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Trump Widening America’s Ethnic Divide – OpEd

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By Yossi Mekelberg*

Not a week goes by without President Donald Trump stirring up controversy that deepens ethnic, racial or religious divisions within the US, as if there is not enough of it already. In a short space of time, he employed incendiary criticism against athletes protesting the discrimination of African-American citizens; he has renewed his battle against migration from countries with a Muslim majority; and continues to play a cynical political game with legislation protecting the undocumented “Dreamers” brought illegally to the US as children.

In all of these policies, he positions himself as the defender of white Americans, who according to him are the only true patriots, from the ethnic and religious minorities, not to mention foreigners, who in his eyes are all a threat to the American way of life. This is the reactionary world of Donald Trump.

For most people outside the US, the name Colin Kaepernick was until quite recently completely unknown. However, the former quarterback for the San Francisco 49ers has become an international household name since he refused “to stand up to show pride in a flag for a country that oppresses black people and people of color” in August of last year. His protest, in the form of kneeling, known as “taking the knee” when the national anthem is played before games, has since been emulated by other sports figures from football league the NFL, basketball league the NBA, and sometimes by entire teams.

The support of this protest has intensified since Trump entered into the fray in his typical manner, providing the match (or tweet) whenever there is a combustible situation.

For these protesting athletes, their act of kneeling during the national anthem and in front of the American flag is their way of exercising a fundamental democratic right of remonstrating against police brutality and other injustices against black people.

Statistics coming from the US indicate that African-Americans are the worst off in society, with some disturbing figures to demonstrate this. Considerably fewer African-Americans hold university degrees in proportion to the rest of the population, they have higher levels of unemployment, and African-Americans make up nearly a third of inmates in prisons.

Kneeling during the national anthem might be controversial, and is definitely not universally endorsed as a means of protest. However, it is a legitimate act in a free society and is effective in highlighting one of the major issues that threaten the cohesion of American society. But, as we unfortunately have become accustomed to with Trump, he says exactly the wrong things, which exacerbate an already very tense situation.
In a campaign rally in Alabama, in a vitriolic verbal outpouring, he called for NFL players to be fired for kneeling during the national anthem. “Wouldn’t you love to see one of these NFL owners, when somebody disrespects our flag, to say, ‘Get (him) off the field right now…’ You know, some owner is going to do that. He’s going to say, ‘That guy that disrespects our flag, he’s fired.’ And that owner, they don’t know it (but) they’ll be the most popular person in this country.”

Knowing what these athletes are protesting against, it is hard to see his inflammatory language as anything but a deliberate attempt to sow divisions within American society along ethnic lines for his own political gain. If this was not enough, Trump also canceled a visit to the White House by NBA champions the Golden State Warriors through a tweet after one of their star players, Stephen Curry, expressed his doubts as to whether it was appropriate for his team to carry on with the tradition of NBA champions visiting the White House, considering the president’s approach to race relations. Instead of diffusing the row, he provoked even more acrimony by canceling the visit.

Those are not isolated incidents but a reflection of someone who may seem to have a questionable agenda. For instance, North Korea, Venezuela and Chad were cunningly added to the travel ban list, which previously included only countries with vast Muslim majorities. This is supposed to make it more palatable for the courts in the US, which had already rejected Trump’s attempted ban on two previous occasions due to obvious discrimination against people of one specific religion.

It may now be more difficult to challenge this policy in court, but in reality it represents a distinction without a difference. There isn’t exactly an influx of visitors from North Korea queuing at the gates of the US and Venezuela is an obvious target, but neither of them presents a danger to the US through migration.

Similarly, playing with the future of 800,000 undocumented immigrants who were brought to the US as children, otherwise known as Dreamers, originating mainly from Latin America, is aimed at galvanizing his xenophobic credentials. It creates needless uncertainty around a program that was devised by the Obama administration to enable them to stay for at least a limited time. Once again, promoting anti-immigration policy comes at the price of victimizing a very vulnerable group in society that has committed no offense.

Sadly, this is the face of the US under President Trump. If Congress, civil society and ordinary people won’t stand up against the road he is taking them down, they might not recognize their country come the next election.

• Yossi Mekelberg is professor of international relations at Regent’s University London, where he is head of the International Relations and Social Sciences Program. He is also an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House. Twitter: @YMekelberg


Dunford: New Operational Construct In Afghanistan Should Break Stalemate

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By Jim Garamone

The new South Asia strategy should break the stalemate in Afghanistan and make the United States, its allies and its partners more secure, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told the Senate Armed Services Committee Tuesday.

Marine Corps Gen. Joe Dunford told the panel he agreed with the NATO commander in Afghanistan, Army Gen. John W. Nicholson, that the effort in the country was stalemated. He noted that Defense Secretary Jim Mattis had said the coalition in the country was not winning.

This situation developed after the NATO Resolute Support mission in the country transitioned from the International Security Assistance Force to an advisory effort.

“Since January 2015, we have advised and accompanied Afghan special operations units at the tactical level, but our advisory effort for conventional forces has generally been limited to the Afghan corps and institutional level,” the general said in testimony. “We also reduced the aviation, artillery and intelligence support provided to the Afghan forces.”

The conventional forces did their best, but they weren’t prepared to succeed in combat against the Taliban, al-Qaida and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Dunford said. “My military assessment is that we drew down our advisory effort and combat support for the Afghan forces too far and too fast,” he told the senators. “As a result, the Taliban expanded territorial and population control and inflicted significant casualties on the Afghan army and police, while the campaign lost momentum.”

Targeted Solutions

Soon after taking office, Mattis asked for a detailed review of operations in the country and for officials to determine the root causes for the lack of progress in Afghanistan. “And he directed we provide targeted solutions,” the chairman said. The result was a new operational approach designed to break the stalemate.

“The new approach supports the president’s broader strategy by expanding our advisory efforts to the tactical level, increasing the combat support we provide through our Afghan partners and enhancing authorities to our commanders,” Dunford said.

The construct is designed to improve the ability of Afghan forces to conduct offensives, defend critical areas and reduce the casualties they are taking. “The emphasis is on providing effective support to the over 300,000 Afghans we have trained and equipped, so they can secure their own country,” the chairman said.

The plan follows Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s plan to reorganize the Afghan force. This will mean expanding the nation’s special operations capabilities while reducing less-effective units. “We will also continue our efforts to develop a capable and sustainable Afghan air force,” the general said. “Finally, we’ll enhance and expand our own counterterrorism operations in the region.”

This means that experienced, senior coalition leaders will be advising Afghan commanders where it will do the most good — at the brigade or even kandak level. Under the previous operational construct, advisors would limited to the corps level.

Taking the Fight to the Enemy

“Their efforts will be fully enabled by the support and authorities needed for the Afghans to take the fight to the enemy,” the general said. Coalition nations will provide air support, intelligence expertise, command and control capabilities, logistics and other help as needed.

“As we implement the strategy, we’re also tackling corruption, the single greatest roadblock to progress,” Dunford said.

The military objectives are clear and achievable, the general said. This, he added, should “defeat ISIS and al-Qaida in Afghanistan and ensure other terrorist groups are unable to launch attacks against the homeland, U.S. citizens or our allies; further develop Afghan forces that are capable of managing residual violence with limited international support; support President Ghani’s effort to secure key population and economic centers; and provide an enduring counterterrorism partnership with Afghanistan to protect our shared interests in South Asia.”

This is aimed at showing the Taliban that the Afghan government has partners who are committed to the effort for the long run, the chairman explained. The enemy needs to understand they cannot win a battlefield victory, he added, and that it is in their best interests to join the Afghan government in building a new nation.

Croatian Island Airport Becomes Pentagon Hub – Analysis

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A small airport on a Croatian island has become an important but unofficial logistical base for Pentagon shipments to the Middle East, likely including arms for Syrian rebels.

By Ivan Angelovski, Lawrence Marzouk and Jelena Cosic

Low-cost airlines packed with sun-seekers are the norm for Rijeka airport on the Croatian island of Krk.

But since April, they have been sharing a runway with vast cargo planes carrying munitions and unidentified military supplies for the Pentagon’s wars in the Middle East, the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network has discovered.

Reporters have identified 14 cargo flights in the past six months carrying, or probably carrying, Eastern Bloc-style weapons and ammunition for the US military.

Air traffic control at Rijeka declined to comment on the planes’ cargo, but admitted that there had been “many more” of these types of flights this year.

The upsurge appears to be the result of the Pentagon’s decision to switch its arms supply-line route to Syria away from Germany.

Since April, ten flights have been operated by Pentagon-commissioned air carriers between Rijeka and the US’s airbase in Qatar, Al Udeid Air Base, with the last taking off on September 25.

Each used a specific call-sign, ‘CMB’, given to cargo flights chartered by the Pentagon . Before landing in Rijeka, the planes used a commercial flight number, indicating that the military cargo was picked up in Croatia.

Evidence collected by BIRN suggests the cargo is likely to have been former Eastern Bloc countries’ arms destined for the Middle East.

Qatar has not been named as an official hub for the Pentagon’s programme of arming anti-ISIS fighters, but is listed as the headquarters for US air operations for Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.

Flight records also show that Pentagon-commissioned cargo planes regularly transport military supplies between Qatar and Kuwait, one of the depots for weapons destined for Syrian rebels.

In June and July, another four flights to Rijeka were carried out by the Azerbaijan airlines Silk Way, which runs a fleet of giant, Russian-built Ilyushin-76 aircraft.

Leaked documents from the cargo carrier reveal that these aircraft delivered ammunition for Soviet-style weapons from Azerbaijan to the Croatian coast on behalf of the Pentagon’s Special Operations Command, SOCOM.

These files reveal that $16million of Bulgarian ammunition destined for Pentagon-backed forces in Syria and Iraq was due to be routed through Germany but later this was changed to Croatia.
These files reveal that $16million of Bulgarian ammunition destined for Pentagon-backed forces in Syria and Iraq was due to be routed through Germany but later this was changed to Croatia.

SOCOM, a secretive branch of the US military, buys equipment for anti-ISIS rebels in Syria, as well as other sensitive partners. It is a key player in funnelling up to $2.2 billion of arms to Syrian fighters from former Eastern Bloc countries.

Rijeka’s transformation into a hub for military flights came after the US stopped supplying former Eastern Bloc arms to Syria through military bases in Germany.

As BIRN previously reported, leaked emails obtained by reporters reveal that in December 2016, the Pentagon ordered its contractors working on the supply-line to stop trucking weapons to US army bases in Germany because Berlin had become “very sensitive” about the deliveries.

The Pentagon has refused to confirm that its contractors used Germany for the transfer of military equipment to Syria.

But information published by the Federal Procurement Data System, an online library of US official spending, provides further evidence that the Pentagon did use German bases, as well as proof that weapons to Syria were shipped through Croatia.

According to the document, which was found in the online library by BIRN’s reporters, the Pentagon ordered nearly $16 million of Bulgarian ammunition for Iraq and Syrian fighters in September 2016.

In April 2017, this order was amended to reveal that the delivery point, which had not previously been disclosed, had been switched from Germany to Croatia.

The arrival of the cargo flights on the Croatian island of Krk also coincides with the first Pentagon contract in a decade with Alan Agency, the Croatian state-owned arms broker. The Pentagon signed a deal worth up to $12.4 million for former Eastern Bloc weapons in April.


When asked by BIRN about the final destination of these weapons, Alan Agency rejected any suggestion of impropriety.

“We strongly deny all conclusions and assumptions from your messages,” the agency said.

The Croatian government and the Pentagon did not respond to requests for a comment on Rijeka’s use as a hub for military flights. (Croatia’s ministry of defence and foreign affairs and aviation authority did not respond, while the Ministry of Trade said the information was confidential.)

Damir Ruzic, the head of air traffic at Rijeka airport, said: “There are reasons why those planes are coming here. Rijeka airport is not the one who is dragging them here.”

Ruzic added that he had not received any complaints about the increase in large cargo flights.

But Almira Brtan, who rents out holiday apartments near the airport, described how some of her guests thought that “a war is starting” when the cargo planes, such as the giant Ilyushin-76, flew overhead.

“They jump around so we need to calm them down and explain that those are airplanes,” Brtan said.

“People on the beach get up from the towels to see what is happening as it looks like planes are about to land on their heads. Local people react to those big ones now as they are really noisy,” she added.

A public prosecutor in Germany has announced that he will carry out a preliminary investigation into whether the Pentagon broke the law by sending weapons to Syrian rebels through its German airbases without the correct documentation.

The move follows the publication of an investigation by the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project and Süddeutsche Zeitung in September.

German law, based on the EU’s common position on arms exports, dictates that licences to transport weapons must be accompanied by end user certificates which state the final destination of the shipment and who will be using the equipment.

BIRN asked officials in Zagreb why Croatia was willing to accept Syria-bound weapons that the Germans had refused, despite the fact both capitals followed the same EU-wide regulations, but received no answer.

It is not the first time that Zagreb has proved a useful partner to the US efforts in Syria. Croatia was among the first countries to supply weapons to anti-Assad rebels as part of a CIA-led, Saudi-funded pipeline.

In the winter of 2012, dozens of cargo planes, loaded with Saudi-purchased Yugoslav-era weapons and ammunition, began leaving Zagreb for Jordan. Soon after, the first footage emerged of Croatian weapons in use on Syrian battlefield.

Read all the documents used in the investigation at BIRN’s online library BIRN Source.

This investigation is produced by BIRN as a part of Paper Trail to Better Governance project.

 

Ron Paul: What Did Washington Achieve In Its Six Year War On Syria? – OpEd

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Now that the defeat of ISIS in Syria appears imminent, with the Syrian army clearing out some of the last ISIS strongholds in the east, Washington’s interventionists are searching for new excuses to maintain the illegal US military presence in the country. Their original rationale for intervention has long been exposed as another lie.

Remember that President Obama initially involved the US military in Iraq and Syria to “prevent genocide” of the Yazidis and promised the operation would not drift into US “boots on the ground.” That was three years ago and the US military became steadily more involved while Congress continued to dodge its Constitutional obligations. The US even built military bases in Syria despite having no permission to do so! Imagine if Syria started building military bases here in the US against our wishes.

After six years of war the Syrian government has nearly defeated ISIS and al-Qaeda and the US-backed “moderates” turned out to be either Islamist extremists or Kurdish soldiers for hire. According to a recent report, the US has shipped two billion dollars worth of weapons to fighters in Syria via eastern Europe. Much of these weapons ended up in the hands of ISIS directly, or indirectly through “moderates” taking their weapons with them while joining ISIS or al-Qaeda.

“Assad must go,” proclaimed President Obama back in 2011, as he claimed that the Syrian leader was committing genocide against his own people and that regime change was the only way to save Syrians. Then earlier this year, when eastern Aleppo was about to be liberated by the Syrian government, the neocons warned that Assad would move in and kill all the inhabitants. They warned that the population of eastern Aleppo would flee from the Syrian army. But something very different happened. According to the UN’s International Organization for Migration, 600,000 refugees returned to Syria by August. Half of the returnees went back to Aleppo, where we were told Assad was waiting to kill them.

What happened? The neocons and “humanitarian interventionists” lied. Just as they lied about Libya, Iraq, and so on.

While it was mostly ignored by the mainstream media, just this week a Christian was elected speaker of the Syrian parliament. The new speaker is a 58-year-old Orthodox Christian law graduate and member of President Assad’s Baath party.

How many Christians does our “ally” Saudi Arabia have in its parliament? Oh I forgot, Saudi Arabia has no elected parliament.

Why does it seem that US policy in the Middle East always hurts Christians the most? In Iraq, Christians suffered disproportionately from the 2003 US invasion. In fact there are hardly any Christians left. Why aren’t more US Christian groups demanding that the US get out of the Middle East?

The US is not about to leave on its own. With ISIS all but defeated in Syria, many in Washington are calling for the US military to continue its illegal occupation of parts of the country to protect against Iranian influence! Of course before the US military actions in Iraq and Syria there was far less Iranian influence in the region! So US foreign interventionism is producing new problems that can only be solved by more US interventionism? The military industrial complex could not have dreamed of a better scheme to rob the American people while enriching themselves!

What have we achieved in Syria? Nothing good.

This article was published by RonPaul Institute.

How Social Media Spurred Burma’s Latest Violence – OpEd

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By Alan Davis*

While religious nationalists in Myanmar have proved highly adept at understanding and exploiting the power of social media, they seem oblivious to Newton’s Third Law of Motion. The principle that for every action there is a reaction may not be well known to a group that ranks astrology above science or logic.

On my first visit to what was then Burma in 1991, the local currency was only printed in 18, 45 and 90 kyat notes on the basis that the government judged any multiple of nine to be “lucky”.

The universities were closed, students were jailed and the country’s entire education system was in a pitiful state – as was pretty much everything else. On the road from the airport into what was then Rangoon, huge red billboards in both Burmese and English warned visitors to “Love the Motherland” and threatened “Anyone who is Unruly is the Enemy.”

The country was very much a backwater forced into isolation by its own military leaders. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was widely unknown outside of Burma, despite having just won the Nobel Peace Prize. The road to her house on University Avenue was blocked off and soldiers would hiss warningly at anybody foolish enough to approach them.

Those big red billboards have long gone and hundreds of others have gone up in their place warmly welcoming today’s tourists with adverts for luxury cars and international consumer brands.

What visitors on the road into town will not see, however, are the many smaller noticeboards that have sprung up with increasingly frequency across the country. These are written in Burmese only, often use the colourful Buddhist flag as a background – and declare that particular village or township to be “Muslim Free.”

As part of IWPR’s two-year anti-hate speech project in Myanmar that ran until this July, we documented and reported the increasing incidence of these signs. Many of them further clarified that “Muslim Free” meant that Muslims were not allowed to stay the night, nor own any property there. Some went up at riverboat stations, denying Muslims access.

We asked the authorities if they knew who had put these signs up, and why they weren’t being removed. We never got a satisfactory answer.

IWPR also found photos of these signs on Facebook, being shared and applauded by users who urged their own communities to take note and follow suit. Incendiary comments and ethnic slurs were typical. Muslims were described as dogs and vermin who had no place in the country and were threatening the state’s very existence.

We called this out for what it was – a move toward apartheid. But reports of these signs never made it into the local media. Rising Islamophobia made it physically dangerous for any local journalist to report on or visit such sites – and their story might not have been published anyway.

Without doubt, Myanmar’s journalism has become much better since 2012, when poor quality and inflammatory reporting worsened inter-communal riots that broke out in Rakhine state. The international media training community stepped in and the professionalism of local journalism notably improved.

But while traditional media is no longer part of the problem, it has yet to become part of the solution. With one or two notable exceptions, it simply sidesteps the issue of race-relations –especially where Muslims are concerned.

To be fair, local journalism simply reflects political trends in Myanmar over the past few years. There has not only been a political vacuum in terms of moral leadership, but also a move to marginalise the Muslim community in general and the Rohingya in particular.

The race and religion laws brought in to restrict the right of Muslims to marry or have children with Buddhists and Suu Kyi’s stubborn ambiguity on the Rohingya have led many to believe the coalition government led by her National League for Democratcy (NLD) is increasingly in thrall to an ultra-nationalist agenda.

My own disillusionment came in 2014 on the day of the Yangon launch of the Suu Kyi Foundation, when the actress Michelle Yeo, who played her in the 2011 hagiographic film The Lady, joined her on stage. A Bangladeshi journalist tried to ask the final question at the press conference but was very rudely, sharply – and loudly – dismissed by the Nobel laureate, who then turned, beaming, to the CNN representative.

The lady as portrayed in the film would have done no such thing.

This deepening sense of unease about Suu Kyi’s moral compass was worsened by her delayed response to the assassination of the NLD’s top lawyer and constitutional adviser Ko Ni on January 29 this year. He also happened to be a Muslim, and was saddened that the NLD were unable to field a single Muslim candidate for the 2015 General Elections.

It was almost a week before Suu Kyi got in touch with his widow or spoke out about the killing.

Over the course of IWPR’s two-year Myanmar project, our team comprised more than a dozen local monitors and editors whose job it was to scan, assess, qualify and report on hate speech.

All our team, save one, were Buddhists and from the majority Bamar ethnic group. And only one of my colleagues felt safe about putting her name to the project. Our office’s location was kept hidden, given the online threats posted against us. Despite this, all of our staff wanted a way to engage public meetings and discussions up and down the country about the dangers of hate speech and what a failure to speak up would do to society. Sadly, we had their safety to think of and a responsibility to protect and do no harm.  Our donors also were most probably correct in urging us to err on the side of caution. Even so, it was a quandary that still hurts.

We found very little hate speech in the printed media – the only exception being newspapers published by the Buddhist MaBaTha Movement which has since been banned, although it has reinvented and renamed itself. The vast majority of hate speech was on social media, particularly Facebook.  And to be clear, the situation was never simple: IWPR’s monitoring found a great deal of ultra-nationalist vitriol aimed at the NLD and at Suu Kyi herself: she was even called a “kalar-Indian lover” simply for the time she wore her shawl over her shoulder.

But while not all hate speech was anti-Muslim or anti-Rohingya, the overwhelming majority certainly was. Much was juvenile and just plain nasty, while a good deal was insidious and seemed to be increasingly organised. A lot of it was also smart and it was clear a great deal of time and energy had gone into some of the postings.

Over time, we saw the hate speech becoming more targeted and militaristic. Wild allegations spread, including claims of Islamic State (IS) flags flying over mosques in Yangon where munitions were being stored, of thwarted plots to blow up the 2,500 year-old Shwedagon Pagoda in Yangon and supposed cases of Islamic agents smuggling themselves across the border.

At the same time we noted, in comment pieces and project reports, that we felt a clear sense that in the absence of any kind of political leadership that a darkening and deepening vacuum that would ultimately result in a violent reckoning.

After every IS or IS-inspired terrorist attack in Paris, London and elsewhere, the hate speech in Myanmar increased. Bombings overseas served to amplify simple disputes and arguments between people of different faiths.  Just a few months ago, we reported how a mob of nationalists stormed through an enclave in Yangon where it was reported several illegal “Bengalis” – code for Rohingya – were hiding.

Most importantly, we warned that rumours and lies peddled and left unchecked might end up creating their own reality. We feared that the fake news of plots and insurgencies would end up coming true.

And that is what is now happening. A group of insurgents calling itself the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Front (ARSF) has attacked government positions, eliciting a brutal army response. Now finally it is not just philanthropist George Soros and the Human Rights Clinic at Yale Law School who are claiming a genocide is taking place. Today, senior representatives at the UN are alleging ethnic cleansing, too.

In the past few days, from Turkey to Afghanistan and Indonesia, Saudi Arabia to Malaysia and beyond, we are seeing demonstrations for jihad in support of the Rohingya. And social media is now finally mobilising against the Buddhist nationalists.  Newton’s Third Law is in full swing.

There are far fewer Buddhist nationalists in Myanmar than there are connected, energised and angry Muslims around the world. And Myanmar is increasingly facing mounting anger inside the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) where countries long practised a policy of non- interference in each others’ affairs.

This is now changing – and Myanmar faces being weakened both internationally and domestically. The ultra-nationalist Buddhists did not see this coming, or perhaps they did and this is somehow part of an even bigger and outlandish plan and an attempt to cleanse the Union and ‘save’ the Bamar race. In the end, everybody loses, just as they always do in instances of hate speech.

Lest we forget, the country is made up of around 135 different nationalities – 136 if you count the Rohingya, which many do not – living in often uneasy co-existence. It is not quite Yugoslavia, but it might end up being so unless much wiser heads prevail.   Now more than ever, Myanmar and the international community needs a political leadership and moral vision to prevent the situation deteriorating rapidly.

Suu Kyi spent many decades amassing her moral capital. She had better start spending it fast, or else risk going down in history as the leader who oversaw a break-up of her father’s beloved Union. International support and goodwill has largely helped keep the country together in the absence of an all-powerful and merciless military junta – and being neither one thing nor the other, the fragile country might easily start coming apart. Without either power or morality, Myanmar will be lost.

*Alan Davis is Asia & Eurasia Director for the Institute for War & Peace Reporting. Previously he was an award-winning journalist covering Asia and the former Yugoslavia. This article was published by IWPR.

Spain: Catalan Leader Puigdemont To Declare Independence In ‘Matter Of Days’

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(RFE/RL) — The leader of Catalonia says the region will declare independence “in a matter of days,” a move certain to ratchet up already high tensions with the national authorities in Madrid.

Secessionist leader Carles Puigdemont told the BBC on October 3 that his government would “act at the end of this week or the beginning of next,” as protests in the prosperous region in favor of independence mounted.

Puigdemont warned that if the Spanish government attempted to intervene and take control of Catalonia’s government, it would be “an error which changes everything.”

Catalan authorities said that about 90 percent of the 2.26 million people who participated in an independence referendum on October 1 voted in favor of a split from Spain. Officials said turnout was about 42 percent of the region’s 5.34 million registered voters.

Before the vote, polls indicated that a minority of around 40 percent of the region’s total 7.5 million Catalans supported independence, but many opposed to the referendum did not participate.

Spain’s constitutional court had ruled the referendum illegal and Spanish police moved to block polling stations on the day of voting, with some 900 people reportedly injured in battles with law-enforcement officials.

Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy called the vote a “mockery” of democracy, and the European Commission expressed support for Madrid’s position before the referendum.

In an October 3 televised address, Spanish King Felipe VI accused the secessionist leaders of contravening democratic principles and dividing Catalan society.

In a rare intervention by the monarch, Felipe said the “irresponsible behavior” of the Catalan leaders had undermined social harmony in the region. “Today, Catalan society is fractured and in conflict,” he said.

Striking workers and hundreds of thousands of protesters took to the streets of Barcelona and other Catalan towns on October 3 to protest police violence, blocking traffic and public transport and disrupting businesses.

Autonomous Catalonia is Spain’s richest region and has a separate language and culture. It has been a part of Spain since the 15th century but has a long history of separatist sentiment.

Large Volcanic Eruptions In Tropics Can Trigger El Niño Events

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Explosive volcanic eruptions in the tropics can lead to El Niño events, those notorious warming periods in the Pacific Ocean with dramatic global impacts on the climate, according to a new study.

Enormous eruptions trigger El Niño events by pumping millions of tons of sulfur dioxide into the stratosphere, which form a sulfuric acid cloud, reflecting solar radiation and reducing the average global surface temperature, according to the study co-authored by Alan Robock, a distinguished professor in the Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University-New Brunswick.

The study, published online today in Nature Communications, used sophisticated climate model simulations to show that El Niño tends to peak during the year after large volcanic eruptions like the one at Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines in 1991.

“We can’t predict volcanic eruptions, but when the next one happens, we’ll be able to do a much better job predicting the next several seasons, and before Pinatubo we really had no idea,” said Robock, who has a doctorate in meteorology. “All we need is one number – how much sulfur dioxide goes into the stratosphere – and you can measure it with satellites the day after an eruption.”

The El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is nature’s leading mode of periodic climate variability. It features sea surface temperature anomalies in the central and eastern Pacific. ENSO events (consisting of El Niño or La Niña, a cooling period) unfold every three to seven years and usually peak at the end of the calendar year, causing worldwide impacts on the climate by altering atmospheric circulation, the study notes.

Strong El Niño events and wind shear typically suppress the development of hurricanes in the Atlantic Ocean, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration says. But they can also lead to elevated sea levels and potentially damaging cold season nor’easters along the East Coast, among many other impacts.

Sea surface temperature data since 1882 document large El Niño-like patterns following four out of five big eruptions: Santa María (Guatemala) in October 1902, Mount Agung (Indonesia) in March 1963, El Chichón (Mexico) in April 1982 and Pinatubo in June 1991.

The study focused on the Mount Pinatubo eruption because it’s the largest and best-documented tropical one in the modern technology period. It ejected about 20 million tons of sulfur dioxide, Robock said.

Cooling in tropical Africa after volcanic eruptions weakens the West African monsoon, and drives westerly wind anomalies near the equator over the western Pacific, the study says. The anomalies are amplified by air-sea interactions in the Pacific, favoring an El Niño-like response.

Climate model simulations show that Pinatubo-like eruptions tend to shorten La Niñas, lengthen El Niños and lead to unusual warming during neutral periods, the study says.

If there’s a big volcanic eruption tomorrow, Robock said he could make predictions for seasonal temperatures, precipitation and the appearance of El Niño next winter.

“If you’re a farmer and you’re in a part of the world where El Niño or the lack of one determines how much rainfall you will get, you could make plans ahead of time for what crops to grow, based on the prediction for precipitation,” he said.

Tobacco Smokers Could Gain 86 Million Years Of Life If Switch To Vaping

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Up to 6.6 million cigarette smokers will live substantially longer if cigarette smoking is replaced by vaping over a ten-year period, calculates a research team led by investigators from Georgetown Lombardi Cancer Center. In all, cigarette smokers who switch to e-cigarettes could live 86.7 million more years with policies that encourage cigarette smokers to switch completely to e-cigarettes.

Published in the journal Tobacco Control, the first study to model public health outcomes if cigarette smoking was replaced by e-cigarettes “supports a policy strategy that encourages replacing cigarette smoking with vaping to yield substantial life year gains,” says the study’s lead author David Levy, PhD, professor of oncology at Georgetown Lombardi.

For the study, Levy and a team of 10 investigators looked at such variables as harm from e-cigarettes, and amount of youth uptake, and the rate of cessation among others.

Two projections, one described as optimistic and one pessimistic, were made based on different scenarios regarding the relative harms of e-cigarettes compared to cigarettes as well as differences in the timing of smoking initiation, cessation and switching. Both scenarios conclude there still would be considerable premature deaths averted, but also a much larger number of life years saved.

The “pessimistic” scenario finds 1.6 million of these former cigarette smokers will have a combined 20.8 million more years of life, while the “optimistic” scenario calculates 6.6 million nicotine users who switch from cigarettes to e-cigarettes will live 86.7 more life years.

“In addition, there would be tremendous health benefits including reduced disease disability to smokers, reduced pain and suffering, and reduced exposure to second hand smoke,” Levy said. “Even the gloomiest analysis shows a significant gain in years of life if nicotine is obtained from vaping instead of much more deadly amount of toxicants inhaled with cigarette smoke.”

Levy says the findings might help the Surgeon General and the public health community find a solution to their call to end cigarette smoking.

“The 2014 U.S. Surgeon General Report recommended an endgame strategy for the country’s tobacco epidemic, but no additional strategy was laid out other than the current status quo tobacco control policies,” he said.

Those policies include higher cigarette taxes, smoke-free public places, media campaigns, cessation treatment programs and advertising restrictions.

“While those policies have been effective over time — smoking prevalence has decreased markedly over the past 50 years — their impact has been relatively slow,” Levy said.

He points out that the most current and substantial research on the use of vaping shows that use of e-cigarettes can effectively help smokers give up cigarettes.

“Old policies need to be supplemented with policies that encourage substituting e-cigarettes for the far more deadly cigarettes,” Levy said. “Together, these policies as well as regulating the content of cigarettes have the potential to drastically reduce the massive harms from smoking cigarettes.”

Levy added, “FDA Commissioner [Scott] Gottlieb recently outlined a strategy of reducing the nicotine content in cigarettes and a harm reduction approach to e-cigarettes. These approaches are right on track. While we know less about nicotine reduction than the other more traditional policies, the evidence to date indicates that this approach also holds promise, especially if smokers are encouraged to switch to e-cigarettes.”


Freed Indian Priest Uzhunnalil To Receive Mother Teresa Award

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An Indian Catholic priest, who arrived home last week after being freed from 18 months of captivity in Yemen, has been named as this year’s recipient of the Mother Teresa Award for Social Justice.

Salesian Father Thomas Uzhunnalil, will receive the award from the Harmony Foundation, a Mumbai-based group.

Abraham Mathai, founder of the group, told ucanews.com on Oct. 2 that the priest had been chosen as his life exemplifies the theme of this year’s awards.

“Compassion Beyond Borders — a compassionate response to the refugee crisis,” is the theme this year, Mathai said.

Father Uzhunnalil was released on Sept. 28 after 18 months of captivity in Yemen, where a civil war between government forces and Houthi rebels has killed more than 8,500 people since 2015, according to the U.N.

Suspected Islamic terrorists kidnapped the priest in March 2016 during an attack on a home for the elderly operated by Missionaries of Charity nuns in Aden. The militants gunned down 16 people including four nuns. The priest served as chaplain at the home.

Father Uzhunnalil “had the option of leaving Yemen in 2015 but he chose to stay and provide humanitarian aid in the midst of such terror,” Mathai said.

The award recognizes his “dedication and commitment towards working in a place of great danger where his colleagues were murdered in cold blood,” Mathai said.

The Mother Teresa Memorial Awards for Social Justice was introduced in 2005. It is the only award in the world bearing St. Mother Teresa’s name and is endorsed by Sister Mary Prema, the second successor of St. Mother Teresa, who founded the Missionaries of Charity congregation.

Burma: Military Massacres Dozens In Rohingya Village, Says HRW

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The Burmese military summarily executed several dozen Rohingya Muslims in Maung Nu village in Burma’s Rakhine State on August 27, 2017, Human Rights Watch said. Witnesses said that Burmese soldiers had beaten, sexually assaulted, stabbed, and shot villagers who had gathered for safety in a residential compound, two days after Rohingya militants attacked a local security outpost and military base.

Human Rights Watch has not been able to verify estimates of the number of villagers killed. Satellite imagery analyzed by Human Rights Watch shows the near total destruction of the villages of Maung Nu (known locally as Monu Para) and nearby Hpaung Taw Pyin (known locally as Pondu Para). The damage signatures are consistent with fire.

“All the horrors of the Burmese army’s crimes against humanity against the Rohingya are evident in the mass killings in Maung Nu village,” said Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “These atrocities demand more than words from concerned governments; they need concrete responses with consequences.”

On September 28, the United Nations Security Council met to discuss Burma publicly for the first time in eight years, but took no action. Human Rights Watch repeated its call for the council and concerned countries to adopt an arms embargo and individual sanctions, including travel bans and asset freezes, against Burmese military commanders implicated in abuses.

Human Rights Watch spoke with 14 survivors and witnesses from Maung Nu and surrounding villages in the Chin Tha Mar village tract of Buthidaung Township. The witnesses, now refugees in Bangladesh, said that after the militant attacks they feared Burmese military retaliation. Several hundred gathered in a large residential compound in Maung Nu. Several Burmese soldiers entered the compound while others surrounded it. They took several dozen Rohingya men and boys into the courtyard and then shot or stabbed them to death. Others were killed as they tried to flee. The soldiers then loaded the bodies – some witnesses said a hundred or more – into military trucks and took them away.

Attacks by Militants

Over 500,000 Rohingya Muslims have fled to Bangladesh to escape mass atrocities by Burmese security forces. The crackdown followed after militants from the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), on August 25, attacked a military camp and about 30 security force outposts throughout northern Rakhine State. The government reported that the militants killed 11 security force personnel during the attacks.

The militants attacked the headquarters of the Western Command’s Light Infantry Battalion 552 in Taung Bazar, about 10 kilometers north of Maung Nu. The government said that at least 10 militants were killed.

One of the post attacks occurred early that morning close to the market in Hpaung Taw Pyin, just north of Maung Nu, when ARSA militants attacked a checkpoint manned by the Border Guard Police (BGP). Residents living near the market told Human Rights Watch that they were sleeping at home and heard heavy gunfire coming from the area near the BGP checkpoint. They said gunfire continued until about 6 a.m.

Mohammad Usman, a 15-year-old Rohingya, said he was awakened by the heavy gunfire. When their homes caught fire, he and other villagers fled, but it was too dark to see who was shooting. “We ran out of our house to other villages,” he said. “Bullets were falling like rain and people were falling down around me. Suddenly, I felt something hit my arm and then my back. I lost consciousness and I woke up in someone else’s home.” Mohammad said he had been shot in the arm and hit by shrapnel in the back.

The Burmese government reported that over 100 militants took part in that attack using “swords, firearms and bombs,” and that two police officers and two militants were killed. There are numerous reports of serious abuses committed by ARSA militants, though Human Rights Watch has not been able to independently verify those accounts, in part because of the lack of access to northern Rakhine State.

Human Rights Watch could not verify the government’s figures, but witnesses said that after the fighting ceased soldiers from the army camp requisitioned a large private boat onto which they loaded an unknown number of bodies from near the village marketplace. The boat owner, Mohammad Zubair, identified the soldier who seized the boat as Staff Sergeant Baju from an army camp just south of the market occupied by Light Infantry Battalion 564. Zubair said he watched the soldiers load the bodies, some of which he recognized as young Rohingya men from the area.

Killing of Villagers by Soldiers

Witnesses told Human Rights Watch that after the militant attacks, several hundred frightened Rohingya villagers from the surrounding area fled to the compound of Badrudduza and Zahid Hossain, two well-off men in Maung Nu village, seeking safety and shelter. The large property is less than 200 meters from the main road that runs in a north-south direction through Buthidaung Township. Within the compound were a large two-story, mud-walled structure, several smaller buildings, and a large rectangular pond. Most of the men sought shelter upstairs while the women and most of the younger children crowded onto the ground floor. The witnesses said they gathered together hoping there would be safety in numbers.

Witnesses said about two dozen Burmese soldiers arrived at the crowded property late in the morning on August 27. One soldier, identified by many witnesses as Staff Sergeant Baju, led several soldiers into the courtyard and began calling to the people hiding in the house in the Rohingya language. Villagers said Baju had lived at the nearby military base for 15 years and spoke Rohingya. Several overheard Baju trying to convince the men and boys inside the house that they would not be killed if they left the buildings.

Villagers inside the courtyard as well as some who managed to escape and were observing from hillsides overlooking the compound, said that soldiers brought Rohingya men and boys into the courtyard. The soldiers bound their hands behind their back. Then they beat them, stabbed and slashed them with long knives, and shot them.

Abdul Jabar, 60, said the soldiers made the men kneel down as they struck them with the butts of their rifles and kicked them repeatedly before killing them: “[T]hey killed people from the back with machetes and they also fired on them with their guns.”

Mohammad Ayas, 29, said that he managed to hide in the rafters of the house and saw soldiers kill numerous people: “They are slaughtering them just like they are clearing the jungle with their thin, sharp, and long knives.”

Turkey Issues 142 Arrest Warrants For Ministry Staff Allegedly Using By-Lock App

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The Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office in Ankara issued arrest warrants for 121 National Education Ministry personnel and 21 former Ministry of Youth and Sports staff on Tuesday as part of a probe into the Gülen movement.

The suspects have been accused of using the By-Lock mobile app that was allegedly used by Gülen movement members during last year’s deadly defeated coup.

In a statement, the prosecutor’s office said the Ankara-based probe was being conducted throughout eight provinces’ public institutions and organizations.

A total of 116 out of 121 Ministry of National Education staff had already been dismissed for using the By-Lock app, said the statement.

The By-Lock smartphone app is believed to have been cracked by Turkish security agencies, allowing them to identify tens of thousands of suspected Gülen movement supporters.

Turkey accuses the Gülen movement and its U.S.-based leader Fetullah Gulen of having orchestrated the defeated coup of July 15, 2016, which left 250 people killed and nearly 2,200 injured.

Ankara also accuses the Gülen movement of being behind a long-running campaign to overthrow the state through the infiltration of Turkish institutions, particularly the military, police, and judiciary.

Original source

Moscow Patriarchate’s Failures Have Opened Way For Orthodox Radicalism – OpEd

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Many Russians believe that the controversy around “Mathilda” explains why Orthodox radicalism is on the rise, Sergey Chapnin says; but in fact the reasons for that are far deeper and when the clashes over the film quiet down, the faithful will have to confront serious questions about “which empire and which Orthodoxy we are heirs to.”

In an address to the Predaniye Foundation last week that has been written up by Svetlana Solodovnik of Yezhednevny zhurnal now, the commentator argues that there are many reasons why individual Orthodox radicals have emerged, and they all reflect basic failures of the Moscow Patriarchate (ej.ru/?a=note&id=31631).

These failures in turn are a product of the fears of the church leadership that if it takes a clear decision on any one of a number of issues, it will be confronted by large protests from the many who will disagree with it. And it has thus tried to be all things to all people, a stance that in the end has infuriated almost everyone.

First of all, Chapnin says, “it has turned out that the Russian Orthodox Church cannot say anything articulate on the occasion of the centenary of the two revolutions,” even though the one allowed the Patriarchate to reemerge and the other brought the church untold suffering.

Second, “it hasn’t been able to find a format for recognition of the genuineness of the tsarist remains. In the church, there were and are opponents of recognition, this group is quite large, and the church hierarchs do not want to take the risk.

And third, the Moscow Patriarchate “hasn’t been able to find a mechanism for the transfer of St. Isaac’s Cathedral,” in large measure because whatever it does, it is going to continue to face large crowds of protesters in the streets.

The church has taken the same stance during the Mathilda controversy, Chapnin says. It has said that “force isn’t Christian, but somehow no one condemns the specific use of force which is taking place here and now,” lest it offend one group of Russians or another.

As a result, he argues, “the state and the official church are losing their monopoly on symbolic capital,” and individual radicals “who aren’t meeting the necessary resistance” are coming to the fore. And this of course is “the result of church construction … which has cultivated a kind of Christianity without Christ.”

“Over the last 10 to 15 years, the Russian church just like the state has been mainly occupied with searchers for a post-Soviet identity. The state quite quickly … chose as its goals the restoration of the empire.” And not surprisingly, given the church’s links with the state, it followed allow.

“The empire is now considered by many Orthodox as something sacred.” But the problem is which empire, tsarist, Soviet or post-Soviet? In large measure because of the way the state has proceeded, Chapnin says, the church has been forced to go a long way toward “Soviet imperial consciousness.”

That of course is what the fight over Mathilda is all about, but even once that film recedes from public view, the church and its followers are going to have to come to a decision on whether they support an Orthodox empire or a Soviet one and whether they support only an Orthodox emperor or any emperor altogether.

Some have drifted in the latter direction but “happily” not everyone. Another speaker at the meeting Chapnin addressed suggested that “the less free from the state the church is, the more this logic will be considered and the more will appear individual radicals.” That isn’t a necessary result but rather one made likely and more disturbing by the decisions of the hierarchy.

Crime Of Destroying London’s Social Housing: Significance (Or Not) Of Jeremy Corbyn’s Response – OpEd

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A great crime is taking place in London — the destruction of social housing estates by councils, who, squeezed of cash by central government, and, for decades, prevented from spending money on social housing, have entered into deals with private developers, in which housing — primarily estates — that the councils claim they have no money to refurbish are demolished, and replaced by new developments that offer huge profits for the developers, but that provide no social housing, or a risibly small amount.

In recent years, the purely private developers have been joined by housing associations, the preferred choice of governments, since the time of Margaret Thatcher, for managing social housing. However, with their central funding completely cut by the Tories since 2010, they have also been obliged to embark upon more and more developments featuring a large component of private housing to subsidise their properties for rent.

A further complication is that, in one of the most cynically breathtaking acts of spin in modern British history, the social housing provided is generally what is officially termed “affordable,” but which, in reality, is not affordable at all for most Londoners. Boris Johnson, during his eight destructive years as London’s Mayor, set “affordable” rents at 80% of market rents, and in most of London — if not all — market rents are so out of control that those on the median income in London (the level at which 50% of workers earn more, and 50% earn less) are paying up to 70% of their wages on rent, when the acceptable model — in pre-Thatcher days — used to be that no one should pay more than a third of their income, just as, before the insane bubble that has more or less existed since New Labour took office in 1997, the acceptable cost of a house was no more than three and a half times a worker’s income.

Figures are hard to ascertain, but the median annual income seems to be around £21,000 a year, while average monthly rents are £1,564, and when it comes to buying, of course, even three and a half times the London average income, which seems to be around £37,000 (in other words, around £130,000), wouldn’t even buy a one-bed flat in one of the least desirable and far-flung corners of outer London.

In order to get away with the destruction of people’s homes, councils lie and cheat to get tenants and leaseholders to vote for their own dispossession, and if the results should go against them, they either completely ignore the result, or, it has been suggested in some cases, rejig the figures to give them the desired result. And in almost every case of “regeneration”, a pattern is depressingly clear — the destruction of estates involves wholesale social cleaning. Tenants are scattered to the winds, never to return, and so too are leaseholders — those who bought into Thatcher’s great ‘Right to Buy’ scam — whose faith in home-owning is betrayed when councils compulsorily purchase their homes for far less than the market value, obliging them too to move out of the area.

In a further condemnation of the “regeneration” scandal, a revolving door exists between the council and the developers. With eye-wateringly large profits up for grabs, an entire culture of greedy companies, consultants and lobbyists has sprung up, with everyone schmoozing at international trade fairs and conferences, where plans for the destruction of estates are firmed up, and where properties are sold off-plan (before they’re even built) to foreign investors. As a reward for their dedication to the lies and spin required to make immense profits from making their own constituents homeless, numerous councillors are then given lucrative jobs with the developers for whom they have enabled vast profits to be made.

Perhaps most shockingly, for those who believe that the sole repository of evil in British society is the Conservative Party, most of the social cleansing in London is actually being undertaken by Labour councils — in Southwark, Lambeth, Hackney and Haringey, to name just four of the worst culprits. There is, in some quarters, ferocious denial about this, but it is absolutely true, as the entirely commendable pressure group Architects For Social Housing never tires of demonstrating, and partisan politics are ultimately self-defeating when looking at the scope of the “regeneration” scam, to which, to the best of my knowledge, no council in London is immune.

Without a serious change of mentality, in central government and at council level, it is unlikely that the current toxic mix of lies, spin, social cleansing and colossal profiteering can be stopped, but if it is not, it is not unrealistic to foresee a million Londoners driven out of the capital over the next ten to 15 years.

Oh, Jeremy Corbyn?

In response, last week, Jeremy Corbyn — who, since he became leader of the Labour Party two years ago, has refused to say anything about his own party’s massive complicity in the modern equivalent of the clearances — finally broached the social cleansing scandal in his speech to the Labour Party conference, to giddy enthusiasm from the left-wing media. In the Guardian, for example, Aditya Chakrabortty and Dawn Foster, who both have a proven track record of supporting social housing and opposing the rigged, predatory nature of the housing bubble and the attendant dispossession of the poor, turned in articles that spoke glowingly of Jeremy Corbyn’s position.

Jeremy Corbyn has declared war on Labour councils over housing’, Chakrabortty wrote, while Foster filed ‘Jeremy Corbyn’s bold pledges will halt social cleansing of estates.’

Chakrabortty’s article included a thoroughly commendable analysis of the current unacceptable position regarding the destruction of social housing, noting “a wearily familar pattern”, in which “[f]amilies are booted out of their homes, the bulldozers tear down publicly owned property, and on the ruins are erected hundreds of expensive flats and a risible number of ‘affordable’ homes. The developer makes their mark-up, the council gets some loose change, and the Evening Standard has something to fill its property pages. Everyone’s a winner – apart from those now deemed too poor to live in their former homes.”

However, while Chakrabortty is correct to note that this was “a Labour leader making the strongest commitment to social housing in over three decades,” in which he “moved Labour policy forward by miles” with a speech that attacked the corrupt regeneration industry, and proposed “[r]ent controls in cities, a tax on landbanking by big developers, and forcing slumlords to bring their homes up to scratch,” the big question mark, which Chakrabortty doesn’t fully address, is the extent to which Corbyn’s speech means that, on “regeneration”, he is “effectively going to war with some of the most powerful Labour councils,” who, “[f]or decades … especially in London, have invited in big developers to ‘regenerate’ public housing estates,” a process that, he notes, the academic Paul Watt calls state-led gentrification.

To be sure, as Chakrabortty states, “many Labour council leaders in the audience must have had a start” when Corbyn began, “After Grenfell we must think again about what are called regeneration schemes”, and he is right to point out that this applies to estates including “the giant Aylesbury estate in Southwark, Cressingham Gardens in Lambeth, Love Lane in Haringey, and the Ferrier in Greenwich,” as well as “the giant Woodberry Down estate in Hackney”, about which, in 2014, he and Sophie Robinson-Tillett produced a powerful report.

The list, as he also notes, goes “on and on”, and it is particularly heartening that he links to the work of ASH, who, as he describes it, have ”identified 195 council estates in the 21 Labour-run London boroughs that have been through this process, are going through it, or are faced with it.”

As Corbyn stated in his speech, the result of these schemes is “forced gentrification and social cleansing, as private developers move in and tenants and leaseholders are moved out.”

However, as Chakrabortty notes, “He could have added: as tenants and leaseholders of Labour councils are turfed out by the party many of them have voted for all their lives.” The reality, however, is that he didn’t, so while his words sounded all the right notes, how much will is there to follow through on them, if it means tackling corrupt council after corrupt council in boroughs controlled by Labour? How, as I mentioned above, will there be “a serious change of mentality” to stop “the current toxic mix of lies, spin, social cleansing and colossal profiteering”?

As Chakrabortty describes it, Corbyn has promised that, “if elected to government, he will compel councils to ballot all tenants and leaseholders before any regeneration”, and he has also promised that “all tenants on a redeveloped site will be entitled to move back to the same estate, on the same terms and conditions.” As Corbyn himself described it, “No social cleansing, no jacking up rents, no exorbitant ground rents.”

This is significant, as rigged votes and lies about the right to return and affordability are central to the regeneration process, but how will they become reality in a party in which, as Chakrabortty concedes, “[h]is remarks are almost certainly miles from the estate-renewal scheme” that Sadiq Khan, London’s Mayor, “is drawing up in London’s City Hall”?

Chakrabortty proceeds to explain how, in Haringey, the Labour leadership “is pushing ahead with a plan to shunt housing estates, school buildings, libraries and other public property into a £2bn private fund – despite the opposition of local Labour MPs, the local trade unions, constituency parties and even many Labour councillors”, a process (the Haringey Development Vehicle) that takes social cleansing to a new and alarming level, and which I wrote about here, and which my band The Four Fathers supported at a benefit gig last weekend.

The plan, as he adds, “has sent the local Labour movement into a bitter civil war.” but although Corbyn, as he describes it, “has effectively taken sides in that war – and it is against council leader Claire Kober,” what does that mean when Haringey immediately, and imperiously, responded that, as councillor Alan Strickland, who holds the housing and regeneration brief, put it, “We will continue to put comprehensive and meaningful engagement with residents at the heart of our regeneration plans, but we do not expect to start using yes/no ballots.” As the Guardian explained, Haringey “cited guidance” from Sadiq Khan, which warned that ballots “can risk turning a complex set of issues that affects different people in different ways over many years into a simple yes/no decision at a single point in time.”

All of this wheedling sounds to me like nothing more than a cheap effort at a conjuring trick, a sleight of hand to distract from the reality that, for many tenants, the only outcome they want to is to be able to say no to regeneration, and to insist that, unless there are fundamental structural problems with their homes, which, in many cases, there are not, the only just response to properties needing care and attention is refurbishment.

This is a process that ASH not only defends, but has also drawn up plans for in relation to a number of threatened estates. As housing experts who assess the situation objectively repeatedly point out, refurbishment is far cheaper than demolition, and, of course, it also shows a fundamental respect for tenants and leaseholders that, for the most part, is anathema to councils and developers, who, whatever they might say, are actually motivated almost entirely be greed — and, often, by both racism and a contempt for the working class.

At the same time that Haringey responded, so too did Southwark’s head of housing Mark Williams, who alleged that opponents of Southwark’s social cleansing “had wrongly claimed many tenants were being forced out of the area, when 95% of those who had moved still lived in the borough.” Research by dedicated and incredibly hard-working campaigners in Southwark, including 35 Percent and Southwark Notes, demonstrate, however, that this is patently untrue.

In its article on Haringey’s opposition to Jeremy Corbyn’s proposals, the Guardian also noted that “Corbyn’s plans do, however, tap into longstanding public opposition to some of the schemes”, like Cressingham Gardens in Lambeth, a charming little estate unfortunate enough to overlook Brockwell Park, whose residents “have fought a long battle against the council’s plans to demolish what they say is a vibrant community.” Jo Parkes, one of the campaigners, told the Guardian that, “after Lambeth declined to ballot residents on its plans, her group did, and found 86% of households opposed them, with a 72% response rate.” She added that “she believed campaigns such as the Cressingham one had helped push Corbyn into action”, in the Guardian’s words.

As she said, “Absolutely. We’ve been talking about it for some time, and it had been a bit disappointing that Corbyn was silent on this before now. You can understand that as a politician he didn’t want to wind up his Labour councils, but now it seems the grassroots within the party are influencing policy, and he’s got to put his money where his mouth is.”

Architects for Social Housing – and the latest sad news from Lewisham

While we wait to see what develops, I recommend those interested in further reading on this topic to read the detailed analysis of Corbyn’s speech by Simon Elmer of ASH. Simon is very skeptical about how, if at all, Corbyn’s fine words might be implemented, concluding, instead, that the Labour Party has no intention of changing its policy on estate regeneration. As he puts it, “Claire Kober is lying in Haringey town hall; Lib Peck is lying in her new £104 million Lambeth town hall; Philip Glanville is lying in Hackney town hall; John Biggs is lying in Tower Hamlets town hall; Peter John is definitely lying – over and over again – in Southwark town hall; Steve Bullock is lying in Lewisham town hall; Robin Wales is lying in Newham town hall; Sadiq Khan is lying in City Hall; John Healey is lying in the Houses of Parliament; and Jeremy Corbyn – yes, even Labour’s saintly Leader – is lying at this conference about estate regeneration. But then the entire Labour Party is lying – to residents, to constituents, to its own supporters.”

Ironically, as I mentioned on Facebook and Twitter, and as Simon Elmer also noted in his article, “On the same day that Corbyn made his speech to his adoring audience in Brighton, back in London Lewisham Labour council announced the demolition of Reginald House and the Old Tidemill Wildlife Garden in Deptford.” Campaigners have fought for years to save the community garden, but the council has never lost its enthusiasm for cleansing this part of Deptford. Its original plans involved the demolition of a number of social housing blocks, but although those plans were scaled back, that won’t be very reassuring to the residents of 2-30a Reginald Road, who never asked to have their homes demolished.

Lewisham Council has just postponed until October 25 another social cleansing decision that was meant to be taking place next week, regarding the proposed demolition of an estate in New Cross, Achilles Street, which has the misfortune, like Cressingham Gardens, to overlook a park — a location beloved by developers as much as lakeside and riverside sites are.

In his article, Simon Elmer proceeded to state, in a withering analysis of the Labour Party’s collective betrayal of the people it is supposed to represent that I’m happy to co-opt as a conclusion for this article, that “Corbyn’s promises are too late for them [the residents of Reginald Road in Deptford]. There are well over 150 London estates threatened with regeneration by Labour councils alone. Even if Corbyn is elected Prime Minister in five years’ time, it will be too late for them too. Until the Labour Leader gets off his soap box, stops grinning at that ridiculous and facile song sung by middle class idiots who do not live in council housing, and calls an immediate stop to every single estate demolition scheme being implemented by a Labour council, we will continue to hold him responsible for leading a political party that will forever be known as the Number One demolisher of working class homes in the history of this country.”

If you care about genuinely affordable housing, and think we need a massive not-for-profit homebuilding programme, then it’s time to get involved. Sitting on the fence, or believing too readily the sweet words of politicians, is not enough. It’s time to stand up and be counted.

Chatbots: Friend Or Fiend? – Analysis

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The world is seeing how Internet technologies can facilitate crime and terrorism for the purposes of victimisation, illicit communication and online radicalisation. As advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) drive the growing adoption of chatbots, it may be a matter of time before threat actors jump on the bandwagon to stay ahead of law enforcement and security agencies.

By Muhammad Faizal bin Abdul Rahman*

Criminals and violent extremists have demonstrated swiftness in adopting new technologies and innovative tactics to outsmart security agencies and widen their reach. Since the 9/11 attacks for instance, extremist groups such as ISIS have been particularly adept in leveraging advances in internet technologies – from early websites to social media to messaging apps – for the purposes of online radicalisation and planning terror attacks.

The next frontier of internet technologies – Chatbots – may shape the future chapter of the criminals’ and terrorists’ playbooks. As advances in AI and Machine Learning (ML) improve the availability and capabilities of Chatbots, the technology may plausibly become a powerful tool for cyber-enabled crimes and online radicalisation.
Building “Human” Connections

Chatbots are projected to surpass Web 2.0 (social media and messaging apps) as digital assistants on smart devices and desktops that mimic conversations to create more engaging interaction experiences for public, commercial and social applications. Indeed, the social chatbot “Mitsuku” – accessible online -upon query describes itself as “a computer programme designed to talk to you”.

Presently, the technology is being explored in numerous industries. Chatbots have been developed by Georgia Institute of Technology as a teaching assistant (Jill Watson) and by the Singapore government to answer public queries (Jamie).

With ML and access to knowledge from a multitude of internet sources and global pool of users, chatbots are envisioned to over time become more human-like by learning from human behaviour and be more succinct in its answers. For instance, the social chatbot “Eugene Goostman” imitated a human teenager online and reportedly fared well in the “Turing test” which judges the indistinguishability of intelligent conversation between machines and humans.

Given the utility, chatbots as a platform for government agencies and businesses to engage with their target audiences, Internet-of-Things (IoT) interface for smart homes, and “virtual friends” would become ubiquitous in the foreseeable future.

“Virtual friendships” that chatbots can potentially offer would be a natural evolution of the current popularity of Web 2.0 particularly among the digital natives; these are currently young people who are inherently accustomed to embracing new technologies to fulfill their practical (e.g. education and communication) and social needs.

The key features of chatbots – human-like and unconstrained by time and space – can help to drive human-machine interactions that would meet the intrinsic social needs for belonging, acceptance and friendship as defined by Maslow. Thus, it is unsurprising that Kaspersky Lab’s blog on “the dangerous future of chatbots” foreshadowed the technology’s ability to learn and influence human behaviour as “a goldmine for social engineering and crime”.

Virtual Threat Agents

Similar to human threat actors, chatbots may be instrumental in criminal and extremist enterprises to build rapport with their respective target audiences for the purposes of victimisation (e.g. phishing and other online scams) and online radicalisation. Indeed, the tactic of using software robots that mimic humans for propagating radical views and garnering support is hardly unprecedented given the reported use of pro-Trump twitter bots during the 2016 US presidential campaign.

Similar to how ISIS demonstrated greater proficiency than Al Qaeda in online radicalisation, the use of chatbots may plausibly be one of the tools that would be integral to what comes after the imminent fall of ISIS. Such chatbots can potentially be programmed with a basic database of extremist narratives and responses to manipulate the psychological vulnerabilities and social grievances of people who are seeking answers and support.

Even without explicit programming, the case of social chatbot Tay unexpectedly sprouting neo-Nazi remarks exemplifies the risk that AI can teach itself – through online conversations – to spread radical propaganda.

Hence, chatbots in the wrong hands and like any technology can facilitate security threats. By functioning as robot extremists spreading radical propaganda, chatbots can support or even supplant online (human) extremists who have been detained by security and intelligence agencies during counterterrorism operations.

Exposing the Wolves

Governments and communities need to begin anticipating the possible risk scenarios that may emanate from the imminent ubiquity of chatbots and plan for strategies to address the risks while the technology is still nascent.

First, security agencies need to collaborate with communities and the industry both in the practical uses of chatbots amid smart cities initiatives and also in developing mechanisms to identify and contain chatbots that may be malicious by design or have gone rogue. This includes deploying chatbots to help counter extremist propaganda coming from malicious chatbots.

Second, existing education on cyber wellness and internet literacy would have to keep pace with technological changes including in promoting the safe use of chatbots and equipping the general population with the knowhow to identify and stay away from malicious chatbots.

Third, security agencies need to develop a framework that helps to decide when certain chatbots should be allowed to remain online for purposes of gathering intelligence on the threat actors and their sponsors, and when a certain threat threshold is crossed thus necessitating the removal of the chatbots.

In sum, the complex challenges that are being faced in confronting contemporary threats facilitated by technology point to the need for a multi-pronged approach in addressing the plausible criminal and terrorist threats that may emanate from the imminent ubiquity of chatbots. This would include a whole of society involvement besides legislative and law enforcement measures.

*Muhammad Faizal bin Abdul Rahman is a Research Fellow with the Homeland Defence Programme and V S Suguna is an Associate Research Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), a unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Time To Ban Automatic Weapons Of Any Kind From High Population Density Areas – OpEd

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Even vociferous supporters of the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, including undersigned, no longer have an argument against an outright and blanket ban of any and all automatic weapons from high-population density areas of the United States of America, any longer after the horrific and inexplicable largest mass shooting in U.S. history in Las Vegas during the month of October 2017.

If one lone nut such as uber-vanilla Steven Paddock can take out thousands of innocent people murdering hundreds in his wake, then something drastic needs to be done, because this will only be the beginning, by terrorists both domestic and foreign.

Conspiracy theorists be damned – because the American people will still be able to own and sell automatic weapons in low density population areas of the United States, thus protecting their much prized “militia” movement to “safeguard their freedoms” from “new world order” types and “globalists” looking to “grab their guns.”

There are mechanisms which could theoretically strike a balance by and between the U.S. Constitution Second Amendment and Public Safety, however, and they need to be explored:

(1) most civilized nations throughout the world have mandatory and perfunctory metal detector apparatus systems at all entry ways into their facilities if they are close to high population density locations within their major cities;

(2) there should no longer be a distinction between “semi- automatic” versus “automatic” and “assault weapons” since these weapons can be easily altered/converted into one or another;

(3) life sentences should be handed down if one is found to be trafficking/selling/in possession of an automatic weapon in high population density areas;

(4) specific federal lawsuit legislation, criminal penalties, and legal causes of action should be enacted by Congress and the Senate against any and all facilities and executives (hotels, stadiums, etc) which have been found to have either housed or enabled sick demented killers like Steven Paddock from storing weapons or launching their mass killings, as well as similar penalties for immediate family members or friends who maybe have been aware of said planning or proclivity, in order to help bankrupt those entities which made it easier for these fiends to commit their crimes – this will undoubtedly help increase private security and reporting mechanisms in order to protect themselves from mass lawsuits, incarceration, and financial ruin;

(5) outright ban on automatic weapons sales at gun shows and other informal marketplaces and venues;

(6) automatic weapon registration with local, state and federal law enforcement agencies in all 50 states, including where automatic weapons possession/sales are banned;

(7) limiting of all automatic weapons sales by U.S. and foreign manufacturers only to the U.S. Military and U.S. Government, including police and federal law enforcement;

(8) increase in automatic weapon detection apparatus and technology to “sniff out” any and all automatic weapons by law enforcement in the midst of any high population density community or population;

(9) new federal legislation against weapons manufacturers and sellers when their weaponry is found to have been used in a mass shooting, similar to the ITAR and AECA rules promulgated by the U.S. State Department punishing anyone (brokers, dealers, sellers, manufacturers) who was linked to weapons falling into the hands of international terrorist “end users,” regardless of whether or not their initial customers were law abiding individuals/entities;

(10) enlist gun rights lobbyists such as the NRA to help create, draft and enact said legislation so that it gets an official “seal of approval” from any potential enemies of these protective mechanisms.

The above are just some of the measures to ensure that no more mass shootings take place in the USA, but that also satisfy gun enthusiasts and proponents of the Second Amendment to help protect and safeguard people in their homes and their freedom from enemies, both foreign and domestic.


Syrian Statelets And Intelligence Games: Al-Sham’s New Mukhabarat – Analysis

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By Carl Anthony Wege*

A novel Alawite-Shi’a security network may be developing in the Assad statelet now defining western Syria. It consists of an archipelago layered with remnants of the Bashar al-Assad-era intelligence organizations along with Iraqi Shi’a and other pro-Assad militias.

They are supported by Iran and Russia who separately struggle to integrate them all under the figurehead of Bashar Assad. This security infrastructure is emerging in the grey zone of conflict but is beginning to consolidate the many armed elements in western Syria opposed to Salafi Jihadism but having only cursory loyalty to Assad.

Bashar Assad’s pre-war regime in Syria was understood less by formal governmental institutions and more by a constellation of favored Alawite and Assad-affiliated families linked by marriage before the 2011 rebellion. The whole of Syria had been organized into a system where certain preferred families could enrich themselves with impunity irrespective of formal Syrian legal norms. The patronage networks created by Hafez and Bashar Assad during this era established a nominal Ba’athist secular modernity to overlay an Alawite dominated kleptocratic and Mukhābarāt state. Historically the intelligence services of Hafez Assad’s regime were built on four core agencies; the Idarat al-Amn al-Siyasi (Political Security Directorate) and Idarat al-Amn al-‘Amm (General Intelligence Directorate) that reported to the President through the Office of National Security of the Ba’ath Party. Additionally the Shu’bat al-Mukhābarāt al-‘Askariyya (General Military Intelligence) reported to the commander of land forces, and Idarat al-Mukhābarāt al-Jawiyya (Air Force Intelligence) reported to the head of the Air Force. These foundational intelligence agencies were ostensibly controlled by a National Security Council (or Bureau) and were supported by derivative agencies in a security network whose primary imperative was protection of the Assad (both Hafez and Bashar’s) dynasty.

These legacy intelligence services were largely unprepared when the winds of the Arab Spring blew into the souks and alleys of Damascus and Syria’s secondary cities. In those cities waited thousands and thousands of unemployed young men having migrated there to escape a devastating drought scorching the already economically marginal steppe lands (Badia) in eastern Syria. Now mobilized by aspirations for democracy and economic reform, the Syrian people began to rise as one. Assad sought to weather the reforming aspirations of his people that were unleashed by the Arab Spring, but as rhetoric turned to war Syria’s complex demography, long subsumed by the Ba’athist Mukhābarāt state, exploded in fratricide.

The Syrian rebellion became militarized by 2012 and the Sunni-dominated Syrian Arab Army (SAA) quickly disintegrated as long-buried sectarian divisions ignited an intercommunal firestorm beneath the political conflagration of Syria’s civil war. As the rebellion wore on Assad quickly lost control of events on the ground. Intervention by both Iran and Hezbollah proved inadequate to smother what by now was a legitimate revolution. Tehran, although willing to use whatever force necessary to preserve the Assad regime and its land bridge to Hezbollah, desired a light military footprint in Syria and resisted large scale deployments. Initially the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Quds Lebanon Corps (then called Department 2000) was tasked by Tehran to restore what the Revolutionary Guard called alignment as the Syrian Rebellion escalated. While never reaching the levels later employed by Russia, Iran did deploy greater and greater numbers of specialized army units, Basiji and Saberin special operators, into the Syrian theater. Nonetheless by 2015 the Syrian Arab Army ceased to exist in any meaningful way, precipitating a grey zone conflict between army remnants, competing militias, and their various foreign sponsors. The eastern regions of Syria devolved into Salafi Jihadi badlands controlled by rival Salafi factions, many of whom were ultimately absorbed into the Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh) which itself is now fracturing under foreign military pressure. Only the massive Russian military incursion beginning in the fall of 2015 prevented the total collapse of what was by then a Russian allied pro-Iranian Statelet in western Syria. Supplementing direct troop deployments, Russian mercenaries fought for Assad directly along with hundreds of additional Russian fighters affiliating with various pro-Assad factions. Concurrently, the fratricide in western Syria became a more byzantine struggle between ethnic and religious groups complicated by massive internal population displacement. Western Syria’s Alawi population, however, remained geographically concentrated in the coastal Latakia Governorate abutting Jabal Nusayriyah. These Alawi generally aligned with the larger Syrian Shi’a and Ismaili communities and remained generally supportive of the regime even though the Latakian Governorate had to absorb thousands of refugees from other parts of the country.

Two loosely organized networks of armed groups were foundational in support for the regime in western Syria. The first and older of the two was the Shabiha, or Ghost Militia derived from the 1980s’ Latakia region mafia-style criminal gangs. The Latakian Shabiha criminal gangs were headed by Assad first cousins Fawaz Assad and Munzer Assad, providing unofficial support for the regime. They had been left to their own devices when the war broke out but were now adapting to the collapse of government authority and affiliating with apolitical gangs, local militias, and faux government entities to expand their presence in western Syria. More significant was the Jaysh al-Shab’bi (People’s Army), which emerged somewhat spontaneously from the Lijan al-Sha’bia (Popular Committees) of armed citizens originally intended for little more than defending local communities from outsiders. Assad later took advantage of these Committees and tried to combine them into the Quwat al-difa al-Watani (National Defense Forces or NDF), initially under the command of General Hawash Mohammed and sporadically affiliating with remnants of the SAA. However, by 2016 the NDF had disintegrated at the national level and their center of gravity in western Syria collapsed as most fighters shifted loyalty to local warlords capable of paying regular salaries.

By 2016 the Syrian civil war ground into a stalemate. Neither Russia nor Iran’s Revolutionary Guard operating through a façade Syrian sovereignty nor the eastern Syrian Salafi Jihadi factions had the strength to rule the whole of the country. Across this Hobbesian landscape, with hundreds of militias dividing, re-dividing, coalescing, and changing names, while controlling small and shifting parcels of territory, the only real focus was on local intelligence collection. Militia and other local actor notables cooperated to aggregate their knowledge of the local social hierarchy and kinship structures to develop intelligence that was essentially ad hoc but useful for local tactical purposes. However, over time, it may become possible for a faux Assad regime centered in the Latakia – Tartus rump statelet to begin to combine the intelligence generated by these local militias with an attendant infrastructure that can both consolidate power in the Alawite heartland and secure the fluid frontiers from Damascus to Aleppo. Consolidating local intelligence collection efforts into any embryonic security archipelago in the wider regions of western Syria presumes a nexus with the remnants of legacy Syrian governmental institutions, including Syrian Air Force Intelligence and the pre-civil war Military Intelligence Directorate along with fragments of the SAA and the NDF. Syrian Air Force Intelligence is the most significant legacy institution surviving into the current era having manifested the greatest organizational discipline. It is the most cohesive remnant of the regime intelligence agencies. Therefore, Air Force Intelligence will likely be the most significant legacy institution in any embryonic security archipelago.

To build a new Mukhābarāt state and such a security archipelago the regime must organize the numerous Shi’a affiliated militia fiefdoms and secular militias of different configurations dotting western Syria into a coherent security architecture stretching across the Damascus -Homs region and to the Lebanese frontier. In constructing such an architecture, a first objective for the Assad regime would be to get control of the streets in the towns and villages and to develop new informant systems on the ground to build a network that could exploit their collection activity. Over time, the regime will need to develop the necessary ability and authority to task such networks and logically aggregate information provided by such networks. Organizationally this must exploit residual NDF intelligence assets and interface with Hezbollah while successfully liaising with the Russian Sluzhba vneshney razvedki (SVR) and intelligence elements of the Revolutionary Guards Intelligence Directorate (Sazeman-e Ettelaat-e Sepah). Any new Mukhābarāt state will require the Assad regime to re-create national intelligence services. Russia may assist in this by resurrecting an analog of their 1970s KGB and GRU roles, but now training Syrian personnel in a wider spectrum of modern intelligence disciplines to include utilizing the strategic depth of virtual spaces for tradecraft models and information operations. Iran’s primary concerns in western Syria have a greater focus on maintaining a land bridge into Lebanon’s Shi’a territories. The role of Iranian intelligence organizations supporting a new Mukhābarāt state is likely a bit more limited. While a separate issue, Iranian and Russian political goals differ in Syria over the long haul and those differences may seed competition between them for influence in the Assad regime’s new security organizations. The challenge for the regime is to organize its intelligence infrastructure in a way that coherently encompasses the whole of the western Syrian space and provides a foundation for later expansion to incorporate the balance of territories defined by Syria’s pre-civil war borders.

Hezbollah’s relations with any post-war Assad regime’s new security organs consolidating along its frontiers would be a bit more complex. Hezbollah’s massive engagement in the Syrian war foreshadows a generation-long commitment between Hezbollah and any emergent Syrian Mukhābarāt. Anticipating such commitments, Hezbollah’s Intelligence Apparatus is now reproducing itself by seeding, with Iranian assistance, intelligence entities within the Iraqi Shi’a militias deployed across western Syria using the Hezbollah model. The geographic interface between the Hezbollah territories and the Assad regime is through the Lebanese ‘Shi’astan’ frontier on the eastern edges of the Anti-Lebanon (Al-Jabal Ash-Sharqī ) mountains running from Zebdani to the Hermel region in the northeast Bekka into the Qalamoun Mountains and Qusayr linking the Orontes River Basin with Damascus, Homs and Tartus in Syria’s Alawite regions. The Qalamoun was already a logistics reserve prior to the war housing Syrian SCUD and M600 Tishrin missiles as well as housing Syrian army ammunition storage areas. While no doubt cooperating with the Assad regime resources, what Hezbollah has committed in this region suggests it may pursue its own interests and take advantage of the chaotic circumstances to utilize part of the Qalamoun as a “new” Bekka for locating Hezbollah logistical assets while interfacing with the emergent Alawite-Shi’a intelligence organs.

Ted Robert Gurr modeled the pattern of ‘frustration-anger-aggression’ many decades ago in Why Men Rebel. Yet that anger and aggression came to naught as the democratic aspirations of the Arab Spring were found wanting in the face of Salafi Jihadism and the cold steel of Russian and Iranian geopolitical ambition. The Assad regime having lost half the country and teetered on the edge of extinction did not yield but now grows within it’s dead hulk a new Mukhābarāt to terrorize the remnants of a war-weary population.

About the author:
*Carl Anthony Wege
in early 2017 became Emeritus Professor of Political Science at the College of Coastal Georgia, Brunswick, where he had taught since 1989. A graduate of Portland (Oregon) State University, with an M.S. from the University of Wyoming, Professor Wege has written extensively on Middle Eastern terrorism and related issues in a wide range of academic and professional journals.

Source:
This article was published by Modern Diplomacy

Streamlining Alien Removal Process And Lifting Unnecessary Burden From Federal Appeals Courts – Analysis

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By Hans von Spakovsky*

Introduction: The Administrative Immigration Court System

There is probably no area over which federal jurisdiction is as complete as immigration. The Constitution provides Congress with full authority to “establish a uniform rule of Naturalization.”1 The Supreme Court of the United States has affirmed this imperative, holding that “the power of naturalization is exclusively in Congress.”2 This exclusivity is a function of national sovereignty and enables the federal government to prescribe the terms and conditions for citizenship and the means by which it is adjudicated.

Through the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Congress established an administrative immigration court system. It is run by the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) at the U.S. Department of Justice.3 Immigration judges who hear such cases are employees of the Justice Department. The Attorney General delegates to them the authority to determine whether aliens “should be allowed to enter or remain in the United States or should be removed.”4 The Office of the Chief Immigration Judge has supervisory authority over all immigration judges and the immigration trial courts, which are located in cities across 29 states ranging from Arizona to Washington.5

The decisions of the immigration trial courts are final unless appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), an administrative appeals court within the EOIR. The majority of the cases appealed to the BIA involve reviewing orders of removal. But it also hears cases involving the “exclusion of aliens applying for admission to the United States, petitions to classify the status of alien relatives for the issuance of preference immigrant visas, fines imposed…for the violation of immigration laws, and motions for reopening and reconsideration of decisions previously rendered.”6

The BIA has the authority to designate which of its decisions are “precedent decisions” that apply to immigration cases nationwide. The BIA, which is authorized to have up to 17 members, is the “highest administrative tribunal for interpreting and applying U.S. immigration law.”7

Unlike the federal court system established by Article III of the U.S. Constitution, administrative immigration courts do not have the authority to enforce their own orders as other federal courts do. As a result, enforcement of deportation or removal orders depends entirely on the efforts of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), whose enforcement priorities are set by the President. This lack of authority profoundly affected immigration enforcement on the watch of Barack Obama and resulted in the disarray the U.S. confronts today.

By May of 2017, the number of unenforced removal orders issued by immigration courts stood at 953,506—a 58 percent increase since 2002.9 Political appointees at DHS, specifically those at Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), refused to remove all but the worst criminal aliens and seldom enforced deportation orders in the U.S. interior.10

No less than President Obama provided the clearest confirmation that his Administration’s enforcement priorities excluded the nation’s interior and non-criminal aliens.

On September 28, 2011, Obama explained that his Administration’s deportation statistics were mis­leading and that, in addition to criminal aliens, border crossers were being deported who did not pass through immigration courts: “[T]he statistics are actually a little deceptive,” he said, “because what we’ve been doing is…apprehending folks at the borders and sending them back. That is counted as a deportation, even though they may have only been held for a day or 48 hours.”11

Criminal aliens and recent illegal border-crossers were removed, but few others. A Migration Policy Institute study agreed: “[N]inety-five percent of the immigrants deported from 2009 to 2013 were criminal aliens…, meaning only about 77,000 of the 1.6 million illegal immigrants removed by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) over the last five years were rank-and-file border-crossers with clean records.”12

Even felony records, as it turns out, were no guarantee of removal.13

Large numbers of ICE’s Level I and II offend­ers—murderers, drug traffickers, kidnappers, and sex of­fenders—were released by ICE decision makers,14 only to jeopardize the safety of people in the communities that had once placed them behind bars. Having the highest removal priority made no difference.15

In fiscal year 2013, the Obama Administration released over 36,000 convicted criminal aliens and another 30,558 in fiscal year 2014.16

Since 2010, 124 criminal aliens have been implicated in 135 deaths after ICE declined to remove them.17

The backlog of cases in the immigration trial courts also increased dramatically during the Obama Administration and arguably became just as problematic as unenforced removal orders. At the end of 2008, just before Barack Obama became President, federal immigration courts reported a backlog of 186,108 cases. However, by the end of 2016, the number of backlogged cases had increased 300 percent to 542,411 and reached 585,930 in April of 2017, despite the number of immigration judges increasing significantly. In 2006, 233 immigration judges completed 407,487 cases. Yet in 2016, more than 270 judges completed only 273,390 cases, a dramatic slowdown in the handling of cases that having more immigration judges was supposed to fix.18

This slowdown was graphically illustrated in a report released by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in June 2017. According to the GAO, the “median number of days to complete a removal case, which comprised 97 percent of EOIR’s caseload…, increased by 700 percent from 42 days in fiscal year 2006 to 336 days in fiscal year 2015.”19

One of the reasons cited for this by “DHS attorneys, experts, and other stakeholders” was that “immigration judges’ frequent use of continuances resulted in delays and increased case lengths that contributed to the backlog.”20

In order to help alleviate this bottleneck, Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced on April 11, 2017, that the Justice Department would hire an additional 50 immigration judges this year, and 75 next year. He also promised to streamline the normal 18- to 24-month hiring process to get these new judges on the bench as soon as possible, not only to address backlogs, but also to tackle other problems the Obama Administration created.21

Ending Catch and Release

The Department of Homeland Security’s “catch-and-release” policy aggravated what became known as the Central American “surge” at the Southwest border. Catch and release was DHS’s policy of arresting illegal aliens, giving them a date to appear before an immigration court, and then releasing them.

Unsurprisingly, many of those released never showed up for court. In 2016, 39 percent of aliens who were free pending trial failed to show up for their immigration hearings. In 2015, 43 percent did the same. Over the past 21 years, 37 percent of all aliens that DHS allowed to remain free before trial were ordered removed for failing to show up for their hearings—some 952,000 aliens altogether.22 Immigration courts have the highest “failure to appear” rate of any court system in the country, averaging more than 45,000 per year.23

Fortunately, one of President Donald Trump’s first actions as President was to end the catch-and-release policy, which some employees within DHS had nicknamed the “catch-and-run” policy.24

On January 25, 2017, the President signed an executive order that instructed DHS to issue new policy guidance to its personnel for the “termination of the practice commonly known as ‘catch and release,’” and to take “appropriate actions to ensure the detention of aliens apprehended for violations of immigration law pending the outcome of their removal proceedings.”25

A separate executive order issued the same day addressed the problem of unenforced removal orders. President Trump stated that it was his Administration’s policy to “ensure that aliens ordered removed from the United States are promptly removed.”26 He directed DHS to make removing such aliens a priority.27

Aliens have procedural due-process rights in the immigration courts similar to those of citizens in other American courts. That includes the right to be represented by counsel “or other representative.”28

Witnesses must testify “under oath or affirmation” and immigration judges can authorize depositions and subpoenas.29 Aliens are entitled to an interpreter at the hearing and can ask for postponement of a hearing for “good cause.”30

Immigration judges are required to inform aliens of their right to representation as well as the right “to examine and object to the evidence against him or her, to present evidence in his or her own behalf and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the government.”31

The hearing must “be recorded verbatim except for statements made off the record with the permission of the immigration judge.”32 Once the court issues its final decision, both the government and aliens have 30 days to file an appeal with the BIA.33 The BIA also has extensive procedural due-process rules governing practice before the Board that are outlined in a 222-page practices manual.34

One of the deficiencies of the immigration court system is due to the failure of past attorneys general to act. Federal law provides that immigration judges “shall have authority (under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General) to sanction by civil money penalty any action (or inaction) in contempt of the judge’s proper exercise of authority.”35

Those regulations have not been promulgated. That needs to be done as soon as possible by Attorney General Jeff Sessions so that immigration judges can enforce the procedural and substantive rules of applicable immigration law in their hearings.

That contempt power should include the ability to sanction Department of Homeland Security officials who fail to implement deportation and removal orders issued by immigration judges. The Obama Administration nearly halted the enforcement of such orders.36

Incentivizing Appeals—at Taxpayer Expense

Another dynamic inside the immigration court system that is unfair to the American taxpayer should also be changed. From 1996 through 2009, aliens appealed 214,404 out of 218,589 removal decisions issued by immigration trial courts—or 98 percent of all removal orders that included an application for relief.37

What conditions incentivize such an overwhelming appeal rate? Former Judge Michael Heilman of the BIA provides the answer.

At a House Judiciary Committee hearing on February 6, 2002, Judge Heilman testified that low filing fees and non-existent court costs encourage unwarranted appeals, the vast majority of which were “without any substantial basis on any ground.” He faulted the use of tax dollars to underwrite transcripts for private litigants, something that does not happen elsewhere in the civil court system. Judge Heilman stated:

One part of the answer lies in the fact that the appeal filing fee is very low, $110. With that fee being waived by the BIA in about 50 percent of appeals, oftentimes even where an alien is represented by an attorney. The alien is not charged for copies of the record or for the transcript of the hearing, which often exceeds 50 pages. All of these costs are absorbed by EOIR. By contrast, to my knowledge, no-cost appeals on a civil level are a rarity.38

It makes no sense for the government to pay the costs of such appeals. As Judge Heilman outlined, these are “significant expenses absorbed by the Department of Justice because it foots the bill for the appeal process.” Everywhere else in the civil process in Article III courts, “the appealing party pays the cost of the appeal, including the transcript.”39

The bottom line is this: Tax dollars are paying some of the costs associated with private litigation—even the litigation of those aliens being deported after being convicted of crimes in the United States and those who entered fraudulent marriages. From 2000 through 2008, the EOIR spent $29 million for the transcripts of alien litigants appealing deportation orders. Factoring in court personnel time, another $4.7 million went to process these records. Altogether just under $34 million was allocated from taxpayer dollars to underwrite (and encourage) private litigation.40

The immigration court system is mired in a practice that seemingly prompts more litigation and delays the removal of those ordered removed who have no right to be in the U.S.41

Appeals from the Administrative Court System to the Federal Courts

The “exclusive means of review” provided by Congress for any order of removal issued by the administrative immigration court system is a “petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals.”42 Thus, immigration appeals bypass the federal district courts and go directly to one of the 12 regional circuit courts of appeal in the federal system.

Aliens cannot use the habeas corpus process to get around this limitation since this statute specifically says that “in every provision that limits or eliminates judicial review or jurisdiction to review, the terms ‘judicial review’ and ‘jurisdiction to review’ include habeas corpus review pursuant to section 2241 of title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision.” 28

U.S. Code § 2241 is the provision of federal law that outlines habeas corpus procedural rules for the Supreme Court and the district and appellate courts. As the Ninth Circuit has said, courts of appeal “defer to the BIA’s Interpretation and application of immigration laws unless its interpretation is contrary to the plain and sensible meaning of the law at issue.”

In 2016, immigration appeals “accounted for 81 percent of administrative agency appeals and constituted the largest category of administrative agency appeals filed in each circuit except the D.C. Circuit.”44

In June 2016, the appellate courts terminated 7,502 administrative agency appeals on the merits,45 so over 6,000 of those cases were civil immigration appeals. On top of that, the appellate courts handled an additional 1,342 appeals of convictions for criminal immigration offenses such as alien smuggling, felony re-entry, and marriage fraud.

Two different federal appellate court judges complained to the author about these immigration appeals from the BIA clogging up their dockets and being used by illegal aliens to try to delay their removal from the United States. Two cases from the Seventh Circuit that upheld removal decisions of the BIA illustrate the types of cases the appellate courts get.

In 2000, Anthony Kimani, a citizen of Kenya, entered the U.S. on a visitor’s visa but then remained after his visa expired.47 He registered to vote when he obtained his driver’s license in Illinois and voted in the 2004 presidential election, a felony under federal law. After marrying an American citizen, he applied for an adjustment of his status to that of a lawful permanent resident. An investigation by DHS, however, revealed his illegal voting (it was not detected by Illinois election officials), and he was placed in removal proceedings.

U.S. immigration law declares any alien “who has voted in violation of any Federal, State, or local constitutional provision, statute, ordinance, or regulation” as inadmissible.49 Thus, Kimani’s defensive application to avoid removal was denied by an immigration judge, who ordered his removal, and the BIA upheld the judge’s decision. Despite the undisputed facts and the lack of ambiguity of the law, Kimani appealed to the Seventh Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the BIA, holding that Kimani violated the law when he made “his own decision to register, to claim citizenship, and to vote.” The BIA, the court rules, “did not abuse its discretion.”50

Similarly, Margarita Del Pilar Fitzpatrick, a citizen of Peru, claimed U.S. citizenship when she registered to vote while obtaining a driver’s license in Illinois, then voted in the 2002 election. Federal law provides that legally present aliens who vote in violation of state or federal law are removable.51 Her application for citizenship revealed her voting history, which also had not been detected by Illinois election officials. The Seventh Circuit upheld the removal order issued by the immigration trial court and confirmed by the BIA. As the court said, the decision of whether to enforce this statute and remove an alien “is entrusted to executive [branch] officials.”52

Removing the Federal Appellate Process from Ineligible Aliens

There is no constitutional obligation to provide aliens in removal proceedings with access to Article III federal courts as a matter of right. As previously outlined, aliens who are in this country illegally and the subject of removal proceedings enjoy the full panoply of procedural due process in the administrative immigration court system, including the ability to appeal contrary decisions to an administrative appellate court. There is no substantive or procedural reason to provide such aliens with access to the federal court system and no reason to burden the federal appellate courts with thousands of such cases.

The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the sufficiency of having claims for citizens determined by an administrative agency in Crowell v. Benson in 1932. The question in that case was “whether the Congress may substitute for constitutional courts, in which the judicial power of the United States is vested, an administrative agency—in this instance a single deputy commissioner—for the final determination of the existence of the facts upon which the enforcement of the constitutional rights of the citizen depend.”53

The Court held that the administrative procedures established by the U.S. Employees’ Compensation Commission for claims related to injuries occurring “on the navigable waters of the United States” met Fifth Amendment due-process requirements because final authority on matters of law was still vested in the federal courts. But the doctrine established in that case was being applied to citizens, not aliens. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court outlined in Thomas v. Union Carbide in 1985, there is a difference between claims arising between private parties and claims made against the government. This difference is relevant to determining whether jurisdiction by federal courts can be entirely eliminated by Congress without violating separation-of-powers principles or the judicial authority of the courts under Article III. As the Court said in Thomas, the Constitution does not require “every federal question arising under the federal law…to be tried in an Art. III court before a judge enjoying life tenure.”54 Instead, the Court “has long recognized that Congress is not barred from acting pursuant to its powers under Article I to vest decisionmaking authority in tribunals that lack the attributes of Article III courts.”55

The essential factor in whether a citizen has a right to an Article III court is whether he is asserting a private or a public right. A “public right” is defined as “matters arising between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments.” “Private rights” are “the liability of one individual to another under the law as defined.”56

The public rights doctrine “reflects simply a pragmatic understanding that when Congress selects a quasi-judicial method of resolving matters that ‘could be conclusively determined by the Executive and Legislative Branches,’ the danger of encroaching on the judicial powers is reduced.”57

There is no question that removal proceedings initiated by the executive branch against an alien under the immigration authority delegated to it by Congress fall within the “public rights” doctrine. Thus, Congress is fully within its authority to limit the procedural due-process rights of aliens who enter or remain in this country illegally. In U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, a case involving the right of an alien war bride married to a U.S. citizen to enter the country, the Supreme Court said that “whatever the rule may be concerning deportation of persons who have gained entry into the United States, it is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to review the determination of the political branch of the Government to exclude a given alien.”58 More importantly, the Court emphasized that the due-process rights of such aliens are limited to “the procedure authorized by Congress.”59 An alien who seeks admission “may not do so under any claim of right.” Such admission “is a privilege granted by the sovereign United States Government” and will be granted “only upon such terms as the United States shall prescribe.”60

In Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel. Mezei, the Supreme Court upheld the refusal of the government to allow the reentry of a Hungarian/Romanian alien who had previously lived legally in the U.S. He became stuck at Ellis Island because other countries such as France and Great Britain refused his entry, as did Hungary, which refused his readmission.61

The Court said that while “it is true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law,” an “alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on a different footing: ‘Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.’”62 However, the Court also made it clear that “traditional standards” of due process, such as for a lawful resident alien, only require a hearing “before an executive or administrative tribunal.”63 Due process does not require “forms of judicial procedure,” but only an “opportunity, at some time, to be heard, before such officers” as are given the authority to act on the merits of the alien’s claim.64

The extensive due-process protections provided for aliens in the administrative immigration system that give them the opportunity to be heard, to be represented by counsel, and to present their case to an immigration judge, with a subsequent right of appeal to an administrative appeal tribunal, more than satisfy this requirement.

Conclusion

The federal appellate courts hear thousands of immigration appeals every year, and they represent an overwhelming majority of the administrative agency appeals filed in the federal courts. No constitutional mandate requires that illegal aliens have access to Article III federal courts to contest removal and deportation determinations. In fact, the due-process procedures authorized by Congress and provided in the federal administrative immigration court system go much further than is required under the constitutional baseline laid down by the Supreme Court for aliens who are already present in the U.S.

As a basic matter of judicial efficiency and productivity, optimum use of government resources, and effective control of our borders and enforcement of our internal security and safety, Congress should eliminate the ability of aliens to contest the decisions made by the immigration court system.

Additionally, the attorney general should require aliens to pay the same types of fees and court costs that all private plaintiffs incur in civil litigation and stop the taxpayer subsidy of these costs. Finally, it is imperative that the attorney general immediately promulgate regulations authorizing immigration judges to sanction the parties involved in these hearings for contempt—as well as Department of Homeland Security officials who fail to enforce deportation and removal orders. Immigration judges must have this authority in order to have an orderly, effective process that removes illegal aliens from the United States.

About the author:
*Hans A. von Spakovsky
is a Senior Legal Fellow in the Edwin Meese III Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, of the Institute for Constitutional Government, at The Heritage Foundation. He is an authority on a wide range of issues – including civil rights, civil justice, the First Amendment, immigration.

Source:
This article was published by The Heritage Foundation.

Notes:
[1] U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.

[2] Chirac v. Lessee of Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259 (1817).

[3] 48 Fed. Reg. 8,038 (Feb. 25, 1983).

[4] Evolution of the U.S. Immigration Court System: Pre-1983, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., U.S. Dept. of Justice, available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/evolution-pre-1983. The illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 implemented a comprehensive revision of EOIR procedures, including combining deportation and exclusion proceedings into a single proceeding called a “removal proceeding.” Evolution of the U.S. Immigration Court System: Post-1983, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., U.S. Dept. of Justice, available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/evolution-post-1983.

[5] See EOIR Immigration Court Listing, U.S. Dept. of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-immigration-court-listing.

[6] Board of Immigration Appeals, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., U.S. Dept. of Justice, available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals.

[7] Evolution of the U.S. Immigration Court System: Post-1983, supra note 4.

[8] Id.; 5 Fed. Reg. 3,502 (Sept. 4, 1940).

[9] Hans A. von Spakovsky & Mark H. Metcalf, How to Get Our Immigration Courts Back to Enforcing Federal Law, Fox News (May 17, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2017/05/17/how-to-get-our-immigration-courts-back-to-enforcing-federal-law.html.

[10] Stephen Dinan, Deportations Come Mostly From Border, DHS Chief Says, Wash. Times, (Mar. 12, 2014), (“Home­land Security Secretary Jeh Johnson acknowledged Tuesday that his department’s deportation numbers are now mostly made up of illegal immigrants caught at the border, not just those from the interior, which means they can’t be compared one-to-one with deportations under President Bush or other prior administrations.”), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/12/deportations-come-mostly-from-border-dhs-chief-say/.

[11] See What You Missed: President Obama’s Open for Questions Roundtable, White House (Sept. 28, 2011), available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/09/28/what-you-missed-president-obamas-open-questions-roundtable.

[12] Stephen Dinan, 95 Percent of Deported Illegals Were Criminals, Wash. Times, (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/oct/16/obamas-deportation-policy-leaves-most-illegal-immi/.

[13] Jessica Vaughan, ICE Released 19,723 Criminal Aliens in 2015, Ctr for Immigration Studies (Apr. 27, 2016) (“In 2015, ICE made 119,772 arrests, or just half the number of arrests made in 2013 (232,287). Under the strict enforcement rules implemented as part of President Obama’s executive actions announced in 2014, ICE officers are forced to ignore a large share of the criminal aliens they identify in jails or who are referred by local law enforcement agencies.”), available at http://cis.org/vaughan/ice-releases-19723-criminal-aliens-2015.

[14] Id. (“[Y]ear after year, even after the deaths of Chadwick, Ronnebeck, and dozens of others [killed by criminal aliens]. These cannot be characterized as ‘isolated incidents’ or ‘anecdotal’—not after 86,000 releases [of criminal aliens] and 124 new homicides.”).

[15] Supervision of Aliens Commensurate with Risk, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, OIG–11–81, Dec. 2011, pp. 18–19, available at https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-81_Dec11.pdf. Offense levels are designated as Levels I, II, and III. The Specially Designated Countries list (formerly Special Interest Countries) was withdrawn by DHS in December 2011. This list, however, is still in use by DHS employees.

[16] Hans von Spakovsky, How Sanctuary Policies Have Directly Led to Thousands of Crimes Against Americans, Daily Signal (July 9, 2015), http://dailysignal.com/2015/07/09/how-sanctuary-policies-have-directly-led-to-thousands-of-crimes-against-americans/; Vaughan, supra note 13.

[17] Jessica Vaughan, Free to Kill: 124 Criminal Aliens Released by Obama Policies Charged with Homicide Since 2010, Ctr for Immigration Studies (Mar. 14, 2016), available at http://cis.org/vaughan/Map-124-criminal-aliens-released-obama-policies-charged-homicide-2010. Of the criminal aliens freed by ICE between 2010 and 2015, 124 were subsequently charged with homicide-related incidents.

[18] von Spakovsky & Metcalf, supra note 9; Mark Metcalf, Courting Disaster: Absent Attendance and Absent Enforcement in America’s Immigration Court, Ctr for Immigration Studies (Mar. 2017), available at http://cis.org/metcalf-courting-disaster.

[19] U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO–17–438, Immigration Courts: Actions Needed to Reduce Case Backlog and Address Long-Standing Management and Operational Challenges 25 (June 2017), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/685022.pdf.

[20] Id. at 27.

[21] Attorney General Jeff Sessions Delivers Remarks Announcing the Department of Justice’s Renewed Commitment to Criminal Immigration Enforcement, Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Apr. 11, 2017), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-announcing-department-justice-s-renewed.

[22] von Spakovsky & Metcalf, supra note 9.

[23] On failure to appear rates, see generally Brian H. Bornstein, Alan J. Tomkins, & Elizabeth M. Neeley, Reducing Courts’ Failure-to-Appear Rate: A Procedural Justice Approach, Nat’l Criminal Justice Reference Service, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dept. of Justice (May 20, 2011) at 5-6, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/234370.pdf.

[24] von Spakovsky & Metcalf, supra note 9.

[25] Exec. Order No. 13767, Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements (Jan. 25, 2017), Sec. 6; 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/25/executive-order-border-security-and-immigration-enforcement-improvements.

[26] Exec. Order No. 13768, Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States (Jan. 25, 2017), Sec. 2(d); 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/25/presidential-executive-order-enhancing-public-safety-interior-united.

[27] Id. at Sec. 5 (f).

[28] 8 C.F.R. § 1240.3. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.

[29] 8 C.F.R. § 1240.7.

[30] See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.5 and § 1240.6.

[31] 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10.

[32] 8 C.F.R. § 1240.9.

[33] 8 C.F.R. § 1240.15.

[34] Board of Immigration Appeals Practice Manual, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., U.S Dept. of Justice (last revised Feb. 3, 2017), available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-immigration-appeals-2.

[35] 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (b)(1).

[36] von Spakovsky & Metcalf, supra note 9.

[37] Mark H. Metcalf, Built to Fail: Deception and Disorder in America’s Immigration Courts, Ctr for Immigration Studies (Oct. 2001) at 78, note 91, available at http://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/2011/built-to-fail-full.pdf.

[38] Id. at 63, note 551 (citing Testimony of Honorable Michael Heilman, “2002 Operations Of The Executive Office For Immigration Review,” House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Feb. 6, 2002), http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju77558.000/hju77558_0f.htm).

[39] Id. at 63, note 551.

[40] Id. at 62, notes 523, 524, and 525.

[41] For other good recommendations on improving the immigration court system, see Andrew R. Arthur, The Massive Increase in the Immigration Court Backlog, Its Causes, and Solutions, Ctr for Immigration Studies (July 2017).

[42] 8 U.S.C. 1252 (a)(5). See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 928-29 (9th Cir. 2005); Mamigonian v. Biggs, 710 F.3d 936, 941 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Habeas relief for final orders of removal is only available through a petition to the court of appeals.”).

[43] Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504 (9th Cir. 2012), note 6. Aliens appealing BIA decisions also have “no due process right to discretionary relief.” The appellate courts only “review the legal sufficiency of the removal proceeding.” Zyapkov v. Lynch, 817 f.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).

[44] Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2016, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2016.

[45] Table B-5. U.S. Courts of Appeals—Decisions in Cases Terminated on the Merits, by Circuit and Nature of Proceeding, During the 12-Month Period Ending June 30, 2016, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/stfj_b5_630.2016.pdf.

[46] Table B-7. U.S. Courts of Appeals – Civil and Criminal Cases commenced, by Circuit and Nature of Suit or Offense During the 12-Month Period Ending June 30, 2016, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/stfj_b7_630.2016.pdf.

[47] Kimani v. Holder, 695 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2012).

[48] See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1015 (f), 911, and 611.

[49] 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10)(D).

[50] Kimani, 695 F.3d at 672.

[51] 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(6).

[52] Fitzpatrick v. Sessions, 847 F.3d 913, 915 (7th Cir. 2017).

[53] Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 56 (1932).

[54] Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985) (citations omitted).

[55] Thomas, 473 U.S. at 583.

[56] Thomas, 473 U.S. at 585 (citations omitted).

[57] Thomas, 473 U.S. at 589 (citations omitted).

[58] U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950).

[59] Knauff, 338 U.S. at 544.

[60] Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542.

[61] Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).

[62] Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212.

[63] Mezei, 345 U.S. at 214 (citing Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953)).

[64] Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953), footnote 6.

Damn, I Don’t Want Rahman To End Up Being Killed – OpEd

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Sultan, Ali’s brother, was killed in August 2016.

Hussein, Bismillah’s uncle, was killed in April 2017.

I don’t want Rahman, Inaam’s brother, to end up being killed. Rahman is now training to be a soldier.

Both Sultan and Hussein were Afghan soldiers in their twenties. They joined the army because there were no other viable jobs available. Their families needed food. Hussein was killed in Helmand Province, where in the past 15 years, 18,000 policemen ( not counting soldiers or civilians ) were killed.

Newton would have wondered why we fail to apply scientific laws to human behaviour too ; for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. The more ‘enemies’ that armies and soldiers kill, the more soldiers and civilians will be killed.

The casualty numbers in Afghanistan and elsewhere prove this. The 2015 Global Terrorism Index has recorded a nine-fold increase in terrorism-related deaths since 2000. War doesn’t work!

Inaam, who is a street kid attending the Borderfree Afghan Street Kids School, had taken me to his family’s rented room so I could do an annual household survey. It was then that I heard his mother tell Rahman’s story. I felt a slow panic, even though I hadn’t met Rahman before.

“My son called to say he was feeling terrible. His hands were blistered from the army training. They are training him to shoot,” his mother told me, her fingers gesturing as if to ‘pull the trigger’. She paused, then continued nervously, “He said he doesn’t wish to continue. I cried. He told me not to cry, saying, ‘This is life, mother.'”

She took the helm of her headscarf and wiped off the tears that had ‘ballooned’ rapidly above her eye-bags. Just as I’ve seen so many times before in Afghan demeanor, she steadied herself within seconds, pulled her shoulders back slightly, swallowed her anxiety, and looked up again.

Inaam is a thoughtful, hardworking child. Photo Credit: Dr. Hakim Young.
Inaam is a thoughtful, hardworking child. Photo Credit: Dr. Hakim Young.

I heard a paralysis, a sort of helplessness in her voice. Inaam was sitting by the window sill. I could tell he was worried.

Like a mad fever, I saw the blood-stained history of humanity streaming into that spartan room in Kabul. The water well in the yard outside had dried up to its last drop, part of a severe water crisis in Kabul.  While the leaders of the world are pumping money into the business of fighting and killing, no one is paying attention to the depletion of water.

Like a scene from a movie that’s replayed again and again from a malfunctioning video player, I saw Rahman crawling in the burning, dry desert sand, cold dehydrated sweat on his brow.

“When Rahman called, he asked whether Inaam was returning home from ‘work’ earlier every night, instead of at 9.30 p.m., when ‘all sorts of crime and incidents fester in the streets’. Out of worry, I beat Inaam once for coming home too late at night. I didn’t want to punish him, but I got so intolerably worried about bad things happening to him. He’s still so young.”

Inaam is 13. I responded, “Why didn’t Inaam tell me that Rahman was hoping to continue his studies in night school? How I wish I had known about his deliberations to join the army!” My frustration at life’s small but water-shed decisions was obvious.

“Inaam didn’t want you to know that we’re trapped in this undignified situation. As you know, Inaam’s father is a drug addict, and we have so many problems. We don’t tell anyone such things,” Inaam’s mother explained. Inaam hasn’t seen his father for more than seven years. His father is in another province, unable to kick his drug habit, and oblivious to similarly desperate challenges at home. Inaam’s mother continued, “And, Inaam is not a kid who complains. He goes to school and then to work. He comes home, and he listens. He doesn’t give us any trouble.”

I reassured her, “There’s no ‘shame’ in your sons’ hard work to eke a living. The Afghan Peace Volunteers are a family, and it is no ‘shame’ for family members to help out if possible. Please ask Rahman to come meet us when he’s on a home visit, and perhaps, we can discuss job options.”

Inaam’s mother gave Inaam some instructions. He shuffled about in the corridor space outside the room, which doubles up as a kitchen, and returned quickly, placing a plate of washed grapes before me.

What is needed is food on the table, enabled through dignified labour. But, where are the decent-wage jobs that don’t involve exploitation and killing? If the call is to choose peace, where are the everyday options? Why can’t peace, economic justice, and environmental groups pool their efforts together to address their common root problems, which Naomi Klein encouraged as the deepening of ‘relationships between issues and movements, so that our solutions address multiple crises at once’? This would surely include making nonviolent jobs available to Rahman, as a concrete way of ‘saving’ him.

Why can’t I do something about this?

As we left on our bicycles, Inaam pointed out the reinforced concrete walls of an army facility a few hundred metres away from his home. The thick walls had been broken into pieces as if they were made of paper, in a suicide bomb attack a couple of months ago.

Inaam on his bicycle, near his house and the scene of a suicide bomb attack. Photo Credit: Dr. Hakim Young.
Inaam on his bicycle, near his house and the scene of a suicide bomb attack. Photo Credit: Dr. Hakim Young.

“I was not at home. The battle raged on for a few hours after the explosion,” Inaam said. I could only imagine his shocked mother sitting in the room alone, legs folded, biting her lips, pale with worry.

My thoughts kept hovering around Rahman, searching for a definite way to ease him out of war’s insanity and death. How?

I had heard Rahman’s voice on the phone before, when I called to ask Inaam to turn up at the Centre. This was before Rahman was recruited into the army. Just hearing a voice, even a stranger’s, can connect us to the person’s humanity. “Where? What time? Okay! I’ll tell Inaam. Thank you.”

That day, as I cycled back to the Borderfree Nonviolence Centre where Ali, Bismillah and the Afghan Peace Volunteers realize that every crisis and every human is connected, my heart was thumping away.

I felt that Rahman’s ‘fate’ was linked to mine and that it was now tied to a ticking time bomb that would follow Newton’s law.

Damn, I don’t want Rahman to end up being killed.

 

Dr. Hakim Young.
Dr. Hakim Young.

*Dr Hakim, ( Dr. Teck Young, Wee ) is a medical doctor from Singapore who has done humanitarian and social enterprise work in Afghanistan for more than 10 years, including being a mentor to the Afghan Peace Volunteers, an inter-ethnic group of young Afghans dedicated to building non-violent alternatives to war. He is the 2012 recipient of the International Pfeffer Peace Prize and the 2017 recipient of the Singapore Medical Association Merit Award for contributions in social service to communities.

Playing With Fire: Israel And Its Problematic Friends Solidify Ties – Analysis

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There are no nice guys in the Middle East, a region that is in the sixth year of transition. It’s a transition that is likely to take up to a quarter of a century. It’s a transition that is being exacerbated by states that are battling either one another for regional hegemony or to maintain an unsustainable status quo or to shape the region in their mould. There are no good or bad guys in this battle, at best there are bad and worse ones.

That is the playing field on which long existing relations between Israel and status quo powers, primarily in the Gulf, as well as in Jordan and Egypt, have grown far closer and more overt. Closer relations are primarily based on perceived common interests in stymying Iran as well as political change. It’s an alliance in emergence, particularly with the Gulf, that irrespective whether it results in formal diplomatic relations as already is the case with Egypt and Jordan or may soon occur with Bahrain, is likely to be fragile, not because the parties view it that way, but because far-reaching change on the Arab side is inevitable.

The parameters and dynamics of what the Middle East is experiencing and the risks Israel runs with the alliances it is cementing centre on five fundamental developments or disputes:

  •   The impact of the 2011 popular Arab revolts
  •   The Gulf crisis
  •   The Saudi-Iranian rivalry
  •   Transition in the Gulf
  •   The Israeli-Palestinian conflict

The roll back of the 2011 popular revolts by a UAE-Saudi led counterrevolution has prompted many to write off the chance for democratic change in the Middle East and to refer to the uprisings as the Arab winter. That may prove to be a short-lived analysis. For one, it’s a mistake to see the revolts as a quest for Western-style democracy. Rather, they were a quest for dignity, greater freedoms and liberation from corrupt, nepotistic regimes that, with few exceptions, had failed to deliver in terms of public goods and services. Those revolts may or may not have succeeded in the longer term but ultimately, they were prematurely defeated by domestic status quo forces backed by the UAE and Saudi Arabia, whether it is the 2013 military coup in Egypt, Saudi and UAE intervention in Yemen, or UAE and Egyptian backing of General Khalifa Haftar in Libya. To be clear, Qatar was a player in this too.

The legacy of the revolts is far greater than simply defeat or failure. It has changed mentality and attitudes. The quest for change is alive and kicking. That is not to say that masses of people are about to take to the streets again – despite recent months long protests in the Rif in northern Morocco. Events in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen may by and large have for now chilled the quest for revolutionary change. So has severe repression across the Middle East. The desire for change is however alive and kicking in social media.

It is also alive in kicking in the radicalization of Arab youth, who make up the bulk of jihadists in Syria and Iraq. The Islamic States is on the verge of territorial defeat in Iraq and Syria, but that only means that political violence will no longer have a central address; it will be more decentralised, more amorphous, more spread out, and probably more lethal. Political violence has been a fixture of human history, but blunting its current phase will take a lot more than military might and law enforcement. It will take economic and social policies as well as forms of governance that are inclusive rather than exclusive.

Which leads to the third legacy of the 2011 Arab revolts: the future of Middle Eastern nation states as they were known until now.  Neither Iraq nor Syria will return as nation states in the borders prior to 2011 in Syria or 2003 in Iraq when the United States invaded and toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein. The independence referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan is part of a global battle whose outcome will determine the ability of small states to chart their own course in the shadow of a regional behemoth, whether that is Saudi Arabia in the Middle East or China in Asia. It parallels the efforts by peoples like the Catalans in Spain, the Kurds in Syria, or Ambazonians in Cameroon to secede and form independent small states of their own. It also parallels the dispute in the Gulf between Qatar and various other Gulf states.

Most conflicts in the Middle East have a pot blames the kettle quality, but no one dispute more so than that between Qatar and a UAE-Saudi-led alliance of financially and politically dependent states. At the heart of the crisis are four issues: the ability of small states to chart their own, independent course; diametrically opposed perceptions of national security threats; fundamentally different strategies for regime survival; and radically differing definitions of what constitutes terrorism and who is a terrorist.

Also at the heart of both the Gulf crisis and the Saudi-Iranian rivalry are opposing approaches to political or activist forms of Islam. We can go in question and answers into greater detail about the Gulf crisis. Qatar has the naïve belief that it can support political change anywhere in the Middle East while at the same time ringfencing itself as well as other Gulf states from the fallout. Qatari support as well as its soft power strategy has meant that it has maintained contact and/or supported a host of militant groups, in some cases with the approval of the United States, as well as Islamists. It was a policy that clashed with that of the UAE, first and foremost, which sees any form of political Islam as a threat and under the influence of the UAE with Saudi Arabia’s evolving threat perception.

Fact of the matter is that all the Gulf states have maintained and/or supported militants and Islamists; no country more so than Saudi Arabia, not only in Syria and Iraq. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been involved in a covert war for the past 40 years. It is a war that explains much of Iranian actions today. Yet, Saudi Arabia is fighting an uphill battle. Its future in the Middle East is that of a second fiddle state. There are three major powers in the Middle East, Turkey, Iran and Egypt, and Israel, in certain regards. Turkey, Iran and, Egypt have what Saudi Arabia does not: large populations, huge domestic markets, industrial bases, highly educated populations, and deep-seated identities grounded in histories of empire. Iran, moreover, has resources. Saudi Arabia has oil and Mecca, not enough to compete. Saudi Arabia is a regional power because of past containment policies towards Iran. Once Iran is unfettered, it will unlikely be able to compete for long.

A major aspect of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry is the ideological and religious battle that Saudi Arabia has waged for the past four decades, the fallout of which is being felt across the globe. Saudi Arabia has invested an estimated $100 billion to promote Sunni Muslim ultra-conservatism. To be clear, the bulk of that money did not go to militants, it went to religious, cultural and educational facilities that Saudi Arabia largely did not micro-manage or control. There are only a handful of countries where the Saudis funded violence: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, Iraq and Syria. Also to be clear, ultra-conservatism does not by definition breed militancy but it does create an enabling environment in conjunction with other factors, first and foremost lack of social and economic opportunity.

The blowback of ultra-conservatism is felt in the kingdom as is evident in the economic and social transition Gulf states are embarking on. To put the transition in perspective, keep in mind that every person born in the Gulf today is likely to witness the end of oil in his or her lifetime. Economic streamlining and diversification was long overdue but was made unavoidable by the drop in oil prices sparked by Saudi oil policy that focussed on market share rather than price.

Economic reform and limited social change but no political liberalization amounts to ruling families unilaterally rewriting social contracts by rolling back the cradle-to-grave-welfare state. The reforms cater to aspirations of significant segments of the youth who constitute the majority of the region’s citizenry. But they also go against the grain of vested interests and deep-seated ultra-conservatism. With few exceptions, there is little indication that the reform process is being well-managed, certainly not in terms of the gap between expectations and delivery. With other words, the jury on the reform process is still out. Moreover, nowhere in the Gulf is the legacy of the 2011 Arab revolts potentially more potent than in Saudi Arabia given its size and repressed diversity in terms of popular aspirations. It goes without saying, that what happens in the kingdom would ripple across the Gulf.

The short-term silver lining of events in the Middle East may be developments in Palestine with the reconciliation between Hamas in Gaza and the Palestine Authority in the West Bank as a result of engineering by the UAE and Egypt. It will no doubt bring relief to Gaza which has effectively been blockaded by both Egypt and Israel. The decisive factor however will be the ability of the government to provide jobs and services, the outcome of elections and how Hamas fares in those polls,

For sure, in theory the deal removes a major obstacle to peace talks: the division among the Palestinians themselves. Yet, fact of the matter is, even if a peace can be negotiated, it may not be worth the paper it is written on without Hamas being part of it. The good news is that the United States and Israel have been muted in their response to the reconciliation. Nonetheless, fundamental differences between Hamas and the Palestine Authority have not been resolved, including the terms of any peace talks and a unified military command.

The bottom line of all of this is that short-term, opportunistic policies will not provide solutions unless they lead to a tackling of fundamental problems. Without that, they could exacerbate situations, meaning that ultimately the threats and problems mushroom rather than shrink. If that happens, Israel’s alliance with Gulf could shift from an asset to a liability.

The above article is based on remarks at United Hebrew Congregation, Singapore, 3 October 2017

The West Should Get Out Of The Kosovo Debate – OpEd

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If the so-called peaceniks are genuinely interested in peace, then they must stop expecting the Serbs to put aside their core values and interests and accept solutions imported from the West that reflect its own particular values and interests. As the tenth anniversary of Kosovo’s independence approaches, and with the issue of recognition yet to be solved, it’s high time they started to do so.

By Timothy Less*

The only durable peace in the Balkans is one which accords with the wishes of the people on the ground. That may be a truism for some, but this obvious point is lost in a new report by Columbia University’s Program on Peace-building and Rights on the Belgrade-Prishtina dialogue.

The author is clearly exhausted by this tiresome conversation which has produced nothing of substance in years. ‘It’s time for measurable outcomes’, he says. ‘No more photo ops’.

So he’s decided it’s time to bang Balkan heads together. His big idea is that the Americans and the Europeans should finally get tough with the locals by launching a so-called ‘enhanced dialogue’, led by a heavyweight ‘mediator’, who settles all the outstanding issues between Serbia and Kosovo (missing persons, monasteries, money, etc.) after which Serbia has no more excuses for refusing to recognise its neighbour and just recognises it

To keep matters simple, the mediator decides what those issues are and aren’t (‘partition is not an option’) and, to maintain discipline, progress is monitored, deadlines are set and penalties imposed on the parties if they refuse to co-operate.

The report even identifies the man to perform this unforgiving task: Wolfgang Schauble, the stony-faced former German finance minister, whose unstated qualification for the job is his track record of getting disobedient Balkanites like the Greeks to do what they’re told.

But it’s not all pain for the Serbs because, in return for relinquishing Kosovo, Serbia gets to join the EU. That’s because negotiations between Belgrade and Prishtina are tied to the process of EU accession, with progress in the first leading to progress in the second (providing, of course, that Serbia meets the thousands of other onerous conditions for EU entry). As the report says ‘No progress, no chapters’.

An Old Fix

If all this sounds wearily familiar, it’s because once again, the report is proposing a fix to the Kosovo problem on terms which are obviously unacceptable to the Serbs, who are the ones required to shift their position on this issue.

Sure, protecting monasteries and compensation for assets expropriated by Prishtina are both important. But they are second-order issues at best. If fixing these was all that stood in the way of a deal, Serbia would have recognised Kosovo years ago.

No, if Serbia is to recognise Kosovo, then the terms on which it does so must satisfy much deeper needs. Most importantly, they must offer some redress for what Serbia sees as the outrageous injustice of Kosovo’s illegal confiscation back in 2008, which struck at the very core of the Serbian soul. That is a matter of honour and basic self-respect.

And they must offer some solution to the dismemberment of the nation that follows from having an international border between Serbia and Kosovo. And that means resolving the question of which state the thousands of Serbs in Kosovo actually live.

If Belgrade is to recognise Kosovo, then these issues must be confronted head on.

But there is an elephant in the room in the form of the West, which stands foursquare behind Prishtina on the questions of Kosovo’s status and territory, leaving it no obvious reason to make concessions to Serbia. Why should Prishtina negotiate anything when powerful countries are pressing Serbia to just get on and recognise Kosovo?

The report doesn’t address this basic point. And that’s presumably because the author shares the prevailing Western view on Kosovo, that Albanians were the victims in the Kosovo crisis; morality is on their side; the Serbs deserve a bit of punishment; the issue of Kosovo’s status was resolved back in 2008; and, the fundamentals, like Kosovo’s population and borders are fixed. As it says of Serbia: ‘They must face the fact that Kosovo is lost’.

As a political position that’s fair enough – the author can think whatever he likes. But as a negotiating position, it’s a non-starter because the partner being asked to make a concession simply doesn’t accept that the fundamentals of status and territory are resolved, particularly if that means Serbia cannot satisfy its deeper needs.

And that effectively precludes any possibility of a successful resolution in which Serbia signs off Kosovo’s independence.

The report’s solution to this is a predictable one: put more pressure on the Serbs. Since they are clearly unable to see what is obvious to everyone – that Kosovo is independent – they need to be told the facts more clearly, understand what they have to do and then locked into a political process which forces them to do it.

The difficulty is that no one can make Serbia recognise Kosovo, even after all this. Not even Wolfgang Schauble. So the report also offers an enticement, namely membership of the European Union, which for a certain kind of optimist is the solution to all political problems in Europe.

But this ignores the fact that, outside the urban elites, most Serbs are just not that interested in the EU because, for good reason, they’re suspicious of the West. Sure, some would like Serbia to join it because that means work and money and a kind of respectibility. But as opinion polls make consistently clear, membership is supported by only a minority of Serbs and only 13% are willing to trade it for recognition of Kosovo.

There’s also the awkward fact that, with its unrelenting internal crisis and seeming inability to reform, the EU is not actually in any position to enlarge. On its current trajectory, by the time Serbia actually qualifies for membership, the EU may not even exist, at least in anything like its current form. If Columbia University hasn’t noticed this, the Serbs most certainly have.

The sad reality is that, far from resolving the Kosovo question, if Columbia’s approach were ever attempted, it would only complicate matters.

Notwithstanding the fact that it would fall flat since Belgrade would have no obvious reason to shift its position, the certain effect of trying to strong-arm Serbia into recognising Kosovo’s independence would be to whip up public resentment against the West and increase Russian influence – in other words, the very opposite outcome to the one the author claims to want.

How do we know? Because that’s exactly what happened when the same approach was tried last decade.

A Radical Suggestion

But it would not be fair to knock down Columbia’s proposal for resolving the Kosovo issue without putting up an alternative of my own.

So, here’s my radical suggestion: if we recognise the West cannot bully the Serbs into accepting its preferences, and we recognise that the West’s involvement in the negotiations is actually part of the problem, how about the West gets out of the way and lets Belgrade and Prishtina work out their own solution to the Kosovo issue?

In negotiating terms, this implies a very different methodology to the one Columbia University is proposing.

For one thing, it would mean that outsiders were diligent in maintaining a distance from proceedings and intervened only if negotiations completely broke down. Belgrade and Prishtina both want to fix Kosovo and, left to their own devices, they would do so in ways that reflected their basic values and beliefs, the facts on the ground as they stood and the balance of power between them.

In fact, if Belgrade and Prishtina were to reach a deal on Kosovo which had any domestic legitimacy, it would be vital it came from the parties themselves rather than imposed by a foreign ‘mediator’ who pushed his own interests or took sides in the discussion.

A second difference is that negotiations would be free of the excessive complications suggested by Columbia, such as deadlines, timetables, monitoring mechanisms, unity teams, interim agreements and so on. They could also proceed without the unnecessary distraction of linking each step to progress in a non-existent process of European integration. Instead, where there is a will to resolve the Kosovo question, the two sides could fall back on something much simpler and more meaningful – trust.

And a third difference, quite simply, is that the two sides would be free to put anything on the table they considered important, regardless of how unpalatable that was to the West.

The Deal

Pretty quickly, the two would start to focus to the key questions in this whole debate. On Prishtina’s side: Is Serbia willing to recognise Kosovo or not? On Belgrade’s: What compensation is Kosovo willing to offer Serbia if it does? What happens to those Serbs left inside the country after recognition?

And the near-certain outcome is that the two would settle on partition.

Serbia’s foreign minister, Ivica Dacic, has already put an offer on the table in which Kosovo’s Serb-dominated northern enclave passes to Serbia in return for Belgrade’s recognition of the rest. This fits with his idea of maintaining the unity of the Serbian nation and constitutes some satisfaction for Kosovo’s loss.

Meanwhile, from Prishtina’s perspective, giving away the north would not actually give away anything at all but merely formalise the political reality on the ground – that the north is functionally a part of Serbia. It would also put a brake on any larger claim to territory that Belgrade might potentially make.

So that would be the kernel of the deal: Serbia gets northern Kosovo and agrees in principle to recognise the south as an independent state.

The next issue would be the status of the Serbs left behind in Kosovo. And here the two sides could agree to create a small, autonomous unit for Serbs in the south which allowed them to maintain their way of life. The quid pro quo is that Prishtina could then reasonably demand an end to the complex arrangements that give Serbs massively disproportionate influence on Kosovo’s political institutions, including ten reserved seats in parliament (plus another ten for other minorities) and veto powers over matters of vital national interest.

In short, both sides would agree to leave the other alone.

With these fundamentals agreed, the way would be clear for Serbia and Kosovo to move onto the relatively straightforward second-order issues the Columbia report identifies, and even out any perceived iniquities. Among other things, Belgrade wants special protections for its religious and architectural heritage. Prishtina wants an account of missing persons and completion of the ‘normalisation’ process. And both sides want financial compensation.

Suspending Ideals

The difficulty, if anything, would be selling such a deal to the West which is committed to upholding the ‘multiethnic character’ of the Balkans. When Serbia raised the issue of partition in status negotiations last decade, diplomats immediately rejected it for fear of setting a dangerous precedent in the ethnically-divided states of Bosnia and Macedonia. Many also recoiled at idea of separating people along ethnic lines.

But if it came to it, the West would do well to keep its sights on the real issue in hand, which is to get Serbia to recognise Kosovo and remove a flashpoint for conflict. Partition is an ugly solution to any ethnic dispute but the people on the ground know better than outsiders how to solve their problems and, unlike in the West, the process of creating nation states is only now beginning in the Balkans.

So if that is what Belgrade and Prishtina freely agreed between themselves, and as long as their proposals were consistent with international law, the West should suspend its ideals and accept such a deal in the interests of a durable peace.

The consolation is that an agreement between Serbia and Kosovo that revised their borders would not automatically set a precedent for the rest of the region. As the West has long argued, Kosovo is sui generis and the fate of Bosnia and Macedonia depends far more on their respective domestic politics and the wider geopolitical environment than developments in Kosovo.

Moreover, to the extent that a deal between Serbia and Kosovo that revised their borders did set a regional precedent, it would be a positive one. The Western Balkans is handicapped by a mismatch of political and ethnic boundaries that has led to institutional dysfunctionality and economic stagnation.

If two of the region’s most formidable foes could find a way to disentangle their affairs in a peaceful, negotiated way, this would serve as a positive model for other states where the likely alternative to a negotiated settlement on borders is violent rupture followed by ethnic cleansing.

It may be annoying for peaceniks that Serbs have their pride and remain attached to traditional concepts such as nationhood, sovereignty and territory. Columbia University’s report displays all the frustrations of those in the West who despair at Serbia’s refusal to accept their enlightened, post-modernist vision for the Balkans.

But if they are genuinely interested in peace, they must stop expecting the Serbs to put aside their core values and interests and accept solutions imported from the West that reflect its own particular values and interests. As the tenth anniversary of Kosovo’s independence approaches, and with the issue of recognition yet to be solved, it’s high time they started to do so

*Timothy Less is the director of the Nova Europa political risk consultancy and a former British diplomat in the Balkans. He worked on the question of Kosovo’s final status in 2004-05.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of TransConflict.

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