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Can Macron’s ‘Fire And Fury’ Lead A Renaissance For Europe? – Analysis

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Macron, avoiding treaty changes, moves swiftly in proposing reforms to revitalize the European Union and France’s role.

By François Godement*

La furia francese – France’s fire and fury – was how Italians saw France’s repeated military campaigns after 1495, and these words have come to encapsulate a recurring French ambition and, sometimes, overextension inside Europe. Emmanuel Macron is giving the phrase new life.

For decades, France’s role inside Europe has been dwindling. Nicolas Sarkozy’s brilliant but tactical handling of the 2007 financial crisis was probably France’s leading contribution to Europe in recent decades, and it was not followed through. This is in part due to the political blockade against domestic reforms, making France a laggard among European economies and also due to three successive presidents – Jacques Chirac, Sarkozy and François Hollande – who shied away from making significant proposals for the European Union. Managing public anxiety and shielding France from direct impact of a global crisis turned France into a follower.

During that same interval, no other member state led Europe, not even Germany, unless one imports the Japanese notion of “leading from behind.” This could be a fit with Germany’s historically based reluctance to put itself in the firing line as well as Chancellor Angela Merkel’s well-known aversion to quick and high-risk decisions. Yet in a Europe that is not federal, not much can happen without a strong push by one or several core member states. Germany under Merkel has been unambiguously committed to Europe, but seldom shown the way forward, instead preferring to debate and move under the cover of European consensus. Only on the refugee issue did Merkel take a quick and decisive step – one that proved controversial inside Germany and with European neighbors.

Macron’s victory at the polls therefore came at a critical juncture for Europe. He has pushed back two decades of rising nationalist sentiment while embodying a sense of renewal as French politicians of the baby-boom generation exit a stage which they have monopolized longer than elsewhere in Europe. Two political camps have fought each other for decades over whom to subsidize and whom to tax in order to pay for continuing subsidies. The two are now in disarray. Macron broke with what had become France’s prevailing tactics – use its weight inside Europe and Germany’s need of a French proxy to delay major reforms: “Encore un instant, Monsieur le Bourreau,” or “Just a moment, Monsieur Executioner.”

Instead, Macron has moved to a dual strategy: Use European needling to push domestic reforms, leverage these reforms to lobby the entire European Union for deeper integration, and needle Germany in the direction of federal economic governance for Europe.

This last goal may seem trivial, given that it has often been German politicians rather than the more defensive French who advocated moving towards a federal Europe, starting with the notion of an elected European president. But Germany’s federalism has always stopped at the door of budgetary federalism. The euro – an extension of the former D-mark zone – was one step forward under Helmut Kohl–François Mitterrand leadership during the confident era of German reunification. A common currency without a common treasury may well be an oddity full of market risks. But a common treasury is a political risk – especially for the savers of the richest member state, who fear a run on their savings.  Macron has summed up the dilemma: “the German unthinkable is a financial transfer union, the French unthinkable is a treaty change.”

There are hints in his landmark September 26 speech and its bevy of proposals that Merkel and Germany are acknowledged as the key to change: “Everyone is used to not saying what he thinks or wants and to say that this is tactical,” but also, “I know that, as has been the case when [Merkel’s] country was confronted with historical challenges, she will react with audacity and a sense of history.” The pulling and tugging are apparent.

But Macron’s furia francese, as some conservative Germans and Europeans may be tempted to see him, is not without a strong sense of political expediency. After all, this is the man who since June seems to have disarmed a domestic uprising supposed to kill proposed labor and social reforms. Months of quiet bartering with unions and, for the most part, a careful balance of proposed changes, may have had their effect. His offer to Germany and Europe follows the pattern.

First, there is no unconditional ask – except democracy and the rule of law, a message to those tempted by authoritarian models – and instead, a deluge of proposals within which there is some give and take for partners. Indeed, Macron pulls back on a key issue:  mutualizing past member state debts.

Second, policy proposals are often for specific stand-alone European agencies that do not require treaty changes. His suggestions for common budget resources involve new resources such as a digital tax and carbon taxes, including at Europe’s external borders.

In France, Macron’s adversaries have begun describing this as a mishmash of proposals, rather than as the incremental federalism that they should see. And within these proposals, realism prevails, apparent in the strengthening of Europe’s borders against uncontrolled migrant flows and also in the proposal for a European Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency that sustains the call for a common defense strategy. To the central and eastern European countries where it is difficult to advocate a downscaling of the European posted worker rule, Macron holds out an ingenious incentive: posted jobs for workers in other EU countries would be subject to the host country’s social contributions, but these will be turned over to the country of origin for these workers. Macron strides the line between a renaissance of the European ideal and realist steering of Europe in a dangerous world – a line Merkel has found hard to navigate with the public opinion of her own constituents.

A president who just received a five-year mandate including a parliamentary majority should have the gift of time. Instead, Macron seems driven by a sense of urgency, as is the case for domestic reforms. Asking for a new deal, a new Élysée Treaty, between France and Germany by January seems like a tall order, absent a stable coalition in Germany. Calling for transnational party lists for the next European Parliament election that would compete for the United Kingdom’s former 73 seats is daring, since these elections will take place in May 2019, at most two months after the delay expires for Britain’s departure from the Union. All other reform proposals are timed to 2024 and the next European election cycle.

All of this has a chance of happening under two conditions. France’s economy must get a lift from the intended changes and therefore support renewal of France’s influence within Europe. And en même temps – “at the same time,” as Macron may say too often – French public diplomacy inside Europe must continuously manage the expectations of other member states as well as Germany’s. How to do so without ceding to hackneyed euro-south coalition politics against Germany, a sure proposition for failure?  How to help persuade German politics and society that sticking to the status quo will lead to a failure of Europe? That is Macron’s tall agenda.

*François Godement is the director of the European Council on Foreign Relations’ Asia & China program and a senior policy fellow. He is a non-resident senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC, and an outside consultant for the Policy Planning Staff of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His last published book is Contemporary China: Between Mao and Market, Rowman & Littlefield, 2015.


Hurricanes Cause Job Loss, But Household Survey Points To New Low in Unemployment Rate – OpEd

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Employment fell by 33,000 in September, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics establishment survey, the first decline since September of 2010. The drop was due to the effects of the hurricanes in Texas and Florida. This is shown clearly from the loss of 104,700 jobs in restaurants. Offsetting this bad news, the household survey showed the unemployment rate falling to 4.2 percent, a new low for the recovery. This was due to a reported surge in employment of 906,000. This increased the employment-to-population ratio (EPOP) to 60.4 percent, a new high for the recovery. The household data are erratic (reported employment fell 74,000 in August), so this jump is likely to be at least partially reversed next month.

Trying to pull out the effects of the hurricane is difficult. One item that is disturbing was a downward revision to the August job growth number by 51,000, going from 189,000 to 138,000. Since the reference period was the middle of the month, this was not the result of the hurricanes. The rate of job growth was already substantially below the 193,000 monthly average for 2016 and 226,000 for 2015. The downward revision for August and the decline in September pushes the pace down further, although October is virtually certain to show a sharp rebound.

There does appear to be a substantial uptick in wage growth in the data, with the average hourly wage rising 12 cents in September. This brings the year-over-year increase to 2.9 percent. The average over the last three months compared with the average for the prior three months rose at an even more rapid 3.6 percent annual rate.

However these numbers should be viewed with some caution. The hurricanes reduced hiring in the month across the board and the newly hired are generally the lowest paid. This compositional effect can be seen with the loss of restaurant jobs. Since these jobs pay over $10 below the overall average, the loss of more than 100,000 restaurant jobs has the effect of raising the average hourly wage by roughly 1 cent. This compositional effect is occurring within every industry.

There appears to have been a similar, albeit smaller effect, in January of 1996 when severe snowstorms across the Midwest and Northeast led to a loss of 15,000 jobs. The average hourly wage for production and nonsupervisory workers (the only series available for that period) jumped by 0.5 percent that month compared with 0.3 percent in December. It was flat the following month. It is worth noting in this respect that the pay of production and nonsupervisory workers rose by 9 cents in September and is up by 2.5 percent over the last year.

In addition to the fall in overall unemployment, other data in the household survey was overwhelmingly positive. The unemployment rate for blacks fell to 7.0 percent, tying the low hit in April of 2000, which is the lowest number on record. The EPOP rose to 58.2 percent, half a percentage point higher than the prior peak for the recovery. The unemployment rate for black women fell to 6.0 percent, the lowest on record.

The employment rate for prime age (ages 25–54) workers rose by 0.5 percentage points to 78.9 percent — a new high for the recovery but a level that is still 1.4 percentage points below the prerecession peak and 3.0 percentage points below the peak hit in 2000. The 85.5 percent EPOP for prime-age men is a new high for the recovery, while the 72.4 percent rate for women ties the peak hit in July.

The number of people who are incorporated and self-employed jumped by 145,000 to a new high. The average for 2017 is 460,000, or 8.6 percent, above the average for 2013. An increase in self-employment is one of the predicted effects of Obamacare since ending dependence on employer-sponsored insurance allows people to start their own business.

In spite of the hurricane-caused drop in employment, there is much positive news in this report, especially the continuing rise in employment rates for prime-age workers. However, it will be difficult to get a better sense of the underlying trends in employment and wage growth until we see the data for October.

Religious Exemption For HHS Mandate – OpEd

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President Trump did not let Catholics down: his administration has granted a religious exemption to the HHS mandate. Those employers whose “sincerely held religious beliefs” are compromised by providing for abortion-inducing drugs, sterilization, and contraceptives in their healthcare plans do not have to abide by the mandate.

By providing for the religious exemption, the Trump administration affirms conscience rights, a liberty trashed by the Obama administration. This means that organizations such as the Little Sisters of the Poor will not have to abide by healthcare provisions deemed morally offensive.

What still needs correction, not simply clarification, is the Obama administration’s pernicious attempt to redefine what constitutes a Catholic organization. Catholic entities that hire and serve non-Catholics do not lose their Catholic status simply because the government defines them as functionally secular.

This issue still needs to be addressed. Indeed, it is the most important matter in the entire HHS mandate controversy.

Can Mali Maintain Its Gold Mining Status? – Analysis

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By Joao Peixe

Mali’s gold exports are falling, and new discoveries aren’t enough to make up for the loss of its giant legacy mines, where production is already dead or winding down, and the fate of one of the biggest of them all—Sadiola—now hangs in the balance.

The world-class Sadiola gold mine needs an investment of $380 million to keep it open for another 10 years, accessing 3.4 million ounces in reserves.

The Sadiola Gold Mine in Mali. Photo via OilPrice.com
The Sadiola Gold Mine in Mali. Photo via OilPrice.com

But there are signals that negotiations over the deal to extend the productive life of Sadiola by at least another decade have stalled within the government, putting the investment at risk.

The reason for the stalled negotiations remain unclear, but what’s at stake for Mali is as visible as ever: Sadiola is crucial for Mali’s reputation as one of Africa’s top three gold producers. Next to this, it is a crucial lifeline for new jobs and much-needed state revenues.

How the stalled negotiations over Sadiola are resolved could be a litmus test for a government heading into elections next year—and a government that relies heavily on foreign aid, while working hard to create an attractive investment climate.

The investment climate in theory has improved immensely in recent years, but putting this into practice has proved to be challenging in this terrain.

So far, it’s been moving in the right direction. But many industry eyes will be on the Sadiola deal ahead of the Invest in Mali Forum 2017, which will be held in Bamako in early December and supported by the World Bank.

Sadiola—A Legacy with a Lot More Gold to Give

The Sadiola mine is a joint venture between Canadian miner IAMGOLD (NYSE:IAG) (TSX:IMG) with 41 percent, operator AngloGold Ashanti (NYSE:AU) with 41 percent, and the Government of Mali with 18 percent.

Located in southwest Mali near the border with Senegal in a remote part of the Kayes region, the giant Sadiola permit covers 302 square kilometers.

The existing plant was built to process soft rock, or oxides, and the soft rock is now running out. But Sadiola has much more to give with the massive hard-rock, or sulphides, deposit that lies beneath the depleted oxides. This is now a ‘hard rock’ story, and IAMGOLD and AngloGold Ashanti are keen to invest in a major plant modification that would enable hard-rock processing.

The Sadiola mine has had a major, positive economic impact on Mali since it opened in 1997, following liberalization of the sector. That same year, gold had already become the primary source of Mali’s foreign currency. By 1999, it had become its biggest export. By 2001, Mali had risen to become the third top gold producer in Africa.

Location of Sadiola Mine in Mali. Graphic via OilPrice.com
Location of Sadiola Mine in Mali. Graphic via OilPrice.com

It wouldn’t have happened without Sadiola—one of three key mines behind Mali’s preeminence as an African gold giant. The other two mines are Morila and Yatela.

The Morila mine, owned by Randgold Resources, AngloGold Ashanti and the government, is scheduled to be closed down in 2019, after producing over 200 tonnes of gold since it opened in 2000.

Yatela—a joint venture between IAMGOLD with 40 percent, operator AngloGold Ashanti with 40 percent and the Government of Mali with 20 percent—has already reached the end of its productive life, and closure activities continue.

Originally, Yatela’s planned mine life would have seen it closed in 2007. But the exploration efforts of IAMGOLD and AngloGold Ashanti extended the life of the mine by an exceptional seven years. The partners continually opened up additional economically exploitable deposits at Yatela, pushing the closure back repeatedly.

But Yatela is much more expensive to exploit than Sadiola, which has been producing gold at a lower total cash cost.

If negotiations fail over the terms necessary to invest in Sadiola’s ‘hard rock’ gold, much could be lost.

What’s at Stake for Mali

Mali’s industrial gold production rose negligibly from 2015 to 2016, with 2015 coming in at 46.5 tonnes and 2016 just squeaking past at 46.9 tonnes, according to Reuters. But total gold exports fared even worse, falling from 70 tonnes to 67 tonnes during that same period.

With Morila winding down, Yatela closed, and Sadiola stuck in apparent bureaucratic purgatory, the next couple of years will be an uphill struggle to maintain production—even with new discoveries.

Mali’s state revenues from mining companies rose only 1 percent last year—but it wasn’t due to an uptick in exports; rather, gold prices saw a bit of a bump.

Indeed, industrial gold production will fall this year to 45 tonnes, with no new mines slated to come online until 2018—if all goes well.

With gold representing about 25-30 percent of government revenues, getting more out of a giant legacy mine like Sadiola is critical.

So, what’s at stake? Nearly 56,000 tonnes of ore containing 3.4 million ounces of gold. And these are proven and probable reserves, which already have a demonstrated economic viability.

Though the ‘soft rock’ is nearing depletion, the ‘hard rock’ is bursting at the seams, and Sadiola is ready to fast-track its expansive development. But getting past the politics in Mali is no easy task—even when you have a track record of extending the life of another legacy mine—Yatela—for seven years.

Sadiola has been operating for 20 years. Because the soft rock is being depleted, production has dropped from 600,000 ounces in 2000 to less than 200,000 ounces today.

But it could go for another ten years if IAMGOLD and AngloGold Ashanti are given the green light to invest some $380 million to process the hard rock.

Not only government revenues would increase, the investment would create additional jobs for Malians.

Sadiola, with soft-rock production slowing, is now employing around 1,000 people, 93 percent of whom are Malian nationals. If Sadiola’s hard-rock expansion plans are green-lighted, it would not just protect, but expand those jobs for a country that is struggling to keep its growing numbers of young people gainfully employed.

And for Mali, this means much more than putting food on the table. For the government, it means security. With over half of the Malian population under the age of 35, and that figure expected to double by 2030, there is a direct link between unemployment and crime or terrorism. And when criminal-terrorist groups offer money for new recruits, security is increasingly compromised.

Getting the Gold Out

The Sadiola mine is surrounded by some 46 villages and a few hamlets, as well as a mining village created specifically for Sadiola employees, with housing, a medical clinic, recreation facilities, a supermarket, a sewage treatment facility and recreation facilities, among other things.

Water comes from a 55-kilometer pipeline from the Senegal River, providing the villages with drinking water and the mine with water for operations. The site and its surrounding villages are powered using diesel-fueled generators.

Sadiola’s expansion project will use existing infrastructure, but also build new infrastructure. The plan is to connect the mine to the Malian power grid, which may also facilitate distribution of electricity to local villages.

But 2018 is an election year, and in Mali, this means uncertainty, especially for the fate of mining deals, but also for the investment climate as a whole.

IAMGOLD, for one, is closely watching the developments, and what they might mean for the investment environment.

In an interview with Oilprice.com, IAMGOLD CEO Stephen J.J. Letwin noted that the “Sadiola mine has been a remarkable success for all stakeholders in Mali for two decades.”

The Canadian giant has operating mines in Burkina Faso, Suriname, Mali and Canada, and exploration projects in Senegal, Brazil, Mali, Canada and Nicaragua.

While Essakane, in Burkina Faso, is IAMGOLD’s biggest mine and its most prolific, Mali was “the birthplace of our company,” Letwin said. “And we will always be committed to exploring opportunities in Mali, and West Africa more generally.”

IAMGOLD did not comment on rumors of a possible deadlock over the Sadiola deal.

To make Sadiola work for Mali and its people, the energy-intensive expansion to access the deep sulphides requires a world-class miner and the right economics. The gold is there, the economics are there from a mining perspective, and the miner has been there successfully for 20 years and is particularly known for an intense focus on mine optimization—but the government, whose representatives are struggling for political capital ahead of crucial elections, is hamstrung.

In the meantime, 3.4 million ounces of gold remain stuck in the hard-rock at Sadiola.

Source: http://oilprice.com/Metals/Gold/Can-Mali-Maintain-Its-Gold-Mining-Status.html

Political Islam Vs A Secular State: Struggle For European Autochthonous Identity – OpEd

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Introduction

The Islamic world, since the incident of Sidi Bouzid, a Tunisian city where a teenager set himself on fire, is going through a series of major political changes that are of historical proportions. However, the tendencies to embrace a renaissance of “Arab Republic” as a modern institution of democratic governance, after the evergrowing presence of Political Islam, appears to have failed and is fading away.

In the United Nations Report on the situation of Arab world, drafted by Arab Human Development Report in 2009, in the context of “Arab Spring” was emphasized the exploding state of political affairs, eclectic backwardness and violence. Meanwhile the deterioration of educational policies from authoritarian governments, made it easier for political Islam to penetrate and become an offensive doctrinal force among the young European generation.

If the major world threats of XX Century were coming mainly from Europe, today the Near East and the Far East (those countries with authoritarian government systems and with muslim ethnic majority in their respective populations), and very often the Balkan Peninsula is included in this equation, as a major regions where Global Peace is in constant danger.

Turkey has drafted the “depth of strategy” as its doctrine in service to a rebirth of the Ottoman Empire, in her view of geopolitics towards the Near East and Far East, but also towards Southeastern Europe, as a counter response to the Russian Expansionism and Western European influences, as a result Political Islam is considered by Ankara as a naturally convenient ally.

The political destiny of Illyrian Peninsula and of all Europe, very similar to the era of George Kastriot Skanderbeg, where the resistance led by Arberia Principality was determinant to safeguard Europe, there are real threats that could revive the same scenario over the next decade, through the creation of an Albanian Federation as a neo-albanian product of political doctrine, consecuently reviving the autochthonous European identity. The return of Skanderbeg in today’s political memory has occurred for the same reasons that he was previously raised in the zenith of history as a European heroe – with the defense of European values during his lifetime. Our time is harboring an ideal opportunity for the Albanian nation to set the record straight and advocate for a new European period, always based on its untarnished past.

1. Modern State

In the historical perspective of state formation, from the ancient times all the way to the present, the concept of statehood has often been used to encompass all shapes of political power, without any necessary differentiation according to historical periods and development of states in this process. In this context we have the power of pharaons, in the ancient city—states, the power of Rome, for various states in Medieval Times (Bruner: 1962:252), for the state-principality, the state of nobility, early modern state (Wimmer 1995) and lastly for modern state (for example Poggi 1978).

As it is rightfully emphasized by all of these contemporary scholars, such an attitude takes us to a number of blatant misunderstandings. The notion of a state through the meaning that we currently know is a product of a multifaceted development that has taken place over a long period of time. According to Benz, in the XVII century takes place the modern notion on state formation, that is relevant to political sciences and practice in general (Kosellock 2006: 288-291; Meyer 1950; Quaritsch 1970: 27-36; Weinacht 1968).

Even today the State as a modern concept continues to be the subject of theoretical analysis and infinite political discourse. For the definition of a modern state there are many views that encourage Berki to reiterate once again that “there is a general agreement that modern state is an enigmatic occurrence.” (Berki 1989:12).

Different to theoreticians of judical sciences, experts in the realm of politics, with a highly empirical thought, as we are mostly “focused on the ‘governments’ and ‘political systems’ while renouncing to a skeptical metaphisics field of ‘state’ for institutions and practices, that can be measured ‘with an optimal operational exactitude’” (Almond et. al. 1988: 872; Easton 1981). 988:872; Easton 1981).

A State in the modern sense compared to other alternatives of political organization, including empires, city states and association of states into fragile federations etc.; has proved to be more effective. A modern state has immediately reflected a greater potential of delivering services and obligations that benefit their respective citizens, therefore creating better living standards and ensure a universal wellbeing.

Of course, such an organizational form of government has always been improved, while focused in the four strategic thrusts that are well known from state formation theories:

  1. Defense of public order and international security, including the viable conditions for a comfortable life;
  2. Strengthening and building to a desirable and emotional level the state system that enables the creation of a collective identity (the purpose of an identity);
  3. Creating a level of public relations that furnish the execution of political decisions (Purpose of Legitimacy);
  4. Shaping early economical conditions that facilitate an acceptable welfare system as well as a steady economic growth, as an assurance for the citizens’ wellbeing overall.

These objectives, acquired a greater priority among Western European governments, especially after World War II, and emerged as political values. The ever growing policies that strengthen accountability on top of government administration, for the defense of each arm of statecraft and then on a cumulative setting, created a political stability on most of the countries of Western Hemisphere, after the Second World War.

The most important duty of a modern state is to take care of all its people and citizens, while ensuring a dignifying life style, freedom, employment, economic growth and proactive social policies, all of these must not be articulated only on empty rhetoric, instead, they should be the framework of every government and statesman.

Switzerland through a total reform of its federal constitution (April 19, 1999), which is considered among the most modern constitutions of our time, but organically has secured a full respect and natural changes, respectively becoming a product of the first constitution (1848 and the following reforms of 1874 and 1999), obviously it is reformed and equipped with a language and modern requirements of societal developments in Switzerland, it has sanctioned obligations and duties of the modern state. With this political act, the duties of the modern state shaped within the language of most important and legal document of the state, not only embody a modern content, but also have come to be very effective. The Helvetian Federation is considered as one of the best models of modern statehood.

Here are some of the essential duties of the modern state according to the Swiss Constitution:

  1. The state defends freedom and the rights of its people, it preserves independence and national security.
  2. The state encourages and promotes wellbeing, sustainable development, cohesion and cultural diversity.
  3. The state ensures an equal treatment among all citizens.
  4. The state is committed to defend the natural resources and human life for a peaceful societal order and independent international posture.

In the history of the state’s vertical rise, from the charismatic all the way to a traditional or rational state, respectively to the modern state, the human society as an organized political community; appears to find its utmost fulfillment in the modern state. This is why the XXI century is characterized as the century of modern state.

2. The State of Justice and Political Islam

Historical progress in the realm of political and judicial development and in the relations of the state with the individual is a product of political history, respectively the political developments in Europe. The XVIII century and XIX Century are characterized with political developments of historical proportions that would pave the way of convincing citizens that the Law will be the set of rules that legitimizes the exercise of power among government leadership instead of God.

Those who have the power become ‘the servants’ of the people and are legitimate only if they exercise the will of the people. This way it comes at the fundamental changes of the State, from the structure of a monarchy to an abstract institution, constructed over special laws. The State has been transformed and became the State of Law, built over the principles of constitutionalism.

According to Hagen Schulze, the revolution of 1789 did not overthrow the old state nor it created the new one, but it established the old order, the good one.

As a result the foundation of the state did not experience any changes, because the French revolution failed, meanwhile the dictatorship of Napoleon paved the road of establishing absolutism, regardless of the fact that absolutism in France never reached a level of perfectionism on any given period. After the revolution, France finally encompassed and finalized the process of centralization and unification all the way down to the smallest provinces.

In this period, through the hegemonic power that was exerting, France was commended and had a significant influence, as it became the model state for all Europe. The French Revolution for the first time even legitimized violence. The citizens, based on the inspirations of this revolution, were ready to jump into barricades in order to defend their rights, political ideals and freedoms.

In a number of states were created the conditions of solving contradictions among different societal stratas and classes even through violence, allowing the government to exert violence in the name of defending the highest national and state interests, respectively, while giving sway to legitimize the exploitation of one class by another, of one ethnicity by another etc.

The consequence of this atmosphere was the Revolutions of 1830 and 1848. It was evident that the Government needed a new structure, but also finding new ways of operations, while calling upon the legitimacy that a ruling class had acquired by law with the intention to bring the people closer to the government.

This right was founded on the idea of the establishment of a nation. Meanwhile the swift development of a nation – state facilitated the right conditions for a modern state only by connecting it strongly with the state of law. As such, the modern state, as we saw above, has obligations and tasks to serve all citizens, without any exception, while creating the conditions for its further improvement, without hindering the traditional political spaces of a nation-state, which is the foundation of a modern state and the state of law, to avoid merging it into an empty space.

On the contrary, as it is articulated by Wilfried Dettling, we will have a deficit in democracy. As a result, aside of the state, will appear relevant actors in the stage of international affairs, as we know the case of Islamic State (ISIS) in the Near East, or even global enterprises, particular groups of interest and non governmental or non-profit organizations.

2.1 Democracy and Political Islam

Freedom and equality are two basic principles of political utopia that are intertwined in the political philosophy of social state, and that in a latter stage, were embodied in the modern constitutions of states such as United States, Germany, France, Switzerland, Sweden and marking a judicial revolution that open the road to political ideals, meanwhile neoliberal politics, everywhere, is transforming this utopia into an irrelevant set of values and is sliding it into point zero.

The neoliberal experiment in Europe during the last decades, has demonstrated that it remains one of the serious factors that is threatening the perspective of historical projects, just like European Union. Even those who aspire to bring forward the project of European Union together with the prosperity of Democracy cannot tolerate furthermore the experiments in the economic and social systems, let alone the strengthening of right extremist popular parties that have been spread across many countries (Hungary, Netherlands, France).

In this context of interests we should study the phenomena of Political Islam and its penetration in Kosovo and throughout the Albanian territories. It appears to be a political project shaped by the agendas of anti – Albanian centers that is seriously threatening our nation. Let’s remind ourselves that Political Islam should be a priority in the agenda of national security, treating it as it is: a serious threat and for enticing violence and division within the Albanian nation for its long run geopolitical positioning in the western hemisphere and ensuring its insertion into the European family.

The handling of these phenomenas with perilious measures for the society does not tolerate the luxury to ‘feel comfortable’. Neoliberalism and right wing populist movements in Europe, the same as Political Islam in the Arab world and beyond, meanwhile we are witnessing that such trends are not positive or ambivalent in relation to democracy, freedom and the state of law. On the contrary, such attitudes and trends are harmful and highly destructive.

2.2 The incompatibility of Political Islam with Democracy

Over the possibility of bringing closer, respectively the coexistence between the values of democratic order – freedom, on one side and Political Islam on the other, and the dilemmas where further augmented especially after the inauguration of the so-called new democracy of Egypt. At that time, Muslim Brotherhood had come to power in Egypt thanks to free elections.

Meanwhile, one year later, when demonstrations erupted against the regime of Mohamed Morsi, and generally the Arab Spring as a torch of freedom, was spread from Tunisia towards Syria, and later on, in summer 2013, would shake President Erdogan’s Turkey, immediately thereafter we experience a tremendous expansion of dilemmas in the possible coexistence of Political Islam and Democracy. In her book Christine Schirrmacher “Islam and Democracy: a contrast” (2013), has intensively addressed these matters.

At the end of her work, Schirrmacher excludes the unavoided question pertaining to the reports between Islam and Democracy. She testifies on her exhausted analysis that, despite the free elections in Egypt and Tunisia, the political parties with an Islamic background had a social priority and their victory was not disputed at all.

This happens regardless of the fact that they have never detached themselves from their political aspirations that are associated to applications of the Shariah Law. Meanwhile, taking this into account, it further deepens its study in order to further reflect, deduce those parts in the Shariah Law and in the Koran that are against the fundamental democratic values. In her interview for bucer.de newspaper, she expressed her opinion: “The majority of opinion makers and Muslim theologians are totally against democracy, as a way of government.”

A well known politologist of Heidelberger University Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Merkel advocates the thesis that Islam and Democracy are not compatible, due to the fact that Islamic world does not acknowledge the separation of state, law and religion. Moreover, American politologist John Waterbury classifies the Near East region as ‘singularly inhospitable to legal pluralism and democracy.”

Results from empirical studies also demonstrate the incompatibility of Islam with Democracy, especially Political Islam. The fall of rightwing dictatorships in Greece, Portugal and Spain in the middle of 1970s, was the widest spread of real democratic governments across the history of humanity. Until 2000, in this democratic wave there were included over 87 former dictatorial countries, former autocracies, where the basic values of democracy were applied for the first time, including the freedom of expression and free elections.

From a total of 192 states (admitted members of the United Nations) in 2000, 121 of them were qualified by the Freedom House as electoral democracies. In this group there were only 11 countries where the majority of their population was of Islamic faith. Meanwhile from 47 countries with a majority of Muslim population, in 2000, only eleven of them had resulted to be practicing, embracing minimal elements of electoral democracy; therefore 77 percent of these countries were ruled by dictatorial regimes.

On the other hand, there are 145 independent countries that belong to non Islamic societies as a religion, 110 of them were qualified as electoral democracy. This quota is 76 percent of the entire concert of nations; 24 percent of these countries have autocratic regimes. Such a number appears to be even smaller when aiming to certify the list of countries that are qualified as electoral democracies.

Freedom House has made eligible the following nations as democratic countries: Albania, Bangladesh, Djibouti, the Gambia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Turkey. Meanwhile from the 16 countries that are in the center of Islamic world (expanding in the Middle East and Northern Africa), there was not a single one of them that fulfilled the minimum of democratic values, to be considered as electoral democracies.

Politologist Volfgang Merkel, in the context of Universal Forum of Sudwestrundfungs, 2003, with the topic “the Clash of Civilizations – the West and Islamic World”, at the end of the forum he stated, if these ‘democracies’ would undergo through a more rigorous evaluation, not a single one of them would pass the rubicon and be considered as states of law where democracy prevails.

At the end, democratic order is based over the principle of being represented and with this is conditioned the length of government mandates that is running through a strict control. Democracy is the foundation of political values; democracy is above all a political culture of pluralism and disagreement, based on core values combined with the acceptance of diversity.”

Does this mean that had these people been living on a real democracy, are naturally relieved from Political Islam, would they embrace these democratic values?

2.3 Turkish Experiment and Real Democracy

European Democracy and Western Democracy has generally passed through the struggles of social revolutions that have been led by intellectual confrontations between the illuminists and the overall scientific world on one side and the Church as an institution on the other side, in order to accomplish the democratic revolution (1789) that separated the State from Church and the explicit cultivation of secular thought as well as the appropriate rapport of state and religion.

Since Sharia and Koran have gone through a critical thought, the chances for democracy to have the possibility of development and real cultivation would be open, as Christine Schirrmacher articulated, but in fact this would happen only when in the Islamic World would begin the era of changes that is led by theological interpretations, she concludes.

In fact everywhere just like in the West and the East, the threat of regressive regimes, the overthrow of social order from democracy into dictatorship, is not something new. Just like Hitler in Germany, the same as Slobodan Milošević in Serbia, both of them have come into power from free elections. A similar trend is taking place in most parts of Eastern Europe.

Such a transformation becomes even faster, when governments threaten the freedom of media, the basic freedoms and above all these leaders are incapable to guarantee the equality of citizens before the law. These values are not simply a genuine component of a democratic order. They are extremely important for the survival and development of democracy as a social order and as a progressive framework of political values.

Something similar is taking place in the Turkish system and implemented by the Justice Party. The branding of neoliberalism with an oriental figure, that was promoted by this political force during this period of economic boom for Turkey, the extremist right populism and Political Islam, a mix in its own right, had no choice but to produce a political crisis that has engulfed Turkey’s present political reality.

The experiment of Erdogan and his team in their aspirations to resuscitate Turkey’s expansionist ideology based on the neo-Ottoman philosophy that has been openly proclaimed by him and the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlut Cavusoglu, are not ambivalent nor positive in relation to democracy, freedom but also for the perspective of the Turkish Republic.

At Erdogan’s figure attentive scholars would observe his propensity to call himself as a modern Sultan, identifying himself with Sultan Mehmet II, who had expended the empire in the territories of what is today Iraq, Syria, Egypt (1517), and establishing his courts in Constantinople. Obviously, he aspires to experience the limelight of ottoman empire in the XVI century when it was expanded from the Arabian Peninsula all the way to Algeria in Northern Africa and from Anatolia to the outskirts of the Balkans – in Southeastern Europe, and made the empire into a superpower of the time with an expansion in three continents, and today Erdogan’s Turkey, through the political platform of Ahmet Davutoğlu (The Depth of Strategy), as he aspires to re-establish this empire.

The Muslim community in Kosovo, the Justice Party, the “Fjala” Movember and “Besa” Movement in Macedonia, inspired by the incursions from Mr. Erdogan’s team, are becoming the voice and promoters of expansion of Turkish hegemony, respectively the penetration of neo-Ottomanism in the Albanian regions.

Such an expansion, not only cultural, that is dedicated to the development of new mosques and reconstruction of the old ottoman mosques, the opening of a network of schools, with direct investments and stimulated from the Government Policy of Turkey, has as its fundamental objective to implement the aggressive posture of President Erdogan that was articulated in the spiritual capital of Albania, Prizren: “Kosovo is Turkey and Turkey is Kosovo.” The accomplishment of such a strategic objective, Recep Tayyip Erdogan considers Political Islam as an optimal ideological instrument, as an added tool with tremendous value.

* * *
After the changes of the coup d’etat in July 2016 and the declaration of the state of emergency that continues to take place until today, accompanied with the incarceration of hundreds of thousands of political opposition leaders, and their liquidation, the state of law is paralyzed completely, today Turkey is living one of the rarest political crisis, that could easily end up being a civil war.

Political Islam, that is cultivated by Erdogan and not only by him, has already taken into control the power that comes from the state and power, while completely ignoring the democratic norms. The polarization of the society is an unavoidable process. The highest levels of Turkish justice system, the Attorney General’s office, the top layers of independent justice, are going through a permanent political pressure that has been coming from Erdogan’s administration for a number of years. The clash of these two systems could not be avoided.

When the Supreme Court of Administration decided to declare as illegitimate the order of Erdogan to the National Police, only a few months before the coup d’etat, an order that obliged national police to present first of all the requests for investigation to the Ministry of Interior before sending to the Attorney General’s office, the attitude of Erdogan was the same as was from his despotic predecessors centuries earlier. I am the state, as a result I am also the law, Erdogan was trumpeting, as he was ordering the judicial branch to behave in accordance with his interests and suitable to his party’s interests.

As Seneca used to say: “Religion is trusted by kids; the intelligent underestimate; and statesmen use it.”

3. Political Islam

With the terminology “Political Islam” is understood as the way of Islam becoming a theory of thinking and actions within the state. This way of reading has provided a genuine political character to Islam, which testifies that such a religion, from the beginning was essentially a political act. These views that are spread in the West and Arab World, has a real foundation. In fact, political history of Islam ensures us that a discourse constituted over political Islam is a product of historical circumstances and of its early beginning.

In his book entitled “Handbook of Political Islam” authored by Thomas Schmidinger, has brought in a summarized fashion the history of definitions, giving us a concise version of Political Islam. He considers Political Islam as “a gathering concept for all movements and groups, who don’t understand Islam as a simple religion. These groups consider Political Islam always conceived as the road map of political action that always inspires and motivates the Islamization of society and politics.”

As a roadmap to political action, the religion of Islam has embodied these features since its founding. Political and social ideas during its historical development and even through the research in the literature of Islamic thought; starting with Islamic theology, to Islamic philosophy all the way to Islamic law. In one of its studies Tamara Sonn, defines Political Islam as a specific ideology that appeared in the 1920s. As a motive she sees the catastrophic socioeconomic state among the Arab people and the failure of secular governments. In essence Political Islam contains three primary elements: politics, justice and theology.

3.1. Political Islam and PanArab nationalism

In order to better understand the Political Islam, there is a need to take a peak, even briefly, the secular reforms that are intertwined with nationalism and socialism, as two separate paradigms, immediately after the postcolonial period, that are present everywhere in the Islamic world. The aim to present the superiority of Islam against Christianity as a concurrent religion, has been venerated as a favorable starting point on the anti imperialism and colonialism in Europe. But the critical study of the Koran brings us to the clear political conclusions that have to do with the Islamisation of all people, as a result even its Arabization.

”It goes without saying that Arab unity requires the creation of a political union of the different Arab countries the inhabitants of which speak Arabic. As for Muslim unity, that naturally requires the creation of a political union of the different Muslim countries, the
Inhabitants of which profess the Muslim religion, regardless of the variety of their languages and races.”

“It is clear that the Arab Union aspires to develop the political union of various arab countries, the inhabitants of which speak Arabic…” without excepting even the possibility of including inside this political culture other non-Arab nations, but belong to Islamic faith.

A well known Islamologist, Muhamad Anvar Shaikh, is shedding light on this platform of pan-Arab nationalism. “Even though Islam has caused so much damage to the national Muslim identities that are non-Arabs, much more damage than any other blunder, that could have happened to them, regardless of this situation they believe that this religion is the Ambassador of Equality and love among people.

1a. Equality – This is a fantasy, displayed with great professionalism. Indeed, Prophet Mohammad separated the humanity into two parts: in Arabs and non Arabs. According to this categorization, while using the card of Arabian cultural imperialism, the Arabs are the rulers and the non Arabs are those who are suppressed. Islam is the way of accomplishing this dream, because its basis takes up to the sky the Arabian superiority, causing this way to its non Arab successors a sort of inferiority in their national identity.

From the Arab point of view, this manner appears to be extraordinary, marvelous and mysterious, but it is destructive, for non-Arab Muslims. However, under its psychological effects, they are happy all the way to self destruction, while hoping that the prophet would reward them with the luxury of paradise.

2b. Islamic love for humanity is a myth, of large proportions. The hate towards non-Muslims is the foundation of Islamic resistance. He is not only declaring non Muslims as inhabitants of evil, but attempts to light infinite flames and tensions between Muslims and non–Muslims, this is even more threatening than the idea of Karl Marx over social conflict, which he indoctrinated to keep alive his theory. While keeping in mind the deep tendency for the glorification of Arabs, Islam is not characterized as a faith, but as a National Arab movement.

Its success is embedded in the total transformation of its non-Arab worshipers, who have rejected their national roots, to adore and pray the sanctity, superiority and Arab egoism. Its spring is the mythical negotiating ability of Prophet Mohammed. Such a psychological paralysis is causing the fall of large Asiatic nations, such as India, Egypt and Iran, which had emerged once ‘as the greatest introducers’ of civilization, but are currently ranked as members of the ‘Third World’ due to the loss of their national identity and (agility) under Islamic indoctrination. (…)“

Anti-historical attitude, in concert with the philosophy of a Haxhi Qamilist style of some sectors of our Islamic clergy, are the real testimony that, in Albanian regions, the combination of Arabian cultural imperialism with the neo-Ottoman political agenda, has radiated its first results that are evident and represent the real threat for our nation. The first step towards loosing national identity in the interest of religious identity has already been established. First I am an Islamic citizen, then Albanian, are the words of all Salafism and Wahabism worshipers throughout the Albanian speaking regions.

Islamic scholars, from Afghan all the way to Qutb, have tried to secure for the political Islam a solid cultural foundation. Such a discourse was based mainly on the works of Afghan. However the architects of Political Islam have taken advantage of the social and economic backwardness; nonetheless the theoretical base of political Islam remains the anti-colonial warfare.

Political Islam in the Arab world for a certain time had lost terrain, until Hamas would take power in the first legislative elections of the Palestinian Authority in the western shores, in 2006. The refusal on the side of Hamas to recognize Israel and withdrawal from possible negotiations table that would lead towards the recognition of the Hebrew State, had convinced the latter to take the Gaza Strip as a preventive security measure, with which there have been extinguished the hopes for the solution of the conflict in the Middle East, while leaving a vacant ground for Political Islam as a dominating Ideology in the Arab World.

3.2. The Definition of Political Islam

For the scholars of Arab World, according to contemporary politologists Holger Albrecht and Kevin Köhler, it is very clear that Palestinian Hamas due to the resistance against Israel, is rightfully characterized as a militant group, since it has not rejected violence, but in the ideological realm, there are apparent differences with political Islam and its true supporters – Saudi Arabia, which is characterized as the state that is led from the ideology of Wahabism. Ryadh has brought to the world attention a whole list of groups that support Political Islam, despite the fact that they may not be characterized as militant groups that are present and operate in Arab countries.

In other words, the connection between ideology, radicalism and militantism of Political Islam in connection to acquiring a set of tooks for political purposes, is not even sighted, respectively determinant. This is also the fundamental reason why it becomes so difficult to reach an overall accepted consensus on the definition of Political Islam. However, one of the most accepted definitions over Political Islam is particularly the study of Albrecht and Köhler. They characterize Political Islam as any shape of action, that is encompassed by the accepted values of Islam and simultaneously, while forming part of this setting, are able to gain support for the very same political group and mobilize other groups.

Just like in the German speaking countries and in the roman speaking countries, even in the Albanian Language there are differences of view points and misunderstanding even in the terminology framework, when we are dealing with political Islam. Very often there are drawn parallels, by mistake, between the notion of “Fundamentalism”, “Fundamental Islam” and of “Political Islam”. Such confusion occurs due to the fact that we consider these concepts as a product of western political thought, whose source is the philosophical source of Christian Civilization Albanians, are also part of this civilization.

The notion of “Fundamentalism” that is explained in the professional literature in English Language, French, German, but also in Albanian Language, as a determining field of political Islam, its main source is the Western Christian Tradition and as a result it is not in a full concordance with the real notion of political Islam. “Fundamentalism” in the western way of understanding is a terminology that describes a rigid theological tendency of worshipers with the Bible, and has to do with Protestantism.

But in the modern era, Political Islam appears to be a renaissance of pan-Arab nationalism. In fact such a national renaissance of Political Islam appears overwhelmingly under the shadow of international terrorism such as Al-Qaeda, meanwhile it is perceived in its full understanding as a challenging force to western civilization, within the concept of Islamic fascism.

The Introduction of superiority of Islamic Empire is cherished, over all, as a strong basis to counter the European colonialism and imperialism. Such a theoretical thesis is not only valid to all political actions, but also in the approach towards the government. The ideological rise of Political Islam becomes even more complex after September 2001, when the Western World woke up under the anxiety of terrorist attacks in New York and Washington DC.

In some countries that are characterized as the world of Islam, already Political Islam is considered as an established Ideology. The common factor of all these countries is deeply ingrained to the failure of secular state. Today political Islam has become a daily topic, not only in the Arab and Islamic World, besides misconceptions is infusing fear and panic everywhere, but also expectations and hopes for a category of citizens. There have been conducted a series of researches focused on political Islam.

Nonetheless, many of these studies have not taken into account the social circumstances, cultural and historical contexts upon which took place and begun to raise political Islam. Sometimes the responsibility is falling upon the anarchist religion, which “since its inception and notion…is a condition that in modern times, secular, which has separated from religion the concepts of human rights, democracy and pluralism, once again would succumb the absolute will into a divine state that is assumed or invented.”

3.3 Islam of public life – the primary objective

A matter that unites the ideologists of Political Islam, respectively their objective, everywhere and in every region, remains the goal of giving an Islamic orientation to public life. The motion of Political Islam intertwines in essence the ideals and accomplishments, respectively to instill the cultural values of Islam and ensure that Islamic cultural values are deeply ingrained in the public life. Generally speaking, we can already state that Islamic leaders have accomplished their objectives, including the Albanian speaking regions.

This trend is spread everywhere in the Albanian regions, with a heavy presence in Macedonia and Kosovo. It is evident everywhere. The construction of mosques in the oriental or Arab style is becoming predominant (with a larger prayer square), during the Friday prayers and during all celebrations, in squares and streets, with the organization of iftars and also the use of covered faces of women in public and the marching of youngsters with short pants and long beards.

Such demonstrations in roads and circles similar to demonstrations of fascist style (organized completely by Albanian speaking forces), during WWII it was know as the Skanderbeg Batallion, the mission of today’s Islamic worshipers, is the same, and totally clear.

Islamization of public life is clearly seen in the town centers (especially in Prishtina and Skopie), where the Arabic life style is obvious (Hallal food services, hospitals, kindergarden for kids, schools …that have adjusted all meal times based on the schedule of prayers. The persistence of Islamic organization to take under control all funeral processes, including the public cemeteries, while imposing their own rules to non-Muslims, and through such measures other religious communities have requested for the first time the establishment of cemeteries that would be used by other religious groups in Prishtina, Kosovo.

The State Concessions towards such a tendency and becoming a prey of Islamic public life has just begun. This process, if it does not go through an eruptive national awakening of the style of Albanian Renaissance movement, soon will be very hard to deter and contain!

But the resistance against these trends has just started. It is much more present among the people, middle class, it is even more present than what politicians have ever thought. The resistence is even more centered among those economic stratas that had exerted a political resistance against the Serbian power, and is identified as an accomplishment of former political dissidencia who was jailed. This type of resistence will take an even clearer shape with national orientations during the coming years, becoming a true political movement, its inspirations will derive from Albanian Renaissance leaders, including national hero George Kastriot. As a a result the conclusion of Political Islam in essence is totally against the western civilization principles such as: illuminism, liberalism, universal human rights, democracy, the separation of State and Religion (Secularism), the separation of powers and respect of ideas over human dignity, on the right of free personality development and equality before the law, is gaining ever more traction and is expected to secure a greater people’s support.

4. Political Islam among Albanians – a product of foreign political agendas

The expansion and influence of Islam in the middle of Albanians has been connected with the invasion of Ottoman Empire. Since the second half of XIV Century when Ottoman invasion towards the Balkans and Albania were becoming ever more intensive, Albanian princes were obliged (…) to accept the capricious attitude of the Sultan, and as his vassals, would send their kidnapped sons to the courtyard of the Ottoman Empire. In Costantinople, after they were converted into Muslims and acquired the appropriate training, they were in charge of specific military and appointed to important government offices, while reaching top positions in many occasions. The islamization of parts of feudal elite in Albania since the first decades of its invasion marked the inception of the first Islamic Community of Albanians.

During the XV-XVI centuries the dynamics of Islamisation of average population was implemented in larger proportions, especially in the cities of Kosovo. The reason is fully objective. The Albanian population of Kosovo was at this time under the political occupation of Serbian State; meanwhile the religious power was exerted by the Patriarch of Peja.

As a result, the liquidation of Serbian invasion and weakening of the Serbian church’s leverage with the predominant imposition of Ottoman invasion and its Muslim religion, the local inhabitants took advantage and escaped from the influence of the Serbian Orthodox church, while embracing the Islamic Faith as a tool of their ethnic expression from Serbians. While beginning from the XVII Century, the historical sources elaborate on the massive desertion of Christian faith and increase of popularity of Islamic faith.

The observation of dynamics in the Islamic process shows that in the middle of XVIII Century the new religious structure of Albanian people, meaning the number of Christian worshipers and those who had become Muslims had reached stabilized levels, which would slightly change over time until the modern days. Such a massive religious conversion, received many public reactions, one of the local measures was the application of secret christianization (chripto-christianism). The secret Christianism represents a temporary state of a double faith, based on which Christian individuals were accepting Islam only formally, only to avoid the payment of additional taxes and to enjoy equal rights with the Muslim population in the social life. Meanwhile in public these individuals appeared as Muslims with Muslim names, went in mosques, at their homes, secretely maintained Christian rites and mores.

A special case of a large group of villages that were pursuing a double religious life, were a series of villages in the mountainous region of Karadak of Skopie and Gjilan. This is the region where Idriz Seferi, was born and grew up, one of the epic fighters of Albanian Independence, who had also adopted the life of a crypto-catholic. After the liberation of Kosovo (1999), sections of this population returned publicly into Christian religion. As we know an important place was also given by the council of Arberia (Lezha, 1703) under the direct auspices of Pope Clement XI. This way of coexistence in a bi-religious setting came to an end in 1744 with a special papal decree.

With all of the massive conversion, Islam as a religion was not able to ignore some of the ethnopsychological characteristics including the attitude of Albanians. To the contrary, parts of the Albanian regions that went through the conversion process, since they embraced the alternative options of Islam – Sufism as a multisect trend, including tarikat and bektashi, simultaneously were shaped with the idea of autonomy in political administration. According to Prof. Dr. Kristo Frashëri: “The factors that made this sect even more attractive to Albanians in the XVIII Century, was the appreciation of Albanian identity in the cultural movement and principles of local autonomy in the field of state administration.”

However the conversion of a large portion of Albanian population converted into Islam has a number of consequences in the field of spiritual culture. But religious diversity had played a positive role in the process of national identity formation therefore these consequences were transferred all the way to our time in regards to the formation of political ideas and the lineage of geopolitical character. Religious diversity would be used, later on, by nationalist ideologies and chauvinist movements of neighbouring countries.

4.1 The Madrasa of Skopie “Alexander Gjorgevic” and Political Islam

The beginning of political Islam in the Albanian regions is shaped in the Serbian political project for the invasion of Albanian lands and their peoples’ displacement from Toplica and Pusta Reka. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be projected as the main purpose of expanding the influence and hegemony of Serbia during the process of fulfilling the national Serbian code, that are projected into two representational texts of classic Serbian Nationalism – of Ilija Garashanin (Nacertania – 1836) and that of Vuk Stephanovic Karajic (“Srbi sfi i svuda – Serbians all over the world – 1849), and that of Vuk Stephanovic Karaxhic, at the brink of the Berlin Congress (June 1878), the Serbian expansionism, based on nacertania, would be headed towards the south – expanded in the Albanian regions (already when the Sanxhak of Nis, Piroti, Leskoci and Prokuplja would be secured with a respective agreement ahead of the Berlin Congress), where Novi Pazar, Kosovo, Macedonia were included.

The conclusions of Berlin Congress had an epochal character for the Serbian expansionist politics. It was not only focused on the recognition of state sovereignty of Serbia, but also to fulfill the national code of Serbia, especially in relation to Albanians and the threatening of their vital interests. With the invasion of the Nis region and ethnic cleansing of Albanians, was promoted the example on how to further act in the accomplishment of a “New Serbia.”

The Serbian State would be fully established under the guidance of a homogenous national state that would be expanded towards annexing Kosovo and Macedonia (1912). Such a permanent expansion of Serbia against the interest of Albanians, as it is testified in history, was also a product of the Serbian myth over Kosovo in a way and shape that were fully updated, which also happen to be the center of geopolitical discourse at that time. After the re-invasion of Kosovo and Macedonia from the Serbian Army in 1918, were closed almost every Albanian public schools that were especially opened in the territories of Augsburg Empire, there were tolerated only the Arabic and Turkish schools installed in major mosques.

According to Serbian ideologists, these actions would contribute towards a faster assimilation of Albanians. Such a project was state sponsored, and brought Islamic clergy from Bosnia and Herzegovina and also through the opening of a large Madrasa in Skopie, in 1924, in the function not only to the dissimilation, but also to the assimilation of Albanians, while creating this way an ideal scenario for the creation of conditions to stimulate and establish political Islam. A number of scholars and clergy who had come from those madrasas, as part of the political scenario and promotion of political Islam, had served under Serbian rule to exterminate and ethnic cleansing of Albanians towards Turkey and Syria, while vacating large cities and towns (Skopie, Prishtina, Gjilani, Kumanova and others). That wave of ethnic cleansing would only be stoped by the Second World War.

In the new geopolitical conditions created in the beginning of the Cold War, the population of Albania and Kosovo, Macedonia, such as the one in Sanjak, would be faced with the last era of these massive ethnic cleansing during the period of Yugoslav Communism (1949-1963). Only during the years of 1948-1962 approximately 300 thousand Albanians were violently displaced and were sent to Turkey.

4.2 ALAUDIN Madrasa the continuation of the “Alexander Gjorgevic” Madrasa

In the last decade of the XX century, in Kosovo again would be repared the whole arsenal of violence with the proportions of a genocide of Serbian power towards ethnic cleansing, very similar to what had been done in Toplace and Pusta Reka (1878).

Surprisingly or not, with the Alaudin Madrasa in Prishtina, Belgrade would act the very same way as it did with the madrasa of Skopie (Alexander Gjorgevic), while maintaining the control over it, as it has been embraced earlier in the community of Sufism, and while intensifying the penetration of political Islam among the cadre of myfties and imams in Kosovo.

Albanians, after the redrafting of the Constitution on March 1989, would be expelled from the political institutions, academic and science entities, but they would be tolerated to develop ‘some activities’ in the fields of science and culture, and even faced by the challenge of constituting the so-called Parliament of the Fictitious Republic, at the very auditorium of this madrasa! The results of these political and military duty, have been reflected particularly after the separation of Serbia from Kosovo (June 1999) and during these years, when radical Islam has installed a rigorous control over this madrasa, as well as over the general Islamic community.

Again, in the alliance with Turkey, the breadth of neo-ottomanism paired with Serbia’s Special warfare, has created new connections that appear to be antihistorical, that are already representing a threat to security and perspective of the nation. In this overwhelming class of politics and political Islam, respectively the Islamic Community in Kosovo, already under the double layered control (on one side from Erdogan, and on the other side by the Government of Kosovo as a strong Ally of Erdogan), the threat is much more prevalent.

About this matter, Ismail Kadare (a world renowned Albanian poet, currently among the candidates who has been nominated multi times to receive the Nobel Prize, and awarded previously many prestigious awards, is warning all of us and chiming the alarming bells:
“It is certain that the factions are paid by Serbia and Turkey! Free Albanians are beginning to loose confidence with European Civilization. Does this seem as if Albanians don’t know how to live in freedom? Yes, it sounds accurate, and as a juxtaposition of this unfortunate trend it is required to consolidate the national union. Away from the radical clerics and those who have no religion! George Kastriot Skanderbeg would have many more statues to be raised new memorial plaques in honor of his legacy; and why not to match the number of mosques with the number of new statues of Skanderbeg. Who does not trust that Serbia pays Radical Islam on one side, and on the other side complains to the western powers by suing them: “This is why you bombed us in 1999 for the mosques of Albanians!”

The Serbian Fascist propaganda while playing with many cards, sometimes accuses Albanians as “foreign part” in Europe, classifying them as a nest of ISIS in the Balkans, and sometimes as an influential instrument of Western powers.” Even according to Ivica Dacic, Foreign Affairs Minister of Serbia, the purpose of Albanians was ‘the creation of larg Albania”. In the style of Goebbels he is insinuating that “this large Albania is threatening to be ‘the most vital state in the Balkans’ and an instrument of Western influence in the region.”

But this is not enough for Serbian representatives to convince Western Diplomatic Platforms, he is screaming in order to remind us again about the so called “green transversality”: Albanians are planning to unite the Northern Kosovo with Sanxhak in order to ‘renew the ottoman territory’. ‘A connection between “Islamic Kosovo” with Sanxhak, according to Minister Dacic it would be a greater fiasco for the Serbian People, and even greater than any other loss of Serbian people in the XX Century”, this was stated in his interview for FAZ, and brought to Albanian language by Deutche Welle.

4.3 Mosques as a base of Political Islam

Albanian conservatives and religious fanatics are generally marginalized as small groups of people, but they appear to be well organized and very active. They are already stretched in big cities and even in some rural areas, where poverty is at high levels. Security personnel have shared for BIRN that “the strictest shapes of Islamic faith had been engrained after the war, while following the trend of Islamic organizations of assistance and education of the local clerics and those from Arab countries.

While interviewed on the condition of anonymity, security officials have stated that up to fifty thousand people, have started to pursue more conservative reforms of islam. There is no way on how to independently confirm this number, that represents a small part of the population in Kosovo, calculated to be at approximately 1.8 million inhabitants.

But the ever growing presence of the two most popular sects dedicated to radicalization – the salafies and haunefies, meanwhile is very present and aggressive. Their connection with political Islam is not only something of ideological character. They ‘tend to describe themselves as defenders of Islam that are against the western seculiarism over Kosovo.

As stated by the Kosovar officials of Security, in the conditions of anonymity, shared with BIRN, “the suspected extremists there have been 30 out of 650 mosques under surveillance.” A good portion of the mosques already are transformed into hubs of political extremism and ‘centers of ideological indoctrination’ from fascist Islam preachers.

But the aggressiveness of these circles has increased especially with the start of the war in Syria and Iraq and with the emergence of Islamic State. The Police states that approximately 300 men and 42 women are believed to have left Kosovo, with a population of 1.8 million to unite with Islamic State – this is the highest recruitment level per capita in Europe, after Bosnia and Herzegovina. The participation of a relatively large number (over 300 people) in these wars with political anti-civilized agendas, have mobilized not only the citizen counteractions, but also the institutional structures. Already it is clear, the distinction between traditional Islam among Albanians and Political Islam in a long run, makes the difference between peaceful Albania of our dreams and today’s Syria.

5. Albanian Federation – a field of a new political doctrine

Just as it is potentiated the lack of a sole center, unifying, historical, regional for the Middle East, at the same time there can be stated that after the fall of Yugoslavia, and the Balkans is lacking such a center of gravity. The efforts to revitalize Yugoslavia through the creation of a New Yugoslav Federation (5+2: the former five Federal Units of Yugoslavia, without Slovenia and Croatia, plus Albania and Kosovo), now under the Berlin Process and with the crowning of this initiative in Trieste, while promoting the common market of this space, as a precondition and temporary replacement of the EU aspirations, demonstrate more than anything else the absence of a geopolitical agenda from Brussels and Berlin for the Balkans, more than a real tendency for the creation of a sole geopolitical center.

The declarations of the Serbian President that Belgrade can be considered as the political center of Balkans, after all that turmoil and violence at the proportions of a genocide that Serbia has committed in Kosovo, talks more about the absence of political will of Brussels, to consider Albanians above all, as a political factor and security factor in the Balkans, more than having real opportunities for Serbia and Belgrade to become a center of heavy political weight in the region. The tendencies to withhold the factorization of the Albanian Nation are already open. The latest tri-partite meting: Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria on 13 July 2017, in Salonica, of the Prime Ministers of Greece and Bulgaria Aleksis Cipras and Bojko Borisov and the President of Serbia Aleksandar Vucic, had this objective.

This is why the creation of Albanian Federation is transforming into a political imminence. The new political doctrine should incorporate in itself this process of national factorization. Albanian Federation would balance powerfully the power among nations in the region, while creating real aspirations to reflect objectively towards foreign factors and its influence in the future positioning of a clear geostrategic character, certainly including the geopolitical center of gravity.

5.1 Albanian Federation – as a coronation action in the construction process of a nation state

In the contemporary literature is strengthened the concept of a wide understanding for the notion of a ‘nation’ based under the political context. It is unified, in the fundamental concept of a state. It is melted in the notion that marks the establishment of the state. But not always a state is united with a nation. There are many cases when a nation is divided in a few states (the case of Koreas, Azerbaijan, Kurdish population, etc.)

According to the republican expression in France, the nation “should be one and inseparated” (From this tenet comes the concept that a nation is predetermined to form a state and only serves wholeheartedly without being divided). According to this concept, “a nation” was a group of citizens; their collective sovereignly is constituted in a state, as an expression of their political will. In this definition, the ‘equality of nation – state – people, especially the sovereign people, certainly connects the nation with territory, as long as the structure and identification of a state are already central territories.

This concept according to Hobsbaun; means the majority of nation states that are constituted this way and that has been the fruit of the peoples’ decision and actions.
The nation is a testimony of the greatest cohesive power for the integration of the goup members. The history as a special value that marks a nation in its shared memory from the past; plays an important role. It is also reflected in the actions, attitude of a nation’s relation with its neighboring countries, just like in the daily lives, and also in its own perspective. This is evident in our age, the so-called integration of many nations, and is experienced specifically in Europe today.

The process of creation of nation states is already considered to be a closed process in Western Europe almost in all of its territory. There are open cases of growing nationalism in Scottland, Ireland and Spain. Such a process has a real potential to be implemented through the use of referendums and political will. There is no way in avoiding the right of people to express their preferences, especially as it happened in Kosovo, after its liberation, to the Albanian community!

The creation of Albanian Federation is connected and interdependent exponentially with the cohesion of political forces in the two existing Albanian Republics. This process means the process of strengthening and expanding the political landscape that have as an aspiration to unite the Albanian nation, but also to furnish a vivid political and financial support from the Albanian Diaspora with able legislators and equipped with the right political will in order to accomplish aspiracions, share sacrifices and support necessary compromises.

Meanwhile, these political forces should be further developed in order to implement a new model of thinking that would enable the recognition of gobal political tendencies, while employing them in the national interest. If the Anglo Saxons, after World War II were focused in the construction of this method of political thinking, while taking into account aspects and geostrategic interests, on the other hand the French, aside from their territorial aspirations, had also cultivated the philosophical and ideological concept through the strengthening of social and political sciences.

At the same time the philosophical and ideological component of Albanians for the creation of Albanian Federation and expansion of their influence in the region require a combination of the two schools that are emphasized above, while adding to them the military concept of thinking. Such a concept, would give to the Albanian Federation a greater weight in the eyes of our geopolitical allies, above all infront of United States.

5.2 George Kastriot Skanderbeg – a model of a hero and Albanian politician with European Identity

The fulfillment of obligations in the field of partnerships and geostrategic ties and that of security with USA, would be even more real in that positive energies of our young generation would be channeled clearly and straight forward. Only then the agenda of Russian influence in the Balkans would reach the end in the Southeastern Europe and the dreams of neo-ottomans would be vanished in the Balkans.

This is also the reason why Europe of many centuries ago had embraced George Kastriot as its most important hero while attempting to consolidate the nation-state in Europe, and refreshing Skanderbeg’s legacy in the memory of Albanians to ensure the preservation of their nationhood. The political fate of Ilirian Peninsuna and of that of Europe at the same time, in the late medieval centuries (XVII-XVIII), was clearly shaped thanks to the role and resistance played by George Kastriot Skanderbeg.

The return of Skanderbeg in the political memory of today has to deal with the very same motives that have made him a European hero, centuries ago. The defense of European Civilization, not only from political Islam but also from the clashes among various princes of modern Europe have become important objectives and political challenges that are making modern Europe to struggle until today. The transformation of Albanian space in the field of defending political Islam, not only returns the Albanian nation into its full European identity, but also gives to this nation the role of guardsmen for this identity. As a result, Albanian Federation has a vital role in Europe. George Kastriot Skanderbeg, above all, would have to re-emerge and be preserved as a model of Albanian politician with European identity. The time has reserved for Albanian nation an ideal opportunity to correct a whole era, filled with tides of century old wars and conflicts.

Conclusion

Islam as an ethical framework, but also as a private faith, should not have been positioned against democracy as a societal and judicial order. Sufism, as one of the waves of Islam, or the other Islam, as it is named by Robert Shvarc, that represents the spiritual and practical side of islam as a religion, why not even other waves, through the activities that are connected with prayers and fasting, should not have fallen in contrary positions against democracy. Nonetheless, this is valid only for Islam as a personal faith, not for Islam that is a legal system that defines values, norms, and is indeed the theoretical base of Political Islam.

Political Islam today is the existing ideology of Islamic Fascism that was unraveled in Syria, Iraq, and in other areas of the near east. As an ideology of Islamic Fascism, Political Islam appears through the macabre acts of terror throughout Europe; meanwhile the Albanian space is putting at serious risk the existence of Albanian nation.

The Defense of European civilization, an authentic part is also the Albanian civilization, from Political Islam, takes an immediate historical character. In this context, through the Albanian federation the Albanian territories are turned into a buffer zone of defending our identity and European civilization against Political Islam, while returning Albanian nation into its full identity.

Literature of reference:

1. Arthur Benz “Der moderne Staat”, München. 2008
2. Christofer Pierson, Shteti modern, AIIS, Tiranë. 2009
3. Michael Zürn, Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaates, Frankfurt am Main. 1998
4. Stefan Breuer. Der Staat.Entstehung, Typen, Organisationsstadien. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt. 1998
5. ASHSH/IH: HISTORIA E POPULLIT SHQIPTAR, I, Tirnaë. 2009
6. Hagen Schulze, “Staat und Nation in der Europäischen Geschichte”, Botimi i dytë, München. 2004
7. Maximilian Lakitsc, Der Politische Islam, Graz. 2009
8. Albrecht, Holger dhe Köhler, Kevin. Politischer Islam im Vorderen Orient. Baden-Baden. 2008
9. Kristo FRASHËRI, Lidhja Shqiptare e Prizrenit 1878 -1881, Toena, Tiranë. 1997
10. Sadri Ramabaja, Federata Shqiptare – Kohezioni i shtetit-komb në BE, Lubjanë. 2016
11. M.Gj.Miliçeviq: Kraljevina Serbija – Novi Krajevi, Beograd. 1884
12. Waterbury, John. Democracy Without Democrats? The Potential for Political Liberalization in the Middle East, New York.1994
13. Wnfried Dettling, Utopi und Katastrophe, Die Demokratie am ende des 20. Jahrhunderts, Berlin. 1996
14. Dietmar Mueller, Staatsbuerger auf Wideruf, Wiesbaden. 2005
15. Saul Bernard Cohen, Gjeopolitika, Tiranë.2016

Internet sources:
1. Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft
2. http://www.zhurnal.mk/content/?id=1771314305360
3. Ismail Kadare: http://www.pamfleti.com/serbia-nga-njera-ane-paguan-radikalizimin-islam-nga-ana-tjeter-ankohet-fuqive-perendimore-duke-paditur-ata
4. Arbana Xharra: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/grat%C3%AB-e-reja-nga-kosova- prijn%C3%AB-kampet-n%C3%AB-isis-01-22-2016
5. Arbana Xharra: https://albemigrant2011.wordpress.com/2013/01/30/arbana-xharra-carjet-ne-fe-alarmojne- kosovaret-2/
6. DW: http://www.dw.com/sq/idet%C3%AB-e-da%C3%A7i%C3%A7it-shqip%C3%ABria-e-madhe-zon%C3%AB-influence-e-per%C3%ABndimit/a-40091858
7. https://www.bucer.de/ressource/details/bonner-querschnitte-292013-ausgabe-264.html
8. http://www.islam-watch.org/AnwarSheikh/Islam-Arab-
Imperialism6.htm

India’s Women Need To Break Vicious Cycle Of Malnutrition And Poor Education To Escape Poverty

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Bringing more women into the workforce will take a systemic change involving a range of efforts, including improved nutrition for mothers and babies, keeping girls in school and bringing dropouts back, and providing vocational training, Amitabh Kant, Chief Executive Officer of NITI Aayog, said in a panel discussion today on India’s Women in the Workforce.

Women’s contribution to GDP in India is 24% as against 48% on average worldwide, Kant said. India’s challenge is huge and multidimensional – children are born into cycles of poor nutrition and education, which they never escape. To break these cycles, India needs targeted policies on improving infant and maternal nutrition, and girls’ and women’s education. The government is pushing through a range of solutions to this end – by ensuring that all direct-benefits transfers are made into the mother’s account, for instance.

At the same time, India displays the paradox of women topping nearly every competitive examination in the country, outnumbering men in the best colleges, including in the STEM fields, and making great strides in sectors such as financial services that are male-dominated in the West. This not only is a result of wide income and wealth disparities – some women from well-off and educated families are able to pursue their studies and careers almost unhindered – but also reflects some happy socio-economic coincidences.

In the financial services sector, for instance, 25 years ago the client base became more women-centric at the same time as global firms entering newly liberalized India offered an attractive mix of maternity leave and flexi-work options. Today, women who entered the sector then are among its most recognizable faces. “Having said that, the financial services sector has its own struggles,” said Manisha Girotra, Chief Executive Officer of Moelis and Company, India. “Other than the top 15-20 women you see, we still struggle to retain women.”

To change this, India needs to change mindsets, Girotra said. Employers must work to help families take pride in a woman’s job, to have male colleagues or seniors take ownership of women’s success, to not “form boys’ clubs at lunch tables” but integrate women and make them part of the team. At the same time, she said, the government must improve law and order to ensure women’s safety.

Kant agreed, pointing out that state governments that are responsible for law and order must step up to this challenge, and adding that state governments’ efforts to help women create self-help groups have enabled millions of women to pull their families above the poverty line across the country. Among the federal government’s efforts, the start-up financing programme MUDRA is issuing over 70% of loans to women entrepreneurs, he said.

The business case for employing more women is clear, Al Rajwani, Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director of Procter & Gamble, India, said – diverse teams deliver better results. With the right government policies, corporates feel comfortable initiating innovative ideas, he said, giving the example of the Swachh Bharat programme that is building toilets everywhere, including the government schools, so Procter & Gamble designed a programme on menstrual health in schools that fits in with its feminine hygiene product range.

There is much that business leaders can do within their organizations – create networks to support, mentor and retain women, let male managers know it is their responsibility to ensure women are well represented, and let it be well-known that there is zero tolerance for sexual harassment, among other things, Rajwani said.

Skilling, upskilling and reskilling women workers is another step businesses can take, said Dipali Goenka, Chief Executive Officer and Joint Managing Director of Welspun India, adding that, in her company’s experience, it has helped reduce attrition rates.

India is very diverse and would need specific, micro-level solutions, although the expanding gig economy is certain to make it easier for more women to work as it will eliminate traditional obstacles such as rigid working hours and safety issues.

Why Are Washington’s Clients Getting Cozy To Moscow? – OpEd

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Turkey, which has the second largest army in NATO, has been cooperating with Russia in Syria against Washington’s interests since last year and has recently placed an order for the Russian-made S-400 missile system.

Similarly, the Saudi King Salman, who is on a landmark state visit to Moscow, has signed several cooperation agreements with Kremlin and has also expressed his willingness to buy S-400 missile system.

Another traditional ally of Washington in the region, Pakistan, has agreed to build a 600 mega-watt power project with Moscow’s assistance, has bought Russian helicopters and defense equipment and has held joint military exercises with Kremlin.

All three countries have been steadfast US allies since the times of the Cold War, or rather, to put it bluntly, the political establishments of these countries have acted as virtual proxies of Washington in the region and had played an important role in the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991.

In order to understand the significance of relationship between Washington and Ankara, which is a NATO member, bear in mind that the United States has been conducting air strikes against targets in Syria from the Incirlik airbase and around fifty American B-61 hydrogen bombs have also been deployed there, whose safety became a matter of real concern during the failed July 2016 coup plot against the Erdogan administration; when the commander of the Incirlik airbase, General Bekir Ercan Van, along with nine other officers were arrested for supporting the coup; movement in and out of the base was denied, power supply was cut off and the security threat level was raised to the highest state of alert, according to a report [1] by Eric Schlosser for the New Yorker.

Similarly, in order to grasp the nature of principal-agent relationship between the United States on the one hand and Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on the other, keep in mind that Washington used Gulf’s petro-dollars and Islamabad’s intelligence agencies to nurture jihadists against the former Soviet Union during the Cold War.

It is an irrefutable fact that the United States sponsors militants, but only for a limited period of time in order to achieve certain policy objectives. For instance: the United States nurtured the Afghan jihadists during the Cold War against the former Soviet Union from 1979 to 1988, but after the signing of the Geneva Accords and consequent withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the United States withdrew its support to the Afghan jihadists.

Similarly, the United States lent its support to the militants during the Libyan and Syrian civil wars, but after achieving the policy objectives of toppling the Arab nationalist Gaddafi regime in Libya and weakening the anti-Israel Assad regime in Syria, the United States relinquished its blanket support to the militants and eventually declared a war against a faction of Sunni militants battling the Syrian government, the Islamic State, when the latter transgressed its mandate in Syria and dared to occupy Mosul and Anbar in Iraq in early 2014.

The United States regional allies in the Middle East, however, are not as subtle and experienced in Machiavellian geopolitics. Under the misconception that alliances and enmities in international politics are permanent, the Middle Eastern autocrats keep on pursuing the same belligerent policy indefinitely as laid down by the hawks in Washington for a brief period of time in order to achieve certain strategic objectives.

For example: the security establishment of Pakistan kept pursuing the policy of training and arming the Afghan and Kashmiri jihadists throughout the eighties and nineties and right up to September 2001, even after the United States withdrew its support to the jihadists’ cause in Afghanistan during the nineties after the collapse of its erstwhile archrival, the Soviet Union.

Similarly, the Muslim Brotherhood-influenced government of Turkey has made the same mistake of lending indiscriminate support to the Syrian militants even after the United States partial reversal of policy in Syria and the declaration of war against the Islamic State in August 2014 in order to placate the international public opinion when the graphic images and videos of Islamic State’s brutality surfaced on the social media.

Keeping up appearances in order to maintain the façade of justice and morality is indispensable in international politics and the Western powers strictly abide by this code of conduct. Their medieval client states in the Middle East, however, are not as experienced and they often keep on pursuing the same militarist policies of training and arming the militants against their regional rivals, which are untenable in the long run in a world where pacifism has generally been accepted as one of the fundamental axioms of the modern worldview.

Regarding the recent cooperation between Moscow and Ankara in the Syrian civil war, although the proximate cause of this détente seems to be the attempted coup plot against the Erdogan administration in July last year by the supporters of the US-based preacher, Fethullah Gulen, but this surprising development also sheds light on the deeper divisions between the United States and Turkey over their respective Syria policy.

After the United States reversal of “regime change” policy in Syria in August 2014 when the Islamic State overran Mosul and Anbar in Iraq in early 2014 and threatened the capital of another steadfast American ally, Masoud Barzani’s Erbil in the oil-rich Iraqi Kurdistan, Washington has made the Kurds the centerpiece of its policy in Syria and Iraq.

Bear in mind that the conflict in Syria and Iraq is actually a three-way conflict between the Sunni Arabs, the Shi’a Arabs and the Sunni Kurds. Although after the declaration of war against a faction of Sunni Arab militants, the Islamic State, Washington has also lent its support to the Shi’a-led government in Iraq, but the Shi’a Arabs of Iraq are not the trustworthy allies of the United States because they are under the influence of Iran.

Therefore, Washington was left with no other choice than to make the Kurds the centerpiece of its policy in Syria and Iraq after a group of Sunni Arab jihadists transgressed its mandate in Syria and overran Mosul and Anbar in Iraq in early 2014 from where the United States had withdrawn its troops only a couple of years ago in December 2011.

The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, which are on the verge of liberating the Islamic State’s de facto capital, Raqqa, and are currently battling the jihadist group in a small pocket of the city between the stadium and a hospital, are nothing more than the Kurdish militias with a symbolic presence of mercenary Arab tribesmen in order to make them appear more representative and inclusive in outlook.

As far as the regional parties to the Syrian civil war are concerned, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the rest of the Gulf Arab States may not have serious reservations against this close cooperation between the United States and the Kurds in Syria and Iraq, because the Gulf Arab States tend to look at the regional conflicts from the lens of the Iranian Shi’a threat.

Turkey, on the other hand, has been more wary of the separatist Kurdish tendencies in its southeast than the Iranian Shi’a threat, and particularly now after the Kurds have held a referendum for independence in Iraq despite the international pressure against such an ill-advised move.

Finally, any radical departure from the longstanding policy of providing unequivocal support to Washington’s policy in the region by the political establishment of Turkey since the times of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk is highly unlikely. But after this perfidy by Washington of lending its support to the Kurds against the Turkish proxies in Syria, it is quite plausible that the Muslim Brotherhood-led government in Turkey might try to strike a balance in its relations with the Cold War-era rivals.

 

Sources and links:

[1] The H Bombs in Turkey by Eric Schlosser: http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-h-bombs-in-turkey

Trump’s Shifting Argument Against The Iran Deal – OpEd

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No doubt about it, US President Donald Trump is now gearing up in the Iran demonization department and increasingly sounding like a nuclear ventriloquist whose voice of criticism of the Iran deal rings hollow, substituting slogans for a rational discourse.

A week after his Defense Secretary James Matties told the US Senate that the Iran deal is in US’s national interest, Trump is now contradicting Mattis and a number of other influential members of his administration, including the Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, by claiming otherwise. Trump’s reported readiness to decertify the Iran deal next week and to brand it as contrary to US national interest will, of course, trigger a rainstorm of controversy, in light of the strong defense of the deal by the other five countries that authored the deal after marathon negotiations.

Upping the ante against the deal by raising the volume of verbiage against it, but scrapping the deal by some vague references to the US national interest is quite another.

The deal is pretty much certified as upholding by Iran by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which in turn makes it nearly impossible for Trump to claim that Iran is in technical violation. Calling it a bad deal and, at the same time, blaming Iran for violating the “spirit” of the agreement is also contradictory, the latter sounding as if Trump actually respects it as sound and defensible. But, he cannot have his cake and eat it too, as the saying goes, and the chips must fall down one way or another.

The problem with resorting to the national interest argument is that it is largely subjective and subject to varying interpretations, given the mix of national security, economic, and other interests involved, whereas what is needed for a sober assessment of the nuclear deal is the objective criteria set by the IAEA, in other words, international norms that are used as the standard for making sound assessment of the subject matter, that is, the level and scope of Iran’s compliance with an international agreement that has been blessed and authorized by the UN Security Council.

As a result, Iran is within its rights to complain to the UN Security Council against the US for dishonoring Resolution 2231 that the US fully endorsed two years ago. No amount of diplomatic back paddling by Trump, who lacks international credibility after so many missteps including his warmongering speech at the UN last month, will suffice to convince the international community that he is on the right track with respect to Iran.

US’ European allies, including England and Germany, have forcefully defended the Iran deal and would be hard pressed by their public if they choose to follow Trump’s new track against Iran. The European Union is also a chief supporter of the deal and it is quite unlikely that the EU will make any sudden turnabout on a deal it has praised on numerous occasions. US will, therefore, be inclined in the days to come toward a pathetic situation of acting alone on Iran, thus adding to the US administration’s pile of international problems, in other words a recipe for disaster.


Mending Russia-Saudi Arabia Ties: King Salman Makes Landmark Visit To Moscow – Analysis

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King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud became the first Saudi monarch to visit Moscow, and this trip has been hailed by both governments as historic. The relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia have often been strained in a geopolitical lens on issues like Syria and Iran.

However, the two countries signed agreements on weapon sales, trade, oil, energy, and have also pledged to work together to resolve Middle East regional issues peacefully. Even though Moscow and Riyadh are on opposing sides in the War in Syria, relations have improved in recent years. Deputy Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman has held several meetings with President Vladimir Putin that can help expand peace and prosperity for both countries.

King Salman’s visit to Moscow highlights Russia’s growing power in the Middle East. The Saudi king is not only trying to find a political supporter after the defeat of the Islamic State, but he is also looking for a military market that can drive out the last remaining strongholds of DAESH.

Since the continuing fall of oil prices in mid-2014, Russia and Saudi Arabia, along with OPEC and non-OPEC members, agreed to extend production cuts of around two million barrels a day. Moscow and Riyadh’s increasingly growing ties can allow them to cooperate on stabilizing the global oil market.

One of the interesting focal points of Moscow’s diplomatic role in the Middle East has been its ability to maneuver with its partners as not only a regional power, but a global power. So far, Russia has been able to hold a lot of stake in the security and political dimensions of the Middle East’s growing powers like Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.

The visit by King Salman creates a new opening for Russia to economic and security interests in the gulf. The million-dollar question many analysts would ask is how Russia can shape the global content of the future for the Middle East? Well, Russia has always acted as a balancer in the sectarianism around the region between Sunni and Shia, and it has fully analyzed the many differences between the regional power, for example, areas like GCC issues between Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

The reality on the ground in the Middle East is that Russia is being trusted more by the regional players than the United States. Because Russia has a lot of partners in the Middle East, despite overlapping competitive geopolitical/geostrategic interests in the region, Russia could play some role in narrowing differences, and having a stake in thorny issues like the Iran-Saudi rivalry, the Syrian war, and the Israel-Palestine conflict.

As a result of Russia’s role in the Middle East, regional players are looking for alternatives away from the west that can balance the order in the region, and this is why the US role in the Middle East is declining.

What the Russians have been trying to do in the Middle East is establish contact with all sides, and talk to everybody involved in these conflicts. For example, in Syria, Russia has talked to Iran, Syria, and Turkey through the Astana talks, the Russians have even talked with close US allies like Saudi Arabia and Israel because they have so much maneuverability to listen to all players in the region. The Russian aim in the Middle East is not to reconcile everyone’s differences, but to create a realistic approach towards the region that not only goes along with their own national interests, but also working towards a higher degree to preserve regional stability.

Saudi Arabia has its own problems at home and abroad. Currently, Riyadh is facing serious financial deficits, and it needs a partner like Russia to stabilize the oil market which is an absolute necessity for Saudi Arabia. Over the last few years, it has been made clear that the Saudis cannot ride out the falling oil prices to the extent that many people thought it could.

Riyadh must also look at the international dimensions of where its foreign policy has backfired. Saudi Arabia gambled and invested very heavily on regime change in Syria, which has ultimately failed. Saudi is also tied up in an overdue campaign in Yemen which has not going very well either. Instead of operating foreign policy adventures into the region, or playing the role of hegemon, Saudi Arabia needs to start rethinking its foreign policy objectives and look for partners it can talk to.

Russia can be one of these countries, and that is why King Salman is the first Saudi monarch to go on a formal visit to Russia, which is a global power that is re-emerging in the Middle East that can help the Saudis on issues like oil, the war in Syria, and future relations with other countries in the region where Saudi Arabia has so many difficulties.

Cooperation on Syria is crucial for Russia and Saudi Arabia. What happened in Syria was that Saudi Arabia came out against Russia and Iran on opposite ends in the conflict, and the Saudis have recognized that they did not achieve their objective of overthrowing the Assad government. The Astana process has not been something the Saudis wanted to see, but they have been shown time and time again, how effective the talks in Astana have been in creating de-escalation zones and taking out DAESH strongholds. Officials in Riyadh need to be taught the lessons of Syria, the lessons of Yemen, and come up with a realistic approach to cracking down on Wahhabi movements in the region and within Saudi Arabia itself to find a way forward.

The only way to achieve peace in the Middle East is an ultimate rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran. The Middle East has been torn by sectarianism, endless wars, and massive bloodshed, but it is time for a change, and the only way to end these constant conflicts is for Saudi Arabia and Iran to find some common ground to pave the way for peace.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia and Russia re-established diplomatic relations. A lot of Syrian war politics have been throne into the discussions, and Moscow’s growing influence in the Middle East has been something Riyadh has been monitoring very carefully. Oil has also been a giant factor to the renewed Russia-Saudi ties.

In the past, Russia and Saudi Arabia have been rivals in competition for oil market share, but recently, Moscow and Riyadh did sign an agreement last December to cut output and bring prices up since the collapse of oil prices in mid-2014.

And lastly, there have been some defense agreements on air defense systems, military training, and some talk of building a Saudi nuclear complex that is second to Iran. Given the uncertainty of US leadership and foreign policy objectives from the Trump Administration, the Saudis would like to balance their relationships with Moscow and Washington. King Salman’s visit to Moscow not only marks a rapprochement between Russia and Saudi Arabia, but it also marks a new chapter in Russia-Saudi Arabia relations.

How Yellow And Blue Make Green In Parrots

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When it comes to spectacular displays of color, birds are obvious standouts in the natural world. Many brightly colored birds get their pigments from the foods that they eat, but that’s not true of parrots. Now, researchers reporting a study of familiar pet store parakeets–also known as budgies–have new evidence to explain how the birds produce their characteristic yellow, blue, and green feathers.

The findings reported in the journal Cell on October 5th promise to add an important dimension to evolutionary studies of parrots, the researchers say.

“Budgerigars are a great system for studying parrot colors because artificial selection over the last 150 years has resulted in a large number of simple Mendelian genetic traits that affect color,” says first author Thomas Cooke, a graduate student at Stanford University. “We identified an uncharacterized gene in budgerigars that is highly expressed in growing feathers and is capable of synthesizing the budgie’s yellow pigments.”

Scientists have studied colors in budgies for more than a century. They knew that parrots produce psittacofulvins, a type of red to yellow pigment that’s not found in any other type of vertebrate. They also knew that an inability to produce yellow pigments in some parakeets turns the birds from yellow and green to blue. But it wasn’t clear which genes and biochemical pathways were involved.

To find out in the new study, the team led by Stanford’s Carlos Bustamante first used genome-wide association mapping to identify a region containing the blue color mutation. That region contained several genes, so it wasn’t yet clear which of them was responsible.

To narrow it down further, the researchers sequenced the DNA of 234 budgies, 105 of which were blue. They also sequenced 15 museum specimens from Australia. Those studies pointed to a single mutated gene (MuPKS) encoding a little-known polyketide synthase enzyme in the blue birds.

In another key experiment, the researchers compared gene expression from feathers of green and yellow versus blue budgies. Those studies showed that MuPKS was highly expressed in birds of both color varieties, but that there was a single amino acid substitution at a conserved residue in the blue budgies.

The researchers next cloned the MuPKS gene and inserted it into yeast to find out if the yeast would begin producing yellow pigments. And they did.

The researchers say it was a surprise to find that a mutation in MuPKS causes such a noticeable color change. That’s because similar genes are found in nearly all birds. The difference is that birds outside the parrot family such as chickens and crows don’t express the enzyme in their feathers. As a result, they aren’t yellow. This discovery suggests the key evolutionary change that led to parrot’s brilliant colors was the pattern of gene expression.

“Presumably the gene has some function in non-parrots besides pigmentation, but we don’t know what that might be,” Cooke said.

Another surprise to the researchers was that the enzyme was most highly expressed in a portion of the feather that dies once the feather is fully formed. It suggests those cells must produce the color and deposit it in neighboring cells before they die.

Color plays an important role in how birds interact with each other, including how they choose mates. The researchers say that as they learn more about how these enzymes are controlled, the findings could be applied to many parrots around the world, from Australia’s crimson rosellas to the burrowing parrots of Argentina.

“It would be interesting to see what sorts of changes at the DNA level underlie coloration differences within and between different species of parrots,” Cooke said.

Research May Lead To Improvements In Water Use For Crop Irrigation

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Two papers published in Irrigation and Drainage may help improve estimates of water requirements for crops, which will save water and minimize losses, allowing more land to be irrigated and subsequently more food to be produced.

The results of one study on an experimental farm near Bologna, Italy indicated that crop irrigation water requirements based on evapotranspiration obtained from modern technologies (Scintillometer and Eddy Covariance) could save at least 50% of irrigation water. Also there would be no need to use what is called the crop coefficient Kc, which for many irrigation practitioners is difficult to obtain.

The other publication showed that a new technology called the Cosmic-ray Soil Moisture Observation System (Cosmos) can be used to determine when and how much water to apply in irrigation.

Saudi Arabia, Russia Urge End To Palestinian Suffering

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Saudi Arabia’s King Salman on Friday said he and Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev “stressed the importance of ending the suffering of the Palestinian people and achieving a just, comprehensive and permanent peace for the Palestinian question.”

During their meeting in Moscow, the monarch added, they agreed that “accomplishing peace and stability in the Gulf and Middle East region, with the crises it is currently witnessing in Yemen and Syria, requires Iran to halt its expansionist policies, commit itself to the principles of good neighborliness, respect international norms and laws, and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other nations.”

Saudi Arabia is keen to develop relations with Russia, King Salman said, a sentiment echoed by Medvedev, who expressed the Russian government’s pleasure with the monarch’s visit.

King Salman said his country “is going through a historical and fundamental phase of total development, which has been translated into Vision 2030. We look forward to (Russia’s) participation and its cooperation in implementing the programs of this vision in a way that serves our common interests.”

He added: “The efforts of our countries in the field of oil have borne fruit in reaching an agreement for reducing production and achieving a balance between the interests of consumers and producers. We stress our commitment to the stability of the international oil market.”

Medvedev praised Thursday’s talks between King Salman and Russian President Vladimir Putin on developing bilateral cooperation in all fields.

“I will today give all the necessary directions to the ministers in order to realize the achieved agreements as soon as possible,” said Medvedev, calling Saudi Arabia an important partner in the Middle East.

The Complex Politicization Of Race And American Sports – OpEd

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Last year, American football player Colin Kaepernick started kneeling during the US national anthem before his games, claiming he could not show pride for a country that “oppresses black people.” He distorted a very complicated issue of race to make a political point about events taking place in the US. Several black teenagers were shot dead on American streets by white police officers, yet those incidents symbolize the exception rather than the rule.

Ignored in the protests against these shootings is the question of what the parents were doing or not doing in raising their children, armed teenagers wandering the streets at night, refusing to listen to police orders, or worse, using drugs. To many Americans, Kaepernick symbolizes the politicization of racism, which in the US is no longer a social disease, but a political weapon used by activists seeking to bring about radical societal change in their favor.

African Americans enjoy more freedoms today than ever before. Civil rights laws passed in 1964 gave blacks equal rights, including the right to vote, but it took decades before those laws became reality. Women continue to be the bigger victims of discrimination in America, even though laws have been passed to give them equal rights too.

The US civil rights movement for blacks and women has seen slow but steady progress. It has taken more than 200 years, something critics of Saudi Arabia should remember. Last month’s decision in the Kingdom to allow women to drive reflects a process of change that continues in America.

Kaepernick should be the last person to complain about discrimination. He was drafted by the San Francisco 49ers with a contract that promised as much as $126 million. But after an up-and-down performance he eventually left, receiving $39 million in wages and bonuses.

That is almost 700 times greater than the average annual salary of $56,000 that a typical American worker receives. And female workers receive 21 percent less on average than men for the same job, position and workload. Was Kaepernick really kneeling to make a statement about racial inequality in the US? Football, baseball and basketball are filled with African-American and other minority athletes who earn millions each year.

Most of the top athletes in America — black and white, male and female — make outrageous salaries. To see them kneel rather than show pride during the national anthem is disgraceful. If you want to make a difference and take a stand against racism, there are more effective ways to do so, such as using your wealth and influence to create employment, mentoring and education programs.

Kneeling during the national anthem is disrespectful to those Americans who lost their lives serving in the military. As an Arab-American veteran who served during the Vietnam War, I am insulted by Kaepernick’s abuse of his privilege and wealth. He is a hypocrite in my eyes, and his actions are a shameful display similar to other super-wealthy athletes, including many who have engaged in criminal activity, gambling, drugs and spousal abuse.

Not all athletes are  icons of propriety. Why does Kaepernick not stand up to the immoral conduct of his sports colleagues? Last week, the National Football League (NFL) defended him and dozens of other athletes, mostly African Americans, who refuse to stand during the national anthem.

What the rest of the world is seeing is more proof that everything in America is politicized, and that issues are not driven by equality, but by special interests and power. Racism today is political too. Kneeling is not to demand equality for blacks, but to make a political statement about alleged police brutality.

There are more than 1 million police personnel in America, 75 percent of them on the streets protecting neighborhoods, black and white. How can one justify assertions of discrimination when racism involves a dozen incidents over the past year, and when in most of those cases the police offenders have been charged with crimes?

Racism today is nothing near the racism faced when black athletes Tommie Smith and John Carlos raised their black-gloved fists in the air at the 1968 Olympics after receiving their gold and bronze medals during the US national anthem. They were speaking out against racism at a time when it plagued nearly every corner of American society. Today, that disease may not have been totally eradicated, but it has been pushed into the darkest shadows of society.

Instead of kneeling during the national anthem, all athletes should stand proudly, because the US continues to fight against racism and for civil rights. If Kaepernick wanted to send a really powerful message about civil rights, he should have stood tall, put his hand over his heart, and thanked America for the privileges it has given all its athletes.

Kurdish Secession And The Mysteries Of Identity – OpEd

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By Amir Taheri*

An old Arab adage asserts that there is always something good in whatever happens. The secession referendum held in the autonomous Kurdish region of Iraq is no exception. Yes, it has added to tension in the region, awakened many old demons and diverted attention from more urgent problems, but at the same time it has also provided an opportunity to examine and debate some important issues in a cold and clinical manner, as opposed to the inflammatory style in vogue in our neck of the woods.

One such issue concerns the relationship between ethnicity and nationality.
It is important because the Middle East — which is, and has always been, a mosaic of ethnicities — has arrived at the point of nation-statehood, a la Europe, through a historic shortcut that bypasses the ethnic conundrum.

In Europe, the birthplace of the modern nation-state, the concept of citizenship provided a synthesis between ethnicity and nationality. All European states are multiethnic entities, yet few of them experience ethnic tension the way it affects the emerging nation-states of our region.

The assumption on the part of Iraq’s Kurdish secessionists is that statehood should coincide with ethnicity. However, if that were the case almost all Middle Eastern states would have to be divided and subdivided, by one account, to create at least 18 more states. Kurdish secessionists dismiss that account with the argument that most ethnic groups in the region are too small to merit statehood. In other words, size becomes a justification for secession.

They also claim that Kurds represent the largest ethnic group without its own state. That, of course, is not true: In the Indian subcontinent, the Dravidians, numbering over 300 million, do not have a state of their own. The same is true of the Punjabis, some 100 million of them, who are divided between India and Pakistan with reference to religious differences into Muslim, Hindu and Sikh sub-groups.

In Africa, the Haussa and the Ibo — who number 40 and 35 million respectively — do not have a state of their own. In China, the Uighurs (22 million) and the Manchus (12 million), as well as 4 million Tibetans, of course, have had their states wiped out by the Han majority.

There are more Pathans in Pakistan than in Afghanistan, more Irish in the UK than the Republic of Ireland, and more Hungarians outside Hungary than inside it.

The second argument is that since Iraq is an “artificial country” created by Sykes-Picot, there is no reason why anyone should not walk out of it. To start with, despite fashionable buzz, the so-called Sykes-Picot “plot” has nothing to do with the current shape of the Middle East.

Sykes-Picot was a draft treaty by Britain, France, Russia and Italy to carve out the Middle Eastern possessions of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. However, the draft never received final ratification by the four countries involved.

Before the war ended the Tsarist Empire collapsed and the new Bolshevik regime published the text of the draft as part of its propaganda against “Imperialist powers.”
The draft envisaged giving large chunks of Anatolia to Russia, an ally of Britain, France and Italy. But when the Bolsheviks seized power Russia became an enemy; there was no reason to give it anything.

As for Italy, it had performed so miserably in the war that Britain and France decided it merited nothing but crumbs of the cake, in the shape of a presence in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. With Sykes-Picot rendered inoperable, Britain and France made new deals later reflected in several treaties notably of Lausanne and Montreux.

In any case, to say Iraq is “artificial” is meaningless. All states are artificial. None has fallen from the heavens fully shaped. It took the US almost 200 years to assume its present shape, by admitting Hawaii, annexed in 1898, as its 50th state in 1959.

A century ago there were 32 nation-states in the world; today there are 198, the majority of which are newer, and more “artificial,” than Iraq.

In some cases, ethic identities are either fabricated or exaggerated in pursuit of political power. For example, the Castilians and the Catalans share the same Christian faith, speak variations of the same Latinesque language, and are hardly distinguishable from one another by outsiders. Yet, we have a Catalan secessionist movement in Spain. The reason is that Catalonia has always been a support base for leftist movements in the Iberian Peninsula while the rest of Spain, especially Castile and Galicia, has been conservative.

Ironically, the more multi-ethnic a state, the more successful it has proved in history. The Sumerian state was “pure” in ethnic terms but vanished without trace. The Roman Empire, open to all ethnicities up to the position of the emperor, lasted over 1,000 years, and perished when it tried to impose uniformity through its new official religion: Christianity.

Countries where citizenship is not based on ethnicity or religion offer inhabitants freedoms unavailable elsewhere. In a small street in Paris, Rue des Petites Ecurries, shops and cafes belonging to all sorts of Islamic sects, Jews and Christians exist side by side without anyone cutting anyone’s throat — at least not yet; something unthinkable in “pure” places such as a Daesh or Taliban “emirate.”

There is nothing easier to invent than “traditions” upon which to construct ethnic identities. To fabricate a new identity, Ataturk adopted the Latin script, purged the Turkish language of Arabic and Persian vocabulary, and used French words instead. Now, however, we see the old Ottoman ghost coming back to reassert itself.

Some Kurds tried a similar scheme by including the vowels in Arabic script and, imitating Ataturk, purging many Arabic and Persian words. The result is that their new-speak appears more Kurdish but is harder to understand, especially when it comes to classical texts of their literature.

There is much talk of identity these days. But human identity is protean, subject to the tangential twists and turns of individual and collective life.

For example, Masoud Barzani’s identity is not exactly the same as the Peshmerga who drives his bullet-proof Mercedes. Barzani was born in Mahabad, Iran, as an Iranian subject, but he spent the first 12 years of his life in the Soviet Union. He then spent a decade in Iraq before being forced out by the Baathist terror machine, finding refuge first in Iran and then in the US. None of this makes him any less Iraqi or any less Kurdish — if only because the two are not incompatible but complimentary in his case.

An Iraqi citizen is easy to define and recognize because citizenship is a politico-judicial status that can be tested and ascertained. When it comes to ethnic and/or religious identities, however, we are often in terra incognita.

Two things are certain about any one of us: Our humanity and our citizenship. Everything else is subject to speculation and convoluted definitions.

• Amir Taheri was executive editor in chief of the daily Kayhan in Iran from 1972 to 1979. He has worked at, or written for, innumerable publications and published 11 books.
— Originally published in Asharq Al-Awsat.

Spain: Constitutional Court Suspends Catalan Parliament’s Independence Session

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The Spanish Constitutional Court has ordered a suspension of a Catalan parliament session on Monday, at which the local MPs planned to announce the region’s unilateral independence from Madrid.

The court ruling came as a result of a legal challenge by the Catalan Socialist Party, which sees Catalonia as part of Spain and opposes secession from Madrid, according to El Pais.

Earlier, lawyers for the Catalan regional parliament had also warned that Monday’s session would be illegal due to the referendum it is planning to address, which was outlawed by the Constitutional Court, AP reported.

Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy has again called on Catalan leaders to give up on any unilateral declaration of independence.

“Is there a solution? Yes, there is,” Rajoy said in an interview with Efe news agency. “And the best one would be a return to legality and the swiftest possible confirmation that there won’t be a unilateral independence declaration because that way greater evils could still be avoided.”

Catalan regional leader Carles Puigdemont reiterated on Wednesday that that the local authorities “have to present the results of the referendum to parliament” in the next couple of days.

An independence referendum was held in the prosperous Spanish region of Catalonia on Sunday, despite the central government in Madrid labeling it “unconstitutional.”

According to local authorities, around 90 percent of the voters said “yes” to cutting ties with Spain in the plebiscite, in which less than half of the Catalan population participated.

The EU has urged both sides to refrain from steps that would provoke more unrest, as seen last Sunday.

European Commission First Vice President Frans Timmermans said on Thursday, however, that EU member states have the right to use “proportionate” force to defend the rule of law.

Earlier, the European Commission backed the Spanish government’s stance that the referendum was unlawful, calling the police crackdown an “internal matter” for Spain.

The comments by the EU led to accusations of “hypocrisy” by Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, who said: “How come that in the case of Catalonia the referendum on independence is not valid, while in the case of Kosovo, secession [from Serbia in 2008] is allowed even without a referendum?”


Nepal: Climate Change And Human Mobility – Analysis

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By Avasna Pandey*

In 2016, Samjong village in Upper Mustang, Nepal, which is at an elevation of 4100 m, had to be relocated to Namashung village in the same region. This was necessitated by acute drought in Samjong that had persisted for almost a decade. While this might be a small case study of relocation, it merits closer analysis to understand the implications of climate change and human mobility. Should this happen on a larger scale, say, across Nepal, given the country’s vulnerability to climate change, climate change-induced migration will demand timely policy intervention.

Droughts: Does Samjong Reflect a Trend?

In Upper Mustang, which is a trans-Himalayan region receiving less than 200 mm of rain annually, erratic rain and snowfall has led to a deepening water crisis. The village of Dhey in the same region is a case-in-point. After facing an acute shortage of water supply for seven years and consequently decreased irrigated land size, a total of twenty three villages had to be relocated to Thangchung in 2009. Similarly, in 2016, eighteen households shifted from Samjong village to Namashung village in search of water. Upper Mustang, where people depend on agriculture and livestock rearing, has been reeling under acute water shortage due to prolonged spells of drought. With their main source of livelihood in jeopardy, the locals are faced with no option but to move.

Whether this is a trend or a standalone incident is hard to gauge as of now owing to the nature of droughts. Droughts occur slowly as compared to other natural hazards. They start without warning. Prolonged periods of no or acute rainfall can bring about crop failure, which in turn increases the vulnerability to food shortage. As a corollary, agrarian families that are directly dependent on the natural environment for their livelihood have to migrate. However, a single event of drought might not trigger migration. Due to this, the link between slow onsetting environmental changes like droughts and migration are not immediately apparent as sporadic droughts do not usually cause a large number of people to leave their living environment. Repeated droughts however can induce forced migration as without water for both drinking and irrigation purposes, people are compelled to move elsewhere as a means of survival.

Future Projections

Based on the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) 2010 report, due to effects of climate change, out of 75 districts in Nepal, 29 are highly vulnerable to natural hazards. Of the 29, 22 are drought-prone. Despite a paucity of data, it is safe to assume that these 22 districts will be the most vulnerable should the significant and consistent increase in temperature projected for Nepal over the coming years translate into drought conditions. In addition there are 12 districts vulnerable to Glacial Lake Outburst Floods (GLOFs).

Programmes like Local Adaptation Plan of Action (LAPA) have focused on the possibility of drought and have tried to mitigate the effects by encouraging ground water storage in communities, harvesting rain water, and so on. However, the enforced mobility of populations such as in Upper Mustang has not been given attention, despite the fact that it may become a necessity.

Human Mobility

Human mobility in the context of climate change and livelihood choices is based on individual capacities to access social and natural resources. Human mobility could manifest itself in the form of evacuation, temporary displacement, cross-border movement, planned relocation and so on. This has consequences of its own. High population density in one area can cause land stress as a disproportionate number of people will be dependent on a small amount of land for cultivation and agricultural purposes. Population stress on resources as a result of migration increases the chances of social conflict. This could manifest in the form increased competition over resources between local inhabitants and newly relocated populations. The relocation of people will influence the ecosystem at their destination by driving up demand for local and natural resources such as land, food, water, and fuel. Also, the relocation destination could already be under some water stress. Thus, more people will only add to the problem, making the site selection imperative.

Although this has so far been seen only in the two above-mentioned villages in Upper Mustang, should relocation become inevitable, government policy must consider factors like potential social tensions, availability of cultivable land, and population density of the area to be relocated. Having key infrastructure in the place of relocation is important; this would include access to clean and drinkable water and water for other purposes, such as irrigation. Unless these factors are considered, arbitrary relocation could potentially cause a backlash – usually in the form marginalisation – instead of providing relief to those relocating.

Conclusion

According to Nepal’s Department of Meteorology and Hydrology, the country’s average temperature is increasing at an average rate of 0.04 degree celsius per year with the trend being much higher in the mountain region. Yet, the relationship between human mobility and climate change remains in the fringe of Nepal’s policy discourse.

* Avasna Pandey
Research Intern, CRP, IPCS

The Challenge Of Getting Responsible Behavior In Cyberspace – Analysis

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The inability of a United Nations Group of Experts to produce a consensus report on setting norms of behaviour in cyberspace seems to have brought norm development to a temporary halt. The growing digitalised world needs proper rules of engagement among states. ASEAN should not wait for others to set norms for the world to follow.

By Eugene EG Tan*

Media reports have termed the failure to produce a consensus report on setting norms of behaviour in cyberspace as a ‘collapse’ of the process led by an international core of experts in cybersecurity. They are known as the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunication in the context of International Security (UNGGE). Prominent thinkers lamented the group’s inability to build on the progress made in the previous rounds of the UNGGE in the governance of cyberspace: in 2012/13, agreeing that international law applies in cyberspace; and, in 2014/15, proposing a set of eleven voluntary, but non-binding norms that states should adopt as best practice.

UNGGE Chair, Karsten Geier, insists that it was no failure. Geier said the experts at the UNGGE had broad agreement on points including capacity-building measures; confidence-building measures; raising awareness among senior decision-makers; conducting exercises; defining protocols for notifications about incidents; warnings when critical infrastructure is attacked; and preventing non-state actors from conducting cyber-attacks. The experts also agreed that there is space for further negotiation and there were options for compromise.

Why They Failed to Reach Consensus

Geier’s comments show that for the most part, states are in agreement, but there are issues that are currently unresolvable. Some observers suggest that the political motives of Russia and China were behind the failure to reach consensus and, by extension, hindering the development of international law in cyberspace. These political motives include promoting other international norms, or testing the limits of influence.

In the absence of official confirmation, this may be a biased view in light of China and Russia’s membership of all the previous UNGGEs, including those that agreed international law applies in cyberspace and proposed the adoption of voluntary norms.

There have also been legal objections to how international law applies in cyberspace. Statements from the American and the Cuban representatives are indicative of how divergent the views are in the applicability of international law.

The American representative, Michele Markoff, expressed her dissatisfaction at some states seeking to “walk back progress” made at the previous UNGGEs; she therefore could not support the draft report because it fell short of the mandate given to the UNGGE, which was to explore how international law applied vis-à-vis cyberspace.

Cuba objected to the proposed draft on grounds that the malicious use of ICTs can be considered an equivalent to armed attack, which would give states the right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. This, to Cuba, puts small states at a disadvantage as they do not have the capability to retaliate. Cuba also claims that subjecting ICT to the principles of International Humanitarian Law legitimises warfare in ICT.

How This Affects the World

The inability to reach consensus does not mark the end of the road for the development of norms or international law. International law often takes years, even decades, to formalise and for differences among states to be ironed out. It may well be that the common ground for agreement is exhausted for now. Attention should therefore be paid to other initiatives led by international organisations and non-government organisations, often with state backing, to promote norms and shape normative behaviour among states.

These initiatives include the “Hague Process,” which facilitated input of states into the Tallinn Manual 2.0 project. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 is a handbook on the applicability of international law in cyber operations, and was formulated by legal experts from all over the world. The Netherlands is sponsoring a global training programme and consultation process on the Hague Process, including a workshop for ASEAN, conducted in Singapore in August 2017.

Other worldwide initiatives include the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (where Singapore is represented by former Police Commissioner Khoo Boon Hui); the Global Conference on Cyberspace; and workshops conducted by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). These capacity building initiatives are especially important to bring more states to an understanding of how internationally agreed norms can benefit them.

What It Means for Singapore and ASEAN

Norms are especially important to small states like Singapore, as norms set out their rights, including the protection of critical infrastructure from malicious attacks, non-interference in political processes, and the illegality of economic espionage. When pressed for his opinion on what should states do in the wake of the UNGGE impasse, Michael Schmitt, editor of the Tallinn Manuals, strongly recommended that individual states and regional organisations like ASEAN should set out their own positions on norms, in order to build greater international momentum for their adoption.

The EU, in its September 2017 Joint Communication on “Resilience, Deterrence, and Defence: Building Strong Cybersecurity for the EU”, has already pledged to uphold the eleven voluntary, non-binding norms proposed by the 2014/15 UNGGE. There have been calls from within the EU to consider a wider set of norms, and to play a greater leadership role in the formation of norms in cyberspace. To avoid being served with a fait accompli, ASEAN should articulate its views and contribute to how these norms are formed.

The ambiguity of China’s position on how international norms apply in cyberspace may however create a divergence in views among ASEAN states, especially those with pro-China sentiments. There is hence a delicate balance when dealing with norms that could antagonise Singapore’s ASEAN neighbours, especially if the Republic wants to push for the adoption of the norms mooted in 2015, including using its position as ASEAN Chair in 2018 to do so. Capacity building and promotion of norms are thus even more important now, to persuade more states that norms in cyberspace are in the common interest of all.

* Eugene EG Tan is an Associate Research Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Could Kyrgyzstan And Uzbekistan Solve Exclave Problems By Exchanging Territory? – OpEd

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Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have now agreed on the delimitation of 85 percent of their borders, but they have not yet succeeded in agreeing on the borders between the exclaves of each on the territory of the other. Some in Bishkek think this could be addressed by an exchange of territories, but others in Tashkent remain totally opposed.

Despite the widespread view that the borders of the Soviet Union republics on which the post-Soviet states are based were immutable, there are dozens of major and more than 200 minor transfers of territory from one republic to another in Soviet times. (On this, see this author’s “Can Republic Borders Be Changed?” RFE/RL Report on the USSR, 28 September 1990.)

That view was reinforced in February 1992 when the first Bush Administration announced that the United States would not recognize “any secession from secession” in the post-Soviet states, a position that explains the US position not only on Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia but also on Russian-occupied Crimea.

But despite that principle, in fact, many of the post-Soviet states in Central Asia in particular have adjusted their borders in order to reach bilateral agreements on their delimitation and the Russian Federation has even adjusted its borders with China over the course of the last 25 years.

Most of these changes have been small, involving 100 hectares or less; but now some are at least discussing the possibility of a larger exchange of territory between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan so that the two could resolve the neuralgic problems of the enclaves of the one on the territory of the other.

These include most prominently the Uzbek exclaves in Kyrgyzstan, Sokh with some 50,000 people and Shakhimardan with 5,000. In the event of an exchange, these could become part of Kyrgyzstan and their residents Kyrgyz nationals (unless they were to leave) and Bishkek would compensate Tashkent by land elsewhere along the current administrative border.

Anvar Mokeyev, former Kyrgyz ambassador to Tashkent, says that such an exchange would face many difficulties including the still open question as to whether the residents of the exclaves would want to remain in Kyrgyzstan or those in land transferred to Uzbekistan would want to remain in that country (ng.ru/cis/2017-10-05/6_7088_kirgisia.html).

Bakhtier Ergashev, a researcher at the Center for Traditional Cultures, sees another obstacle to such an exchange: there is no Kyrgyz equivalent in Uzbekistan to Sokh in Kyrgyzstan. The closest is the Barak exclave, but it has a population of less than a thousand and a total area of four hectares. For a trade to work, other territories would have to be included.

The political analyst aacknowledges that there have been small exchanges of territory between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as those two countries have worked to delimit their common border. That kind of thing is “normal practice in the process of defining borders.” But larger exchanges of land and population are something else entirely.

According to Ergash, “the exchange of the enclaves would be a big mistake which would have serious social consequences for the entire territory of the Fergana Valley. But here there is already another question: would citizens of Uzbekistan agree to become citizens of Kyrgyzstan?” The answer almost certainly is no given the instability in the latter.

Given these arguments, the possibility of an exchange is undoubtedly small; but what is intriguing is that officials in many countries keep bringing up this possibility as the only way they can see to move forward on otherwise intractable issues.

Philippines: 40 Bodies Found In Marawi Buried In Mass Graves

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Forty sets of remains recovered from the battle zone in the southern Philippine city of Marawi were buried in a public cemetery on Oct. 5.

It was the third mass burial of people believed to be victims of the four-month-old conflict in the country’s only Islamic majority city.

One other set of bones not buried is believed to belong to a police inspector killed by gunmen who attacked the city on May 23.

Police officials said that of the 40 sets of bones buried, 25 were those of suspected gunmen who claimed to have links with the so-called Islamic State.

“We can say that they are [Islamic State] fighters because they were wearing black uniforms and they have pistol belts and other indicators that they were fighters,” said Senior Superintendent Mary Leocy Mag-abo of the police’s crime laboratory.

Jelbin Darantinao, a provincial government worker, said burying the remains was “kind of eerie.”

“I am a Christian and I believe that we have souls so I silently said to them while operating the backhoe loader [to fill in the graves] that ‘I am only doing my job, I’m just following orders’, please don’t scare me,” he said.

Government spokesman Ernesto Abella, meanwhile, announced that 17 hostages were rescued on Oct. 5 while eight terrorists had surrendered and turned over another nine hostages to the military.

He said ongoing military operations are focused on rescuing remaining hostages. It is unclear how many other hostages the militants hold.

The four-month old conflict has displaced close to 400,000 people, and resulted in the death of more than 900 others, including 753 terrorists, 155 soldiers and police, and 47 civilians.

Trump Administration Provides Guidance For Protecting Religious Freedom

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In a set of memos issued Friday, U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions outlined principles of religious freedom that federal agencies and departments are to incorporate into their work.

“Our freedom as citizens has always been inextricably linked with our religious freedom as a people,” Sessions said in an Oct. 6 statement. “Every American has a right to believe, worship, and exercise their faith. The protections for this right, enshrined in our Constitution and laws, serve to declare and protect this important part of our heritage.”

The memos were issued in response to an executive order signed by President Trump in May, declaring, “It shall be the policy of the executive branch to vigorously enforce Federal law’s robust protections for religious freedom” and instructing the attorney general to “issue guidance interpreting religious liberty protections in Federal law.”

Friday’s memos do not resolve specific cases currently in the court system. However, they were issued on the same day that the administration announced changes to the federal contraception mandate, allowing broad religious and moral exemptions to the regulation.

The first memo lists 20 principles of religious liberty that should govern all administrative agencies and executive departments in their work as employers, contract- and grant-makers, program administrators, rule-makers, and adjudicators.

These principles recognize religious freedom as “an important, fundamental right,” expressly protected by the Constitution and by federal law. This freedom extends to both individuals and organizations, and it is not surrendered when Americans engage in the marketplace or interact with the government.

Furthermore, the guidance says, religious freedom is more than the right to worship or believe privately. It includes “the right to perform or abstain from performing certain physical acts in accordance with one’s beliefs.”

The document notes the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, which says that the federal government may not substantially burden the exercise of religious freedom, unless there is a compelling state interest in doing so, and it is carried out in the least-restrictive manner possible.

This law “does not permit the federal government to second-guess the reasonableness of a sincerely held religious belief,” the guidance says, and it places a demanding standard on government interference with religious belief or practice, including when the religious party is seeking “an exemption from a legal obligation…to confer benefits on third parties.”

The guidance also reiterates that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits employers covered by the regulation from discriminating based on an individual’s religious belief, observance or practice, “unless the employer cannot reasonably accommodate such observance or practice without undue hardship.”

Furthermore, the memo clarifies, religious employers are entitled to limit employment to people whose beliefs and conduct adhere to their religious precepts.

“Generally, the federal government may not condition federal grants or contracts on the religious organization altering its religious character, beliefs, or activities,” the document says.

A second memo by the attorney general directs implementation of the guidance within the Department of Justice. It instructs the department to vigorously defend religious liberty protections in federal law.

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