By Jim Hightower*

These are hard times for America’s gold miners. They’re scrambling to get ahead, but seeing their pay dropping.

Take Bob Mercer, who’s been a top miner for years, but last year even Bob was down. He pulled in only $125 million in pay. Can you feel Bob’s pain?

Well, these aren’t your normal miners. They’re hedge fund managers, digging for gold in Wall Street. Indeed, if you divided Mercer’s pay in his “bad year” among 1,000 real miners doing honest work, each would consider it a fabulous year.

Nonetheless, hedge funds are almost literally gold mines, although they require no heavy lifting by the soft-handed, Gucci-wearing managers who work them. These gold diggers are basically nothing but speculators, drawing billions of dollars from the über-rich by promising that they’ll deliver fabulous profits.

But the scam is that Mercer and his fellow diggers get paid whether they deliver or not.

Their cushy set up, known as 2 and 20, works like this.

Right off the top, they take 2 percent of the money put up by each wealthy client, which hedge fund whizzes like Mercer keep even if the investments they make are losers. Then, if their speculative bets do pay off, they pocket 20 percent of all profits.

Finally, hedge fund lobbyists have rigged our nation’s tax code so these Wall Street miners pay a fraction of the tax rate that real mine workers pay.

Last year, the 25 best paid hedge fund operators totaled a staggering $11 billion in personal pay — even though nearly half of them performed poorly. Meanwhile, Donald Trump, who promised last year to close that special hedge-fund tax break, has mysteriously omitted that vow from the “tax reform” framework the White House released this fall.

Guess who was one of Trump’s most generous funders last year? Bob Mercer.

*OtherWords columnist Jim Hightower is a radio commentator, writer, and public speaker. He’s also the editor of the populist newsletter, The Hightower Lowdown. Distributed by OtherWords.org.

By Rafael Acevedo and Luis B. Cirocco*

In order to understand the disaster that is unfolding in Venezuela, we need to journey through the most recent century of our history and look at how our institutions have changed over time. What we will find is that Venezuela once enjoyed relatively high levels of economic freedom, although this occurred under dictatorial regimes.

But, when Venezuela finally embraced democracy, we began to kill economic freedom. This was not all at once, of course. It was a gradual process. But it happened at the expense of the welfare of millions of people.

And, ultimately, the lesson we learned is that socialism never, ever works, no matter what Paul Krugman, or Joseph Stiglitz, or guys in Spain like Pablo Iglesias say.

It was very common during the years we suffered under Hugo Chávez to hear these pundits and economists on TV saying that this time, socialism is being done right. This time, the Venezuelans figured it out.

They were, and are wrong.

On the other hand, there was a time when this country was quite prosperous and wealthy, and for a time Venezuela was even referred to as an “economic miracle” in many books and articles.

However, during those years, out of the five presidents we had, four were dictators and generals of the army. Our civil and political rights were restricted. We didn’t have freedom of the press, for example; we didn’t have universal suffrage. But, while we lived under a dictatorship, we could at least enjoy high levels of economic freedom.

A Brief Economic History of Venezuela

The economic miracle began a century ago, when from 1914 to 1922, Venezuela entered the international oil race. In 1914, Venezuela opened its first oil well. Fortunately, the government did not make the mistake of attempting to manage the oil business, or own the wells. The oil wells were privately owned, and in many cases were owned by private international companies that operated in Venezuela. It wasn’t totally laissez-faire, of course. There were tax incentives and other so-called concessions employed to promote exploration and exploitation of oil. But most industries — including the oil industry — remained privatized.

Moreover, during this period, tax rates in the country were relatively low.

In 1957, the marginal tax rate for individuals was 12 percent. There was certainly a state presence, and the public sector absorbed 20 percent of GDP. But, government spending was used mainly to build the country’s basic infrastructure.

The area of international trade was relatively free as well — and very free compared to today. There were tariffs that were relatively high, but there were no other major barriers to trade such as quotas, anti-dumping laws, or safeguards.

Other economic controls were few as well. There were just a few state-owned companies and virtually no price controls, no rent controls, no interest-rate controls, and no exchange-rate controls.

Of course, we weren’t free from the problems of a central bank, either. In 1939, Venezuela created its own central bank. But, the bank was largely inactive and functioned primarily defending a fixed exchange rate with the US dollar.

Moving Toward More Interventionism

Despite the high levels of economic freedom that existed during those years, government legislation started to chip away at that freedom. Changes included the nationalization of the telephone company, the creation of numerous state-owned companies, and state-owned banks. That happened in 1950. The Venezuelan government thus began sowing the seeds of destruction, and you can see the continued deterioration in the level of economic freedom in the decade of the 1950s.

In 1958, Venezuela became a democracy when the dictatorship was overthrown. With that came all the usual benefits of democracy such as freedom of the press, universal suffrage, and other civil rights. Unfortunately, these reforms came along with continued destruction of our economic freedom.

The first democratically elected president was Rómulo Betancourt. He was a communist-turned-social democrat. In fact, while he was in exile, he founded the Communist Party in Costa Rica and helped found the Communist Party in Colombia as well. Not surprisingly, as president, he started destroying the economic institutions we had by implementing price controls, rent controls, and other regulations we hadn’t had before. On top of that, he and his allies created a new constitution that was hostile to private property.

In spite of this — or perhaps because of it — Betancourt is almost universally revered in Venezuela as “the father of our democracy.” This remains true even today as Venezuela collapses.

Of course, compared to today, we had far greater economic freedom under Betancourt than we do in today’s Venezuela. But, all of the presidents — with one exception — who came after Betancourt took similar positions and continued to chip away at economic freedom. The only exception was Carlos Andrés Pérez who in his second term attempted some free market reforms. But, he executed these later reforms so badly and haphazardly that markets ended up being blamed for the resulting crises.

The Rise of Hugo Chávez

Over time, the destruction of economic freedom led to more and more impoverishment and crisis. This in turn set the stage for the rise of a political outsider with a populist message. This, of course, was Hugo Chávez. He was elected in 1998 and promised to replace our light socialism with more radical socialism. This only accelerated the problems we had been facing for decades. Nevertheless, he was able to pass through an even more anti-private-property constitution. Since Chávez’s death in 2013, the attacks on private property have continued, and Chávez’s successor, Nicolás Maduro, promises only more  of the same. Except now, the government is turning toward outright authoritarian socialism, and Maduro is seeking a new constitution in which private property is almost totally abolished, and Maduro will be allowed to remain in power for life.

A Legacy of Poverty

So, what are the results of socialism in Venezuela? Well, we have experienced hyperinflation. We have people eating garbage, schools that do not teach, hospitals that do not heal, long and humiliating lines to buy flour, bread, and basic medicines. We endure the militarization of practically every aspect of life.

The cost of living has skyrocketed in recent years.

Let’s look at the cost of goods in services in terms of a salary earned by a full college professor. In the 1980s, our “full professor” needed to pay almost 15 minutes of his salary to buy one kilogram of beef. Today, in July 2017, our full professor needs to pay the equivalent of 18 hours to buy the same amount of beef. During the 1980s, our full professor needed to pay almost one year’s salary for a new sedan. Today, he must pay the equivalent of 25 years of his salary. In the 1980s, a full professor with his monthly salary could buy 17 basic baskets of essential goods. Today, he can buy just one-quarter of a basic
basket.

And what about the value of our money? Well, in March 2007, the largest denomination of paper money in Venezuela was the 100 bolivar bill. With it, you could buy 28 US dollars, 288 eggs, or 56 kilograms of rice. Today, you can buy .01 dollars, 0.2 eggs, and 0.08 kilograms of rice. In July 2017, you need five 100-bolivar bills to buy just one egg.

So, socialism is the cause of the Venezuelan misery. Venezuelans are starving, eating garbage, losing weight. Children are malnourished. Anyone in Venezuela would be happy to eat out of America’s trashcans. It would be considered gourmet.

So, what’s the response of our society? Well, it’s the young people who are leading the fight for freedom in Venezuela in spite of what the current political leaders tell them to do. They don’t want to be called “the opposition.” They are the resistance, in Spanish, “la resistencia.” They are the real heroes of freedom in our country, but the world needs to know that they have often been killed by a tyrannical government, and all members of the resistance are persecuted daily.

Nevertheless, a new pro-market leadership must emerge before we can expect many major changes. Our current political opposition parties also hate free markets. They don’t like Maduro, but they still want their version of socialism.

This is not surprising. As Venezuelans, our poor understanding of the importance of freedom and free markets has created our current disaster. We Venezuelans never really understood freedom in its broader dimension because when we enjoyed high levels of economic freedom, we allowed the destruction of political and civil rights, and when we finally established a democracy, we allowed the destruction of economic freedom.

But there is reason for hope. Along with the Mises Institute we do believe that a revolution in ideas can really bring a new era to Venezuela. On behalf of the resistance and millions of people in our country, we thank the Mises Institute for this opportunity to briefly tell the full history of Venezuela. Thank you very much.

*About the authors:
Rafael Acevedo is Founder Director of Econintech, and teaches at the Universidad Centroccidental Lisandro Alvarado in Barquisimeto. He is also Director of Politics of the Venezuelan Freedom Movement. Luis Cirocco is Director of Econitech. He is an Electrical Engineer with a Master’s degree in Finance from IESA. Luis has eighteen years of experience in the private telecommunications sector, and is Director of Formation of the Venezuelan Freedom Movement.

Source:
This article was published by the MISES Institute.

A nine-year joint research project conducted by VIB, KU Leuven and VUB has led to a crucial breakthrough in cancer research. Scientists have clarified how the Warburg effect, a phenomenon in which cancer cells rapidly break down sugars, stimulates tumor growth.

This discovery provides evidence for a positive correlation between sugar and cancer, which may have far-reaching impacts on tailor-made diets for cancer patients. The research has been published in the leading academic journal Nature Communications.

This project was started in 2008 under the leadership of Johan Thevelein (VIB-KU Leuven), Wim Versées (VIB-VUB) and Veerle Janssens (KU Leuven). Its main focus was the Warburg effect, or the observation that tumors convert significantly higher amounts of sugar into lactate compared to healthy tissues. As one of the most prominent features of cancer cells, this phenomenon has been extensively studied and even used to detect brain tumors, among other applications. But thus far, it has been unclear whether the effect is merely a symptom of cancer, or a cause.

Sugar awakens cancer cells

While earlier research into cancer cell metabolism focused on mapping out metabolic peculiarities, this study clarifies the link between metabolic deviation and oncogenic potency in cancerous cells.

Prof. Johan Thevelein (VIB-KU Leuven): “Our research reveals how the hyperactive sugar consumption of cancerous cells leads to a vicious cycle of continued stimulation of cancer development and growth. Thus, it is able to explain the correlation between the strength of the Warburg effect and tumor aggressiveness. This link between sugar and cancer has sweeping consequences. Our results provide a foundation for future research in this domain, which can now be performed with a much more precise and relevant focus.”

Yeast as an advantageous model organism

Yeast cell research was essential to the discovery, as these cells contain the same ‘Ras’ proteins commonly found in tumor cells, which can cause cancer in mutated form. Using yeast as a model organism, the research team examined the connection between Ras activity and the highly active sugar metabolism in yeast.

Prof. Johan Thevelein (VIB-KU Leuven): “We observed in yeast that sugar degradation is linked via the intermediate fructose 1,6-biophosphate to the activation of Ras proteins, which stimulate the multiplication of both yeast and cancer cells. It is striking that this mechanism has been conserved throughout the long evolution of yeast cell to human.

“The main advantage of using yeast was that our research was not affected by the additional regulatory mechanisms of mammalian cells, which conceal crucial underlying processes. We were thus able to target this process in yeast cells and confirm its presence in mammalian cells. However, the findings are not sufficient to identify the primary cause of the Warburg effect. Further research is needed to find out whether this primary cause is also conserved in yeast cells.”

IMDEA Networks and Huawei Technologies have recently launched a joint research project to explore the synergies of two distinctive wireless technologies, which are both key components of the present and future of mobile communications.

On the one hand, the project builds on everyday mobile networks such as WiFi and LTE. On the other hand, it integrates state-of-the-art wireless networks operating in the millimeter-wave band, as envisioned for future 5G networks. Their combination is crucial to enable the evolution of mobile networks, one of the most impactful technologies driving change and progress toward the “network society”.

Beyond better mobile coverage for individuals, mobile technology has boosted the development of society as a whole in terms of communication, commerce, and public services. To address the resulting (and increasing) demand for mobile data, more resources in terms of frequency bands are currently being allocated to wireless networks. This allows operators not only to provide faster connections, but also to serve more users at a lower cost, thus bringing wireless connectivity to a larger portion of society.

However, using innovative millimeter-wave frequency bands to channel mobile communications poses a number of technical challenges compared to traditional mobile networks. In such traditional networks, each base station covers roughly a circular area. As long as a mobile device is within that area, the base station can communicate with it seamlessly irrespective of its location. In contrast, in millimeter-wave networks the base station must be aware of the direction in which the device is located in order to communicate with it.

The underlying reason is that the signal attenuation is much higher in millimeter-wave frequency bands compared to traditional bands. The base station must concentrate all of its transmission energy in the direction of the device in order to be able to deliver messages to it. As a result, coverage is not circular anymore, and the base station can only serve one specific direction at a time. This makes it intrinsically harder to operate the network.

The partnership of IMDEA Networks and Huawei aims at tackling the above challenges.

In this joint project, the partners exploit traditional frequency bands to estimate the direction in which a user is located and use this information to steer the transmission in the millimeter-wave band. The synergy among both bands is that estimating the direction of a user is more convenient using traditional bands, whereas transmitting high volumes of data is easier using millimeter-wave bands.

The goal of the project is to adapt and improve existing techniques to estimate direction for the particular case of millimeter-wave networks. To this end, IMDEA Networks contributes past technical expertise in this field, as well as an initial prototype of the system. Huawei contributes measurement data from a large practical testbed, which is key to validate the mechanisms developed as part of the project.

This collaboration is expected to result in a significant improvement in terms of steering accuracy and data throughput compared to the state-of-the-art in the area, thus paving the way for the massive deployment of millimeter-wave technologies, an essential requirement in the roadmap for 5G communications.

The project started in July 2017 and has a planned duration of one year.

The levels of mercury in the Oslofjord cod has increased over the last 30 years, despite reduced emissions of this toxic element. In the same period, the average size of sampled cod has increased. Are the elevated levels of mercury simply a result of larger cod?

Historical use and emissions of mercury have resulted in its leaking into the environment, and mercury has found its way to the Oslofjord cod. Mercury has toxic effects on the nerve system, and may have negative impacts on fine motor skills, cognitive abilities, attentiveness and memory.

The Norwegian Institute of Water Research (NIVA) has been monitoring the mercury levels in the Oslofjord cod since 1984, and now a group of researchers can present the latest news about the fish in a newly published research article. This article may uncover the reasons behind the mysterious increase in mercury over the last thirty years.

More mercury

In several studies researchers have been investigating the processes by which mercury is taken up in wildlife. One would think that the mercury levels in wildlife were reduced over the last years, considering the deposition of mercury in Southeast Norway is reduced.

But more intense rainfalls have increased wash-out of humus substances in inland waters, and in those environments mercury has possibly become more available for uptake in organisms, by processes that the researchers do not yet fully understand. Theoretically, this could contribute to the changes also observed in the Oslofjord cod.

Another explanation for the elevated mercury levels could be a change in cod diet towards more contaminated prey. Unfortunately, there is no historic prey data available for comparison. NIVA researcher Anders Ruus still thinks they have come closer to an answer.

“Our analyses indicate that close to a third of the variation in mercury concentration was explained solely by variation in fish length,” said Ruus.

Thus, it seems like bigger fish size causes higher mercury levels.

“The average length of the sampled Oslofjord cod has increased over the last decades, and this might be the main explanation of the pronounced increase in mercury levels. When we corrected the data for fish length, there was no significant increase in mercury concentrations.”

Loves proteins

The concept of bigger and older organisms having higher levels of certain toxicants is well-established in the field of toxicology. It is called bioaccumulation: a toxicant is more easily absorbed through feed than excreted, and over time, the toxicant accumulates in the organism.

Pure mercury is not readily taken up in organisms; but in aquatic environments where oxygen is not present, small microbes can transform mercury to methyl mercury. This substance easily binds to proteins.

By this mechanism mercury enters the food chain, and the concentration builds up for each level in the chain. The compound is stored in protein-rich tissue like muscles, which is the part of the cod that humans prefer to eat. By this route, humans are also exposed.

Why is the cod larger?

There are two possible explanations to why the Oslofjord cod is bigger: Either there has been a change in the cod population, or there has been a shift in the sampling methods towards fishing larger cod.

“Beach seine surveys in the Inner Oslofjord have shown that cod recruitment has been low since the beginning of the 2000s. In 2014 there were no young fish observed at all,” said Ruus.

The reason for these changes in the cod population is unknown, and this needs to be investigated further.

But the fact that there is a tolerance for fish length in the protocol for selecting fish could cause the analyses to show a trend that isn’t necessarily real.

“Since we started monitoring in the mid-eighties, there has been an increasing number of chemical parameters to be analysed, demanding sampling of more tissue per fish. As there is a tolerance for fish length in the protocol, we cannot exclude the possibility of a bias towards sampling more of the larger fish, even if all guidelines have been followed,” Ruus explained.

Anyhow, length cannot be the only factor causing the increase in mercury, Ruus emphasized. More research is needed to investigate other explaining factors.

This study was done by the Norwegian Institute of Water Research (NIVA) with economic support from the Research Council of Norway. Data collection is part of the Norwegian contribution to OSPAR´s (Oslo and Paris Commission) Joint Assessment and Monitoring Programme (JAMP). This is conducted by NIVA by contract from the Norwegian Environment Agency.

Cosmic rays of very high energy have their origin outside of our own galaxy, the Milky Way. This is suggested by a study of the angles of incidence of more than 30,000 particles at the Pierre Auger Observatory in Argentina, which is now reported in the Science journal.

This finding of the KIT-managed largest experiment measuring cosmic rays worldwide is another important step on the way towards answering fundamental questions relating to the origin of the universe.

Since the early 1960s, it has been known that high-energy cosmic particles exist and enter the Earth’s atmosphere. Since then, scientists have been trying to reveal the origin of these particles and the process responsible for their high energy. The latest finding of the Pierre Auger Observatory now for the first time proves the extragalactic origin of these particles. Researchers of the Pierre Auger Collaboration report their observation in the latest issue of the Science journal under the title “Observation of a Large-scale Anisotropy in the Arrival Directions of Cosmic Rays above 8×10^18 eV.” They found that cosmic rays preferably enter the Earth’s atmosphere from a direction that differs from the center of the Milky Way by 120 degrees. Hence, they do not come from our galaxy.

It is not yet possible to identify their source, as the particles on their way towards the Earth are strongly deflected by galactic and extragalactic magnetic fields. Based on their preferred arrival direction, however, their origin may be assumed to be located in the cosmological neighborhood of the Milky Way, where the density of galaxies is high.

“In astroparticle physics, we mostly have to rely on assumptions and indications. For the first time now, it is significant that a preferred direction exists from which the rays arrive. This is a very important step in our research,” said Dr. Markus Roth, Deputy Head of the Pierre Auger Group of KIT’s Institute for Nuclear Physics.

“The cosmic rays are ambassadors, through which we learn something about the origin of the universe. They enable us to look back into the history of the cosmos,” the physicist added.

High-energy cosmic rays very seldom arrive on Earth. Each year, only one particle hits an area of 1 km², which corresponds to not even one impact per century on an average football field. On Earth, cosmic rays can be detected indirectly only: The cosmic rays themselves do not reach the ground surface, but collide with atomic nuclei in the Earth’s upper atmosphere, as a result of which cascades of new particles – air showers of more than 10 billion particles – are produced, which hit the Earth’s surface.

These secondary particles are measured by the detectors of the Pierre Auger Observatory on an area of 3000 km² in the Argentinian pampa near Malargüe. There, 1660 water tanks containing 12 m³ of highly pure water each and 27 telescopes record the indirect light signals of these secondary particles. The measured light pulses allow conclusions to be drawn with respect to the energy and arrival direction of the original particle.

The Pierre Auger Observatory in the province of Mendoza in Argentina is the largest project worldwide to study high-energy cosmic rays. More than 400 scientists from 18 countries cooperate. From Germany, KIT, RWTH Aachen University, and the universities of Hamburg, Siegen, and Wuppertal are involved, with KIT managing the Pierre Auger Observatory project. KIT also was responsible for the setup of the fluorescence telescopes. The Federal Ministry of Education and Research made available about EUR 8.3 million for the funding period from 2011 to 2017.

“For four years, we have been planning to extend the observatory to AugerPrime,” Roth said.

An additional detector to be constructed in international cooperation at KIT is expected to yield even more precise measurements in terms of quality and quantity. From 2018, research is planned to focus on particles, whose energy is 10 to 100 times higher. They enter the Earth’s atmosphere with an energy similar to that of a strongly hit tennis ball. As these particles are lighter and richer in energy, they are deflected less on their way to the Earth. Consequently, scientists expect more precise information on the source region of high-energy cosmic rays.

“In future, we will obtain a much deeper insight into the processes taking place in the universe,” Roth said.

Both Hindu and Catholic schoolchildren in India claim to have witnessed an apparition of Christ and several appearances of the Virgin Mary accompanied by the scent of jasmine, the gift of contrition, and the healing of a girl’s ear problem.

The site of the alleged apparitions is St. Ambrose Church and Lower Primary School in Edavanakkad, in the far southwestern state of Kerala, 16 miles northwest of Kochi. The parish and adjacent school are under the Archdiocese of Verapoly. The Marian apparitions are said to have happened on at least two separate dates.

The church’s assistant pastor Father Merton D’Silva said archdiocesan authorities have taken a “wait-and-see” approach before intervening, the news site Matters India reports. Matters India has recounted the apparitions based on a note on the parish billboard by parish priest Father Mathew D’Cunha.

The apparition reportedly began Sept. 28 when a student at the school, a Hindu girl named Krishnaveda, went to the church to pray for her ear problem. She put some holy water on her ear. She later told her fellow students that the holy water immediately helped her ear.

When the children left the school to pray in the church, they looked up and saw in the sky a vision of Christ being scourged. They recited the name of Jesus and went into the church to thank God for healing the girl’s ear.

The only Catholic girl among them, Ambrosiya, volunteered to lead the students in praying the rosary. However she did not know the Luminous Mysteries recited on Thursday and sought a teacher’s help. The children were in prayer when the teacher reached them at about 1:45 in the afternoon.

One of the girls, named Anusree, told the teacher that the Blessed Virgin was standing under the altar. They reported the smell of jasmine flower. The alleged apparition told the children to come closer, which frightened a girl named Sivanya, who said she wanted to leave.

While the teacher was leading the children out of the church, the girls said the apparition followed them and pleaded with them not to leave. The teacher went to tell the other teachers, while some children went to the assistant pastor, Father D’Silva.

When D’Silva took the children back to the church so they could pray, the children claimed to see the Virgin Mary standing under the altar. The adults could not see anything.

According to the children, the apparition promised them help in their studies and promised to send them the Holy Spirit. The apparition also promised to take them to heaven.

When the news of the apparition spread, people began to gather at the church. Parents of the children took them home.

On Oct. 3 a large crowd prayed the rosary in the church with the reputed visionaries. After a time, everyone perceived the scent of jasmine flowers. The children said they saw the Virgin Mary again.

A priest asked the children to point out the exact spot. The congregation saw a bright light and the priest said he felt someone patting his head.

Many in the congregation said they received the gift of contrition as they prayed.

The church had planned a night vigil on Oct. 12.

After the Catalan government declared independence earlier this week, only to suspend it moments later, the Spanish interior minister has warned that Madrid will have no choice but to take direct control of the region unless it clearly states its intentions.

On Tuesday, Catalan President Carles Puigdemont and other local leaders signed a symbolic declaration of independence, calling on “all states and international organizations to recognize the Catalan Republic as an independent and sovereign state.”

However, Catalan sovereignty appeared to be short-lived, as the declaration was suspended moments later to resume negotiations with the central government.

As Madrid says it cannot decide on any further action amid such ambiguity, Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy has given Puigdemont a deadline of Monday to clarify his position, or else his government will move to suspend Catalonia’s autonomous status.

“The answer must be without any ambiguity. He must say ‘yes’ or ‘no,’” Interior Minister Juan Ignacio Zoido told Cope radio on Saturday.

“If he answers ambiguously, it means he doesn’t want dialogue and thus the Spanish government will have to take action.”

Zoido said that investment and tourism in Catalonia have both been dropping amid the recent political tensions, so a clear answer is needed soon for the sake of both the Spanish and Catalan economies. Catalonia is one of the richest regions of Spain, responsible for about one-fifth of the country’s GDP.

If Puigdemont declares independence, Spain is likely to take firm measures and invoke Article 155 of the constitution, allowing it to take direct control of a region that has broken away.

On the other hand, if the Catalan leader doesn’t confirm independence, he risks losing the support of the left-wing CUP party, which is propping up his minority government. On Friday, the CUP also asked Puigdemont to clarify his position and to push ahead for independence, along with other members of his coalition.

“We have an unequivocal and absolute commitment to fulfill the democratic mandate from October 1,” Reuters quoted coalition member Oriol Junqueras as saying.

In spite of a heavy presence of national police, which led to violence and nearly 900 injuries, over 2.2 million Catalans (roughly 43 percent of all eligible voters) still turned out to vote in the October 1 referendum on independence, which local officials claim led to a landslide (90 percent) vote in favor of splitting from Spain.

The ensuing few weeks have been characterized by protests and counter-protests, denouncements of police brutality, and a tense standoff between the Catalan government and Madrid, which considers the vote unconstitutional and void.

By Alan Crosby

(RFE/RL) — Voters in Kyrgyzstan head to the polls on October 15 in an election that is expected to result in the first peaceful transfer of power from one popularly elected president to another in Central Asia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

While dirty tricks, arrests, and the alleged use of “administrative resources” have cast a pall over the campaign, the vote is likely to solidify Kyrgyzstan’s credentials as an island of democracy in the region’s authoritarian sea.

A total of 11 candidates, including one female, are vying to replace President Almazbek Atambaev, who is constitutionally barred from running for a second consecutive six-year term.

The three leading contenders – Omurbek Babanov, Temir Sariev, and Sooronbai Jeenbekov – were all prime ministers during Atambaev’s term in office, raising expectations of policy continuity in a country that has to balance the often-competing interests between neighbors Russia and China.

“I am proud of my freedom-loving people which has staged two national revolutions against dictatorial regimes over the last 12 years and has proven that people are the only possible source of power in the Kyrgyz Republic,” Atambaev said during the campaign.

Atambaev said that Kyrgyzstan had achieved peace and stability in recent years and claimed it is “the first and only country in post-Soviet Central Asia with parliamentary democracy.”

Having battled through two revolutions and several noisy election campaigns, the 6 million mainly Muslim citizens of this mountainous former Soviet republic have become an anomaly among the region’s five ex-Soviet states: the most democratic country in a predominantly authoritarian region.

While most elections in the region see incumbents garner at least 90 percent of the votes, Kyrgyzstan’s vote this weekend is turning into a cliffhanger that is too close to call.

Jeenbekov, a 58-year-old political ally of Atambaev, has used his political leverage and support from the incumbent to wage a heated battle with 47-year-old Babanov, a wealthy entrepreneur and former oil trader from the north.

Neither has been able to gain a strong upper hand, with a September poll by the Western-backed NGO Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society giving Jeenbekov 41 percent to about 39 percent for Babanov.

If no candidate wins a majority of votes in the first round, a runoff between the top two vote getters will be held.

“For elections in Kyrgyzstan, one must expect the unexpected,” according to Michal Romanowski, an expert in Eurasian affairs at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

“Citizens have proved to those in power that in the end they call the shots and authorities will be held accountable for their actions. The attitude promotes political pluralism and a substitute for real electoral competition,” he said.

The campaign has been littered with accusation of dirty tricks and outright corruption, underlying the instability that led to the ouster of two leaders through revolutions in 2005 and 2010.

Government critics say the campaign has been marred by a criminal conviction handed down to opposition Ata-Meken (Fatherland) party leader Omurbek Tekebaev in August after a trial his backers say was politically motivated.

Meanwhile, the government has accused Babanov of trying to buy votes, and late last month it detained one of his supporters, saying they were plotting a coup during the election.

Babanov has denied the accusations and in turn alleges the government has used “administrative resources” against his candidacy and in favor of Jeenbekov.

While Kyrgyzstan’s key ally Russia has stayed neutral, neighboring Kazakhstan’s autocratic Nursultan Nazarbaev made a surprise appearance in the campaign in September by appearing to endorse Babanov.

That sparked a strong rebuke from Atambaev, who blasted Nazarbaev in a speech lauding his country’s democratic principles and accusing Kazakhstan of being ruled by corrupt “sultans.”

In a sign of building tensions and in a thinly veiled criticism of Babanov on October 13, Atambaev also called an unnamed leading contender in the elections a “flunky” of a foreign country.

Kazakhstan’s government called the remarks “unacceptable” and introduced tighter border controls this week on the Kyrgyz border, citing security concerns.

By Thomas Ayres*

Refugees flowing out of the Middle East pose a serious humanitarian crisis for Europe and the world at large. The indiscriminate use of violence by the so-called Islamic State (IS), the unlawful actions of the Syrian regime, and the conduct of some of the warring factions precipitated and continue to fuel this crisis. Consequent to the indiscriminate use of force and explosives in cities, the flow of Syrian refugees has caused some to call for a complete ban on the use of explosive weapons in cities or urban areas. But to what end? Let’s not learn the wrong lessons from this calamity.

The use of military force in cities or urban environments is not a new phenomenon, nor does it present novel problems for which the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) is insufficient.1 For those acting under military necessity, the LOAC demands much from those who must use force against a military objective in an urban environment. In an effort to prevent unnecessary suffering and destruction, the LOAC attempts to regulate the conduct of armed hostilities without unduly impeding the proper or allowable waging of war. Unfortunately, the current calls by some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for a complete ban on the use of explosives in populated areas go far beyond what the LOAC requires.

Already, law-abiding nations forced to fight in populated areas use extreme caution. Professionalized military forces around the world take extraordinary precautions to accomplish their complex missions while limiting civilian casualties and protecting nonmilitary structures from the effects of attacks directed toward lawful military targets. For instance, former Department of Defense General Counsel Jennifer O’Connor discussed her recent observations on a trip to Iraq and the extreme care taken by U.S. forces when making targeting decisions.2 Existing LOAC obligates military commanders making targeting decisions to consider the cascading and multiplying effects of explosive weapons on civilian populations when critical infrastructure such as power, water, sewage, and hospitals is concerned.

LOAC requires the commander or anyone ordering offensive action in an urban area to make careful assessments in order to prevent an impermissible extent of “incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects.”3 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia underlined this principle as a transcendent norm in noting that “certain fundamental norms still serve unambiguously to outlaw (widespread and indiscriminate attacks against civilians), such as rules pertaining to proportionality.” The commander’s role is inherently demanding, but the standard remains that only clearly excessive strikes are per se impermissible. The important point is that discretion remains vested in reasonable persons, normally military commanders, who share a professional ethos that obligates them to balance competing goals in complex circumstances with incomplete or inaccurate information.4 Israel’s supreme court summarized this notion by noting that the authority of military commanders “must be properly balanced against the rights, needs, and interests of the local population: the law of war usually creates a delicate balance between two poles: military necessity on one hand, and humanitarian considerations on the other.”5

The misguided initiative to go beyond what the LOAC already exactingly requires—to implement an unconditional ban on the use of explosives in populated areas—must be viewed in the light of recent, seemingly laudable NGO successes. NGOs have waged a decades-long campaign to ban landmines, and they have more recently followed with a similar if idealistically humanitarian desire to ban cluster munitions. As discussed below, such efforts have been persuasive and successful in changing public, national, and international perceptions. Although the moral impulse to prohibit these explosives in cities is compelling, especially as a way to further humanitarian goals, an absolute prohibition on these weapons would further encourage groups like IS to manipulate this well-intentioned control as just a new arrow in their asymmetric quiver.

Future Enemies, Future Wars

Current violence in the Middle East, where the use of explosives in populated areas has been so devastating, continues with no end in sight. However, this current long war is also not the last war. Terrorist organizations have made their flagrant violations of the LOAC and against the customs of war routine. They fight without uniforms, habitually use human shields, or purposely place their highest value weapon systems and operations among civilians. They take these measures purposefully in order both to improperly hide themselves and to incite retaliation by law-abiding military forces to cause greater civilian casualties. Recent actions in Mosul are demonstrative and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid bin Ra’ad al-Hussein, while noting that IS herds residents into booby-trapped buildings as human shields and fires on those trying to flee, stated, “This is an enemy that ruthlessly exploits civilians to support its own ends.”6 These terrorist organizations do have limited means and resources, but future enemies may not have such limitations. Moreover, future enemies with greater resources and far greater war-making capacities would make only greater use of the safe haven of cities.

Although the absence of war is preferable, until that utopian vision can be realized, nations must accept the concept underpinning the LOAC that wartime violence can unintentionally spill over to cause civilian casualties. As an agreement between nations, the LOAC has always been about finding a balance between the need for violence to achieve necessary national goals such as self-defense and the responsibility to prevent unnecessary suffering. The LOAC also seeks to preserve life and humanity and limit suffering while acknowledging the reality that wars are violent. Therefore, the LOAC does not prohibit the use of explosives in cities. However, as with any use of force, the LOAC requires a calculated decision based on necessity, proportionality, distinguishing civilians, and limiting suffering.

Such calculations are clearly more difficult for military forces to make within urban environments crowded with innocent civilians. But such calculations still do not preemptively and exclusively ban the use of explosives in cities. Where would the common enemies of mankind gather if law-abiding national military forces could never use overwhelming force within populated areas? The Islamic State has already shown us the answer through its regular use of human shields as a means to exploit a nation-state’s practice of minimizing collateral casualties. A complete ban on otherwise lawful tools available to nation-states to combat indiscriminate violence would, ironically, increase violence, increase the likelihood and quantity of innocent civilian injuries and deaths, and make the defense of civilian populations even more difficult.

Orde Kittrie, in his thought-provoking book Lawfare, discusses the idea of compliance-leverage disparity.7 The term is easily understood considering the terrorist organizations we now face. Their tactics to protect themselves purposely induce civilian casualties. They hide in civilian areas and invariably wear civilian clothes while conducting their operations. Kittrie contrasts “the painstaking law-abiding practices of the U.S. military and the dismissive practices of at least some of its adversaries.” Kittrie notes that these opposite approaches originate from different ideologies and tendencies regarding the levels, means, and disparity in the transparency and accountability in the use of force. The costs of compliance-leverage disparity are many, with the most insidious result being hesitance by law-abiding armies to use force even when such use is legal and required by military necessity. This is a great jeopardy to lawful missions and ultimately results in lengthier conflicts and even greater loss of lives.

Compliance-leverage disparity can also be viewed in a broader light. Terrorist organizations are not alone in their flagrant disregard of the LOAC. Nations also sometimes flagrantly disregard their treaty obligations or customary international law limits in order to gain an advantage. Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Crimea, Hezbollah tactics, Iran’s proxy in Lebanon, or China’s proclamation of its Nine-Dash Line claiming territorial rights over an outrageous expanse of the South China Sea are current examples. If explosive weapons in populated areas are preemptively banned, not only will terrorist organizations have easier safe harbor, but future well-resourced national armies who see the advantage of compliance-leverage disparity will continue to use them in populated areas and benefit from the safe haven of their adversaries’ adherence. Well-resourced armies not intent on following the LOAC have historically and frequently used urban areas as key defensive positions. Nazi Germany’s fortification, or Konigsberg, during World War II is just one of many examples. Providing even greater incentive to conceal armed forces, emplace weapon systems, or fortify cities would be creating and amplifying the conditions for new forms of perfidy in the urban environment where the risk to civilians is greatest.

The unfortunate reality is that effective violence in war brings the war to its end, and when wars end quickly, potential civilian suffering generally comes to a better conclusion. In 1859, the battlefield of Solferino was strewn with 40,000 dead and wounded. Henry Dunant, moved by the suffering, mobilized the local populace to respond and later founded the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC, the only organization named within the four Geneva Conventions, has an exclusive charter and unique capacity to protect and advance the LOAC. Many NGOs seek to limit the effects of war, but the ICRC, with its special and sometimes confidential relationship with nation-states, has been particularly balanced as they seek to limit the effects of war on both civilians and combatants. If wars are ever to be terminated, violent and deadly actions required by military necessity must be allowed. However, with its unique charter, the ICRC seems poised to take on the issue of banning explosives in populated areas. This is troubling. For when the ICRC takes up a cause, international consensus builds more quickly.

Landmines and Cluster Munitions

In 1996, the ICRC published a landmark paper, Anti-personnel Landmines: Friend or Foe?8 The humanitarian movement to ban landmines had been a longstanding campaign, and the ICRC’s decision to enter the discussion so forcefully was not without significant influence. In 1997, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personal Mines and on Their Destruction, known informally at the Ottawa Treaty, was adopted. By 1998, 40 nations had ratified the treaty, triggering its entry into force. It became binding on March 1, 1999. Although the United States was opposed to the treaty and is not a signatory, the treaty has not been without effect. On September 23, 2014, the Barack Obama administration announced it would abide by key requirements of the Ottawa Convention with the exception of the Korean Peninsula.9

Similarly, the ICRC added its voice to the topic of cluster munitions and its influence to the Cluster Munition Coalition to great effect. After the 2005 military campaign between Israel and Hizballah, where both sides were accused of killing civilians with cluster munitions, the ICRC engaged on the topic. During a November 2006 conference in Geneva regarding the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the ICRC sought to address the issue of limiting the use of cluster munitions.10 With work on the Oslo Accords beginning in earnest in 2007, the Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted on May 30, 2008, in Dublin, Ireland, and was signed on December 3–4, 2008, in Oslo, Norway.11 Once again, the ICRC’s entry into the conversation and focus on the issue created a momentum that was too great to ignore. And once again, the impact would be felt in the United States. In 2008, despite apparent misgivings clear from his statement, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced that the United States would eliminate all cluster bombs that do not meet established safety and dud-rate standards by the end of 2018.12 Whether cluster munitions will be needed by the United States before 2018, or whether the technology will be developed that would reach the required dud-rates and allow cluster munition use after 2018, remains to be seen. As the date grows nearer, and near-peer adversaries continue to use cluster munitions, calls to delay the ban and extend the use of cluster munitions by the United States grow.13

The ICRC Enters the Explosives in Cities Debate

In February 2015, the ICRC convened a meeting of experts on the dangers of using explosives in populated areas, and they also published a short video on the topic.14 In June 2016, the ICRC published a fact sheet calling on signatories to the conventions and parties to armed conflicts to avoid using explosive weapons that have a wide impact area in densely populated areas due to the significant likelihood of indiscriminate effects.15 Whether the ICRC’s added voice to the call to ban explosive weapons in populated areas will have the same pronounced effect as it had on the debates on landmines and cluster munitions is still to be seen. It is clear that their presence in the debate can add significant velocity to the speed at which the topic will be debated, and whether the issue may catch hold in the international community.

No person or nation of reason can be opposed to the noble goal of limiting civilian casualties. Similarly, we should all desire to avoid future refugee issues on the scale or scope of the Syrian crisis. At first glance, many NGOs and nations would appear only more reasonable and humane by coalescing around such a noble, humanitarian goal. By seeing the problem solely through the lens of the current conflicts, it seems to amplify the reasonableness of this approach. In a war waged within the limited borders of one nation, or combat against one limited foe—even a transnational terrorist foe—such calls seem to make sense. But the result may be more far-reaching and dangerous.

Although the ICRC’s desire to bring focus to this issue is laudable, this is no time to come to the absolute conclusion that explosives should be banned in populated areas. In reality, the current proposal would protract a conflict, increase casualties on all sides, to include innocent civilians, and turn populated areas into rubble as a consequence of rooting out the enemy house to house. A ban of this nature is overbroad and might indeed portend even greater suffering, death, and loss of humanity. It would leave those we want civilian populations to be protected from—those terrorists and common enemies of mankind—as the only sure beneficiaries. Instead of banning explosives in cities outright, nations should ensure that military forces using explosives in populated areas consider in their proportionality calculus the possibility of cascading effects of weapon systems use and impacts on infrastructure and the inhabitability that results, further leading to refugees, to increased loss of life, and to greater human suffering. Such diligent and due care is reasonable and required by the law of war, and does not subvert its intentions.

About the author:
*Major General Thomas Ayres, USA, is the Deputy Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Army.

Source:
This article was published in the Joint Force Quarterly 87, which is published by the National Defense University.

Notes:
1 The Department of Defense (DOD) defines the law of war as “that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. It is often called the ‘law of armed conflict.’” See DOD Directive 2311.01E, DOD Law of War Program, May 9, 2006. See also DOD Directive 2311.01E, DOD Law of War Manual, June 2015: “International humanitarian law [IHL] is an alternative term for the law of war that may be understood to have the same substantive meaning as the law of war.”

2 Jennifer M. O’Connor, “Applying the Law of Targeting to the Modern Battlefield,” remarks at New York University School of Law, November 28, 2016, available at <www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Applying-the-Law-of-Targeting-to-the-Modern-Battlefield.pdf>. Ms. O’Connor’s remarks include this description of the punctilious nature of reviewing targets:

At one location, I observed a dynamic strike take place. I was in a meeting at the Joint Operations Center. A military lawyer, also present in the meeting, got called into the strike cell to work with the commander who was the target engagement authority—the ultimate decision maker. The proposed target consisted of two VBIEDS [vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices] that were completed but not yet on the move to where they would be detonated. Before authorizing the strike, the commander methodically worked through the analysis of whether the target was a valid military target. He asked lots of questions, including what information supported the assessment that these were VBIEDS, and that the people near them were ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] fighters, what weapons were available, whether any civilians were nearby and how his staff reached their conclusion to these questions, what the collateral effects would be, whether those collateral effects would be proportionate to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained by striking the target. Cameras scanned to get close-up views and also to pull back to provide a wide-angle view in order to see if there were other buildings or people nearby. This all moved very quickly, and involved input from a room full of people with different dedicated jobs. Ultimately, once the target engagement authority was satisfied, he asked the judge advocate whether he had any remaining legal or policy issues, and when the lawyer did not, the commander decided to carry out the strike.

3 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume 1: Rules (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); see Rule 14: “Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.” This premise of international law is the articulated principle of proportionality that applies in all armed conflicts at all times as a matter of both treaty law and widespread state practice. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court reflects this tenet in Article 8, which addresses war crimes in both international and noninternational armed conflicts.

4 Michael Newton and Larry May, Proportionality in International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 117–119.

5 Beit Sourik Village Council v. the Government of Israel, HCJ 2056/04, 34 (2004), available at <http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/560/020/A28/04020560.a28.htm>.

6 “U.S. Sees Probable Role in Mosul Blast, Probe Under Way,” Reuters, March 28, 2017, available at <http://cms.trust.org/item/20170328130001-hfg9g>.

7 Orde F. Kittrie, Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

8 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Anti-personnel Landmines: Friend or Foe? (Geneva: ICRC, March 1996).

9 Department of State, U.S. Landmine Policy (2014), available at <www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c11735.htm>.

10 Lionel Beehner, “The Campaign to Ban Cluster Bombs,” Council on Foreign Relations, November 21, 2006, available at <www.cfr.org/weapons-of-mass-destruction/campaign-ban-cluster-bombs/p12060>.

11 The Convention on Cluster Munitions, available at .

12 DOD, “Cluster Munitions Policy Released,” press release, July 9, 2008, available at <http://archive.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12049>.

13 Bob Scales, “Bring Back Artillery Submunitions; Russian Threat Too Great,” Breaking Defense, October 21, 2016, available at <http://breakingdefense.com/2016/10/bring-back-artillery-submunitions-russian-threat-too-great/>.

14 “Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas: The Consequences for Civilians,” International Committee of the Red Cross video, 1:49, June 15, 2015, available at <www.icrc.org/en/document/explosive-weapons-populated-areas-consequences-civilians>.

15 ICRC, “Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas—Factsheet,” June 14, 2016, available at <www.icrc.org/en/document/explosive-weapons-populated-areas-factsheet>.

Sometimes, a view of the future can only be presented in the form of fiction, even though it represents a viable hypothesis of where events are leading. It is, in effect, strategic gaming. It was certainly the case with Stefan Possony’s great book Waking Up The Giant (1974), which discussed how a US president takes office during the Cold War.

Australian-born Indonesia specialist Kerry Collison — a fluent Bahasa Indonesia speaker1 — has been forced to specialize in such a genre, largely because legal constraints in Indonesia preclude discussing many political issues.

Nonetheless, his writings invariably serve as prescient view of present and emerging trends. His latest book, Rockefeller & The Demise of Ibu Pertiwi, is particularly profound.

And Mr Collison surely pushes the boundary of the Indonesian legal system merely for its title, because it talks of “the demise of Ibu Pertiwi”: Ibu Pertiwi is the Indonesian motherland (literally “Mother Earth” from the pre-Muslim, Hindu era of Java).

His book immediately immerses the reader into the context of the post-World War II era and through to the transition from Pres. Sukarno into the era of Pres. Suharto, in the 1960s. Suddenly the attitudes and activities of the powers of the day — the declining Dutch and British, the increasingly concerned Australians, and the growing needs of the US — can be seen ensuring the inevitable global acceptance of the fatal “Act of Free Choice” (which was anything but) in July 1969.

This was the act which breathtakingly stole the Melanesian, former Dutch colony of West Papua (Irian Jaya), transforming it into a colony of the Javanese-dominated Indonesian Government. It remained a colony, disguised as the 26th province of Indonesia, later divided into two provinces (West Papua and Papua).

Collison’s deep knowledge and research will have readers reaching for history books and atlases. But he has been there as this history was being made, and his writing looks for all the world as though it is the combination of diaries of the players in all the camps: Indonesian, American, Australian, Dutch, British, and even those in the village huts in the highlands.

The fact that this is “current historical fiction” — a new genre? — does not make the book any less readable or gripping as Collison weaves highly credible scenarios in the halls of power in Jakarta, Canberra, Washington, and London. Indeed, the professional Asia hand will certainly crave even more detail, and I challenge any serious reader not to rush off to consult further references to read of the affairs which have plagued the lives of Papuans for decades.

When Collison also weaves into the story the saga of the 1961 disappearance in the Arafura Sea, off southern West Papua, of explorer Michael Rockfeller, scion of the wealthy and political US Rockefeller clan, he does so in a way which adds real credibility to the overall tale. The fact that this makes the book more appealing to US readers is a bonus.

Kerry Collison makes it clear that the central player in the economy of Indonesian-occupied Papua is the mining operation which, in Rockefeller & The Demise of Ibu Pertiwi, is the fictitious P.T. Akumuga Mining corporation, run by the also-fictitious Summit Gold Mining Company of the US. The book details the maneuvering and corruption of Indonesian political, military, and corporate interests to seize the mining operation, which has already been central to the Indonesian economy.

Collison’s book was already at press when the real-life parallel occurred: On September 20, 2017, the Government selected State-owned aluminum firm PT Indonesia Asahan Aluminium (Inalum) to acquire 51 percent of shares in gold and copper miner PT Freeport Indonesia from the US Freeport McMoRan Inc. parent company of Freeport Indonesia, which runs the mine which is central to the region’s economy.

The book is sub-titled “When Australia and Indonesia Again Go to War …”, and not without reason. The issue of Indonesian-occupied Papua is extremely sensitive in Canberra-Jakarta relations, and Indonesian officials still burn over the perceived Australian betrayal in supporting the independence movement in the then-Indonesia-occupied former Portuguese colony of East Timor, now Timor Leste, in 1999-2000. Today, West Papuan independence activists find safe-haven in Australia and, particularly, New Zealand.

Collison, in the book, gives significant background to real activities, events, people and organizations, including, of course, the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Movement: OPM) and the very real, multinational body, the Melanesian Spearhead Group.

On September 26, 2017, a secretly-gathered petition signed by 1.8-million Papuans, demanding a new independence referendum for Indonesian-occupied Papua, was presented to the United Nations; that represented more than 70 percent of the province’s population. United Liberation Movement for West Papua spokesman Benny Wenda told the Australian Broadcasting Corporation that signing the petition was a “dangerous act” for West Papuans, with, he said, 57 people arrested for supporting the petition, and 54 tortured by Indonesian security forces during the campaign. The Prime Minister of Solomon Islands, Manasseh Sogavare, said the petition was incredibly important and the people of West Papua had effectively already voted to demand their self-determination.

Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop said that Australia had long recognized Indonesian sovereignty over the Papuan provinces.

Kerry Collison’s “fictional” book is essential reading for anyone wishing to understand the unfolding issue of West Papuan independence.

*Gregory Copley, AM, GCHT, FRCGS, is the editor of Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, where this article was published.

Notes:
1. Kerry Collison also serves as Indonesia correspondent for the Defense & Foreign Affairs publications. See his recent report, “The Question of West Papuan Independence”, which was published by Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, 9-2017.

By Marguerite Borelli*

Introduction

Since 2016, the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS), or Daesh, has sustained a propaganda offensive directed at Southeast Asian Muslims as they recruit Indonesians, Malaysians and Filipinos to join the war effort in Iraq and Syria, or to wage armed jihad in their own region.1 IS’ approach to Southeast Asia is a part of its regional, transnational agenda. Similar to Filipino, Indonesian, and Malay fighters being regrouped in the Katibah Nusantara, a Malay-speaking regional battalion on the Syrian-Iraqi front, IS propaganda addressed to local sympathisers calls for Southeast Asian jihadists of all nationalities to come together in Mindanao, located in South Philippines, to train and fight.2

Moreover, as IS is losing ground on the Middle East front, it is actively seeking to establish a global, decentralised network of wilayahs (governorates).3 IS’ efforts to capture territory in Southeast Asia will not stop at Marawi City – a part of which it currently occupies — as the group has previously attempted to establish a foothold in Poso, Indonesia4 and Malaysia.5

Given that the contemporary threat of terrorism within ASEAN is a regional one, it cannot be eradicated by any single state; a regional counter-terrorism strategy is therefore necessary. ASEAN6 stands out as the obvious forum for the development of such a collective response, as paragraph 2.2. of the organisation’s mission statement, written into its founding Bangkok Declaration, states that ASEAN shall “promote regional peace and stability”7. Additionally, the 2007 ASEAN Charter introduces the concept of “collective responsibility in enhancing regional peace, security and prosperity” (Art. 2.2.b.).8

In line with this mission, ASEAN has developed a substantive counter-terrorism arsenal in the years since 9/11. The cornerstones of these measures are the 2007 legally binding ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism (ACCT) and the subsequent 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of Action on Counter Terrorism. In particular, the Association serves as an efficient platform for member states to promote moderation,9 engage in continuous dialogue on counter-terrorism policies, exchange best practices, and promote research into innovative ways of countering violent extremism.

However, as argued in this article, ASEAN’s counter-terrorism arsenal remains insufficient. Jonah Blank of the RAND Corporation notably states, “there are few mechanisms in place for genuine cooperation by all — or even most — ASEAN nations on any issue”.10 In addition, the UN Security Council Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC) recommended in its 2016 report that ASEAN “[s]trengthen [the] use of sub-regional instruments and mechanisms, including the ASEAN Convention for Counter-Terrorism and Plan of Action and the ASEAN Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance.”11 This article touches upon ASEAN’s current counter- terrorism measures in order to provide an overview of the organisation’s weaknesses in this policy area. The first part presents the counter-terrorism insufficiencies created by structural factors pertaining to the nature of ASEAN, and the second highlights the lack of preventative counter-terrorism measures within the current framework.

Structural obstacles to counter-terrorism

The nature of ASEAN as an intergovernmental organization whose member states are attached to the ‘ASEAN Way’ of policy-making means that it is based on consensus, respect of national sovereignty and non-interference into domestic matters. Therefore, ASEAN’s counter-terrorism role within the region includes being a general agenda-setter and facilitator, rather than acting as a driving force for the implementation of new measures.12 This limited role translates into four overarching weaknesses within ASEAN counter-terrorism efforts.

Slow process

First, ASEAN policy-making is slow in its production of legislation as well as its ratification process and implementation of measures.13 While the time lag may not be as problematic in other policy areas, efficient counter-terrorism requires timeliness. The institution should aim to anticipate and evolve in accordance with transformations and current trends in terrorism.

ACCT exemplifies this well. When the ACCT was signed in 2007, long after the idea for a regional counter-terrorism treaty emerged, Southeast Asia was one of the last regions of the world to adopt such legislation.14 The treaty came into effect in 2011 when six out of ten member states ratified it. But complete ratification within ASEAN only came in 2013 – six years after the treaty’s signature. Similarly, the idea for a regional extradition treaty has been discussed since the Bali bombings, but has not yet materialised, leading to the CTC’s reiteration in 2016 that the region should adopt such an instrument.15 In part due to slow processes, ASEAN has failed to impose itself as the dominant forum for regional counter-terrorism policymaking as regional states tend to prefer using bilateral arrangements.

According to a senior ASEAN official, “bilateral cooperation between members has always been the most effective way of managing security issues in the region. There are sensitivities when it comes to security agenda and member countries certainly prefer it to be done on a bilateral basis.”16 However, since the territorial advances of IS in Iraq and Syria in 2014 and its efforts to set up wilayahs by courting and co-opting militant groups in volatile areas of the world such as Afghanistan and Mindanao, there is a greater appreciation for the need for regional cooperation between leaders.

In practice, Southeast Asia’s counter- terrorism landscape is highly complex and asymmetrical in terms of member states’ respective counter-terrorist capabilities, efficiency and involvement in transnational cooperation. These gaps can be exploited by terrorists, notably for the smuggling of foreign fighters and weapons, made evident by the presence of Uyghurs and other non- Southeast Asian militants in Mindanao.17

Weak concrete impact

Second, ASEAN produces ‘soft’ laws, using vague language and imposing “many uncertain obligations [on states].”18 Its counter-terrorism efforts are “a process of ‘norm internalisation’, rather than imposition of legal obligation”.19 As the language in ASEAN legislation allows for different national interpretations, member states display varying levels of commitment to their spirit and implementation.

As such, the ACCT was never given a specific timeframe for implementation, nor did it clearly provide an enforcement mechanism to monitor and review member states’ compliance to the Convention.20 Indeed, the CTC reported in 2016 that, “[the] ASEAN Convention and Plan of Action, adopted in 2007 and 2009, respectively, do not appear to be effectively utilised.”21 As of July 2017, important ACCT provisions such as the creation of a common regional intelligence database to facilitate cooperation between national intelligence services, law enforcement agencies, militaries and judiciaries has yet to be implemented at the regional level. The establishment of such a database is routinely encouraged by experts in the current context.22 It would allow national counter-terrorism professionals to save time and benefit from the context- specific, cultural and linguistic expertise of other member states, while ensuring that research is readily available and not unnecessarily duplicated.

Precedence of domestic issues

Third, very often domestic political considerations impede the development of regional counter-terrorism.23 In fact, despite their strong rhetorical commitment to a regional strategy in ASEAN forums, member states treat counter-terrorism as a domestic issue. National counter-terrorism instruments within Southeast Asia differ widely. For instance, there are differences between the law enforcement in charge of counter- terrorism in Singapore and Malaysia and the military in Thailand and the Philippines.24

Differing national counter-terrorism structures are not in themselves a counter-terrorism weakness of ASEAN but they do require regional policies to account for them, notably through international cross-institutional cooperation. For example, counter-terrorism cooperation between the Malaysian and Philippines police through ASEANAPOL, and between the militaries through ADMM (ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting) is insufficient. Instead, Malaysian law enforcement and the Philippine military should also closely cooperate to obtain optimal results. ASEAN currently lacks a forum or procedure for such international cross-institutional cooperation.

Moreover, states also routinely “prioritise respect for state sovereignty…at the expense of their regional community interest.”25 According to Tan and Nasu, ASEAN counter- terrorism efforts should thus be appraised within the wider regional context where national counter-terrorism policies “are enmeshed with their own political agenda of national harmony and combating dissidents.”26 In the past, the precedence of domestic politics over regional counter-terrorism was visible in Indonesia’s denial of Jemaah Islamiyah’s presence, which allowed the group to flourish.27 And history recently repeated itself, as the Philippines (under former president Aquino) denied the rise of IS on its territory to ease the finalisation of the Moro peace process. In both cases, governments turned a blind eye to terrorism within their borders, ultimately endangering the whole region by allowing the threat to consolidate further. Even as civil society experts warned regional governments of the developing threat,28 other ASEAN members were prevented from taking direct action to protect the region as they adhered to the principle of non-interference. It can then be said that “rethinking the ASEAN principles and the ‘ASEAN Way’ is necessary if ASEAN is to deliver effective multilateral counter- terrorism cooperation.”29

Unresolved territorial claims translate into opportunity for terrorists

Finally, ASEAN counter-terrorism efforts are partially ineffective due to long-lasting administrative gaps within the region. It is no coincidence that the contemporary threat of Daesh in Southeast Asia is concentrated in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas. This tri-border area, where the national borders of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines meet, has historically suffered from weak governance because of ongoing territorial disputes pertaining to islands and maritime borders.30

ASEAN should help resolve these disputes to ensure that state control over this area is re- established. The joint-maritime patrols implemented recently by the aforementioned countries are a clear sign that some member states are willing to move from cooperation to collaboration in order to face contemporary threats.31 However, as stated by the Singaporean Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen:

“[The patrols were] a good start. But we recognize that there [is] a lot to be done, and that information sharing and intelligence [is] also a key area.”32

Lack of preventative counter-terrorism

Beyond counter-terrorism weaknesses endemic to ASEAN, the existing counter- terrorism framework is reaction-oriented and lacks a strong prevention and pre-crime chapter. Rose and Nestorovska assess that ASEAN “measures for prevention and intelligence cooperation are insubstantial. Their main strengths include providing procedures for mutual assistance in investigations and extradition arrangements.”33 Meanwhile, Ahmad also concludes that, “[t]here must be a shift in ASEAN’s counter-terrorism paradigm from reactive measures to more robust preventive and protection strategies.”34

Preventing radicalisation, recruitment and recidivism

In light of the extensive use of modern communication technologies by terrorists, individuals vulnerable to extremist discourse tend to radicalise or self-radicalise online.35 Any strategy aimed at disrupting radicalisation, recruitment and recidivism by former offenders must therefore include an online aspect. But states have so far experienced difficulty in dealing with online propaganda.36

The Internet knows no boundaries and because IS has treated Southeast Asian Muslims as a homogenous target-demographic, ASEAN should occupy a substantial position in regional efforts to counter extremist ideology online. According to Greer and Watson, ASEAN should encourage, subsidise and implement, “local, data-driven restorative approaches to prevent and rehabilitate radicalisation.”37

ASEAN has an advantage when it comes to countering extremism as its member states have considerable expertise especially with regards to rehabilitation and counter-propaganda. Some of ASEAN’s member states have been hailed globally for pioneering many of the most successful initiatives in the world especially with regard to rehabilitation and counter-propaganda. In particular, two examples of such innovative approaches should be mentioned. First, Singapore’s Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), which actively counters radicals’ misperceptions and instrumentalisation of Islam through a grassroots approach. This includes a counselling centre, a smartphone app, publications by religious scholars, conferences and community outreach events.38

The second initiative is the RDC3, the Regional Digital Counter-Messaging Communication Centre recently launched by Malaysia. The centre counters IS propaganda and more specifically its misuse of the Muslim religion in cyberspace by disseminating content which was elaborated upon in collaboration with the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (JAKIM).39

These admirable national initiatives should be strongly supported, replicated and disseminated in various ASEAN member countries.

Critical infrastructure protection

Despite its high-pace economic growth and proportional reliance on critical systems, infrastructure and information technologies, ASEAN has also been slow in planning for the protection of its critical infrastructure (CIP).40 Indeed, the ASEAN Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resilience Asia (CIP Asia) conference was only established in mid-2015, and is set to gather industry, governments and agencies every two years to exchange on CIP.

According to the CIP Asia website, ASEAN has established disaster management teams under its Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), but “none is geared towards the protection of critical infrastructure.”41 Moreover, the 2008 CTC report “identifies that vulnerabilities still exist in some areas such as border control…whilst there are shortfalls in the implementation of international standards of aviation, maritime and cargo security.”42

As the integration of the Economic Community progresses, notably through the launch of cross-national projects such as the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline and the ASEAN Power Grid, ASEAN should encourage and participate in efforts to harden new and existing targets to protect critical infrastructure in the region. In addition, ASEAN should increase preparedness in the event of terrorist attacks as, “a terrorist attack against critical infrastructure is likely to have implications beyond national borders.”43

Critical infrastructure in the form of water and energy supplies, transport systems and information infrastructure is a valuable target for terrorists and attacks against such systems are globally on the rise. 44

In particular, ASEAN lacks actionable research on regional vulnerabilities.45 In the future, the ASEAN Infrastructure Fund (AIF) could be assigned the task of raising awareness and promoting CIP knowledge transfers following the example of the Catastrophe and Risk Management in ASEAN (CARMA). CARMA is an online portal where interested parties can research regional risk management systems to reinforce natural disaster preparedness, resilience and mitigation.46

As stated by Feakin, “research is urgently needed to get a better grasp on the threat environment, especially as the region is expected to see rapid expansion in infrastructure delivery [expected to reach a US$20 billion worth by 2020]”.47 Along similar lines, ASEAN should also strongly push for member states to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 2341 (2017) on the protection of critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks.

Finally, the urgent need for CIP within ASEAN does not only apply to the physical realm, but also to cyberspace because modern critical infrastructure is increasingly reliant on the Internet. Multiple reports conclude that ASEAN states are highly vulnerable to cyber-attacks because of their rapidly expanding economies, online presence and parallel digitisation of various critical systems. But ASEAN has, again, been too slow in reacting to the growing threat of cyber-terrorism.

Indeed, in 2014, Heinl estimated that “national and regional efforts to adopt comprehensive cybersecurity strategies have been slow and fragmented. Similarly, the efforts of the ten ASEAN member states to adopt both national and comprehensive regional frameworks for cybersecurity have so far been piecemeal.”48 Two years later in 2016, the situation had not evolved, as summarised by Stacia Lee:

“[o]fficial cyber security and information and communication technology (ICT) policies primarily function as mechanisms to either aid ASEAN’s growing economy or limit crimes that hinder the further development of legal business channels (…) illustrat[ing] ASEAN’s historic function as a regional trade group rather than a cohesive political and legal body. Strong cybersecurity policy in and of itself has never been adequately prioritised, leaving member states vulnerable to cybercrime through a lack of compliance mechanisms, institutional disconnect, and uneven national legal capabilities.”49

In 2015, the discovery of the virus APT30 by Fire Eyes, a cyber-security firm, illustrated the inadequacy of ASEAN cyber-protection. Indeed, the virus, which had gone undetected for 10 years, had infiltrated ASEAN member states’ critical information networks to collect government and military sensitive information, “particularly around the time of official ASEAN meetings.”50

While this virus is believed to have been launched by Chinese-affiliated hackers,51 it does highlight vulnerabilities in ASEAN’s cyber- infrastructure that can be manipulated by terrorists. For instance, IS is known to target individuals with the know-how for sophisticated cyber-attacks for recruitment.52 Furthermore, ASEAN’s vulnerability in cyberspace is increased by a general under- estimation of the threat among leaders in the private and public sectors, as observed by FireEye APAC CTO Bryce Boland. He stated that, “organizations in Asia feel they are not likely to be a target of advanced cyber threat.”53

Conclusion

ASEAN has so far been a successful discussion forum bringing Southeast Asian states together around the topic of counter- terrorism. However, its lack of responsiveness to contemporary developments and a general lack of political appetite for collective security and responsibility in the region have prevented it from acting as a driving force and an architect of regional counter-terrorism.

However, the intrinsic transnational nature of the current threat of IS in Southeast Asia provides a strong impetus for regional cooperation and collaboration, and even more so as regional member states will in the coming months be faced with similar problems linked to the return of IS fighters from the Middle East and Marawi City.

This pressing need for a regional counter- terror strategy is publicly recognised by the ASEAN member states that face the highest threat levels, as exemplified by the tri-lateral sea patrols in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas. However, it will take time for this instance of collaboration to lead to an increase in multilateral counter-terrorism activities under the scope of ASEAN.

About the author:
*Marguerite Borelli is a graduate student in International Relations at Sciences Po Doctoral School in Paris, France. She has recently completed a research internship at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSiS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and can be contacted at marguerite.borelli@sciencespo.fr.

Source:
This article was published by RSIS in Counter Terrorist Trends And Analysis, September 2017 Volume 9, Issue 9, pages 14-20 (PDF)

Notes:
1 See Muhammad Haziq Bin Jani and Jasminder Singh. “Daesh-isation” of Southeast Asia’s Jihadists.” RSIS Commentaries. N°080. April 11, 2016. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis- publication/icpvtr/co16080-daesh-isation-of- southeast-asias-jihadists/
2 United Nations Security Council Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC). Global survey of the implementation by Member States of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). (2016), 52 and 54. 3 See Rohan Gunaratna. “Global Threat Forecast 2017.” RSIS Commentary. N°316. December 19, 2016. . https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis- publication/icpvtr/co16316-global-threat-forecast- 2017/
4 See Muhammad Haziq Bin Jani and Jasminder Singh. “Daesh-isation” of Southeast Asia’s Jihadists.” RSIS Commentaries. N°080. April 11, 2016. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis- publication/icpvtr/co16080-daesh-isation-of- southeast-asias-jihadists/
5 Parameswaran, Prashanth. “Malaysia Says New Terror Group Trying to Create Islamic State.” The Diplomat. January 8, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/malaysia-says-new- terror-group-trying-to-create-islamic-state/
6 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) includes Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia*, Laos, Malaysia*, Myanmar, the Philippines*, Singapore*, Thailand*, and Vietnam (*founding member).
7 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The Asean Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) Bangkok, 8 August 1967. (1967). http://asean.org/the-asean-declaration-bangkok- declaration-bangkok-8-august-1967/
8Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. November 20, 2007.
9 ASEAN formally endorsed the Global Movement of Moderates (GMM). See Global Movement of Moderates Foundation. “Introduction on GMMF.” [date unknown]. http://www.gmomf.org/about- us/introduction-on-gmmf/
10 Chandran, Nyshka. “Is fighting terrorism key to ASEAN unity and credibility?” CNBC. October 9, 2016. http://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/10/is-fighting- terrorism-key-to-asean-unity-and-credibility.html
11 See note 2, 52.
12 Tan See Seng and Hitoshi Nasu. “ASEAN and the development of counter-terrorism law and policy in Southeast Asia.” UNSW Law Journal, Vol. 39 No.3 (2016): 1219-1238.
13 Ahmad, Abdul Razak. “The ASEAN Convention on Counter-terrorism 2007.” Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and Law, Vol.14 No.1-2, (2013):93- 147.
14 The treaty was in the works prior to 2003. See Human Rights Watch. In the Name of Counter- Terrorism: Human Rights Abuses Worldwide. March 25, 2003, 8. https://www.hrw.org/legacy/un/chr59/counter- terrorism-bck.pdf
15 See note 2, “Priority issues/recommendations.” p.53.
16 See note 13, p.97.
17 See Ho, Ben and Yee, Chen May. “Danger close: Mindanao, and the terrorists next door.” Today online. June 9, 2017.. http://www.todayonline.com/world/asia/big-read- terrorists-next-door-and-danger-close-mindano
18 See note 12, p. 1236. 19 Ibid, p. 1238.
20 Ibid.
21 See note 2, p. 52.
22 According to Professor R. Gunaratna “Governments must build common databases, exchange personnel (and) conduct joint training and operations to make the Asia-Pacific region hostile to ISIS and unfriendly to ISIS supporters.” As quoted in Sim, Melissa. “’Cooperation is key for Asean to fight terror’ say experts.” The Straits Times. June 29, 2015. http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se- asia/cooperation-is-key-for-asean-to-fight-terror-say- experts
23 See note 13.
24 Almuttaqi, Ibrahim. “Countering ISIS in Southeast Asia: ASEAN’s Efforts at the Regional Level.” Habibie Center, ASEAN Studies Program. February 18, 2016. [presentation slides] https://www.google.com.sg/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc= s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUK EwionozViaTVAhVGl5QKHWPhAKEQFggkMAA&url =http%3A%2F%2Fadmin.thcasean.org%2Fassets% 2Fuploads%2Ffile%2F2016%2F02%2FA._Ibrahim_ Almuttaqi_Presentation_-_THC_- _31st_TA.pdf&usg=AFQjCNFs_YQsuc8T2ZYBE- QHzpBDDoYRVQ
25 See note 12, p.1236.
26 See note 12, p. 1238.
27 See the diplomatic incident between Singapore and Indonesia after Lee Kuan Yew (former PM) accused Indonesia of being soft on terrorists. See: “Lee Kuan Yew Interview Transcript.” CNN. February 12, 2002. http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/02/12/ta lkasia.lee.script/ ; and ”Jakarta: Singapore is too Authoritarian to Understand Us; Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Gets in Jab at the Republic, Saying that in a Democratic System, Terrorism must be Dealt with Differently.” The Straits Times. February 25, 2002.
28 For the case of the Philippines, see Mangosing, Frances. “Marawi crisis was a lesson for us – Lorenzana.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. July 25, 2017. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/917448/marawi-crisis- was-a-lesson-for-us-lorenzana; and Ylagan, Lea. “DND admits being unappreciative of intel reports on Maute-ISIS attacks in Mindanao.” UNTV. July 27, 2017. https://www.untvweb.com/news/dnd-admits- being-unappreciative-of-intel-reports-on-maute-isis- attacks-in-mindanao/
29 See note 13, p.119.
30 Greer, Adam, and Watson, Zachary. “Countering radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism in Southeast Asia.” Quilliam Foundation. August 10, 2016. https://www.quilliaminternational.com/countering- radicalisation-extremism-and-terrorism-in-southeast- asia/
31 “ASEAN defence ministers sign joint declaration on combating terrorism.” Channel NewsAsia. May 25, 2016. [author unknown] http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/as ean-defence-ministers-sign-joint-declaration-on- combating-terr-8039886
32 Chen Zixian. “Greater ASEAN-US cooperation in counter-terrorism, maritime security & disaster relief.” CyberPioneer, Singaporean Ministry of Defence. October 2, 2016. https://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resourcelibrary/cy berpioneer/topics/articles/news/2016/oct/02oct16_ne ws.html
33 See note 12, p. 1236. 34 See note 13, p. 147.
35 See for instance Jasmine Jahwar. Terrorists’ use of the Internet: The case of Daesh. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: The Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2016).
36 See note 2, para 190-191.
37 See note 30.
38 See Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG). “About RRG.” [date unknown]. https://www.rrg.sg/about-rrg/ 39 Bernama. “Malaysia’s Counter-Messaging Centre combating terrorism, radical activities, says DPM.” New Straits Times. November 8, 2016. https://www.nst.com.my/news/2016/11/186976/mala ysias-counter-messaging-centre-combating- terrorism-radical-activities-says
40 ASEAN defines critical infrastructure as the “primary physical structures, technical facilities and systems which are socially, economically or operationally essential to the functioning of a society or community, both in routine circumstances and in the extreme circumstances of an emergency.” See Amul, Gianna Gayle. “ASEAN’s Critical Infrastructure and Pandemic Preparedness.” RSiS Centre for Non- Traditional Security (NTS) blog. January 22, 2013. https://ntsblog.wordpress.com/2013/01/22/aseans- critical-infrastructure-and-pandemic-preparedness/
41 Critical Infrastructure Protection & Resilience Asia. [no title]. [date unknown] http://cip-asia.com/
42 Hafidz, Tatik S. “A Long Row to Hoe: A Critical Assessment of ASEAN Cooperation on Counter- Terrorism.” Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia, Vol.11 (December 2009). https://kyotoreview.org/issue- 11/a-long-row-to-hoe-a-critical-assessment-of- asean-cooperation-on-counter-terrorism/
43 United Nations Security Council Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC) Executive Directorate. “Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure Against Terrorist Attacks.” CTED Trends Report. (2016):12.
44 Zahri Yunos. “Cybersecurity Initiatives in Securing ASEAN Cyberspace.” CyberSecurity Malaysia. May 11, 2016. [presentation slides] http://www.connect2sea.eu/news-and- events/news/details/Towards-new-avenues-in-EU- ASEAN-ICT-collaboration-Highlights-and- presentations.html?file=files/connect2sea/files/Works hops/Final%20conference/Session%203/11%20- %20CyberSecurity%20Initiatives%20- %20Dr%20Zahri%20Yunos.pdf
45Tobias Feakin. “Building critical infrastructure resilience in the Asia-Pacific.” Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), The Strategist. August 5, 2015. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/building- critical-infrastructure-resilience-in-the-asia%C2%AD- pacific/
46 See Catastrophe and Risk Management in ASEAN (CARMA). “About us.” [date unknown] http://www.carma-asean.com/index.php
47 See note 45.
48 Caitríona H. Heinl. “Regional Cybersecurity: Moving Toward a Resilient ASEAN Cybersecurity Region.” Asia Policy. Vol. 18 (July 2014).
49 Stacia Lee. “ASEAN Cybersecurity Profile: Finding a Path to a Resilient Regime.” The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington. April 4, 2016. https://jsis.washington.edu/news/asean- cybersecurity-profile-finding-path-resilient-regime/
50 Fire Eye Labs/Fire Eye Threat Intelligence.
Special Report: APT30 and the mechanics of a long- running cyber espionage operation. April 2015:19. https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt- apt30.pdf
51 Ibid.
52 See note 44.
53 Boland, Bryce. “APT30 and Lessons for ASEAN.” Fire Eye. April 12, 2015. https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive- perspective/2015/04/apt30_and_lessonsfo.html
collaboration to lead to an increase in multilateral counter-terrorism activities under the scope of ASEAN.
Marguerite Borelli is a graduate student in International Relations at Sciences Po Doctoral School in Paris, France. She has recently completed a research internship at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSiS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and can be contacted at marguerite.borelli@sciencespo.fr.

The death toll from two car bomb explosions in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, has risen to 231, AP reports. The attack has become one of the deadliest in the recent history of the country beset by Islamist insurgency.

Medics are attempting to help hundreds of victims, many of whom have been burned beyond recognition, AP added.

The first blast happened near the Safari Hotel, close to Somalia’s Foreign Ministry. The blast area lies in the center of the city where government offices, hotels, restaurants, and shops are located, police said.

The second explosion took place in the city’s Madina district hours later, according to police.

The attacks happened just two days after the head of US Africa Command was in Mogadishu to meet with Somalia’s president, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed.

No group has claimed responsibility for the attack so far. However, similar assaults in the country have been blamed on fighters from Islamic extremist rebel group Al-Shabaab.

The group controlled Mogadishu from 2006 until August 2011, when African Union (AU) and Somali forces pushed them out of the capital. The extremists have launched regular attacks on the city since 2011.

Al-Shabaab has repeatedly targeted army bases and communities across the southern and central parts of the country.

The deadliest incident in the recent decade until now was an attack on the Transitional Federal Government’s ministerial complex in Mogadishu in 2011, when a suicide bomber drove a truck loaded with explosives into the building, killing at least 100 people. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack.

One year since the start of the battle to retake Mosul from the Islamic State group (IS), some 673,000 Iraqis from the city and its surroundings remain displaced and unable to go back to their destroyed neighborhoods, the Norwegian Refugee Council said Sunday.

According to Norwegian Refugee Council, more than half of the displaced may have lost their official civil documents — from birth certificates to property deeds – which will make rebuilding their lives even harder.

“The battle of Mosul is over, but for hundreds of thousands who fled the city, their suffering and despair continues,” said the Norwegian Refugee Council’s Iraq Country Director Heidi Diedrich. “People we work with are still missing some of the most basic necessities and have no idea if they will ever be able to go back to their homes.”

An assessment conducted by NRC among displaced Iraqis from Mosul and surrounding areas found that 53 percent of respondents maintained they did not have civil documentation. The majority of those living outside displacement camps are finding it impossible to pay rent, with many families having to share one house together. They reported their major concerns to include forced evictions, and inability to pay the increasing cost of rent.

A majority of women said they were concerned about the future. Their children were not registered in schools because they did not know whether or not they would return back to their homes and had very low income. Men reported the lack of job opportunities as their top concern and that sending children to work was one way of coping. Almost all women interviewed listed the lack of shelter, water and health services as their top unmet need.

The top reason for continuing to stay away from their areas of origin was the lack of livelihoods and income opportunities, with violence and insecurity coming in as second top concern. When asked about their future plans a majority responded that it all depended on the situation back in Mosul.

“After three years living under the brutal reign of the IS and a year since the battle to retake the city started, the tragedy for Iraqi civilians continues to this day. Until they are able to return home and rebuild their lives, the international community must continue to stand in solidarity with the Iraq’s displaced. Meanwhile, the government’s plans to rebuild Mosul must ensure the rights of displaced Iraqis are at the forefront of these efforts,” said Diedrich.

A princess has been named to head a Saudi multi-sports federation, in the latest of a string of such appointments in the Kingdom.

An official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that Princess Reema bint Bandar bin Sultan has become “the first woman to lead a federation” covering sporting activities for men and women.

In August 2016, the princess scored another first for women in Saudi Arabia when she was named by the Cabinet to a senior post in the Kingdom’s equivalent of a sports ministry.

A daughter of a former Saudi ambassador to Washington, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Princess Reema is a graduate in museology from an American university.

Several women have this year been appointed to top jobs in Saudi Arabia, which is undergoing a huge program of reforms which includes moves to encourage more women into work.

In February three women were appointed to top jobs in Saudi Arabia’s male-dominated financial sector in the space of just one week.

Sarah Al-Suhaimi was named chair of Saudi Arabia’s stock exchange, the Tadawul; Rania Nashar became the CEO of Samba Financial Group; while Latifa Al-Sabhan was appointed chief financial officer of Arab National Bank (ANB).

Other changes introduced this year include the announcement that physical education classes for girls would be introduced in schools, as well as a review of the guardianship system.

The Kingdom announced last month that it will lift a ban on women drivers from next June.

A poll by Arab News and YouGov found that half of Saudi women who said they want to drive plan to use a car to get to work more easily.

By Oubai Shahbandar*

To understand why the Iranian government is worried about President Donald Trump taking a harder line with sanctions against the Revolutionary Guards, we first must take a look back at how the 2015 nuclear deal intersected with the IRGC and its regional activities and interests.

In what perhaps turned out to be a signal of where the Iran nuclear deal would lead us today, as it immediately released billions of dollars into the hands of Tehran and gradually ended crippling economic sanctions, President Barack Obama pledged in 2015: “There’s no scenario where sanctions relief turns Iran into the region’s dominant power.”

He went on: “This is not to say that sanctions relief will provide no benefit to Iran’s military…. We have no illusions about the Iranian government, or the significance of the Revolutionary Guard and the Quds Force.”

The message that Obama was attempting to send, both to a domestic audience and internationally, was that his administration would still take seriously the destabilizing activity of the IRGC and that the nuclear deal would not in any way deter US resolve to confront IRGC terror activity that threatened US and its allies’ interests.

When Obama said: “If we’re serious about confronting Iran’s destabilizing activities, it is hard to imagine a worse approach than blocking this deal,” he was attempting to outmaneuver opponents of the deal by arguing that not only would the deal prevent — at least in the short term — Iran from achieving nuclear break-out capability, but that effectively confronting Iran’s covert activities in the Middle East necessitated such a deal.

Critics, of course, have pointed to what seem to be contradictory facts on the ground. For instance, IRGC activity has significantly increased since 2015. The commander of the IRGC, Qassem Soleimani, took a direct and much more visible role in expanding IRGC bases of operation throughout Syria and lines of supply to its proxies throughout the Arabian Gulf.

By making the entire IRGC — not just the Quds Force — subject to a total freeze of its assets abroad, Trump will have more than just sent a warning show across the bow. It means that IRGC front companies, or even companies suspected of being IRGC fronts, from Asia to the Gulf states to Europe, will be shut down. The US National Security Council has said Trump’s Iran strategy has four strands: Neutralizing IRGC and destabilizing operations; targeting IRGC financial lifeblood; countering Iran’s ballistic missile threat, in which the IRGC and its front companies play an important role; and ending all pathways to nuclear weaponization.

The last objective is particularly important as it means not only ensuring Iranian compliance, but also preventing Iran from biding its time and preparing the requisite procurement, production and research facilities that would allow it to move quickly toward a nuclear weapon after the nuclear deal expires.

So it was no wonder that Ali Akbar Velayati, the adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said if the US labeled the IRGC a terrorist organization, then “all options are on the table.” Trump may have outmaneuvered Tehran in this regard. Instead of handing Iran a diplomatic victory by initiating a wholesale pull out from the nuclear deal, the White House has now shifted the pressure and spotlight on the IRGC.

The thinking among Trump’s senior officials seems to be that a much stronger case can be made to European allies that Iran is in violation of the nuclear deal if Tehran decides to initiate massive breaches of the agreement as a retaliatory measure to sanctions against the IRGC. Obama’s senior foreign policy adviser Ben Rhodes has argued that Iran is much stronger today than it was then, and that direct confrontation would only play into its hands and de-incentivize it from holding its end of the nuclear bargain. But Trump is playing from a wholly different playbook — one that Tehran may not be prepared to deal with.

• Oubai Shahbandar is a Fellow in New America’s International Security Program. He is a former Department of Defense senior adviser, and currently a strategic consultant specializing in technology, energy and Arabian Gulf security. Twitter: @OS26

By Fatjona Mejdini

Albania is under pressure to deport a 39-year-old detained in Durres, who Turkish media link with a Twitter account that infuriated Ankara with its leaks of state secrets.

Albania is under pressure to extradite an alleged member of Muslim cleric Gulen’s Hizmet movement, which Turkey accuses of being behind last year’s failed coup against President Erdogan.

On Thursday, Albanian police in Durres announced the detention of a Turkish national named Muhammet Aydogmus, 39, on the basis of a Turkish international arrest warrant.

Police said Aydogmus, his wife and two children were detained on Monday in Durres while trying to travel to Italy using false passports.

“After an investigation by the office of Interpol, Tirana found out that Turkish citizen Muhammet Aydogmus had an international warrant concerning a terrorist organisation and was sought by the Turkish courts,” the police said.

Sources from the Durres prosecution told BIRN that they had asked for a 40-day jail security measure – the legal deadline – before considering extradition.

“Within this deadline, the foreign authorities – in this case the Turkish ones – have to send all the investigative materials for the case based on which they seek extradition,” the source said.

Turkish state news agency Anadolu reported that Aydogmus was allegedly connected to the movement linked to exiled Turkish cleric Fetullah Gulen, which Ankara calls the Fetullah Terrorist Organization, FETO.

“Aydogmus is accused of membership of a terrorist organisation [FETO] and was allegedly one of the suspects controlling the notorious @fuatavni Twitter account,” Turkey’s Anadolu Agency reported on October 12.

The same report said that Aydogmus would be deported to Turkey after the legal procedures were completed in Albania.

@fuatavni and @fuatavni_f, which have millions of followers, leaked several top-secret state documents about elections, security and the government in Turkey, as well as secrets about Erdogan and his family.

The Twitter accounts first appeared in 2013 and 2014 respectively, and stopped publishing tweets following last year’s coup attempt.

The Gulen movement is a transnational religious and social movement inspired by the Turkish Muslim preacher Fethullah Gulen who has lived in voluntary exile in Pennsylvania in the US since 1999.

Erdogan and Gulen were close allies until 2013, and thousands of Gulen supporters took up positions in the army, police, judiciary and bureaucracy.

From 2011 onwards, however, the so-called Gulenists became uncomfortable with Erdogan’s nationalist and Islamist agenda and the first cracks in their alliance became visible.

Erdogan then turned on the organisation, calling it a “parallel state” and calling it “the Fethullahist Terrorist Organization”, or FETO, for short.

Ankara claims that last year’s failed coup on July 15 was instigated by Gulenists, after allegedly the “FETO” had infiltrated army and other state institutions.

Turkish officials have pressured Albania and other states in the Balkans to suppress Gulenist NGOs and colleges and hand over Gulen movement members.

As a major crackdown continues in Turkey, tens of thousands people, including Gulenists, opposition members and minorities, have left the country seeking political asylum or a better life in Europe and the US.

According to the German foreign ministry at least 8,000 Turkish citizens have applied recently for political asylum in Germany.

Albania has ratified the European Convention on Extradition. After the courts have ruled on this case, the Justice Ministry will have the last word over extradition.

Fauziya Bayramova, the founder of the Tatar nationalist Ittifaq Party, has called on all non-Russians to vote against Vladimir Putin in the upcoming Russian presidential elections because of the Kremlin leader’s language policies which threaten the future of the country’s non-Russian nations.

At the annual commemoration of the anniversary of the 1552 sacking of Kazan by the forces of Ivan the terrible, she urged that even before the March elections, non-Russians work to reverse Putin’s policies which will allow Russian speakers not to study non-Russian languages even if they live in one of the republics (idelreal.org/a/28794765.html).

Three things make Bayramova’s remarks especially important. First, when officials gave permission for this year’s anniversary meeting, they specified that there was to be no talk about the language issue. By going ahead, the activist and the 300 others at the event showed their contempt for any efforts to deprive them of their right to protest (idelreal.org/a/28777868.html).

Second, her words underscore the centrality of the language issue for the non-Russians and demonstrate that Putin by his incautious language concerning the rights of Russian speakers not to study non-Russian languages may have played to his nationalist base but only at the cost of infuriating the non-Russians and politicizing the issue.

And third, by taking this stand, Bayramova has restored Tatarstan’s role not only as a bellwether of non-Russian thought and action but as a leader of the non-Russian nations that Kazan was under former president Mintimir Shaymiyev but has become less so under his successor.

The nearly century-old Jones Act, enacted in 1920 to protect American shippers from foreign competitors, is back in the news. To speed delivery of relief supplies to Puerto Ricans devastated by Hurricane Maria, President Trump waived compliance with the Jones Act’s requirements for up to ten days, allowing for an extension of the waiver if needed.

The Jones Act (shorthand for the Merchant Marine Act of 1920) requires any cargoes shipped from one U.S. port to another to be carried on vessels built in the United States and flying the American flag. The law plainly was intended to protect the owners of such merchant ships, their officers, and their crews from foreign competition. The law was expected to make America’s shipbuilding industry great again, but the Jones Act-compliant fleet actually has shrunk to only 91 vessels.

Presidents have routinely waived the law after natural disasters along America’s Gulf of Mexico and eastern coastlines. The law even was waived during a particularly harsh winter a few years ago to top up inventories of road salt in New Jersey, which was running short. (Fortunately, the weather moderated before the shortage became a full-blown crisis.) Presidents can grant waivers only temporarily, however.

Gallons of ink were spilled in the days after Hurricane Maria hammered Puerto Rico, claiming that the Jones Act impeded emergency shipments of everything from food, water, and blankets to heavy construction equipment. President Trump’s decision to waive the law was taken in direct response to claims that it was “strangling” relief efforts.

But some commentators think blaming the Jones Act is a serious error: the bottleneck, they say, may not be the availability of too few U.S.-flagged vessels to deliver emergency supplies to Puerto Rican ports, but rather a lack of infrastructure to move supplies inland from the ports. Maria wrecked the island’s distribution networks, adding to the long-term failure of the territory’s bloated, debt-ridden public sector to build and maintain roads and bridges.

One commentator even suggests that, far from being an impediment to Puerto Rico’s recovery, the Jones Act actually encourages a strategically important U.S. merchant shipping industry, going so far as to write that Adam Smith would have supported the law. That opinion comes from the chairman of the American Maritime Partnership, the merchant shippers’ principal lobbyist, and so should be taken with a grain of salt.

Whether or not the Jones Act was responsible for delaying shipments of aid to Puerto Rico, it has no doubt raised the cost of moving cargoes by sea between U.S. ports ever since 1920. Studies suggest that energy prices for consumers on the east coast are one third to one half higher than they would otherwise be. Hawaiians are harmed, too, along with the residents of Guam and other outlying U.S. territories.

And that’s just the tip of the iceberg. Because American vessels do not have to compete with vessels flying other nations’ flags and thus can raise their charges to cargo owners, traffic gets diverted to other, possibly less cost-effective ground transportation modes like highways, railroads, and pipelines. Some of those higher shipping charges are of course passed on down the supply chain and ultimately are paid by the shippers’ customers and final consumers.

It is somewhat ironic that a president pushing an “America First” policy agenda saw fit to waive a special-interest law enacted almost 100 years ago to protect U.S. merchant shippers. Trump’s action proves the rule that economic nationalism benefits a handful of cronies at the expense of everyone else, including Puerto Ricans.

Rather than depending on benevolent chief executives to waive the Jones Act selectively and temporarily, the law should summarily be repealed, a step that only the U.S. Congress can take.

This article was also published at American Thinker and is reprinted with permission.

By Serina Rahman*

While members of Malaysia’s political elite have turned to yet another rebranding exercise to corral the citizenry behind them (with the launch of the 1Malaysia Negaraku logo), individual Malaysian states remain steadfast in their identities through their own subtle yet enduring means. In the north and east of Peninsular Malaysia, Kedahans, Kelantanese and Terengganu folk bond through their unique dialects upon meeting each other outside of their home states. In East Malaysia, the Sarawak for Sarawakians and Sabah for Sabahans campaigns bring the people together in their determination to protect East Malaysian state rights and interests. Bangsa Johor is the clarion call for those from the southern-most state, an identity instituted by Johor’s royal family and most strongly brought forth through the state football team, JDT FC (the acronym for Johor Darul Ta’zim Football Club – also known as the Johor Southern Tigers).

Sport has always been a useful tool for engendering national or state patriotism and loyalty. In spite of an increasingly (politically-instigated) publicly polarized society, Malaysians of all colours and creeds invariably come together in suspense and support of sportsmen and sportswomen such as squash champion Nicol Davids, badminton legend Lee Chong Wei and Paralympian Muhamad Ziyad. This phenomenon is not unique to Malaysia of course.

FOOTBALL TO ESTABLISH AND UPHOLD IDENTITY

Sports are generally highly-charged emotional ecosystems in which every match instigates passion and patriotism for one side against the other. Spectators overcome otherwise tangible differences amongst themselves in support of their team, and in many cases this accord also unites them in political matters well beyond the playing field. In Spain for example, matches between Real Madrid and FC Barcelona harbour more significance than just the spectacle of two top-notch teams battling for a prize. It is the embodiment of the historic tension between Spanish nationalism and Catalan pride.1 In its hosting of the 2010 Soccer World Cup, South Africa attempted to demonstrate its evolution from a country known for apartheid to one that is non-racial and inclusive.2

Matches between neighbouring countries, states and even districts within a state are always the ones most fiercely contested and most raucously supported. The rivalry between Argentina and Brazil is always amplified through its football matches, with representations of the opposing team in all manner of media – advertising, articles, television, sporting commentaries and the like – depicting each nation’s disdain for the other.3

THE BANGSA JOHOR IDENTITY

The multiracial Bangsa Johor identity presently being used in Johor state existed long before the formation of its football team. In his account of Johor’s history, Trocki 4 noted that Johor before the arrival of the British was a thriving maritime entrepôt with the indigenous orang laut (sea people) and island people forming its military and administrative infrastructure.

After the arrival of the British, Johor was distinct from other Malay states in that its ruler was able to successfully incorporate the Chinese population under his reign. This was quite extraordinary in 1885, but Sultan Sir Abu Bakar ibni Al-Marhum Tun Temenggung Raja Daing Ibrahim (Sultan Abu Bakar), was able to succeed because in essence, the Johor government had become a business; the economy of the state took precedence over traditional military pursuits. Chinese secret society headmen became businessmen and Malay pirates were transformed into bureaucrats. Trocki went so far as to state that Sultan Abu Bakar ‘ruled over a Chinese state’.5 Not only was the ruler able to maintain old Malay ties even as he absorbed the Chinese under his reign, but during his lifetime, he was able to ensure that the Europeans treated him more as a business and administrative partner (and less as a subordinate as they were wont to do with other Malay rulers). While ideologically they still perceived any Asian ruler as despotic and inferior to themselves,6 they were otherwise unable to untangle the complicated web of local politics and trade. Their access to local resources and means of production had to go through the Johor rulers and their government.7

It was through this consolidation of local peoples – regardless of ethnic origin – against the advances of the Europeans that the concept of Bangsa Johor emerged. While the notion was not as wittily phrased at the time, the idea that all citizens of Johor were equal under one ruler was established then.

To be sure, the concept of ‘race’ was a uniquely European one, and the division of a state’s people by race was a colonial practice employed for better control of the locals.8 The ‘Malay’ people identified themselves with names that referenced their geographical location such as ‘orang sungai’ (river people) or ‘orang darat’ (land people).9 The use of the phrase ‘Bangsa Johor’ is thus significant on many fronts.

‘Bangsa’ was a word used by royal Malay courts to refer to those of ‘glorious descent’ or descendants of rulers or the noble elite.10 Using the term ‘Bangsa Johor’ returns the identity marker to that of the people’s geographical location, as was customary before the arrival of the Europeans. This concept of Bangsa Johor was put forward and is greatly emphasised by Johor’s currently reigning Sultan Ibrahim Ismail ibni Almarhum Sultan Iskandar and his son, the Crown Prince, Tunku Mahkota Ismail ibni Sultan Ibrahim, thus incorporating the people of Johor neatly under the royal family and their oversight.

Sultan Ibrahim has taken many steps to visibly uphold the concept of Bangsa Johor, and demonstrate its authenticity. He consults various ethnic groups in important state-level decisions and participates in festivities by all ethnicities and faiths in his state.11 While federal religious leaders decree that it was sinful to utter festive greetings, both Sultan Ibrahim and the Crown Prince publicly wish their subjects ‘Merry Christmas’ on their media channels, followed by the hashtag (among others) #muafakatBangsaJohor (meaning: Bangsa Johor consensus).12 The Permaisuri (Johor Queen) also released an open letter calling for a return to a time when “saying ‘Merry Christmas’ offended no-one”.13 These clear stands for racial and religious tolerance in the state endears the royal house to its people, and these messages are invariably disseminated through the JDT FC media channels.

JDT FC & THE STRENGTH OF JOHOR ROYALTY

Originally known as the Kelab Bolasepak Perbadanan Kemajuan Ekonomi Negeri Johor (PKENJ FC), the Johor state professional club team was set up under the PKENJ Recreation Bureau, where its highest accolades included winning the FAM (Football Association of Malaysia) Cup in 1994 and 1995, then the Malaysian Premier League title in 2001. Johor Corporation then took over the club in 1996 and renamed it Johor FC.14 It participated in the AFC (Asian Football Confederation) Cup for the first time in 2009, but lost in the group stages. In what is now a legendary story recounted in a recently released video clip that traces the JDT journey to success,15 Tunku Mahkota Ismail (popularly referred to as TMJ) and his younger brother Tunku Idris Sultan Ibrahim attended a Johor FA (now known as JDT II) match in 2012 where there were just a handful of spectators, and the older brother heard a lone voice call out for someone to ‘save Johor football’. That, it seems, was the trigger for him to act.16 Not long after, he became the President of the Johor Football Association and by December 2012, it was announced that the Johor state teams would be taken over. Rebranded as JDT FC and JDT II, and backed by royal clout and generous financing, the teams were able to attract local and international players of good repute, including those from both the English Premier League and the Spanish League.17

In an extraordinarily short time, JDT FC climbed the table and won four consecutive Super League titles (2014-2017), as well as the regional AFC (Asian Football Confederation) Cup in 2015.

All of JDT FC’s exploits are documented in images and videos and posted on their Facebook page and the Johor Southern Tigers website. The royals’ adept use of these media channels has been the key to the diffusion of the Bangsar Johor identity through JDT FC. While these sites were set up to publicise the achievements of the state football teams, they quickly evolved into the unofficial mouthpiece of the royal family, primarily that of Tunku Ismail. An overview of the sites reveals not just the usual team listings, fixtures, match photos, scores and celebrations of championships won, but also a liberal dose of Johor state history and news as well as updates from the royal family. When the need arises, the sites become the opinion outlet of either TMJ or Sultan Ibrahim, and published statements, images or videos quickly become viral. Table 1 below lists the JDT FC social media channels and their following. A few other teams and public figures’ Facebook following have also been included for comparison.

According to the third party website LinkAlyzer, the JDT FC Facebook page was the most sought-after brand in August 2015.18 At the time of writing, JDT FC is ranked number 26 out of 144 ranked pages in Malaysia.19

DISSECTING THE ALLURE OF BANGSA JOHOR THROUGH JDT FC

The primary strength of JDT FC in the reinforcement of the Bangsa Johor identity is its ability to create a sense of belonging. Through the emotion of competition, JDT supporters bond through historical affinity and state representation.20 Imagery such as that of the tiger illustrates the power, energy and strength of the JDT teams, and is not unlike a coat-of-arms used by nation states to embody their identity. This tiger imagery once subtly juxtaposed a widely circulated photo of TMJ pretending to dine on a mini slain elephant (Johor’s neighbour and bitter rival Pahang’s mascot) after beating them in a crucial match;21 an incident not unlike those that occur between Argentina and Brazil.22

Historical posts on the website serve to remind the populace of their origins, state history and the efforts taken by the Johor royals for their citizens.23 In Spain, Basque footballing identities, personified through Real Sociedad and Athletic Bilbao, among others, are political identities, where in spite of internal differences, ‘unity’ of the Basque nation is created to counter other Spanish ethnic groups.24 JDT FC, on the other hand, is owned by royalty; an establishment which constantly reminds its populace that they are above politics – and thus also above politicians.25 Unlike that of the Spanish Basque states, the Johor state team is not a vehicle used to put forward a political construct. Instead, JDT FC perpetuates a pre-existing concept of unity through the team’s popularity, which comes about as a result of its royal leadership and success on the field.

Johorean football and sport is deemed apolitical because it is not led by politicians; a concept constantly touted by TMJ in his criticism against Malaysia’s national football team.26 This too brings the people together in support of their vocal Crown Prince, in part for his bluntness, as well as out of frustration with the lack of success of the Malaysian national team. In establishing themselves as the ‘Southern Tigers’ JDT also differentiates itself and its success from that of the national team27 – usually referred to as Harimau Malaysia (Malaysian Tigers) – and thus became a southern sibling who fares much better.

Added to the mix are the highly publicised spats between TMJ and Khairy Jamaludin (popularly referred to as KJ), Malaysia’s Minister of Youth and Sports. The tiff began with TMJ accusing the Football Association of Malaysia (FAM) of politicking and corruption28 (which eventually led him to successfully bid for the role of president29). In a recent open letter bemoaning the state of Malaysia, 30 TMJ made veiled comments about KJ’s participation in the recent Southeast Asian (SEA) Games as a polo player. Even Sultan Ibrahim weighed in on this, inviting the SEA Games polo team to play the Johor state team, featuring his two sons.31 This saga was played out on the JDT FC media channels to a large following, as well as shared, retweeted and featured in regular print and online news media.

The drama once again distinguished Johor, Johorean sporting teams and the Johorean way as different and better than others, eliciting further pride in Bangsa Johor.

As Sultan Abu Bakar was recognised for his ability to establish international acknowledgement of Johor, JDT media channels often publicise international support, recognition or accolades for both the team and the Crown Prince. This too differentiates JDT from other teams. It also nurtures a parallel diplomacy by the royal house that upstages the federal government. A case in point is the recent announcement by North Korea’s envoy to allow TMJ the ‘highest honour’ by enabling him to fly direct to Pyongyang from Johor.32 While this pronouncement was in preparation for a planned football match between North Korea and Malaysia, it comes at a significant time; less than 10 days after Prime Minister Najib Razak made a much-criticised visit to President Trump in the US,33 and two days after Trump announced to the UN General Assembly that the US is able to ‘totally destroy’ North Korea.34 TMJ’s sporting diplomacy with North Korea illustrates the power of royalty to elevate itself above politics, further endearing itself to its people. Support for JDT and the royal house then translates into further support for the visions that they put forward.

A recurrent theme on JDT media sites is the hashtag #JDTForAll, or in Malay, #JDTUntukSemua which emphasises the equality of all Johoreans in their support for JDT. This is often compared to the national ‘1Malaysia’ slogan, which both the Sultan and the Crown Prince have derided as an unsuccessful political gimmick.35 The JDT media channels are often used by TMJ to candidly express his views on the state of the country and its government. An example of this is his desire to establish Bangsa Johor schools across the state to unite Johoreans from young36 as well as Sultan Ibrahim’s wish to ensure that English is a medium of instruction.37 These are prickly issues frowned upon by the federal government which, by law, oversees educational matters nation-wide. Political comments from the royal house are particularly attractive at a time when the federal government is weak38 and in both these cases, the Sultan and TMJ have been able to show that they are in closer touch with the needs of their people (unlike the federal government). Media reports indicate that there is public support for both of these goals.39 It is also interesting to note that the JDT FC media channels are bilingual, but with English as the main medium of communication.

Detractors to the propagation of Bangsa Johor through JDT FC posit that it is but a clever marketing strategy that allows Johor royalty to exert and reclaim its power, as well as make good earnings from JDT merchandise and ticket sales.40 Johor Southern Tigers Sdn Bhd is listed on Facebook as a media company, thus the JDT FC media channels are professionally set up to function along a well-planned media strategy. The website has a specific page dedicated to generating advertising revenue.41

The Crown Prince often takes pains to emphasise the importance of a team’s fans and his state’s citizens. JDT media channels often showcase events in which members of the royal family go to the ground to meet with their citizens,42 bestow royal gifts,43 and provide opportunities for people to celebrate team wins through championship parades.44 While on the one hand these posts highlight the importance of a team’s fans for its empowerment45 (and by extension its owners’ empowerment), it also preserves the status of the royal house in relation to its subjects through its demonstrations of wealth and generous offerings to the people.46 An example of this is Sultan Ibrahim’s gift of a private jet to the state team.47 Again, this further strengthens the support base for JDT, TMJ and the concept of Bangsa Johor. The physical manifestation of support for JDT can be seen in how countless houses and cars are often decked out in full JDT livery, as well as in the proliferation of people of all ethnicities in JDT jerseys or other merchandise. Comments on the JDT media channels include those by people from other states, and even Singapore, who post praises of the team, the Crown Prince and his approach to both football and equal citizenship.

CONCLUSION

While the Bangsa Johor identity is not new, its importance has been amplified through its prominence in JDT FC media channels. It is through these vehicles that the royal house perpetuates the concept and engenders it as the definitive marker of a Johorean, wherever he or she may be residing.
The popularity of JDT FC as a result of its royal leadership and success on the field drives the enthusiasm for the unifying identity. The success of the concept is often highlighted in contrast to less successful national attempts to nurture a unified 1Malaysia, stimulating even further support for Bangsa Johor.

About the author:
* Serina Rahman is Visiting Fellow at the Malaysia Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. She would like to thank Leonard C. Sebastian and James M. Dorsey of RSIS for their encouragement, and for planting the seed that germinated the idea that football and JDT FC can be used to discuss Johorean identity.

Source:
This article was published by ISEAS as ISEAS Perspective 75, 2017 (PDF)

Notes:
1 Vicente Rodriguez Ortega (2016) Soccer, nationalism and the media in contemporary Spanish society; La Roja, Real Madrid & FC Barcelona. Soccer & Society, 17:4, 628-643.
2 Vishanthie Sewpaul (2009) On national identity, nationalism and Soccer 2010. International Social Work, 52(2), 143-153.
3 Simoni Lahud Guedes (2014) On criollos and capoeiras: notes on soccer and national identity in Argentina and in Brazil. Soccer & Society, 15:1, 147-161.
4 Trocki, C.A. 2007. Prince of Pirates – The Temenggongs and the Development of Johor and Singapore 1784-1885. NUS Press, Singapore.
5 Trocki, C.A. 2007. Prince of Pirates – The Temenggongs and the Development of Johor and Singapore 1784-1885: p186. NUS Press, Singapore.
6 The Sultan who could not stay put. Malaysiakini, 30 April 2001. https://www.malaysiakini.com/columns/6833
7 Trocki, C.A. 2007. Prince of Pirates – The Temenggongs and the Development of Johor and Singapore 1784-1885. NUS Press, Singapore.
8 Arrifin SM Omar. 2011. The makings of a nation-state: Malaysia’s struggle in promoting national unity since 1948. In Bangsa and Umma, Development of People-grouping Concepts in Islamized Southeast Asia. Hiroyuki, Y, Milner, A, Midori, K and Kazuhiro, A. (eds.): 108-140. Kyoto University Press, Japan.
9 Firth, R. 1966. Malay Fishermen, their Peasant Economy. The Norton Library, Connecticut, USA.
0 Nishio Kanji. 2011. Statecraft and people-grouping concepts in Malay port-polities: Case studies on Johor-Riau and Riau-Lingga. In Bangsa and Umma, Development of People-grouping Concepts in Islamized Southeast Asia. Hiroyuki, Y, Milner, A, Midori, K and Kazuhiro, A. (eds.): 50-70. Kyoto University Press, Japan.
11 Hutchinson, F. 2016. The Johor Sultanate: Rise or Re-emergence? Trends 2016/16, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore.
12Johor sultan, crown prince wish ‘Happy Christmas’, while Brunei ruler bans greetings. Today Online, 26 December 2015. http://www.todayonline.com/world/asia/johor-sultan-crown-prince- wish-happy-christmas-while-brunei-ruler-bans-greetings
13 An Xmas note from Johor Sultanah. FMT News, 24 December 2016. http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/opinion/2016/12/24/an-xmas-note-from-johor- sultanah/
14 http://johorsoutherntigers.com.my/
15 Masanya Telah Tiba – The Revolution Begins https://www.facebook.com/johorsoutherntigers.com.my/videos/896357573860876/
16 Love him or hate him, TMJ makes an impact on Malaysian football. Malaysian Digest, 30 October 2014. http://www.malaysiandigest.com/frontpage/282-main-tile/525514-love- him-or-hate-him-tmj-makes-an-impact-on-malaysian-football.html
17 From European champion to Malaysian superstar. World Soccer website, 13 July 2013. http://www.worldsoccer.com/blogs/from-european-champion-to-malaysian-superstar- 341582
18 http://johorsoutherntigers.com.my/advertising/
19 https://likealyzer.com/explore
20 Adriano Gómez-Bantel (2016). Football clubs as symbols of regional identities. Soccer & Society, 17:5, 692-702.
21 TMJ’s ‘eating elephant’ picture causes a stir. Mole.my, 26 May 2016. http://mole.my/tmjs- eating-elephant-picture-caused-a-stir/
22 Simoni Lahud Guedes (2014) On criollos and capoeiras: notes on soccer and national identity in Argentina and in Brazil. Soccer & Society, 15:1, 147-161.
23 (for example) History of Johor: Sultan Sir Ismail often received overseas recognition. Posted 28 August 2017. http://johorsoutherntigers.com.my/history-of-johor-sultan-sir-ismail-often-received- overseas-recognition/
24 Robert Györi Szabó (2013) Basque identity and soccer. Soccer & Society, 14:4, 525-547.
25 Johor Sultan: I am above politics. The Star Online, 27 December 2015. http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2015/12/27/johor-ruler-im-above-politics-the-interest-of- the-rakyat-always-comes-first/
26 TMJ: I want to stop FAM from being misused for political reasons. The Malay Mail Online, 22 February 2017. http://www.themalaymailonline.com/sports/article/tmj-i-want-to-stop-fam-from- being-misused-for-political-reasons#EYzopVYIylc6B5dK.97
27 Dorsey, JM. 2015. Constructing national identity: the muscular Jews vs the Palestinian underdog. RSIS Working Paper No. 290. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore.
28TMJ claims to possess evidence of FAM’s purported corruption. Goal.com, 18 July 2016. http://www.goal.com/en-my/news/3889/main/2016/07/18/25724332/tmj-claims-to-possess- evidence-of-fams-purported-corruption
29 FAM set to tackle corruption, TMJ to meet MACC for talks. New Straits Times, 22 April 2017. https://www.nst.com.my/news/2017/04/228494/fam-set-tackle-corruption-tmj-meet-macc-talks
30 I will always pray for your stability Malaysia. Malaysiakini, 8 July 2017. https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/387895
31 Sultan dares national polo team to play against Johor FMT News, 24 August 2017. http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2017/08/24/sultan-dares-national-polo-team- to-play-against-johor/
32 North Korea grants special TMJ special access to Pyongyang. Malaysiakini, 20 September 2017. https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/395745
33 Jimmy Fallon pokes fun at Najib-Trump meet with video parody. FMT News, 16 September 2017. http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2017/09/16/jimmy-fallon-pokes-fun-at- najib-trump-meet-with-video-parody/
34 Trump threatens to ‘destroy North Korea’ if necessary. Al Jazeera, 20 September 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/trump-threatens-destroy-north-korea- 170919140528723.html
35 We are Bangsa Johor not Bangsa Malaysia says Crown Prince. Malaysia Today, 7 July, 2017. http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2015/07/07/we-are-bangsa-johor-not-bangsa- msia-says-crown-prince/
36 Johor Crown Prince wants vernacular schools to be replaced with Bangsa Johor schools. Says.com, 5 September 2016. http://says.com/my/news/johor-crown-prince-wants-vernacular- schools-to-be-replaced-with-bangsa-johor-schools
37 Make English a medium of instruction in schools: Sultan of Johor. Asia One, 12 June 2015. http://www.asiaone.com/singapore/make-english-medium-instruction-schools-sultan-johor
38 Ward, T. (2009). Sport and the national identity. Soccer & Society, 10:5, 518-531.
39 Parents support Johor Sultan’s call for English as medicum of instruction ins chools. Asia One, 13 June 2015. http://www.asiaone.com/singapore/parents-support-johor-sultans-call-english- medium-instruction-schools
40 Bangsa Johor – a brief analysis. Malaysiakini, 31 August 2016. https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/354167
41 http://johorsoutherntigers.com.my/advertising/
42 (for example) Second day Kembara Mahkota Johor. Posted on 10 September 2017. http://johorsoutherntigers.com.my/second-day-kembara-mahkota-johor-2017/
43 (for example) Sultan of Johor to build houses for the people. Posted on 21 March 2017. http://johorsoutherntigers.com.my/sultan-of-johor-to-build-houses-for-the-people/
44 (for example) JDT FC fans invited to join JDT celebration of winning fourth consecutive Super League title. Posted on 3 September 2017. http://johorsoutherntigers.com.my/jdt-fc-fans-invited- to-join-jdt-celebration-of-winning-fourth-consecutive-super-league-title-2/
45 Totten, M. (2016) Football and community empowerment; how FC Sankt Pauli fans organize to influence. Soccer & Society, 17:5, 703-720.
46 Trocki, C.A. 2007. Prince of Pirates – The Temenggongs and the Development of Johor and Singapore 1784-1885. NUS Press, Singapore.
47 Sultan Johor gifts JDT an aircraft. FourFourTwo, 3 August 2016. https://www.fourfourtwo.com/sg/news/sultan-johor-gifts-jdt-aircraft