There has been ethnic tension in Myanmar’s Rakhine State in recent years. The crisis has triggered a mass exodus into neighbouring Bangladesh generating security threats to the South Asian country.

By Major General ANM Muniruzzaman*

Ethnic tension has prevailed between the Rohingya minority and the dominant Rakhine Buddhist population for centuries. The Rohingya population has been oppressed and persecuted by the Myanmar military and Rakhine Buddhists for decades. This ethnic tension has recently given birth to a new armed organisation Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) that recently called for an all-out resistance to the Myanmar government.

But the Myanmar army’s counter offensive triggered one of the largest refugee outflows into Bangladesh in decades. The resulting Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh poses security threats and challenges on the full spectrum of the security landscape. The challenges range from human or non-traditional security encompassing transnational security, internal security, militancy and terrorism, border security etc.

Human Security

The Rohingya refugees are vulnerable to human trafficking, food insecurity and health insecurity. It has been reported that international human trafficking gangs are actively looking at this situation to exploit the vulnerability of the Rohingya. Many Rohingya families are arriving in Bangladesh without any male family members. Therefore, many young women and children will fall victim to the trafficking gangs and end up in international markets for prostitution and slave labour.

There is gross food insecurity within the displaced Rohingya refugee population arriving in Bangladesh. This has resulted in malnutrition and allied problems of food insecurity within the refugee population. The undetermined number of people arriving in Bangladesh would contribute to price hikes in the local markets.

The health security of the Rohingya refugees is also a cause for concern. Any contagious diseases that rely on the human host have the potential to become an epidemic as refugees are living in densely packed camps. Many of the arriving refugees are already carrying a number of diseases, including tuberculosis, skin diseases and HIV/AIDS etc. The severe lack of safe drinking water may contribute to diarrhoea and cholera that could spread to the local population. The examples from the Haiti and Yemen are instructive.

Internal and Transnational Security

The massive exodus of Rohingya refugees might alter the internal security scenario of Bangladesh. These are vulnerable people in dire need of a living and are likely to be involved in petty crimes for their survival. Criminal groups may also exploit the situation. Public sentiments and emotions are running high on the Rohingya issue in Bangladesh.

The continuous atrocities on the Rohingya population in Rakhine State by the radical militant Buddhists have given rise to strong resentment of the local population in Bangladesh. This may trigger a backlash on the minority Buddhist population in Bangladesh. This could pose a major challenge to communal peace and harmony in the country.

The geographical proximity of the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent makes Bangladesh an attractive route for drug smuggling. The international gangs will exploit Rohingya as couriers for the drugs and small arms smuggling. The easy availability of small arms and drugs can greatly jeopardise the security situation in Bangladesh, as more drug cartels and criminal gangs would mushroom near the border areas.

Militancy and Terrorism

Many militant and terrorist groups have called for jihad in response to the prolonged Rohingya crisis in Rakhine State. Transnational terror organisations are calling for recruitment for jihad in Myanmar as stories of thousands of Rohingya victims are broadcast on the Internet. A right-wing Islamist organisation from Indonesia, Front Pembela Islam (FPI), has opened registration for 1,200 mujahideen volunteers to join in the jihad in Myanmar in defence of the Rohingya.

More established terror outfits such as Al Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) as well as Islamic State (IS) have expressed solidarity with the Rohingya. Chechen groups have shown their willingness to fight alongside the Rohingya. The possibility of prolonged ethnic conflict in Myanmar might create a hotbed of terror as foreign fighters set eyes on the region. The security dilemma comes at a time when IS, in responding to setbacks in Syria and Iraq, is planning on expanding operations beyond the Middle East.

Border Security

The prolonged refugee crisis in Myanmar is making the border of Bangladesh vulnerable and unstable. Bangladesh has experienced tension and near-conflict in the border area with Myanmar on both land and water. Given such a history, the possibility of a border conflict cannot be ruled out. There has been reports of violation of the airspace of Bangladesh by the Myanmar air force in the last few days. This is not conducive for the border security and stability.

It is impossible to completely seal off the border due to the porous nature of the Bangladesh-Myanmar boundary. Thus the instability and violence in Rakhine State, especially activities of terror groups with linkages to the Rohingya will pose a threat to Bangladesh’s border security. The instability at the Bangladesh-Myanmar border may give rise to the emergence of non-state actors and this can complicate the internal security of the states.

Environmental Security

Due to the large influx of the Rohingya refugees, many fail to find shelter within the camps. As a result, many of them have spread out to the nearby hills. They have resorted to widespread deforestation, causing severe land degradation of the locality. Bangladesh is already vulnerable to a new threat from human-induced degradation of the environment that can have a long-term impact on its environmental security.

The Rohingya situation is urgent and complex. The mass exodus of Rohingya is already putting enormous stress on the limited resources of Bangladesh. As more Rohingya arrive on a daily basis, there are a number of states and non-state actors that might try to exploit the security situation in this country. Bangladesh must find a comprehensive solution to the refugee crisis and must work out a cohesive security strategy to deal with all the potential threats. Otherwise, the security of the state will be in serious jeopardy.

* Major General ANM Muniruzzaman (Retd) was recently a Visiting Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He is the President and CEO of Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS) and Chairman of the Global Military Advisory Council on Climate Change (GMACCC).

By Pinaki Bhattacharya

The ‘princelings’ had been in a longstanding feud with the Communist Youth League (CYL) that has produced till now a President (Hu Jintao); a Premier (Li Keqiang) and potentially another President, come March, 2023, Hu Chunhua.

If Xi Jinping were to decide not to throw Constitutional conventions out of the country, the Sixth Generation of the Chinese leadership will be ushered into the top jobs by early next decade. And many of them would be from the CYL.

But Xi, once a ‘princeling’ (taizidang) now the prince who looms over Chinese national institutions – he holds 12 offices of the Chinese Party-State – have a running feud with the CYL (tuanpai). The issue is obviously power-sharing and parallel power centres. The CYL is comprised of millions of Chinese youth from the age of 14-28 years who become members as they get a better opportunity for education and almost an assured government job.

They still continue to populate almost 90 per cent of the government jobs and are the biggest backers of the continued ‘reform’ process. They have to share power with the PLA and the cadres of the State Owned Enterprises (SoEs). It remains an obvious area of conflict.

As they say the trouble in ‘Paradise’ began with the low hanging fruit, Xi was planning to begin the process of cutting the CYL to size by disposing off the Premier, Li Keqiang. But he got thwarted. Instead, he cut the financial allocation to the organisation by half – from 624 million Yuan in 2015 to 306 million Yuan in 2016, as reported by the US-based Chinese news source, Epoch Times. He also downgraded its current chief, the First Secretary Qin Yizhi, removing him from him from Beijing. The South China Morning Post has also reported that he is being made into a deputy head of a government agency under the State Council.

An action like this has three political messages embedded: one, it says that the CYL is no longer the route for its important cadres to gold plated jobs in the Party or the State; two, it tells the PLA that while its primacy is being reduced as the vanguard force of the Chinese State, its loss of influence is also being balanced off by shedding the weight of the CYL; and thirdly, it sends the message of Hu-Li team that they will not be able to pack the Central Committee and the Polit Bureau like they during the 18th CPC Congress. Only the PBSC was the sole preserve of Xi, who had a complete sway over the seven member body with six members of his own, including himself.

According to Dr Cheng Li,  one of the foremost scholars of Chinese elite politics in the USA, “seven of these former officials (Su Shulin, Chen Chuanping, Wang Yongchun, Wan Qingliang, Pan Yiyang, Yang Weize, and Yu Yuanhui) were born in the 1960s and thus had been considered up-and-coming leaders of the future generation.”

As Li, pointed out they were all members of the CC, and potentially some of them could end up at the PB at the 19th CPC Congress. However, the most important catch has been Sun Zengcai, the man who was at the edge of attaining the second highest office – the Premier and the head of the State Council.

Sun is believed to have been caught by what is known as the ‘Chongqing curse.’ There was a time when he was hailed as the man who had handled a potentially explosive fall-out of the Bo Xilai arrest, his highly publicised (on social media) trial and his jailing. But he is now in the hands of CCID authorities for yet to be publicised charges. Some say it could be financial corruption or hatching a conspiracy against Xi. Or it could be both. Meanwhile, his dreams lay shattered. And the CYL is reeling from the impact.

Some Saudi state clerics and institutions incite hatred and discrimination against religious minorities, including the country’s Shia Muslim minority, Human Rights Watch said in a report.

The 62-page report, “‘They Are Not Our Brothers’: Hate Speech by Saudi Officials,” documents that Saudi Arabia has permitted government-appointed religious scholars and clerics to refer to religious minorities in derogatory terms or demonize them in official documents and religious rulings that influence government decision-making. In recent years, government clerics and others have used the internet and social media to demonize and incite hatred against Shia Muslims and others who do not conform to their views.

“Saudi Arabia has relentlessly promoted a reform narrative in recent years, yet it allows government-affiliated clerics and textbooks to openly demonize religious minorities such as Shia,” said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. “This hate speech prolongs the systematic discrimination against the Shia minority and – at its worst – is employed by violent groups who attack them.”

Human Rights Watch found that the incitement, along with anti-Shia bias in the criminal justice system and the Education Ministry’s religion curriculum, is instrumental in enforcing discrimination against Saudi Shia citizens. Human Rights Watch recently documented derogatory references to other religious affiliations, including Judaism, Christianity, and Sufi Islam in the country’s religious education curriculum.

Government clerics, all of whom are Sunni, often refer to Shia as rafidha or rawafidh (rejectionists) and stigmatize their beliefs and practices. They have also condemned mixing and intermarriage. One member of Saudi Arabia’s Council of Senior Religious Scholars, the country’s highest religious body, responded in a public meeting to a question about Shia Muslims by stating that “they are not our brothers … rather they are brothers of Satan…”.

Such hate speech may have fatal consequences when armed groups such as the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, or Al-Qaeda use it to justify targeting Shia civilians. Since mid-2015, ISIS has attacked six Shia mosques and religious buildings in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province and Najran, killing more than 40 people. ISIS news releases claiming these attacks stated that the attackers were targeting “edifices of shirk,”(polytheism), and rafidha, terms used in Saudi religious education textbooks to target Shia.

Saudi Arabia’s former grand mufti, Abdulaziz Bin Baz, who died in 1999, condemned Shia in numerous religious rulings. Bin Baz’s body of fatwas and writings remain publicly available on the website of Saudi Arabia’s Permanent Committee for Islamic Research and Issuing Fatwas.

Some clerics use language that suggests Shia are part of a conspiracy against the state, a domestic fifth column for Iran, and disloyal by nature. The government also allows other clerics with enormous social media followings – some in the millions – and media outlets to stigmatize Shia with impunity.

Anti-Shia bias extends to the Saudi judicial system, which is controlled by the religious establishment and often subjects Shia to discriminatory treatment or arbitrarily criminalizes Shia religious practices. In 2015, for example, a Saudi court sentenced a Shia citizen to two months in jail and 60 lashes for hosting private Shia group prayers in his father’s home. In 2014, a Saudi Arabia court convicted a Sunni man of “sitting with Shia.”

The Saudi Ministry of Education religion curriculum al-tawhid, or (monotheism) which is taught at the primary, middle, and secondary education levels, uses veiled language to stigmatize Shia religious practices as shirk or ghulah (exaggeration). Saudi religious education textbooks direct these critiques to the Shia and Sufi practice of visiting graves and religious shrines and tawassul (intercession), to call on the prophet or his family members as intermediaries to God. The textbooks state that these practices, which both Sunni and Shia citizens understand as Shia, are grounds for removal from Islam, punished by being sent to hell for eternity.

International human rights law requires governments to prohibit “[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.” Implementation of this prohibition has been uneven and sometimes used as a pretext to restrict lawful speech or target minority groups. Any steps to counter hate speech should be carried out within overall guarantees of freedom of expression.

To address this problem, experts in recent years have proposed a test to establish whether any particular speech can be lawfully limited. Under this formula, the speech Human Rights Watch documented by Saudi religious scholars sometimes rises to the level of hate speech or incitement to hatred or discrimination. Other statements don’t cross that threshold, but authorities should publicly repudiate and counteract it. Given the influence and reach of these scholars, their statements advance a system of discrimination against Shia citizens.

Saudi authorities should order an immediate halt to hate speech by state-affiliated clerics and government agencies.

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has repeatedly classified Saudi Arabia as a “country of particular concern” – its harshest designation for countries that violate religious freedom. The 1998 International Religious Freedom Act allows the president to issue a waiver if it would “further the purposes” of the act or if “the important national interest of the United States requires the exercise of such waiver authority.” US presidents have issued such waivers for Saudi Arabia since 2006.

The US government should rescind the waiver and work with Saudi authorities to end incitement to hatred or discrimination against Shia and Sufi citizens, as well as other religions. The US should also press for removal of all criticism and stigmatization of Shia and Sufi religious practices, as well as practices of other religions, from the Saudi religion education curriculum.

“Despite Saudi Arabia’s poor record on religious freedom, the US has shielded Saudi Arabia from possible sanctions under US law,” Whitson said. “The US government should apply its own laws to hold its Saudi ally accountable.”

Football players are a special class of workers. Even the lowliest of them make six-figure salaries, at least for the short time they stay healthy enough to play, but they are, nonetheless workers, and unionized workers at that.

And what is happening right now — with NFL players, black and in some cases white, and now professional basketball and baseball players too, acting in solidarity to protest racist policing and other issues of equality denied in America by not standing for the traditional performance of the Star-Spangled Banner, and with the subsequent incendiary calls by President Trump for the firing of these protesters by team management — is shining a light not just on the racist politics of the president, but on the wholesale lack of First Amendment freedom on the job for most American workers.

The reality is that workers in the US, unless they are represented by a labor union — and even then only a powerful and assertive union — speak their minds at the risk of being fired, and have no recourse if they are fired for the opinions they express if those opinions aren’t shared by the boss.

Freedom of speech, that hallowed and much touted supposed birthright of all Americans, actually only applies during the hours that that we are sleeping, traveling to and from work, on our days off, or at home. And even then, as people are discovering with employers monitoring their personal blogs, Facebook pages and Tweets, and firing them for things they may have said or written, we’re not so free

Hooray for the professional ball players who, following the lead of the heroic former San Francisco 49er Colin Kaepernick, are engaging their public protests before the fans and asserting their right to speak their minds about racism and the national epidemic of police brutality against and murders of African Americans.

Now this burgeoning struggle for the freedom to speak out has to move out of the sports stadiums and into the workplaces of America.

You can tell such a movement is badly needed when the self-styled “patriotic” yahoos in the stands boo and shout “stand up!” at kneeling athletes speaking their mind on the job and don’t get upset when millionaire Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin scolds the protesters, telling them to do their free speech thing “on their own time” and not on the bosses’. These white “NASCAR dudes” don’t even realize that everyone — including they themselves — should be demanding First Amendment rights on the job, and that the ball players they are condemning and jeering at are making that case for everyone’s benefit.

What this football protest has demonstrated is that when one person takes a stand on the job and makes a statement as Kaepernick did last year, it may cost that person her or his job. But when lots of people take the stand together, the boss can’t retaliate so easily. In fact, the boss may even join them.

Blacklisting Kaepernick, as the NFL’s teams appear to all have done, may cost a couple of teams a badly needed crack quarterback (and everyone agrees there are teams that could use him), but it isn’t really costing any team any money or lost ticket revenue to let him stay unemployed. Now that whole teams are taking a knee, or refusing to enter the field for the opening patriotic display and the singing of the national anthem, though, there’s no way to fire them without trashing the season and losing millions of dollars.

If workers want to finally do away with totalitarian policies in the workplace, they need to start taking a page from their sports heroes and begin speaking out collectively on the issues that matter to them. It has to be a collective effort though. Maybe it is the dirty washrooms. Maybe it’s unfair pay for women or minorities. Maybe it’s the endless war in Afghanistan. Maybe it’s police brutality in the local metropolis, or toxic waster in the local water supply. Whatever the issue, like-minded workers need to start talking about it, wearing T-shirts declaring their views, demanding that the company that employees them stop supporting policies they object to. Whatever the issue, if you can talk about it on the street or at home, you should be able to talk about it where you work and where you spend most of your waking hours each day!

The Constitution says it clearly in the First Amendment:

“Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech.”

Note that it does not say anything about “except in the workplace.” And yet Congress has endorsed myriad laws and regulations that allow employers to fire workers “at will,” which includes for saying things that the boss doesn’t like (they call it insubordination, which is a term that has no place in a supposedly free society). We don’t allow people to be fired for being of the “wrong” religion, or for being of the wrong race, so it’s not like there’s no precedent for Congress to limit the power of corporate bosses over their workers. But when it comes to that free speech thing, our elected officials and our judges get cold feet.

It’s ironic that many of the yahoos in the stadiums who angrily shout “Stand up!” at some football player taking a knee during the national anthem probably forget that they can’t say anything political or make a political protest on their own job. They have no rights. And for that matter, neither does the guy down on the field that they are heckling, and yet he is doing it.

And the truth is, any of those guys down there on the field in their uniforms making a pubic protest, is doing more than just protesting against some issue, like police abuse. They’re also protesting for the right of all workers to make their voices heard where they work.

The truth is, when the country was founded, there were no real factories in the new independent United States of America. It was a largely agrarian society of farmers and small businesspeople who might have a couple of employees at most. In that kind of environment, there was little difference between the home and the place of work. It’s likely that people in such settings had plenty to say on the issues of the day while they were working. It’s also likely that people who had a job and did it well were valuable enough to the employer that even if they said things that the boss didn’t agree with they wouldn’t be summarily fired for speaking up. That kind of thing is much more likely to happen in huge companies where individual workers are just replaceable cogs.

The founders who wrote the Constitution and its Bill of Rights wouldn’t have imagined that eventually there would be huge workplaces with hundreds or even thousands of workers, gates and security guards and ID cards to control access to the site, and files kept of each employee’s behavior.

It is this new work environment, created during the 19th century, that led to a bifurcated world — one largely free and more or less unmonitored, where people could do and say pretty much what they pleased without fear of punishment or harassment, and another, set up much like an old feudal estate, where the “lord” or boss and his or her minions could order the peons around, punish them at will with no right of appeal for made-up infractions or “insubordination,” and control what they could say or even think, on pain of being tossed out the door.

Things have gotten worse with our new information age, so that once a worker is fired by one boss, it can be hard to get a job anywhere, since one’s employment record becomes available to all.

It’s time to grab this new opening made by professional athletes of conscience, and to start a national campaign to extend the First Amendment to the shop floor, not just the athletic field.

While we’re at it, let’s demand that Kaepernick get hired again as a QB. After all, he started this ball rolling.

The Jewish press has been full of lurid tales of ‘faculty anti-Semitism‘ at the University of Maryland, where an assistant professor announced a lawsuit against her former department for cancelling her teaching contract.  Melissa Landa taught courses in the education program at the school and had been mentored by one of the senior faculty.

According to her suit, she became involved in pro-Israeli academic activism through Academic Engagement Network, and its work against BDS, specifically the academic boycott.  As an Oberlin alumnus, she organized a national protest against an African-American instructor at her alma mater who posted social media comments judged by some to be anti-Israel and anti-Semitic.  The Oberlin faculty member was eventually fired in a move that was protested by free speech advocates.  She said her academic mentor then asked her to stop hanging an Israeli flag in her office.  He also allegedly told her he objected to her activism against the Oberlin professor.

In all of the twelve years I spent in academia as an undergraduate and graduate student, I never saw a single Jewish professor display an Israeli flag in their office.  And that includes two academic years studying Judaica at the Hebrew University.  As for the mentor’s expression of displeasure about the Oberlin campaign, many academics have problems with colleagues who suppress free speech and get peers fired.

After this, Landa says he and the rest of the department treated her as a pariah. Invitations to collaborate on academic projects stopped. Her phone calls remained unanswered.  Her dismissal came a short time after that.

She filed a Title IX claim against the University for religious discrimination, arguing that her pro-Israel activity caused her firing.  There is a problem with this reasoning: Israel isn’t a religion.  Anti-Semitism certainly would be legitimate grounds in an anti-discrimination suit.  But claiming you were fired for supporting Israel, even if it were true, is not grounds to claim religious prejudice.  Further, Landa hasn’t brought forward any proof that those who fired her did so for the reasons she asserts.  Though she provided e-mails which offered her reasons for her dismissal, none of them, nor any other documents or statements support the discrimination claim.

Her sole proof is that once she became overt in her pro-Israel activism, that’s when the cold shoulder began.  If that’s her main or sole proof, she’s resting on a very thin reed.

The most interesting part of this story is a letter written by a number of Landa’s students protesting her release.  They wrote that she “has provided a safe environment and approach to learning, in which students learned about the roots of racial bias.”

The rhetoric here could be lifted verbatim from any legal brief filed by Kenneth Marcus or press release from the pro-Israel academic group, Amcha.  Their primary argument is that campuses must be made “safe” for Jews.  By safe, they mean cleansed of criticism of Israel.  And by Jews, they mean pro-Israel Jews.  In essence, they argue that academia must bend over backwards to accommodate the amorphous fears of a minority of the campus Jewish student body.

This legal strategy, used in Title IX challenges against numerous universities have all failed, as will this one.  The notion of ‘safety’ as well has been hijacked.  Jews are not in danger on American campuses.  They are not physically threatened.  But this campaign attempts to turn safety into an intellectual category, arguing that Jews must feel safe from the harm of threatening speech by other students.  It suggests that some ideas may be “unsafe” for Jews.

Further, the University of Maryland has a vibrant and active Jewish student community, which includes pro-Israel groups.  The notion that the campus is infected with the anti-Israel virus is laughable on its face.

This is not what American university life is about, nor has it ever been about.  No one promises an incoming freshman that they will remain safe in whatever intellectual cocoon they brought to campus from their homes or local communities.  Campus life is about challenging ideas, experimenting, trying new identities.  It is about expanding one’s intellectual horizons.  Perhaps even a bit of danger in trying out ideas which might have been disparaged in their parents’ homes, churches or synagogues.

Nor is Jewish life about intellectual safety.  The greatest Jewish philosophers and intellectuals since the Enlightenment, ranging from Spinoza to Trotsky to Einstein, were fearless exponents of radical ideas.  Many of these ideas were threatening to their fellow-Jews.  But these great thinkers didn’t cower.  They didn’t compromise when they were told their ideas threatened the comfort or safety of the community.  They remained true to their convictions.  That’s the heritage of modern Jewish thought.  It’s the heritage we should offer our children as they enter college life.

If you are a student who wants to protect him or herself from such exposure, there are many religious colleges available.  I even attended one myself as an undergraduate.  They will likely not pose a threat and enable you to continue life in the narrow confines of a parochial religious experience (though even in some of these students may find their assumptions challenged).

But if you go to a major American liberal arts college or university don’t expect intellectual safety.  Expect debate, argument, even provocation.  If you are a full, well-rounded human being, you will withstand it, perhaps even come out stronger for the challenge.

This article was published at Tikun Olam

The ostrich policy of Angela Merkel’s grand old coalition has reached a dead end. Even without the AfD, the government will have to address uncomfortable questions.

By Britta Petersen

Germans are sometimes a bit afraid of themselves, still. They mistrust their political culture because they know what a civilisational breakdown is. It happened when Adolf Hitler was elected in 1933. That is the reason for the panic that emanates from some media reports about the results of Sunday’s parliamentary elections. But the verdict of the voters is actually much more progressive, more future-oriented than some people think.

Let’s have a look at the figures. Yes, the far right Alternative fuer Deutschland (AfD) enters the German parliament, the Bundestag, with a handsome 13% of the votes. That makes Germany part of the Western European mainstream, where the far right has surfaced as a political force that needs to be reckoned with. But there is no reason for panic. It also means that 87% of Germans did not vote for them and that is still a vast majority.

Both parties are reaping the fruits of their so-called “grand coalition” in the last four years. A cohabitation of the two largest parties in the parliament is destined to strengthen the smaller parties because they are the only available opposition. But apart from this structural challenge, the German government under Angela Merkel squandered the opportunity of a comfortable majority to prepare the country for the challenges of the 21^st century.

That is exactly why two smaller parties gained. First of all, the Liberal Democrats (FDP), who were not in the Bundestag for the last four years because they could not clear the necessary five-percent-hurdle in 2013. The business-friendly, libertarian party now has won 10.7% under its young leader Christian Lindner (38). The Green Party also fared better than predicted by opinion polls and ended up with 8.9%, which is slightly more than in the last elections.

Although both parties have serious ideological differences, they are entering coalition talks now with the CDU/CSU to form a so-called Jamaica coalition, named after the colours of the Jamaican flag “black” (CDU/CSU), “yellow” (FDP) and “green” (Greens). While everybody knows that this is not a match made in heaven, it is nonetheless an exiting opportunity because it opens a power option that never existed in the history of German post-war democracy. The SPD has already announced that it would rather join the opposition than continuing the grand coalition that has damaged their image badly.

This outcome also reflects the deep-rooted changes in the political system of Western democracies. Almost everywhere in Europe, Social Democrats have failed to find convincing answers to the challenges posed by global digital capitalism and the so-called anthropcene, the age of significant human impact on the ecosystem of our planet.

But Christian Democrats under Merkel did not fare better. The Chancellor herself has become a figure of the status quo who tried to comfort her voters in difficult times rather than prepare her country for the things to come. This is a lost opportunity because Germany’s economy has been doing much better than that of most European countries. But the writing is already on the wall.

For a country that relies as much as Germany on export it is needless to say, that protectionism cannot be an option. The idea of a “green new deal” to address energy, climate and economic crises as propagated by parts of the Green movement is one of the ideas that has to be explored. A stronger focus on the opportunities that digital economy offers is another that the Liberals will most likely push for.

Both Liberals and Greens do not stand for totally different politics but for a shift in the attention of the German government. And it is clear from the election results that this is what many voters want. The dramatic losses of the Social Democrats, whose campaign was all around social justice failed because voters understand that the challenges of today are the result of a new industrial revolution and a shift in the global economy that cannot be tackled by the politics of redistribution.

The extreme right tries to turn back the clock of globalisation by closing borders and creating an Ersatz enemy in the form of Islam. It is a destructive ideology that does not even pretend to be a solution for the complex task to safeguard freedom and prosperity for Europe. But right wing populists have a big mouth and they will make use of the platform that the German parliament will offer them in the next four years.

Therefore, the ostrich policy of Merkel’s grand old coalition has reached a dead end. Even without the AfD, the government would have to address these uncomfortable questions. It is regrettable that it needed the not so subtle wake-up call from a more-or-less fascist party. The good news is that Angela Merkel has proven extremely pragmatic and flexible over the time.

If Greens and Liberals manage to overcome their differences, that are themselves rooted in ideologies of the past, a Jamaica coalition could bring together just the right mix of people to answer some of the major questions of the 21^st century. This is the task, that German voters have given these parties. There is no doubt that it is the right task. Given the dreadful alternative, they know that putting the head in the sand is no longer an option.

By Valerie Anne Jill I. Valero*

On 19 September 2015, Japan, under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, effected one of the most recent and significant changes in its national security policy with the passage of the Legislation for Peace and Security. Precipitated by a cabinet report in July 2014, the law serves as a response to the shifting regional security environment, the need for greater strategic partnerships and collective action, and clamor for Japan’s more active involvement in the promotion of global peace and stability. It enables Japan’s “seamless response” to contingencies and enhances the country’s capability to contribute to international security and development. Guided by the Proactive Contribution to Peace policy and continued adherence to the principle of pacifism, it is likewise a means to deepen Japan’s commitment to its alliance with the US and help it forge stronger security ties with other countries.

Understanding the Legislation for Peace and Security

The Legislation for Peace and Security is a comprehensive legislative package consisting of 10 laws. It is an initiative that introduces significant changes to Japan’s security responses during peacetime and times of contingency through the expansion of existing laws and introduction of new laws.

The law’s passage has given way to, among other modifications, the increase in situations in which Japan may extend supplies and services to the US military during peacetime; revision of the International Peace Cooperation Law; extension of Japanese military support not only to the US, but also to other countries in times of exigency; and conduct of ship inspection as part of Japan’s contributions to international security. It has also introduced new laws, some of which appear to be supplementary to existing ones, such as the law on the protection of Japanese nationals and the law on the protection of military equipment of the US and other countries.

But perhaps the most scrutinized are the new laws on collective security, which buttress Japanese involvement in international peace and security operations. Easing legislative and operational restraints, these laws enable Japan to engage in multinational cooperation outside the UNPKO framework, provide assistance to foreign militaries engaged in collective security efforts, and respond to armed attack against another country, especially when the attack could undermine Japanese national security. At the crux of the law on responding to armed attack against another country is the use of force, which is permissible when (1) a country that shares close relations with Japan is under attack, and the threat of the attack extends to Japan; (2) there are no other viable measures to resist the attack and safeguard Japanese national security; and (3) use of force is kept at the absolute minimum.

Addressing the elephants in the room

Two elements are inextricable from the Legislation on Peace and Security – the Self- Defense Forces (SDF) and the Constitution. Without the SDF, Japan cannot realize its Proactive Contribution to Peace policy and successfully enforce its latest security laws. Both amended and newly established laws rely on mobilizing the SDF. Meanwhile, the Constitution, particularly the reinterpretation pertaining to collective self-defense, provides Japan with the conceptual foundation and legal latitude to rethink and modify the elements, practices, and regimes that have been the mainstays of Japanese security policy.

It is the prominence and inextricability of the SDF and Constitution from Japanese national security that make the law a subject of debate. The conundrum lies in the reality that Japan cannot make inroads in security reform without dealing with the pillars and values of its postwar national security policy and raising public intrigue and wariness. By putting the SDF and Constitution at the forefront, Japan is attempting to address its wartime past and security future. However, there still lies the question of whether or not measures like the Legislation on Peace and Security are the right way for the country to go forward.

Putting the Legislation for Peace and Security into perspective

The efforts of Abe to transform Japan into a proactive player in global and regional security affairs culminate with the Legislation for Peace and Security. The road to the law’s passage had been arduous, fraught with controversy and antagonism at home and abroad.

Given the incremental shifts in Japanese security policy in the last decade or so, the law’s inception and eventual institution should come as little surprise. With the acceleration of security-related reforms under the Abe administration, its passage was more a matter of when than a matter of if. For all intents and purposes, the law looks to bolster Japan’s security dynamism and complement the reforms that preceded it. Viewed differently, it is another gesture meant specifically for the US, to express Japan’s unwavering commitment to the Japan-US alliance by addressing the demands of its most important partner and to make amends for the shortcomings that have caused fissures in their bilateral relations in the past.

Until tested in a time of contingency, the law’s real impact will remain unclear. In some ways, the law introduces many vital changes, but in other ways, it can be argued that it does not. For instance, the SDF has been engaged in international peace and security operations, and in politico-military cooperation with partners and like-minded countries; it will continue to do what it has done for years. If there is any partner that will significantly, if not immediately, reap the benefits resulting from the law, it will be the US. Moreover, while fewer restrictions afford the SDF greater operational autonomy, it is important to recognize that, as a result, the SDF has to shoulder additional responsibilities and assume greater accountability for its activities.

Considerations for the Philippines

The Philippines’ positive response to the law’s passage illustrates the importance and impact of developments undertaken by other countries, especially key bilateral partners, on international security affairs. It is in the Philippines’ interest to continually encourage Japan’s constructive transition and to capitalize on this transition by advancing other aspects of Philippines-Japan relations.

It is also in the Philippines’ interest, in light of developments in Japanese security affairs, to evaluate its own resolve to evolve and adapt to shifts in global and regional security. How much is the country willing to commit for its security future? If there is anything to be learned from Japan, it is that transition is necessary, but it is also a complicated process that entails compromise, alignment of priorities and resources, and dealing with a firestorm of criticism and opposition. There must also be strategic reciprocity since partnerships can only go so far as the level of commitment a country is willing to demonstrate. How important are partnerships in pursuit of national interest, and is the Philippines, like Japan, willing to push itself towards new policy boundaries for the sake of these partnerships?

About the author:
*Valerie Anne Jill I. Valero is a Senior Foreign Affairs Research Specialist with the Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies of the Foreign Service Institute. Ms. Valero can be reached at vivalero@fsi.gov.ph

The views expressed in this publication are of the authors alone and do not reflect the official position of the Foreign Service Institute, the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Government of the Philippines.

Source:
This article was published by FSI. CIRSS Commentaries is a regular short publication of the Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies (CIRSS) of the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) focusing on the latest regional and global developments and issues.

By Jack Memolo and Jordie Conde*

Introduction

For the last fifty years, Colombia has been torn by ongoing conflict between the Colombian government, paramilitary groups, and left-wing guerrillas fighting each other to increase their influence over the country.

In 2016, a historic peace agreement was reached between the government and one of the left-wing guerrilla groups, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército Popular (FARC-EP or simply FARC) (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army), to bring about hopeful peace in the ravaged nation. The peace deal that took nearly a decade to finalize has been met with skepticism as some of the principles in the agreement have been seen as difficult to accomplish. “For some, the FARC acronym carries a negative charge, but it also represents our history. We are going to continue the conflict but through legal politics,” stated Iván Márquez, a member of FARC’s secretariat, after a party meeting. [i]

In agreement with the peace deal made with the government, the guerrilla force has taken steps to accomplish political participation; officially renamed Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común (Common Alternative Revolutionary Force). The former guerrilla turned political party, will have a tough task ahead as it attempts to enter the political arena and bring stability to a country that has seen little of it over the last half-century.

Questions regarding the likelihood of sustained peace and the viability of a FARC political party are sure to arise in the months and years to come. This transformation from guerrilla organization to a political party is not new to Colombia or Latin America; the Movimiento 19 de Abril (19th of April Movement) in Colombia started as a guerrilla movement before demobilizing into the Alianza Democrática M-19 (M-19 Democratic Alliance) in the 1970s. Other examples include the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front – FMLN) in El Salvador, and the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front – FSLN) in Nicaragua. Yet regardless of historical precedent, FARC will have a challenging task ahead if they wish to achieve a lasting peace.

Origins of FARC

To understand FARC as a political party, we must first understand its origins as a guerrilla organization. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia was founded in 1964 as an armed wing of the Communist Party that followed a Marxist-Leninist ideology. The movement was born as “autodefensas,” paramilitary groups designed to defend poor rural peasants against the aggression of right-wing militia groups, in a conflict between liberals and conservatives during the 1940’s and 1950’s. Originally they were small and unorganized, but during the late 1980s they expanded into a formidable guerrilla army as their financial capabilities increased thanks to Colombia’s booming drug trade. [ii] This recent turn to a political party is not the first attempt by FARC; in 1984 they launched Union Patriótica (Patriotic Union – UP), a political party that attempted to negotiate a peace settlement with the government.

The party was small but gained momentum as power in the country shifted from the national to local level. In its first elections in 1986, the UP won several seats in Congress and its presidential candidate garnered over 300,000 votes, a record for a leftist candidate. Ultimately, paramilitary groups and drug traffickers, at times working closely with the Colombian government, assassinated UP members en masse in response to their victories that forced the guerrillas back into the jungle. [iii] Criticisms of FARC have ranged in their practice of kidnapping for revenue, forced impressment of civilians, their association with the drug trade, and contributions from other hardline left-wing governments such as Cuba and Venezuela. [iv] Hence, one can see why the recent peace agreement has been met with judgment as these individuals, for the first time in decades, will now attempt to return to everyday life.

The current guerrilla leader Timoleón Jiménez, or better known as Timochenko, recently stressed at a Congress of members that the recent change “does not mean that we are giving up our ideological foundations or project of society; we will persist in collecting the Bolivarian flags and libertarian traditions of our people, to fight for power and to bring Colombia to the full exercise of its national sovereignty, and to enforce popular sovereignty.” [v] Under this banner, FARC will continue to pursue its left-wing agenda — even as the United States remains a prominent actor in Colombia. Currently, the party intends to address issues varying from wealth distribution, inequality, health care, public housing, women’s rights, the fight against global warming, and urban drug use. [vi]

A challenge to FARC’s freshman political party will be whether its candidates are capable of operating effectively within Colombia’s political system. A number of its members have known no other life except that of the guerrilla. The FARC’s often Cold-war era’ Marxist rhetoric strikes Colombian citizens as an antiquated throwback to its 1964 founding; but proposals for reforms to complicated property laws may gain traction with rural voters who struggle as subsistence farmers. [vii]

Given that a majority of their support currently originates from only rural areas, the party will also have to adjust its platform to appeal to the urban sector of the country . In the initial years of transition into the political sphere, FARC will probably have to form coalitions with other competing parties and movements if they hope to achieve meaningful electoral success. But the new party’s ambitions extend beyond the Congress. Although Ivan Marquez has stated that “the party will not field a candidate for president in the 2018 elections,” preferring to seek a coalition with other leftist forces, it is clear that FARC-EP leadership has set its sights on the presidency. Such ambitions are not clandestine, as Márquez has stated “we have entered legal politics because we want to govern.” [viii]

Along with it’s coming electoral challenges, the FARC also faces the formidable task of integrating women and its unprecedented feminist vision into the party and its platform. Estimates are hard to calculate, but some evidence suggests that upwards of 40 percent of the 18,000-member movement are women, while others sources from the government assert that around 30 percent of FARC ranks are women with a degree of independence and responsibility that is uncommon in Colombian civil society. [ix] [x]Regardless, the women in leadership positions of FARC have stated that “within the New Party, we will maximize vigilance to prevent any type of violence against women, people with diverse sexual orientations and identity constructions.” [xi]

There is strong belief that necessary empowerment of women in decision-making spaces, the right to decide on their own bodies, and respect for diversity and sexual orientation are essential to address in the years to come if the party hopes to appeal to the general public. These views can also be quite appealing to new sectors of urban society, and to new civil society organizations, as well as other political parties. It represents at the same time a challenge and an opportunity.

A Lasting Peace?

Alongside the ongoing peace process, one obvious question persists: will it succeed? On the one hand, much in the agreement struck between FARC and the Colombian government gives reason to be optimistic. For one thing, studies have shown that deals with “Electoral Participation Provisions” often have a much higher chance of achieving a more lasting peace if implemented properly.[xii] Such provisions allow for candidates chosen by FARC to compete in post-conflict elections with the government. While free and fair elections could help facilitate a more lasting peace, the integrity of these elections is of paramount importance. If the upcoming elections are fraudulent, or their integrity can be legitimately questioned, then the odds of FARC continuing to honor the deal made with the government are slim.[xiii] Fortunately, the agreement also allows the elections to be monitored by outside actors. These external forces, along with the presence of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN), will provide an incentive for both sides to stay faithful to the tenets of the deal or face the ire of international public opinion.

Alongside the “Electoral Participation Provisions” and the presence of outside actors to monitor the process, other parts of the agreement could also ease tensions between the various parties. With the disarmament of FARC guerrillas, the deal provides for the forfeiture of resources and assets gained through the use of methods such as extortion and drug trafficking. The compensation acquired from such forfeitures will go to victims and the families of victims directly affected by the conflict.[xiv] While this certainly will do little to heal the deep wounds opened by 52 years of civil war, it may serve to ease tensions between the FARC and certain segments of Colombia’s population whose suspicion of the peace process doomed the first agreement proposed by the government in October of 2016.

Regardless of the optimism expressed by leaders on both sides, many are still skeptical about the durability of a peace agreement. Wounds created by prolonged civil war have in the past proven difficult to heal—even when compared to conflicts on a much larger scale between developed nation-states. With 52 years of conflict, some of the men and women fighting for the FARC have known nothing but war. Many of these fighters, perhaps even a majority, were recruited, or in some cases forcibly removed, from small rural farms and communities as children. As a result, “the reintegration” of these soldiers back into society presents a daunting task for both the government and FARC high command.

One major concern for both sides is the possibility that many guerrillas, despite the deal made between the FARC leadership and the Colombian government, will simply take their arms and military experience to other paramilitary groups still at large in Colombia, such as the so-called Ejército de Liberación Nacional, or National Liberation Army—a left-wing militia which has been categorized as a terrorist organization by Colombia and the United States. Worse still, the possibility remains that disaffected former FARC veterans will bolster the ranks of drug trafficking gangs, which have plagued Colombia for decades. Moreover, given their past experience with the peace process in the mid- 1980s, many FARC fighters will be hesitant to turn their arms over to the government.[xv]

Efforts to achieve successful reintegration of FARC fighters is currently being spearheaded by the UN along with Colombia’s Reincorporation and Normalization Agency (ACR). While the task of reintegrating thousands of former FARC guerrillas into civilian life is certainly intimidating, the ACR has already brought an estimated 50,000 FARC fighters out of the jungle and back into civilian life over the past 14 years.[xvi] Yet regardless of efforts made by the UN and the ACR, the real battle for successful reintegration will not happen at the federal or multinational level, but at the local one. Local communities will have a critical role to play in reabsorbing FARC fighters back into society. Moreover, providing a sense of belonging and purpose to former FARC guerrillas will perhaps be the most decisive factor in ensuring that they accept civilian life.

Conclusion

All in all, the longevity and durability of the peace process is still uncertain. While many provisions in the deal reached by FARC and the government, such as the promise of electoral participation in 2018, give reason to be optimistic, history leaves reason to worry. Past agreements have universally failed and have in some instances led to even further bloodshed—as was the case in the breakdown of a failed peace agreement made in the 1980s. Another reason to wonder whether the agreement will survive is the possibility that a pro-Uribe party wins the elections in 2018 and seeks to reverse the peace process. Former president Alvaro Uribe has been critical of the deal and a new candidate from his camp could do away with the agreement, jeopardizing the future of FARC and a sustained peace.

Still, Colombia and the rest of the world can only hope that the conflict—which has claimed over 250,000 lives and led to the displacement of over six million people—can finally be brought to a decisive conclusion.[xvii] Overall, the most pertinent question for the future is whether the “new” FARC will be capable of adapting their former mode of conduct into one that will allow them to achieve their political objectives. Only time will tell if they will be able to get the public and political support needed to achieve their radical vision for the future.

*Jack Memolo and Jordie Conde, Research Associates at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

Additional editorial support provided by Clement Doleac and Louise Hojen, Senior Research Fellows, and Arianna La Marca, Alejandra Rodriguez, and Gabriel Barbosa, Research Associates at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs.

Notes:
[i] Sibylla Brodzinsky. “Farc eyes Colombia’s 2018 elections as it seeks new political dawn.” The Guardian September 1, 2017.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/02/farc-eyes-colombias-2018-elections-as-it-seeks-new-political-dawn

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] “FARC.” Insight Crime: Investigation and Analysis of Organized Crime. March 03, 2017. http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/farc-profile

[iv] “Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army”. Stanford University.

http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/89

[v] “FARC-EP celebrating new party congress.” FARC-EP International. August 30, 2017.

https://farc-epeace.org/newsflash/item/2564-farc-ep-celebrating-new-party-congress.html

[vi] Anthony Faiola. “Colombia’s FARC rebels launch a political party, trading bullets for blazers.” The Washington Post. September 2, 2017.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/colombias-farc-rebels-launch-a-political-party-trading-bullets-for-blazers/2017/09/01/86c9595e-8c28-11e7-9c53-6a169beb0953_story.html?utm_term=.3eda016d465e

[vii] Nelson Bocanegra. “After decades of war, Colombia’s FARC rebels debut political party.” Reuters. August 27, 2017.

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-peace-politics/after-decades-of-war-colombias-farc-rebels-debut-political-party-idUSKCN1B705U

[viii] “Farc eyes Colombia’s 2018 elections as it seeks new political dawn”, Ibid.

[ix] Keith Stanski. “Terrorism, Gender, and Ideology: A Case Study of Women who Join the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).” Academia.

http://www.academia.edu/148962/Terrorism_Gender_and_Ideology_A_Case_Study_of_Women_who_Join_the_Revolutionary_Armed_Forces_of_Colombia_FARC_

[x] Anastasia Moloney. “Colombia’s FARC female fighters.” Thomson Reuters Foundation. May 9 2014.

http://news.trust.org/slideshow/?id=ed79b68a-bfda-44e6-b139-40125173ae9f

[xi] “Mujeres de Farc plantean incorporar visión feminista en su nuevo partido.” Agencia Bolivariana de Prensa. 30 Julio 2017

http://www.abpnoticias.org/index.php/nosotros/igualdad-genero/4208-mujeres-de-farc-plantean-incorporar-vision-feminista-en-su-nuevo-partido

[xii] Matanock, Aila M. “Analysis | The FARC just became a Colombian political party. Here’s why elections are critical to a lasting peace.” The Washington Post. August 30, 2017. Accessed September 08, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/08/30/the-farc-just-became-a-colombian-political-party-heres-why-elections-are-critical-to-a-lasting-peace/?utm_term=.21b77ecb5a2e

[xiii] Matanock, Aila. “Bullets for Ballots: Electoral Participation Provisions and Enduring Peace after Civil Conflict.” Bullets for Ballots: Electoral Participation Provisions and Enduring Peace after Civil Conflict | International Security | MIT Press Journals. April 25, 2017. Accessed September 08, 2017. http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00275.

[xiv] Volckhausen, Taran. “FARC leader says guerrillas to forfeit illicit assets obtained during the conflict.” Colombia News | Colombia Reports. June 13, 2017. Accessed September 09, 2017. https://colombiareports.com/farc-leader-says-guerrillas-will-forfeit-assets-gathered-conflict/.

[xv] NUSSIO, OLIVER KAPLAN and ENZO. “How to Keep the FARC Guerrillas Out of the Fight.” The New York Times. August 03, 2017. Accessed September 09, 2017.

[xvi] NUSSIO, OLIVER KAPLAN and ENZO. “How to Keep the FARC Guerrillas Out of the Fight.” The New York Times. August 03, 2017. Accessed September 09, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/03/opinion/farc-colombia.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FRevolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia&action=click&contentCollection=timestopics®ion=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=collection.

[xvii] Brodzinsky, Sibylla, and Jonathan Watts. “Colombia and Farc rebels sign historic ceasefire deal to end 50-year conflict.” The Guardian. June 23, 2016. Accessed September 09, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/23/colombia-farc-rebel-ceasefire-agreement-havana

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein*

(FPRI) — The current situation is no ordinary escalation of tensions on the Korean peninsula. Those happen with regular frequency, but tend to fizzle out after a few days or weeks. Not so this time. Rhetoric is certainly more extreme than it has been in the past. North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho’s declaration on September 25th that North Korea reserves the right to (note: not that it “will”) shoot down American bombers even in international airspace is an eerily concrete threat. Its logic is easy to understand: in a situation as tense as this one, North Korea cannot be sure whether approaching bombers are merely intended to signal U.S. resolve in its defense of South Korea, or if they are out on a mission. When tensions run as high as they do right now, the potential for misunderstandings between the two parties poses enormous risks.

The tone and context of the statement matters. North Korea has accused other countries of making “declarations of war” against it on numerous occasions, just like its foreign minister did in New York on September 25. North Korea’s Foreign Ministry, for example, claimed in 2016 that a U.S. State Department report release on human rights in North Korea constituted a declaration of war. But with the overall bluster, it is harder for the parties to read each other’s true intentions through the chatter.

In many ways, however, not much has changed on the Korean peninsula for the past few decades. North Korea’s rapid development of its nuclear weapons and missiles (including ICBMs) has certainly been a game changer, but many of the basic dynamics have remained the same since the fall of the Soviet Union, throughout North Korea’s nuclear crises. A look back into the archives provides a fascinating reminder that situations and dynamics that we explain and analyze time and time again often haven’t changed for several decades.

By the end of the 1980s, the U.S. first saw, on satellite images, what looked like the construction of a nuclear reactor near the North Korean town of Yongbyon. Together, with the international community, it began to demand that North Korea allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which North Korea was still a party to at the time.

What tools did the U.S. consider using to pressure North Korea into compliance? One that should be familiar to basically every human being on the planet within listening range to TV news by now: economic sanctions.

A look in the archives of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reveals some assessments that the agency made about how well sanctions could function. And here is where things get very familiar. One memo drafted by the National Intelligence Council in December 1991 shows that much of the reasoning of the time around North Korea’s reactions to sanctions, as well as those of its neighbors, have remained very similar till this day. Let us look at some of the key analyses of the memo, one by one (some are shortened for simplicity):

• “. . . economic sanctions per se would not cause North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program.”

This, U.S. intelligence assessed 26 years ago. North Korea has been under various UN sanctions since 2006, which did little or nothing to prevent them from acquiring a nuclear deterrent. The ambitions for a nuclear deterrent have always been stronger than Pyongyang’s fear of sanctions, especially when these largely lack impact because of China’s unwillingness to enforce them. And now, here we are.

• “Foreign trade plays an important role in key sectors of North Korea’s economy. P’yongyang imports all of its crude oil, coking coal, and advanced technology, and 25 percent of its needed food grains.”

North Korea today exports far more coal than it imports (before the latest rounds of sanctions, that is). Though the data is uncertain, it is likely far less dependent on outside imports of food than it was in 1991. Still, the basic tenets hold. North Korea depends on the outside world for crucial resources, most notably crude oil.

The memo notes further that:

• “A trade embargo – if fully respected and enforced – would cause a significant falloff in production and impose severe hardships on the North Korean populace. A curtailment of crude oil shipments would be particularly troublesome and would lead to industrial shutdowns, restricted transportation, and reduced agriculture and fishing.

And, further down in the document:

• “The cutoff of oil deliveries would probably cause the regime to accelerate the shutdown of even essential industries and move to inefficient alternative forms of transportation – ox carts, bicycles, and charcoal-burning vehicles . . .”

There is currently no full trade embargo on North Korea. But under the current sanctions, and mainly due to China’s enforcement of them, a number of the results above are creeping into the economy. The fishing industry is suffering under the ban on seafood exports, and likely due to increased fuel prices as well. Should China continue to restrict its exports of oil, the transportation sector that supports the private market economy will also suffer. Agriculture, however, remains poorly mechanized—it largely reverted to manual methods after the famine in the mid-1990s when fuel became extremely scarce, so the predictions of the memo largely came true there as well, only through a different process.

But then, as today, the “if” on full respect and enforcement of a trade embargo was a big one:

• “Most of the North’s trading partners would be reluctant to impose, much less to enforce, economic sanctions. China’s role would be key, and we believe Beijing would strenuously oppose – and assist P’yongyang in evading – an embargo.”

And, further down:

• “We believe China – which has publicly opposed pressure tactics against the North – would not support trade sanctions and would veto UN action either to impose or militarily enforce an embargo. At a minimum, we believe Beijing would break the embargo by expanding trade with North Korea in an effort to preserve the P’yongyang regime. In particular, China would probably provide needed food and medical supplies, and could also increase oil deliveries . . .”

Again, no embargo is in place against North Korea, but current sanctions largely fill a similar function in blocking or severely restricting North Korea’s external trade in a wide range of goods. And as of now, China appears to be implementing many of the trade restrictions with force—at least enough for the North Korean economy to feel it. But in the grand scheme of things, Beijing’s sanctions enforcement remains an anomaly. China usually enforces sanctions only for temporary periods of time, when global attention is focused on North Korea, and reverts to normal trade with the country when tensions have blown over. It remains China’s primary objective in this that the status-quo be preserved, and part of that is to ensure the survival of North Korea in the long run. This was true in 1991, and it remains true in 2017.

About the author:
*Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein is an Associate Scholar with FPRI, focusing primarily on the Korean Peninsula and East Asian region. He is a doctoral candidate in the Department of History at the University of Pennsylvania, where he researches the history of surveillance and social control in North Korea, and a co-editor of North Korean Economy Watch. He publishes regularly on Korean affairs in publications such as IHS Jane’s Intelligence Review and The Diplomat, and has previously worked as a journalist, and has been a special advisor to the Swedish Minister for International Development Cooperation.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI

By Ryan McMaken*

Desperate to fill hours and hours of air time on 24-hour news channels, media corporations have made sure the discussion of the correct posture of National Football League players has been front and center.

Apparently, before grown men can chase a little toy around a grassy field for a few hours, it’s absolutely essential that they take part in a variety of pro-government rituals. This was not always the case, though, and prior to the twentieth century, it was hardly expected that a ballgame be preceded by a recitation of the national anthem or any other song of national allegiance.

Some assert that current rituals are of especially recent origin, with  Tom Curran claiming on Comcast Sportsnet that prior to 2009, football players “weren’t on the field for the national anthem and instead generally remained in the locker room.”

There is little doubt that at least some players, prior to 2009, elected to be on the field during the anthem, but there is no known current regulation mandating such behavior.

The fact that participation in these rituals have become mandatory —  in the minds of many Americans, at least — would likely strike nineteenth-century Americans as rather odd.

Before the First World War, playing the national anthem or sporting events was quite rare. No one expected it to be done, and hiring a band was expensive.

As is often the case with jingoist displays, however, matters were accelerated and exaggerated by wartime.

According to mlb.com, the most conspicuous early use of the national anthem was at game 1 of the 1918 World Series during World War I. Unexpectedly, during the seventh-inning stretch, a military band played the national anthem in an effort to liven up a reportedly surly and war-wearied group of spectators.

Use of the anthem spread from there. The anthem’s use expanded even more during the Second World War, as Matt Soniak notes:

During World War II, baseball games again became venues for large-scale displays of patriotism, and technological advances in public address systems allowed songs to be played without a band. “The Star-Spangled Banner” was played before games throughout the course of the war, and by the time the war was over, the pregame singing of the national anthem had become cemented as a baseball ritual, after which it spread to other sports.

But even after the war, the habit of playing the anthem at every game was not firmly in place until the Vietnam war.

It was during the Vietnam war, however, that the spread of the national anthem’s use finally met with some resistance. Historian Marc Ferris, in his book Star Spangled Banner notes that similar protests took place in the NFL during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Ferris recounts how “Responding to [protests during the playing of the anthem at the 1968 Olympics] the league’s commisioner, Pete Rozelle, required players to hold their helmets in their left hands and salute the flag during the anthem.” But, This was not without its detractors within the NFL, and, Ferris notes, “Anthem controversies [during the 1970s] helped institute and increased analysis of sports, which turned into the primary battleground over the beleaguered national anthem and its meaning.”

By the Obama era, however, not even this grassroots spread of the anthem was sufficient for the federal government.

By 2009, the Pentagon was actively using taxpayer money to pay the National Football League to expand “patriotic” displays:

In 2009, Barack Obama’s Department of Defense began paying hundreds of thousands towards teams in a marketing strategy designed to show support for the troops and increase recruitments. The NFL then required all players and personnel to be on the sidelines during the national anthem, in exchange for taxpayers dollars. Prior, the national anthem was played in the stadium but players had the option of staying in the locker room before heading out to the field.

Furthermore, teams that showed “Veteran’s Salutes” during games were paid upwards of $5.1 million dollars.

In total, 6.8 million in taxpayer money was doled out to sports teams — mostly NFL teams — for so-called “paid patriotism.”

In most cases, the use of the anthem was not directly subsidized, however. Usually, team owners quite voluntarily employed the anthem as a marketing gimmick. In times of war, team owners were happy to use the anthem as a type of advertising to make an emotional connection between the customers — i.e., the spectators — and the team’s product. Wrapping a commercial product in the flag and apple pie to increase sales is hardly unique to pro sports. But pro sports may have used this tactic more successfully than any other industry.

Prior to its use in sporting events, the national anthem had been cunningly used by Vaudeville acts “when the management would bring out the flag to win applause for a poor act.” This fact, related by Baltimore Orioles general manager — and World War I veteran — Arthur Ehlers was presented as a reason why Ehlers opposed playing the national anthem at every game. Ehlers felt overuse of the anthem could be done cynically, and would “cheapen” the song.

Ehlers, it turns out, remembered things correctly. In an article in Collier’s magazine in 1914, the amused author notes the widespread use of the anthem to elicit a positive response from audiences at performances:

[N]othing is more destructive to gravity than to watch a small oppressed poodle dog walking a tight wire in a vaudeville show with the United States flag hanging from his mouth, while the orchestra plays “The Star-Spangled Banner” and some stout, earnest woman, standing in solitary grandeur in the middle of the house, glares at the sodden mass of humanity which declines to do reverence to the anthem or the flag or the dog. … If encouraged in this sort of business, some clog dancer may yet do the Doxology in ragtime while the audience stands with bowed and contrite heads.1

Apparently, by 1914, it had already become fashionable to use the anthem to browbeat spectators into assigning deep meaning to what was clearly — like NFL football — never anything more than trivial low-brow entertainment. The author, with his sarcastic reference to the anthem as a “Doxology” knew when he’s being manipulated. Would that modern Americans displayed the same level of mental clarity.

Decades after the Colliers writer observed the anthem’s value as a commercial ploy, Ehlers, it seems, was attempting to actually preserve some dignity for the anthem.  Unfortunately for the NFL, it didn’t listen to Ehlers, and the league’s use of the tried-and-true marketing strategy of draping the flag over everything may be backfiring. The teams’ employees — and surely many spectators as well — see no problem with using the anthem ritual as an opportunity to make a political statement. The result has been a marketing nightmare for the league.

A Private-Sector Issue

Although this has been taken up by politicians such as Donald Trump as a matter of critical importance, it really should be viewed as just a private business matter. Tho Bishop has noted that, as private firms, each team should be free to discipline or fire any employee who might cause customer displeasure or a loss of revenue for the team. The question of course, is whether it might be even worse — in terms of earnings — for a team to eliminate its most talented athletes. That’s a business decision the owners will have to make.

Everything Is Political

To a certain extent, though, the pro sports industry has called down the current controversy on itself. Having wrapped their product in the political garb of Old Glory and the national anthem for decades, team owners are now having to pay the piper. Since many of their customers now expect pro sports to be political — but only political in a way that matches their particular ideology — team owners now face a headache that could have been totally avoidable.

It didn’t have to be this way. In recent years, many reasonable observers have complained that society is becoming increasingly politicized. Today, it’s easy to find ways in which once apolitical activities have been ruined by ideological posturing. Late night talk shows are now essentially hard-left propaganda. Selling tacos is denounced as “cultural appropriation,” and every Hollywood awards show is now a series of political speeches. In the case of professional sports, however, there’s nothing recent about this sort of politicization. For nearly a century, pro sports have been politicized through their habitual use of the American state’s symbols and songs. The Pentagon knows this, which is why it so enthusiastically shoveled millions of dollars of taxpayer money at the NFL as part of an advertising blitz. But even back in 1918, the US government knew the potential of politicizing sporting events. This is why, during the 1918 World Series, the Navy made sure it had a recruiting station at Wrigley Field.

About the author:
*Ryan McMaken is the editor of Mises Wire and The Austrian. Send him your article submissions, but read article guidelines first. Ryan has degrees in economics and political science from the University of Colorado, and was the economist for the Colorado Division of Housing from 2009 to 2014. He is the author of Commie Cowboys: The Bourgeoisie and the Nation-State in the Western Genre. Contact Ryan McMakenTwitter<

Source:
This article was published at the MISES Institute.

Notes:
1. “We Shy at Vaudeville Patriotism,” Colliers, March 14, 1914.

By Irina Slav

The solar sector is reeling from confusion, and stock prices are reeling right along with it. The time it has taken investors and traders to wrap their heads around Trump’s industry tariffs and the pyrrhic victory of two solar companies in a case against cheap Chinese imports has seen stocks rally in a big way, and then fall just as hard.

When the International Trade Court ruled in favor of plaintiffs Suniva and SolarWorld in their case against cheap Chinese solar module and cell imports, reactions were polarized: the U.S. solar industry was outraged—as it had been for most of the duration of the court investigation—and investors, apparently, were extremely upbeat for the future of this same outraged industry, sending solar stocks sky-high.

The rally did not last long, though. While investors’ immediate reaction to the court ruling was of the unsurprising knee-jerk variety, reality started to set in over the last few days and solar stocks took a nosedive as sharp as the rally they enjoyed last week. Just what the solar companies needed after the ruling that threatened their chances of survival.

On the face of it, the court case doesn’t seem like such a big deal, but nothing could be further from the truth. Narrowly speaking, bankrupt Suniva filed a complaint with the ITC claiming that cheap Chinese solar panels and cells were instrumental in the company’s declining performance. Suniva, whose owners are Chinese, was quickly joined by German-based SolarWorld in its claim. The key word in the case was “flooded”: the U.S. market, the plaintiffs claimed, was flooded with Chinese-made cells and panels. The solution? A floor price of US$0.78/W for modules and a US$0.40/W tariff for solar cells—enter the broader picture.

One would think that these two would effortlessly win the support of their local sector players, competitors and all. But this is not what happened. What did happen was exactly the opposite: the Solar Energy Industries Association came down on Suniva and SolarWorld like a ton of bricks, claiming that tariffs and floor prices would be a stab in the chest for the U.S. solar industry, leading to project cancellations worth billions of dollars and massive layoffs, to the tune of a third of the total number currently employed in the industry.

Yet it’s easy to see why the ruling resonated with traders. Tariffs and floor prices are, after all, protective measures aimed—on the face of it—at protecting U.S. solar businesses from cheap imports. The problem is that sometimes, as in the Suniva/SolarWorld case, this is a dangerous oversimplification.

Contrary to what the plaintiffs in the case were claiming, there was no “flooding” of any sort, according to the solar industry association in response to the court ruling. What Chinese exporters did was merely provide U.S. solar installations builders with the necessary materials—namely, cells and modules. In fact, the SEIA said, the plaintiffs were trying to blame Chinese cell and module makers for their own failure to turn in a profit because their products were subpar, while the Chinese suppliers were simply filling a critical gap amid booming demand for utility-scale solar installations.

The shares of utility-scale solar companies saw obvious effects of the investigation and the consequent ruling—chief among these: First Solar’s stock.

First Solar (NYSE:FSLR)

The country’s largest solar panel manufacturer’s shares added a stunning 78 percent between the end of March and last week, hitting US$51.99 on September 22, the day of the ruling.

That was the highest price for the stock for the past 12 months.

On Monday, First Solar’s stock reversed to US$46.88 as investors started to wrap their heads around the actual implications of the ITC ruling. As of late-morning trading on Tuesday, FSLR was at $46.44, down 0.94 percent on the day and down over 5 percent on the week.

Last year, First Solar announced it could take an impairment charge of between US$500 and US$700 million in the phasing out of the thin-film solar panel model it was producing at the time, its flagship Series 4, and speed up the development of the new model, Series 6. The Series 6 was expected go into production in 2018, and according to comments at the time of the announcement, would help First Solar to gain a competitive edge in a world of falling solar panel costs.

But what about the proposed tariff?

This is where it gets complicated for First Solar, because it’s not black and white—and when it comes to stock prices, well, it depends who is paying attention and what they’re paying attention to, exactly.

It would seem to make sense that a tariff on imported solar modules and cells would benefit First Solar, but not necessarily because it would boost sales by eliminating lower-cost imports.

On the contrary, a tariff on Chinese solar module and cell imports would benefit First Solar by allowing it to continue to produce its own modules and cells in Malaysia while competitors grapple with higher import prices. Why? Because First Solar does not use crystalline silicon for its modules. It uses cadmium telluride for its thin-film PV panels, so the tariffs, which specifically concern the more popular crystalline silicone solar products, won’t affect it.

But let’s not get ahead of ourselves. First Solar’s Series 4 is what is being produced in Malaysia, and that production capacity is being idled. So this immediate benefit of the tariff isn’t as great at it looks on the surface. It’s preparing for the launch of the Series 6 now, and it may have to reopen one idled factory in Vietnam to respond effectively to a hoarding urge in response to the ruling. This would add to the company’s cost burden in the short-term, but over the medium and long term, it could be a benefit—if tariffs go through.

Right now, the drop in FSLR’s stock price reflects the general confusion as to what this means for all solar stocks, and the reality hasn’t yet set in regarding this company’s future in a new regulatory environment. It also reflects the fact that no one can be sure if these tariffs are going to see the light of day, given the level of opposition from the industry they are meant to protect.

In the medium and long-term, First Solar could turn out to be one of the very few winners from the Suniva/SolarWorld case, so even though it’s lost over 5 percent this week, there’s room for a reversal.

Source: http://oilprice.com/Alternative-Energy/Solar-Energy/Trumps-Solar-Tariff-Confusion-Creates-An-Opportunity.html

The United Nations General Assembly, which kicked off on September 12 at the headquarters of the international organization in, New York has just ended. During the meeting, the priority was given to the issues of global security and combating terrorism. The settlement of crisis in Libya was also touched.

On September 20, the UN envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame at a closed meeting proposed an action plan for resolving the Libyan conflict. Mr. Salame told journalists that the plan had been allegedly based on the needs of the Libyans who deserved the cessation of uncertainty and unpredictability. The plan for emerging the crisis implies amending the current Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), namely the reduction of Presidential Council to three members, forming new transitional government, holding a constitutional referendum and general parliamentary elections.

Libya is still a fractured country after the beginning of hostilities, the military intervention by NATO states in 2011 and the following civil war. The Gaddafi’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya fell and the democracy promised by the western states has never been established in the country.

Currently there are two key powers in Libya: Government of National Unity led by Fayez Al-Sarraj in Tripoli and the House of Representatives, which is allied with the powerful military commander Khalifa Haftar.

Judging by the actions of the Western countries regarding Libya, there is no guarantee that the plan will be really focused on the needs of Libyans and could radically change the situation for the better.

In its turn, Washington tries to pretend that it takes an active part in the further fate of the previously prosperous country. State Department spokesperson Heather Nauert stated that the United States has welcomed the September 20 United Nations announcement of an action plan to advance political reconciliation in Libya and help the Libyan people achieve lasting peace and security. Obviously, the presented document meets the financial interests of the White House. Moreover, America and its true allies are interested in establishing full control over natural energy resources, which Libya is rich in.

The U.S. military intervention in Libya was essentially the beginning of profitable military campaign for Washington to seize Libyan ‘black gold’. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) data, after the beginning of the hostilities, the American oil imports from Libya increased approximately six-fold: from 3 thousand barrels in 2011 to 20 in 2012. This is just approximate figures, but the amount of cheap oil obtained by the U.S. will remain a mystery.

The true attitude of the U.S. authorities towards the Libyan people is reflected in Donald Trump travel ban, which prohibits the entry for the citizens of Libya and five other Middle East countries, who are fleeing from hostilities and chaos.

Apart from the western countries, the monarchies of the Persian Gulf, including Qatar, took part in the destabilization of Libya. This June, the Libyan army spokesman Colonel Ahmed Al-Mesmari presented video and audio evidence confirming Qatar’s official involvement in financing and supporting terrorist groups. The Libyan army leadership also blamed Ali Sallabi, the spiritual leader of the Libyan opposition, for close ties with the Muslim Brothers and the Qatari Royal Family.

Colonel Ahmed Al-Mesmari also presented evidence that the Qatari authorities initiated the dispatch of its army units on the territory of Libya to impose control over the oil-rich Mu’tika and Misurata areas. At the same time, Libya was used as a transit point for the Qatari military aviation delivering arms and weapons to Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups in Syria.

Obviously, the United States and its partners are doing their best to slow down the political settlement of Libyan crisis. Instead of concrete steps, they look for opportunities to legalize their actions and seize the natural resources of the former Jamahiriya. However, despite all the Western intrigues, the Libyan people are capable to resist any external threat independently.

*Adel Karim is an independent investigative correspondent who writes on the Middle East.

Hugh Hefner’s legacy cannot be adequately assessed without addressing the sociological fallout of “The Playboy Philosophy.”

Hefner founded Playboy in 1953 and he quickly succeeded in making it an important cultural marker. He rebelled against his conservative Protestant parents, whom he called “very repressed,” and set out to rectify the problem by targeting Christianity.

In 1962, Hefner made his case for sexual freedom in his series, “The Playboy Philosophy.” While it is a stretch to call it a “philosophy,” it was much more than mere musings about matters sexual: it was a clarion call for libertinism, and a wholesale rejection of Christian sexual ethics.

The series lasted for two and a half years, and during that time virtually every deviant act noted by Christianity came under assault. To be specific, Hefner blamed Christianity for inhibiting sexual expression, accusing it of having too many rules against non-marital sex, homosexuality, bestiality, and the like.

Hefner’s reach was wide, finding a receptive home on college campuses. The men loved it. So did his friends: Roman Polanski was one of his best buddies, and Bill Cosby was a regular at the Playboy Mansion.

Every social observer agrees that the sexual revolution is unintelligible without noting the effect that Hefner’s philosophy played. But did it liberate?

When Playboy was founded, the birth control pill did not exist, abortion was illegal, and sex education was non-existent in the schools. Yet the rate of out-of-wedlock births was negligible, abortion was rare, and STDs were insignificant. Today, all three conditions have soared. Moreover, the spike occurred at a time when everything from the ABC’s of condom usage to the wonders of anal sex are taught in sex education classes all across the nation.

Anyone who thinks that Hefner’s legacy is one of liberation needs to explain why those who were the most likely to practice his philosophy wound up being anything but beacons of happiness. Want proof? Just ask the shrinks, and the morticians, in Hollywood.

Good morning ladies and gentlemen. It’s a pleasure to be here with you today. Thank you to the FT for the invitation. I will primarily take the opportunity to share with you our view on some of the key issues facing the Euro Zone at this time.

The economic news from the Euro Zone is very encouraging. Quarterly growth has been positive for the last 17 quarters. Like others, we have underestimated the strength of the recovery, and will soon again revise up our projection for 2017. In June, we projected growth to reach 1.9 percent, but this is now clearly too low. The ECB recently raised its projection for 2017 to 2.2 percent. I would expect our own estimate, which will be finalized shortly, to be close to that.

Important for the robustness of the recovery, investment is now playing a stronger role. Real investment, excluding construction, has surpassed its pre-crisis level.

But most encouraging is the fact that the recovery is broad-based. All euro area countries are growing above trend and unemployment is declining. Looking at our measure for the dispersion of growth rates across member states, this is the most evenly distributed recovery for more than two decades.

European policymakers deserve much credit for this sustained upswing. You will obviously not have forgotten that it is not so long ago that a severe economic crisis raised existential questions about the viability of the Euro Zone—about its architecture and about the determination of policymakers to do what is needed. The ECB’s very proactive accommodating policies above all, but also the creation of firewalls and the building of the banking union, among other architectural improvements, have been key to the recovery in confidence that is underlying the broader recovery.

Looking forward, let me make my main point upfront: the current recovery is an important opportunity to strengthen the resilience and growth potential of the currency union. Specifically, the main task facing policymakers at this juncture is to gradually rebuild fiscal buffers and push ahead with structural reforms—mainly at the national level—to improve productivity and raise potential output.

The challenge will be to avoid yielding to complacency—and not to waste the recovery. While policymakers have shown their resolve during the difficult times to do what is needed, complacency during good times has unfortunately also been a recurrent feature of European policy making in the past.

Let me be very explicit: the Euro Zone’s ability to prevent major procyclical tightening when the next shock hits will critically depend on whether the right policy choices are made during the ongoing recovery. To understand the urgency, remember that there are seven countries in the Euro Zone, among them several large ones, with public debt near or above hundred percent of GDP, suggesting that policy buffers to deal with significant future shocks are very limited. And with structural unemployment still high in many countries, there is clearly a risk that future adverse shocks could cause significant political and social tensions unless policymakers take steps now to increase their future room for maneuver.

So what are the priorities?

Let me start with monetary policy. As mentioned, our estimates suggest that the output gap for the euro area as a whole is closing fast. Unemployment is down to 9 percent, of which we estimate only one percentage point to be cyclical. However, despite the improvements in labor markets, wage pressures are weak, and core inflation is inching up only very slowly. Our own projections suggest that inflation in the euro area would reach 1.9% only by 2021.

This clearly suggests that the ECB needs to maintain an accommodative policy stance for the foreseeable future. Its unconventional measures have been critical to averting deflation risks and getting the recovery going. At some stage, the ECB will have to slowly begin unwinding these measures, but this does not mean that it would have to stop its accommodative stance anytime soon.

One concern in this regard is premature pressures on the ECB to begin the normalization of monetary policy. In particular, for the ECB to reach its medium-term inflation objective of close to 2 percent for the Euro Zone as a whole, it is inevitable that countries with the strongest cyclical position at this juncture accept that their inflation rate will have to rise above this objective for some time.

From the perspective of investors, I would take comfort from the fact that the ECB has been clear about its resolve to maintain the accommodating stance as long as necessary.

Let me turn next to fiscal policy. Fiscal policies in euro area countries have had to strike a delicate balancing act in recent years. On the one hand, they had to restore confidence that fiscal policy would bring about a decline in public debt, which had shot up during the crisis. On the other hand, fiscal adjustment had to be sufficiently gradual to avoid choking the nascent recovery.

In this context, Europe’s fiscal governance framework, complex and imperfect as it is, has provided an important anchor. Budget deficits have come down significantly since the crisis. That said, progress on fiscal consolidation has slowed in several countries where debt remains very high despite accelerating growth. Given the strength of the recovery and the interest savings from accommodative monetary policy, there is a concern that the countries with the least fiscal space are not using this window of opportunity sufficiently for rebuilding their fiscal buffers, leaving them vulnerable to potentially difficult adjustments when economic conditions deteriorate

So, what are we advising?

First, with growth recovering quite strongly and output gaps narrowing fast, now is the time to rebuild fiscal space and place public debt on a firm downward trajectory. Gradual fiscal consolidation would help ensure that, when the next adverse shock hits, the euro zone is on a stronger footing and has the necessary buffers.

Second, we still see significant scope for rebalancing fiscal policy to become more growth friendly, including in countries that have some way to go in terms of fiscal consolidation. Making public spending more efficient and growth-oriented, while making the tax system more supportive of job creation and productivity growth, would further strengthen the recovery and raise the medium-term growth potential.

Let me next turn to the need for structural reforms to boost productivity in individual member states. The metrics developed by the Commission to monitor changes in this area show almost universally that there has been only very limited progress in recent years. This is the one area where the news is still not good enough.

I shall not go in to what precisely is needed to raise productivity as this differs considerably from member state to member state, and the problems are generally well understood by policymakers. In this regard, we welcome proposals to improve the Euro Zone’s fiscal governance framework in a way that would incentivize support for productivity boosting reforms at the national level. But the main challenge remains the ability of policy makers to overcome fierce and entrenched resistance from vested interests at the national level

To illustrate the importance of overcoming such resistance, consider the following discouraging picture of the development in GDP per capita for the original twelve Euro Zone members: before they adopted the Euro, there was steady convergence, as countries with lower GDP per capita were growing faster than those with a higher GDP per capita. This is what you would want to see. But from around the time of euro adoption, convergence stopped. And since the crisis, we have actually seen divergence. That is, the countries with lower per capita GDP have fallen further behind.

The persistent productivity gaps is the root cause of the high structural unemployment and the particularly high youth unemployment in a number of countries. In the long-run, this is obviously politically unsustainable. Reforms to boost productivity remains the overarching challenge facing Euro Zone policy makers.

Finally, let me turn to the question about changes to the Euro zone architecture. Polls show that support for the Euro in member countries is at the highest level in more than a decade. Moreover, many national policymakers are more supportive of further integration, as exemplified by the recent speech by French President Emmanuel Macron and the encouraging dialogue between Germany and France.

To some extent, this is a reaction to Brexit and other external developments that are seen as a challenge to the integrity of the European Union, and not least the Euro Zone. As we have seen in the past, the sense of crisis has often catalyzed political support for further integration in Europe. Whatever the reason, the renewed impetus for reforms is very good news, coming only a few years after the Euro Zone was in the grip of widespread existential angst.

A few remarks about the priorities for architectural reforms:

First, while much progress has been made already, there is still some way to go to complete the banking union. To create a truly integrated banking market, the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism need to be accompanied by a common deposit insurance and a common fiscal backstop. But we also recognize that increased risk sharing must go hand-in-hand with risk reduction and a solution to legacy problems, including through an uncompromising approach to resolving problem banks. Closely related is the issue of advancing capital markets union. I think that these issues are well understood.

Let me also briefly comment on two architectural issues that have received much attention recently—the question of the creation of a Euro Zone budget and a European Monetary Fund.

We have argued for a number of years that a Central Fiscal Capacity would help improve the euro area’s ability to offset shocks by alleviating fiscal space constraints in downturns and building buffers in good times. This could potentially be an element of an eventual common euro area budget if member states decide to move in this direction.

Similarly, there is a case to be made for a “European Monetary Fund” in order to strengthen crisis prevention and crisis management. One critical issue is of course the role of such a fund relative to the existing European institutions. This is for European policymakers to decide. Ultimately, the success of a European Monetary Fund will critically depend on its ability to overcome some of the problems that have marred the fiscal governance framework in the past, not least its ability to demonstrate that it is robust to undue political interference. From the IMF’s perspective, we have a long history of working cooperatively with regional financial institutions, including with the ESM.

The boldness and ambitions of such architectural reforms will undoubtedly be tempered by the concerns that prevail among some member states about moral hazard problems, that is concern about potential disincentives to pursue the necessary policies at the national if policies are not subject to national budget constraints.

Thus, the defining feature of the Euro Zone, and also the root cause of many of the problems we have seen during the last decade, is the fact that it is not a political union, which inevitably means that progress will remain gradual and evolutionary, involving difficult political compromises. The reforms might end up underwhelming those of you who compare European decision-making to what you are used to in much more homogenous political unions. But I would caution against setting the bar too high and about mistaking a slow incremental approach for a lack of a basic commitment to continued integration. I certainly think that there is now a climate in Europe where we stand a better chance of making meaningful progress than what we have seen for a very long time.

This being said, and here I am coming back to my central message, I want to reiterate that it is crucial that national policy makers do not defer critical measures during good times in the expectation that the changes to the architecture will significantly mitigate the next adverse shock. Whatever these changes will be, they will not be on a scale to alter the basic fact that for the foreseeable future the ability of individual member countries to weather shocks will continue to depend overwhelmingly on policies at the national level. Again: for countries with relatively limited fiscal space and modest potential growth, the ability to avoid a major pro-cyclical tightening in the face of a major adverse shock will depend on the buffers they build during the current recovery phase, both through fiscal adjustment and structural reforms.

In conclusion, the outlook for the Euro zone has improved significantly. This is an opportunity to lay the foundations—both at the national and central level—for a more resilient Euro Zone. While the challenges ahead are still formidable, we have good reasons for being much more optimistic about the future.

I will stop here and be happy to take questions.

Speech at the Financial Times Investment Management Summit, London

Climate change is no longer a purely environmental issue, it has far reaching implications for almost every organism on earth. Human beings- the drivers behind the accelerated anthropogenic climate change are also victims of their own industrial legacy.

The effect of climate change on human health although largely taken for granted is a serious issue. Like other vagaries of climate change, it is felt most harshly by geographically and economically vulnerable communities; especially in developing countries (DCs) and least-developed countries (LDCs).

Increased concentration of C02 in the atmosphere is a leading cause for respiratory problems and extreme weather patterns result in millions of casualties every year. Natural disasters like acute floods and droughts claim thousands of lives and also cause a great deal of climate induced migration and displacement.

Climate Change Induced Food Insecurity

Food security is a major challenge for most DCs and LDCs and climate change adds further complexity to this problem. Approximately 842 million (12% of the global population) people suffer from hunger worldwide out of which ninety-eight percent of those who suffer from hunger live in DCs and LDCs. 553 million live in the Asian and Pacific regions, while 227 million live in Sub-Saharan Africa. Latin America and the Caribbean account for 47 million. As per a 2017 report by the Global Hunger Index (GHI), India is one of the top countries suffering from a serious hunger crisis.

It is no secret that climate change has directly impacted agriculture across the world and is responsible for decrease in crop yields caused by erratic droughts and floods. A recent scientific study published in the Nature journal in 2014 has also shown that several staple crops are losing their nutritional value due to the impact of climate change and increased CO2 levels in the atmosphere. The findings of this study have been corroborated by scientific reports by the WHO and other international organizations as well. “We found rising levels of CO2 are affecting human nutrition by reducing levels of very important nutrients like iron and zinc, as well as cutting protein levels in very important food crops,” says Prof. Samuel Myers, an environmental health expert at Harvard University. Although this problem may not appear significant from a developed country’s perspective, it has a severe impact on DCs and LDCs struggling with food insecurity.

Declining protein and micronutrients in in staple crops like rice, maize, wheat, etc. causes malnutrition and weakens our immune system. Weakened immune systems make us more vulnerable to infectious diseases such as malaria, dengue and other tropical diseases whose spread is catalyzed by warmer temperatures according to a WHO Report on Climate Change and Diseases.

Under the circumstances, climate adaptation is the obvious need of the hour. Adaption using biotechnology in the field of agriculture is critical in order to provide food security to vulnerable communities across the world, especially in the Global South.

Biotechnology as a mode of climate adaptation

Over the last few decades, biotechnology has evolved significantly and genetically modified organisms (GMOs) have been on the rise in several countries including DCs and LDCs. GMOs have found their way into agriculture, fisheries and livestock farming and in some cases; certain varieties of GMOs have been proven to be more resistant to the vagaries of climate change. Efficiently harnessing and utilizing these climate resilient GMOs has the potential to mitigate the adversities of climate change on food security and health.

However, some Governments and NGOs have adopted a stubborn stance against GMOs in agriculture. They believe that adopting GMOs in our diet pose severe health hazards and also negatively affect the environment. While there is great scientific consensus about the positive effects of climate resilient GMOs in agriculture and the negligible adverse impact on health, these Governments and NGOs continue to debunk such scientific research and instead continue to support other research which shows that there may be certain health hazards associated with GMOs. These anti-GMO lobbyists are also influenced by irrational myths and non-scientific ideologies.

In 2015, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) published the results of a long term comprehensive assessment of safety, efficacy and future of GM crops and found that they had no adverse impact on health and environment.

Some examples of successful climate resilient GM crops are DroughtGard- a variety of corn produced in the U.S. which can withstand severe water shortages; GM soybean produced in Argentina which can withstand draughts and GM Cotton from India which can withstand extreme weather conditions. Recently, Tanzania has made a breakthrough in climate change adaptation by overcoming its irrational GMO phobia and introducing a drought resilient variety of GM corn which will be closely monitored over the next few years.

A review of national biotechnology laws of various countries as well as international conventions indicate that GMOs are heavily regulated and are approved only after completion of careful research and stringent field trials. However, the anti-GMO lobby continues to gain popularity in several countries in the Global South even as millions suffer due to food shortage.

This scientific debate on the actual risks of accepting or rejecting GMOs in our diet is almost as never ending as the debate questioning anthropogenic reasons for climate change. Like the climate change debate, the GMO and health debate also has much scientific research from opposing ends of the spectrum.

However, the one thing that is absolutely certain is this: erratic weather patterns are disrupting traditional agriculture and enhancing food insecurity concerns worldwide. In order to protect the most vulnerable communities from acute starvation, malnutrition and other diseases, food security is a priority for Governments as well as international organizations.

GMOs may or may not have serious implications on human health, but starvation and malnutrition in the wake of the present climate change fueled food insecurity, coupled with the global rise in serious infectious diseases is sure to wipe out poor and vulnerable communities in the near future unless biotechnology driven adaptation measures are implemented in the agricultural sector worldwide in addition to other climate mitigation efforts.

*Srinivas Raman is a law student at National Law University Jodhpur (India).

Recently, the Islamic State’s purported “terror franchises” in Afghanistan and Pakistan have claimed a spate of bombings against the Shi’a and Barelvi Muslims who are regarded as heretics by Takfiris. But to contend that the Islamic State is responsible for suicide blasts in Pakistan and Afghanistan is to declare that the Taliban are responsible for the sectarian war in Syria and Iraq.

Both are localized militant outfits and the Islamic State without its Baathist command structure and superior weaponry is just another ragtag, regional militant outfit. The distinction between the Taliban and the Islamic State lies in the fact that the Taliban follow Deobandi sect of Sunni Islam which is a sect native to South Asia and the jihadists of the Islamic State mostly belong to Wahhabi denomination.

Secondly, and more importantly, the insurgency in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan is a Pashtun uprising which is an ethnic group native to Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan, while the bulk of the Islamic State’s jihadists is comprised of Arab militants of Syria and Iraq.

The so-called “Khorasan Province” of the Islamic State in the Af-Pak region is nothing more than an alliance of several breakaway factions of the Taliban and a few other inconsequential local militant outfits that have adopted the name “Islamic State” to enhance their prestige, but that don’t have any organizational and operations association, whatsoever, with the Islamic State proper in Syria and Iraq.

Conflating the Islamic State either with Al-Qaeda, with the Taliban or with myriads of ragtag, local militant groups is a deliberate deception intended to mislead public opinion in order to exaggerate the threat posed by the Islamic State which serves the scaremongering agenda of security establishments.

Regardless, the only difference between the Afghan jihad back in the ’80s that spawned Islamic jihadists such as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda for the first time in history and the Libyan and Syrian civil wars, 2011-onward, is that the Afghan jihad was an overt jihad: back then, the Western political establishments and their mouthpiece, the mainstream media, used to openly brag that the CIA provides all those AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades and stingers to Pakistan’s intelligence agencies, which then distributes those deadly weapons amongst the Afghan so-called “freedom fighters” to combat the Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

After the 9/11 tragedy, however, the Western political establishments and corporate media have become a lot more circumspect, therefore this time around they have waged covert jihads against the Arab-nationalist Gaddafi regime in Libya and the anti-Zionist Assad regime in Syria, in which Islamic jihadists (aka terrorists) have been sold as “moderate rebels” with secular and nationalist ambitions to the Western audience.

Since the regime change objective in those hapless countries went against the mainstream narrative of ostensibly fighting a war against terrorism, therefore the Western political establishments and the mainstream media are now trying to muddle the reality by offering color-coded schemes to identify myriads of militant and terrorist outfits operating in Syria: such as the red militants of the Islamic State and Al-Nusra Front which the Western powers want to eliminate; the yellow Islamic jihadists, like Jaysh al-Islam and Ahrar al-Sham, with whom the Western powers can collaborate under desperate circumstances; and the green militants of the Free Syria Army (FSA) and a few other inconsequential outfits which together comprise the so-called “moderate” Syrian opposition.

If we were to draw parallels between the Soviet-Afghan jihad during the ’80s and the Syrian civil war of today, the Western powers used the training camps located in the Af-Pak border regions to train and arm Afghan “Mujahideen” against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

Similarly, the training camps located in the border regions of Turkey and Jordan are being used to provide training and weapons to Sunni Arab militants to battle the Shi’a-dominated Syrian regime with the collaboration of Turkish, Jordanian and Saudi intelligence agencies.

During the Afghan jihad, it is a known historical fact that the bulk of the so-called “freedom fighters” was comprised of Pashtun Islamic jihadists, such as the factions of Jalaluddin Haqqani, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf and scores of other militant outfits, some of which later coalesced together to form the Taliban movement.

Similarly, in Syria, the majority of the so-called “moderate rebels” is comprised of Sunni Arab jihadists, such as Jaysh al-Islam, Ahrar al-Sham, al-Nusra Front, the Islamic State and myriads of other militant groups, including a small portion of defected Syrian soldiers who go by the name of Free Syria Army (FSA).

Moreover, apart from Pashtun Islamic jihadists, various factions of the Northern Alliance of Tajiks and Uzbeks constituted the relatively “moderate” segment of the Afghan rebellion, though those “moderate” warlords, like Ahmad Shah Massoud and Abul Rashid Dostum, were more ethnic and tribal in character than secular or nationalist, as such.

Similarly, the Kurds of the so-called “Syrian Democratic Forces” can be compared to the Northern Alliance of Afghanistan. The socialist PYD/YPG Kurds of Syria, however, were allied with the Baathist regime against the Sunni Arab jihadists for the first three years of the Syrian civil war, i.e. from August 2011 to August 2014.

At the behest of American stooge in Iraqi Kurdistan, Massoud Barzani, the Syrian Kurds have switched sides in the last three years after the United States policy reversal and declaration of war against one faction of the Syrian opposition, the Islamic State, when the latter overstepped its mandate in Syria and overran Mosul and Anbar in Iraq in June 2014, from where the US troops had withdrawn only a couple of years ago in December 2011.

Regarding the creation and composition of the Islamic State, apart from training and arms which have been provided to Syrian militants in the training camps located in the Turkish and Jordanian border regions adjacent to Syria by the CIA in collaboration with Turkish, Jordanian and Saudi intelligence agencies, another factor that has contributed to the stellar success of the Islamic State is that its top cadres are comprised of former Baathist military and intelligence officers from the Saddam era.

According to reports, hundreds of ex-Baathists constitute the top and mid-tier command structure of the Islamic State who plan all the operations and direct its military strategy. The only feature that differentiates Islamic State from all other insurgent groups is its command structure which is comprised of professional ex-Baathists and its state-of-the-art weaponry that has been provided to all the Sunni Arab militant outfits fighting in Syria by the intelligence agencies of the Western powers, Turkey, Jordan and the Gulf states.

Moreover, it is an indisputable fact that morale and ideology plays an important role in battle, and well-informed readers must also be aware that the Takfiri brand of most jihadists these days has directly been inspired by the puritanical Wahhabi-Salafi ideology of Saudi Arabia, but ideology alone is not sufficient to succeed in battle.

Looking at the Islamic State’s astounding gains in Syria and Iraq in 2014, a question arises that where does its recruits get all the training and state-of-the-art weapons that are imperative not only for hit-and-run guerrilla warfare but also for capturing and holding large swathes of territory?

According to a revelatory December 2013 news report [1] from “The National” newspaper affiliated with the UAE government which supports the Syrian opposition: it is clearly mentioned that along with AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades and other military gear, the Saudi regime also provides machine gun-mounted Toyota pick-up trucks to every batch of five jihadists who have completed their training in the training camps located at the border regions of Jordan.

Once those militants cross over to Daraa and Quneitra in southern Syria from the Jordan-Syria border, then those Toyota pick-up trucks can easily travel all the way to Raqqa and Deir al-Zor and thence to Mosul and Anbar in Iraq.

Moreover, it is clearly spelled out in the report that Syrian militants get arms and training through a secret command center based in the intelligence headquarters’ building in Amman, Jordan, that has been staffed by high-ranking military officials from 14 countries, including the US, European nations, Israel and the Gulf Arab States to wage a covert war against the government in Syria.

Finally, unlike al Qaeda, which is a transnational terrorist organization that generally employs anticolonial and anti-West rhetoric to draw funds and followers, the Islamic State and the majority of Sunni Arab militant groups fighting in Syria are basically anti-Shi’a sectarian outfits. By the designation “terrorism” it is generally implied and understood that an organization which has the intentions and capability of carrying out acts of terrorism on the Western soil.

Although the Islamic State has carried out a few acts of terrorism against the Western countries, such as the high profile Paris, Brussels and Manchester attacks, but if we look at the pattern of its subversive activities, especially in the Middle East, it generally targets the Shi’a Muslims in Syria and Iraq. A few acts of terrorism that it has carried out in the Gulf Arab states were also directed against the Shi’a Muslims in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia and Shi’a mosques in Yemen and Kuwait.

Sources and links:

[1] Syrian rebels get arms and advice through secret command center in Amman: http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/syrian-rebels-get-arms-and-advice-through-secret-command-centre-in-amman

Uproar about a launderette owner’s decision to bar non-Muslims from using his service has focused a spotlight on broader discriminatory attitudes in Malaysian society as well as elsewhere in Asia that are reinforced by Saudi-inspired ultra-conservative interpretations of Islam.

In contrast to many Asian leaders who have been reluctant to confront-ultra-conservatives head-on, Sultan Ibrahim Ibni Sultan Iskander, the sovereign of the Malaysian state of Johor, did not mince his words in forcing the launderette owner to rescind his ban on non-Muslims and insist that Johor was “not a Taliban state.”

The silver-lining in the launderette owner’s controversial move is the fact that it sparked debate about discrimination in Malaysia. Malaysian opposition member of parliament Teo Nie Ching announced that she was considering introducing legislation to strengthen anti-discrimination in the country’s legal code. It was not immediately clear whether she would tackle Malaysia’s banning of the use of the word Allah by Christians and repression of the country’s miniscule Shiite community in any proposed legislation.

Similarly, Malaysian lawyer Syahredzan Johan asked on Twitter what the difference was between what the difference was between a launderette owner refusing to service non-Muslims and Malaysian Chinese accepting only Chinese roommates or Malaysians refusing to rent properties to Africans.

“We need to look at the aspect of discrimination within our society… I think these are discussions that need to happen moving forwards instead of just pigeonholing it as something like increasing Islamisation or Talibanization,” Mr. Johan said.

The launderette uproar was but one of several incidents in Malaysia sparked by Saudi-inspired ultra-conservatism. Ultra-conservatives stirred a furore over this year’s Better Beer Festival in Kuala Lumpur.

In contrast to Sultan Ibrahim’s response, Kuala Lumpur’s municipality caved in to Islamist agitation by refusing to authorize the annual event that aims to promote smaller breweries because it was politically sensitive.

Similarly, a decision by religious authorities in the Malaysian state of Kelantan to recommend counselling and impose a fine on a Muslim man for wearing shorts in public triggered fierce debate on social media. “Slowly, those educated in religious education in Middle East is trying to turn Malaysia into Taliban country,” said John Brian Anthony on Facebook.

The debate sparked by the string of incidents goes to the core of concern across Asia about a rising threat of jihadism as the Islamic State (IS) loses its territorial base in Syria and Iraq and looks for new pastures in South, Central and South-eastern Asia. A IS-affiliated group has been battling security forces in the Philippine city of Marawi for the past three months while Islamic militants are blamed for sparking the latest Rohingya crisis in Myanmar.

The challenge for Asian governments is to complement law enforcement and military measures to counter militants with inclusive policies that ensure that all segments of their populations have a stake in society.

That is proving to be a tall order for leaders like Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak, who has used Islam to shore up his image tarnished by a massive corruption scandal, as well as Indonesian President Joko Widodo. Like others, the two leaders face popular pressure from Saudi-inspired Islamic militants. Similarly, Pakistani military and civilian leaders see militants as useful proxies in their dispute with India and geopolitical manoeuvring in Afghanistan.

There is little indication that Asian governments are capable or willing to confront deeply ingrained attitudes that have in part been fostered by a global, four-decade old, $100 billion Saudi campaign that propagated ultra-conservative visions of Islam in a bid to establish the kingdom as the leader of the Muslim world and to counter the revolutionary appeal of Iran following the 1979 Islamic revolution that toppled a monarch and an icon of US influence in the Middle East.

The campaign has not only influenced segments of Muslim society across Asia, but also ensured that discrimination is enshrined in legislation in various countries that politically would be difficult, if not impossible, to revise.

Repealing blasphemy laws in countries like Indonesia and Pakistan would spark popular revolts. So would rolling back Saudi-inspired anti-Ahmadi legislation in Pakistan and anti-Shiite laws in Malaysia and discrimination of Ahmadis as well as gays and transgenders in various parts of Asia. Militants this year successfully blocked a Christian from running for re-election as governor of Jakarta after ensuring that he was convicted on blasphemy charges.

In Pakistan, a country in which Saudi-inspired ultra-conservatism has left one of its largest footprints, supporters of a preacher who adheres to a strand of Sufism, a mystical wing of Islam denounced by ultra-conservatives, attacked a party in a region bordering on Afghanistan for playing music The incident demonstrated the pervasiveness of Saudi-inspired ultra-conservatism.

“If you use force to make people more religious or make them understand religion the way you understand it, then you are bringing more harm than benefit to the religion,” said Mustafa Akyol, a prominent Turkish intellectual and journalist, minutes before boarding a plane at Kuala Lumpur International Airport after he was detained for 24 hours for giving a university lecture allegedly without having proper credentials.

In an indication of the risks of ingrained discrimination and racism, Malaysian authorities this week arrested an Indonesian supporter of IS who was on his way to Myanmar to support the Rohingya by attacking Myanmar targets.

The arrest highlighted the degree to which Asian leaders would have to think out of the box to tackle drivers of militancy and work towards religious and ethnic harmony. The Rohingya issue poses a threat that goes far beyond immediate humanitarian concerns or where to temporarily locate hundreds of thousands who in recent weeks have fled to Bangladesh from Myanmar, a patchwork of 135 predominantly Buddhist ethnic groups.

Differences of opinion about who the Rohingya are and where they belong among Myanmar Muslims and non-Muslims alike are not going to solve a problem that is fuelling militancy and potentially is becoming a rallying cry for the Muslim world.

“We don’t want to simply go back to Myanmar to be non-persons. We want to belong somewhere,” a Rohingya refugee in Bangladesh was quoted by news media as saying.

The refugee hit the nail on the head. The Rohingya will continue to be a festering problem as long as no permanent solution is found. The stakes are not defining who they are or where they historically belong but creating a permanent, solution for a group whose unresolved plight goes to the future of Asia. The stakes are what kind of Asia Asians want and to what degree Asian leaders and societies are willing to confront problems head-on.

Saudi Arabia’s long-awaited lifting of a ban on women’s driving, widely viewed as a symbol of Saudi misogyny, will likely serve as a litmus test for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s ability to introduce economic and social reforms despite conservative opposition.

It also distracts attention from international criticism of the kingdom’s war in Yemen and charges by human rights groups as well as some Muslim leaders that the kingdom is fostering sectarianism and prejudice against non-Muslims.

If last week’s national day celebrations in which women were for the first time allowed to enter a stadium is anything to go by, opposition is likely to be limited to protests on social media.

To be sure, thousands welcomed the move as well as the lifting of the ban and Saudi media reported that senior Islamic scholars, who for decades opposed expanding women’s rights and some of whom criticized Prince Mohammed’s effort to expand entertainment opportunities in the kingdom, said that they saw no religious objection to women’s driving.

Conservatives made their rejection of enhancing women’s rights in response to the national day celebrations.

“Patriotism does not mean sin. Of course, what is happening does not please God and his prophet. Patriotism is not dancing, free mixing, losing decency and playing music. What strange times,” said one critic on Twitter.

A video of a man telling celebrating crowds that they have “no shame, no religion, no tribe” was widely shared on social media.

Hundreds of thousands used an Arabic hashtag demanding the restoration of powers to the kingdom’s religious police, whose ability to strictly enforce ultra-conservative Sunni Muslim moral codes was curbed last year.

A 24-year-old, speaking earlier this year to The Guardian, noted that ultra-conservatism maintains a hold on significant numbers of young people. “You know that the top 11 Twitter handles here are Salafi clerics, right? We are talking more than 20 million people who hang on their every word. They will not accept this sort of change. Never,” the youth said.

Talal Salama, a Saudi singer, was attacked on social media this week for singing a text from the Qur’an during the national day celebrations. “The disaster is not just that he is sitting singing the Quran, the disaster is that it was a party approved by the government that is allowing him to sing, said lawyer Musleh al-‘Udayni on Twitter.

In advance of the lifting of the ban, Saudi authorities banned Saad al-Hijri, head of fatwas (religious legal opinions) in the Asir governorate, from preaching for declaring that women should not drive because their brains shrink to a quarter the size of a man’s when they go shopping.

The suspension was the latest measure in a crackdown in which scores of Islamic scholars, including some of the kingdom’s most popular ones, judges and intellectuals, were arrested. The arrested were likely to ensure that conservative opposition to the lifting of the ban would be muted.

The kingdom’s decision to delay implementation of the decision until June next year gives the government time to neutralize opposition and serves as an indication of what it would take to ensure Saudi women’s rights.

To implement the decision, Saudi Arabia has to first eliminate bureaucratic, legal and social hurdles that prevent women from obtaining licenses, create facilities for women to learn how to drive, and train policemen to interact with female drivers in a country that enforces gender segregation and in which men largely interact only with female relatives.

The lifting of the ban is part of Prince Mohammed’s Vision 2030 plan that seeks to diversify and streamline the economy and introduce limited social reform but avoid political liberalization.

With women accounting for half of the Saudi population and more than half of its university graduates, Vision 2030 indicates the limits on granting women’s rights by envisioning that women will account for only 30 percent of a reformed kingdom’s workforce.

While the lifting of the ban in a decree by King Salman allows women to apply for a license without the permission of their male guardian, the principle of male guardianship that subjects women to the will of their menfolk remains in place.

There is, moreover, for example, no indication that last week’s use of a stadium as a test case, will lead to a lifting of restrictions on women’s sporting rights, including free access to attend men’s competitions and the ability to practice and compete in a majority of sports disciplines that are not mentioned in the Qur’an.

The public relations value of the lifting of the ban was evident in the fact that it temporarily drew attention away from news that reflected badly on the kingdom, including mounting international criticism of Saudi conduct of its war in Yemen, that has pushed the country to the edge of the abyss. Saudi Arabia has desperately been seeking to avert censorship by the United Nations and defeat calls for an independent investigation.

It also put on the news backburner, a 62-page report by Human Rights Watch that, despite the banning of Mr. Al-Hijri, documented that that Saudi Arabia has permitted government-appointed religious scholars and clerics to refer to religious minorities in derogatory terms or demonize them in official documents and religious rulings that influence government decision-making.” Anti-Shia, anti-Sufi, anti-Christian and anti-Jewish sentiment was evident in the Saudi education system and in the judiciary, the report published on Tuesday said.

Saudi Arabia adheres to a puritan interpretation of Islam that views Shiite Muslims as heretics and advocates avoidance by Muslims of non-Muslims.

The kingdom has spent an estimated $100 billion in the last four decades to propagate its austere vision of Islam in a bid to establish itself as the leader of the Muslim world and to counter the revolutionary appeal of Iran following the 1979 Islamic revolution that toppled a monarch and an icon of US influence in the Middle East.

In doing so, it has contributed to Muslim societies like Malaysia and Indonesia becoming more conservative and intolerant towards minorities. Saudi ultra-conservative influence was visible earlier this week when an owner of a self-service launderette in the Malaysian state of Johor banned non-Muslims from using his services.

“Saudi Arabia has relentlessly promoted a reform narrative in recent years, yet it allows government-affiliated clerics and textbooks to openly demonize religious minorities such as Shia. This hate speech prolongs the systematic discrimination against the Shia minority and – at its worst – is employed by violent groups who attack them,” said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East director at Human Rights Watch.

The book Marriage and its Discontents: Women Islam and the Law in India by Sylvia Vatuk is an empirically rich work that discredits the very myth among masses of other religions that Islam is anti-social, anti-feminist, silent towards women and more precisely towards the matter of ‘Divorce’. It is a comprehensive study that brings out in detail how Muslim women negotiate about the Muslim personal law, family courts and extra-judicial options that can be used by women to come out of the marriage.

Her hard-hitting work based on ten years of research in Chennai and Hyderabad explored various options that Indian Muslim Women possess to walk out upon learning that the marriage is no longer going to work. Most interesting is that she didn’t limit herself to a particular institution, Law, Act or popular cases, but patiently studied minutes of Muslim Personal Law, Dowry, Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act and the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, along with conducting extensive interviews with government-appointed qazis in both cities; met and had detailed discussions with women themselves, as well as with lawyers, judges, counselors, court staff and advocates.

The author has beautifully tried to include the records of every registered case even if it has not caught eyes of media or scholars. Each chapter at the end provide references to other journals, books, court cases, explanation of various words like iddat, khula, mehr, etc and verdicts relevant to the topic that really enrich the book and reader will have no problem in understanding the meaning of the concepts used by the author.

The book is divided into eight chapters and each chapter is well explained and justifies the title of the book in terms of what happens when the marriage breaks up and the proceedings wherein the couple face each other in the judicial settings and the experiences of women to these non-state institutions. Further, the author tries to capture as to how the Muslim personal law impacts women’s efforts to enable them to overcome the constraints or obstacles when they approach to the civil and religious institutions.

The most interesting and readable part of the book is when she explains how women are treated under Muslim personal law and the role of non-state religious bodies in the administration of Islamic law in marital disputes. The book is useful for the students of law, social sciences and gender studies.

In the first chapter she argues that administration of laws on women generally follows ‘paternalistic’ approach and ‘compromise’ is a gender-linked concept especially she mentions about the functioning of Family courts wherein women were asked to withdraw criminal charges filed against their husbands along with other negotiations that goes in favor of men. The chapter revolves around the issue of power and resistance in relationship of individual to the law. Women, for granted, taken as weak, dependent creature for all basic needs throughout life, hence, whatever is done is less and ineffective because finally they need lifelong material and symbolic support and protection from men in their lives. She contested that although the Indian legal system is ‘pluralistic’ but in practice, Indian women could only use unofficial community or religious dispute-settlement bodies that too have their own limitations.

‘Triple talak’ allures local as well as foreign public too much that one often get to see strikes, demonstrations, deliberations at both formal and informal platform too. Therefore, in the chapter on ‘Muslim Women and Personal Law’ the author emphasizes how the MPL (Muslim Personal Law) operates on paper and in practice; and to what extent it has impacted the lives of Muslim women who come to its shelter. This chapter stands as a base for understanding forthcoming arguments, discussions and criticism as it sets the background by familiarizing the reader with broader socio- cultural context of Muslim women’s lives.

The author argues that the cultural configurations of gender and law and their relationship to the state and its representatives are more important than the imperfect and inappropriately implemented laws.

The issues discussed in this context are the reason for marital conflict; resort to various formal- informal institutions for settlement; divorce and modes of divorce; mehr and iddat the two financial supporters after divorce. The khula, the way women can exercise her right to get free from unwanted relation has also been explained by the author in detail backed by primary data which makes this book unique and most important to read at least once for researchers working on this subject. This phenomenon of wife-initiated divorce has hardly got a space in the scholarly literature and outside the standard legal text book. Other options available to Muslim women such as DMMA (Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939), Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act are also mentioned in this book.

The author mentions two other options for the woman who seeks to extricate herself from an unhappy marriage: one is through DMMA and the other is private negotiation with her husband, by khula. This fourth chapter (Divorce at the Wife’s Initiative: Options and Implications for Women’s Welfare?) outlines the main features of the law of khula, how its implemented in studied areas along with a brief highlight of DMMA, that is said to be the last option with women to seek divorce. One could summarize this chapter by stating that khula is the only way out for women to discontinue a relationship between husband-wife which is inclined towards male with concrete and factual reasons. The author concludes that the problem confronted by women is not the code of law, but the structures that limits their options.

The chapter on ‘Islamic Feminism in India’ is something new and informative to the young scholars working on Muslim women in India. In this section the author has lucidly elaborated the origin of feminist movement in Islam, government and non-government institutions working towards not only for rights of women, but also concerned about empowering the women of this community in every sphere. She has tried to raise three issues in this chapter namely; the views especially the Bhartiya Muslim Mahila Andolan, on reform of Muslim personal laws, advocacy initiatives and the challenges these feminists face within and outside the community and from the representatives of the larger ‘secular’ feminists movement.

Chapter 6 is based upon match-making practices in past and present, focusing mainly on the change and continuity. The changes are more due to the changes in the social and economic situation of the family. Nowadays, elders are allowing their children to engage directly in the choice of a spouse even outside kin-group on various criteria suitable to present situation. Nevertheless, marriage within Khandan is still largely continued as preferred marriages due to various reasons along with ideology of purity of blood mentioned by the author.

The last two chapters focus on broken marriages by citing some cases based on the narratives or documented in court of separation/divorce arguing that the expectations based on religious prescriptions and proscriptions along with the responsibilities and rights of husbands and wives and the social milieu which sometimes contradict the provisions of Islamic law. The author through these cases has tried to show how the stories of divorced women could help in understanding the dynamic of the institution of marriage and the expectations from each other.

The last chapter is important as it critically examined MWA in association with maintenance benefit after divorce as some women have benefited especially under the Section 3(1) (a). The impact of the Shah Bano case and its outcome is also mentioned by the author during her discussion on the issue. The author concluded the chapter by stating that it’s not possible to give a simple yes or no answer to whether MWA has been advantageous to divorced Muslim Women.

There is no doubt that reading the book broadens the knowledge about the issue and various dynamics of marriage and divorce, in addition to the first hand experience on the importance of primary data to explain sensitive issues. Nevertheless, one finds some gaps in the study, e.g. while the institution of marriage is well explained the discontents of marriage that leads to break is slightly weak. The reasons for discontent in marriage not necessarily be religion specific, rather more social in nature.

Further, with regard to Khul the author point out that it contributes in a ‘positive way to women’s ‘agency’, ‘empowerment’ or their relative ‘bargaining power’ which may be specific to the region studied but in the northern part of India the situation is different as some times the women have to forgo even the amount of their Mehr (Hussain, 2013).

The book also does not mention adequately about the deserted and destitute women and the reasons for their discontent in marital relations. It would have further enriched the book if the author could have taken some narratives of these women too.

With regard to match making the main focus is on Khandan, but this hardly says about the culture prevalent in past of giving preference to a close relative has entirely vanished. Also, the author has not mentioned the cases where families today prefer marrying their children outside the kin-group firstly because asking for openly for the dowry openly may not possible within close relative as this may disarray their reputation among relatives and friends. Secondly, the fear of worsening the relationship among families and not obeying one’s command could be some more reasons that have not been taken into account by the author. She mentioned that girls are also given liberty to select, but generally, in practice, openness is seen among the family while negotiating the marriages.

Nevertheless, the book enriches the understanding of the reader and is very useful for those who are working on the issue of marriage and family among the Muslims in India.

*Prof. Sabiha Hussain is the Director at Sarojini Naidu Centre for women’s studies (SNCWS), Jamia Millia Islamia, Central university, New Delhi, India. She is also the editor of reputed journal Women’s Link.

Like other world leaders, Ashraf Ghani, president of Afghanistan, participated in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) of 2017 which takes place every year. Among meetings with other world leaders, he met with US President, Donald Trump. Subsequently, he talked in Asia Society and Council on Foreign Relations. Here are five important takeaways from his UNGA visit:

First and foremost, he explicitly elucidated the denominations of the Afghan conflict and laid ground for its solution at his UNGA speech. He noted that peace between Afghanistan and Pakistan is important for stability in the region, reiterating the fact that Pakistan is in a state of hostility in Afghanistan. He called on Pakistan to sincerely participate in the Kabul Process, a term coined by Ghani to rally support for Afghan peace process, and benefit from the trade route Afghanistan provides from Central Asia, a region rich in energy, to South Asia, a region in dire need of energy. This definition was very important because it clarified the perplexity to the West that there is no civil war going on in Afghanistan. Ghani implied that it is an expansionist aggression launched by Pakistan, which now is accompanied by other players like Iran and Russia.

Second, the important stipulation for the dialogues with Taliban he put forward was that Afghans want “peace that would lead to enduring stability.” That is of immense importance because Afghans would not yearn to negative peace; a peace that would undo all the constitutional, bureaucratic and foreign relations of Afghanistan built post 9/11. In the discipline of conflict resolution, negative peace means when peace is imposed by heavy military presence, or any other mean that undermines freedom and democracy. Such as peace in North Korea and in Rwanda. Afghanistan needs peace that would lead to enduring prosperity, economic well-being, and protection of human rights, especially women’s rights.

Third, he conveyed the plight of Afghans who are in the forefront of fighting state-sponsored and transnational terrorist organizations. He insisted that Afghan National Security and Defense Forces (ANDSF) are fighting global terrorism to defend democracy against aggression. He said what is important is not the fact how much of Afghanistan is controlled by Taliban, but the fact that ANDSF were able, without the help of NATO and their sophisticated weapon system, to defend Afghanistan against an extensive campaign of twenty terrorist organizations launched this past season.

Fourth and the most important for me, was the announcement of his security sector reform strategy. In January this year, I wrote in The Diplomat how corruption prevails in Afghan security apparatus and how important reforming it was. Ghani highlighted that a generational transition is occurring in Afghan National Army (ANA). This was one of the suggestions I made in the aforementioned article. This announcement carried a message that challenges the political elites’ (warlords of the civil war) interests. He mentioned that the generation that grew up in the 90s are taking over the controversial ANA officers who grew up in the 70s and 80s. That is a brave announcement because a superfluous majority of the current brass within ANA are militias of Jamiat-e-Islami, an ethnic Tajik political party. He elaborated that reform in ANA is beginning to bear results. ANA, especially, the Special Forces branch have defeated Taliban on every front. But control of territories are lost to Taliban because the Afghan National Police (ANP) could not hold onto them. Hence ANP is next in the list to be reformed.

Fifth, his reassurance to the Trump administration that the Afghan government is committed to uproot corruption. Ghani has been able to amend Afghan government’s relations with the US, which was on the brink during Hamid Karzai’s presidency. Ghani has successfully built the Afghan government’s credibility within NATO nations, especially, the US As a result of which the US has committed to modernize and fortify Afghan Air Force.

So far Ghani’s multi-dimensional diplomacy of trade and global political pressure on Pakistan has not yielded in closing down of terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan and halting of sponsoring of terrorism by Pakistani Army. But he has built a regional and international consensus on the fact that Pakistan is the main player behind the Afghan conflict. President Trump called the Taliban a terrorist group housed by Pakistan in his UNGA speech. That is an improvement as far as Afghanistan is concerned because the US’ prime objective in Afghanistan was to counterintuitively target al-Qaida leaders but to evade Taliban. In another move, the US is considering to drop Pakistan from its list non-NATO allies, and impose travel bans on officers of Taliban’s patron, ISI, Pakistani military’s intelligence agency. Further, Ghani has attracted the US to support his reform and anti-corruption campaign against the corrupt elite during his UNGA tour.

*Samim Arif is a Fulbright scholar and researcher. He tweets @samimarif.