of any literature or other material.

A fine of 50,000 Roubles (21,500 Ukrainian Hryvnias, 6,700 Norwegian Kroner, 715 Euros or 835 US Dollars) represents about three months’ average wages for those in work, according to local residents.

The new Parts 3, 4 and 5 of Article 5.26 entered into force on 20 July 2016 and were immediately deployed to punish individuals in Russia.

Numerous such punishments have been imposed in Russia in the year since they came into force.

“Illegal actions of an extremist nature”?

A 29 January announcement on the Crimean Interior Ministry website described violations of Russia’s Religion Law punishable under Administrative Code Article 5.26 as “illegal actions of an extremist nature”.

An 11 April 2017 announcement on the Crimean Prosecutor’s Office website warned that – under the restrictions introduced in Russia in 2016 – “missionary activity” can be undertaken only by registered religious organisations or religious groups which have notified the authorities of their existence. Religious organisations and groups need to formally designate a member as a “missionary” before that individual can share their faith with people who are not already members of their community, the announcement noted.

Illustrating that the Russian authorities regard sharing faith as a security issue, the 11 April announcement was signed by Andrei Alekseev, the head of the Department for Overseeing Fulfilment of Laws on Federal Security, Inter-Ethnic Relations and Countering Extremism and Terrorism at the Crimean Prosecutor’s Office.

First known Crimean punishments

The first known punishment in Crimea under Administrative Code Article 5.26, Part 3 was of First Baptist Church in Simferopol. The Church was fined 50,000 Russian Roubles on 28 December 2016 for failing to display its full name on a sign outside its place of worship, exactly two weeks after Prosecutor’s Office officials spotted the “violation”.

The Church’s leader did not deny the discrepancy, but told the court that the Church had simply failed to bring the notice into line with the name as recorded on the documents when the Church re-registered under Russian law, according to the decision seen by Forum 18.

The first known punishment in Crimea under Article 5.26, Part 4 was of a Muslim, Arsen Ganiev. He was fined 5,000 Russian Roubles on 9 February 2017 by a magistrate in Bakhchisarai for offering to others Muslim calendars and invitations to a commemoration of the Muslim Prophet Muhammad’s birthday to be held at a restaurant, according to the decision seen by Forum 18.

Punishments in occupied Crimea a double violation?

Aleksandr Sedov of the Crimean Human Rights Group, who has analysed six of the Article 5.26 punishments in Crimea in 2017, noted that punishment for exercising the right to freedom of religion or belief violates Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

“Limitation of this right is possible only in the interests of public safety and the protection of public order,” Sedov noted on the group’s website on 5 July. However, in all six of the cases he examined “there was no such threat”.

Sedov also stated that “the restriction by occupying powers of the possibility of conducting religious rituals and the punishment for it of inhabitants of occupied territory violates Article 27 of the Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War”. The Russian Federation is a party to the 1949 Convention.

Article 27 includes the provision: “Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs.”

Sudden death

In one case, Vitaly Arsenyuk, a 67-year-old Jehovah’s Witness who led the community in Dzhankoi, died within 24 hours of his first court hearing under Administrative Code Article 5.26, Part 4. Magistrate Alkhaz Tulparov of Magistrate’s Court No. 34 held the first hearing on 27 June, according to court records. The case was due to continue on 11 July. Arsenyuk died in the night of 27 to 28 June.

The Prosecutor’s Office had summoned Arsenyuk several times in May for questioning, local journalist Anton Naumlyuk noted on his Facebook page on 30 June. The first hearing was 27 June. “That night Arsenyuk died of a massive heart attack. He was 67, had suffered persecution in Soviet times and now he did not survive.”

Jehovah’s Witnesses have not stated that Arsenyuk’s death was due to the interrogations and court hearing.

“Extremist” literature hunted – or planted?

Police, the FSB security service and Prosecutor’s Office have continued to hunt for literature Russian courts have deemed “extremist”. Ownership of works on Russia’s Federal List of Extremist Materials makes an individual liable to prosecution under the Administrative or Criminal Code.

The Federal List contains many violent, racist and xenophobic works. However, it also contains many Muslim and Jehovah’s Witness works, as well as a few Falun Gong, Catholic and Jewish works, which do not appear to violate the human rights of others.

Since the Russian annexation of Crimea, religious communities, libraries and individuals have repeatedly faced raids and punishment over religious literature which is banned as “extremist” but which does not appear to violate the human rights of others.

Officers – often armed – have raided numerous madrassahs (Muslim colleges), libraries, Muslim-owned homes and Jehovah’s Witness meetings seizing such literature. Individuals have been punished under Administrative Code Article 20.29 (“Production or distribution of extremist materials”).

On 8 November 2016, Yalta City Court fined two Imams in separate cases after copies of works including “Fortress of A Muslim” were found in their mosques in separate raids on 28 October 2016. Fevzi Tasinov and R. Useinov were each fined 1,000 Russian Roubles under Administrative Code Article 20.29, according to the decisions seen by Forum 18.

Crimean Tatar lawyer Emil Kurbedinov complained about the FSB security service raid on Imam Tasinov’s mosque in Simeiz near Yalta. “They planted something, two books it seems,” the lawyer wrote on his Facebook page on the day of the raids.

On 1 February 2017, Crimea’s Supreme Court upheld the fine of 2,000 Russian Roubles originally handed down on 24 November 2016 by Yevpatoriya City Court on Elmar Abdulganiev, Imam of the city’s Khan-Jami Mosque. The FSB security service and Prosecutor’s Office claim to have found works on the Federal List by the late Turkish theologian Said Nursi when they raided the mosque in the dark on 14 November 2016. Imam Abdulganiev insisted officers had planted the books.

On 2 July 2016, Prosecutor’s Office officials and police raided the Jehovah’s Witness community as it worshipped in the city of Alushta. Jehovah’s Witnesses complain that officers planted items of their literature which had earlier been banned and placed on the Federal List.

Jehovah’s Witnesses stripped of registration

In April 2015, the Justice Department in the Republic of Crimea registered 20 Jehovah’s Witness congregations, according to official records. The following month the Justice Department in the administratively-separate city of Sevastopol registered two Jehovah’s Witness congregations.

All 22 Jehovah’s Witness communities in Crimea were liquidated in May 2017. These liquidations followed the Moscow Supreme Court decision on 20 April that Russia’s Jehovah’s Witness administrative centre and all local communities were “extremist” and liquidated, with their property to be seized.

Jehovah’s Witnesses pointed out that the enforced liquidation demanded by Russia’s Justice Ministry in March came less than two years after the same entity had granted their communities in Crimea registration under Russian law. “For the 8,000 believers on the [Crimean] peninsula, who have been freely professing their religion for decades, this came as a complete surprise,” Jehovah’s Witnesses noted on 30 March.

All 22 Crimean communities – like the local communities in Russia – appealed to Russia’s Supreme Court to be added as parties to the case. The Supreme Court rejected their suits. The 22 communities have submitted private appeals against this, which have yet to be heard.

Other inspections, fines

Even before their forced liquidation, Jehovah’s Witness congregations in Crimea were subjected – like other religious communities – to inspections as to whether they were complying with Russia’s Religion Law and whether the places they were meeting met the requirements for fire safety.

On 24 May 2016, for example, the deputy prosecutor of Sevastopol’s Gagarin District ordered Jehovah’s Witness community leader Yevgeny Butsy to remove violations of the Religion Law, the NGO Law and the Extremism Law. The deputy prosecutor said the community had used a shortened form, not its full legal name, on instructions of how to evacuate the building in case of fire and other documents.

Prosecutors brought a case against Butsy under Administrative Code Article 17.7 as the community responded only one month and one day after the official written demand to remove violations. A Magistrate’s Court twice dismissed the case, but prosecutors appealed both times. Sevastopol’s Gagarin District Court approved the prosecutor’s second appeal on 1 June 2017 and sent the case back to be heard for a third time, according to the decision seen by Forum 18.

Butsy was fined separately under Administrative Code Article 5.26 (see below).

Cases against Jehovah’s Witness communities have also been brought to punish them for alleged violations of fire regulations. Fines are issued under Administrative Code Article 20.4.

A 22 October 2015 Prosecutor’s Office and fire inspector’s inspection of the Jehovah’s Witness place of worship in Saki claimed to have found violations, for example. The inspector issued a summary fine of 150,000 Russian Roubles on 5 November 2015 under Administrative Code Article 20.4. Jehovah’s Witnesses claim the inspection took place with violations of procedure.

However, the Saki Jehovah’s Witness community failed to overturn the fine, most recently at Crimea’s Supreme Court on 2 December 2016, according to the decision seen by Forum 18. However, later at later hearings the community managed to delay the deadlines for paying instalments of the fine.

On 7 February and 9 March 2017 the Supreme Court similarly rejected appeals against Article 20.4 fines by the leaders of the Jehovah’s Witness communities in Yevpatoriya (15,000 Rouble fine) and Mirny (6,000 Rouble fine).

Known Article 5.26 cases in Crimea

– Article 5.26, Part 3 (“Implementation of activities by a religious organisation without indicating its official full name”)

1) 28 December 2016

Name: First Baptist Church, Simferopol

Punishment: 30,000 Roubles

Court: Simferopol Central District Court

Circumstances: Notice on church building failed to include full legal name

2) 18 February 2017

Name: Grigory Stasyuk

Punishment: 30,000 Roubles

Court: Yalta Magistrate’s Court No. 96

Circumstances: Seventh-day Adventist Church leader, failed to have sign outside church (church was undergoing repair and sign was in hall)

3) 7 April 2017

Name: St Mary Augsburg Lutheran Congregation, Yalta

Sent back for correction and resubmission

Court: Yalta Magistrate’s Court No. 95

Circumstances: Originally sent back for correction and resubmission

31 January 2017

4) 28 April 2017

Name: Jehovah’s Witness congregation, Kerch

Punishment: 50,000 Roubles

Court: Kerch Magistrate’s Court No. 46

5) 11 May 2017

Name: Nikolai Blyshchik

Punishment: 30,000 Roubles

Court: Bakhchisarai Magistrate’s Court No. 29

Circumstances: Revival Pentecostal Church leader, failed to have sign outside church

6) 22 May 2017

Name: Jehovah’s Witness congregation, Yalta

Case dropped because of liquidation of community

Circumstances: Failure to have a sign outside place of worship

Court: Yalta Magistrate’s Court No. 94

7) 15 June 2017

Name: Living Water Pentecostal Church, Yevpatoriya

Punishment: 30,000 Roubles

Court: Yevpatoriya Magistrate’s Court No. 42

Circumstances: Sign on church building did not have full legal name of church

8) 21 June 2017

Name: A.A. Stadnikov

Sent back for correction and resubmission

Court: Dzhankoi Magistrate’s Court No. 34

Circumstances: Belief affiliation unknown

9) 22 June 2017

Name: Yevgeny Butsy

Punishment: 30,000 Roubles

Court: Sevastopol, Gagarin District Magistrate’s Court No. 8

Circumstances: Jehovah’s Witness

Appeal: ?? Court

Reached court: 3 July 2017

10) 27 June 2017

Name: Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary Roman Catholic

Church, Yalta

Punishment: 30,000 Roubles

Court: Yalta Magistrate’s Court No. 95

Circumstances: case had been sent on 5 April 2017 from Yalta City Court to Magistrate’s Court No. 94, on 11 April 2017 from Magistrate’s Court No. 94 to Magistrate’s Court No. 95, then returned on 14 April 2017 for correction and resubmission

11) 4 July 2017

Name: Yevgeny Zhukov

Sent back for correction and resubmission

Court: Sevastopol, Magistrate’s Court No. 20

Circumstances: Jehovah’s Witness, sent back originally for correction and resubmission 19 April 2017

12) 7 July 2017

Name: Vadim Opyakin

Punishment: 30,000 Roubles

Bakhchisarai Magistrate’s Court No. 28

Circumstances: 11 April 2017 inspection of Jehovah’s Witness place of worship found notice outside did not have full name of organisation

13) 17 July 2017

Name: Denis Titarenko

Court: Pervomaiskoe Magistrate’s Court No. 66

Circumstances: Jehovah’s Witness, case originally returned 29 May 2017 for correction and resubmission, then hearing 13 July

14) 7 August 2017

Name: Crimean Association of Krishna Consciousness

Hearing due (earlier hearings 21 June, 28 June, 14 July 2017)

Court: Bakhchisarai Magistrate’s Court No. 27

– Article 5.26, Part 4 (“Russians conducting missionary activity”)

1) 9 February 2017

Name: Arsen Ganiev

Punishment: 5,000 Roubles

Court: Bakhchisarai Magistrate’s Court No. 29

Circumstances: Muslim, offered calendars and books, announcement of Muslim Prophet Muhammad’s birthday commemoration to be held in restaurant

2) 27 February 2017

Name: E.R. Islyamov

Punishment: 5,000 Roubles

Court: Feodosiya Magistrate’s Court No. 90

Circumstances: Belief affiliation unknown

3) 28 April 2017

Name: I.I. Vasiliev

Punishment: 5,000 Roubles

Court: Simferopol, Central District Magistrate’s Court No. 16

Circumstances: Belief affiliation unknown

Appeal: Simferopol Central District Court

Decision: 7 July 2017

4) 10 May 2017

Name: V.V. Larionov

Sent back for correction and resubmission

Court: Simferopol, Kiev District Magistrate’s Court No. 11

Circumstances: Belief affiliation unknown

5) 13 June 2017

Name: Sergei Kolomoets

Punishment: 5,000 Roubles

Court: Sevastopol, Lenin District Magistrate’s Court No. 14

Circumstances: Pastor, New Generation Church, police inspection revealed he was leading regular Sunday worship on 9 April

6) 15 June 2017

Name: D.I. Sofronov

Case dropped

Court: Simferopol, Central District Magistrate’s Court No. 20

Circumstances: Belief affiliation unknown

7) 15 June 2017

Name: Sergei Martyushov

Punishment: 5,000 Roubles

Court: Kerch Magistrate’s Court No. 46

Circumstances: Spoke at 10 April religious meeting of his Jehovah’s Witness community without authority

8) 19 June 2017

Name: Eduard Kudin

Punishment: 5,000 Roubles

Court: Kerch Magistrate’s Court No. 46

Circumstances: Spoke at 10 April religious meeting of his Jehovah’s Witness community without authority

9) 19 June 2017

Name: Dmitry Sazonov

Punishment: 5,000 Roubles

Court: Yalta Magistrate’s Court No. 94

Circumstances: Read Bible, sang songs and prayed at Jehovah’s Witness services without authority

Appeal: Yalta City Court

Reached court: 12 July 2017

Hearing due: 14 August 2017

10) 20 June 2017

Name: Artyom Morev

Punishment: 5,000 Roubles

Court: Yalta Magistrate’s Court No. 95

Circumstances: Pastor of Generation of Faith Pentecostal church, case transferred 25 April 2017 from Yalta City Court to Yalta Magistrate’s Court No. 95, case returned 28 April 2017 for correction and resubmission

11) 27 June 2017

Name: Vitaly Arsenyuk

First hearing

Court: Dzhankoi Magistrate’s Court No. 34

Circumstances: Jehovah’s Witness, Arsenyuk died night following first hearing

12) 12 July 2017

Name: P.Yu. Grishchenko

Case reached court

Court: Simferopol, Central District Magistrate’s Court No. 16

Circumstances: Belief affiliation unknown

13) 26 July 2017

Name: P.K. Shpak

Hearing due

Court: Simferopol, Central District Court

Circumstances: Belief affiliation unknown, case reached court 27 June 2017

By Wajiha Ibrahim*

What peaked in 2011 as a series of political protests sweeping the Middle East and North Africa is today an opportunity to celebrate and evaluate how various regimes mould their path towards democracy. A noteworthy component of these transitions includes the shifting role of the informal sector.

While many countries have increased political participation, achieved macroeconomic stabilisation and restored growth, millions of people remain excluded from political and economic systems.

Although in theory, democratic governance and market-based economies should extend benefits to all populations, there are several institutional structures that prevent this from happening. In other words, there are barriers to participation – in formal political and economic systems – such as restricted access to financial opportunity, limitations on property rights and inadequate legal protection.

While some transitioning governments have blatantly sidelined the informal sector, others – such as Morocco – have found unique ways to leverage the informal sector as a means of socio-economic advancement.

Informal housing reserves an all-encompassing role within the informal market, making it a compelling topic of research. As a place of residence for low-income employees, informal dwellings keep the wheels of the city turning in many different ways. Many of these informal housing communities are the first stopping points for immigrants and rural migrants, providing the low-cost and only affordable housing that will enable them to save for their eventual absorption into urban society.

Informal housing (bidonvilles, shantytowns or douar) are also places in which the vibrant mixing of different cultures frequently results in new forms of artistic expression. Out of unhealthy, crowded and often dangerous environments can emerge cultural movements and levels of solidarity unknown in the suburbs of the rich.

Thus, in evaluating the policies and programmes put in place by emerging democracies to address informal housing, there is opportunity for deeper understanding and discovery of the state of informality in a region.

Morocco’s national Villes Sans Bidonvilles Programme (VSBP) is an example of such a policy worth evaluating. It was launched by King Mohammed VI in 2004 as part of a larger government strategy to address both supply and demand sides of the housing sector. Aiming to make 85 Moroccan cities free of slums, the VSBP is celebrated for being the first nationwide programme to approach informal settlements within a much broader urban perspective.

Falling under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Habitat and Urban Planning (MHU), the programme upgrades shantytowns and douar in Morocco and prioritises relocation of their inhabitants.

The ANHI – a state enterprise in charge of providing access to safe and sanitary housing for lower income families in Morocco – and other local public housing agencies have been merged into a financially autonomous, parastatal organisation, the ‘Al-Omrane Group’. Working closely with the private sector, this agency is responsible for the coordination of more than eighty percent of slum-upgrading projects.

Several facets of the VSBP distinguish it from the former Moroccan initiatives. First, the strategic engagement of semi-private and state actors has implied a unique political reorganisation of the housing policies. This is largely by facilitating the entrance of governmental actors into shantytown settlements and paving the way for relocation.

The social accompaniment of the programme, which grew out of debates on the social impact of slum clearance, is a specific methodology designed to accompany the slum dweller through the process of moving to their new housing. This social component of the VSBP mediates between the technical operator and the local population.

Finally, the programme has developed new mechanisms to increase the shantytown dweller’s access to financial institutions, improve their solvency, and facilitate the purchase of a new housing unit.

FOGARIM – a Moroccan government mortgage guarantee programme started in 2003 to open up access to housing loans to those who work in the informal sector – permits populations with modest or volatile income to obtain a bank loan thanks to a government guarantee on maximum amount of 200,000 dirham (about 20,000 dollars).

Given that under the VSBP, the shantytown dweller is responsible for a majority of their relocation cost, FOGARIM has created an enabling-framework for shantytown dwellers to obtain housing access. With the ultimate goal of the VSBP being the eradication of informal settlements and the relocation of their populations, virtually every household has the right to housing under this programme.

While Morocco’s Villes Sans Bidonville Programme presents fundamental reforms towards harnessing a three-way interaction among the parastatal, private and public sectors, there are still opportunities for improvement.

It is rightfully argued that parastatal enterprises, such as Al-Omrane, service a centralised, top-down approach to planning that quickly fails to prioritise the role of the shantytown dweller in the implementation and design of the programme. In addition, many participants of the programme claim that inclusive measures were not taken as originally intended by the VSBP guidelines.

This evokes the question: is Morocco ready for participatory planning to enter the gateway of housing policies? [IDN-InDepthNews – 24 July 2017]

* Wajiha Ibrahim is a Boston-based architect and city planner specialising in housing policy and slum upgrading strategies. She previously worked on housing project assistance with the High Atlas Foundation in Marrakech and currently works as an international city planner for Sasaki Associates.

Donald Trump is failing to fulfill promises of his campaign. Who would argue with that? But how could he turn things around for the benefit of the American public?

Take the Russia issue for example. Establishing a positive working relationship was a consistent campaign theme. It apparently resonated enough with voters. Elected as president, Trump famously went on to say, “I would love to be able to get along with Russia. Now, you’ve had a lot of presidents that haven’t taken that tack. Look where we are now. Look where we are now.”

I get his point. Making an enemy of Russia has yielded no benefit for America. It’s even dangerously increased world tension. That’s what he means, I think, with his “Look where we are now” remark.

But as a result of Trump’s mishandling the Russia issue to date, look where HE is now.

Trump, his family, and his associates have been thoroughly vilified by unsubstantiated allegations of an untoward Russia connection. Members of Congress even want to impeach him.

Perpetrators of fraudulent allegations have made great headway. Variety magazine reports, “Driven by surges for The Rachel Maddow Show and Last Word with Lawrence O’Donnell, MSNBC is up a whopping 86 percent in total viewers in primetime compared to second-quarter 2016.” I’ve seen these commentators to be two of the most rabid fraudsters in the so-called “Russian Conspiracy.”

Trump’s primary response? It’s been to tweet. But tweets aren’t fixing this problem. Trump faces unprincipled opposition pushing a fabricated grand conspiracy. They’re playing hardball. But Trump offers softball responses. His retaliation has been a bust.

Other than the fabricators, nobody is benefiting from this. Even principled liberal and progressive opponents are losing out. The Russian Conspiracy is pushing aside everybody’s national agenda, liberal or conservative. Trump needs to get serious about this fast.

All the fabricators are long overdue for hardball responses. If Special Council Mueller is, as the Trump side contends, conducting a witch hunt outside the law, appoint a special prosecutor to go after him. If on-air broadcast outlets are using the public airwaves to perpetrate a fraud on the American people, call their licenses into question. If Hillary Clinton did, as is alleged, commit crimes, prosecute her and her accomplices. No more Mr. nice guy.

The fraudsters must be stopped. The story that 17 intelligence agencies found Russian culpability was proved a hoax. Even the New York Times admitted that. Now a group of intelligence experts has proved forensically that there was no hack in the first place. It was a leak from inside. But yet the fraudulent claims persist in news reports. Americans have a right to be protected from massive fraud. The idea is not to silence divergent viewpoints, but to stop the fraud. Simply correcting false stories has been ineffectual so far. This nonsense needs to be nipped in the bud.

For years Vladimir Putin handled a multitude of fabricated allegations against him with a softball approach. He never effectively dealt with the problem. Look where HE is now. He’s viewed as an international pariah in many quarters.

Allegations include destroying press freedom, blowing up apartment buildings, killing Alexander Litvinenko, invading Crimea. There are no supportive facts. Just allegations. I’ve written four books https://www.amazon.com/William-Dunkerley/e/B0068SP10C documenting this. Taken together, the accusations represent an attempt by Putin’s political enemies to take him down.

That’s what Trump’s political enemies are doing to him. The Russian Conspiracy isn’t the real issue. It’s just the latest effort by political enemies to take down Trump. It’s not Russia. It’s an attempted take down.

You know, even if the Russian Conspiracy allegations were true, what’s the big deal? Russia would still be well within international norms established by the United States through its own actions.

Trump has allowed himself to be baited into a defensive posture over a nonsense issue. He faces a Congress that itself has fraudsters in its midst. They’re trying to use Russia in their efforts to get rid of him. The rest of Congress, unfortunately, is mostly full of members who have been duped by long-running false and mythical stories about Russia.

Now it looks like Trump is trying to appease the dupsters by compromising his promise of a positive working relationship with Russia. But he should think of his own words, “Look where we are now.” If he doesn’t stick to his promise we will find ourselves STUCK where we are now. Or worse.

The only way out for Trump I see is to use full force to take on the Russia myth and the fraudsters that are using it to destroy his presidency.

It’s time to wise up to that, President Trump.

The Coalition Against Foreign Military Bases is a new campaign focused on closing all US military bases abroad. This campaign strikes at the foundation of US empire, confronting its militarism, corporatism and imperialism. We urge you to endorse this campaign.

On the occasion of its announcement, the coalition issued a unity statement, which describes its intent as “raising public awareness and organizing non-violent mass resistance against U.S. foreign military bases.” It further explains that US foreign military bases are “the principal instruments of imperial global domination and environmental damage through wars of aggression and occupation, and that the closure of U.S. foreign military bases is one of the first necessary steps toward a just, peaceful and sustainable world.”

While the US sought to be an imperial force beginning just after the US Civil War and then escalated those efforts at the turn of the 20^th Century, it became the dominant empire globally after World War II. This was during the time of de-colonization, when many traditional empires were forced to let their colonies become independent nations. So, while the US is the largest empire in world history, it is not a traditional empire in which nations are described as colonies of the US empire. Nations remain independent, at least in name, while allowing US bases on their soil and serving as a client state of the United States. They are controlled through the economic power of the US, World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The US has used regime change tactics, including assassination and military force, to keep its empire intact.

Commentators have described the United States as an “empire of bases.” Chalmers Johnson wrote in 2004:

As distinct from other peoples, most Americans do not recognize — or do not want to recognize — that the United States dominates the world through its military power. Due to government secrecy, our citizens are often ignorant of the fact that our garrisons encircle the planet. This vast network of American bases on every continent except Antarctica actually constitutes a new form of empire — an empire of bases with its own geography not likely to be taught in any high school geography class. Without grasping the dimensions of this globe-girdling Baseworld, one can’t begin to understand the size and nature of our imperial aspirations or the degree to which a new kind of militarism is undermining our constitutional order.

Our military deploys well over half a million soldiers, spies, technicians, teachers, dependents, and civilian contractors in other nations. To dominate the oceans and seas of the world, we are creating some thirteen naval task forces built around aircraft carriers whose names sum up our martial heritage — Kitty Hawk, Constellation, Enterprise, John F. Kennedy, Nimitz, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Carl Vinson, Theodore Roosevelt, Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, John C. Stennis, Harry S. Truman, and Ronald Reagan. We operate numerous secret bases outside our territory to monitor what the people of the world, including our own citizens, are saying, faxing, or e-mailing to one another.

We do not know the exact number of US military bases and outposts throughout the world. The Unity Statement says “the United States maintains the highest number of military bases outside its territory, estimated at almost 1000 (95% of all foreign military bases in the world). . . . In addition, the United States has 19 Naval air carriers (and 15 more planned), each as part of a Carrier Strike Group, composed of roughly 7,500 personnel, and a carrier air wing of 65 to 70 aircraft — each of which can be considered a floating military base.”

The annual Department of Defense (DoD) Base Structure Report says the DoD manages a massive “global real property portfolio that consists of nearly 562,000 facilities (buildings, structures, and linear structures), located on over 4,800 sites worldwide and covering over 24.9 million acres.” They value DoD property located in 42 nations at over $585 billion. It is difficult to tell from this report the number of bases and military outposts, which has led analysts like Tom Engelhardt to describe US empire as an “invisible” empire of bases. He points out the US military bases are rarely discussed in the media. It usually takes an incident, like US soldiers being attacked or a US aircraft being shot down, for them to get any mention in the media.

Many of the bases remain from previous wars, especially World War II and the Korean War:

According to official information provided by the Department of Defense (DoD) and its Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) there are still about 40,000 US troops, and 179 US bases in Germany, over 50,000 troops in Japan (and 109 bases), and tens of thousands of troops, with hundreds of bases, all over Europe. Over 28,000 US troops are present in 85 bases in South Korea, and have been since 1957.

The number of bases is always changing as the US seeks to continuously expand its empire of bases. Just this week the US is opening a military base in South Korea, which is described as a city of 25,000 people. The Washington Post reports:

“We built an entire city from scratch,” said Col. Scott W. Mueller, garrison commander of Camp Humphreys, one of the U.S. military’s largest overseas construction projects. If it were laid across Washington, the 3,454-acre base would stretch from Key Bridge to Nationals Park, from Arlington National Cemetery to the Capitol.

* * *

Now, the $11 billion base is beginning to look like the garrison that military planners envisaged decades ago.

The Eighth Army moved its headquarters here this month and there are about 25,000 people based here, including family members and contractors.

There are apartment buildings, sports fields, playgrounds and a water park, and an 18- hole golf course with the generals’ houses overlooking the greens. There is a “warrior zone” with Xboxes and Playstations, pool tables and dart boards, and a tavern for those old enough to drink.

Starting this August, there will be two elementary schools, a middle school and a high school. A new, 68-bed military hospital to replace the one at Yongsan is close to completion.

Also this week, it was reported that the United States has created ten new military bases in Syria. This was done without permission of the Syrian government and was exposed by Turkey in protest against the United States.

There is a cost to these bases, not only the $156 billion in annual funds spent on them, but also the conflicts they create between the United States and people around the world. There have been protests against the presence or development of US bases in Okinawa, Italy, Jeju Island Korea, Diego Garcia, Cyprus, Greece, and Germany. Some of the bases are illegal, as the unity statement points out, “The base that the U.S. has illegally occupied the longest, for over a century, is Guantánamo Bay, whose existence constitutes an imposition of the empire and a violation of International Law.”  Cuba has called for the return of Guantánamo since 1959. David Vine, the author of Base Nation, describes how these bases, which seek to project US power around the globe, create political tensions, are a source for military attacks and create alliances with dictators. They breed sexual violence, displace indigenous peoples, and destroy the environment.

The unity statement of the Coalition Against Foreign Military Bases concludes by urging all of us to unite to close US bases around the world because:

U.S. foreign military bases are NOT in defense of U.S. national, or global security. They are the military expression of U.S. intrusion in the lives of sovereign countries on behalf of the dominant financial, political, and military interests of the ruling elite. Whether invited in or not by domestic interests that have agreed to be junior partners, no country, no peoples, no government, can claim to be able to make decisions totally in the interest of their people, with foreign troops on their soil representing interests antagonistic to the national purpose.

Please endorse the statement and join the campaign to remove US military bases from foreign soil.

On the occasion of the eighteenth anniversary of Throne Day, King Mohammed VI addressed a speech to the nation.

The speech is as follows:

“Praise be to God,

May peace and blessings be upon the Prophet, His Kith and Kin

Dear Citizens,

Today, we are celebrating the eighteenth anniversary of my accession to the throne, in a national environment characterized by achievements as well as challenges.

This yearly celebration is an opportunity to renew the mutual bonds of the Bei’a uniting us and to take stock, together, of the state of the nation.

The development projects and the political and institutional reforms carried out target a single goal: to serve citizens, wherever they may be. There is no difference between north and south, east and west, urban and rural areas.

It is true that Morocco’s resources are limited. It is also a fact that many regions need more basic social services.

However, Morocco has been constantly developing, by the grace of the Almighty. Progress is clear and real; it is recognized across the board and in all sectors.

Today, however, we are witnessing glaring paradoxes that are hard to understand or accept.

On the one hand, Morocco enjoys indisputable credibility at continental and international levels, the esteem and consideration of our partners and the confidence of major investors, such as the Boeing, Renault and Peugeot groups. But on the other hand, we are shocked by the end results, the facts on the ground and the modest achievements made in certain social sectors, so much so that it is shameful to admit we are actually talking about present-day Morocco.

While it is true that our action, through a number of sectoral plans – like those relating to agriculture, industry and renewable energy – has been successful, human and local development programs, which have a positive impact on citizens’ living conditions, do us no credit, nor do they match our ambitions.

In many sectors, this is mostly due to the inadequacy of joint action, the lack of a national, strategic dimension, inconsistency instead of harmony, disparagement and procrastination instead of entrepreneurship and concrete action.

These paradoxes are even more acute when we compare the private sector – which is efficient and competitive, and which is built on a governance model that has incentives, as well as follow-up and monitoring mechanisms – to the public sector, particularly our civil service, which is suffering from poor governance and weak performance.

The private sector is attracting the best human resources that are trained in our country. They are involved in the management of major international groups in Morocco as well as small and medium-sized Moroccan enterprises.

As for civil servants, many of them do not have the skills, qualifications or ambition required; moreover, they are not always guided by a sense of responsibility.

Some of them report to work for only short periods of time, preferring to settle for modest – but guaranteed – pay, instead of working hard to improve their social conditions.

One of the problems which impede Morocco’s progress is the weakness of the civil service, be it in terms of governance, efficiency or the quality of the services provided to citizens.

For instance, the regional investment centers – with the exception of one or two – are a problem. They impede the act of investing instead of serving as a mechanism that provides incentives and resolves the problems of investors at the regional level, without their having to go to central government departments.

This has an adverse impact on regions that are suffering from insufficient – sometimes inexistent – private investment and from the public sector’s weak performance. This, in turn, affects citizens’ living conditions.

The challenge is even more daunting in regions with the biggest shortage of health, education and cultural services, not to mention the lack of jobs. Greater cooperative efforts are required to close gaps and help these regions catch up with the others.

Conversely, regions with a vibrant private sector, like Casablanca, Rabat, Marrakech and Tangier, are enjoying strong economic dynamism which creates wealth as well as jobs.

To put an end to this situation, governors, caids, directors, staff members, local officials, etc. should work hard, just like staff in the private sector – or even harder. They should show a sense of responsibility that does credit to the civil service and yields concrete results since these officials are entrusted with serving citizens’ interests.

Dear Citizens,

All in all, our development policy choices remain sound. The problem lies with mentalities that have not evolved as well as with the inability to implement projects and to innovate.

The evolution witnessed in Morocco in the political domain and in the area of development has not led to the kind of positive reaction you would expect from political parties, leaders and government officials when dealing with the real aspirations and concerns of Moroccans.

When results are positive, political parties, politicians and officials vie for the spotlight to derive benefits from the achievements made, both politically and in terms of media exposure.

However, when matters do not turn out the way they should, they hide behind the Royal Palace and ascribe everything to it.

As a result, citizens complain to the King about government services or officials that take too long to respond to their queries or process their cases, asking him to intercede on their behalf.

Citizens are entitled to convincing answers – within reasonable timeframes – to their queries and complaints, including the explanation or justification of negative decisions. Requests and queries should not be turned down without a valid legal reason; they should be rejected only when they are inconsistent with the law, or when the citizen concerned has not completed the relevant procedures or met the requirements.

Given this situation, citizens are entitled to ask themselves: What is the use of having institutions, holding elections, forming governments and appointing ministers, walis, governors, ambassadors and consuls if they live on one planet, and the people and their concerns are on another one?

The practices of some elected officials induce a number of citizens, especially young people, to shun political life and take no part in elections.

Put simply, they do not trust politicians; indeed, some stakeholders have perverted politics, diverting it away from its lofty objectives.

If the King of Morocco is not convinced of the way political activity is conducted and if he does not trust a number of politicians, what are the citizens left with?

To all those concerned I say: ‘Enough is enough!’ Fear God in what you are perpetrating against your homeland. Either discharge your obligations fully or withdraw from public life. There are plenty of honest men and women in Morocco.

This situation can no longer be tolerated because the homeland’s interests and those of the citizens are at stake. I am choosing my words carefully here, and I know what I am saying because it comes after deep reflection.

Dear Citizens,

The responsibility and the privilege of serving citizens call for action that goes from responding to their basic demands to implementing projects – big and small.

As I always point out, there is no difference between small and large projects. All projects are meant to meet people’s needs.

Whether a project concerns a district, a hamlet, a city, a region or the entire country, it still has the same objective, which is to serve citizens. In the eyes of citizens, digging a well or building a dam, for instance, are equally important.

What is the meaning of responsibility if the official concerned loses sight of one of the most basic requirements of that responsibility, which is to listen to citizens’ concerns?

I fail to understand how officials who do not fulfill their duties can leave home, drive their cars, stop at traffic lights and brazenly and shamelessly look people in the face, knowing that they are aware of their unscrupulous conduct.

Are these people who took the oath before God, the homeland and the King, and who fail to perform their duties, not ashamed of themselves? Should not any official who is guilty of dereliction of duty be held to account and dismissed?

I must insist, in this respect, on the need to apply rigorously the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 1 of the Constitution, which links public office with accountability.

It is high time this principle were implemented in full. Just as the law applies equally to all citizens, it must be applied, first and foremost, to all officials, without distinction or discrimination, and in all of the Kingdom’s regions.

This is the dawn of a new era in which there is no difference between officials and citizens as far as civic rights and obligations are concerned; nor is there room for shirking responsibility or avoiding sanctions.

Dear Citizens,

I insist on the need to implement the provisions of the Constitution fully and rigorously. This is a collective responsibility which lies with all stakeholders, each in their respective area of competence – the government, parliament, political parties and all the institutions concerned.

When an official obstructs or delays the implementation of a development project or a social program, this is not simply a case of dereliction of duty; it amounts to treason because that official is harming the interests of citizens and preventing them from enjoying their legitimate rights.

Strangely enough, there are some officials who fail in their duty and still consider that they deserve a higher position.

It is attitudes and inconsistencies such as these that give substance to the widely-held belief among most Moroccans that the reason behind vying for positions is to benefit from rent-seeking and to wield power and influence to serve one’s own interests.

And since examples of such practices exist in everyday life, people unfortunately tend to give credence to this belief.

But, thank God, not all politicians and senior civil servants are like that. There are trustworthy people who genuinely love their homeland and who are known for their integrity, uprightness and commitment to serving the public good.

Dear Citizens,

The events taking place in some parts of the country have regrettably revealed an unprecedented lack of the sense of responsibility.

Instead of each party fulfilling its national and professional obligations; instead of resorting to cooperation and collaborative efforts to resolve citizens’ problems, the parties concerned have been laying the blame at one another’s door, and narrow politicking has been allowed to take precedence over the homeland. As a result, citizens’ interests have been ignored.

Some political parties believe that all they have to do is hold their general meetings, those of their political and executive committees and get involved in election campaigns.

But when it comes to engaging the citizens and solving their problems, they do nothing and are non-existent. This is unacceptable on the part of institutions whose role is to guide and represent the citizens and to serve their interests.

I never expected partisan bickering and political score-settling to go as far as to jeopardize the interests of citizens.

Running public affairs should have nothing to do with personal or partisan interests, populist discourse, or the use of strange expressions that undermine political action.

I have noted that most stakeholders have opted for a win-lose rationale to preserve or expand their political capital at the expense of the homeland, even if that means making the situation worse.

The fact that political parties and their representatives refrain from performing their mission – sometimes deliberately, and sometimes out of a lack of credibility or patriotism – has further compounded the situation.

Given this regrettable and dangerous vacuum, law enforcement services have found themselves face to face with the citizens. They have bravely and patiently fulfilled their duty, showing restraint and commitment to the rule of law as they maintained security and stability.

I am referring to Al Hoceima, but what happened there could actually occur in any other region.

This refutes what some have referred to as the ‘security approach’, as if Morocco were sitting on top of a volcano, or as if each household and each citizen were being watched over by a policeman.

Some even say there is a radical wing and a moderate one, adding that they disagree on how to tackle these events. Nothing could be further from the truth!

In reality, there is only one policy and a single, unwavering commitment, which is to enforce the law, respect the institutions, ensure the security of citizens and safeguard their property.

Moroccans know that the people behind the afore-mentioned anachronous theory are using it as a business undertaking; they also realize that what these people say is not credible.

They act as if law-enforcement services are the ones who run the country and control the government and senior officials. It is probably these services that set prices, etc.

By contrast, law enforcement officers are making major sacrifices, working day and night in difficult conditions to fulfil their duty, maintain the internal and external security and stability of the homeland, and safeguard the security, serenity and tranquility of citizens.

Moroccans have every right and ought, in fact, to be proud of their law-enforcement authorities. I say this loud and clear, without any inferiority complex: if certain nihilists do not want to admit this, or refuse to tell the truth, it is their problem – and theirs alone.

Dear Citizens,

The Moroccan institutional model is an advanced political system.

Nevertheless, for the most part, it is not properly applied. The problem concerns actual implementation on the ground. Having said that, I am particularly keen to respect the prerogatives of institutions as well as the separation of powers.

However, if officials fail to discharge their duties, and the interests of the homeland and of citizens are jeopardized, it is incumbent upon me, as per the Constitution, to ensure the country’s security and stability and to safeguard people’s interests as well as their rights and freedoms.

At the same time, I will not accept any backtracking on democratic achievements, nor will I tolerate any obstruction as far as the work of institutions is concerned. Both the Constitution and the law are quite clear, and powers need no explanation.

Officials must exercise their prerogatives without waiting for someone’s permission. And instead of repeating the same excuse – namely ‘I am being prevented from doing my job’ – it is better for them to offer their resignation, which nobody would reject.

Morocco must come first: before political parties, before elections and before senior positions.

Dear Citizens,

Until my very last breath, I will always take pride in serving you, for I was brought up to love our motherland and to serve its sons and daughters.

I solemnly promise, before God, to keep up my earnest endeavors and seek to meet your expectations so that your aspirations may be fulfilled.

Allow me, Dear citizens, to speak my mind and tell you exactly how I feel, eighteen years after assuming the sacred mission of leading the nation.

I cannot hide certain matters from you. You know them quite well. It is my duty to tell you the truth. Otherwise, I will let you down.

You will notice, Dear Citizens, that I have not talked about our territorial integrity, Africa, or any other foreign policy issue.

Needless to say, the question of the Moroccan Sahara is not open for discussion, and, of course, it remains a top priority.

What I am seeking to achieve today, in all regions of the Kingdom, is a new massîra, or march – a march for the achievement of human and social development; a march for equality and social justice for all Moroccans, because such a major endeavor cannot be carried out in one region and not in the others.

One may come up with the most efficient development model and the best plans and strategies but:

– without a change in mentality;

– without having the best civil servants;

– without the political parties choosing the best elites that are qualified to run public affairs;

– without a sense of responsibility and national commitment; one would not be able to offer all Moroccans the free, dignified life one wants them to have.

I do not want you, Dear Citizens, to think, after listening to this address, that I am being pessimistic.

Far from it! You know that I am a realist. I tell the truth, painful though it may be.

Pessimism is the lack of will, the absence of a forward-looking vision and the inability to see things as they are.

Thank God, our resolve is both firm and sincere, and we also have a clear, long-term vision. We know who we are and where we are heading.

Throughout the centuries, and by the Grace of the Almighty, Morocco has managed to survive countless hardships, thanks to the close, symbiotic relationship between the Throne and the people.

And here we are today, forging ahead and making progress, together, in various sectors. We confidently and resolutely look forward to making more achievements.

Almighty God says:

‘Allah does command you to render back your Trusts to those to whom they are due; and when you judge between man and man, that you judge with justice’.

True is the Word of God.