The Times was none too pleased, riled and concerned. Contributors to The Spectator were wondering whether an imminent implosion was about to take place.  Who would profit from this act of suicide, this ritual of Tory party cannibalism?  The Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn, naturally. The Tories, Britain’s drivers of Brexit, have gone from trouble to potential disaster.

It all came down the antics of Buffoonish Boris Johnson, the foreign secretary who rendered himself a talismanic figure during the Brexit referendum campaign, the figure whom Prime Minister Teresa May felt best secure from in sending him to far-flung places. Over time, the talisman has become an un-improvised explosion device, poorly assembled but nonetheless devastating.   At any moment, he might just blow up, leaving a crippling residue.

Rumours had begun circulating this week that Johnson was set for the cabinet chop.  In a lengthy note in the Daily Telegraph, Johnson was returning to soil long tilled over by the Leave debate.  Even grounds now considered inaccurate if not plainly misleading by those who participated in the campaign to leave the EU, were revisited with unremitting enthusiasm.

It was this very meditation that had peeved establishment Tories.  “I don’t know where this is coming from, honestly. It feels to me like an attempt to keep the great snoreathon story about my article running.”[1]

Tory grandee Ken Clarke was in little doubt what the foreign secretary was up to: soiling the prime minister’s stable. “Sounding off personally in this way is totally unhelpful and he shouldn’t exploit the fact that [Theresa May] hasn’t got a majority in parliament.” Had May received a stonking majority in what turned out to be a withering election, he would have been surely sacked for such conduct.

Interest centred on Johnson’s cavalier approach to the claim, made before and most recently in the Daily Telegraph, that £350 million a week was being paid in dues to the European Union, and that it was an amount that would be duly clawed back once Britannia had made her brave, disentangling escape.  “Once we have settled out accounts, we will take back control of roughly £350m a week.”

It was a figure he has defended with iconoclastic conviction and a degree of enthusiasm verging on mania.  Never mind the inconsistencies and the balanced losses, the EU subsidies and services supplied in return for dues. Britain, bold, hamstrung Britain, had to out, to fight this imposition.

Once freed from these clutches, Britain would be able to relocate the funding to, for instance, the National Health Service (NHS), the very system Tories was sworn to eliminate at various stages since its inception. (The NHS already suffers at the hands of the privatisation ideologues.)

“It would be fine thing,” suggested Johnson, “as many of us have pointed out, if a lot of that money went on the NHS, provided we use that cash injection to modernise and make most of the new technology.”

The core of his argument was his own pitch for a Hard Brexit.  Rather than fearing the behaviour of EU apparatchiks, it was important for Britain not to pay anything to the EU for access post-Brexit. To remain within, even if only financially, would constitute a betrayal.  As would a transitional period after 2019 that would involve the government softening its exit with ongoing EU payments for market benefits.  Prime Minister May had been warned.

Statistics Chief Sir David Norgrove deemed Johnson’s play with figures a “clear misuse of official statistics”.[2]  It was a classic statement of British understatement.  “I am surprised and disappointed that you have chosen to repeat the £350m per week, in connection with the amount that might be available for extra public spending when we leave the European Union.”

It conveyed a fundamental confusion, refusing to admit to the difference between gross contributions and net.  Johnson’s response was to accuse Norgrove, in turn, of a “wilful distortion of the text of my article”.

This has been an ongoing problem of Johnson and his Leave comrades, a certain injudicious use of statistics.  In April 2016, Norgrove’s predecessor as chair of the UK Statistics Authority, Sir Andrew Dilnot, noted that the figure cited by those in the Leave campaign appeared “to relate to the UK’s gross contributions to the EU, before the applications of the UK’s rebate.”[3]  As he concluded in a letter to Norman Lamb, MP, “Without further explanation I consider these statements to be potentially misleading.”  As, indeed, it proved to be.

That was not all – Johnson was keen to insist that the aggrieved young, those who felt that Britain had profited from being involved in the union, were suffering a case of split loyalties. The zealous Europeanist Guy Verhofstadt could be counted on picking up on this criticism.

“Some British politicians – not to name Boris Johnson – criticise their countrymen and women for wanting to keep their European identity.”  This sort of approach smacked of the archaic, claimed Verhofstadt, a case of “binary, old-fashioned and reductionist understanding”.[4]

For Johnson, these points hardly matter.  After being kept on the cooler, and isolated as a dangerous, rebarbative maverick, he has signalled his wish to be counted again, to make the case that will resonate with those who voted to leave in 2016. Time, it seems, to either turn or spurn the prime minister.

Notes:
[1] https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/sep/19/boris-johnson-i-wont-quit-over-theresa-mays-brexit-speech

[2] https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/sep/17/boris-johnson-slapped-down-statistics-chief-fresh-350m-brexit-claim

[3] https://www.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Letter-from-Sir-Andrew-Dilnot-to-Norman-Lamb-MP-210416.pdf

[4] https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/sep/21/eu-brexit-negotiator-attacks-boris-johnson-old-fashioned-views-on-identity-european

Textiles represent one of the earliest human craft technologies and applied arts, and their production would have been one of the most important time, resource and labour consuming activities in the ancient past.

In archaeological contexts, textiles are relatively rare finds, especially in Mediterranean Europe where conditions are unfavourable for organic material preservation. Many archaeological textile fragments do, however, survive in mineralised form, which forms the basis of a new study published today in Antiquity.

Detailed analysis of several hundred textile fragments has provided, for the first time, a much more detailed definition of the textile cultures in Italy and Greece during the first half of the first millennium BC.

According to Dr Margarita Gleba, the study’s author and researcher at the McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research, University of Cambridge, “Luckily for us, during the Iron Age (c. 1000-400 BC) people were buried with a lot of metal goods such as personal ornaments, weapons and vessels. These metals are conducive to the preservation of textiles as the metal effectively kills off the micro-organisms which would otherwise consume the organic materials, while at the same time metal salts create casts of textile fibres, thereby preserving the textile microstructure.”

“This is how we get such a large number of textiles, even though they only exist now in tiny fragments. Through meticulous analysis using digital and scanning electron microscopy, high performance liquid chromatography and other advanced methods we are able to determine a lot of information including the nature of the raw materials and structural features such as thread diameter, twist direction, type of weaving or binding, and thread count.”

The technical differences suggest that during the Iron Age, textiles in Italy more closely resembled those found in Central Europe (associated with the Hallstatt culture that was prevalent in modern-day Germany, Austria and Slovenia) while the textile culture of Greece was largely connected with the Near East.

Dr Gleba added, “There is overwhelming evidence for frequent contact between Italy and Greece during the first half of the first millennium BC, but this evidence shows that their textile traditions were technically, aesthetically and conceptually very different. This means that the populations in these two regions are making an active decision to clothe themselves in a certain way and it may have to do with traditions set up already in the Bronze Age.”

“Textiles have been and still are widely considered one of the most valuable indicators of individual and group identity. Even in societies today, we frequently form opinions of others based on the type of cloth they are wearing: tweed is associated with Irish and British country clothing, cashmere with Central Asia and silk with the Far East for example.”

“Curiously, by Roman times, the establishment of Greek colonies in southern Italy and more general oriental influences observed in material culture of Italic populations leads towards gradual disappearance of the indigenous textile tradition. Our future research will attempt to understand the cause behind this change in textile culture.”

By Bruce Pannier

(RFE/RL) — On September 12, Kyrgyz journalist Zulpukar Sapanov was sentenced to four years in prison after being found guilty of inciting hatred between religious groups.

The basis for the court decision was Sapanov’s book Kydyr Sanjyrasy (Genealogy of the Forefather Kydyr), which dealt with the pre-Islamic beliefs and traditions among the Kyrgyz people.

The book proposed that the Kyrgyz people came from a respected (and likely mythical) holy person, Kydyr-Ata, and Sapanov asked if “maybe Kydyr is the true God and Allah is Satan?”

The book was published in August 2016 and several newspapers published excerpts, quickly attracting the attention of religious scholars in Kyrgyzstan.

Some of these religious scholars appealed to the State Committee for National Security (SCNS) to take action against Sapanov.

Prominent among these theologians were Kadyr Malikov — a vocal opponent of radical Islam who was attacked by alleged extremists in Bishkek on November 26, 2015, and spent time in the hospital with knife wounds to his face and neck — and Tursunbai Bakir uulu, a member of parliament who once burned an Israeli flag at a press conference.

The SCNS summoned Sapanov for questioning in February and his home was later searched.

The SCNS assembled a panel of religious experts, including Malikov and Bakir uulu, to review Sapanov’s book and these experts concluded that Sapanov’s writing did constitute incitement of religious hatred.

A case was filed with the Prosecutor-General’s Office with the prosecution initially demanding Sapanov be imprisoned for six years.

Sapanov says he has read the Koran, the Bible, the Jewish holy book the Torah, and has researched ancient Kyrgyz history. He mentions Tengri, considered by pre-Islamic Turkic cultures of Inner Asia to be a, or the, god, in his book also.

He contends his book was meant to help unite the Kyrgyz people by providing a better understanding of their common past, not to divide religions.

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) released a statement on September 14 criticizing the verdict.

“Although Kyrgyzstan boasts of being an island of free speech in Central Asia, a court in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz capital, passed the sentence on 12 September,” RSF said. “The judges said the book ‘downplays Islam’s role as a religion and fosters a negative attitude towards Muslims.'”

On September 18, Kyrgyzstan’s ombudsman, Kubat Otorbaev, called on the court system to “review [Sapanov’s] verdict and free him from custody.”

Otorbaev said, “One could characterize the court decision on the journalist [Sapanov] as being a return to the inquisition.”

At the Qishloq we’ve been watching the case against Sapanov with great concern.

It does seem similar in some ways to the 1925 case of the state of Tennessee vs. John Thomas Scopes, better known in history as the Scopes Monkey Trial.

Scopes was a substitute high school teacher in Tennessee who taught Darwin’s theory of evolution in defiance of state laws at the time, which specified only the Bible’s version of creation could be taught in schools.

The trial quickly evolved into a case of religion versus science; in this instance, science lost, and Scopes was forced to pay a $100 fine, which was a sizeable amount of money in those days.

Sapanov did his research and his book is based on the conclusions he drew; it nearly goes without saying that in a free society one should be free to write books or articles with an opposing point of view, leaving detractors to simply dismiss whatever they don’t agree with.

The verdict in the Sapanov case is likely to have a chilling effect on writers, journalists, or intellectuals who plan on publishing historical research.

They now must consider their works could be reviewed by state religious experts and declared heretical, in which case they could face the same fate as Sapanov.

RFE/RL Kyrgyz Service Director Venera Djumataeva contributed to this report.

The Russian Defense Ministry has announced one of its generals was killed while fighting Islamic State in Syria.

“Division general Valeri Assapov was killed when a shell exploded during shelling by IS fighters,” the ministry was quoted as saying by local media.

He was serving as an advisor to Syrian government troops “in the operation for the liberation of the city of Deir el-Zour,” it said.

Deir el-Zour province, on Syria’s eastern border with Iraq, is rich with oil and gas fields that served as a key revenue stream for IS at the peak of its power.

Meanwhile, Syrian media reported that government and allied troops have seized Maadan, a town north of Deir el-Zour city and south of Raqqa, which has been a scene of intense fighting with Islamic State militants.

In the pre-nuclear age, the question of credibility in executing the threat was not a vital problem because the mighty side having the military means could carry out threat or launch an offensive while the weaker side could not take an aggressive action. Thus, the military means and the willingness were two foremost factors requisite to fulfilling the threat whereas after nuclear revolution the deterrence theory speaks predominantly about the credibility.

In a literary sense, ‘deterrence means to prevent people from doing something by frightening them, particularly through threats of severe consequences.’ Later, the concept of nuclear retaliation further consolidated the threat by permitting vigorous punishment without allowing realistic defense, because after the introduction of nuclear or strategic weapons, the cost of nuclear weapons is no more restricted to the battlefield or front line and the nation’s infrastructure, population and industries cannot remain intact in modern conflict. The general realization is that in nuclear conflict either side would lose more than it gains. Thomas Schelling argues that in nuclear coercion, actors can credibly threaten or take steps on the route that may eventually result in the situation getting out if control.

The destruction done by nuclear weapons were first witnessed by the world in the Second World War when Hiroshima and Nagasaki were hit by the atomic bomb. The general perception is that since the advent of the nuclear weapons, the sense about major world war has grown. The potential impact and efficacy of nuclear weapons spurred a debate between proliferation optimists, the more the better, and pessimist, more will be worse.

On the notion of deterrence, optimists argue that the nuclear proliferation decreases the likelihood of war. Kenneth Waltz opined that nuclear weapons can increase stability among states because due to deterrent factor and nuclear retaliation the states will tend to avoid war; both conventional and nuclear. Whereas, the nuclear pessimists argue that states possessing nuclear weapons may not necessarily come in mutually deterring pairs or stable relationships which would increase the risk of accidental nuclear war. Pessimist also contend about the possibility of preemptive strike between two hostile states possessing nuclear weapons and sharing common borders although deterrence till now worked in such cases, for instance between US-USSR, Soviet Union-China, India-China and Pakistan-India.

The cold war model is the most recounted to explain this phenomenon as the hostility between United States and Soviet Union did not escalate into direct military conflict despite the height of tensions. On the contrary, with reference to ongoing US-North Korea tensions, the US President’s national security adviser, H.R. McMaster in an interview lately disagreed with the perception that “US and its allies will tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea and rely on traditional deterrence to prevent the North from using them, just as they had deterred the Soviet Union from using its much more massive nuclear arsenal during the Cold War”.

However there are other Trump advisers of the view that deterrence can work with North Korea. On the other hand, Pyongyang claim to complete the miniaturization of hydrogen bomb capable of being fitted to an intercontinental ballistic missile is also important component of the North Korea’s deterrent strategy. The country is showcasing its capabilities to demonstrate that it can cause significant damage to adversary. Thus the derivatives of deterrence are certainly functional in current tensions. Yet a noticeable fact or limitation is that even if deterrence can stop a state to launch an aggressive action, it cannot prevent a country to further develop nuclear weapons.

Nonetheless, if North Korea is undeterrable then its nuclear weapons can be the most feared weapons. Robert Gallucci, a former Clinton administration official rightly questioned that ‘what makes deterrence unreliable in North Koreans case as it is certainly not the quality or quantity of North Korea’s nuclear weapons because Soviet Union had about thousands of weapons at height of Cold War while North Korea have less than 20’. The United States have so far deterred governments in past from using nuclear weapons that include Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong in China.

However, whether North Korea would be deterred by destruction or change its calculus on the development of nuclear weapons by the incentives, disincentives or sanctions is yet to be seen but the cost of failed deterrence is unimaginable.

*The writer is a Senior Research Associate at an Islamabad-based think tank, Strategic Vision Institute (SVI). She works on issues related to nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and South Asian nuclear equation. She writes for South Asian Voices, international blogs and national dailies. She can be reached at maimuna.svi@gmail.com.

With just a week left before Congress’ budget reconciliation process ends, the Senate is once again peddling a poorly-thought out plan to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act (ACA). If Senators vote before the September 30 deadline, they only need 50 votes instead of the filibuster-proof 60 votes to pass amendments. And once again, people are rising up in opposition to the plan, making it unpopular and unlikely to pass.

At the same time, support for a National Improved Medicare for All single payer healthcare system is increasing and there are bills in both the House and Senate with record numbers of co-sponsors. Will the United States finally join the long list of countries that provide healthcare to everyone?

Overall, it is a time to be optimistic. The movement for National Improved Medicare for All has made great strides this year. Whether we succeed still hangs in the balance. We discuss what it will take to win and how to proceed.

Join Health Over Profit for Everyone (HOPE) , a campaign for National Improved Medicare for All.

First, Some History

Efforts to create a national health insurance have existed in the United States for the past 100 years. Health historian, David Barton Smith, writes (in a draft chapter) that the fundamental struggle in the US has been over the question of whether health care is a commodity that belongs in a market or whether it is a basic necessity that requires the protection of government so that it is universal. Smith breaks up the past one hundred years into five phases and argues that in each phase, compromises were made that failed because they did not meet the fundamental criteria of covering everyone and achieving effective governmental oversight. He refers to these compromises as “more palatable approaches” that were considered to be politically feasible, but each “self-destructed.”

These failures, including the most recent ACA, have driven health care deeper into the pockets of private industry from the provision of medical services to the the production and distribution of pharmaceuticals and medical devices. Doctors are turning their practices over to large institutions, “going corporate,” in order to have the negotiating power to simply exist in this environment. Mergers by health insurers, hospitals and pharmaceutical companies have been acts of desperation, as each sector fights for control. But the bottom line in this fight is profit for a few, not health for the many, and so it is the public who suffers. Dr. Adam Gaffney traces and explains this trend from the 1940s to the present in “The Neo-liberal Turn in American Health Care.”

Make no mistake, currently, in the United States, health care is a commodity, and the profiteers are going wild. Since passage of the ACA, major health insurance company stock values have quadrupled. And they are never satisfied. Democrats and Republicans in Congress are discussing a “bipartisan approach,” as outlined by the Center for American Progress, which is funded by health industry lobbyists, to fix the healthcare system. Their plan is to give billions of more dollars to the industry to encourage it to cover our healthcare needs. They refer to this as “stabilizing the market.”

Any person who says that health care is a right or basic necessity but supports keeping the existing market-based structure is either confused or lying. The market model of health care is a failure. Even Fareed Zakaria, conservative host of CNN, understands this.

This history is important because the elites in power are working to maintain their grip on the system. Incrementalists were out in full force after the failure of repeal attempts this summer. Writers who claim to be progressives argued that those who want National Improved Medicare for All are asking for too much, that it is just not politically feasible and that we must compromise. But what they might consider to be doable won’t solve the healthcare crisis.

Incremental steps that were taken in the past did not succeed because they failed to meet the basic requirements of being both universal and properly overseen by the government. This is why we say that the smallest incremental step that we can take in the US is to create a National Improved Medicare for All, a universal publicly-funded healthcare system that relegates private insurers to a supplemental role to provide extras that the system does not cover. Beyond that, there will still be a lot to do to make sure everyone has their healthcare needs met.

National Improved Medicare for All is on the table

A victory this year is that there are bills in the House and Senate that outline a National Improved Medicare for All healthcare system, and they have record numbers of co-sponsors. HR 676 is considered the ‘gold standard’. It has been introduced every session since 2003 and it has broad support from the single payer healthcare movement. It would truly treat health care as a public necessity and not a commodity.

Under HR 676, all people living in the US would be included in the system, there would be free choice of health professional, the coverage would be comprehensive and care would be provided as needed without financial barriers. HR 676 would create a publicly-financed not-for-profit healthcare system. It currently has 119 co-sponsors, all Democrats, plus Rep. John Conyers, who introduced it.

S 1804 is the Medicare for All Act in the Senate that was introduced on September 13 of this year by Senator Sanders with 16 co-sponsors, all Democrats. It has strengths and similarities to HR 676 as well as weaknesses. Its strengths are that it endeavors to achieve a universal Medicare for All system with more comprehensive coverage than what most people have now. It has strong language protecting women’s reproductive rights and it removes most co-pays and deductibles.

The weaknesses of S 1804 prevent it from fully transforming our healthcare system to a public service. Investor-owned facilities are permitted to continue to operate within the system and budgetary controls that might restrain them were excluded from the bill. Another weakness is the exclusion of long term care and keeping it in Medicaid, which forces people and their families to live in poverty to receive benefits.

Perhaps one of the greatest concerns about S 1804 is the long transition period. Most universal systems are started at once – on a certain date everyone is in the system. This is how we did Medicare as a totally new system in 1965 before we had computers. The delayed implementation period over four years is such a complex transition that there are concerns it will proceed poorly and support for a universal healthcare system will disappear before it is complete. With complexity, comes greater costs. HR 676 would start all at once, which would not only allow the savings needed to cover everyone but would also put us all in the same boat so that we all have an interest to fix any problems that arise.

We created a chart comparing HR 676 and S 1804 and a chart outlining the transition for S 1804.

Jim Kavanaugh of The Polemicist argues that S 1804 may actually be a “Trojan Horse” for the Democrat’s favored proposal, a public insurance they refer to as a ‘public option’ being added to the current mix. We call the ‘public option’ a “Profiteer’s Option” because it will serve as a relief valve for private insurers to jettison people who need care.

Health Over Profit for Everyone (HOPE), a campaign of Popular Resistance, sent a letter to Sanders before he introduced his bill urging him not to compromise from the start. Thank you to all of you who wrote to his office.

Next Steps

Winning the fight for a National Improved Medicare for All healthcare system is possible. It will take preparation and hard work. Our opponents are those who profit from the current healthcare system, such as the pharmaceutical companies behind the opioid epidemic, those who are ideologically opposed to public safety nets, the commercial media, as Yves Smith describes, and legislators from both major parties, even those who claim to be progressive, because our political system is dominated by Wall Street. We can’t be fooled by progressive veneers. President Obama’s ACA was written by and for the medical industrial complex to enrich the few, and he is already receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars for Wall Street speeches.

We counter our opponents through the principals of I.C.U.:

I =Independence – we must be independent of political parties and willing to pressure all members of Congress, the White House and federal institutions to achieve the healthcare system we need. We cannot attach this movement to any political party or politician’s agenda. To have lasting success, this needs to be a multi-partisan effort on the movement’s terms. If one party or person takes ownership, then the issue can become a political football, as the ACA has become.

C = Clarity – we must educate ourselves and others about basic health policy so that we understand what elements are required for the system to meet our goals and our needs. We will be the watchdogs for the system to make it the highest quality system it can be. This includes understanding which proposals are insufficient too, such as the much-promoted public option and lowering the age of Medicare.

U = Uncompromising – we must stay strong and united around the basics that we need to achieve for the National Improved Medicare for All healthcare system to function. We are often told that politics involves compromise, but some compromises undermine our goal. Movements for social transformation have always been told they are asking for too much. We are asking for what many other countries have and what we are already spending enough money to have – a healthcare system that is universal high quality and comprehensive. We spend more than twice per person per year what other countries spend that have achieved this. For those who say we should have anything less than a universal system, we ask: who should be left out?

The People will Win Improved Medicare for All

Our goal for the HOPE campaign is to achieve National Improved Medicare for All. We provide the tools and information you need to accomplish this. Sign up for HOPE here.

People across the country are organizing teach-ins and movie nights, doing outreach in their communities, attending town halls and meeting with their members of Congress. We urge you to join the effort and join the monthly education and organizing national calls.

When we win the fight for a universal healthcare system, it will represent a political sea change in the US that will bring solidarity and empowerment to fight for the many other changes that we require. Health is connected to having an education, a job, a home, clean air and water and much more.

As medical student Mike Pappas describes, we need to look beyond access to care and recognize that:

“We must address the social determinants of health. Taking the social determinants of health into account can no longer be something nice to do if there is ‘extra time.’ It must become the focus of medical practice. This will require changing medical education and medical practice.”

It’s time for a real healthcare revolution of, by and for the people!

Chancellor Angela Merkel, the real force behind the continuation of EU, clinched a fourth term in Germany’s election on Sunday, but her victory was clouded by the hard-right AfD party winning its first seats in parliament.

Merkel, who after 12 years in power held a double-digit lead for most of the campaign, scored around 33 percent of the vote with her conservative Christian Union (CDU/CSU) bloc, according to exit polls. The exit poll made her and her supporters very happy. Its nearest rivals, the Social Democrats and their candidate Martin Schulz, came in a distant second, with a post-war record low 20-21 percent.

Supporters gathered at the party headquarters in Berlin cried out with joy as public television reported the outcome, many joining in a chorus of the German national anthem.

But in a bombshell for the German establishment, the anti-Islam, anti-immigration Alternative for Germany (AfD) captured around 13 percent, making it the country’s third biggest political force. The four-year-old nationalist party with links to the far-right French National Front and Britain’s UKIP has been shunned by Germany’s mainstream.

While the likelihood of the AfD winning seats was clear for months, commentators called its strong showing a “watershed moment” in the history of the German republic. It is now headed for the opposition benches of the Bundestag lower house, dramatically boosting its visibility and state financing.

Alarmed by the prospect of what Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel branded “real Nazis” entering the Bundestag for the first time since World War II, the candidates had used their final days of campaigning to implore voters to reject the populists.

Germans elected a splintered parliament reflecting an electorate torn between a high degree of satisfaction with Merkel and a desire for change after more than a decade of her leadership.

Another three parties cleared the five-percent hurdle to be represented in parliament: the liberal Free Democrats at around 10 percent and the anti-capitalist Left and ecologist Greens, both at about nine percent.

As Merkel failed to secure a ruling majority on her own and with the dejected SPD ruling out another right-left “grand coalition” with her, the process of coalition building was shaping up to be a thorny, potentially months-long process.

Merkel, 63, whose campaign events were regularly disrupted by jeering AfD supporters, said in her final stump speech in the southern city of Munich that “the future of Germany will definitely not be built with whistles and hollers”.

Merkel, often called the most powerful woman on the global stage, ran on her record as a steady pair of hands in a turbulent world, warning voters not to indulge in “experiments”. Merkel’s reassuring message of stability and prosperity resonated in greying Germany, where more than half of the 61 million voters are aged 52 or older. Her popularity had largely recovered from the influx since 2015 of more than one million mostly Muslim migrants and refugees, half of them from war-torn Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.

But the AfD was able to capitalise on a wellspring of anger over the asylum issue during what was criticised as a largely lacklustre campaign bereft of real clashes among the main contenders.

The party has made breaking taboos its trademark. Gauland has called for Germans to shed their guilt over two world wars and the Holocaust and to take pride in their veterans. He has also suggested that Germany’s integration commissioner Aydan Ozoguz, who has Turkish roots, should be “disposed of in Anatolia”.

Law student Sabine Maier dismissed the AfD as “too extreme” as she voted in Berlin. But she also criticised the media for lavishly covering the most outrageous comments by the upstart party. “They aren’t all fascists,” she said.

The SPD said its catastrophic result would lead it to seek a stint in opposition to rekindle its fighting spirit. “This is a difficult and bitter day for German social democracy,” a grim-faced Schulz, a former European Parliament chief, told reporters, adding that he hoped to remain party leader.

This would leave Merkel in need of new coalition partners — possibly the pro-business Free Democrats, who staged a comeback after crashing out of parliament four years ago. In theory they could join forces with the left-leaning Greens, who, however, starkly differ from the FDP on issues from climate change to migration policy.

Schulz, 61, struggled to gain traction with his calls for a more socially just Germany at a time when the economy is humming and employment is at a record low. The SPD also found it hard to shine after four years as the junior partner in Merkel’s left-right “grand coalition”, marked by broad agreement on major issues, from foreign policy to migration. In the final stretch, the more outspoken Schulz told voters to reject Merkel’s “sleeping-pill politics” and vote against “another four years of stagnation and lethargy”.

Angela Merkel has been derided as Europe’s “austerity queen”, cheered as a saviour by refugees and hailed as the new “leader of the free world”. But as the pastor’s daughter raised behind the Iron Curtain just won a fourth term at the helm of Europe’s biggest economy, many Germans simply call her the “eternal chancellor”.

Merkel was born Angela Dorothea Kasner in 1954 in the port city of Hamburg. Weeks later her father, a leftist Lutheran clergyman, moved the family to a small town in the communist East at a time when most people were headed the other way.

Biographers say life in a police state taught Merkel to hide her true thoughts behind a poker face. Like most students, she joined the state’s socialist youth movement but rejected an offer to inform for the Stasi secret police while also staying clear of risky pro-democracy activism.

A top student, she excelled in Russian, which would later help her keep up the dialogue with President Vladimir Putin, who was a KGB officer in Dresden when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989.

During that momentous upheaval, Merkel joined the nascent Democratic Awakening group, which later merged with the Christian Democrats (CDU) of then-chancellor Helmut Kohl, who fondly if patronisingly dubbed Merkel his “girl”. But Merkel’s mentor was not the last politician to underestimate her and pay the price. When Kohl became embroiled in a campaign finance scandal in 1999, Merkel openly urged her party to drop the self-declared “old warhorse”.

The move, which has been described as “Merkelvellian”, kicked off her meteoric rise. As an outsider, she remade the CDU, anchoring it in the political centre by pushing progressive social policies, abolishing compulsory military service and scrapping nuclear power. She emerged as Europe’s go-to leader during the debt crisis, though she was derided as a puritanical “austerity queen” in the worst-hit southern countries.

As she starts her fourth term, there is no challenger in sight, but plenty of challenges ahead for Merkel, whom New Yorker magazine just labeled “the most powerful woman in a world filled with unstable men”.

Brexit and consolidation of EU, Turkey’s legitimate EU membership are some of the issues she is likely to concentrate on in the near future.

António Manuel de Oliveira Guterres became Secretary-General of the United Nations on January 1, 2017. Once Portugal’s prime minister, he was UN High Commissioner for Refugees from 2005. For ten years he headed the world’s largest humanitarian organization during a period when unprecedented numbers of people fled their homes to seek safety or a better life elsewhere. He used his time in office to achieve fundamental organizational reform, cutting staff and administrative costs, while expanding the organization’s emergency response capacity during the worst displacement crisis since the Second World War.

At the end of his term Guterres had more than 10,000 staff working in 126 countries; and the UNHCR was providing protection and assistance to over 60 million refugees, returnees, internally displaced people and stateless persons.  The only refugees for which the UNHCR had no responsibility was the Palestinians. This is one desperately costly anomaly that the new UN Secretary-General must address sooner rather than later, as he seeks to reshape an organization that most world leaders agree is in urgent need of change from within.

Reform of the whole UN organization now looms large on his agenda. Ever more urgent calls for action are emanating from world leaders as diverse as Britain’s prime minister, Theresa May, and Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. On Monday Sep 18, 2017 US President Donald Trump hosted a high level meeting on the subject, which ended with 128 nations signing a declaration of support for UN reforms, only Russia and China abstaining.

Humanitarian concerns underlie one of the reforms to the UN structure urgently requiring attention. Some 5 million Palestinians under the aegis of UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) are doomed to perpetual refugee status.

At around the time the state of Israel came into being, something over half the non-Jewish population of what used to be called “Palestine”, some 750,000 people, left their homes. The 1949 General Assembly resolution establishing UNRWA called for “the alleviation of the conditions of starvation and distress among the Palestine refugees.” Yet the resolution also stated that “constructive measures should be undertaken at an early date with a view to the termination of international assistance for relief.” In other words, the new refugee agency’s mission was intended to be temporary.

Nearly 70 years have passed. The “temporary” UNRWA has been transformed into a bloated international bureaucracy with a staff of 30,000 and an annual budget of around $1.2 billion. As for the number of Palestinians registered by UNRWA as refugees, that has mushroomed from 750,000 in 1950 to 5.6 million today. How could such a situation have been allowed to develop? The transformation occurred according to the diktat of UNRWA itself, which decided to bestow refugee status upon “descendants of Palestine refugees,” in perpetuity. The growth in UNWRA’s client base is therefore exponential, justifying an ever-expanding staff and an ever-increasing budget. It has been estimated that by 2050 the number of UNRWA’s “Palestine refugees” will reach just short of 15 million.

When the civil conflict broke out in Syria in 2011, some 3 million UNRWA registered Palestine refugees were living in some 58 camps in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. By early 2017 up to 280,000 Palestinians had been displaced inside Syria, and a further 120,000 had fled to neighbouring countries. But what has justified this perpetuation of refugee status on millions of human beings?

The three key policies pursued by the UN’s main refugee organization, the UNHCR, which Guterres ran so effectively, are voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement. As a result UNHCR has resettled literally millions of unfortunate people who have left their homes, willingly or unwillingly, over the years. A major effect of UNRWA’s humanitarian activities, on the other hand, has been not only to maintain millions of people in their refugee status decade after decade, but to expand the numbers as generation has succeeded generation.

Over the past 70 years UNRWA has allowed itself to become a tool of those Arab states intent on using the Palestinians as bargaining chips in their anti-Israel politicking. For the receiving states to resettle and absorb these people into their new places of residence would be to remove a formidable negotiating advantage, and have the effect of legitimising Israel. The result? Jordan today contains over two million Palestine refugees, of whom 338,000 are still living in camps. In Lebanon an Amnesty International study described registered Palestine refugees as living in “appalling social and economic conditions”. Following Lebanon’s civil war in 1990, the 400,000 Palestine refugees living there were barred from professions such as medicine, law and engineering and were not allowed to own property. A very partial relaxation of these harsh conditions was granted In June 2005 to Lebanon-born Palestinians.

For its part, UNRWA – unlike UNHCR – made no effort to achieve integration or local resettlement. It washed its hands of any involvement in “final status” considerations.

None of this is good enough. There has been talk of dismantling UNRWA, or of absorbing it into the UNHCR, or of radically amending its terms of reference. Any of these would be preferable to allowing the present state of affairs to run on indefinitely. Guterres must put this pressing issue high on his agenda for UN reform.

The signs are good. Guterres is a reformer by temperament. He himself has argued that the UN’s unwieldy bureaucracy and structure need to be reshaped for a more interconnected world. UNWRA which keeps Palestinians permanently dependent as refugees is not currently fit for purpose. If it is to remain in operation, its remit requires fundamental reconsideration, its terms of reference need to be substantially amended, and its functions must be subject to rigorous and continuous scrutiny. If it cannot subject itself to this degree of reform, then it should be wound up, and its functions transferred to the UNHCR. Since this step would require a majority vote in the UN General Assembly, it would represent a major diplomatic challenge for the UN’s new Secretary General. Antonio Guterres seems the very man to take it on, and succeed.

Iran has all options on the table, including pulling out of the 2015 nuclear agreement and bolstering its nuclear program at a “greater speed,” should President Trump decertify the pact, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif told CNN.

“Iran has a number of options, which include walking away from the deal and going back with greater speed with this nuclear program,” Zarif said in an interview with Fareed Zakaria on his CNN show “GPS,” aired Sunday. The minister stressed that Iran’s nuclear program “will remain peaceful,” but “will not address and accept the limitations that we voluntarily accepted.”

In case the US leader doesn’t recertify the nuclear agreement in mid-October, Tehran will consider options in response. Trump said he has “decided” how to proceed with the agreement but did not publicly share his decision.

Zarif, however, noted that certification is not part of the deal and is only “the US internal procedure.”

“It doesn’t absolve President Trump and the administration of the responsibility because the only authority that has been recognized in the nuclear deal to verify [compliance with the deal] is the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency],” the minister said.

The nuclear deal, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), has to be re-assessed every 90 days by the US president in accordance with a Congress-created mechanism. The next deadline set for October 15. If Trump decides to decertify, Congress will have 60 days to vote on re-imposing the sanctions, lifted under the pact in exchange for Tehran capping its nuclear program.

READ MORE: HR McMaster pitches Trump’s ‘broadly different’ Iran strategy ahead of nuclear deal ‘decision’

“Iran has committed itself never to develop nuclear weapons, both as a member of the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] and in the [JCPOA] deal itself,” Zarif continued, deriding a so-called “sunset clause” to the 2015 pact, which Trump claims would erase some of its restrictions over time, as a “myth” existing in Washington.

Having repeatedly stated that Tehran violated the agreement’s “spirit,” despite the pact’s watchdog IAEA confirming Iran’s compliance, Trump reluctantly issued certification in the past. However, Trump recently signaled he might not proceed with the deal, calling it “an embarrassment” and “one of the worst and most one-sided transactions.”

When asked what his message to Trump would be, Zarif urged the US government to look into Iran’s realities.

The realities in our region are crystal clear, they have been for the last 40 years and the US unfortunately decided to neglect those realities and has not fared well by doing that.”
Iran is pursuing its defensive needs, the minister insisted.

“We have said time and again and we have proven that our missiles are for defense,” Zarif said, reminding how Saddam Hussein ordered airstrikes on the Iranian territory in the Iran-Iraq war.

“We go back to a history where our cities were being showered with missiles from Saddam Hussein,” he said, adding that Saddam used to be “a sweetheart” for the US and some other Western powers.

“Iran didn’t have a single missile to work as a deterrent against its citizens, its civilians being target of almost daily missile attacks.”

This week, Tehran unveiled a new Khorramshahr long-range ballistic missile with a range of 2,000 kilometers, which is capable of delivering several warheads, prompting concerns in the West. Trump took to Twitter to voice his skepticism over weapon’s defensive nature, noting the missile is able to reach Israel.

By Polina Ostrovskaya

On October 5 in Budapest (Hungary) will be held an international conference «Russia and Europe: Topical Issues of Contemporary International Journalism». The conference is organized by the International Affairs magazine with support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Federal Agency for Press and Mass Media of the Russian Federation. The main topics to be discussed this year are: «Russia-Europe relations: is “reset” possible? Role of media», «Revival of neo-Nazism: analysis of media technologies used by interested parties. Creating a Counterstrategy» and «Media of Russia and Europe. View from the inside».

The conference is held annually in different countries. List of participants traditionally included directors of European media, politicians, diplomats, political and media scientists, management of international media companies. The first version of the conference took place in November 2011 in Paris and has proved the importance of collaboration between Russian and European media. It received status of a topical annual event with the main goal to boost cooperation between Russian and European media.

Today we speak with Mr. Armen Oganesyan, chairman of the conference and editor-in-chief of the magazine International Affairs.

Why is it important for the press to strengthen relations between Russia and the European Union?

I believe your question actually potentially contain 2 questions: a) Why is it important for Russia and European Union to maintain strong relations?; b) Why should media be the facilitator of the dialogue?

To respond to the first question, let’s just look at history, both cultural and historical. Going back to the 18th century and beyond, Russia has invariably been part of both the intra-European and extra-European dialogue. As we fast-forward to the 21st century, European Union is facing a number of internal and externally imposed crises. Just to enumerate some of them: demographic squeeze; internal and external migration; financial shocks and responses; terrorism, both externally exposed and penetrated into the national fabric; climate change; many others. I cannot fathom how a comprehensive lasting solution to the issues I’ve mentioned, as well as to innumerable others, can be attained without participation of Russia.

Now, to answer the second question, let’s look at the role, a high-level purpose of media. We believe that media should essentially be a mirror, an instrument that exposes basic truths. We don’t believe we should affect the historical flow but we do believe we should make the facts, ideas and opinions known and promulgated.

When the responses to the two parts of your question are combined, I believe we can derive the mission we undertake: using the unique skills of media, fully explore the ideas and opinions underpinning the historical and of-the-moment relationship between the European Union and Russia.

For example, look at just two of a number of round tables we’ll conduct: “Russia-Europe relations: is a reset possible? Role of media” and “Media of Russia and Europe. View from the inside.” They aim to exactly achieve what I have written about: take the long, almost historical view of relations between the parties and explore the role media can play in the discussion.

What is your opinion on anti-Russian media propaganda?

It would be primitive to say that there is a single center that coordinates anti-Russian propaganda, even though in the Cold War period there were centers that provided stereotypes. There are such centers today, and there are experts who work for them. People talk of censorship. As for Ukraine and Crimea, each and every one are free to interpret them as they see it fit. But journalists are not free to express their opinions, yet the way the media spoke about these complicated issues can be described as nothing but obviously biased. The guilt here should be evenly spread between politicians and the journalists who listen to them. Today in Russia exist around 80.000 media organizations each having its own different opinion. Radio-stations Echo of Moscow and Serebryany Dozhd are the most outspoken critics of the official foreign policy line in relation to the West. There is no uniformity: colors are different and each and every one is free to choose a channel or an information niche to his/her liking. Is there anything similar in Europe? There is no such variety in Europe especially when it comes to Russia.

What actions should be taken to resist the false information?

To fight fake news one must go back to basics, namely invest into the fact checking group. These are the people left on the sidelines by the rise of social media and the financial squeeze on traditional media. Many publications have scaled down in this area. Well, now we can see that professional fact checkers are indispensable to prevent proliferation of untrue information

How can a journalist remain non-biased in the modern world?

I believe the best thing a journalist can do to present information objectively is to be well informed in a broad sense of the expression. Yes, the journalist needs to dig into the story, to interview all sides and to ask difficult question. But, I think, a journalist must also see the story in the context of historical and social backgrounds. Only then can truly meaningful coverage emerge

Why is the conference going to be in Budapest?

As I’ve stated above, we aim to explore the opinions of the Russia-EU relationship. It becomes almost intuitively correct to hold such a conference in a city that is somewhat between the philosophical positions of Russia and EU, cities that can easily comprehend the positions of each side. We have always held that view and our previous conferences took places in ideologically similar cities to Budapest: Vienna, Berlin, Bratislava. To my view, Budapest, is if i may say so, a highly “dialogical”, open city, nothing to say about traditional hospitality

How can the cultural connection between Russia and Hungary be strengthen?

Older and middle-aged Russians are more familiar with Hungarian history and culture. From my childhood I remember reading well-translated Hungarian folk tales. Several times I re-read the novel Eclipse of the Crescent Moon, admiring the legendary captain István Dobo. Hungarian literature and, of course, the poetry of Sándor Petőfi have been and remain in the standard university curriculum.

In general, Hungarian culture is close to Russian. Histories of Hungary and Russia are full of dramatic events that have challenged the very existence of our people, in turn influencing respective cultures. Russian and Hungarian cultures belong to the world, not only to Europe. However your question is related to the dialogue between the cultures. It seems to me that not enough is being done to popularize Hungarian language in Russia and Russian in Hungary. Post-Soviet generations are poorly acquainted with the best examples of Russian and Hungarian cultures. I think that we need to do more on both sides to support individual and collaborative projects with the aim of building bridges between our countries that would help renew an active dialogue between the cultures.

Role of the “International Affairs” magazine worldwide

Founded in 1922 as a weekly of the USSR People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and re-established as a monthly edition in 1954, International Affairs is a journal of Russia’s Foreign Ministry covering a broad range of subjects in international politics, diplomacy, and global security. Today’s International Affairs is among the world’s key forums for discussions of international policy issues. The English-language version is distributed in the US, digests are published in French, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Polish, Chinese and Arabic. The journal is available to individual and corporate subscribers in Russia and 150 other countries.

International Affairs offers a round-up and competent analysis of Russia’s and the world’s most pressing political and economic problems. Extensive connections within Russia’s Foreign Ministry reinforce the journal’s ability to serve as a credible and well-informed source of information. Contributors to International Affairs comprise a unique team of diplomats and experts from Russian and international politics, research, business, and policy analysis communities.

Clearly the US has escalated the pivotal role of the military in the making of foreign and, by extension, domestic policy. The rise of ‘the Generals’ to strategic positions in the Trump regime is evident, deepening its role as a highly autonomous force determining US strategic policy agendas.

In this paper we will discuss the advantages that the military elite accumulate from the war agenda and the reasons why ‘the Generals’ have been able to impose their definition of international realities.
We will discuss the military’s ascendancy over Trump’s civilian regime as a result of the relentless degradation of his presidency by his political opposition.

The Prelude to Militarization: Obama’s Multi-War Strategy and Its Aftermath

The central role of the military in deciding US foreign policy has its roots in the strategic decisions taken during the Obama-Clinton Presidency. Several policies were decisive in the rise of unprecedented military-political power.

1. The massive increase of US troops in Afghanistan and their subsequent failures and retreat weakened the Obama-Clinton regime and increased animosity between the military and the Obama’s Administration. As a result of his failures, Obama downgraded the military and weakened Presidential authority.

2. The massive US-led bombing and destruction of Libya, the overthrow of the Gadhafi government and the failure of the Obama-Clinton administration to impose a puppet regime, underlined the limitations of US air power and the ineffectiveness of US political-military intervention. The Presidency blundered in its foreign policy in North Africa and demonstrated its military ineptness.

3. The invasion of Syria by US-funded mercenaries and terrorists committed the US to an unreliable ally in a losing war. This led to a reduction in the military budget and encouraged the Generals to view their direct control of overseas wars and foreign policy as the only guarantee of their positions.

4. The US military intervention in Iraq was only a secondary contributing factor in the defeat of ISIS; the major actors and beneficiaries were Iran and the allied Iraqi Shia militias.

5. The Obama-Clinton engineered coup and power grab in the Ukraine brought a corrupt incompetent military junta to power in Kiev and provoked the secession of the Crimea (to Russia) and Eastern Ukraine (allied with Russia). The Generals were sidelined and found that they had tied themselves to Ukrainian kleptocrats while dangerously increasing political tensions with Russia. The Obama regime dictated economic sanctions against Moscow, designed to compensate for their ignominious military-political failures.

The Obama-Clinton legacy facing Trump was built around a three-legged stool: an international order based on military aggression and confrontation with Russia; a ‘pivot to Asia’ defined as the military encirclement and economic isolation of China – via bellicose threats and economic sanctions against North Korea; and the use of the military as the praetorian guards of free trade agreements in Asia excluding China.

The Obama ‘legacy’ consists of an international order of globalized capital and multiple wars. The continuity of Obama’s ‘glorious legacy’ initially depended on the election of Hillary Clinton.

Donald Trump’s presidential campaign, for its part, promised to dismantle or drastically revise the Obama Doctrine of an international order based on multiple wars, neo-colonial ‘nation’ building and free trade. A furious Obama ‘informed’ (threatened) the newly-elected President Trump that he would face the combined hostility of the entire State apparatus, Wall Street and the mass media if he proceeded to fulfill his election promises of economic nationalism and thus undermine the US-centered global order.

Trump’s bid to shift from Obama’s sanctions and military confrontation to economic reconciliation with Russia was countered by a hornet’s nest of accusations about a Trump-Russian electoral conspiracy, darkly hinting at treason and show trials against his close allies and even family members.

The concoction of a Trump-Russia plot was only the first step toward a total war on the new president, but it succeeded in undermining Trump’s economic nationalist agenda and his efforts to change Obama’s global order.

Trump Under Obama’s International Order

After only 8 months in office President Trump helplessly gave into the firings, resignations and humiliation of each and every one of his civilian appointees, especially those who were committed to reverse Obama’s ‘international order’.

Trump was elected to replace wars, sanctions and interventions with economic deals beneficial to the American working and middle class. This would include withdrawing the military from its long-term commitments to budget-busting ‘nation- building’ (occupation) in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya and other Obama-designated endless war zones.

Trump’s military priorities were supposed to focus on strengthening domestic frontiers and overseas markets. He started by demanding that NATO partners pay for their own military defense responsibilities. Obama’s globalists in both political parties were aghast that the US might lose it overwhelming control of NATO; they united and moved immediately to strip Trump of his economic nationalist allies and their programs.

Trump quickly capitulated and fell into line with Obama’s international order, except for one proviso – he would select the Cabinet to implement the old/new international order.

A hamstrung Trump chose a military cohort of Generals, led by General James Mattis (famously nicknamed ‘Mad Dog’) as Defense Secretary. The Generals effectively took over the Presidency. Trump abdicated his responsibilities as President.

General Mattis: The Militarization of America

General Mattis took up the Obama legacy of global militarization and added his own nuances, including the ‘psychological-warfare’ embedded in Trump’s emotional ejaculations on ‘Twitter’.

The ‘Mattis Doctrine’ combined high-risk threats with aggressive provocations, bringing the US (and the world) to the brink of nuclear war.

General Mattis has adopted the targets and fields of operations, defined by the previous Obama administration as it has sought to re-enforce the existing imperialist international order.

The junta’s policies relied on provocations and threats against Russia, with expanded economic sanctions. Mattis threw more fuel on the US mass media’s already hysterical anti-Russian bonfire. The General promoted a strategy of low intensity diplomatic thuggery, including the unprecedented seizure and invasion of Russian diplomatic offices and the short-notice expulsion of diplomats and consular staff.

These military threats and acts of diplomatic intimidation signified that the Generals’ Administration under the Puppet President Trump was ready to sunder diplomatic relations with a major world nuclear power and indeed push the world to direct nuclear confrontation.

What Mattis seeks in these mad fits of aggression is nothing less than capitulation on the part of the Russian government regarding long held US military objectives – namely the partition of Syria (which started under Obama), harsh starvation sanctions on North Korea (which began under Clinton) and the disarmament of Iran (Tel Aviv’s main goal) in preparation for its dismemberment.

The Mattis junta occupying the Trump White House heightened its threats against a North Korea, which (in Vladimir Putin’s words) ‘would rather eat grass than disarm’. The US mass media-military megaphones portrayed the North Korean victims of US sanctions and provocations as an ‘existential’ threat to the US mainland.

Sanctions have intensified. The stationing of nuclear weapons on South Korea is being pushed.

Massive joint military exercises are planned and ongoing in the air, sea and land around North Korea. Mattis twisted Chinese arms (mainly business comprador- linked bureaucrats) and secured their UN Security Council vote on increased sanctions. Russia joined the Mattis-led anti-Pyongyang chorus, even as Putin warned of sanctions ineffectiveness! (As if General ‘Mad Dog’ Mattis would ever take Putin’s advice seriously, especially after Russia voted for the sanctions!)

Mattis further militarized the Persian Gulf, following Obama’s policy of partial sanctions and bellicose provocation against Iran.

When he worked for Obama, Mattis increased US arms shipments to the US’s Syrian terrorists and Ukrainian puppets, ensuring the US would be able to scuttle any ‘negotiated settlements’.

Militarization: An Evaluation

Trump’s resort to ‘his Generals’ is supposed to counter any attacks from members of his own party and Congressional Democrats about his foreign policy. Trump’s appointment of ‘Mad Dog’ Mattis, a notorious Russophobe and warmonger, has somewhat pacified the opposition in Congress and undercut any ‘finding’ of an election conspiracy between Trump and Moscow dug up by the Special Investigator Robert Mueller. Trump’s maintains a role as nominal President by adapting to what Obama warned him was ‘their international order’ – now directed by an unelected military junta composed of Obama holdovers!

The Generals provide a veneer of legitimacy to the Trump regime (especially for the warmongering Obama Democrats and the mass media). However, handing presidential powers over to ‘Mad Dog’ Mattis and his cohort will come with a heavy price.

While the military junta may protect Trump’s foreign policy flank, it does not lessen the attacks on his domestic agenda. Moreover, Trump’s proposed budget compromise with the Democrats has enraged his own Party’s leaders.

In sum, under a weakened President Trump, the militarization of the White House benefits the military junta and enlarges their power. The ‘Mad Dog’ Mattis program has had mixed results, at least in its initial phase: The junta’s threats to launch a pre-emptive (possibly nuclear) war against North Korea have strengthened Pyongyang’s commitment to develop and refine its long and medium range ballistic missile capability and nuclear weapons. Brinksmanship failed to intimidate North Korea. Mattis cannot impose the Clinton-Bush-Obama doctrine of disarming countries (like Libya and Iraq) of their advanced defensive weapons systems as a prelude to a US ‘regime change’ invasion.

Any US attack against North Korea will lead to massive retaliatory strikes costing tens of thousands of US military lives and will kill and maim millions of civilians in South Korea and Japan.

At most, ‘Mad Dog’ managed to intimidate Chinese and Russian officials (and their export business billionaire buddies) to agree to more economic sanctions against North Korea. Mattis and his allies in the UN and White House, the loony Nikki Hailey and a miniaturized President Trump, may bellow war – yet they cannot apply the so- called ‘military option’ without threatening the US military forces stationed throughout the Asia Pacific region.

The Mad Dog Mattis assault on the Russian embassy did not materially weaken Russia, but it has revealed the uselessness of Moscow’s conciliatory diplomacy toward their so-called ‘partners’ in the Trump regime.

The end-result might lead to a formal break in diplomatic ties, which would increase the danger of a military confrontation and a global nuclear holocaust.

The military junta is pressuring China against North Korea with the goal of isolating the ruling regime in Pyongyang and increasing the US military encirclement of Beijing. Mad Dog has partially succeeded in turning China against North Korea while securing its advanced THADD anti-missile installations in South Korea, which will be directed against Beijing. These are Mattis’ short-term gains over the excessively pliant Chinese bureaucrats. However, if Mad Dog intensifies direct military threats against China, Beijing can retaliate by dumping tens of billions of US Treasury notes, cutting trade ties, sowing chaos in the US economy and setting Wall Street against the Pentagon.

Mad Dog’s military build-up, especially in Afghanistan and in the Middle East, will not intimidate Iran nor add to any military successes. They entail high costs and low returns, as Obama realized after the better part of a decade of his defeats, fiascos and multi-billion dollar losses.

Conclusion

The militarization of US foreign policy, the establishment of a military junta within the Trump Administration, and the resort to nuclear brinksmanship has not changed the global balance of power.

Domestically Trump’s nominal Presidency relies on militarists, like General Mattis. Mattis has tightened the US control over NATO allies, and even rounded up stray European outliers, like Sweden, to join in a military crusade against Russia. Mattis has played on the media’s passion for bellicose headlines and its adulation of Four Star Generals.

But for all that – North Korea remains undaunted because it can retaliate. Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons and remains a counterweight to a US-dominated globe. China owns the US Treasury and its unimpressed, despite the presence of an increasingly collision-prone US Navy swarming throughout the South China Sea.

Mad Dog laps up the media attention, with well dressed, scrupulously manicured journalists hanging on his every bloodthirsty pronouncement. War contractors flock to him, like flies to carrion. The Four Star General ‘Mad Dog’ Mattis has attained Presidential status without winning any election victory (fake or otherwise). No doubt when he steps down, Mattis will be the most eagerly courted board member or senior consultant for giant military contractors in US history, receiving lucrative fees for half hour ‘pep-talks’ and ensuring the fat perks of nepotism for his family’s next three generations. Mad Dog may even run for office, as Senator or even President for whatever Party.

The militarization of US foreign policy provides some important lessons:

• First of all, the escalation from threats to war does not succeed in disarming adversaries who possess the capacity to retaliate. Intimidation via sanctions can succeed in imposing significant economic pain on oil export-dependent regimes, but not on hardened, self-sufficient or highly diversified economies.
• Low intensity multi-lateral war maneuvers reinforce US-led alliances, but they also convince opponents to increase their military preparedness. Mid-level intense wars against non-nuclear adversaries can seize capital cities, as in Iraq, but the occupier faces long-term costly wars of attrition that can undermine military morale, provoke domestic unrest and heighten budget deficits. And they create millions of refugees.
• High intensity military brinksmanship carries major risk of massive losses in lives, allies, territory and piles of radiated ashes – a pyrrhic victory!

In sum:

Threats and intimidation succeed only against conciliatory adversaries. Undiplomatic verbal thuggery can arouse the spirit of the bully and some of its allies, but it has little chance of convincing its adversaries to capitulate. The US policy of worldwide militarization over-extends the US armed forces and has not led to any permanent military gains.

Are there any voices among clear-thinking US military leaders, those not bedazzled by their stars and idiotic admirers in the US media, who could push for more global accommodation and mutual respect among nations? The US Congress and the corrupt media are demonstrably incapable of evaluating past disasters, let alone forging an effective response to new global realities.

By George W. Croner*

The Statutory Process of Section 702 Collection

(FPRI) — The statutory scope of Section 702 can be synopsized as follows: Section 702 of FISA permits the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to jointly authorize the (1) targeting of persons who are not United States persons, (2) who are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, (3) with the compelled assistance of an electronic communication service provider, (4) in order to acquire foreign intelligence information.

Section 702 opens by providing the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (“DNI”) with the authority to jointly authorize, for a period of up to one year, “the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence.”^[1] This authorization is immediately followed by a series of “Limitations”: i.e., (1) that no person known at the time of the acquisition to be located within the United States may be intentionally targeted; (2) that no person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States may be targeted if the purpose is to acquire the communications of a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United States; (3) that no United States person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States may be intentionally targeted; (4) that no communication may be intentionally acquired where, at the time of the acquisition, the sender and all intended recipients are known to be located in the United States; and (5) that all acquisitions under Section 702 must be conducted in a manner consistent with the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.^[2]

To ensure compliance with these statutory restrictions, Section 702 requires that the Attorney General, in consultation with the DNI, adopt “targeting procedures” (50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d)),^[3] “minimization procedures” (50 U.S.C. §1881a(e)), and “guidelines” (50 U.S.C. § 1881a(f)). The “targeting procedures” and “guidelines” are designed to ensure compliance with the above-described “Limitations” found in 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b). The minimization procedures, like those required in connection with traditional FISA surveillance, are intended to minimize the acquisition, retention, use, and dissemination of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting U.S. persons consistent with the needs of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information.

Authority for a Section 702 acquisition is obtained in a manner materially different from a traditional FISA surveillance. FISA requires an application to the FISC for an order which can be issued only after an individualized determination that there is probable cause that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, and that the target is using or about to use specified facilities. Conversely, a Section 702 acquisition is initiated by a written “certification” of the Attorney General and the DNI attesting that there are procedures (i.e., targeting procedures) that have been submitted to the FISC (or will be submitted with the certification) and guidelines (which are not submitted to the FISC) that are reasonably designed to: (1) ensure that the proposed acquisition is limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States; and (2) prevent the intentional acquisition of any communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United States. The certification must also include an attestation that the acquisition will be conducted in accordance with minimization procedures that meet the standards of FISA, and that “a significant purpose” of the acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information.^[4] However, in a clear departure from the requirements of a traditional FISA surveillance, a certification is not required to identify any particularized target or to disclose the specific facilities, places, premises, or property at which an acquisition will be directed or conducted. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(4).

Upon receipt of a certification (and, where appropriate, its accompanying targeting and minimization procedures), the FISC has 30 days to conduct a review. The 30-day period may be, and often has been, extended for good cause. The review contemplated by Section 702 is materially different than that performed in connection with a traditional FISA application. Under Section 702, the FISC conducts no probable cause inquiry and does not review the targeting of particular individuals; instead, Section 702 requires that the court determine whether a certification contains all the statutorily required elements and that the targeting and minimization procedures to be used with the acquisition are consistent with Section 702’s statutory requirements and with the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3). If these standards are met to the FISC’s satisfaction, the court issues an order approving the certification.^[5]

Once the FISC has entered an order approving the certification, the government conducts the acquisition by directing the assistance of an “electronic communication service provider.”^[6] Congress clearly contemplated that, notwithstanding the foreign focus of the targets of Section 702 surveillance, the acquisition of communications under Section 702 would occur in the United States, and the statute specifically provides that the Attorney General and the DNI, in conjunction with authorizing an acquisition pursuant to Section 702, may direct an electronic communication service provider to immediately provide the government with all information, facilities, or assistance necessary to accomplish the acquisition in a manner that will protect the secrecy of the acquisition while producing minimum interference with the provider’s service to the target. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1)(A).^[7]

The Operation of Section 702 in Practice

Acquisition

Once a certification is approved, the government proceeds to target those non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States who are within the scope of the certification to acquire foreign intelligence information. Section 702 certifications permit non-U.S. persons to be targeted only through the “tasking” of “selectors.” Selectors are neither key words (e.g., “weapon” or “nuclear”) nor individual names of targeted individuals because these terms would not identify specific communications facilities; instead, a selector is a specific communication facility used by a target, such as the target’s email address or telephone number. In the patois of Section 702 collection, people are “targets,” and “selectors” are “tasked.”^[8]

The NSA develops a proposed “target” based on “lead” information used by its analysts to determine whether the proposed target is likely to communicate foreign intelligence information as designated in an approved certification. The analyst then proceeds further to conduct a “due diligence” examination of the circumstances relevant to the determination of whether, in fact, the potential target is a non-U.S. person reasonably believed to be located abroad.^[9] This “foreignness” test “is not a ‘51% – 49% determination,’” but makes use of multiple information sources and comes to a conclusion regarding the location of the target based on the totality of the circumstances.^[10] Analysts are required under the NSA Targeting Procedures to prepare “tasking sheets” citing the specific documents and communications that lead them to the conclusion that the target is outside the United States.^[11] As the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) reported, the practical effect of these procedures is a requirement that analysts “show their work” with respect to assessing the location of the target.^[12]

In its 2014 report on the Section 702 Program, the PCLOB cited to a 2013 review conducted by the Department of Justice (DoJ) designed to assess how often NSA’s “foreignness” conclusions made under its targeting procedures turned out to be incorrect.^[13] The review assessed a year of data and showed that only 0.4% of those targeting decisions resulted in the tasking of a selector where, as of the date of that tasking, the user was a U.S. person or was located in the United States.^[14]  Stated differently, the DoJ review concluded that 99.6% of the selectors that NSA had tasked did not have users who were U.S. persons or were located in the United States. On those very rare occasions where the NSA subsequently determines, as part of its internal post-targeting analysis, that a target has entered the United States or that a target initially believed to be a non-U.S. person is, based upon further review and information, actually a U.S. person, NSA targeting procedures mandate that the selector(s) associated with that target be “detasked” and that the acquisition from that target terminate without delay.^[15]

Section 702 surveillance is predicated upon acquiring foreign intelligence information. Thus, in addition to assessing the “foreignness” of the target, the NSA’s targeting procedures also require confirmation, again based on the totality of the circumstances considering all information available to the analyst, that every selector used with a target will likely acquire a type of foreign intelligence information identified in an approved Section 702 certification (the “foreign intelligence purpose” test).^[16]

For each selector associated with a target, then, the NSA uses a multi-step process that documents: the foreign intelligence that is expected to be acquired from the selector; the information upon which a reasonable person would conclude that the selector is used by a non-U.S. person; and, the information upon which a reasonable person also would conclude that this non-U.S. person is located outside the United States.^[17] Once approved, the selector is provided to an electronic communication service provider, which is directed to provide the communications associated with that selector.

The NSA receives information concerning a tasked selector through two distinct forms of collection. One, the PRISM program,^[18] has selectors furnished for tasking to electronic communication service providers (such as internet service providers (“ISPs”) like Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo) by the FBI, with the resultant communications sent to or received from the selector(s) then being provided to the NSA.^[19] The NSA receives all data collected through PRISM collection.^[20] In terms of volume, as of mid-2011, for example, 91 percent of the internet communications that the NSA acquired in any year were estimated to be obtained through PRISM collection.^[21] The PCLOB Report offers the following example of PRISM collection in practice:

NSA learns that John Target, a non-U.S. person located outside the United States, uses the email address “johntarget@usa-ISP.com” to communicate with associates about his efforts to engage in international terrorism. The NSA applies its targeting procedures (described below) and “tasks” johntarget@usa-ISP.com to Section 702 acquisition for the purpose of acquiring information about John Target’s involvement in international terrorism. The FBI would then contact USA-ISP Company (a company that has previously been sent a Section 702 directive) and instruct USA-ISP Company to provide the government all communications to or from email address johntarget@usa-ISP.com. The acquisition continues until the government “detasks” johntarget@usa-ISP.com.^[22]

PRISM collection is limited to internet communications, does not include telephone collection, and, in the opinion of the PCLOB as reflected in its 2014 Report, “is clearly authorized by the [FAA] statute.”^[23]

The second form of collection conducted in the Section 702 Program is termed “Upstream” collection. Only the NSA conducts Upstream collection,^[24] and Upstream and PRISM acquisitions differ in several respects. In Upstream collection, the NSA collects both telephone and internet communications and the acquisition is conducted by directives ordering the assistance of those electronic communication service providers that control the telecommunications “backbone” over which both telephone and internet communications transit. The Upstream yield is substantial: for example, in the first six months of 2011, the NSA acquired more than 13.25 million internet transactions (or roughly 9% of its total Section 702 internet communication collection) through its Upstream collection.^[25]

The volume is a reflection of the locus of acquisition. The internet is comprised of interconnected networks that allow computers to communicate. A “gateway” functions as the entrance point from one network to another and possesses the digital dexterity to convert internet protocols with different formats. Thus, gateways, which determine the flow of information, are essential features in most routers that otherwise would be limited to networks using similar protocols. “Cable heads” include the computer systems and databases needed for internet access while including cable modem termination systems that allow for the sending and receiving of signals on a cable network. When tasked selectors are used to acquire communications from these elements of the internet infrastructure, the level of content available for collection increases exponentially over what would be available from a single telephone line or a discrete computer address.^[26]

Until recently, Upstream internet acquisition included two other features not present in PRISM collection: the acquisition of both “about” communications^[27] and multiple communication transactions (MCTs). However, in April 2017, the NSA announced that it would no longer collect “about” communications.^[28] This curtailment has removed a feature of the Section 702 program that was both once a source of concern to the FISC and the focus of considerable fire from critics of the Section 702 Program.^[29]

Communications transit the internet as packets of data that together may be assembled and understood by a device on the internet and, where applicable, rendered in an intelligible form to the user of that device.^[30] The packets forming a particular internet “transaction” may be reassembled as a single discrete communication or as an MCT containing more than one discrete communication within it.^[31] Technologically, the NSA’s Upstream Internet collection devices are generally incapable of distinguishing between the individual communications comprising these MCTs, a task rendered more problematic as evolving technology sees internet service providers constantly changing their protocols and services to afford consumers the ability to customize how they use a particular service.^[32] In its Upstream internet collection, the NSA specifically uses an Internet Protocol filter designed to at least “limit such acquisitions to internet transactions that originate and/or terminate outside the United States;”^[33] but, if one of the communications within an MCT is to or from a tasked selector, and one end of the transaction is foreign, the NSA will acquire the entire MCT. Based on a statistical sample conducted by NSA in connection with proceedings before the FISC in 2011, NSA acquired between 300,000 and 400,000 MCTS where the “active user” (i.e., the actual human being interacting with a server to engage in an Internet transaction) was the target of the surveillance.^[34]

Under NSA’s current minimization procedures, if a communication contained within an MCT is determined to be a domestic communication, the entire MCT will be destroyed unless the NSA’s Director (or Acting Director) specifically determines, on a communication-by-communication basis, that the sender or intended recipient was properly targeted under Section 702 and that certain specific retention criteria are satisfied.^[35]

Use, Retention, and Dissemination

Once a communication is properly acquired pursuant to Section 702, it is processed and retained in multiple NSA systems and data repositories subject to multiple requirements designed to sustain protections for U.S. persons throughout the collection to dissemination process.^[36] NSA analysts access Section 702 communications via “queries,” which may be date-bound, and may include alphanumeric strings such as telephone numbers, email addresses, or terms that can be used individually or in combination with one another.^[37] NSA analysts with access to Section 702-derived data are trained in proper query construction so that the query “is reasonably likely to return valid foreign intelligence information and minimizes the likelihood of returning non-pertinent U.S. person information.”^[38] Analysts conduct, at times, complex queries across large data sets, but in every instance, the queries must be constructed in a manner “reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence information.”^[39]

Any use of U.S. person identifiers as terms to identify and select communications must first be approved in accordance with NSA minimization procedures that require a stated justification providing facts demonstrating that the use of the identifier is reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence information.^[40] The request is then subject to multiple levels of review before approval to use a U.S. person identifier in a query.^[41] The NSA retains records of all U.S. person identifiers approved for use as selection terms, and these records are subject to both internal review and external bimonthly audit by the DoJ’s National Security Division (“DoJ/NSD”) and the Office of the DNI (“ODNI”).^[42]  Compliance issues regarding the use of U.S. person identifiers must be reported to the FISC and to Congress.^[43]

The NSA’s Minimization Procedures require that any communication determined to be clearly not relevant to the purpose of the acquisition or clearly not evidence of a crime be destroyed at the earliest practical time, and that under no circumstances will any communication of or concerning a U.S. person be retained for a period of more than five years.^[44] As noted above, except in very limited circumstances, domestic communications (i.e., any communication lacking at least one communicant who is outside the United States) are destroyed upon recognition.^[45] Even foreign communications of or concerning a U.S. person may be retained, used, and disseminated only for limited purposes specifically detailed in the NSA’s minimization procedures that must be approved by the FISC.^[46]

Special retention rules govern MCTs acquired through the Upstream internet collection. No MCT acquired after March 18, 2017 may be retained unless at least one discrete communication within the MCT meets the NSA’s retention standards, and any MCT failing to meet the retention standards and containing communications of or concerning a U.S. person must be destroyed on recognition.^[47]

Other than as noted above, unminimized Section 702-acquired data must be aged off NSA systems no later than five years after the expiration of the Section 702 certification under which it was acquired; however, internet transactions acquired through NSA’s Upstream collection techniques may not be retained longer than two years after the expiration of the Section 702 certification under which it was acquired unless at least one discrete communication meets the retention standards (i.e., is a foreign communication containing foreign intelligence information).^[48]

The NSA only generates signals intelligence reports when the reported information meets a specific intelligence requirement, regardless of whether the proposed report contains U.S. person information. Dissemination of information about U.S. persons in any NSA foreign intelligence report is expressly prohibited unless that information is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information, assess the importance of that information, contains evidence of a crime, or indicates an imminent threat of serious harm to life or property.^[49] Where dissemination is permitted, the identity of the U.S. person is “masked” and a generic term, such as “U.S. person,” is substituted along with suppression of details that could lead to such person being successfully identified by the context.^[50] “Unmasking” of the U.S. person is permitted only where specific criteria are satisfied, where additional controls are in place to preclude further dissemination, and additional approval has been provided by one of seven designated positions at NSA.^[51]

Oversight

Every feature of the Section 702 Program is subject to a plethora of oversight regimens and reporting requirements. The oversight begins internally at the NSA where the Director of Compliance, the Director of Civil Liberties and Privacy, the Inspector General, the General Counsel, and embedded compliance elements within the NSA’s operational directorates join in an enterprise-wide compliance structure.^[52] Any compliance incidents, whether in the form of inappropriate queries, database errors, or typographical mistakes are reported to DoJ/NSD and the ODNI.^[53]

Additionally, as required by statute,^[54] the NSA completes and delivers to the congressional intelligence and judiciary committees an annual review of the Section 702 Program detailing: (i) an accounting of the number of intelligence reports containing reference to a U.S. person identity; (ii) an accounting of the number of U.S. person identities subsequently disseminated in response to identity requests relating to intelligence reports where the identity was initially masked; (iii) the number of targets that were later determined to be in the United States; and, (iv) a description of any procedure developed by NSA and approved by the DNI to assess, consistent with privacy rights and with national security and operational needs, the extent to which acquisitions authorized under the Section 702 Program acquire the communications of U.S. persons.^[55]

As noted earlier, the NSA is required to document on “tasking sheets” every targeting decision made under its targeting procedures, and DoJ/NSD conducts post-tasking review of every tasking sheet furnished by the NSA.^[56] Additionally, DoJ/NSD and ODNI conduct bi-monthly reviews of the NSA’s application of its minimization procedures focusing particularly on dissemination and queries using U.S. person identifiers.^[57] The results of these targeting and minimization reviews are reported to Congress both in the NSA’s annual review^[58] and in the Joint Assessments that also are furnished to the FISC.^[59]

All of the foregoing represents an ongoing compliance scheme documented in a recurring series of detailed reporting requirements. Aside from this oversight regimen, after an independent, exhaustive and comprehensive review conducted pursuant to both presidential and bipartisan congressional requests, the PCLOB concluded that “the Board has seen no trace of any such illegitimate activity associated with the [Section 702] program, or any attempt to intentionally circumvent its limits.”^[60] Correspondingly, fifteen separate Joint Assessments have concluded there have been no incidents of intentional circumvention of or violation of the procedures or guidelines governing the Section 702 Program.^[61]

A Statistical Snapshot of Section 702 Activity

Having examined how Section 702 collection authority is practiced (largely by the NSA), some statistical data helps illustrate the quantitative scope of that application which, in turn, may offer an order of magnitude from which to evaluate the criticism of the Program leveled by its detractors.^[62]

Much of the numerical data associated with the Section 702 Program remains classified, but some range of its scope can be gauged from a FISC opinion authored by Judge John Bates in October 2011 and subsequently released in redacted form.^[63] In his October 2011 opinion, Judge Bates estimated that NSA acquires more than 250 million communications each year pursuant to Section 702.^[64] Roughly 91% of this collection was PRISM collection, while the remaining 9% constituted acquisitions from the NSA’s Upstream collection.^[65] In 2011, roughly 60% of this Upstream collection represented MCTs with the remaining 40% constituting discrete (i.e., single) communication transactions (“SCTs”).^[66]

Although constituting a statistically smaller part of the overall collection, the Upstream program in 2011 was still acquiring more than 26 million internet transactions per year.^[67] These included both SCTs and MCTs. As discussed earlier, MCTs include multiple discrete communications in a single transaction and, in 2011, the NSA was collecting 300,000-400,000 MCTs per year where the active user was the user of the tasked facility. Moreover, according to Judge Bates, the NSA’s Upstream collection resulted in the acquisition of “tens of thousands of wholly domestic communications.”^[68]

More recently, in accordance with certain requirements imposed by the USA Freedom Act,^[69] the ODNI released its Annual Statistical Transparency Report. While the report does not provide the sort of collection numbers cited by Judge Bates in his October 2011 FISC opinion, it furnished the following data regarding the number of Section 702 targets authorized pursuant to orders issued by the FISC following review of Section 702 certifications:^[70]

Moreover, reflecting the continuing expansion in telecommunication connectivity, as of November 2016, Section 702 taskings were reported to have steadily increased in all but two of the fifteen reporting periods covered by the semiannual joint assessments provided to Congress by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence, including a 14% increase in new taskings during the reporting period covered by the November 2016 Joint Assessment.^[71] Corresponding with the rise in targeting and tasking, the use of U.S. person identifiers increased with the ODNI Transparency Report showing that, in CY 2016, an estimated 5,288 search terms concerning a known U.S. person were used to retrieve unminimized contents of communications acquired under Section 702, as compared to 4,672 such uses in CY 2015.^[72]

While these figures are insufficient to fully portray the scope of the Section 702 Program or assess its impact with any great degree of specificity, they do furnish some quantitative order of magnitude regarding its operation.

Read the first part of the series here. The third part of the series will be published next week.

About the author:
*George W. Croner previously served as principal litigation counsel in the Office of General Counsel at the National Security Agency. He is also a retired director and shareholder of the law firm of Kohn, Swift & Graf, P.C., where he remains Of Counsel, and is a member of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI. This article is the second part of a four part series arguing for the renewal of the FISA Amendments Act originally enacted in 2008, extended in 2012, and now set to expire on December 31, 2017. The first part of the series was published can be accessed here. Part three will be published next week.

Notes:
^[1] 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a).

^[2] 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(5).

^[3] Because NSA and the FBI are the only agencies authorized to engage in targeting to acquire communications pursuant to Section 702, these are the only agencies with targeting procedures. However, given that NSA is the only agency authorized to initiate Section 702 collection and that FBI targeting procedures are applied only to certain selectors that NSA already has determined as appropriate for targeting under NSA’s targeting procedures, this paper focuses on NSA’s targeting and minimization procedures in its discussion of the Section 702 Program. See PCLOB Report at 42 (“only the NSA may initiate Section 702 collection”).

^[4] 50 U.S.C.§ 1881a(g)(2)(A).

^[5] See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion and Order, [Caption Redacted], [Docket No. Redacted], (FISC April 26, 2017) (Collyer, J.) at http://icontherecord.tumblr.com (approving certification, targeting procedures and minimization procedures).

^[6] “Electronic communication service provider” is defined in the FAA, and includes, by reference to other definitions found in the U.S. Code, a telecommunications carrier, a provider of electronic communication service, a provider of remote computing service, and “any other communication service provider who has access to wire or electronic communications either as such communications are transmitted or as such communications are stored.” 50 U.S.C. § 1881(b)(4).

As noted earlier, one of the hurdles to passage of the FAA had been the issue of immunity for electronic communication service providers that had provided services to the government in connection with the TSP and subsequently had been sued for such participation. Congress granted retroactive immunity to these providers and, prospectively, provided: (1) that electronic communication service providers furnishing information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with [a Section 702 directive] would be compensated at prevailing rates; and (2) that “no cause of action shall lie in any court against any electronic communication service provider for providing any information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with a [Section 702 directive].” 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1-3).

^[7] The FAA permits an electronic communication service provider to petition the FISC to modify or set aside the directive ordering its assistance. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4). If the FISC does not provide the requested relief, the electronic communication service provider may appeal to the FISCR and, ultimately, seek certiorari review by the U.S. Supreme Court. See, e.g., In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISCR 2008) (FISCR rejects provider’s challenge that the directed assistance violated customers’ Fourth Amendment rights).

^[8] NSA Director of Civil Liberties and Privacy Office, “NSA’s Implementation of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Section 702” (“DCLPO Report”) (April 16, 2014) at 2-3, 5; PCLOB Report at 21, 32.

^[9] See PCLOB Report at 43 (“The government has stated that in making this foreignness determination the NSA targeting procedures inherently impose a requirement that analysts conduct ‘due diligence’ in identifying these relevant circumstances.”).

^[10] DCLPO Report at 4. See PCLOB Report at 44 (“The government has stated, and the Board’s review has confirmed, that this is not a’51% to 49%’ test.”). See also Procedures Used by the National Security Agency for Targeting Non-United States Persons Reasonably Believed to be Located Outside the United States to Acquire Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as Amended (“2016 NSA Targeting Procedures”) at 1-2 (“NSA may use information from any one or a combination of these categories of information in evaluating the totality of the circumstances to determine that the potential target is located outside the United States.”).

^[11] PCLOB Report at 45; DCLPO Report at 4-5.

^[12] PCLOB Report at 45.

^[13] PCLOB Report at 44.

^[14] Id.

^[15] 2016 NSA Targeting Procedures at 7-9; DCLPO Report at 4.

^[16] 2016 NSA Targeting Procedures at 4; DCLPO Report at 4.

^[17] DCLPO Report at 4-5.

^[18] NSA now refers to PRISM collection as “Downstream” collection. NSA/CSS Press Statement, NSA Stops Certain Section 702 “Upstream” Activities, April 28, 2017. For ease of reference, this paper uses the PRISM descriptor historically applied to this form of Section 702 collection.

^[19] DCLPO Report at 5; PCLOB Report at 33-34.

^[20] PCLOB Report at 7, 33-34.

^[21] Id. citing Bates October 2011 Op., 2011 WL 10945618, at *25 and n. 24.

^[22] PCLOB Report at 34.

^[23] PCLOB Report at 9.

^[24] PCLOB Report at 7.

^[25] Bates October 2011 Op., 2011 WL 10945618, at *10, n. 26.

^[26] This description of Internet structure draws on that provided in Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, 38 Harv.J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 117, 132 (2015).

^[27] In Section 702 parlance, an “about” communication is one that includes the tasked email address in the text or body of an email even though the email is between two persons who are not themselves targets. In the case of “about” communications, acquisition may include communications that are neither to nor from a target but, instead, where a particular selector tasked for collection happens to be included in the communication.

^[28] NSA/CSS Press Statement, NSA Stops Certain Section 702 “Upstream” Activities, April 28, 2017.

^[29] NSA’s 2016 Minimization Procedures reflect this change in the handling of “about” communications by requiring all such communications acquired prior to March 18, 2017 to be segregated until destroyed and all such communications acquired on or after March 18, 2017 to be “destroyed upon recognition.” Minimization Procedures Used by the National Security Agency in Connection with Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as Amended (“2016 NSA Minimization Procedures”) at 4.

^[30] See Bates October 2011 Op., 2011 WL 10945618, at *9, n. 23 (quoting the government’s characterization of what constitutes an Internet transaction).

^[31] 2016 NSA Minimization Procedures at 2.

^[32] Bates October 2011 Op., 2011 WL 10945618, at *10; PCLOB Report at 40.

^[33] 2016 NSA Targeting Procedures at 2.

^[34] PCLOB Report at 40 citing to Bates October 2011 Op., 2011 WL 10945618, at *12.

^[35] 2016 NSA Minimization Procedures at 9.

^[36] See, e.g., U.S. Signals Intelligence Directive (“USSID”) 18 (titled Legal Compliance and U.S. Persons Minimization Procedures, USSID 18 “prescribes policies and procedures and assigns responsibilities to ensure that the missions and functions of the U.S. SIGINT System are conducted in a manner that safeguards the constitutional rights of U.S. persons.”).

^[37] DCLPO Report at 6.

^[38] DCLPO Report at 6-7.

^[39] 2016 NSA Minimization Procedures at 4.

^[40] 2016 NSA Minimization Procedures at 5; DCLPO Report at 7.

^[41] Id.

^[42] 2016 NSA Minimization Procedures at 5; PCLOB Report at 57.

^[43] See FISC Rule of Procedure 13(b) requiring notification of non-compliance (which would include noncompliance with minimization procedures approved by the FISC). See also 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(l)(1) (Attorney General and DNI required to submit semiannual compliance reports to Congress and the FISC).

^[44] 2016 NSA Minimization Procedures at 4.

^[45] Id. at 9.

^[46] 2016 NSA Minimization Procedures at 11-13..

^[47] Id. at 5.

^[48] 2016 NSA Minimization Procedures at 5.

^[49] DCLPO Report at 7; 2016 NSA Minimization Procedures at 10-11.

^[50] DCLPO Report at 7; 2016 NSA Minimization Procedures at 12.

^[51] DCLPO Report at 7-8; 2016 NSA Minimization Procedures at 12-13.

^[52] DCLPO Report at 9.

^[53] Id.

^[54] 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(l)(3).

^[55] 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(l)(3)(A).

^[56] PCLOB Report at 70; Semiannual Assessment of Compliance with Procedures and Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Submitted by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence, November 2016 (covering the period June 1, 2015 – November 30, 2015) (“November 2016 Joint Assessment”) at 7.

^[57] PCLOB Report at 72; November 2016 Joint Assessment at 8.

^[58] 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(l)(3)(A).

^[59] 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(l)(1).

^[60] PCLOB Report at 11.

^[61] Office of the Director of National Intelligence “Fact Sheet” relating to the “Semiannual Assessment of Compliance with Procedures and Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) – 13th, 14th and 15th Joint Assessments” at 1 available at www.dni.gov//Overview_Fact_Sheet.

^[62] This statistical picture is, admittedly, incomplete since quantification of significant features of the Section 702 Program remains classified.

^[63] Certain provisions in The USA Freedom Act, P.L. 114-23 (2015), now provide for release, in certain circumstances, of redacted decisions of the FISC. A mix of other statutory requirements in the USA Freedom Act also requires the DNI to provide certain statistical data on the use of national security authorities like Section 702.

^[64] Bates October 2011 Op., 2011 WL 10945618, at *9.

^[65] Id.

^[66] Id. at *25.

^[67] Id. at *10.

^[68] Id. at *16.

^[69] See, Note 86, above.

^[70] Statistical Transparency Report Regarding Use of National Security Authorities for Calendar Year 2016 (“Transparency Report”), Office of the Director of National Intelligence, April 2017 available at www.dni.gov.

^[71] November 2016 Joint Assessment at 16-18.

^[72] The search term data is not broken down by agency so it is not possible to determine which agency is utilizing search terms concerning U.S. persons, or how frequently. The PCLOB Report indicates that, in 2013, NSA approved 198 U.S. person identifiers to be used as content query terms while CIA conducted approximately 1,900 content queries using U.S. person identifiers. PCLOB Report at 57-58.

US President Donald J. Trump’s targeting of a two-year-old agreement curtailing Iran’s ability to produce nuclear weapons could not only spark a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, but also tilt European-Chinese competition for domination of Eurasia’s future energy infrastructure in China’s favour.

As Mr. Trump keeps the world in suspense by declining to disclose how he intends to correct what he calls an embarrassment, Iranian leaders are betting against the odds that European signatories of the nuclear agreement will persuade him to stop short of pulling out of the nuclear deal and avoid steps that would effectively undermine the accord.

In doing so, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is relying on common interests with Europe: a desire to keep the deal in place, prevent Iranian hardliners from getting the upper hand in his country’s power struggles, avoid a nuclear arms race, and ensure a European role in shaping the future architecture of Eurasian energy.

However, if Mr. Trump’s record is anything to go by, he is unlikely to heed European calls for keeping the nuclear deal in place, much like he ignored pressure from Europe and others not to pull out of the Paris climate accord.

A more likely scenario is that Mr. Trump will refuse to certify Iranian compliance with the deal by October 15, a quarterly requirement mandated by Congress. That would open the door to Congress re-imposing secondary sanctions lifted as part of the nuclear deal.

Renewed secondary sanctions would put Europe in an impossible position. They would not only put European companies and banks at risk of running afoul of US law if they continued to do business with Iran, but also unleash consequences that could significantly increase tension in the Middle East and ripple across Eurasia.

De facto European compliance would significantly weaken the agreement’s value to Iran, boost pro-Chinese Iranian hardliners opposed to the deal and eager to free Iran from restrictions on its nuclear program, risk a nuclear arms race in an environment in which the US is losing out in the Middle East’s quest for nuclear energy that contains tacit building blocks for programs to develop nuclear weapons, and potentially tilt Iran towards China in determining the flow of its natural gas – a key factor in the quest to shape the future architecture of Eurasian energy.

“If the United States leaves the treaty and Europe follows, then this deal will certainly collapse and Iran will go back to what it was before and, technically speaking, to a much higher level,” said Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization.

The United States may be unprepared for the fallout of Iran pursuing an unfettered nuclear program, beyond its ability to tighten the economic screws, wield military power, and support potential efforts to destabilize Iran in a bid to achieve regime change.

A group of former senior US government and military officials recently warned that the United States in the absence of a strategy to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy was lagging behind China and Russia in helping Middle Eastern states develop programs of their own. The officials cautioned that Mr. Trump’s failure to articulate a policy undermined “Washington’s ability to shape the highest standards of non-proliferation safeguards, safety, and security.”

Noting that “the Middle East is in the process of going nuclear,” the officials went on to say that “the big question is whether the nuclearization of the region will be dominated by Russia and China, or by the host countries in partnership with the United States and its allies under a proven program that ensures absolute safety, security and standardization throughout the nuclear fuel cycle.”

Most Middle Eastern states are signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). They have disavowed the pursuit of nuclear weapons and called for a nuclear-free zone in the region in a bid to force Israel to declare its nuclear weapons and join the NPT and at the same time avert a nuclear arms race with Iran.

Saudi cooperation with nuclear power Pakistan has nonetheless long been a source of speculation about the kingdom’s ambition. Pakistan’s former ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani, asserted that Saudi Arabia’s close ties to the Pakistani military and intelligence during the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s gave the kingdom arms’ length access to his country’s nuclear capabilities.

The Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) said earlier this year that it had uncovered evidence that future Pakistani “assistance would not involve Pakistan supplying Saudi Arabia with a full nuclear weapon or weapons; however, Pakistan may assist in other important ways, such as supplying sensitive equipment, materials, and know-how used in enrichment or reprocessing.”

The report said it was unclear whether “Pakistan and Saudi Arabia may be cooperating on sensitive nuclear technologies in Pakistan. In an extreme case, Saudi Arabia may be financing, or will finance, an unsafeguarded uranium enrichment facility in Pakistan for later use, either in a civil or military program,” the institute said.

Rather than embarking on a covert program, the institute predicted that Saudi Arabia would, for now, focus on building up its civilian nuclear infrastructure as well as a robust nuclear engineering and scientific workforce.

This would allow the kingdom to take command of all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle at some point in the future. That process could accelerate if US actions undermine the nuclear agreement with Iran.

Saudi Arabia has in recent years significantly expanded graduate programs at its five nuclear research centres as part of a $100 billion program to build 16 nuclear reactors by 2030.

Saudi King Salman earlier this year signed an agreement with China on cooperation on nuclear energy. The agreement is for a feasibility study for the construction of high-temperature gas-cooled (HTGR) nuclear power plants in the kingdom as well as cooperation in intellectual property and the development of a domestic industrial supply chain for HTGRs built in Saudi Arabia.

The agreement was one of number nuclear-related understandings concluded with China in recent years. Saudi Arabia has signed similar agreements with France, the United States, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea and Argentina.

Lurking in the background of the battle for the future of the Iranian nuclear agreement is an unrelated but no less important issue: the future of Eurasia’s energy architecture. US efforts to undermine the deal and de facto European compliance with US sanctions could push Iran to favour China rather than Europe in allocating its estimated surplus over the next five years of 24.6 billion cubic metres of natural gas. Iran boasts the world’s second largest natural gas reserves and its fourth largest oil reserves.

“Not enough to supply all major markets, Tehran will face a crucial geopolitical choice for the destination of its piped exports. Iran will be able to export piped gas to two of the following three markets: European Union (EU)/ Turkey via the Southern Gas Corridor centring on the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), India via an Iran-Oman-India pipeline, or China via either Turkmenistan or Pakistan. The degree to which the system of energy relationships in Eurasia will be more oriented toward the European Union or China will depend on the extent to which each secures Caspian piped gas exports through pipeline infrastructure directed to its respective markets,” said energy scholar Micha’el Tanchum.

The lifting of international sanctions as part of the nuclear agreement gave Iran a vested interest in deploying its energy wealth in ways that would allow it to balance its relations with China and Europe. A Europe incapable of developing economic ties with the Islamic republic, including the expansion of pipeline infrastructure, could undermine Iran’s calculus to China’s benefit.

In a study, researchers at the University of São Paulo’s Ribeirão Preto School of Medicine (FMRP-USP), in Brazil, finds that the more frequent the migraine attacks, the more severe will be the so-called temporomandibular disorder, or TMD. The temporomandibular joint acts like a sliding hinge connecting the jawbone to the skull, therefore the disorder’s symptoms includes difficulty chewing and joint tension.

“Our study shows that patients with chronic migraine, meaning attacks occurring on more than 15 days per month, are three times as likely to report more severe symptoms of TMD than patients with episodic migraine,” said Lidiane Florencio, the first author of the study, which is part of the Thematic Project “Association study of clinical, functional and neuroimaging in women with migraine”, supported by the São Paulo Research Foundation – FAPESP.

Previous studies already indicated that migraine is somehow associated with pain in the chewing muscles. However, this research was the first to consider the frequency of migraine attacks when analyzing its connection with TMD: eighty-four women in their early to mid-thirties were assessed, being that 21 were chronic migraine patients, 32 had episodic migraine, while 32 with no history of migraine were included as controls – the results were published in the Journal of Manipulative and Physiological Therapeutics.

Signs and symptoms of TMD were observed in 54% of the control participants without migraine, 80% of participants with episodic migraine, and 100% of those with chronic migraine.

For Florencio, central sensitization may explain the association between the frequency of migraine attacks and the severity of TMD.

“The repetition of migraine attacks may increase sensitivity to pain,” she said. “Our hypothesis is that migraine acts as a factor that predisposes patients to TMD. On the other hand, TMD can be considered a potential perpetuating factor for migraine because it acts as a constant nociceptive input that contributes to maintaining central sensitization and abnormal pain processes.” Nociceptive pain is caused by a painful stimulus on special nerve endings called nociceptors.

Migraine and TMD have very similar pathological mechanisms. Migraine affects 15% of the general population, and progression to the chronic form is expected in about 2.5% of migraine sufferers. On the other hand TMD is stress-related as much as it has to do with muscle overload. Patients display joint symptoms – such as joint pain, reduced jaw movement, clicking or popping of the temporomandibular joint – but also develop a muscular condition, including muscle pain and fatigue, and/or radiating face and neck pain.

Which came first?

TMD and migraine are comorbidities. However, while people who suffer from migraine are predisposed to have TMD, people with TMD will not necessarily have migraine.

“Migraine patients are more likely to have signs and symptoms of TMD, but the reverse is not true. There are cases of patients with severe TMD who don’t present with migraine,” said Débora Grossi, the lead researcher for the study and principal investigator for the Thematic Project.

The researchers believe that TMD may increase the frequency and severity of migraine attacks, even though it does not directly cause migraine.

“We do know migraine isn’t caused by TMD,” Florencio said. “Migraine is a neurological disease with multifactorial causes, whereas TMD, like cervicalgia – neck pain – and other musculoskeletal disorders, is a series of factors that intensify the sensitivity of migraine sufferers. Having TMD may worsen one’s migraine attacks in terms of both severity and frequency.”

The journal article concludes that an examination of TMD signs and symptoms should be clinically conducted in patients with migraine.

“Our findings show the association with TMD exists but is less frequent in patients with rare or episodic migraine,” Grossi said. “This information alone should change the way clinicians examine patients with migraine. If migraine sufferers tend to have more severe TMD, then health professionals should assess such patients specifically in terms of possible signs and symptoms of TMD.”

(Civil.Ge) — Georgian officials slammed as “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing” the decision of the Russian-backed authorities in South Ossetia to demolish the houses of ethnic Georgians in village Eredvi, east of Tskhinvali, the region’s capital.

A local television station broadcasted on September 15 a short news story showing the ongoing construction removal works in Eredvi, home to approximately 1000 ethnic Georgian residents before the 2008 Russia-Georgia war.

According to the report, the demolition works, conducted under the frames of the Moscow-funded “South Ossetian Social and Economic Development Investment Program,” will be over in late October and the vacated lands will be transferred to the occupied region’s ministry of agriculture. Overall, 268 homes are to be demolished, 163 of which have already been removed.

Georgian President Giorgi Margvelashvili, Parliamentary Chairman Irakli Kobakhidze and ministers commented the recent developments in Eredvi pointing at the continuation of ethnic cleansing and the Russian occupation, as well as stressing the need for increased involvement of the international community.

In a statement released on September 22, President Margvelashvili said that demotion of homes of displaced residents in village Eredvi aims at “removing the trace of [ethnic] Georgian population from this historic part of Georgia.”

“In the occupied territories of Georgia, where ethnic cleansing has been carried out, the occupying force perpetrates another act of vandalism, directed against the territorial integrity of Georgia and fundamental human rights,” the President also stated.

“This is a continuation of the policy of ethnic cleansing started in 2008. This action is directed towards the annexation of Georgia’s occupied territories. It is a crime against civilians and it should receive a sharp response from the international community,” he added.

Parliamentary Chairman Irakli Kobakhidze slammed the move as “a regretful tendency of aggressive policy,” also noting that Tbilisi constantly raises the issue of occupied territories with international partners.

In her comments to Imedi TV, Georgian State Minister for Reconciliation Ketevan Tsikhelashvili criticized Russia and the local authorities for hampering return of the displaced persons to their homes. “This is not a construction debris, these are houses of living persons, individuals who have been expelled from their homes and who are unable to return because of the ongoing occupation and the deliberate policy of Russia, and regretfully, also of the de facto authorities, to hamper [their return],” she noted.

Georgian Foreign Minister Mikheil Janelidze, who is visiting New York for the United Nations General Assembly, condemned the demolition works in Eredvi as “a continuation of genocide.” “Georgian diplomacy aims at finding a solution to this very difficult problem with the involvement of the international community,” he said.

The Indian government did not accept a number of key human rights recommendations on September 21, 2017, at its United Nations review in Geneva, Human Rights Watch said. The government should promptly act on the recommendations raised by UN member countries during the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process.

India’s government responded on September 21 to the recommendations made by other UN member countries on May 4 during India’s third periodic review. The Indian government was unwilling to accept important recommendations for greater accountability of its security forces, ensuring freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, repealing the law criminalizing consensual adult same-sex relations, and abolishing the death penalty.

“In the face of countless attacks on free speech and threats to marginalized communities, the Indian government has chosen to be in denial,” said Meenakshi Ganguly, South Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “India should show leadership on the world stage by taking the human rights concerns of other countries seriously and adopting concrete steps to address them.”

At the May 4 session, 112 countries made a total of 250 recommendations. On September 21, the government accepted 152, including commitments made toward sustainable development goals aimed at alleviating poverty, improving access to safe drinking water and sanitation, and strengthening protections for children and women.

Thirty countries called on India to ratify the UN Convention Against Torture, a treaty it signed two decades ago but never ratified. Even as the Indian government denied the existence of torture at the May meeting, saying “the concept of torture is completely alien to our culture and it has no place in the governance of the nation,” it said it remained committed to ratifying the treaty. However, India made a similar commitment at the last UPR cycle in 2012 when the recommendation was made by 17 countries, and yet failed to take any steps to fulfill it. In a recent report on deaths in police custody, Human Rights Watch found that torture is frequently used to gather information or coerce confessions.

At the UPR outcome meeting, India’s National Human Rights Commission pointed to the country’s failure to implement several recommendations adopted in the previous UPR cycle.

Regarding several pressing human rights concerns, the government’s outcome report merely “noted” the recommendations, drawing criticism from several countries and domestic and international rights groups. In the past, the Indian government has consistently ignored recommendations that it only noted. For instance, concerns over the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), a law that provides soldiers who commit abuses effective immunity from prosecution, was also “noted” in previous UPR sessions. But the government has refused to repeal the law despite recommendations from numerous independent commissions in India.

Similarly, at the 2012 review, the government said it noted the concerns raised over the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA), a law regulating foreign funding to nongovernmental organizations, but failed to take any action to address it. Instead, since 2014, the Indian government has increasingly used the law to harass, intimidate, and shut down foreign funding for nongovernmental organizations that criticize the government, its actions, or policies. During this UPR, at least 10 countries raised concerns over restrictions to freedom of assembly and association, including the FCRA, but the Indian government merely “noted” the recommendations.

Mob attacks by extremist Hindu groups affiliated with the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) against minority communities, especially Muslims and Dalits, have become a serious threat. In the first seven months of 2017, there were 26 attacks, and seven people were killed over rumors that they sold, bought, or killed cows for beef. The government has failed to prosecute those responsible for such attacks, and at the same time several BJP leaders have made incendiary remarks against minorities, and in support of Hindu nationalism. Fifteen countries raised concerns over such increasing violence, recommending that India should better protect these vulnerable populations and freedom of religion, and prosecute attacks against them. However, the Indian government was unwilling to make any commitments.

More than 30 countries raised concerns over violence and discrimination against women, and 10 asked India to criminalize marital rape. The Indian government accepted recommendations to protect women from violence, but did not accept recommendations regarding marital rape.

Several countries also called on India to repeal section 377 of the penal code, which criminalizes consensual same-sex relations, and to end discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people, a recommendation made and only noted in 2012 and again during the 2017 review. This is despite an Indian Supreme Court ruling in August saying the law had a chilling effect on “the unhindered fulfilment of one’s sexual orientation, as an element of privacy and dignity.”

“The Indian government’s claims of respect for the UPR process mean nothing if it simply brushes aside important recommendations at a time when the country’s long cherished freedoms and its poor and vulnerable are at great risk,” Ganguly said.

By Timur Toktonaliev

As Kyrgyzstan prepares to go to the polls on October 15 to elect a new president, some analysts predict that incumbent Almazbek Atambaev is positioning himself to retain influence even after he leaves office.

Atambaev will step down December 1 after a six-year term, and is constitutionally barred from seeking another. But one of the leading candidates, former prime minister Sooronbai Zheenbekov of the SDPK presidential party, is widely viewed as Atambaev’s chosen successor.

Zheenbekov, considered a quiet and rather passive politician, had been serving for five years as an unremarkable official in the key southern region of Osh before being suddenly appointed prime minister in the spring of 2016.

Observers speculate that Atambaev’s team was considering Sooronbai as a future successor, and he served as premier for barely a year before stepping down in August to run for the presidency.

“No matter what post-election plan Atambaev has, he needs to have a loyal individual to implement these plans,” said Medet Tyulegenov, a political science lecturer at the American university of Central Asia. “For this, a person should be a moderately prominent politician, yet not an entirely independent and active politician. From this point of view, Zheenbekov is probably suitable.”

Revolutions in 2005 and 2010, the latter followed by massive constitutional changes in 2010, have made Kyrgyzstan Central Asia’s most progressive democracy.

But Sergey Masaulov, director of the Center for Perspective Studies, said that it was still important for any Central Asian president to ensure a secure future and a position of prestige after he or she stepped down.

Former president Roza Otunbaeva, who was the interim leader after the 2010 revolution, had failed to do this, Masaulov continued. Atambaev had publicly criticised her, failed to invite her to important events and made light of her achievements.

Although Atambaev said early on in his presidential term that he would not interfere in politics after he stepped down from power, in recent years he has made it clear that he would remain engaged in party activities.

He has also been criticised for his increasingly authoritarian tendencies, and issues such as widespread corruption remain of serious concern in Kyrgyzstan.

But Atambaev can also point to some successes as president. He presided over his country’s accession to the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and won favourable conditions for around a million Kyrgyz migrant workers in Russia. There have been major infrastructure projects funded by Chinese loans and Atambaev’s team recently presented a national development strategy running until 2040.

Zheenbekov has explicitly linked his programme to this scheme and promised his support even as he announced his candidature.

“We need to keep and increase whatever has been achieved by the president of our country,” Zheenbekov said. “We should go down the same path.”

Tyulegenov said that the success of this apparent strategy was by no means assured.

“The scenario with a mastermind who would pull the strings from behind is possible as well, but it depends on the post-election configuration,” he continued. “Suppose everything happens as they plan: Zheenbekov is the president, Isakov is the prime minister, this scenario could exist for some time. But this, of course, is a short-term scenario. It will depend on people’s loyalty, whether they will last for one year or less.”

CAMPAIGN SEASON

The other frontrunner out of the 13 candidates registered with the Central Election Committee (CEC) is businessman Omurbek Babanov, who leads the Respublika party.

Although Babanov lacks the organisational capital and loyal officials of the presidential SPDK party, he is one of the country’s richest people and has spent more than any other candidate on promotional materials.

“In my opinion, the fight is between money or administrative resources,” said Elmira Nogoibaeva, head of the analysis department of the Polis Asia think tank.

According to the CEC, Babanov has already spent more than 110 million soms (1.6 million USD) as compared to Sooronbai’s 36 million soms (500,000 USD).

Main roads and busy junctions across the capital have been plastered with Babanov’s posters.

Babanov’s Respublika faction has avoided confrontation with the ruling party and consistently supported its initiatives, including the recent appointment of Sapar Isakov as prime minister.

Speaking about the contest this summer, Atambaev was complementary about Babanov, even telling reporters that he would have voted for him had his own party not nominated Zheenbekov.

Nonetheless, Babanov’s team has complained that the ruling party’s candidate is being unfairly favoured.

They have already filed complaints about pressure allegedly put on university students and regional officials to campaign for Zheenbekov.

Analysts say that Babanov, 47, has the image of a politician who does not keep his promises. Pledges made by his party in previous years, including special loans for farmers and significant salary rises for teachers and doctors, never materialised.

There are also lingering suspicions that he would favour his own business interests over the public good. But he has nonetheless attracted people with his relative youth and dynamism, as compared to the 58-year-old Zheenbekov.

Both main candidates launched their campaigns in the densely populated south – Babanov in the Osh region, and Zheenbekov in the Jalal-Abad region.

Zheenbekov belongs to the same influential southern clan as other politicians including former parliament speaker Asilbek Zheenbekov as well as prominent diplomat Zhusupbek Sharipov, ambassador to Kuwait. After Kurmanbek Bakiev’s overthrow in 2010, the Zheenbekov clan helped to win SDPK votes in the south of the country and for Atambaev in the presidential election the following year.

A number of politicians from the southern regions had planned to club together to nominate a single candidate, but halted their efforts shortly before the campaign began.

One of them, Ata Zhurt Party co-chairman Kamchybek Tashiev, recently announced he would be supporting Zheenbekov, while the leader of the Onuguu Progress faction, Bakyt Torobaev, has thrown his support behind Babanov. Analysts said that possible compensation could be the post of Prime Minister.

Adakhan Madumarov, the leader of Butun Kyrgyzstan Party, was registered to run himself but is now in talks to also join forces with babanov.

Nogoibaeva said that the potential kingmakers had already used up all their political capital.

“When they consolidated, they used to be a force, but I don’t see any significant influence for each individual,” she concluded.

Although the two front-runners are clear, another candidate might be the surprise winner of the competition. Former prime minister Temir Sariev is the only candidate to highlight judicial and law enforcement reforms. He has support from parts of the educated, urban middle class, but is believed to have too few financial or human resources to be a serious contender.

THE RUSSIAN FACTOR

Russia remains Kyrgyzstan’s key partner in the spheres of economy and security, and is believed to influence its domestic policy too.

In 2010, Russia played a prominent role in the transfer of power. Candidates held talks with senior Russian officials, their meetings broadcast on Kyrgyz television.

This time, according to analysts, Russia will be happy with either of the leading candidates.

“As long as we don’t have any candidates who clearly oppose Russia, Russia will not now influence or support anyone. They will work with whoever is elected,” said political analyst Sergey Masaulov.

“Because [Russia] believes that any candidate who wins the presidential election will pursue a policy consistent with the logic of the country’s development, as long as he is reasonable. The source of Kyrgyzstan’s existence and development is primarily the interaction with Russia, so no one will change it,” Masaulov continued.

Masaulov predicted that the main candidates would not be able to get 50 per cent of votes in the first round and a run-off will have to be scheduled.

This would also have the benefit of reassuring the public about the validity of the result, he said, adding, “The second round is necessary for the safety of the country and to make sure the situation is alright… society will be confident.”

This article was published by IWPR’s RCA 819

The UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres says the UN is ready to provide every possible assistance to Sri Lanka in its efforts to build as a prosperous nation where the reconciliation is strengthened.

He further said that the UN will provide its maximum support to build as an exemplary nation in the world, where all the Sri Lankans can live with prosper and reconciliation, while closely associating with Sri Lanka and its citizens.

The UN Secretary General made these remarks when he met with President Maithripala Sirisena, on the sidelines of the 72nd United Nations’ General Assembly Sessions.

He also commended President Sirisena’s commitment in adopting agreements set out in the Paris Convention and expressed his appreciation over implementing sustainable development goals in the development process of the country.

Mr. Antonio Guterres recalled the tour he made to Sri Lanka in 1978 and said that during that tour he had visited many areas including Sigiriya, Dambulla and Polonnaruwa and further stated that he had visited Sri Lanka as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

He also emphasized that the UN will continually provide support to Sri Lanka while strengthening the ties between the UN and Sri Lanka.

Expressing his views, the President said that the Government is committed for the initiatives taken for the development and the reconciliation and the assistance of all the countries in the world needed in this regard.

During the meeting the President invited the UN Secretary General to visit Sri Lanka to observer the current progress of Sri Lanka in the journey of achieving the development targets and the reconciliation process.

(EurActiv) — British Prime Minister Theresa May called for a two-year transition after Brexit on Friday in which Britain would largely maintain its current ties with Brussels, in a charm offensive intended to unlock stalled negotiations with the European Union.

In a major speech in Florence, May promised to meet Britain’s existing EU budget commitments until 2020 and outlined new legal guarantees for the rights of around three million Europeans living in the UK.

She also committed to maintaining Europe’s security, saying in a direct pitch to EU leaders: “We want to be your strongest friend and partner as the EU and UK thrive side by side.”

A fourth round of negotiations with the European Commission is due to start next week, with London keen to make progress on the terms of the divorce so that talks can move on to trade.

“While the UK’s departure from the EU is inevitably a difficult process, it is in all of our interests for our negotiations to succeed,” she said.

May confirmed she wanted a transition period after Brexit of “around two years” in which EU citizens could continue to work in Britain but have to register.

For both Britain and the EU, “access to one another’s markets should continue on current terms” during this period, she said.

She also promised to honour Britain’s financial commitments for the remainder of the EU’s current budget plan, saying no member state would “pay more or receive less”.

Britain’s contributions for two years would be at least 20 billion euros (£18 billion, $24 billion) — although this falls well below European estimates of Britain’s total Brexit bill.

With new offers on money and citizens’ rights, the prime minister addressed two of the three priorities of the EU.

Charles Grant of the Centre for European Reform said May was “right to adopt a positive tone”, but added that her offers were “not enough to unblock” the talks.

The suggestion that existing immigration and trading rules will continue for two years after Britain leaves the EU in March 2019 sparked immediate condemnation from eurosceptics.

“Theresa May’s Brexit vision is that we leave the EU in name only. All areas of integration we have currently will be rebadged,” said leading campaigner Nigel Farage.

EU citizens’ rights

May’s speech came 15 months after Britain’s referendum vote to leave the EU and six months after she triggered the two-year Brexit process, amid increasing demands by Brussels for more clarity.

One problem was that her own government is still divided — a fact highlighted this week when Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson laid out his own vision for life outside the EU.

After the speech, he said May’s words were “uplifting”.

Although May did not rule out her previous threat of walking away from the talks, she expressed optimism that a deal could be done.

On the issue of EU citizens’ rights, she sought to break the deadlock over the role of the European Court of Justice as the arbiter in any disputes.

She said the final deal agreed with Brussels would be fully incorporated into British law, to ensure parliament could not change it in the future.

British courts could also “take into account” ECJ rulings in deciding cases, she said.

A small group of British expatriates had gathered outside the Santa Maria Novella church complex where May spoke, holding up signs saying “Hands off our rights”.

Carolyn Slater, a 69-year-old pensioner who moved to Italy from Scotland, said: “We’re very fed up with being given no information.

“Brexit was absurd but it’s happened, we have to live with it now. From the start we’ve been told we’re a priority, but that’s wearing pretty thin.”

‘Creative and practical’

May is hoping her speech will be enough to unlock the talks in time for an EU leaders meeting on October 19-20, when her 27 counterparts will decide if talks can move onto trade.

The shape of that future deal remains elusive — although the prime minister insisted there could be no role for the ECJ, a totemic issue for eurosceptics in Britain.

She rejected the idea that Britain could adopt a model similar to that enjoyed by Norway, or a free trade agreement like the one recently struck between the EU and Canada.

“Instead let us be creative as well as practical in designing an ambitious economic partnership,” she said.

he EU’s chief Brexit negotiator Michel Barnier welcomed the “constructive spirit” of May’s speech.

“May has expressed a constructive spirit which is also the spirit of the European Union during this unique negotiation,” Barnier said in a statement.

Lava tubes, underground caves created by volcanic activity, could provide protected habitats large enough to house streets on Mars or even towns on the Moon, according to research presented at the European Planetary Science Congress (EPSC) 2017 in Riga. A further study shows how the next generation of lunar orbiters will be able to use radar to locate these structures under the Moon’s surface.

Lava tubes can form in two ways: ‘overcrusted’ tubes form when low-viscosity lava flows fairly close to the surface, developing a hard crust that thickens to create a roof above the moving lava stream. When the eruptions end, the conduit is drained leaving a tunnel a few metres beneath the surface. ‘Inflated’ tubes are complex and deep structures that form when lava is injected into existing fissures between layers of rock or cavities from previous flows. The lava expands and leaves a huge network of connected galleries as it forces its way to the surface.

Lava tubes are found in many volcanic areas on Earth, including Lanzarote, Hawaii, Iceland, North Queensland in Australia, Sicily and the Galapagos islands. Underground networks of tubes can reach up to 65 kilometres. Space missions have also observed chains of collapsed pits and ‘skylights’ on the Moon and Mars that have been interpreted as evidence of lava tubes. Recently the NASA GRAIL mission provided detailed gravity data for the Moon that suggested the presence of enormous subsurface voids related to lava tubes below the lunar ‘Maria’, plains of basalt formed in volcanic eruptions early in the Moon’s history.

Now, researchers from the University of Padova and the University of Bologna in Italy have carried out the first systematic comparison of lava tube candidates on the Earth, Moon and Mars, based on high-resolution Digital Terrain Models (DTM) created from data from spacecraft instrumentation.

“The comparison of terrestrial, lunar and martian examples shows that, as you might expect, gravity has a big effect on the size of lava tubes. On Earth, they can be up to thirty metres across. In the lower gravity environment of Mars, we see evidence for lava tubes that are 250 metres in width. On the Moon, these tunnels could be a kilometre or more across and many hundreds of kilometres in length,” said Dr Riccardo Pozzobon, of the University of Padova. “These results have important implications for habitability and human exploration of the Moon but also for the search of extraterrestrial life on Mars. Lava tubes are environments shielded from cosmic radiation and protected from micrometeorites flux, potentially providing safe habitats for future human missions. They are also, potentially, large enough for quite significant human settlements – you could fit most of the historic city centre of Riga into a lunar lava tube.”

The work by Pozzobon and colleagues is already being used in the European Space Agency’s astronaut training programme. The teams lead a planetary geology training course called PANGAEA for the European Space Agency’s astronauts and engineers. The PANGAEA project has included a field trip and a test campaign in lava tubes in the Canary Island to familiarise the astronauts with geological research they could carry out during future missions to the Moon or Mars, as well as to test technical and operational systems. In particular, PANGAEA has focused on using laser technologies to characterize the Corona lava tube, an 8-kilometre long tunnel on Lanzarote.

However, analysis of lava tubes with DEMs requires that a collapse or a puncture from a meteorite reveals the presence of the hidden tunnel. Conventional remote sensing instruments cannot detect and characterize the lava tubes, as they cannot acquire measurements beneath the surface.

In a separate talk at EPSC, Leonardo Carrer and colleagues of the University of Trento presented a concept for a radar system specifically designed to detect lava tubes on the Moon from orbit. The radar probes beneath the lunar surface with low frequency electromagnetic waves and measures the reflected signals. This radar instrument could determine accurately the physical composition, size and shape of the caves and obtain a global map of their location.

“The studies we have developed show that a multi- frequency sounding system is the best option for detecting lava tubes of very different dimensions. The electromagnetic simulations show that lava tubes have unique electromagnetic signatures, which can be detected from orbit irrespective of their orientation to the radar movement direction. Therefore, a mission carrying this instrument would enable a crucial step towards finding safe habitats on the Moon for human colonisation,” said Carrer.