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Johnson Meets Rohani, Discusses Case Of Jailed Iranian-British Woman

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(RFE/RL) — Britain’s Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson met with Iranian President Hassan Rohani in Tehran on December 10 as he continued efforts to gain the release of a jailed Iranian-British woman.

A spokesman for the British Foreign Office said Johnson and Rohani “spoke forthrightly” on several issues, including the case of Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe, according to the BBC.

Meanwhile, Zaghari-Ratcliffe’s husband, Richard Ratcliffe, said authorities at the last minute canceled a Tehran court date scheduled for December 10 in which Zaghari-Ratcliffe faced fresh charges of “spreading propaganda.”

“Nazanin’s case was not held today in the wake of the foreign secretary’s visit,” Ratcliffe wrote in an e-mail to reporters. “This is undoubtedly a good sign.”

Ratcliffe also said Johnson met with members of Zaghari-Ratcliffe’s family in Iran and raised the issue of her case in every meeting he had with the Iranians.

Zaghari-Ratcliffe has been held since April 2016 for allegedly plotting against Iran’s government, which she denies.

The British foreign secretary’s spokesman described Johnson’s two-day visit — only the third by a British foreign secretary to Iran since 2003 — as “worthwhile,” adding that “progress in all areas” was agreed.

But Johnson was criticized by Iranian officials for not doing more to build on the nuclear deal Tehran signed in 2015 with world powers in exchange for the lifting of international sanctions.

Rohani’s office said the Iranian president told Johnson that “relations between the two countries have not matched the potential expected” shortly after the nuclear was signed.

Iranian parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani, who met with Johnson on December 9, said other European countries have put in “much more effort” to build ties in the aftermath of the nuclear deal.

“You haven’t even solved the banking problems of the Iranian Embassy in London,” Larijani told Johnson, according to Iran’s state-run IRNA news agency.

Johnson met December 9 with Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif to lobby for Zaghari-Ratcliffe’s release.

The two men also discussed “the obligations of all parties to implement” the 2015 nuclear accord signed between Iran and six world powers, according to Iran’s Foreign Ministry.

The United States has cast doubt on the future of the deal, which provided Iran with sanctions relief in exchange for curbs on its nuclear activities.

However, the other signatories to the accord –Britain, China, Germany, France, and Russia — continue to support the agreement.

Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe is serving a five-year prison sentence for allegedly planning the “soft toppling” of Iran’s government while traveling there with her toddler daughter.

Zaghari-Ratcliffe is a project manager with the Thomson Reuters Foundation, a charity that operates independently from the Reuters news agency. She insists she was in Iran on a personal visit. The Thomson Reuters Foundation has also said she was not on assignment while in Iran.

Johnson faced calls to resign last month after saying in Parliament that Zaghari-Ratcliffe had been “training journalists” in Iran prior to her arrest last year, comments that critics said could lead to an extended prison sentence for her.

He later apologized and said Zaghari-Ratcliffe was not in Iran in a professional capacity.

Iranian officials have cited Johnson’s statement in their effort to bring new propaganda-related charges against Zaghari-Ratcliffe.

Iran has held several foreigners on charges such as espionage, many of them Iranians with dual citizenship.


Will Modi’s Magic Band Work Again In Gujarat? – Analysis

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The BJP is confronting a tough battle. Media reports from the state till recently were almost unanimous that the BJP is going to win again. Of late, the same media has begun writing of a close contest.

By Satish Misra

Gujarat, the home state of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, is scheduled to vote for a new Assembly on 9 and 14 December. The battle between the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which has been in power for almost 22 years, and the Congress is poised for an interestingly crucial and close contest.

The BJP, led from the front by the Prime Minister, has deployed its best possible resources at it command to retain power in a state that has been the laboratory of ‘Hindutva’ and has been presented as a role model for others to follow. The Congress too has put up its best to wrest the initiative from the ruling party.

Location of Gujarat in India. Source: Wikipedia Commons.
Location of Gujarat in India. Source: Wikipedia Commons.

The results of this Assembly election are significant for both the national parties as they are likely to determine the course of national politics in the years to come. The BJP has been in power since 1995 with a small break of 498 days, when one of its leaders Shankar Sinh Vaghela broke away with his followers from the party to become the Chief Minister in 1997 with the support of the Congress.

Since March 1998, the BJP has been ruling the state, shoving the opposition Congress to almost margins. Prime Minister Narendra Modi himself had remained the chief minister for 12 years, before taking the charge in New Delhi. He ruled the state like none other, presenting the state to the outside world as a “model of development” that in turn became his USP to put a claim on the Delhi throne.

Since Modi’s moving to New Delhi in May 2014, after ensuring a massive electoral victory for the BJP in the 2014 general elections, Gujarat has seen two chief ministers in Anandiben Patel and Vijay Rupani. It is pointless to mention that both of them lacked the charisma as well as the shrewd political skills of Modi to keep the anti-incumbency under tight lid.

Woes and problems for the ruling party have further compounded because of the post-Modi state administration’s ill handling of protest movements led by youth leaders Jignesh Mevani, Alpesh Thakor and Hardik Patel who represent the interests of Dalits, OBCs and Pattidars respectively. They are the products of protest movements that erupted in the state since the departure of Modi from the state.

Demonetisation and the introduction of the badly implemented GST have added to the difficulties of the ruling party because the large trading community of the state was unable to cope with the two shocks resulting in both loss of jobs as well as business.

In the backdrop of the rising popular resentment and youth anger, the Congress, out of power in the state for over two decades, sees a chance to stage a comeback. The Congress has been playing its cards cautiously and intelligently. It has been able to rope in the support of Mevani, Thakor and Hardik Patel and has tied up with the breakaway faction of the Janata Dal (U) also to contain division of votes.

In its well thought out electoral strategy, the Congress has been doing a tight ropewalk avoiding the BJP’s trap of being projected in the popular mind as pro-Muslim. With this purpose in mind, Congress Vice President Rahul Gandhi has been paying visits to temples during his campaign. It is even taking the risk of being a culprit of abandoning secularism and playing “soft Hinduatva” card.

The Congress received a boost to its prospects in August this year when its leader Ahmed Patel managed to win the Rajya Sabha seat from the state, thwarting the best-laid plan of BJP president Amit Shah. Shah, who had engineered a rebellion in the Congress ranks by weaning away 11 of its MLAs to vote against Patel, had to swallow his pride as the latter scrapped through the election.

At the same time, the rebellion led by former chief minister Vaghela also helped in cleansing the State Congress of factionalism and presenting a unified image before the electorate.

Another factor that has added to the weight of the Congress’ electoral prospects is a change in the public perception of Rahul Gandhi, who has been drawing impressive crowds in his rallies, meetings and roadshows during his trips to the state in the last three months. Rahul Gandhi, who was an object of ridicule and was the target of the RSS-BJP and the social media, is now being seen as a serious political player by not only his well-wishers but even by his opponents.

The vitriolic attacks on Rahul Gandhi by BJP leaders was reflective of the threat that Gandhi seems to be posing now. Almost every leader of the BJP has been trying to belittle Gandhi who is going to take over the reins of the country’s main opposition party in next few days. One spokesperson even went to the extent of comparing him with Mughal emperor Aurangzeb and monarch Alauddin Khilji. Prime Minister decried young Gandhi’s elevation to the party’s top post, calling the change as dawning of “Aurangzeb Raj”. (Aurangzeb was one of the emperors of the Mughal dynasty that ruled India from 1526 to 1857. He was highly religious and has been projected by pro-Hindutva forces as a tyrant though a large majority of historians hold a contrary view)

Sensing the growing challenge, Modi and Shah have been marshalling all the resources at their command and using every trick up their sleeves to retain power. First, the party in power ensured that the election date of the state were decoupled from that of Himachal Pradesh (where assembly elections were held on 9 November) though the results of both states will be declared on the same date.

The sharpening of communal fault lines in the state by overt and covert campaigns by the ruling party is also on evidence. Controversies like the one on film Padmavati are being stoked and sustained. The state administration has declared a ban on the showing of the film, even before the film is to be cleared by the country’s Censor Board.

Taking advantage of the Supreme Court’s hearing of the Ayodhya case on 5 December and lawyer and Congress leader Kapil Sibal’s submission in court, Modi and Shah have accused the Congress of linking the Ram temple to 2019 Lok Sabha election. Shah also asked Rahul Gandhi to clarify his stand on the Ram temple issue.

BJP leaders, in their campaigns, have been eluding to Muslim rule and stoking fear among the majority Hindu community by subtly suggesting that return of the Congress to power will embolden Muslim rogue elements.

Anticipating a tough contest, Modi has been visiting the state for the last six months at regular intervals, launching projects and laying foundation stones of various schemes to woo the electorate. In next few days, until the campaigning for the two-phased poll comes to an end on 7 and 12 December, Modi is going to address two dozen rallies. Almost every cabinet minister and majority of the chief ministers of the BJP-ruled states have been asked by the Prime Minister to visit Gujarat for campaigning and on-the-spot firefighting. Over three dozen ministers have been on the campaign in the state.

Undoubtedly, the BJP is confronting a tough battle. Media reports from the state till recently were almost unanimous that the BJP is going to win again, on its organisational strengths as well as the Prime Minister’s sway and popularity on the electorate. But of late, the same media has begun writing of a close contest.

In the last assembly elections in 2012, the BJP had won 117 seats, securing 47.90 per cent votes while the Congress had got 60 seats, with 38.90 percent of votes — a difference of 9 per cent between the two parties.

Theoretically, a swing of five per cent votes in favour of the Congress shall tilt the balance. But will it happen this election is a billion dollar question. One of the latest opinion polls, published on 5 December, showed the vote share of the BJP and the Congress at 43 per cent each with 14 per cent votes going to other smaller parties and independents. The BJP’s votes share has been coming down in successive poll surveys in the last few months.

The contest is undoubtedly close. And the outcome can go either way on 18 December when results are announced.

Dustin Hoffman Reveals How He Was Inspired By William Saroyan

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Hollywood star Dustin Hoffman has revealed the way he got inspiration from American Armenian writer and dramatist William Saroyan.

“I like William Saroyan, the writer. I read his plays when I was, like, 22,” Hoffman told James Franco during their “Actors on Actors” chat while talking about his struggle at the beginning of his career.

“And he said one line talking about his work. He was asked ‘Why do you write?’ He said because ‘it’s the only way I choose to survive’. And that was literally in front of me going through rejection year after year,” the actor revealed.

Virtual Reality Makes Journalism Immersive, Realism Makes It Credible

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Virtual reality technology may help journalists pull an audience into their stories, but they should avoid being too flashy, or their credibility could suffer, according to a team of researchers.

In a study, participants indicated that stories experienced in virtual reality — VR — significantly outperformed text-based articles in several categories, such as giving them a sense of presence, or the feeling of being there, and increasing their empathy for the story’s characters, said S. Shyam Sundar, distinguished professor of communications and co-director of the Media Effects Research Laboratory. Using a cardboard VR viewer for experiencing 360-degree videos was better than interacting with the same videos on a computer screen, he added.

“VR stories provide a better sense of being right in the midst of the story than text with pictures and even 360-degree video on a computer screen,” said Sundar. “This is remarkable given that we used two stories from the New York Times Magazine, which were high quality and rich in imagery even in the text version.”

Although virtual reality outperformed text and video, the researchers cautioned that relying on some of the flashier design elements of virtual reality may affect credibility and cause the audience to have less trust in the story. They discovered that evoking a higher sense of “being there” was associated with lower trustworthiness ratings of the New York Times.

“What really makes people trust VR more is that it creates a greater sense of realism compared to text and that creates the trustworthiness,” said Sundar. “But, if it doesn’t give that sense of realism, it can affect credibility. If developers try to gamify it or make it more fantasy-like, for example, people may begin to wonder about the credibility of what they’re seeing.”

That said, the immersive quality of virtual reality and 360-degree video may make the content more shareable, according to the researchers, who report their findings in the current issue of Cyberpsychology, Behavior and Social Networking.

“Virtual reality is often called an empathy machine,” said Sundar. “And, consistent with that thought, we did find that participants in both the VR and 360-degree video conditions were more empathetic toward the story characters than their counterparts in the text condition and they also reported higher intention to share the story with others.”

Journalists on a tighter budget may consider using 360-degree videos. These videos, which allow users to rotate their view, are more immersive than the text-based story. However, these videos were unable to match virtual reality’s ability to make the audience feel like they are in the story, said Sundar.

“On many things 360-degree video on a computer does as well as viewing it on a VR viewer, so you might not need to go through the trouble of putting together the cardboard viewer and slipping in the phone to experience it,” he added. “But, for being transported to the scene of the action, the VR viewer beats it.”

The researchers noted that VR and 360-degree video demand more attention, which can hurt readers’ recall of story details.

“We found some evidence to suggest that memory was affected by all the interaction with immersive journalism, but more research is needed to fully understand this effect,” said Sundar.

The researchers recruited 129 participants and asked them to either read two stories in a magazine, watch the stories using 360-degree video, or use a cardboard virtual-reality reader provided by the newspaper company to view the stories.

They asked volunteers to read two stories with different emotional intensity. The more emotional story — “The Displaced” — focused on the lives of three refugees. The other story — “The Click Effect” — examined marine biologists’ efforts to understand the vocalizations of dolphins. In general, the effects of immersive journalism were more pronounced with the less emotional story.

The virtual reality stories were accessed through the newspaper’s mobile app.

Scientist’s Accidental Exhale Leads To Improved DNA Detector

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Greg Madejski held his breath as he looked into the microscope, trying to weld two fingernail-sized chips together: a tiny chip containing a nanofilter on top of another chip with a DNA sensor.

It was frustrating work. The chips weren’t making good contact with each other. Madejski gently poked at the chips, then peered over the top of the microscope.

And exhaled.

The sudden waft of warm air swept over the nanofilter, transferring it to the sensor -right on target. The “accident” led Madejski to an important insight: the water vapor in his breath had condensed on the device, causing the nanofilter to adhere ever so neatly to the sensor.

“It was like a really high-tech temporary tattoo that I created by accident; lick and stick!” says the PhD student in the lab of James McGrath, a professor of biomedical engineering at the University of Rochester.

And that’s how water vapor became integral to the development and design of a novel device for detecting DNA biomarkers affiliated with disease. Created by McGrath’s lab in collaboration with Professor Vincent Tabard-Cossa and graduate student Kyle Briggs at the University of Ottawa, the device is described in an article published online at Nano Letters. The article, and an image from Madejski’s homemade animation of the device in operation, will be highlighted on the cover of the February 2018 print issue.

‘A remarkable structure’

The device is comprised of three ultrathin layers:

  • a nanoporous silicon nitride membrane which serves as a prefilter.
  • a biosensor membrane with a single nanopore.
  • a spacer layer that separates these by only 200 nm.

The arrangement creates a nanocavity filled with less than a femtoliter of fluid–or about a million times smaller than the smallest raindrops.

During operation, the device uses an electric field to lure a strand of DNA to enter one of the pores of the prefilter and then pass through the nanocavity to reach the pore of the underlying sensor membrane. This triggers changes in the device’s electrical current that can be detected and analyzed. The fact that DNA must elongate itself in a consistent way to pass through the two-membrane combination improves the precision and reproducibility of detection.

“This is a remarkable structure,” says McGrath. “We’ve built an integrated system with a highly porous filter within molecular reach of a sensor. I think there are many sensors, particularly those that hunt for biomarkers in raw biological fluids, that would benefit from filtering away unwanted molecules immediately upstream of the detector.”

The method of fabrication instantly wets the nanocavity, which is often difficult at the nanoscale. The device contains dozens of these nanocavities, which may eventually increase the amount of material that can be screened by enabling parallelized biomarker detection.

Solving problems that others need solved

Tabard-Cossa’s lab uses solid-state nanopore devices to find new ways to manipulate and characterize single molecules. His lab was interested in finding new materials that could be used for biomarker detection. The prefilter in the new device addresses a problem with other silicon nanopore detectors: They are more likely to clog than alternative devices that use that biological pores for sensing. Biological membranes, on the other hand, are less stable than solid state nanopores, McGrath noted.

“We love to apply our membrane technologies to solve problems that others need solved. This is a very nice example.,” McGrath said.

McGrath is co-founder of SiMPore, a University-based startup that develops highly portable, chip-based devices that incorporate silicon membranes for a variety of applications, from biological sensing to dialysis.

“I think we’re going to realize the practical advantages of this technology in the near term,” he says. A second generation of the new device, developed at SiMPore, incorporates the prefilter right on the chips during manufacturing at the wafer scale, “so there’s nobody breathing on it anymore,” he noted. “It’s actually all built as one unit and should make future studies very easy. That’s a credit to the ingenuity at SiMPore and quite a legacy for Greg.”

Extreme Fieldwork, Climate Modeling Yields New Insight Into Predicting Greenland’s Melt

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A new UCLA-led study reinforces the importance of collaboration in assessing the effects of climate change.

The research, published Dec. 5 in the journal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, offers new insights about previously unknown factors affecting Greenland’s melting ice sheet, and it could ultimately help scientists more accurately predict how the phenomenon could cause sea levels to rise.

Greenland is the single largest melting ice sheet in terms of meltwater runoff contributing to rising sea levels — and at least half of sea level rise from Greenland is from melting ice, said Laurence C. Smith, a UCLA professor of geography. (That’s even more than the amount caused by ice calving, when large blocks of ice separate from the ice sheet, forming icebergs, which eventually melt into the sea.)

Since 2012, a team led by Smith has visited Greenland’s ice sheet several times, using satellites, drones and sophisticated sensors to track flow rates of meltwater rivers atop the glaciers, and to map their watersheds, which include the surface areas between the rivers.

In 2015, Smith and a group of UCLA graduate students and collaborators focused on a 27-square-mile watershed, and they discovered an important process that had previously been left out of climate-model calculations. Some of the meltwater from the lakes and rivers atop the region’s glaciers, which end in large sinkholes called “moulins” and barrel down through the glacier, is being stored and trapped on top of the glacier inside a low-density, porous “rotten ice.”

“Ours is the first independent data-gathering effort to directly measure rates of meltwater runoff from the top of the ice,” Smith said. The team’s research was funded by NASA. “Researchers, including us, have attempted gather information using flows from the edge of the ice, but those measurements are problematic for testing climate models.”

Smith’s team found a discrepancy between its data and the calculations of meltwater runoff from five climate models. Those models’ estimates were 21 to 58 percent higher than what Smith’s team measured on the ice.

So Smith invited the scientists who created those models to collaborate with him. Together, they checked real-time statistics from weather stations on the ice to confirm that the data in the climate models were correct — and they found the models’ calculations were accurate. Which meant that the meltwater’s journey over the ice surface was more complex than previously imagined: The scientists recognized that before the water passes through the ice via moulins, it can pool, sit indefinitely or refreeze in porous ice at the surface, Smith said.

“After eliminating all other possibilities, we deduced that the disagreement in our data is because of sunlight penetrating into the ice, causing subsurface melting and meltwater storage,” said Dirk van As, a co-author of the study and a senior researcher at the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland. “And now we know this is happening in the higher reaches of the bare ice zone that cover large regions of the ice sheet.

“We now know that calculation of meltwater retention in porous ice should be included somehow,” he said.

To measure river discharge on the ice, Smith and his team adapted a technique normally used on land. Working in shifts, they collected data hourly, around the clock, for three days in July 2015, braving the cold, wind and 20 hours a day of blazing sunshine. The researchers used safety gear to anchor themselves to the ice and protect themselves from the swift-moving water flowing into dangerous moulins, where surface water plummets into the ice sheet interior.

Among the many logistical challenges was determining how to set up equipment to measure river flow in a way that researchers didn’t need to be positioned on both sides of a river.

“Unless you have a helicopter, you can’t station people on both sides of a large river on top of the ice,” said Lincoln Pitcher, a UCLA doctoral student in geography, who figured out a way to keep sensors in place after trial and error on land and ice. They needed to come up with a stable and strong system that would stay in place even though the ice surface around them was melting.

Study co-author, Asa Rennermalm, professor of geography at Rutgers University-New Brunswick was part of the field team.

“We used a device called an Acoustic Doppler Current Profiler, which tracks discharge based on sound,” she said. “We attached it to a floatable platform, and then attached that to ropes, which were attached to poles on either side of the ice river. We moved the platform back and forth across the river every hour for 72 hours. No one has ever done that before on the Greenland ice sheet.”

Van As said the project proved that combining expertise from multiple disciplines — among them meteorology, oceanography and hydrology (the study of the properties and movement of water over land) — is essential for fully understanding how glaciers and ice sheets respond to the climate system.

“It is important that hydrologists like Larry bring their extensive knowledge into the field of glaciology, using approaches that are new to our discipline,” he said.

In general, glaciologists are not accustomed to thinking about watersheds on top of the ice, Smith said. The irregularities those watersheds impart on the timing and amount of meltwater penetrating the ice are not currently considered in geophysical models of “ice dynamics,” meaning the speed and spatial pattern of sliding glacial ice as it moves toward the sea.

“We’re taking the very mature field of land surface hydrology, which deals with river flow and watersheds on land, and applying it to the ice sheet, which has typically been the scientific domain of solid-ice geophysics,” he said. “We have to borrow from hydrology because the ice surface is becoming more of a hydrologic phenomenon. And we can take these tools from another discipline and apply them and actually have a conceptual breakthrough.”

Smith and his team now are working on a study based on data from a 2016 trip to Greenland, when they spent a week tracking watersheds and digging into the rotten ice.

Led by UCLA graduate student Matthew Cooper, the researchers are attempting to better explain how rotten ice traps water. They have tracked the rotten ice to a depth of nearly 3 feet below the surface — a finding that could help scientists who develop climate models to better understand how ice sheets are losing mass.

Part of Smith’s mission in Greenland is empowering a new generation of hydrologists who are eager to join the front lines of tracking global climate change.

“Climate change is not remote news for me anymore,” said Kang Yang, a former UCLA postdoctoral scholar, who was part of the field team for this study. Now a professor at China’s Nanjing University, Yang will continue to work with Smith on mapping the rivers on Greenland’s ice sheet.

Mining Electronic Medical Records Could Help Depression Patients Find Right Treatment

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Personalized medicine has been one of the most promising medical developments in recent years. To personalize treatment for patients, some doctors have turned to predictive models to help determine which patients will benefit from different treatments.

A new study from Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard University finds that using data from electronic medical records in those models could hold a lot of promise.

Researchers MGH’s Roy Perlis and Harvard’s Finale Doshi-Velez, joined by postdoctoral researcher Michael Hughes, looked over large amounts of electronic medical record data from more than 50,000 people with depression, a condition that is notoriously difficult to treat. Patients often try several different treatments before arriving at an effective one.

The researchers applied machine learning to sort the data into depression subtypes, some of which weren’t necessarily standardized. The subtypes represented clusters of symptoms and features spotlighted by the data–such as age, sexual dysfunction, weight gain, or obesity.

Doshi-Velez’s team also looked at 16 types of antidepressants that were ultimately successful in treating the patients’ depression. From these data, they were able to develop an algorithm to predict an antidepressant’s effectiveness based on depression subtypes.

When implemented in clinical settings, the new tool was more accurate than existing methods, the researchers found. And clinicians polled by the researchers said they found the tool more user-friendly than existing predictive models.

As there is a 50 percent failure rate among patients trying a first treatment for depression, and a 50 percent failure rate among those who try a second type of treatment, cutting down on the guesswork involved could be life-changing.

“Each try can take multiple weeks to assess, while you’re playing around with dosages. And these are already people for whom morale is sapped,” said Doshi-Velez. “Even if we could make a modest improvement — for instance, one less try–this could be a very significant result.”

While the researchers studied the impact of mining records on depression, their method could apply more broadly and help patients with various health problems, mental and physical.

Is Loya Jarga Going To Help Afghanistan? – OpEd

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A Loya Jarga, or “Grand Council” in Pashto, is a centuries-old unique Afghan traditional gathering that brings together representatives from the numerous ethnic, religious, and tribal communities as well as the civil society of Afghanistan to choose new leaders, adopt constitutions and decide important political matters.

Looking throughout the history of the Loya Jargas, we shall find Traditional Loya Jarga, constitutional Loya Jarga and Karzai’s consultative Loya Jarga.

In this article, our focus is on the Constitutional Loya Jarga and whether the traditional Loya Jarga can be summoned in the present scenario with a Constitution governing the country. This question is important in the context of recent efforts by Karzai’s camp to pressurize the Ghani government and compel him for calling in a Loya Jarga. They believe the law and order situation in Afghanistan warrants convening a Loya Jarga where the legitimacy of the current “two headed” Afghan government shall be scrutinized.

Apparently they asking for Loya Jarga to solve these crises of the Country but they are actually struggling to get back the power and rule the country. Considering this issue, traditional Loya Jarga was inserted in Afghanistan’s constitution during the regime of King Zahir Shah in 1343 (solar year).

The main question and controversy which remains unanswered is that whether traditional Loya Jarga is in accordance with constitution or not. Is it legitimate based on constitution?

Since it was defined in the framework of law, the concept of traditional Loya Jarga is irrelevant anymore. Hence, in case of conducting traditional Loya Jarga rather than legal one, it will not be binding. Loya Jarga is supposed to be conducted within the provisions provided in the constitution of the country. However, Consultative Loya Jarga is neither binding nor illegal; and has the right only to advice.

Karzai might remember when he opposed the suggestion for holding traditional Loya Jarga in the end of his first administration saying that it was against constitution. On the other hand, he conducted consultative Loya Jarga for signing security pact with the US during the last days of his second presidential period but refused the Jirga’s decision.

The Constitutional Framework for Loya Jarga

Chapter 6 “Articles 110-115” of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan deals with constitutional Loya Jarga, Article 110 of Afghanistan Constitution stipulates that in its constitutional mandate, a Loya Jarga is the highest manifestation of the will of the people of Afghanistan, and is composed of the members of the National Assembly “Milli Shura”, and Presidents of all provincial and district councils.

However, chief justice and Members of the Supreme Court, ministers, and the attorney general may participate without voting right. This Article is mainly discussing composition of legal Loya Jarga; who shall be members of the Loya Jarga and who has the right to vote and participate.

Article 111 provides in which situations Loya Jarga will be conducted. According to Article 111 of the constitution of the Islamic republic of Afghanistan, the Loya Jarga shall convene in the following situations: to decide on issues related to independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity as well as supreme national interest; amend provisions of this Constitution and impeach the president in accordance with the provisions of Article Sixty Nine of the Constitution.

Short of Chapter six of the Constitution some other articles also deliberate Loya Jarga, Article 147 of the Constitution states that If the presidential term or the legislative term of the National Assembly “Milli Shura” expires during the state of emergency, the new general elections shall be postponed, and the presidential as well as parliamentary terms shall extend up to four months.

If the state of emergency continues for more than four months, the President shall call the Loya Jarga. Within two months after the termination of the state of emergency, elections shall be held. In the light of this article a Loya Jarga will be convened if the state of emergency continues for more than four months and the presidential term or the legislative term of National Assembly expires, then president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan under this article is bound to call Loya Jarga.

Article 150 of the Constitution of the Country explains process of the amendment of the Constitution it asserts that a commission comprised of members of the Government, National Assembly as well as the Supreme Court shall be formed by presidential decree to prepare the draft proposal. To approve the amendment, the Loya Jarga shall be convened by a Presidential decree in accordance with the provisions of the Chapter on Loya Jarga. If the Loya Jarga approves the amendment with the majority of two-thirds of its members, the President shall enforce it after endorsement. According this Article of Constitution Loya Jarga shall only be called by the president to approve the proposed amendment in the Constitution.

Article 69 of the Constitution lays down the process of the impeachment of the President If the president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan becomes accused of crimes against humanity, treason and a crime the President shall be demanded by one-third of all members of the House of People “Wolsi Jirga”. If this demand is approved by two thirds of the House of People, the House of People shall convene the Loya Jarga within one month.

If the Loya Jarga, by two-thirds majority, approves the accusation, the President shall be released from duty and the issue shall be referred to a special court, which shall be comprised of the President of the House of Elders “Meshrano Jirga”, three members of the House of People, and three members of the Supreme Court appointed by the Loya Jarga.

This article of the Constitution states that in case the president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan becomes accused of crimes against humanity, treason and crime and the accusation has proved then two thirds of the House of People shall call Loya Jarga, this is to be noted that impeachment of the president is restricted with three conditions; Crimes against humanity, treason and a crime. Otherwise, House of People cannot convene Loya Jarga.

The Way Forward

The above discussion indicates that the concept of traditional Loya Jarga is irrelevant now keeping in view the fact that the Constitution has internalized the concept and has provided a distinct system for summoning the Loya Jarga.

In addition, calling loya Jarga remains to be the sole authority of the president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The Loya Jarga mentioned in Article 69 of the Constitution. However, is called in by the Wolasi Jarga in case of accusing the President of crimes against humanity, treason and crimes which by law are subject to imprisonment of more than 16 years.

*Abdul Wahid Rizwanzai is Associate at RIAA Barker Gillette AFG, an International legal firm and analyst of legal issues.


Russia Mulls Cryptocurrencies In Oil Trade To Challenge Sanctions And Petrodollar

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The gradual acceptance of digital currencies, with major exchanges about to launch bitcoin futures trading, may prompt some oil producing nations to ditch the US dollar in crude trade in favor of cryptocurrencies, an oil analyst says.

Russia, Iran and Venezuela have more than one thing in common. All three are major oil producing nations dependent on the dollar since the global crude market is traditionally dominated by contracts denominated in US currency.

Moscow, Tehran and Caracas are also facing US sanctions; penalties which are proving effective since the sanctioned countries are dependent on the US dollar to sell their crude.

A decentralized currency – allowing anonymous transactions along with blockchain technology support to facilitate oil contracts – may be the ideal tool to allow the oil producing trio to turn their back on the greenback.

“The advent of cryptocurrencies, therefore, represents a fresh catalyst for commodity-producing countries wishing to abandon the dollar as a means of payment for oil,” said Stephen Brennock, oil analyst at PVM Oil Associates, in a research note seen by CNBC.

Several oil producers have already voiced plans to ditch the dollar in oil trading. Last week, Venezuela announced it will launch its own cryptocurrency, the “Petro,” which will be backed by the country’s vast natural resource reserves.

Russia, China and Iran are currently pursuing currency swap agreements to eliminate the US dollar from trade. One of the world’s biggest crude importers, China, has also announced the launch of the petro-yuan to replace the greenback in oil transactions.

While currency swaps are being considered, cryptocurrencies, once they become less volatile, offer several advantages. Instead of using various national currencies, they provide a common currency for countries seeking to avoid using the dollar. They are also universal and flexible, easily convertible back to national currencies.

Cryptocurrencies provide yet another advantage to countries facing international sanctions. They are anonymous and decentralized, which limits the effect of US economic sanctions on trade deals for countries like Russia, Iran and Venezuela.

Philippines: Rights Groups Criticize Renewed Police Role In Drugs War

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By Felipe Villamor

Human Rights Watch and other groups on Wednesday denounced Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s decision this week to put police back on the frontlines of his administration’s bloody war on illegal drugs.

Two months ago, the tough-talking Duterte had ordered the nation’s police force to pull back from counter-narcotics operations, amid widespread criticism that officers were involved in thousands of extrajudicial killings of drug suspects during his young presidency. On Tuesday, Duterte announced he was reviving an active role for police in the drugs war.

“The reactivation of police anti-drug operations officially requires police to first ‘consult’ with the PDEA [Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency]. But the government’s failure to hold anyone accountable for the thousands of drug war deaths make it highly unlikely that the PDEA will be able to restrain well-documented police abuses,” said Phelim Kine, deputy Asia director for New York-based Human Rights Watch (HRW).

Kine said Duterte may have been emboldened by the unwillingness of fellow members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and U.S. President Donald Trump to publicly challenge “the drug war slaughter,” at an ASEAN summit hosted by the Philippines last month.

Research by HRW indicated that police and other state agents were linked to extrajudicial killings tied to the drug war, Kine said. The vast majority of the more than 12,000 people gunned down in the campaign were poor, the rights watchdog said as it called for the U.N. “to investigate these killings and end the murderous police operations on urban poor communities.”

London-based Amnesty International also spoke out against reinstating police in an active role in the Philippine war on drugs.

“In returning police to his anti-drug operations yet again, President Duterte has consigned the poorest and most marginalized people in the Philippines to another catastrophic wave of violence, misery and bloodshed,” James Gomez, Amnesty’s regional director, said in a statement.

“Since the police were withdrawn from anti-drug operations in October, there has been a marked decline in the number of deaths resulting from these operations,” he added.

In the Philippines, The Movement against Tyranny, whose members are leading Filipino activists, said it planned to rally against the new presidential order on Sunday, international Human Rights Day.

“We are inviting the public to stand with us on Dec. 10 to uphold human rights and reject tyranny and dictatorship,” the group said.

Duterte unapologetic

Duterte gave the PDEA a lead role in October, when he ordered the national police to step back and play a supportive role by primarily forwarding intelligence to the agency.

It was not the first time that Duterte had pulled police back from the drug war. In January, he briefly suspended their participation after a South Korean businessmen was allegedly killed by officers who extorted money from his grieving widow.

Official police data puts the number of deaths linked to the drug war at slightly more than 3,800, far below an estimate of more than 12,000 by the Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates. This higher number included victims of alleged vigilantes who left cardboard messages on bodies claiming responsibility.

Duterte said the figure was bloated, and he blamed the surge in killings to warring drug syndicates who were going after each other and pinning the blame on police.

On Tuesday, the presidential palace announced that Duterte had signed a memo ordering police, the military and the justice department’s investigative arm to resume providing active support to the PDEA in its counter-narcotics operations.

Duterte said the PDEA has been seriously hampered in performing its mandate by its lack of resources – including agents and operatives who could penetrate drug infected areas.

“The president’s memorandum order is likewise in response to a clamor from the public to restore to the PNP [Philippine National Police] and other law enforcement agencies the responsibility of providing active support to the PDEA,” the order said.

“There has been a notable resurgence in illegal drug activities and crimes since the PNP and other law enforcement agencies were directed to leave to the PDEA the conduct of all anti-illegal campaigns and operations,” it added.

On Wednesday, an unapologetic Duterte defended his decision, saying he would welcome international rights experts to observe how police would carry out the drug war.

“I will not answer it anymore except to say that my oath of office demands that I protect the Filipino people, and that the Republic of the Philippines is safe,” Duterte said in an expletive laden speech at a swearing-in ceremony for government officials. “That is the long and short of it.”

He said he hoped to end his country’s drug problem in “just another year” after failing to deliver on a campaign promise to stop the scourge during the first six months of his term, which began in June 2016.

Bitcoin Loses Steam As Steam Loses Bitcoin – OpEd

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By Matthew McCaffrey*

The skyrocketing price of Bitcoin has dominated the financial news for the past few weeks, and the usual suspects are queuing up to offer predictions about its continued rise or inevitable fall.

Yet it’s not all good news for fans of the cryptocurrency: in a notable decision, the digital distribution platform Steam has announced that it will no longer be accepting payment in Bitcoin.

In the grand scheme of things, Steam’s new policy will likely have little impact on the use or price of Bitcoin as such. Rather, the decision is significant because it highlights an underlying economic question about the future of the cryptocurrency. Specifically, Steam’s example shows that despite an enormous gain in market value, Bitcoin still has a long way to go before it becomes money.

Money is conventionally defined as a generally accepted medium of exchange, the key part of this definition being “generally accepted.” In order to be adopted on such a large scale, a medium of exchange must fulfil certain basic criteria, the most important of which is that it must be capable of serving as a tool for economic calculation.

Entrepreneurs must be able to use a means of payment to compare the costs and benefits of different production plans, and this in turn requires a degree of stability in the value of money. Of course, money’s value is never constant: but it must be dependable. The inability of entrepreneurs to calculate is one reason why extreme price inflation creates widespread social havoc—planning production becomes difficult if not impossible.

One of Mises’s original contributions to monetary theory was the emphasis he placed on money’s role as a medium of exchange. Many others had identified this basic function before Mises, of course, but his approach is distinct in the way it argues that the role of medium of exchange is central, and that money’s other functions—as a unit of account, for example—are derived from it. Money is primarily a means of facilitating peaceful social cooperation, and in this sense is an indispensable part of any advanced division of labor as well as of economic calculation.

This brings us back to Bitcoin. At the moment, Bitcoin is still a minority means of payment, and Steam’s decision helps to illustrate why: Bitcoin does not at the moment satisfy the calculation criterion. As the Steam Team notes:

Historically, the value of Bitcoin has been volatile, but the degree of volatility has become extreme in the last few months, losing as much as 25% in value over a period of days. This creates a problem for customers trying to purchase games with Bitcoin. When checking out on Steam, a customer will transfer x amount of Bitcoin for the cost of the game, plus y amount of Bitcoin to cover the transaction fee charged by the Bitcoin network. The value of Bitcoin is only guaranteed for a certain period of time so if the transaction doesn’t complete within that window of time, then the amount of Bitcoin needed to cover the transaction can change. The amount it can change has been increasing recently to a point where it can be significantly different.

The unpredictable changes in the value of Bitcoin mean that it is now extremely difficult for consumers or producers to gauge the true cost of their transactions, or to make an educated judgment about the best time to buy or sell. Increasing transaction fees for paying in Bitcoin further complicate the issue, especially in regard to relatively small purchases (a major concern for Steam).

At the moment, commentators seem intent on convincing each other of their predictive powers regarding Bitcoin’s price, and everyone wants to be on “right side of financial history.” The vital question though is not around what price Bitcoin will ultimately settle, but if and when it will settle at all, especially compared to its competitors. For the time being, however, the extreme changes in Bitcoin’s price mean that although it might be a good investment, it will not soon become money.

Steam’s decision thus nicely underlines a point that Mises was fond of repeating: entrepreneurs and others who are involved in practical economic affairs often know more about prices and what they mean for the economy than the pundits watching from the wings.

About the author:
*Matt McCaffrey
is assistant professor of enterprise at the University of Manchester.

Source:
This article was published by the MISES Institute.

Exploring New System Of Command And Control: The Case For US Africa Command – Analysis

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By Michael G. Kamas, David W. Pope, and Ryan N. Propst*

The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) proposed several changes to improve the organization of the combatant commands (CCMDs) in its markup of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017. The first provision seeks to focus the CCMDs on their primary warfighting mission supporting the National Defense Strategy, limiting CCMD participation in other important, but nonessential, mission sets.

A second proposal would “require the Secretary of Defense to conduct a pilot program on an alternative organizational structure at one combatant command . . . replacing the Service component commands with joint task forces [JTFs] focused on operational military missions. The Committee believes that this could provide lessons for improving the integration of operational efforts across the command, streamlining unnecessary layers of management, and reducing the number of staff.”1 Converting the command and control (C2) structure of a geographic CCMD from a group of Service component commands to a set of JTFs is achievable, despite congressionally mandated reductions in headquarters staff personnel and lack of a major combat operation in theater. While the final version of the NDAA removed this requirement, U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) would have been the ideal CCMD to test and evaluate this new C2 structure.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 provided the impetus for several organizational changes that are still evident today. While many associate Goldwater-Nichols with the mandate to end parochialism within the individual Services through new emphasis on “jointness,” the legislation also provided greater command authority for the unified and specified combatant commands.

Geographic combatant commanders now report directly to the Secretary of Defense instead of falling under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Service chiefs would provide training, manpower, and equipment for the joint force, allocated and apportioned under the operational control of a combatant commander. As Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stated in a 2013 speech, “Goldwater-Nichols succeeded in its purpose by strengthening the Joint Staff and the Combatant Commands, but it went about doing this by layering joint organizations and processes atop service organizations and atop processes. The elevation of the former did not automatically lead to the diminution of the latter.”2

Proponents of Goldwater-Nichols reform argue that changes to warfare in a complex world require a different approach to military command and control. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated, “Updates are needed in the Combatant Commands, adapting them to new functions, including cyber, and continuing to aggressively streamline headquarters.”3

In an era where warfare has shifted from conventional nation-against-nation conflict to a more unpredictable set of interrelated conflicts between state and nonstate actors, perhaps geographic boundaries are no longer the most effective way to organize the C2 structure of military operations.

In August 2016, the Joint Staff J7 Deployable Training Division published the second edition of a focus paper titled “Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) Command and Control Organizational Options,” which analyzes several C2 alternatives available to the unified combatant commanders during steady-state or crisis operations. Traditionally, a CCMD consists of subordinate commands that could be grouped into three categories: Service components, subunified commands, and functional components. There is not a standard template on how each CCMD must organize, but the C2 structure broadly utilizes a set of Service component subordinate commands and an additional special operations component to execute the CCMD’s mission. The J7 paper also analyzes three additional options for a CCMD’s C2 structure: a single Service force, JTFs, and specific operational forces.4

The JTF option is not without precedent as it has been successfully executed in the years following the passage of Goldwater-Nichols legislation. Operation Just Cause in 1989 was the first success story of a JTF operating under the authority of U.S. Southern Command in Panama. Today, the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) is an example of a combined joint task force (CJTF) subordinate to USAFRICOM, which has been charged with oversight and execution of counterterrorism missions in Somalia and the broader East Africa region.

The J7 paper provides significant guidance on when the employment of a JTF or CJTF option could prove advantageous. These reasons include a “single mission focus and resultant close integration/C2 of forces and the freedom for the GCC to maintain a wide focus of the CCMD area of responsibility (AOR) through deliberate delegation of authority to the JTF commander.”5 Although JTFs were designed to be limited in duration, that paradigm has shifted in recent years as demonstrated by enduring JTFs such as CJTF-HOA and JTF-Guantanamo.

Since the proposed 2017 NDAA from the SASC would require one of the geographic combatant commands to evaluate the alternative JTF option, the existence of CJTF-HOA and the broad mission set of USAFRICOM make it the ideal place to test this C2 structure. Although USAFRICOM covers a large continent and is engaged in over 15 named operations, it is an economy of force command with limited assigned forces that relies on force allocation and force sharing agreements with U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) to execute its mission. USAFRICOM has six subordinate component commands, three of which are shared with USEUCOM (see figure 1).

  • U.S. Air Forces Africa (USAFAF) is a Service component command dual-hatted as U.S. Air Forces Europe, headquartered at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. It provides forward-based airpower and infrastructure to execute operations in Europe and Africa and also supports North Atlantic Treaty Organization air operations and planning.
  • U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), formerly called the Southern European Task Force, provides mission command and employs forces to set the theater, conduct security force assistance, and provide support to USAFRICOM land operations in Africa. USARAF is located at Vincenza, Italy.
  • Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa is a multinational task force designed to fight violent extremist organizations in East Africa through power projection and by building the defense capability and capacity of international partners. CJTF-HOA is based at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti.
  • U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa (MARFORAF) also has the role of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe and is headquartered at Stuttgart, Germany. MARFORAF maintains a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force–Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR) in the USAFRICOM AOR.
  • U.S. Naval Forces Africa (USNAVAF), sharing the role of U.S. Naval Forces Europe (USNAVEUR), also serves as Naval Support Activity Naples, in Naples, Italy. USNAVAF/USNAVEUR maintains the U.S. Sixth Fleet, which consists of permanent and rotational naval forces to conduct ballistic missile defense and other missions within its AOR.
  • Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) is a functional, subunified command in Stuttgart, which serves as the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC). While USAFRICOM is granted operational control (OPCON) of the TSOC, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) maintains combatant command authority.

Of these six subordinate commands to USAFRICOM, only half are singularly focused on a specific mission inside the USAFRICOM AOR. For the purposes of converting USAFRICOM to a series of JTFs, CJTF-HOA and SOCAFRICA would remain largely intact.

It could be argued that U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), like USAFRICOM, maintains a diverse mission set, with no near-peer U.S. competitors within its AOR, and is just as well suited to serve as the pilot CCMD to evaluate the NDAA’s proposed C2 structure. USSOUTHCOM currently has three JTFs within its organizational structure as well as the requisite Service component commands, with a large emphasis on theater security cooperation activities.6 The USSOUTHCOM JTFs are Joint Task Force–Bravo, at Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras; JTF-Guantanamo; and Joint Interagency Task Force–South, in Key West, Florida. But unlike USAFRICOM, USSOUTHCOM is not challenged by the fact that three of its four component commands are dual-hatted to support another CCMD. Each Service component command at USSOUTHCOM serves only one combatant commander, and those components have closer proximity and reach-back to forces based in the continental United States. Additionally, USSOUTHCOM’s AOR is not as rife with violent extremist organizations (VEOs), which pose a direct threat to U.S. interests, our allies, and regional stability. USAFRICOM’s one standing joint task force—CJTF-HOA—is focused on combating terrorism and providing stability in East Africa. For these reasons, it would be most logical to expand the JTF structure in USAFRICOM’s AOR, as opposed to USSOUTHCOM’s AOR. To assess the requirements for additional JTFs across the African continent, a basic understanding of the USAFRICOM theater campaign plan (TCP) is required.

USAFRICOM’s Theater Campaign Plan

Published in August 2015, the USAFRICOM TCP is a 5-year plan intended to set conditions for achieving the 10-year regional endstates described in the 2015 USAFRICOM theater strategy. The 5-year campaign mission statement is as follows: “USAFRICOM, with partners, disrupts and neutralizes transnational threats, protects U.S. personnel and facilities, prevents and mitigates conflict, and builds African partner defense capability and capacity in order to promote regional security, stability, and prosperity.”7 To meet mission requirements, the plan defines decisive, shaping, and sustaining efforts for campaign execution. Decisive efforts are those “focused on building African partner capacity and strengthening partnerships.”8

The shaping effort is focused on disrupting and degrading VEOs to set the conditions for success of the decisive effort in time. Sustaining efforts support the other two efforts by ensuring the force and theater are set for the campaign. The campaign lists five lines of effort (LOEs), each with supporting intermediate objectives (IMOs), tied to the plan’s endstates. These LOEs are listed in priority order, and other than LOE 5, they can be attached to a specific geographic area.

  • LOE 1. Neutralize al Shabaab/transition African Union Mission in Somalia
  • LOE 2. Degrade violent extremist organizations in Sahel-Maghreb/contain instability in Libya
  • LOE 3. Contain and degrade Boko Haram
  • LOE 4. Interdict illicit activity in Gulf of Guinea/Central Africa
  • LOE 5. Build peacekeeping/humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capacity of African partners.9

Structure Challenges in a Resource-Constrained Environment

A key assumption of this proposal is the continued desire to minimize the U.S. military footprint in Africa. The vast size of the continent, African sensitivities to a colonial presence, and the lack of political will to establish a large overseas force structure all serve as contributing factors toward the small U.S. presence. Accomplishment of the USAFRICOM mission relies on Secretary of Defense–approved force allocation, which often involves agreements to share operational forces and posture locations with USEUCOM and U.S. Central Command. Proposed C2 changes should not increase the military presence in Africa, unless it is required for tactical mission execution.

U.S. special operations will continue to play an outsize role in military operations over conventional forces; therefore, SOCAFRICA will maintain its current role as a TSOC.

Lines of effort articulated in the 2015 TCP are anticipated to remain consistent, although proposed C2 changes should have a measured amount of flexibility to address emergent combatant commander priorities, improved capabilities of our regional partners, and unforeseen threats. However, a functional-based JTF structure should not result in any net increase of headquarters personnel.

Because USARAF is the only Service component command that is not shared with USEUCOM, it is ideally suited for conversion to a JTF for North and West Africa. It is natural to assume that USARAF will need additional headquarters personnel to expand its role to a fully operational joint task force. The expansion of administrative staff, planners, and leadership should result from a proportional downsizing of personnel from USAFAF, USNAVAF, and MARFORAF. As stated in Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, “When a CCDR [combatant commander] is directed to create a JTF headquarters, the CCDR creates a joint manning document, sourced as much as possible from CCMD resources, that is forwarded to JS [Joint Staff] J-1 for JIA [joint individual augmentation] sourcing approval.”10 The manpower shifts should not be made in a vacuum. Service component commands need to provide vital input on what functions and tasks previously performed by staff to support Africa-centric operations should now shift to the new JTF headquarters.

JTF Structure Standup

To support the NDAA’s proposed pilot program, it is recommended that the new subordinate JTF structures be built around existing USAFRICOM TCP LOEs. JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support, states:

A JTF may be established on a geographical area or functional basis when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics. The mission assigned to a JTF requires execution of responsibilities involving a joint force on a significant scale and close integration of effort, or requires coordination within a subordinate area or local defense of a subordinate area. The establishing authority dissolves a JTF when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved or when it is no longer required.11

LOEs 1 through 4 clearly meet the intent of what a JTF could be used for, as described above, and a JTF in support of these LOEs could allow USAFRICOM to maintain focus across the AOR while a JTF deals specifically with the problem sets inherent in the LOEs, a benefit described in the J7’s August 2016 paper on GCC C2 organizational options.12

CJTF-HOA, as previously described, is already postured to meet objectives in support of LOE 1. Additionally, ongoing programs within their area of operations are supporting LOE 5 objectives. Given that this JTF is focused on the top priority LOE, there is no need to make extreme adjustments to its structure or mission set. LOEs 2 through 4, however, will require a separate and new C2 organization. It is recommended that a new CJTF–North and West Africa (CJTF-NWA) be created in order to address the problem sets that pertain to those regions and LOEs 2 through 4. Like CJTF-HOA, CJTF-NWA would be responsible for coordinating and executing activities in its area of operations that contribute to objectives that fall within LOE 5’s scope. Also, like CJTF-HOA, which serves as a combined JTF, with multinational elements contributing to its staffing and mission execution, the JTF for North and West Africa should be created as a CJTF. As it stands today, the United States and its allies (for example, France, the United Kingdom, Italy) share mutual interests for enduring stability, such as counterterrorism operations, containment of migrant flow, and defense institution building. CJTF-NWA should leverage these shared interests and synchronize partner-nation actions to the benefit of the entire region.

Figure 2 shows the proposed C2 organization for the execution of this pilot program at USAFRICOM. Although each JTF could potentially become disestablished when the JTF’s mission has been accomplished, this model assumes sustained relevance for the next 5 years, which would encompass the length of the C2 evaluation period.

Consistent with its theater campaign plan LOEs, USAFRICOM would accept the risk of not having a JTF focused on the southern region of its AOR. This is mitigated by the fact that this region is relatively stable, has no major VEO threat, and its militaries are mostly capable of internal security. As part of its AOR-wide focus, USAFRICOM will support LOE 5 objectives in this region by planning and coordinating for the use of U.S. Army Regionally Aligned Forces, the Army National Guard State Partnership Program, other military entities, and interagency assets (for example, the U.S. Coast Guard) to meet LOE 5’s associated endstate. Geographic boundaries for CJTF-NWA and CJTF-HOA are illustrated in figure 3.

Proposed JTF C2 Structures and Joint C2 Principles

JP 1-0 states that a joint force commander’s (JFC’s) C2 structure should be centered on its mission, location, and force capabilities, among other things, and the following principles should enable its structure: simplicity, span of control, unit integrity, and interoperability.13

The proposed dual CJTF command structure adheres to the principle of simplicity by establishing distinct objectives, tied to LOEs for each JTF. This enables unity of command and clearly defines roles, responsibilities, and authorities across the AOR not only for each JTF but also for USAFRICOM. As for span of control, CJTF-HOA certainly is compliant; however, CJTF-NWA’s varied problem sets, objectives, and geography will require its planners to consider the scope and size of activities in relation to its force capabilities in the AOR. Conversely, the addition of CJTF-NWA into USAFRICOM’s AOR will support the combatant command’s ability to positively affect its span of control.

Unit integrity is maintained when forces assigned to the JTF align with their designated C2 organization, which maximizes their effectiveness. There are no outstanding issues with unit integrity in the proposed JTF construct; however, JTF commanders with OPCON authority to reorganize assigned units should only do so if there is a compelling case for it. To facilitate interoperability, USAFRICOM will need to ensure shared understanding across its staff and both JTFs regarding its systems, structure, liaison requirements, battle rhythm, and seams that affect the entire AOR. At the same time, each JTF must do the same with its assigned forces as they work to meet objectives. Additionally, interoperability should be extended to CCMD and JTF coordination with Embassy country teams in the AOR to ensure a whole-of-government approach to problems sets and activities within the region. SOCAFRICA would need to maintain close coordination and interoperability with both CJTFs since the special operations mission set would extend into the geographic borders of both CJTF-NWA and CJTF-HOA.

JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, establishes doctrine for the “formation and employment of a JTF headquarters to command and control joint operations.”14 It not only provides clarification on the organization of a new joint headquarters but also discusses command and staff responsibilities and the management of subordinate commands within the JTF. Although beyond the scope of this article, JP 3-33 would be instrumental to the formation or revision of a JTF within USAFRICOM’s structure.

Conclusion

Because one of the geographic combatant commands will likely be selected to evaluate a new system of JTF command and control, USAFRICOM is the ideal theater to test this C2 structure for many reasons. First, the existence of CJTF-HOA has demonstrated this concept over the past 15 years in the eastern part of the USAFRICOM AOR, and it serves as a template for a combined, multi-Service headquarters with an enduring mission set. As an economy of force command with limited assigned forces, USAFRICOM would benefit from restructuring its antiquated system of Service component commands to maximize efficiencies and reduce unnecessary headquarters staff. This slimmer, mission-oriented C2 structure would allow USAFRICOM to adapt rapidly to the many emergent crises and missions that develop within its AOR. Finally, the absence of any current or planned major combat operation gives the combatant commander wide latitude to explore a new system of command and control, without affecting the time, effort, and resources dedicated to the development of operational plans. Eliminating the Service component commands at a CCMD assumes that Services are better suited to serve as force providers based not on geographic boundaries, but rather on the capabilities required for a given JTF mission set.

To convert the current Service component–based subordinate command structure to the proposed dual-JTF structure, the Unified Command Plan should codify the changes to USAFRICOM’s C2 structure and specify a set time period for evaluation of the new process. Additionally, fresh updates to the various memorandums of agreement for apportionment of forces between USAFRICOM and USEUCOM would be necessary to enable the prompt exchange of military units to execute combat operations, security cooperation events and engagements, and other contingencies as they arise. While there is some inherent risk to this type of an organizational change, the potential benefits and efficiencies from a JTF system of C2 should greatly outweigh the challenges associated with this conversion. The primary advantage of this new JTF structure is that it gives the combatant commander an established subordinate headquarters, empowered to flexibly respond to emergent crises and maintain immediate focus on the threats oriented along TCP lines of effort. Although untested, this new construct could have potential benefits over the conventional system of Service component commands, particularly in the USAFRICOM area of responsibility.

*About the authors:
Commander Michael G. Kamas
, USN, is the prospective Executive Officer of the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Weapons School. Major David W. Pope, USMC, is an Action Officer in the Multinational Cooperation Center at U.S. Africa Command. Major Ryan N. Propst, USA, is the Air and Missile Defense Chief for the Army’s 1st Infantry Division.

Source:
This article was published in the Joint Force Quarterly 87, which is published by the National Defense University.

Notes
1 U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017,” May 16, 2016, available at <www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FY17%20NDAA%20Bill%20Summary.pdf>.

2 Chuck Hagel, speech transcript, National Defense University, Washington, DC, April 2013, available at <http://archive.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1764>.

3 Lisa Ferdinando, “Carter Proposes Updates to Goldwater-Nichols Act,” DOD News, April 5, 2016, available at <www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/713930/carter-proposes-updates-to-goldwater-nichols-act>.

4 Deployable Training Division (J7), “Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) Command and Control Organizational Options,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 2016, available at <www.js.pentagon.mil/doctrine/fp/fp_gcc.pdf>.

5 Ibid., 9.

6 U.S. Southern Command, “SOUTHCOM Component Commands and Units,” November 5, 2016, available at <www.southcom.mil/aboutus/Pages/Our-Team.aspx>.

7 “U.S. Africa Command Theater Campaign Plan 2000-16,” Change One, June 1, 2016, 16.

8 Ibid., 18.

9 Ibid., 21.

10 Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), H-2.

11 JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 31, 2016), IV-10.

12 “Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) Command and Control Organizational Options,” 9.

13 JP 1-0, V-18.

14 JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 30, 2012), i.

Greece: Our Old Friend – OpEd

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When the WWI ended leaving a horrible trail of destruction behind, the belligerent countries sat down to square accounts with one another at cold meeting tables. The aftermath of this horrendous war that brought an end to the Ottoman Empire also marked the formation of new Turkey and this new state reached an agreement with the Allied Powers in Lausanne. The exact borders of the new Turkey were determined during this time and the borders of Greece as well as the issues regarding the Turkish minority left in those areas were finalized with the Lausanne Treaty.

Last week’s polemics between the Turkish President Mr. Erdoğan, who became the first Turkish President to visit Greece since 1952 and the Greek President Mr. Pavlopoulos, was about the topic of minorities that was determined with the Treaty of Lausanne.

The Treaty of Lausanne, since it was signed 94 years ago, has never ceased being a controversial topic. It was signed amidst tense and arduous arguments, in a charged environment in which all the countries were trying to tear at each other. Even though the treaty had eleven signatories, the real disputes had always been between Britain and Turkey. Even though it was always Britain that was at the forefront during the disintegration of the Ottoman lands and the subsequent occupation of Istanbul, surprisingly, Turks and Greeks were set against each other.

Although the articles of the treaty regarding Greece were defined by Britain in Lausanne, the same tricks were pulled. Needless to say, in that lion’s den that witnessed such disputes, some issues weren’t completely resolved. Indeed, as our President Mr. Erdoğan stated, even a small disturbance on a rocky islet on our shores was enough to create tension between Turkey and Greece until recently. Surely, this tension needs to be eliminated. However, is it really wise to revisit a treaty that was signed 94 years ago, when the world was seemingly suffering from a joint lapse of reason, not to mention the fact that it was an agreement signed under the aegis of the British?

Surely not. Classic politics and cautious diplomacy might require approaching state matters and international treaties in the light of past treaties. However, our world today can no longer afford classic political maneuvers. As a matter of fact, no country of the world has truly achieved any solution through those methods. Especially today, when almost every part of our world is somehow suffering from problems that need urgent solutions, it is clear that the strategy needs to change and friendships need to be preferred to old, harsh political narratives.

Turkey and Greek are two fraternal countries and Turks and Greeks are two fraternal nations. The two people are similar to each other in many ways; our traditions, customs, our cuisines, music, culture, family relations, hospitality, loyalty, our strong sense of friendship and brotherhood are very similar to each other; Turks and Greeks are like two peas in a pod. There are many Greek people with Turkish blood in their veins and many Turks with Greek blood in theirs. In other words, Greeks are our brothers, sisters, friends and relatives.

However, a sinister plot has targeted these two fraternal nations for a very long time and both sides fail to understand how they ever fell for it. Therefore, the visit of the Turkish President Mr. Erdoğan after 65 years is of crucial importance. The visit was intended to eliminate the artificial discord and in fact, took place in a friendly atmosphere despite the negative coverage in the media that focused only on the short political argument that took place. This coverage and emphasis only serve the interests of those circles that seek to create discord. It is crucial to expose this plot.

Friendships are built on mutual love, cooperation and trust. Turkey and Greece, before anything else, should focus on strengthening this spirit of love that has been ripped from them all those years ago. They should set aside the classical politics and say; ‘we are friends, brothers and sisters, we always trust each other’. In order to do this, political moves should be dropped, and foundations of friendship should be built with love and respect. Turkey’s first step is important in this regard.

Once the political constraints are removed and true friendships are formed, the rest will come very easy. Then the Aegean islets or the complications regarding minority rights will not be an issue. The lands of each country will be mutually respected and protected by both parties, while the two people will be considered the citizens of both countries.

It is also crucial to open the borders with Greece and to develop together through trade and tourism. Greek support for Turkey’s EU membership is commendable and is an important gesture of friendship. Needless to say, when Turkey becomes a EU member, the borders will be automatically opened and the two friendly countries will have even stronger cultural and trade ties.

However, the EU is going through difficult times and considers economically weaker countries like Greece a burden. Especially the representatives of the far-right parties in the European Parliament push for extremely harsh policies for the aforementioned countries. The EMF (European Monetary Fund), intended to offer financial support to Eurozone regions experiencing financial difficulties in the EU, is planned to operate just like the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Although this is portrayed as ‘aid’, it also means making the said countries heavily indebted and in a sense, bringing about their downfall.

When this is the case, if Greece chooses to leave Eurozone or EU, there is no doubt that it will highly benefit from directly opening borders with Turkey and starting a new path of development through joint trade. When a strong friendship is established, projects created mutually will achieve good results and no political rhetoric, individual or country will be able to draw a wedge between these two friends.

For these reasons, it is crucial that this meeting, which started with true intentions of extending a friendly hand, before it was eclipsed by arguments about Lausanne, is repeated. As a matter of fact, it would be great if Greek President Pavlopoulos and Prime Minister Tsipras are invited to Turkey when the media coverage is still fresh. This invitation will demonstrate that the two countries are committed to friendship, more than to political wins and are determined to foil the plots of those who are profiting from Turkey-Greece discord.

It is crucial that these visits take place frequently – if possible on a monthly basis – and be supported with friendship and trade agreements, so that any plots will be exposed through a display of true friendship. Turkey aims to help Greece develop and get stronger together with it, regardless of those circles that wish to profit from the fall of Greece.

*Harun Yahya has authored more than 300 books translated into 73 languages on politics, religion and science. He tweets @harun_yahya.

Weapons Are The Combat Differentiators: The BrahMos Air Launched Cruise Missile – Analysis

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By Kishore Kumar Khera*

“Weapons differentiate between Air Forces and Flying Clubs” is an often heard adage. Weapons capability is an integral part of an Air Power matrix. In the last three months, a number of successful indigenous weapons trials in India indicate a positive move in the right direction even if a little late in certain cases and after multiple failures in others. India’s dependence on foreign vendors for weapons and weapon platforms is well known and it is the largest importer of weaponry. Importing weapons acts as a stimulant for defence capability but it is short lived owing to severe limitations in terms of quantum (cost factor), quality (technology) and sustenance (maintenance support). Indigenous weapons development is therefore the key to efficient and effective security.

In July 2017, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) developed Quick Reaction Surface to Air Missile (QRSAM) was successfully flight tested.1 This was followed by the successful final Development Flight Trials of Astra –the Beyond Visual Range Air to Air Missile (BVRAAM) – against a Pilotless Target Aircraft (PTA) in September 2017.2 On November 3, the indigenously developed light weight Glide Bomb, SAAW (Smart Anti Airfield Weapon), with an effective range of 70 km was tested.3 Then came, after multiple failures, the successful test flight of ‘NIRBHAY’, the Long Range Sub-Sonic Cruise Missile with an indigenously designed Ring Laser Gyroscope (RLG) and a range of over 700 km.4 And finally, on November 22, the most significant development in this class took place when the Indian Air Force (IAF) successfully fired the BrahMos, the world’s fastest supersonic cruise missile, from a Su-30 MKI fighter aircraft. With a warhead weighing 300 kg, this 2.5 tonne missile has an engagement envelope of 400 km. The operationalisation of the BrahMos Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) will significantly bolster the IAF’s combat capability. BrahMos, with a multi-platform and multi-mission role, is now capable of being launched from land, sea and air, completing the tactical cruise missile triad for India.5

Test firing is one of the initial yet significant steps towards the operationalisation of a system. It will take a while before all the above mentioned weapons systems are declared fully operational and inducted for operational deployment. But the die is cast. Once operational, for the first time in India’s history, the armed forces will have a significant share of cutting edge weapons of indigenous origin.

Although already deployed as a ground based and sea based weapons system, the BrahMos ALCM adds a different dimension to combat capability. It converges the advantages of a missile system with the flexibility of air power. A standoff range of 300 to 400 km keeps the mother aircraft outside the lethal zone of all known terminal defence weapons. If need be, the mother aircraft can go deep inside the adversary’s territory with requisite combat support and carry out the attack on target systems hitherto not reachable. In practical terms, with this weapon, the effective range for engaging targets (radius of action) increases by 25 to 30 per cent and the size of engagement zone doubles.6

Carrying out attacks against targets defended by multi-layered air defence weapons systems has attendant risks. Non-stealth aircraft in a ground attack configuration have a large Radar Cross Section (RCS) given the imperative of carrying multiple external weapons. This leads to early detection by adversary surveillance and tracking systems. Besides early detection by the terminal weapon radars, the aircraft configuration imposes a severe limitation both in terms of its speed and manoeuvrability. Unless protected by multiple high powered Electronic Warfare (EW) warning and counter measure systems, there is a high probability that terminal weapons would be able to engage strike aircraft. This leads to either aborted attacks or loss of aircraft. All this can be avoided by carrying out an attack from outside the lethal engagement zone of the terminal weapon systems. For that, an air launched weapon with a range greater than the lethal zone of terminal weapons is required. The BrahMos ALCM is just that. Although BrahMos itself can be intercepted, owing to its relatively smaller RCS and high speed in the range of 2.8 to 3 Mach, interception is much more difficult than intercepting a fully loaded aircraft. This leads to a high assurance level of success of an attack.

Interaction between the primary damage mechanisms of a weapon (like blast, fragmentation or penetration) with the vulnerability of a target system defines the weapon’s effect on target. The amount of explosive in the warhead, the nature and type of casing along with the explosion initiation mechanism and timing determine the nature and extent of damage. The damage caused by each weapon assists in calculating the number of weapons required to achieve the requisite degree of damage on the target system. Owing to its high kinetic energy at the terminal stage, BrahMos has a high penetration potential but subject to the warhead retaining its shape during impact and penetration. The weight of its warhead, which indicates the quantum of explosive carried, indicates that the damage caused by BrahMos would be akin to one 1000-pound bomb. This is a limiting factor. In addition, the weight of attack is relatively low as only one such missile can be carried per aircraft. The low quantity of explosives carried coupled with the fact that one aircraft would be able to carry only one weapon necessitate a high force level. In other words, a very large number of aircraft loaded with BrahMos will be required to neutralise a large target. This can be offset by high weapon delivery accuracy, with a Circular Error of Probability (CEP) comparable to the dimensions of the vulnerable portion of the target around the aiming point or Desired Mean Point of Impact (DMPI).7 Therefore, terminal accuracy attains great significance. An accurate attack can result in damaging the critical sub system to make the target system non-functional and achieve the desired effect. With this size of warhead, sub 10 metre accuracy is ideal for most target systems.8

Three aspects of BrahMos that are still a work in progress are: extending its range, increasing its speed to hypersonic level, and shrinking its size so that three missiles can be carried by a single aircraft. While all three are steps in the right direction, the most significant change that is required is in terms of further enhancing the missile’s accuracy by fine-tuning its terminal guidance. Greater accuracy will actually reduce the number of weapons required to achieve the desired effect on a given target system.

Originally scheduled to be operational by 2012, the BrahMos ALCM is heading to become a reality after a delay of five years. Now is the time to step on the accelerator. Work needs to be carried out on finalising the modification of the aircraft in terms of structure, electrical and avionics, the manufacture of suitable pylons and changes in the weapon to ensure seamless compatibility and communication between the three. Necessary ground handling and support equipment and infrastructure will also have to be defined for storing, servicing, testing, conveying and loading of the weapon. Thereafter, work needs to be initiated with respect to the parallel processing on aircraft fleet modification, pylon manufacture, support equipment and infrastructure and weapon production. This will enable the availability of this unprecedented and game changing weapon delivery capability for operational deployment in adequate strength at the earliest. A similar approach also needs to be followed in the case of the other indigenous weapon systems that have been tested in recent months. These indigenous long range and accurate weapons in the air-to-surface, surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, and air-to-air categories in adequate quantity will partially offset the capability deficiency resulting from the IAF’s dwindling force structure.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

About the author:
*Group Captain Kishore Kumar Khera
, VM is Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi.

Source:
This article was published by IDSA

Notes:

  • 1. Press Release, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, July 3, 2017, available at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/pmreleases.aspx?mincode=33, accessed on November 23, 2017
  • 2. Press Release, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, September 15, 2017, available at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/pmreleases.aspx?mincode=33, accessed on November 23, 2017
  • 3. Press Release, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, November 3, 2017, available at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/pmreleases.aspx?mincode=33, accessed on November 23, 2017
  • 4. Press Release, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, November 7, 2017, available at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/pmreleases.aspx?mincode=33, accessed on November 23, 2017
  • 5. Press Release, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, November 22, 2017, available at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/pmreleases.aspx?mincode=33, accessed on November 23, 2017
  • 6. Engagement Zone is the area in which an aircraft is capable of engaging a target with on board weapons with adequate fuel to return to parent base. It is calculated as the circular area with parent base as the centre and radius equal to the sum of maximum operational range of on board weapons and the maximum distance the aircraft can cover in combat configuration with adequate fuel to return to the parent base. Friendly area is not included in this calculation.
  • 7. Circular Error of Probability (CEP) is the distance in metres from the aiming point on the target within which the impact of 50 per cent of the weapons fired takes place.
  • 8. Number of aircraft required to attack a target reduces significantly when weapon delivery accuracy increases. Halving the CEP generally reduces the number of attack aircraft required by 75 per cent for a typical combat zone target.

India: Weekly Health Camps For Media Families Roll On In Assam – OpEd

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Basundhara (not her real name) often comes to the press club to meet friends and kill extra time. Though she is working at the news desk of an Assamese newspaper, she had never worked as a mainstream reporter. But by coming to press club she finds friends from both the print and television media and take the opportunity to hang out happily.

In one such appearance at the press club premises, I asked her to check her thyroid level in our weekly evening out-patient-department (OPD) clinic that has been organized regularly organized since August 2016. Reluctantly Basundhara gave blood samples to the attending health workers. She also got her blood pressure and sugar checked in the camp.

Next day, the laboratory reports arrived at the press club office and Basundhara took hers away. In the evening hours, when I was busy tracking a news story, she called me and before saying anything she started sobbing. It was astonishing as this normally jolly girl felt so nervous while speaking to me.

‘What happened’, she replied to my query with revelation that she was diagnosed with high thyroid (stimulating hormone) level and hence she was losing energy, joyfulness and gaining unusual weight. I tried to console her that it was not a big deal. Every fourth Indian today suffers from thyroid related problems, but that it can be treated with proper medical intervention.

Sailesh (name changed) normally comes to the press club only when there is a meeting of media persons as he lives at the outskirt of Guwahati. Once he arrives, Sailesh continues his natural lecturing with me on numerous issues irrespective of my interest.

Not young in age now, Sailesh he is a confirmed bachelor and claims that he will remain so, as his big family would look after him. In one of our Saturday media clinics Sailesh casually checked his blood pressure. The nurse widened her eyes looking at the meter. Sailesh was diagnosed with hypertension (almost 180 by 110 mmHg). The attending doctor wanted to check his pressure and did it personally.

The outcome remained the same.

The doctor asked if Sailesh had checked his pressure earlier. The answer was a big no. He had never checked it and justified his point that ‘listening to doctors was an unnecessary exercise as he had always enjoyed good health condition’. He even denied accepting his blood pressure readings.

The doctor, a little younger to Sailesh, called me and requested that I help to convince him that it was very dangerous to live with such high blood pressure as it could cause great harm to him. I asked Sailesh, who is my contemporary in the professional journalism, to listen to the doctor and follow the guidelines. For the sake of my advice, he listened to the doctor, but refused to take mediciation.

After almost a week, Sailesh came to the press club. He looked depressed with untidy dresses. I could see a small bandage on his head. ‘What happened’, I asked, and Sailesh narrated a long story to my question. The substance of it all was that he fell down at his home two days back and was rushed to a nearby hospital, where the attending doctors cautioned him about his hypertension.

Sailesh survived this time with no internal injuries, which is often reported when an individual suddenly tumbles because of high blood pressure. He admitted his guilt for not taking the doctor’s advice seriously earlier and even showed me a strip of medicines, which he had started using regularly.

One can find a number of cases if they go through the records of the Guwahati Press Club, which has launched this unique healthcare awareness programs last year. One of the active press clubs of northeast India, the organization has over 300 regular members, who are mostly professional journalists working for regional, national and international media outlets.

Besides a few regular programs like ‘Meet the Press’, ‘Guest of the Month’, ‘Media Fellowship’, ‘Health Camp’ etc, the 40-year-old organization started a new initiative titled ‘Evening with a Doctor’ in August 2016 with an aim to spread health awareness to its members along with their close relatives. By now over 75 health clinics have been organized at the press club premises benefiting hundreds of media families.

Under this program, a practicing physician is welcome to the press club premises every Saturday evening, where the attending doctor interacts and also offered free health related consultations to the member-journalists with their families. Often screenings of weight, hypertension, blood sugar, bone density, pulmonary function, thyroid levels, etc. are organized and arranged for follow-up consultations.

Started with the initial support from Dr Jayanta Bardoloi, managing director of Assam’s well-known Dispur Hospital in raising a doctor’s chamber at the club premises, the series of health camps have already emerged as a healthy hangout for the media. The endeavor has also helped diagnosing many journalists and their dependents with alarming high blood pressure, sugar and thyroid disorders. They were accordingly advised by the physicians for follow up actions.

To this date, most of the hospitals based in Guwahati, which has slowly turned into a competent healthcare hub in eastern India, have supported the endeavour by sending their practicing physicians in rotation basis for the media clinics. Professional doctors from GNRC Hospitals, Down Town Hospital, Dispur Hospital, Nemcare Hospital, Hayat Hospital, Ayursundra Hospital, Sun Valley Hospital, Barthakur Clinic, Wintrobe Hospital, Narayana Hospital, Rahman Hospital, Excelcare Hospital, Sight First Eye-Clinic, etc. have already attended the camps.

Even specialist doctors from various distinguished healthcare institutions, based in other parts of the country, like Apollo Hospital (Chennai), SIMS Chennai Hospital, Manipal Hospital (Bangalore), Fortis Hospital (Bangalore), Medanta the Medicity Hospital (Gurgaon), etc. have graced the camps. They were simultaneously encouraged by the post-event coverage in both the mainstream and alternate media outlets.

It may be noted that around 90% of media persons in the alienated region have no medical insurance coverage. Most of the journalists, engaged with regional newspapers and news channels, earn compromised salaries and nominal benefits. Hence they can hardly afford healthcare expenditures and often ended up depending on financial support from the government and donations from well wishers when the medical emergencies strike their families.

Even though the evening camps at our press club are being organized for the benefit of the legitimate members with their relatives, any journalist of the region (also the country) with their dependents are welcome to take the advantage of the clinics.

Moreover, the media organizations including the press clubs of the region are being encouraged to take similar initiatives for enhancing the health status their colleagues and also improving the healthcare related journalism in this part of the populous country.

Finally, meet John (a rural journalist from Jayantia hills of Meghalaya), who recently came to meet me at our press club. It was a Saturday afternoon and I was talking to the invited doctor just before starting the weekly OPD clinic.

Quite naturally I asked John to participate in the camp. Initially he declined, saying, ‘I am fine; What is the problem with me; Are you hatching any conspiracy!’

But later he agreed and was subsequently diagnosed with high sugar level (almost 400 mg/dL) at the random test. The doctor had a long conversation with John, who was in his fifties and asked him to follow a few guidelines. Once the session was over, a nervous John came out of the chamber and made an angry comment to me, “Dost (dear friend), you have turned me a sick man today. But anyhow, God bless you”.


China Leverages Belt And Road Investment To Shape Pakistan’s Political Environment – Analysis

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A Chinese decision to redevelop criteria for the funding of infrastructure projects that are part of the $50 billion plus China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a key pillar of the People’s Republic’s Belt and Road Initiative, seemingly amounts to an effort to enhance the Pakistani military’s stake in the country’s economy at a time that the armed forces are flexing their political muscle.

The Chinese decision that has reportedly led to the suspension of funding for three major road projects valued at a total of $850 million – the upgrading of the Dera Ismail Khan-Zhob motorway and the Karakorum highway as well as construction of a 110-kilometre road linking Khuzdar and Basima – suggests that Beijing is not averse to exploiting its massive investment in the Belt and Road, an effort to link Eurasian infrastructure to China, to shape the political environment in key countries in its authoritarian mould.

Pakistan’s use of militants in its dispute with India over Kashmir serves Chinese interest in keeping Asia’s other giant, India, off balance. Chinese personnel and assets have nonetheless been targets of a low-level insurgency in Balochistan.

The suspension of funding coincided with apparent efforts by the military to increase its political sway by supporting militant and hard-line Sunni Muslim groups opposed to the ruling Pakistan Muslim League (N) headed by disgraced former prime minister Nawaz Sharif.

Former Pakistani strongman General Pervez Musharraf, in the latest manifestation of links between the circles close to the military and hardliners, announced earlier this month that he was discussing an alliance with Milli Muslim League (MML).

MML was recently established by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, who was designated a terrorist by the United Nations and the US Justice Department that put a $10 million bounty on his head and stands accused of having masterminded the 2008 attacks in Mumbai in which 164 people were killed.

Mr. Saeed, the leader of Jamaat ud-Dawa (JuD), widely seen as a front for Lashkar-e-Taibe (LeT), one of the largest and most violent groups in South Asia, was last month freed by a court in Lahore from ten months of house arrest.

Speaking on Pakistani television, Mr. Musharraf pronounced himself “the greatest supporter of LeT.” Acknowledging that he had met with Mr. Saeed, Mr. Musharraf appeared to confirm long-standing suspicions that the military supported LeT as a proxy in Pakistan’s dispute with India over Kashmir.

“Because I have always been in favour of action in Kashmir and I have always been in favour of pressuring the Indian army in Kashmir. This is the biggest force and they have been declared terrorists by India and the US jointly,” Mr. Musharraf said.

Parallel to Mr. Musharraf’s endorsement of LeT, the military displayed its political influence by mediating an end to a weeks-long blockade of a main artery leading into Islamabad to protest a perceived softening of the government’s adherence to Islam in a proposed piece of legislation.

Tehreek Labbaik Pakistan (TPL), the organizer of the protest, is a political front for Tehreek Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah (TLR), which glorifies Mumtaz Qadri, who was executed for killing Punjab governor Salman Taseer because of his opposition to Pakistan’s draconic blasphemy law,

The TPL is a political expression of the Barelvi strand of Sunni Islam that throughout the decades was long viewed as more moderate than the other dominant strand in Pakistan, the Saudi-supported Deobandis, whose militancy dates to the US-Saudi-backed Islamist insurgency in the 1980s that forced Soviet troops to withdraw from Afghanistan.

Suggestions that the protesters were supported by the military  were reinforced by video circulating on social media and the negotiation of an end to the blockade that involved the forced resignation of law minister Zahid Hamid and the dropping of all charges against protesters.

Chinese support for the military’s role has long been evident with its repeated veto in the UN Security Council of US, European and Indian efforts to get Masood Azhar, a prominent Pakistani militant designated as a global terrorist. Mr. Azhar is believed to have close ties to Pakistani intelligence and the military. Prior to the Mumbai attacks, China also blocked Mr. Saeed’s designation.

Mr. Azhar, a fighter in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan and an Islamic scholar who graduated from a Deobandi madrassah, Darul Uloom Islamia Binori Town in Karachi, the alma mater of numerous Pakistani militants, is believed to have been responsible for an attack last year on India’s Pathankot Air Force Station. The militants, dressed in Indian military uniforms fought a 14-hour battle against Indian security forces that only ended when the last attacker was killed. Mr. Azhar was briefly detained after the attack and has since gone underground.

Criteria for the funding of the road projects, once redrafted, are expected to benefit the military’s engineering and construction company, Frontier Works Organization.

The suspension was projected as an effort to avoid corruption in CPEC in the wake of Mr. Sharif’s ousting as prime minister after documents leaked from a Panama law firm linked his children to offshore companies and assets. Long viewed as a nemesis of the military, Mr. Sharif demise served the interests of the armed forces.

The suggestion failed to stand up to scrutiny given that some Chinese companies have been granted CPEC contracts despite allegations of corruption. In one instance, the China Gezhouba Corporation (CGGC), was awarded the development of Pakistan’s $4.5 billion, 969 MW Neelum-Jhelum Hydropower Project, despite having been blacklisted by the World Bank.

Chinese backing for a more prominent role of the military in economic and political life comes amid increased Pakistani scrutiny of CPEC.

In a rare challenging of Chinese commercial terms Pakistan recently withdrew from a Chinese-funded dam-building project.

Pakistani Water and Power Development Authority chairman Muzammil Hussain charged that “Chinese conditions for financing the Diamer-Bhasha Dam were not doable and against our interests.” China and Pakistan were also at odds over ownership of the $14 billion, 4,500 megawatts (MW)-hydropower project on the Indus River in the country’s problematic region of Gilgit-Baltistan near disputed Kashmir.

Earlier, a State Bank of Pakistan study concluded that exports of marble to China, Pakistan’s foremost rough-hewn, freshly-excavated marble export market, and the re-export to Pakistan of Pakistani semi-processed marble was “hurting Pakistan’s marble industry to a significant extent.”

A report by the Pakistani Senate, that has repeatedly criticized CPEC’s lack of transparency and Chinese commercial policies, concluded that China would for the next four decades get 91 percent of the revenues generated by the port of Gwadar.

Greater military involvement in CPEC would weaken China’s critics and enhance Chinese confidence in Pakistan’s ability to tackle security concerns. The Chinese embassy in Islamabad warned last week that militants were targeting the embassy and Chinese nationals.

“Beijing is keen to give the Pakistani Army the lead role in the CPEC projects as Pakistani ministries charged with carrying out the projects have incurred delays because of infighting. Concerns that the project bypasses Pakistan’s poorer regions and will mainly benefit the financially-strong province of Punjab has made politicians argue with regards to the benefits of CPEC… The Chinese are not used to such harsh disagreements,” the European Foundation for South Asian Studies (EFSAS) said in a commentary.

Turkey: Future Of Solar Energy – OpEd

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Total installed power in Turkey country is expected to b 82GWe by the end of 2017. We expected that the share of renewable energy plants in total production would increase over time, and that he share of imported and fossil fuels woud decrease, and the import and fossil fuel dependency would decrease. That, however, was not so.

It is estimated that the total installed capacity of solar power generating power plants will reach 2400 MWe by the end of 2017. Total licensed solar projects during the year was 52 MW.

This amount could be taken into operation as 13 MW, the remaining are on hold. Non-licensed projects are too many in numbers, whereas the licensed projects are very few. We have made the license procedures so hard that nobody wants licensed business. The investors prefer to form dozens or even hundreds of companies each with 1-MWe capacities and connect them.

Solar investment costs are now very low. In 2005, incentives were introduced by Law No. 5346. Guaranteed sale prices then were at 5.00-5.50 EuroCent per KWhour in 2005, while it is at $Cent 13.30 per KWhour in 2010. Solar maps were released.

Transmission capacities were determined. In 2014-2015, 6 different tenders were released and 600 MW new solar capacity was created. In 2017, a new solar capacity of 1000 MWe was created through the competitive renewables tender.

Solar cells and panel prices have been excessive cheaper. in time. By the end of 2017, 24-25 $ Cent per Wp prices were received. Import incentives given by the Ministry of Economy to solar panel imports in 2012 were deleted in 2016. In 2016, domestic production could be replied in the amount demanded by the internal market. With Anti -dumping and additional VAT application, foreign panel import prices have reached to 60 $ Cent per Wp level. Then domestic producers have increased their prices to 50 $ Cent per Wp to take advantage of the market prices.

In 2014-2015, transmission authority opened 6 tenders and allocated Solar projects to 49 companies with a total capacity of 600MW. Companies have committed to pay TL 1.23 billion of contribution to the allocation. The two companies have completed their operations and have been operating the solar investments at a capacity of 13 MW. The other companies received the incentive certificates at a capacity of 120 MW, but due to cost increases, the remaining 480 MW capacity projects were locked and are on hold. Because the conditions before the tender were changed after the tender. Initially there were incentives, then incentives were unfairly removed.

In 2010, the new renewables law set the electricity purchase price for Solar investments as 13.30 $Cents per KWh for 10 years.

The winner of the 1000 MWe renewable Solar bid in 2017 reduced this price to 6.99 $Cent per KWh.

The winning group accepted local investment for 500 MWe per yr production capacity and 500 million US$ investment- budgeted production facility in the country.

On the other hand, in 2017 we observed similar tenders abroad.

In Saudi Arabia, the price is 1.79 $cents per KWh, in Germany 4.30 EuroCent, 2.10 $Cents in Chile and 1.77 $cents in Mexico. We are observing big discounts on Solar tenders. However, the Ministry of Economy tax collection efforts deter our investors.
On the other hand, we have gone so difficult as to license the work, that everyone is trying to invest under unlicensed 1-MW projects. In 2005, unit MW cost solar investment was 4,000 US Dollars, while in 2017 Solar investment cost per unit KW decreased to 700-800 US Dollars. In 2017, market observes only 13 MW licensed solar, whereas unlicensed solar at 2400 MW. Public regulatory authorities were a bit indifferent at the beginning, but when they enter the system, the investors regret their applications.

For example, they may ask to use 50% of the electricity produced in investors auto consumption. Continuous storage may be required. They may limit the possession of company shares.

Solar sector currently employs around 20-thousand workers. Currently, 26 different enterprises assemble with Solar PV panels. The majority of fabricators are undergoing simple construction, cabling, framing work, whereas 75-80% of total investment is still imported. The actual production renewable coverage will be made at the last 1000 MW renewable facilities. Others will finish their work in their hands and close their businesses. Then 20-thousand people could be unemployed.

On the other hand, in the recent solar facilities in operation, installed power loss is observed to be 20-25% within a few months.

At home scale roof-top solar installation should be well examined. House sizes are limited to 10kW capacity, that is not feasible. On top roof of existing structures, an additional load of 25 kg per square meter is to be added. The current roof structures are not enough to carry this additional load. The duration of use of summer houses are 3-4 months, and the roof Solar investment return is not enough for this period. Billing is difficult to deduct. There is a high risk of fire, so insurance coverage is difficult.

There are those who bring the fertile agricultural land to the barren land by saying that they will build a solar energy plant. Let them have God to show them the right way.

There are three different associations in the local solar market, GÜNDER, GENSED, GÜYAD. Why are there three separate associations? Why is not there one single association to cover all interest groups? This is another important question. We started with good intentions, but we have a lot of work to do.

Diplomacy And Papacy: How Do The Twain Meet? – Analysis

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This paper analyses the challenges that Pope Francis confronted during his trips to Myanmar from 27 to 30 November 2017 and Bangladesh from 30 November to 2 December 2017 in an effort to defuse the tensions created by the Rohingya crisis between Myanmar and Bangladesh, and to draw the attention of the world to this massive humanitarian crisis. He seemed unswayed by either praise or criticism, and he drew both. He was able to demonstrate that while, as Pope, he might not command any military divisions, as former Soviet Union dictator Joseph Stalin had disdainfully observed, but he had the courage to attempt at more than what many other leaders did.

By Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury*

Former Soviet Union dictator Joseph Stalin was said to have queried, with a modicum of unjustifiable derision, as to how many military divisions the Pope commanded. This was reportedly a quip addressed at the French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval on 13 May 1935. It happened when the Frenchman had suggested that the Pope would appreciate it if the harassment of Catholics in the Soviet Union was stopped.

Given Stalin’s own intensely amoral political predilections, he obviously had failed to take into account the Pope’s moral power, or so the received wisdom goes. Stalin’s assessment was that, whatever strength the Pope possessed would cower under the pressure of Soviet tanks. His remarks have drawn much ire since then, and have been much criticised. Eighty-three years down the line when the current Pope gave in to a junta of a much lesser military entity in Myanmar whose treatment of minorities is seen to be no different from that of the Soviets during Stalin’s time, by trying not to offend them by naming those being persecuted in the country, one could be forgiven for recalling the unfair utterances of the communist dictator – not to endorse, of course, but to understand!

The Irish poet and playwright, Oscar Wilde, had once observed, through a character in his play, The Importance of Being Earnest, that, if one isn’t a dentist, one should eschew talking or behaving like one, because it unnecessarily creates a false impression. No one would expect, of course, the Pope to gather wisdom through Wilde’s epigrams, however witty and famous. If he was acting like a diplomat without being one, it was perfectly understandable as, apart from being the Pontiff, he was also a head of state – one who might control a geographically tiny territory, but held sway spiritually over a billion people around the world.

Also, Pope Francis has earned for himself the distinction of being a champion of human rights around the world. This comes at a time when these values are taking a backseat in the foreign policies of more powerful countries such as the United States. However, it has to be said, to the credit of Washington that, on the issue that this article is focussed – the Rohingya crisis – American policymakers such as Secretary Rex Tillerson and Ambassador Nikki Haley have taken a remarkably strong position in defence of the persecuted, as has the Anglican Protestant stronghold, Oxford, in the United Kingdom (UK). In the past, Pope Francis has described the alleged Armenian massacre by the Turks during World War One, thus arousing Ankara’s wrath, just as he has regretted the Vatican’s silence over the 1994 Rwandan tragedy.2 While still in the Vatican, prior to his recent trip, the Pope had also denounced the “persecution of our Rohingya brothers”.3 Indeed, largely motivated by a desire to address the crisis, the Pope decided to undertake the trip to the region in late November and early December 2017.

As of August 2016, over 620,000 Rohingyas had fled alleged Myanmarese persecution from the Rakhine State of Myanmar to neighbouring Bangladesh. This was in addition to an earlier outflow of 300,000 of the Rohingya Muslim minority whom Myanmar would not accept as ‘nationals’ (nor would tolerate reference to them as ‘Rohingyas’), calling them ‘illegal Bengali migrants’ instead (despite their presence there for centuries).

Those who fled the Rakhine State carried horror stories of rape, loot and arson perpetration by the Myanmar army known as the Tatmidaw, in concert with extremist Buddhist monks. Since these numbers constituted over 95 per cent of the Rohingya population in Rakhine, the United Nations (UN) took a very grim view of the situation, describing it as ‘a textbook case of ethnic cleansing’ in a statement to the Human Rights Council in Geneva by the UN Human Rights High Commissioner Zeid Raad el-Hussain (who also called for an end by Myanmar to the “cruel military operation”).4

A global outcry of criticism followed, directed mainly against the Tatmidaw, but also vis-à-vis the Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, with some activists calling for her Nobel award to be rescinded. Indeed the City of Oxford in the UK stripped her of its ‘Freedom of the City Award’, its highest distinction (awarded in 1997), on grounds of her “inaction in the face of her oppression of the minority Rohingya population”.5

By the time Pope Francis headed to Myanmar and Bangladesh in late November 2017 for the much publicised trip with a view to defusing the crisis, expectations were running high. He was warmly received in Myanmar by the government and most enthusiastically by its 700,000 or so Catholics.

However, what was noteworthy in Myanmar was not what he had said, but what he had not uttered. Reportedly advised by Cardinal Bo of Myanmar, he refrained from using the term ‘Rohingya’ in any of his public remarks. While the Myanmarese authorities were pleased by this, human rights activists and, in particular, the Rohingyas were deeply disappointed. The champion of justice and the opponent of tyranny was seen as kowtowing to the authorities, not out of deference most certainly, but out of fear! The Pope later explained it as flowing from fear, but only for what he would have failed to achieve in terms of his mission had he gone public with using the word ‘Rohingya’ in Myanmar. The mention of the word, he stated, would cause doors in Yangon to be shut on him. That would have prevented him from raising the issue privately with those who rule the country. He said he had done that and expected some fruit. Many who know the Myanmar system could state that this was simply placing hope over experience. Still, he had been able to do what many heads of governments, near and far, had not, either for fear of affronting Yangon or simply according lower premium to nobler values. Also, he rendered a yeoman’s service to the cause of the persecuted humanity by ensuring global media attention on the issue while he was there. This in itself was no mean achievement.

As was predictable, the Pope ultimately used the term ‘Rohingya’ in an emotional meeting with the escapees while in Bangladesh. “The presence of God is also called Rohingya”, he declared in an impassioned address.6 While the human rights activists cheered, there was the inevitable despondency and anger in circles in Myanmar. While the government was politely and, perhaps, wisely unresponsive in Naypidaw, the social media was trenchant in its fury. One blogger angrily posted in the ‘Facebook’, “He should say the same things (everywhere) if he loves the truth”.7

“What’s in a name?” Shakespeare’s Juliet had beseeched her beloved Romeo, arguing that his name of ‘Montague’ (a family inimical to her own, the ‘Capulets’) should make no difference to their shared sentiments. The answer to that would be plenty if one were to judge by the predicament Pope Francis confronted at the present time. However, contrary to the view proffered by some that the Pope rushed in where angels fear to tread, the head of the Catholic Church actually displayed courage by the very fact of choosing to expose himself to criticism rather than avoid a responsibility he felt he should discharge. In doing so, he has done more than other world leaders who have many military divisions under their command.

About the author:
*Dr Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury
is Principal Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore (NUS). He is a former Foreign Advisor (Foreign Minister) of Bangladesh. He can be contacted at isasiac@nus.edu.sg. The author bears full responsibility for the facts cited and opinions expressed in this paper.

Source:
This article was published by ISAS as ISAS Briefs No 532 (PDF).

Notes:
2. “In Myanmar, Pope Francis Calls for Peace Without Saying ‘Rohingya’”, Jason Horowitz,’ New York Times, 28 November, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/28/world/asia/pope-francis-myanmar-rohingya.html ?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fjason-horowitz&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream &module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=5&pgtype=collection. Accessed on 4 December 2017.
3. Ibid.
4. “UN human rights chief points to ‘textbook example of ethnic cleansing’ in Myanmar”, UN News Centre, 11 September 2017. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=57490#.Wia580qWa70. Accessed on 4 December 2017.
5. “Oxford Strips Suu Kyi of Freedom of City Award,” The Straits Times, 29 November 2017. http://www. straitstimes.com/world/europe/city-of-oxford-strips-aung-san-suu-kyi-of-human-rights-award-over-rohingya -treatment. Accessed on 4 December 2017.
6. “Pope Francis utters the word ‘Rohingya’ after criticism”, Faisal Mahmood, Al Jazeera, 2 December 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/pope-francis-utters-word-rohingya-criticism-171201130409417.ht ml. Accessed on 4 December 2017.
7. “Myanmar social media anger after Pope uses ‘Rohingya’ word”, Channel News Asia, 3 December 2017. http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/myanmar-social-media-anger-after-pope-uses–rohingya- -word–9464680. Accessed on 5 December 2017.

India: Struggle for Survival In Gadchiroli, Maharashtra – Analysis

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By Deepak Kumar Nayak*

On December 6, 2017, seven cadres of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) were killed in an encounter with the Security Forces (SFs) near Kalled village, 15 kilometres north of Zinganoor Police Station in the Sironcha tehsil (revenue unit) of Gadchiroli District.

Bodies of the seven uniformed Maoists, along with two Self-Loading Rifle (SLR) rifles, two .303 rifles, two 12 bore guns and one country-made pistol, were recovered from the encounter spot. The deceased CPI-Maoist cadres were identified as Aheri area ‘dalam (armed squad) commander’ Ashok Pendam aka Aaytu, (34), resident of Lingampalli in Gadchiroli, who carried a head money of INR 800,000; Sironcha ‘area assistant commander’; Sunita Kodape and ‘assistant commander’ Chandu from the Aheri area, both of whom carried rewards of INR 600,000 each; Sarita Kavande from Bijapur, Chhattisgarh, Shaila Pokur from Bhamragarh area in Gadchiroli, and Akhila Kulmethe from Aheri, each with a reward of INR 200,000 on their heads. The identity of one remaining cadre is yet to be ascertained.

On November 26, 2017, a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) trooper, identified as Manjunath Shivaligappa, was killed and another two were injured during an encounter with CPI-Maoist cadres in Gadchiroli District.

On November 24, 2017, a Policeman, Suresh Gawde, was killed and a Policewoman, Sonal Khevale, was injured, when CPI-Maoist cadres triggered an improvised explosive device (IED) blast in a bustling market place in Gadchiroli District.

On the same day, CPI-Maoist cadres hacked to death a villager, Suresh Tofa, suspecting him to be a ‘Police informer’, in Sodegaon under the Dhanora Tehsil in Gadchiroli District.

On November 21, 2017, a former CPI-Maoist supporter Sunil Pawar was shot dead at a market place at Jhadapapda, which is located around eight kilometres from Pendhri in the Dhanora Tehsil of Gadchiroli District. Two others, Sadaram Thakur and Ravindra Kusram, sustained injuries as Maoists in civil attire opened fire at them.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least 23 fatalities (six civilians, three SF personnel and 14 Maoists) have so far been recorded in Gadchiroli, in Maoist-linked violence, since the beginning of 2017 (data till December 10). During the corresponding period of 2016, the same number of fatalities was recorded 23 (nine civilians, two SF personnel and 12 Maoists). Total fatalities through 2016 were 26 (12 civilians, two SF personnel and 12 Maoists).

Fatalities in Gadchiroli District: 2004*- 2017**

Year

Civilians
SFs
LWEs
Total

2004

0
0
0
0

2005

2
15
4
21

2006

13
3
34
50

2007

7
2
8
17

2008

2
5
7
14

2009

10
53
22
85

2010

21
15
3
39

2011

34
9
24
67

2012

18
14
5
37

2013

9
7
28
44

2014

9
11
10
30

2015

11
4
2
17

2016

12
2
12
26

2017

6
3
14
23

Total

154
143
173
470
Source: SATP, **Data till December 10, 2017
* Formation of CPI-Maoist on September 21, 2004.

INDIA
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Maharashtra: Gadchiroli: Struggle for Survival
Deepak Kumar Nayak
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

On December 6, 2017, seven cadres of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) were killed in an encounter with the Security Forces (SFs) near Kalled village, 15 kilometres north of Zinganoor Police Station in the Sironcha tehsil (revenue unit) of Gadchiroli District. Bodies of the seven uniformed Maoists, along with two Self-Loading Rifle (SLR) rifles, two .303 rifles, two 12 bore guns and one country-made pistol, were recovered from the encounter spot. The deceased CPI-Maoist cadres were identified as Aheri area ‘dalam (armed squad) commander’ Ashok Pendam aka Aaytu, (34), resident of Lingampalli in Gadchiroli, who carried a head money of INR 800,000; Sironcha ‘area assistant commander’; Sunita Kodape and ‘assistant commander’ Chandu from the Aheri area, both of whom carried rewards of INR 600,000 each; Sarita Kavande from Bijapur, Chhattisgarh, Shaila Pokur from Bhamragarh area in Gadchiroli, and Akhila Kulmethe from Aheri, each with a reward of INR 200,000 on their heads. The identity of one remaining cadre is yet to be ascertained.

On November 26, 2017, a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) trooper, identified as Manjunath Shivaligappa, was killed and another two were injured during an encounter with CPI-Maoist cadres in Gadchiroli District.

On November 24, 2017, a Policeman, Suresh Gawde, was killed and a Policewoman, Sonal Khevale, was injured, when CPI-Maoist cadres triggered an improvised explosive device (IED) blast in a bustling market place in Gadchiroli District. On the same day, CPI-Maoist cadres hacked to death a villager, Suresh Tofa, suspecting him to be a ‘Police informer’, in Sodegaon under the Dhanora Tehsil in Gadchiroli District.

On November 21, 2017, a former CPI-Maoist supporter Sunil Pawar was shot dead at a market place at Jhadapapda, which is located around eight kilometres from Pendhri in the Dhanora Tehsil of Gadchiroli District. Two others, Sadaram Thakur and Ravindra Kusram, sustained injuries as Maoists in civil attire opened fire at them.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least 23 fatalities (six civilians, three SF personnel and 14 Maoists) have so far been recorded in Gadchiroli, in Maoist-linked violence, since the beginning of 2017 (data till December 10). During the corresponding period of 2016, the same number of fatalities was recorded 23 (nine civilians, two SF personnel and 12 Maoists). Total fatalities through 2016 were 26 (12 civilians, two SF personnel and 12 Maoists).
Fatalities in Gadchiroli District: 2004*- 2017**

Year

Civilians

SFs

LWEs

Total

2004

0

0

0

0

2005

2

15

4

21

2006

13

3

34

50

2007

7

2

8

17

2008

2

5

7

14

2009

10

53

22

85

2010

21

15

3

39

2011

34

9

24

67

2012

18

14

5

37

2013

9

7

28

44

2014

9

11

10

30

2015

11

4

2

17

2016

12

2

12

26

2017

6

3

14

23

Total

154

143

173

470
Source: SATP, **Data till December 10, 2017
* Formation of CPI-Maoist on September 21, 2004.

With the success achieved in the December 6, 2017, incident, SFs have further consolidated the position they had begun to secure on the ground during 2016. The kill ratio was in favour of the Maoists in 2014 and 2015, at 1.1:1 and 2:1, respectively. Strongly reversing the trend, SFs secured a ratio of 1:6 in 2016. The kill ratio stands in favour of SFs in the current year at 1:4.66.

Moreover, according to SATP data, at least 10 Maoists were arrested in Gadchiroli in 2017 (data till December 10). During the corresponding period in 2016, only one Maoist had been arrested, and no further arrest was made in the remaining period of 2016. Most recently, on June 17, 2017, SFs arrested Pawan aka Soma Phoda Weladi (35), a member of the Maoists’ Gariabandh ‘divisional committee’, carrying a reward of INR 1.6 million, in Gadchiroli District. A press release by the Superintendent of Police (SP), Gadchiroli, disclosed that Pawan had been involved in several acts of violence in Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh and Odisha over the past 20 years and also worked as a bodyguard for senior Naxal [Left-Wing Extremist (LWE)] leaders.

Mounting SFs pressure has led to the surrender of eight Maoists in 2017 (data till December 10) in addition to 34 such surrenders reported in the corresponding period of 2016 (no further surrender was reported in the remaining period of 2016). Significantly, on December 7, 2017, two Maoists, identified as Kamla Gavle and Nagesh Madavi, each of them carrying a reward of INR 200,000, surrendered before the Gadchiroli Police. In the interim, terming the Aatmasamarpan (surrender) scheme a successful weapon against the Naxalites, the Maharashtra Government extended the scheme for another two years, till August 28, 2019. The Naxal surrender scheme was introduced in August 29, 2005, with the aim of rehabilitating and absorbing the ultras into the mainstream of society. According to a report dated October 6, 2015, the State Government disclosed that, during the 10 years for which the program had been in place, at least 502 Maoists had given up arms and had been rehabilitated. Of those 502, at least 482 were from the Gadchiroli District alone.

In combination, these factors have impacted positively on the civilian security scenario in the District. The number of civilian fatalities, which stands at six in the current year, is the lowest recorded during the corresponding period of each of the previous years, since 2008, when there were two fatalities in this category (there were no more fatalities during the remaining period of 2008). Moreover, fatalities in this category after registering a minimal increase in 2014 and 2015, from nine to 11, declined considerably in the current year.

Located in the north-eastern part of Maharashtra, Gadchiroli is the epicenter of Maoist violence in the State. The District serves as a transit between Telangana [it shares borders with two Districts: Adilabad and Karimnagar] and Chhattisgarh [it shares borders with four District: Bijapur, Kanker, Narayanpur and Rajnandgaon], in regions that are strategically crucial for the Maoists. Gadchiroli has a 78.40 per cent forest cover, i.e. 11,694 square kilometres, out of a total area of 14,412 square kilometres, making the task of locating and sanitizing Maoists hideouts quite difficult. Inevitably, Gadchiroli is among the 35 worst Naxal-affected Districts identified by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) in 2010 across the country. The same information has been shared by the Government thereafter on several occasions. Most recently, on July 18, 2017, the Government informed the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Indian Parliament) that there are 35 most affected Districts across seven states (Gadchiroli included).

Gadchiroli also remains an extremely backward District. According to the “District Development and Diversity Index Report for India and Major States,” a joint survey conducted by the US-India Policy Institute (USIPI) and the Centre for Research and Debates in Development Policy (CRDDP), among the 599 Districts across India covered by the survey, Gadchiroli ranked 429th towards the bottom. The report of the survey, which took composite development — measured in terms of economic development and the indices of health, education and material well-being – into consideration, was released on January 29, 2015.

According to Maharashtra Economic Survey 2016-17, Gadchiroli with INR 6,710 per capita Gross Value Added (GVA, at constant prices), had the lowest per capita district GVA in the State, as against Mumbai, with the highest at INR 296,208, and a State average of INR 43,347.

Meanwhile, according to a May 20, 2017, report, Waman Mandavi (19), a member of the Chetna Natya Mandali (CNM), the CPI-Maoist ‘cultural wing’, who was arrested from neighboring Gondia District (Maharashtra) in the last week of April 2017, revealed that the old North Gadchiroli-Gondia-Balaghat-Rajnandgaon (NGGBR) zone/division had been converted into the Gadchiroli-Rajnandgaon-Balaghat (GRB) zone/division. This is an effort to widen Maoist presence in the whole of Gadchiroli, and not just its Northern part, as in the past, and is expected to provide an opportunity to ‘utilize’ the facilities available in strong Maoist ‘base areas’ of the bordering Districts of Chhattisgarh, such as Kanker, Narayanpur and Bijapur, falling under the Bastar Division of Chhattisgarh, the epicenter of Maoist violence. The Maoists have started surveying and recruiting in the GRB zone/division. The GRB zone/division is currently headed by Darbha ‘divisional commander’ Surendra aka Madkami Soma, who has been promoted to a rank equivalent to a ‘Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee Member (DSZC). Soma is supported by Dama aka Rajesh (50) from Marum in Gadchiroli; and Santosh.

The Maharashtra Government has taken several measures to deal with the problem of backwardness prevalent in the region. Most recently, according to a December 4, 2017, report, the State Government has tied up with the United Nations (UN) to launch the Human Development Mission (HDM) in Gadchiroli District.

In a media interview on December 20, 2016, Abhinav Deshmukh, Superintendent of Police (SP), Gadchiroli, had asserted that the District could be Naxal free in five years if other departments worked as necessary: “We have controlled Naxalism considerably. It’s time for other departments to put in their efforts to fill the development backlog. Then only we can curb Naxalism.”

On the Security Front, according to an April 19, 2017, report, for better surveillance of Maoist activities, Gadchiroli District will have Closed-Circuit Television (CCTVs) in around 25 villages. These cameras would make the images of these remote places — from Kamlapur in the Aheri division to Hedri in Etapalli division — available at the local Police Station as well as at the District Police control room at Gadchiroli, more than 100 kilometers away. In the first phase, south Gadchiroli is being covered, with distant villages like Challewada, Kodselgudam, Tarigudam and some others already connected.

Further, according to a September 6, 2017, report, to boost anti-Naxal operations, the Maharashtra Government has decided to buy a new helicopter which will be used for operations in Gadchiroli and Chandrapur Districts, as well as an air ambulance. Around 12,000 Police personnel are deployed in Gadchiroli, including Commando-60 (C-60, the special anti-Maoist Force of the Maharashtra Police) units, CRPF and the Sate Reserve Police Force (SRPF).

SF successes in Gadchiroli have been dramatic, but greater efforts are required to further reinforce the gains. Any lowering of the guard would augment spaces for the Maoists to recover lost ground.

*Deepak Kumar Nayak
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

Marine Turtles Dying After Becoming Entangled In Plastic Rubbish

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Hundreds of marine turtles die every year after becoming entangled in rubbish in the oceans and on beaches, including plastic ‘six pack’ holders and disgarded fishing gear.

The rise in plastic refuse in the ocean and on beaches is killing turtles of all species, with a disproportionate impact on hatchlings and young turtles, research by the University of Exeter shows.

A world-wide survey covering the major oceans where turtles live found that found that 91 per cent of the entangled turtles were found dead. They also suffered serious wounds from entanglement, leading to maiming, amputation or choking. Others that survived were forced to drag disgarded rubbish or debris with them.

The survey found turtles are being tangled up in lost fishing nets, plastic twine and nylon fishing line, as well as six pack rings from canned drinks, plastic packaging straps, plastic balloon string, kite string, plastic packaging and discarded anchor line and seismic cable. Turtles were also discovered entangled in discarded plastic chairs, wooden crates, weather balloons and boat mooring line.

The research, published in Endangered Species Research, sheds light on the true threat of plastic pollution to marine turtles, which, other research has shown, also eat plastic rubbish, and marine creatures caught up in it.

Professor Brendan Godley. Professor of Conservation Science and Director of the Centre for Ecology & Conservation at the University of Exeter’s Penryn campus and the lead author warned that as plastic pollution increases more and more turtles are likely to become entangled.

Mortality from entanglement has increased substantially over the last century, as with marine mammals and birds.

84 per cent of the 106 experts surveyed on the Atlantic, Pacific Caribbean, Mediterranean and Indian ocean coast, who responded said they had found turtles tangled in rubbish, including plastic debris and lost or disgarded fishing gear.

The report concluded that, based on the survey results, that more than 1000 turtles are likely to die due to entanglement. But the figure is likely to be a ‘gross underestimation’ of the scale of the threat to turtles. Not all dead turtles strand on beaches, especially young animals, and some decay at sea. Some of the experts surveyed said that not all stranded turtles are found and that some are removed by local people to eat.

Hatchlings and young sea turtles are particularly susceptible to getting tangled up in lost or disgarded fishing gear or floating debris. Juvenile turtles ride on ocean currents to zones where floating rubbish and debris is concentrated creating an ‘ecological trap’. They also ‘set up home’ near floating debris and can remain there for years.

Professor Godley, the lead author, said the mortality rate from becoming tangled up in human refuse was, in practice, likely to be far higher than 1,000 turtles a year estimated by the limited survey.

“Plastic rubbish in the oceans, including lost or disgarded fishing gear which is not biodegradable, is a major threat to marine turtles. We found, based on beach strandings, that more than 1000 turtles are dying a year after becoming tangled up, but this is almost certainly a gross underestimate. Young turtles and hatchings are particularly vulnerable to entanglement,” he said.

“Experts we surveyed found that entanglement in plastic and other pollution could pose a long term impact on the survival of some turtle populations and is a greater threat to them than oil spills. We need to cut the level of plastic waste and purse biodegradable alternatives if we are to tackle this grave threat to turtles’ welfare.”

The Exeter University research team, which included two research students Emily Duncan and Zara Botterell who work in conjunction with Plymouth Marine Laboratory, surveyed experts who rescue and rehabilitate stranded turtles in 43 countries, to find out if they had discovered turtles which had been tangled up. They also found 23 reports of entangled turtles in peer-reviewed publications, magazines, newspapers and reports.

All species of turtle were found entangled, but Olive Ridley turtles are the most likely species to get tangled up. The species nests in the hundreds of thousands. It forages in areas where marine debris can aggregate. It may also be attracted to feeding on marine rubbish, including disgarded fishing tackle.

Most entanglements recorded were in lost or discarded fishing gear known as ‘ghost fishing’ rope, nets and lines. Since the 1950s the fishing industry has replaced natural fibres such as cotton, jute and hemp with synthetic plastic materials such as nylon, polyethylene and polypropylene which doesn’t biodegrade in water.

The report concludes: “Entanglement with anthropogenic plastic materials, such as discarded fishing gear, as well as land based sources, is an under reported and under researched threat to marine turtles.”

But it points out some communities are actively working to rescue turtles that get tangled up. Fishermen in Sicily volunteer to take part in the rescue of turtles in difficulty at sea and on beaches, and are trained to transfer them to rescue centres.

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