In Pakistan, there are three distinct categories of militants: the Afghanistan-focused Pashtun militants; the Kashmir-focused Punjabi militants; and foreign terrorists including the Arab militants of al-Qaeda, the Uzbek insurgents of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Uighur rebels of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). The foreign, transnational terrorists number only in a few hundreds and are hence inconsequential.

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which is mainly comprised of Pashtun militants, carries out bombings against Pakistan’s state apparatus. The ethnic factor is critical here. Although TTP likes to couch its rhetoric in religious terms, but it is the difference of ethnicity and language that enables it to recruit Pashtun tribesmen who are willing to carry out subversive activities against the Punjabi-dominated state apparatus, while the Kashmir-focused Punjabi militants have by and large remained loyal to their patrons in the security agencies of Pakistan.

Although Pakistan’s security establishment has been willing to conduct military operations against the TTP militants which are deemed a security threat to Pakistan’s state apparatus, but as far as the Kashmir-centered Punjabi militants, including Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Afghanistan-focused Quetta Shura Taliban, including the Haqqani network, are concerned, they are still enjoying impunity because such militant groups are regarded as ‘strategic assets’ by the security establishment.

For the half of its 70-year-long history, Pakistan was directly ruled by the army, and for the remaining half, the security establishment kept dictating Pakistan’s foreign and security policy from behind the scenes. The outcome of Ayub Khan’s first decade-long martial law from 1958 to 1969 was that Bengalis were marginalized and alienated to an extent that it led to the separation of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971; during General Zia’s second decade-long martial law from 1977 to 1988, Pakistan’s military trained and armed its own worst nemesis, the Afghan and Kashmiri jihadists; and during General Musharraf’s third martial law from 1999 to 2008, Pakistan’s security establishment made a volte-face under Washington’s pressure and declared a war against the Pashtun militants that ignited the fire of insurgency in the tribal areas of Pakistan.

Although most political commentators in Pakistan nowadays hold an Islamist general, Zia-ul-Haq, responsible for the jihadist militancy in the tribal areas; however, it would be erroneous to assume that nurturing militancy in Pakistan was the doing of an individual scapegoat named Zia; all the army chiefs after Zia’s assassination in 1988, including Aslam Beg, Asif Nawaz, Waheed Kakar, Jahangir Karamat and right up to General Musharraf, upheld the same military doctrine of using jihadist proxies to destabilize the hostile neighboring countries, Afghanistan, India and Iran, throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

A strategic rethink in the Pakistan Army’s top brass took place only after the 9/11 terror attack, when Richard Armitage, the US Deputy Secretary of State during the Bush administration, threatened General Musharraf in so many words: “We will send you back to the Stone Age unless you stop supporting the Taliban.” Thus, deliberate promotion of Islamic radicalism and militancy in the region was not the doing of an individual general; rather, it has been a well-thought-out military doctrine of a rogue institution. The military mindset, training and institutional logic dictates a militarist and aggressive approach to foreign affairs and security-related matters. Therefore, as a matter of principle, military must be kept miles away from the top decision-making organs of the state.

Regarding the Kashmir dispute, there can be no two views that the right of self-determination of Kashmiris must be respected in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions on the right of plebiscite for the Kashmiri people, and Pakistan should lend its moral, political and diplomatic support to the Kashmiri cause; but at the same time, the militarization of any dispute, including Kashmir, must be avoided due to colossal human suffering that violence anywhere in the world inevitably entails.

The insurgency in Kashmir erupted in the fateful year of 1984 of the Orwellian-fame when the Indian Armed Forces surreptitiously occupied the whole of Siachen glacier, including the un-demarcated Pakistani portion. Now, we must keep the context in mind: those were the heydays of the Cold War and the Pakistan Army’s proxies, the Afghan so-called ‘mujahideen’ (freedom fighters), were winning battle after battle against the Soviet Red Army, and the morale of the Pakistan Army’s top brass was touching the sky.

Moreover, Pakistan’s security establishment also wanted to inflict damage to the Indian Armed Forces to exact revenge for the dismemberment of Pakistan at the hands of India during the Bangladesh War of 1971, when India took 90,000 Pakistani soldiers as prisoners of war. All the military’s top brass had to do was to divert a fraction of their Afghan jihadist proxies towards Kashmir to ignite the fire of insurgency in Kashmir. Pakistan’s security agencies began sending jihadists experienced in the Afghan guerilla warfare across the border to the Indian-administered Kashmir in the late 1980s; and by the early 1990s, the Islamist insurgency engulfed the whole of Kashmir region.

Here, we must keep in mind, however, that an insurgency cannot succeed anywhere unless militants get some level of support from local population. For example: if a hostile force tries to foment an insurgency in Punjab, it wouldn’t succeed; because Punjabis don’t have any grievances against Pakistan. On the other hand, if an adversary tries to incite an insurgency in the marginalized province of Balochistan and tribal areas, it will easily succeed, because the local Baloch and Pashtun populations have grievances against the heavy-handedness of Pakistan’s security establishment.

Therefore, to put the blame squarely on the Pakistani side for the Kashmir conflict would be unfair. Firstly, India treacherously incorporated the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir into the Dominion of India in 1947, knowing fully well that Kashmir has an overwhelming Muslim majority, and in accordance with the ‘Partition Principle’ agreed upon between the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress on the eve of the independence of India and Pakistan, Kashmir should have been included in Pakistan. Even now, if someone tries to incite an insurgency in the Pakistan-administered Kashmir, it wouldn’t succeed, because the Kashmiri Muslims identify themselves with Pakistan. The Indian-administered Kashmir has seen many waves for independence since 1947, but not a single voice has been raised for independence in the Pakistan-administered Kashmir in Pakistan’s 70-year-long history.

Secondly, India re-ignited the conflict by occupying the strategically-placed Siachen glacier in 1984. Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir has been quite flexible and it has floated numerous proposals to resolve the dispute. But India is now the new strategic partner of the US against China, that’s why India’s stance on the Kashmir dispute has been quite inflexible, because it is negotiating from a position of strength. However, diplomacy aside, the real victims of this intransigence and hubris on both sides have been the Kashmiri people and a lot of innocent blood has been spilled for no good reason.

By Jorge Valero

(EurActiv) — Antoni Comín is one of the four councillors of the sacked Catalan government who fled to Brussels with Carles Puigdemont following the unilateral declaration of independence on 27 October.

He spoke to EURACTIV hours after the judicial case in Belgium closed on Thursday (14 December), following Spain’s withdrawal of the European Arrest Warrant and one week before the Catalan elections scheduled for 21 December.

Antoni Comín was responsible for health in the ‘govern’. He is a member of ERC, a left party included in the governing coalition with PDeCat. He is a political philosopher and was a professor at ESADE business school.

Antoni Comín spoke with EURACTIV’s Jorge Valero.

The extradition case is over. Have you ever considered going back to Spain?

I believe that my political and personal obligation is to avoid a decision that is clearly unacceptable under the Rule of Law. We will return to Spain when there are guarantees that we will not be imprisoned. It is wrong to criminally prosecute a government for its decisions as a government. That is why we claim Spain is not an acceptable democracy. Another thing is whether the electoral programme collides with the constitution or not. The Constitutional Court exists to settle this question.

The Constitutional Court had already declared the procés [bid for independence] illegal, and that led to the prosecution…

The mental framework of the Spanish state today is outside the normal mental framework in a democracy. Many resolutions of the Constitutional Court have been obeyed, some not. But once the Constitutional Court has ruled the illegality of any of our actions, this doesn’t authorise the Spanish government to activate the general prosecutor’s office and prosecute us as if we were criminals. What you do is sit down and talk. All mature democracies have negotiated a referendum: United Kingdom, Canada …

Regarding the Canadian case, its Constitutional Court said that the negotiations for secession could start if a clear majority exists. The pro-independence parties in 2015 got 48% of the votes. Does this support represent a clear majority to launch the process?

What the Canadian court did is to legitimise its referendum, which is one step beyond where Spain is. In the Catalan parliament, there has been a majority of seats and votes in favour of the referendum since 2012.

In the 2015 elections, pro-independence parties campaigned for the unilateral break-up, and you did not reach a majority at the ballot box. Why did you start the process in spite of that result?

This question is very legitimate. A total of 48% of votes were in favour, 38% were against, and 12% was difficult to share between “yes” and “noes”. Two parties (‘Catalonia si que es Pot’ and Unió) explicitly rejected in the campaign being included in the “no” camp, because they denied the plebiscite character of the elections. Therefore, to provide additional legitimacy, given that the election itself was not enough, we decided to call a referendum, given that the results were not unequivocal. While it was not possible to agree on the referendum, we chose to hold it anyway to give a voice to the Catalan citizens.

The referendum was part of a unilateral roadmap, and most Catalans were against that unilateral route. You were advancing against their will.

It is not true. When we voted the referendum law in autumn, Catalonia si que es Pot stayed and abstained [most of the opposition parties left the plenary]. Democracy works like this. You cannot add the abstentions to the votes against. Democracies work by a simple majority.

Important decisions in a democracy are not taken by simple majority, for example constitutional amendments are taken by qualified majorities of two-thirds. Do you think that important decisions must be taken by a qualified majority?

I believe that it has to be done as in Scotland, where no qualified majority was requested. The majority that came out in the referendum was respected. In political philosophy, if you request a qualified majority for a change, you represent a conservative position, because you privilege the status quo.

In the referendum you organised, 43% of the registered voters supported independence. Does that represent a majority of Catalans?

If you consider the total registered voters, around 43% of the census is far superior to the results that approved the Spanish constitution in Catalonia. If you look at all the elections in Western countries and referendums, there is practically no government, nor any referendum victory, which has received the support of 43% of the census.

So you can proclaim a new republic even if a majority of people do not vote for it…

Those who didn’t vote didn’t express their position. You cannot interpret if they are against. Those who were against went to vote against.

Voters against refused to vote because it would have legitimised the vote [the vote has been declared illegal by the Constitutional court].

In political science, only the people who express in the ballot box are counted. Abstentions, blank votes and null votes are not votes against. It is a matter of political rationality.

In regards to the campaign, Carles Puigdemont was hailed during the demonstration in Brussels as president. Catalans shouted even louder when they saw your ERC colleagues. Do you think that Puigdemont’s Junts per Catalunya could surpass you and become the leading pro-independence party?

I will not speculate with results. In Catalonia, where we hold a national feeling, the president of the Govern represents the highest political figure of the nation. Our system appears to me closer to the presidential systems of France or the US, than to those of Italy or Germany. I am not surprised by the support that the president of the Generalitat has, whatever his name is. The scene of the other day does not reflect the electoral campaign.

Since your programme prioritises building the new republic, and given that Puigdemont started the process, should he conclude it as president?

It is essential to continue with the process in a negotiated manner with the Spanish state. But we will not remain paralysed if the Spanish state refuses to negotiate. What you have to do from here is to articulate all available instruments, because there won’t be many at our disposal.

What do you mean?

We want to have the legally constituted government of the Generalitat, according to the legislation. We want to govern in Catalonia. But we also want to maintain a political instrument that is what the Catalans refer to as the legitimate Govern, which should have never been dismissed. We believe that we must claim the restitution of this government. While there is police persecution, we will probably have to continue working from here.

Will there be two governments?

We can only be sacked by democracy. I will not accept being dismissed by an anti-democratic action. And while I can not return, there is no full democracy. The proof of whether there is democracy in Spain is whether I can return.

If the independence parties lose in terms of seats and popular vote, would the pro-independence bid be dead?

Obviously, it would bring a change of pace. But I do not think the procés would die considering that there is such a large part of Catalans in favour of independence. The Scottish independence movement has not ended either.

Will you go back to register as a deputy in the Parliament?

It is not necessary to go physically to complete the process.

Is it not required to complete the process personally, by signing?

You must hand in the acceptance of your seat. That could be done by a proxy. Deputies have never gone to the Parliament personally for this matter. It has always been a proxy.

So you are saying you will not return after the elections…

As long as the illegitimate jail threat remains we will not go back. We will not let totalitarianism impose its injustices. It seems an obligation to resist.

Will you stay in Belgium? Or would you go to another country closer to Spain?

Belgium is a country where we see that our rights as citizens are guaranteed.

In regard to the relocation of the European Medicines Agency, where Barcelona was a candidate. When you visited the EMA headquarters in London in Spring you said that the independence bid would move ahead regardless of the relocation of the EMA. Therefore, there would be a European agency in an independent Catalan republic …

… within the EU, because we want to remain within the EU, and negotiate the divorce with Spain. The two posibilites are compatible for us.

But Europe had already said very clearly that if you leave Spain you will exit the EU.

But this is because Spain demands it. This depends on the political will. There is nothing in the treaties that prevents us from being able to join the Union again.

But Spain will not accept it.

That is why we said that the procés was not incompatible with the EMA, it was the Spanish position. A negotiated separation with Spain would allow us to be independent, to continue in Europe and to have the EMA. In April the president again asked the Spanish government for an agreed referendum.

In spring there was no possibility of an agreed referendum, you were pushing for a unilateral break-up, and the EU had told you that you were going to be left out. Therefore you were heading to a scenario of, at least, legal uncertainty. Do you think your comment damaged the possibilities of bringing the EMA to Barcelona?

I was the first to publicly propose bringing the EMA to Barcelona. The central government spoke days after. From the beginning, I clearly stated that we were not going to renounce to the independence of Catalonia because of the EMA. We consider both were compatible. Barcelona was not the favourite anymore when the repression [as a response to the referendum] took place.

Speaking of repression, your colleague Marta Rovira said days after the proclamation of independence that the Catalan Government heard from sources that the central government would react with a deadly response if you implemented the declaration of independence. To date, you have not provided any evidence or indicated where the information came from. 

I was in meetings where well-informed people said that there was ample evidence that there was a risk of violent intervention by the state.

Do you not think evidence should have been provided, or your sources indicated, given the seriousness of the statement?

Marta Rovira explained that, faced with the risk of violence, which was based on indications, we decided to stop the implementation of the declaration of independence. Do we have proper evidence? We have indications, and many people in meetings where these indications were explained.

Who are these people who provided these indications? Were they from the Catalan government?

Yes, they were. They were people to whom we had an obligation to listen, who explained to us that they had reliable information, according to which the risk of violence was real.

Have you made any mistakes over the past months? Do you regret something when you see the consequences, including the flight of companies or the social fracture?

The fracture is a consequence of the unilateralism of the Spanish government since 2010, when the Popular Party decided to take the Estatut to the Constitutional Court.

And on your side?

There are two things that we should reconsider. We held a paternalistic attitude under which we avoided mentioning all the dangers of the procés. This paternalism is not good. There should be less paternalism and we should explain clearly the dangers and risks. It is neither good setting fixed deadlines so hastily, because you limit your room for manoeuvre. I do not believe that independence must be declared 48 hours after a referendum.

So the pro-independence discourse will get darker? 

I believe that the referendum and the declaration of independence have not been in vain. They are the basis of our future that must be pursued democratically and peacefully, no matter how harsh the repression of the Spanish state may be.

I meant being more clear about the consequences, including that there would not be international recognition of a unilateral break-up, that companies would leave because of the legal uncertainty…

These are your opinions.

I am describing what has happened so far since the declaration of independence took place.

But there is no rule of logic that says that what happened in the past will continue to happen in the future.

So do you believe that if you unilaterally declare independence again there would be international recognition?

I come from political sciences, and I have always said that international relations are governed by the pragmatic principle. We have appealed to the democratic principle, and the Spanish government to legality. The pragmatic principle means that you support the winning horse. If at a certain moment, countries confirm that the Catalan republic is an irreversible reality, they will recognise it. Not the first day, not the second day. But you will end up recognising it.

Even if it is reached unilaterally and against Spain, their partner and ally?

Yes, when they see that the Catalan state actually works as such. Therefore we understand that we must force Spain to reach a negotiation that allows us to resolve this in a democratic manner.

Are you going to look for another unilateral declaration of independence?

Independence would not be declared unilaterally again because it has been already declared. You do this only once. Now we must explore how we open a political scenario in which we can implement our declaration of independence or, if that is not possible, reach a solution similar to the Scottish one.

By Demelza Hays*

For the past month, Bitcoin has reached a new all time high every week. On December 11, Bitcoin reached it’s all time high of over $17,000 per coin. Bitcoin witnessed an impressive 1600% increase in value during the past year. The cryptocurrency market increased from $18 billion in January 2017 to over $475 billion in December.

Bitcoin is going through the process of monetization and the cryptocurrency market is being financialized. Cryptocurrency credit cards, automatic teller machines, exchanges, over-the-counter markets, bank accounts, insurance, derivatives, and trading algorithms are available. CBOE Bitcoin futures launched last Sunday, the CME is launching this Sunday, and NASDAQ is expected to join in early 2018. However, the prices are rising too far too fast. Every asset class has ups and downs. If cryptocurrencies are really a new asset class, they must come down at some point.

The Role of the Overall Economy

As discussed in this report, the prices in many asset classes are at their highest levels and the volatility of equities is on a record low. However, the fundamental problems that caused the 2008 crises have not been solved.

Ronald Stöferle has noted, “although financial markets seem to be all right at the moment, we consider the current situation to be an ‘uneasy calm.’” The financial system continues to be fragile, i.e. because of over-indebtedness, which is a result of the monetary policy interventions in recent years. The value of cryptocurrencies is highly dependent on the state of the global financial and monetary system.

Furthermore, the Bitcoin network relies on the Internet and on cryptographic encryption techniques that have only existed for a few decades. In addition to technological risks, Bitcoin has technological limits as well. The Bitcoin network has reached its full capacity. The network can process approximately 7 transactions per second or 350,000 per day. To ensure a transaction is confirmed quickly, the sender must pay a high transaction fee to miners. A transaction with a high fee is given priority on the network because miners form mining pools and compete against each other to earn transaction fees and freshly minted bitcoins. Due to the increasing demand to send Bitcoin transactions and the limited supply of space in each block, transaction costs increased from 0.40 Swiss francs (CHF) in early 2017 to over 8 CHF in December.

Transaction confirmation times also increased. Originally, transactions took 10 minutes to be confirmed on the network. Now transactions take several hours to be confirmed. Unsatisfied demand for a global payment system is overflowing into alternative cryptocurrencies like IOTA, Dash, and Ethereum. Bitcoin hard forks such as Classic, Gold, and the cancelled Segwit2X also garnered attention by investors captured by the Hayekian dream of privately competing currencies.

Variety Among Currencies

Over 1000 different cryptocurrencies exist; however, the majority of them likely have value solely because of Bitcoin’s hype and will not be around in five years from now. In a recent report for cryptoresearch.report, I presented a classification system of cryptocurrencies. Based on the technological limits of the cryptocurrency, the system has three main classes:

• Money: Medium of Exchange or Store of Value

Bitcoin, Litecoin, Dash, and Bitcoin Cash are part of the money class because these digital tokens compete with fiat currencies such as the U.S. dollar, euro, and renminbi. They offers fast, private, and “permissionless” payments.

• Infrastructure

Cryptocurrencies such as Ethereum, Lisk, and IOTA are infrastructure coins because they provide users with a platform for smart contracts in addition to sending payments. For example, marriage contracts, cosmetology licenses, and seal of approval certificates can be issued and publicly stored on the Ethereum network.

• General Purpose

Cryptocurrencies such as eSports.com’s Reward Token (ERT) and the Spectre.AI (SXS) fall under the general purpose category because they are not designed to send payments or host smart contracts. Instead, they represent digital shares in the company that investors can trade online. General purpose cryptocurrencies are challenging venture capital and traditional stock markets. Some of the latest cryptocurrencies even offer dividends and standard investor rights. Offering cryptographic units that represent shares in a company may disrupt venture capital and stock markets in 2018.

Carl Menger’s theory of subjective valuation explains why some individuals use infrastructure tokens as a medium of exchange or store of value and others use money tokens as a platform for transferring data or smart contracts. The taxonomy does not describe why different cryptocurrencies have value but rather the division of labor or specialization of different cryptocurrencies based on their technological features. For example, Bitcoin is a very simple protocol that does not allow functions such as creating and issuing new cryptographic tokens. Additional layers of protocols can be built on top of the Bitcoin protocol; however, Ethereum is a better platform for issuing new cryptographic tokens and hosting complex smart contracts because these contracts can be executed directly on the Ethereum blockchain. Similarly, Ethereum can be used as a store of value; however, the Ethereum protocol’s complexity makes it vulnerable to attacks. The 2016 Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) hack, and the 2017 multi-signature parity hack resulted in over $100 million dollars being lost. Therefore many investors consider Bitcoin to be a better store of value than Ethereum.

About the author:
*Demelza Hays is a doctorate student in the Department of Economics at the University of Liechtenstein in Europe. Prior to attending the University of Liechtenstein, Demelza completed her Master’s in Economics at the Toulouse School of Economics in Southern France. As a Summer Fellow at the Mises Institute, she investigated if cryptocurrency is compatible with fractional reserve banking.

Source:
This article was published at the MISES Institute

By Abdullah Hamidaddin*

(FPRI) — It is difficult to understand deceased ex-President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen’s calculations before he was killed by a Houthi sniper, and it even more difficult to predict accurately what is to come in Yemen after his death. We simply do not have enough credible information. Worse still, Saleh’s quick defeat by the Houthis—a social movement with a strong paramilitary core who prefer to refer to themselves as Ansar Allah (supporters of God)—shook most of the analytical frameworks that have been used to understand Yemen’s power configuration. The best we can do now is to try to re-frame our understanding of the key dynamics in Yemen in a way that enables us to make proper policy recommendations.

Since 2011-12, the overarching paradigm of Yemen’s politics can be summed up as a breakdown of an old order and the emergence of a new one. The conflicts up to now have been the result of the competition between emerging powers, the Houthis in the upper north of Yemen and the Southern Movement, an umbrella term for various groups in the south of Yemen, to assert their influence and to diminish the powers of the old order.

The Houthi movement was founded by Hussein al-Houthi (hence the name: Houthis) after the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001. Al-Houthi’s key message was that the U.S. was upscaling its regional hegemony in a way that would benefit Israel and undermine the people of the region and that Yemenis should be aware of that. In 2004, Saleh ordered his arrest. Al-Houthi resisted and turned the arrest attempt into a three months war after which al-Houthi was arrested and summarily executed. His younger brother (b.1979) took leadership of the movement and led it through five more wars with the Yemeni government between 2005-2010 with devastating consequences for upper north of Yemen and for the country at large. These wars claimed thousands of lives and displaced more than a hundred thousand civilians. Now, thirteen years after Saleh’s forces killed their founder, the Houthis killed him after Saleh decided to turn against the movement and reach out to the Saudi-led coalition.

The Order—and Eventual Breakdown of Yemeni Politics

In the decades preceding Yemen’s Arab Spring in 2011, the country’s political order was based on a Saudi-sponsored alliance between then-President Ali Saleh, Brig. General Ali Muhsin Al-Ahmar (Saleh’s key ally and military strong man), The Al-Ahmar Sheikhs (leaders of the key tribal federation of Hashid), and the Islah Party (an alliance between traditional tribal leaders and the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood). A key component in Yemen’s political order was the exclusion of the Hashemite clans of Yemen—numbered in the hundreds of thousands—and the Zaidis—one of the key religious groups in Yemen—from power (both Hashemites and Zaidis later became the key drivers of the Houthi movement). Since the late 1990s, a cold and proxy war was waged between the four constituents, and, in 2011, the political order in Yemen finally collapsed when President Ali Saleh, the Ahmar family of the Hashid tribal confederation, and General Ali Al-Ahmar raised arms against each other, and Saleh was almost killed in an assassination attempt. Since then, Yemen’s politics has been shaped by the quest for a new order. In 2011, President Ali Saleh was pulled out of the equation, and his allies were marginalized significantly. The Saudis were also distanced due to the Al-Ahmar’s family and the Islah Party’s support of deposed Muslim Brotherhood President Mohammad Morsi, and both considered his ousting a crime facilitated by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). When the Houthis (read as: Hashemites/Zaidis) entered the game, so did the fears of a new regional actor—Iran—influencing Yemen’s politics emerged.

The Initial Conflict

Between 2011 and 2014, these various actors fought to determine the new order of Yemini politics. The Houthis had forced the Al-Ahmars, Ali Muhsin, and Al-Islah’s leaders to flee the country—pushing them out of the equation. Saleh and his allies moved towards the creation of an alliance with the Houthis to compensate for his weakness after he was deposed. The Iranians wanted to replace (and still do) the Saudis as the sponsor of the key power in Yemen, while the Saudis are looking for ways to reassert their position in Yemen. In 2014, the Houthis entered Sanaa, Yemen’s capital, after defeating all opposition, and they started to consolidate power. Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi was president of Yemen during this time; he is from the southern regions of Yemen and had served Saleh as vice president between 1994-2012 before becoming president himself after Saleh was deposed. He had no strong base to support his rule and had to rely on pitting the various powers against each other. As far as the Houthis were concerned, he was a relic of the old order, and was only useful to them as a facilitator of the transition from the old order to the new one. Of course, Hadi was not pleased.

The Houthis also started to make overtures with Iran, which had nominally backed them before, but now Iran was promising more financial and logistical backing, such as facilitating the Houthi media channel in Lebanon and providing expertise and advice. The Saudis warned the Houthis not to take this route, but the Houthis—who at the time were keen to improve relations with the Saudis—ignored it, hoping that such overtures with Iran would improve their bargaining position with the Saudis and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states. There were attempts to bring the conflicting parties to a Saudi-sponsored negotiation in Riyadh, but the Houthis resisted, perhaps thinking that this would lead only to the assertion of the power of Saudi’s allies and would make it harder for them to set their own terms in their relationship with the Saudis. In the end, Hadi—fed up with the way the Houthis were treating him—decided to resign; he fled to Aden, withdrew his resignation, and called for Saudi support. The inner tension between the old powers and the new, and the fear of a future competition between the Saudis and Iran in Yemen, resulted in the breakout of war.

War Erupts Throughout Yemen

Then, on March 26, 2015, a coalition of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Yemeni rivals of the Houthis, and Yemeni supporters of the Hadi government launched “Decisive Storm” or “Storm of Resolve” (The Storm). The coalition had two goals: one internal and the other regional. The main internal goals were to bring the Houthis to the negotiating table, to disarm the Houthis, to remove the Houthis from all government institutions, and allow internationally recognized President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi to return and govern without threat from all non-state actors in Yemen. Its main regional goals were to assert a new regional order that did not allow the existence of armed non-state actors and to balance and deter Iran from further intervention in the region.

Perceptions and Assumptions

When the “Storm” started, a number of assumptions circulated between analysts, experts, and policy makers.

First, the Houthis would inevitably surrender early in the conflict, or they would at least adopt a defensive strategy, retreating back to their enclaves in northern Yemen, where they have a popular base. This move would relieve Sanaa and other key regions in Yemen from pressure, thus allowing the return of President Hadi and the resumption of a political process. And once the coalition’s airstrikes began, the Houthis’ rivals would use the opportunity to rise against them and support the coalition’s effort to defeat the movement.

None of this happened. The Houthis did not retreat, and the upper North became a stronghold for the Houthis. Why?

The Houthis are an alliance formed between an ideologically committed core and a wide network of actors in the upper north of Yemen. While their leaders may be from Sa’adah (in northern Yemen near the Saudi border), they have now found safe haven and support across all cities and villages in that part of the country. Moreover, since the “Storm” started, there was no political goal convincing enough to mobilize residents to rise against the Houthis. The only available political goal was the return of legitimacy represented by President Hadi. But the communities in the Houthi-controlled areas were not going to war for an abstract and distant concept such as legitimacy.

We need to remember that one of Saleh’s key legacies was eroding the idea of statehood. Due to Saleh’s political machinations, the State came to be perceived as one key power actor amongst others, a “tribe” among other tribes. Thus, “legitimacy” was not a strong enough rallying cry to encourage Yemenis to put their lives at risk. To make matters more difficult, Hadi—a southerner—was not a person who would inspire northerners to fight. Finally, and most importantly, most of the communities in the Houthi-controlled areas did not consider the war theirs. They saw it as a power reconfiguration. These people preferred and decided to remain observers only intervening when it was in defense of their direct and immediate interests and lives.

Second, a number of assumptions were made about the power configuration in the northern regions of Yemen. The most important of which was that the Houthis were mere tools, used by ex-President Saleh to further his goal of returning to the political scene, and that should he turn against them, the Houthis would retreat or even be defeated. Saleh’s long presidency, his survival from many assassination attempts, his success in turning people against each other, and his continuous support from regional and international powers all made him a myth: that he was the man in control of all the strings and that all other parties and actors were mere puppets or temporary obstacles. The myth of Saleh became the prism through which Yemen’s power politics is analyzed and, of course, distorted. This myth generated strategic, tactical, and policy options which were not viable, and the failure of which had a direct consequence on the lives of those living in Yemen. This, of course, turned out to be wrong. The Houthis had long consolidated their power and the extent of their reach. Saleh had lost most of his military influence, mobilization capacity, and tribal base. Most of those who followed Saleh did so because he was president, not due to any personal loyalty towards him.

Wither the Peace

Saleh’s death will not likely influence the military situation in Yemen. His party, the General People’s Congress, has the largest popular base and exhorts much influence in Sanaa, but not any further.

His absence will, however, affect perceptions in ways that will have positive and negative effects on any future peace prospect.

One positive impact is that for the first time since the war began various parties will deal with the Houthis as the ultimate power in the areas they control. This development will be in contrast to previous dealings when Saleh was seen as the ultimate decision maker, or at least as an alternative. Now, all will have to face the longstanding, yet unseen, reality of Houthi power.

While this is a positive impact, there are many negative ones to consider as well. One negative impact is that this new realization may be a reason to continue the war by all sides. On the Saudi side, Saleh was considered a lesser of two evils, a leader with whom one can negotiate and one who is pragmatic enough to accept reasonable concessions; the Houthis, on the other hand, are considered Iranian proxies with whom no reasonable deal can be made, and who are too militant to accept concessions. On the Houthi side, they will now be emboldened to reject any peace offer that does not give them all, or most, of what they are demanding. A second negative impact is related to the new enemies that the Houthis have made. Before killing Saleh, they sought reassurances that the Yemeni supporters of the coalition would not be a threat to their future existence and political role. Now, the Houthis have to worry about their neighbors who were Saleh supporters—many of whom would be happy to avenge the ex-president if given a chance. This may make the Houthis less inclined to accept a ceasefire deal and surrender all heavy and medium weaponry. They would now demand enough assurances that they would be part of any future political process, and they would hold on to their guns in fear of future retaliation and revenge. The Houthis may decide that while the “Storm” can continue indefinitely, the blockade on Yemen cannot, and thus they may decide to hold on until the blockade eases and smuggling money and arms becomes easier.

A serious peace broker would not worry about those and other challenges. All wars generate reasons to continue, and the role of a peace broker is to stand against those reasons. The situation in the aftermath of Saleh’s death is no different. What should be of concern is how the peace is conceptualized. Is it a peace between two warring parties belonging to different political orders? Or is it a peace that creates a total break from the old order and sets Yemen on a path to a new order?

About the author:
*Abdullah Hamidaddin is a researcher on Middle Eastern societies, politics, and religion with a special focus on Saudi Arabia and Yemen. He is also the General Manager at Dorbah Center for Societal Transformation and a senior associate at al-Mesbar Studies and Research Centre.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI.

Catholics in northern Vietnam have been ordered by local officials to dismantle a “nativity” scene in their parish made up of objects representing the birth of Jesus.

Dong Kieu Church, at the center of the row, is located in Dien My Commune of Nghe An Province.

A local witness said police and military personnel had been deployed around the church.

Many Catholics, including from neighboring parishes, had gathered to protect the nativity being erecting on land they say is part of the broader church compound.

“We strongly oppose their illegal and unreasonable demand,” one man said.

Police and local government authorities on Dec. 13 ordered local Catholics to stop building the nativity scene.

They accused them of erecting it on land that is the subject of an ownership dispute.

However, Church sources maintain that the land was donated to the parish.

They complained that on the evening of Dec. 13, a group of “gangsters” destroyed colorful electric lights and other decorative Christmas items on the road leading to the church.

On December 14, priests led by Father Dominic Pham Xuan Ke, head of Dong Thap Deanery, participated in a special Mass.

“Why do authorities here ban erecting nativities?” Father Ke asked.

The priest accused local authorities of backing the gangsters to harass local Catholics.

Communist supporters known as the “Red Flag Group” have allegedly threatened violence over erection of the nativity scene.

However, Father Ke said police and authorities had failed to take action against them.

The number of Americans living in poverty and the already high income inequality could worsen further in the days to come, making the United States the most unequal society in the world, the United Nations expert on extreme poverty and human rights warned Friday.

“The American Dream is rapidly becoming the American Illusion, as the US now has the lowest rate of social mobility of any of the rich countries,” said the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Philip Alston, Friday, at the end of a fact finding mission to the country.

“Instead of realizing its founders’ admirable commitments, today’s United States has proved itself to be exceptional in far more problematic ways that are shockingly at odds with its immense wealth and its founding commitment to human rights,” he added.

In his statement, the Mr. Alston also stated that the assumption that poor came from ethnic minority groups is not correct and in fact there are eight million more white people than African-Americans living in poverty.

“The face of poverty in America is not only black or Hispanic, but also white, Asian and many other colours,” he said.

He went on to add that he was “struck” by the extent to which construed narratives about supposed distinctive differences between the rich and poor have been “sold” to the electorate by some politicians and the media.

Such misconceptions included notions that “the rich are industrious, entrepreneurial, patriotic and the drivers of economic success [while] the poor are wasters, losers and scammers,” he explained.

“Despite the fact that this is contradicted by the facts, some of the politicians and political appointees with whom I spoke were completely sold on the narrative of such scammers sitting on comfortable sofas, watching colour TVs, while surfing on their smartphones, all paid for by welfare.”

“I wonder how many of these politicians have ever visited poor areas, let alone spoken to those who dwell there,” he noted.

Further in the statement, the Special Rapporteur also expressed the fear that proposed changes in US tax and welfare policies could have “devastating consequences” for the poorest in the country and make it the “most unequal society in the world.”

“The dramatic cuts in welfare, foreshadowed by President [Donald] Trump and [House of Representatives] Speaker [Paul] Ryan, and already beginning to be implemented by the administration, will essentially shred crucial dimensions of a safety net that is already full of holes.”

“Several administration officials told me that as far as welfare reform is concerned, states are, in Justice Louis D. Brandeis’ famous phrase, ‘laboratories of innovation.’ Recent proposals to drug-test welfare recipients in Wisconsin and West Virginia, along with Mississippi’s recent purge of its welfare rolls, raise concerns that the administration would happily look the other way while states conducted what were in essence unethical experiments on the poor.”

Mr. Alston’s final report on his US visit will be available in Spring 2018 and will be presented to the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva in June 2018. The statement he delivered in Washington DC today can be found here.

During his two-week mission, at the invitation of the federal government, the UN expert visited California, Alabama, Georgia, West Virginia and Washington, D.C., as well as Puerto Rico.

UN Special Rapporteurs and independent experts are appointed by the Human Rights Council to examine and report back on a specific human rights theme or a country situation. The positions are honorary and the experts are not UN staff, nor are they paid for their work.

By Mohammad Sami Saihoun

Officials in Badakhshan warn that the province’s jail is so dilapidated that the building is in imminent danger of collapse, putting the lives of its more than 400 inmates at risk.

Plans have been underway for a new prison for the last six years, but repeated delays mean that building work is yet to be completed.

One prison warden, Sidiqullah Omari, said that he believed the current adobe prison was nearly 100 years old, with its mud walls becoming increasingly fragile.

“We are worried that if snowfall increases this year, or there’s any other severe weather event, all the prisoners – more than 400 – are in danger of losing their lives,” he said.

His colleague Sidiqullah Omari agreed, adding, “The rooms in Badakhshan prison are completely worn out, damp and not fit to live in. If rainfall increases this year, many of these rooms will collapse over the prisoners’ heads.”

As well as the danger of the building itself collapsing, prisoners say they have to live with deteriorating conditions day-to-day.

Overcrowding is a particular problem, said Abdul Maroof, who is serving a sentence for drug trafficking.

“This prison has 20 rooms, some large and some small,” he explained. “Thirty to 40 people live in each large room and 18 to 22 people live in the small rooms.”

Another prisoner, Shahpoor, said that there were only five single beds in each of these small rooms. This level of overcrowding meant that illness was rife, especially in the cold winter weather.

“If someone is suffering from a contagious disease, it will spread to all the prisoners because there is no way to prevent it,” he continued.

Nazifa Zaki, a Kabul lawmaker in the Wolesi Jirga, or lower house of parliament, recently visited Badakhshan as the head of a delegation from the parliamentary defence committee. She said that the conditions she had found were concerning.

“The prisoners are in a bad state, they live in a ruined building unfit for human habitation,” she said. “It’s true that if someone has committed a crime and has been found guilty by the courts he must be punished, but from a human rights viewpoint the prison of Badakhshan is not a suitable place for detainees to live.”

Zaki urged Badakhshan officials to take action to improve the prisoners’ situation, noting that conditions were even worse for female inmates.

Some of those in the women’s section of the prison – where inmates are allowed to keep their young children with them – told IWPR that they lacked basic facilities such as fuel for heating and warm water for washing.

A female prisoner who asked to remain anonymous said, “In this cold weather I bathe my children with cold water. It’s alright for [grown-ups] but we are worried about our children’s lives.”

Visitors to the prison also said that their relatives were facing harsh conditions.

Ahmad Fawad, a resident of Shahada district, said, “My brother’s wife is imprisoned there, and due to the lack of facilities we brought her some clothes and blankets from home so as to save her from the danger of the cold.”

BUILDING WORK STALLED

In March 2011, a contract to build a new prison was signed with Sharkat Bradaran Kofi, a construction company belonging to member of parliament Maryam Kofi. Technical problems apparently delayed the start of building work and construction on the 20 acre site did not begin until March 2013, according to Afghanistan’s General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Centres (GDPDC).

Officials in Badakhshan’s department of finance said that in 2014 the cost of a new building was estimated to be 2.8 million dollars. Due to the lack of progress, funds had been transferred from one year’s budget to the next.

According to Badakhshan’s development budget, in 2015 1,233,566 dollars were allocated for the building of the new prison. A further 384,420 dollars were transferred in 2016 and the current year’s budget includes 771,689 dollars for the construction of new prisons’ building.

“There is no separate budget for building a prison each year,” explained Atau llah Siddiqui, head of development in the provincial finance department. “It’s just the same budget from the previous year transferred to the next year, due to the work’s lack of completion.”

Omar, the prison officer, said that according to the GDPDC the new building should have been complete in June 2017.

Numerous complaints had come to nothing, he continued, and neither the GDPDC, the local government nor the contractor had any updates for them. Omar said he believed that at this rate construction would not be finished for another year.

The deputy governor of Badakhshan, Gul Muhammad Bidar, said that they had made a formal complaint to the GDPDC about the delays.

Bidar said that his office had repeatedly raised the issue with Sharkat Bradaran Kofi, but had been told work was stalled due to a lack of payment by the interior ministry.

Since the ministry itself had awarded the contract, he explained, the Badakhshan local government lacked the authority to terminate the agreement.

Under Afghanistan’s procurement law, contractors who fail to carry out their work in accordance with the agreed terms and conditions are liable to be fined for any delays.

However Kofi, the director of Sharkat Bradaran Kofi, said that the interior ministry had failed to transfer the necessary funds to them, causing the ongoing delays.

“We have completed 85 per cent of the work on the prison,” she said. “The duration of the contract to complete the construction was two years and some months, but the ministry of interior has delayed the payment of each installment by seven or eight months and has still not paid the last remaining installment of 800,000 dollars.”

The interior ministry did not respond to questions about the specific issues with the construction of the new prison building. Its spokesman Najib Danish said that he had no information about the Badakhshan prison contract. In the meantime, he continued, the ministry intended to transfer the prisoners to a more suitable accommodation in Faizabad city.

This article was published at IWPR’s ARR 584

US President Donald Trump confirmed on Sunday that he has no plans to sack FBI Special Counsel Robert Mueller, who is leading the “Russia collusion” probe, recently marred by conflicts of interest and improper conduct claims.

Trump echoed various Republican officials who said over the weekend that he was not considering Mueller’s dismissal. “No, I’m not,” Trump said upon returning from a trip to Camp David.

With new accusations brought against the investigators by Trump’s transition team lawyer on Saturday, a number of high-profile White House officials came forward to tell the media that the president was not entertaining the option.

In a letter to Congress on Saturday, the lawyer, Kory Langhofer, alleged that Mueller’s office had violated the US constitution by “unlawfully” obtaining troves of emails from a government agency that hosted the transition team’s servers. The emails reportedly included confidential lawyer to client communication.

According to Langhofer, “tens of thousands” of emails were inappropriately managed by the General Service Administration, which handed over the emails without notifying the transition team.

Mueller was quick to dismiss the allegations, with his spokesman Peter Carr arguing on Sunday that the Special Counsel’s office followed due procedure when he sought the emails. “When we have obtained emails in the course of our ongoing criminal investigation, we have secured either the account owner’s consent or appropriate criminal process,” he said, as cited by CNN.

Trump said the allegations were “not looking good. It’s quite sad to see that. My people are very upset about it. I can’t imagine there’s anything on ’em, frankly, because as we said, there’s no collusion.”

Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin told CNN’s “State of the Union” Sunday morning that he doesn’t have “any reason to believe” Trump was going to fire Mueller. Noting that Mueller’s fate is ultimately still up to Trump, he dubbed the embattled probe “a giant distraction.”

Another senior Trump aide, director of legislative affairs March Short, told NBC: “There’s no conversation about that whatsoever” in the president’s circles.

It has been reported that Trump’s transition team officials would ask Mueller to return emails so they could seed out those involving “privilege” communications and redact them before handing them over.

Speculation about Mueller’s looming dismissal was stirred up by Democrats, who accused the White House of putting pressure on the investigative team.

In a Friday interview, Congresswoman Jackie Speier (D-California) claimed that there was a “rumor” spreading among lawmakers that Trump was poised to fire Mueller before Christmas. She even named an exact date when Trump would make the decision: December 22.

The Democrats are pushing for bipartisan bills to be passed by Congress to protect Mueller from what they see as encroachment by Team Trump. Such measures are an “absolute necessary step,” Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) said earlier in December.

The two bills, sponsored by Republicans and Democrats, seek to limit Trump’s ability to sack Mueller. The first one, put forward by Sens. Thom Tillis (R-N.C.) and Chris Coons (D-Del.) grants Mueller the possibility of a judicial review of the decision, while a bill by Sens. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) and Cory Booker (D-N.J.) requests Trump to get a federal court approval if he moves to fire Mueller.

The ever-widening probe has so far produced little fruit in terms of finding evidence of an alleged collusion between Trump, who repeatedly labelled the investigation a “witch hunt,” and Moscow, while costing the Justice Department $3.5 million.

So far, former campaign manager Paul Manafort and his business partner Richard Gates have been indicted in the probe. However, the charges against them have focused on their lobbying in Ukraine between 2006 and 2016, not Russia. Trump’s former national security adviser Michael Flynn and campaign aide George Papadopolous plead guilty to misleading FBI about their contacts with the Russian government that by itself does not equal “collusion.”

The probe, meanwhile, has been rocked by claims of conflict of interest after it was revealed that several of Mueller’s staffers were in one way or another connected to former democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton’s camp, and were openly critical of Trump even before the probe was launched.

Sri Lanka’s President Maithripala Sirisena said he would make an official request to Russian President Vladimir Putin to withdraw the temporary restrictions imposed on tea imports from Sri Lanka.

President Sirisena also said that a special delegation headed by Plantation Industries Minister Navin Dissanayake and Industry and Commerce Minister Rishad Bathiudeen will be sent to Russia to discuss the issue.

Speaking at a public event at Haputale town, President Sirisena said that he was confident that Russia, a long-standing friend of Sri Lanka would respond positively to the request to lift the temporary ban on tea exports.

According to agency reports, the Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance had said last Thursday that it had taken the decision to impose temporary restrictions after it found an insect, in the packaging of one consignment of tea from Sri Lanka.

Sirisena went on to say that already an investigation has been initiated against the company which had exported the consignment of tea from Sri Lanka in which the insect had been detected.

Sirisena said steps will be taken to revoke the export license of the said company if found guilty.

I assert that one of the many influences that modernity wrought on the Sufi ethos was the primacy accorded to the ‘text’. If that assertion is stretched a bit further, the conclusion that one may draw is that the interaction of Sufism with modernity culminated into the emergence of Barelvi creed. Chishtiyya and Qadiriyya Sufi Orders seemed to have subsumed into the Barelvi creed.

Ahmad Raza Khan from Bareilly (1856-1921), adherent of the Qadiriyya Order, laid the foundation of the Ahl-e Sunnat movement (I will use that terminology interchangeably with Barelvis). Strangely enough, in the objective situation obtaining in the second half of the 19thcentury, British colonialism had drawn various tools of rationality to the centre stage of the prevailing religious discourse. However, the intercessionary ritual practices remained the defining feature of the Ahl-e Sunnat movement.

For its opponents, usually representing the denominations like Deobandis and Ahl-e Hadith, shrine-centred devotion, demonstrated by Barelvi Sunnis, was in stark repudiation to its claim of being ‘reformist’, therefore rendering it ‘backward’, and ‘ignorant’. For Sunni (read Barelvi) luminaries, following the Prophet’s prescribed path (Sunna) with the help of saintly intermediaries, “provided a template for the behaviour in the modern world”. According to Usha Sanyal, “In its self-consciousness the movement was based on a sense of individual responsibility, not on attachment to ancient custom (Rawaj) as its detractors alleged”.

Two points are to be teased out from the whole debate around Barelvi denomination and its evolution over the years: the validation of shrine-based practices through text (or interpretation of the text) and the question of it being historically embedded.

In many ways, the last quarter of the 19th century saw a few important changes coming into play in the Muslim world, and the subcontinent was no exception. Emergence of text-centred approach to religion was the most significant development in religious epistemology. The obvious outcome of this development was the renewed importance of exegesis (Tafseer) of the Holy Quran and interpretation of Hadith according to the contemporary situation. The emphasis on Hadith in such seminaries like Dar ul Ulum Deoband enhanced the importance of ‘text’ even further. The ‘text’ came to be the standard bearer for ascertaining authenticity of any ritual or religious practice(s) prevalent in the contemporary era.

Thus shrine-centred practices became the subject of interrogation. Such practices not only connected Islam with the local cultural ethos underscoring ‘unity in diversity’ but they also made shrine a site for socio-religious inclusion, in which plurality could become possible. However, in the changed scenario, in the wake of colonial modernity and the advent of pan-Islamism (which too resulted from the phenomenon of modernity), the validity of ‘Sufi and Shrine’ became questionable. The specificity of Ahmad Raza Khan’s reformist zeal as opposed to that of Rashid Ahmad Gangohi or Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi is the former’s unflinching support to the time-honoured practice(s), performed at the shrine; instead of castigating them, he tried to bring them legitimacy through ‘text’. That was the reason that Ahmad Raza Khan remained in constant touch with the religious scholars in the Hijaz.

In simpler terms, in Ahmad Raza’s endeavours, we see Islam entwined with the local cultural moorings evolving through the historical process. What Ahmad Raza failed to guard against was the exclusion and Takfir. In his famous fatwa Husam al-Haramain ala Manhar al-Kufr wa’l Main (The Sword of the Harmain at the Throat of Kufr and Falsehood), which was written in 1902 but became public in 1906, Ahmed Raza denounced several individuals in the early twentieth-century India. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian was the first on Ahmad Raza’s lists of Kafirs (infidels). He was followed by some eminent Ulema from Deoband denomination like Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi, Ashraf Ali Thanvi and Khalil Ahmad Ambethwi whom he described as Wahhabis. Among the twelver Shias and the organisation of the Ulema known as the Nadwat al-Ulema, he accused some specific people of Kufr.

This is the situation right now when two Barelvi factions are trading Fatwas, calling each other Kafir. One shudders to think about the prevalent situation invested with the possible likelihood of sub-sectarian violence among the Sunnis.

Coming back to the historical analysis of Barelvis, in a bid to strike equilibrium between the ‘text’ and shrine-centric practices, Barelvi version of Islam appeared to have severed its link with the historical continuum. The practice of seeking authenticity of the rituals and religious practices from the Ulema of Arabia was the principal cause of that continuum having been snapped. As a consequence, Barelvi denomination got stuck in ambivalence with a culture entwined with religion on one hand and spawning puritanical tendencies punctuated with the primacy of text on the other.

These trends have riddled the Barelvi sect with contradictions. Thus, its constituency is facing steady erosion.

Another important aspect is about the role of Ahl-e Sunnat wal Jamaat movement under the British, which was conciliatory towards the later. In the Khilafat Movement (1919-22), members of the Ulema, influenced by Jamaluddin Afghani’s pan-Islamic message, forged an alliance with the Indian National Congress. M.K. Gandhi, top leader of Indian National Congress, lent support to the Ulema in their demand for British recognition of the Turkish Sultan as Caliph. Ulema in turn supported the Indian nationalist struggle against the British rule. These decisions were made after threadbare debate in the meetings of Jamiyyat al-Ulema-e Hind, the religio-political party comprising Deobandi clerics.

Ahmad Raza Khan who, by that time, was a well-established leader of Ahl-e Sunnat movement, balked at supporting the Khilafat Movement or the pan-Islamic idea. Ahmad Raza was anti-Hindu which was one of the main reasons that Barelvis threw in their lot with the All Indian Muslim League. The role of Barelwi organisation(s) and various Mashaikhs like Pir of Golra Sharif or Jama’at Ali Shah in the Pakistan is well-documented.

The general perception about the Barelvi denomination is that it’s pluralistic and inclusive vis a vis other sects. However, the Barelvis’ antagonism towards Hindus and other Muslim sects is irrefutable. Similarly, the contention of their support for the Pakistan movement, too, is not that straightforward. As it is noted in the following lines, until 1946, the All-India Sunni Conference had no unequivocal stance in favour of Pakistan.

When Ahmed Raza Khan passed away in 1921, the mantle to lead Ahl-e-Sunnat fell on Naeemud Din Muradabadi when he started a monthly journal Al Sawad E Azam (literally the great, that is to say the Sunni majority). Before proceeding further on the subject, a brief introduction of Naeemud Din Muradabadi will not be out of place. Born in 1882 in Muradabad, UP, he got early religious instruction along with Persian Arabic and Unani medicine along with good part of Dars-i-Nizami syllabus from his father. At the age of 14, he joined Muradabad Madrasa-e-Imdadiyya where he learned, logic, philosophy and Hadith from Syed Gul Muhammad Shah. He graduated from the same madrasa at the age of 20 and took an oath of allegiance at the hand of his erstwhile teacher Syed Gul Muhammad.

The details of his intellectual development point to the fact that his loyalty to the Ahl-e-Sunnat cause developed only gradually. Strangely his father Moeenud Din has been a disciple of Muhammad Qasim Nanutawi, one of the founders of Dar ul Uloom Deoband. Gradually, however, Naeemud Din exhibited his prominence as a debater; he entered into Manazara with Deobandis, Ahl-e-Hadith, Shias, Christians and Arya Samajis, and emerged victorious in these disputations. In these debates, his proclivity smacked of the influences drawn from the Barelvi denomination.

It was then that he caught Ahmed Raza Khan’s eye and became a close companion of the former. Attendant on his skill as a persuader and debater were his organisational abilities. He indeed excelled in establishing and managing institutions. The foremost contribution of him was the establishment of the Jammiyya Naemiyya around 1920.

In 1925, he also put together a new body by the name of Ahl-e-Sunnat by the name of All India Sunni Conference. The very name of the new organisation indicates that it was intended to reach Ahl-e-Sunnat nationwide. It was supposedly the answer to the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind and the Khilafat Committee, then the main Ulema organisations at the national level. The biographical account of Naeemud Din (Hayat I Sadr Al Afazil) reveals that All India Sunni Conference emanated from his awareness of “an increasing anti Muslim attitude among Hindus”, exemplified not only in the Arya Samaj-led Shuddi movement but also Hindu assertiveness over the issue of cow slaughter.

All India Sunni Conference, from the very outset, rejected the principle of the Hindu Muslim unity as means of achieving freedom. In the welcome address of that meeting, Ahmed Raza’s eldest son Hamid Raza Khan rejected the goal of freedom itself, asserting that Swaraj would amount to Hindu Raj; therefore, lending support to that cause would not be of any use to Muslims at large. He along with other speakers emphasised on the need to work for the educational and economic amelioration of the Muslim of the subcontinent. Hamid Raza in his address outlined a range of activities which the conference would undertake; Tabligh against the Shuddi movement being the foremost of all. He also outlined a detailed hierarchy of madrasas to be established throughout India, from the national level going all the way down to the villages.

The All India Sunni conference attained great success in a relatively short period of time. The 1925 meeting of the All India Sunni Conference was attended by over 250 Ulema from all over India. One of the most important supporters of the organisation from Punjab was Pir Jamaat Ali Shah (1841-1951). In his Khutbat, he lent unequivocal support for the anti-Hindu, anti Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind stance of the Sunni Ulema. Here, I feel it important to furnish a brief biographical account of Pir Jamaat Ali Shah because of his preeminent role not only for propagating Ahl-e-Sunnat’s cause but his support for All India Muslim League’s bid for independence.

David Gilmratin in his book Empire and Islam states that he came from a line of Qadri Pirs in Sialkot district, but was active in the reformist Naqshbandia Order; his foremost religious concern was with respect to Tabligh. He undertook extensive tours of Punjab and much of India, stressing the importance of the performance of religious duties according to the Shariat and establishes mosques and madrasas in towns and villages. This greatly expanded his influence and led to contacts with powerful Muslims with wealth that he tapped for religious causes.

By the start of the 20th century, Pir Jamaat Ali Shah could claim an extensive following, both in rural Northern Punjab and among powerful Muslims elsewhere, which made his political influence comparable to that of any Chishti revival Pirs. He donated hundreds of rupees to the Madrasas Nomaniyya and Anjuman-e-Hizabul Ahnaf, so that these pure religious institutions might expand and prosper to serve Islam.

Reverting to Pir Jamaat Ali Shah’s Khutbat that he delivered at the All India Sunni Conference in 1925, he said that unity should not be sort with Hindus, or with free thinking Muslims. Unity already existed among the Ahl-e-Sunnat wal Jamat, who represented a vast majority of Muslims in India. The task before them was to carry out internal reforms — to strengthen Iman, root out social evils like smoking and drinking, build more madrasas and continue the work of Tabligh.

Fast forwarding the evolution of All India Sunni Conference by 10 years, in 1935, the conference met in Badayun and for a third time in April 1946 at Banaras which was the last conference before Pakistan’s establishment. Usha Sanyal notes that the meeting was attended by 500 Sufi sheikhs, 7000 Ulema including Naeemud Din Muradabadi, Mustafa Raza Khan (Ahmed Raza Khan’s younger son), Zafar ud Din Behari and Syed Muhammad Asharafi Jeelani of Kachhochha.

Ironically, in that conference, Pakistan was tangentially mentioned and that too not in political terms. Barelvis as a domination started supporting the Pakistan Movement almost at the same time as some of Deobandi Ulema started espousing it. It must be clarified, however, that the number of Mashaikhs from Western Punjab and also from other provinces threw in their lot behind the All India Muslim League.

About the author:
*Tahir Kamran is a historian and teacher based in Lahore.

Source:
This article was published by New Age Islam in part one and part two.

By Joe Torres

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte said he is open to changing Philippine law to allow same-sex marriage, a turnaround from an earlier view in which he said it “would not work” for Filipinos because “we’re Catholics.”

Speaking before a gathering of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people in Davao on Dec. 17, the president said he was for same-sex marriage after all because it was “the trend of modern times.”

“If that will add to your happiness, I am for it,” he told the gathering. “Why impose a morality that is no longer working and almost passe,” added the president in an apparent reference to traditional teachings of the church.

“I am with you,” said Duterte. He even asked the gathering to nominate “the brightest” among themselves, someone “who is honest [and] hardworking” whom he could appoint to a government post.

“I want same-sex marriage. The problem is we’ll have to change the law,” said the president, adding that the law dictates that marriage is “a union between a man and a woman.”

“But we can change the law,” he said to loud applause.

Philippine Catholic and Evangelical church leaders immediately criticized the president’s pronouncement, saying that the “marriage” of people of the same sex in a church “is impossible”.

Bishop Arturo Bastes of Sorsogon warned in an interview that, “the trivialization of marriage is one of the fundamental reasons behind the breakdown of … society.”

He said the main purpose of marriage “is the procreation of children and the building of a loving family, the basic unit of human society and the church.”

The prelate said the government should protect families “as ordained by God and the church.”

Bishop Noel Pantoja of the Philippine Council of Evangelical Churches said the recognition of same-sex unions is a “serious error” that can harm “not only the Christian faith but also the morality and very destiny of our nation.”

He said that although “our Lord calls us to love the [LGBT] community,” passing a law allowing same-sex unions “will become a source of unwelcome tension in our nation.”

“It will only marginalize religion and thus cause the very discrimination it seeks to avoid,” said Bishop Pantoja, adding that same-sex unions directly contradicts the teaching of Islam and Christianity that marriage is only between a man and a woman.

In March, Duterte said he was opposed to the legalization of same-sex marriage because the country’s Civil Code prohibits it. “That’s the law in the Philippines,” said the president.

Even the president’s allies in Congress said passing a law to allow same-sex civil unions is not among Duterte’s priority measures.

Church leaders welcomed the president’s earlier statement, saying that they are grateful for his respecting the “sanctity of marriage.”

The United States, South Africa, Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, Uruguay, New Zealand, Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Ireland, and Australia have passed legislation ensuring marriage equality.

Given the Tatarstan government’s unwillingness to resist Moscow’s pressure and despite federal laws against ethnic and religious parties, several leading intellectuals of Tatarstan are calling for the creation of an All-Russian Tatar Party to mobilize Tatars within the republic and beyond its borders.

Rafael Khakimov, the former advisor to Mintimir Shaymiyev and long-time director of the Kazan Institute of History, has been promoting this idea; and it has generated widespread discussion on social networks. Now, commentator Ramzil Valeyev has laid out his support for such a move in an article for Business-Gazeta (business-gazeta.ru/article/367179).

“Everyone knows,” Valeyev begins, “that it is impossible to organize a party of a purely national type” or even a regional one. “But never the less, party construction in the interests of the republic and the Tatar people are important because the existing parties and their divisions … live in their own closed world” and ignore outsiders, including the Tatar nation.

Someone needs to begin defending the interests of Tatarstan and of the Tatars of Russia as a whole, “especially now” when the nation finds itself in such a difficult situation. And the numbers of people involved, including those married to Tatars and those who live among them, are far larger than many think.

But “alas” the number of Tatar speakers is declining and some in Moscow like Valery Tishkov and Olga Artemenko think that those who give up the language should change their ethnic identity because to do anything else is a mark of separatism and a threat to the territorial integrity of the country, Valeyev says.

Someone must appear to counter such notions, and a new organization is needed “if existing parties and deputies controlled from above are silent,” the Tatar intellectual continues. And time is of the essence: “To unite and express an opinion is what ordinary people need now — when the constitutions of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan are still in force and when languages and nationalities are not yet done away with by degree.”

We Tatars “are not sheep waiting for Kurban-Bayram. We are a people and not within a statistical margin of error: two million Tatars live in Tatarstan alone, another million in Bashkortostan, and another two to three million in other regions,” not to mention communities across Russia and the world.

Moreover, Valeyev says, we are “indigenous civic Russians” and aren’t going anywhere. We are a donor republic: we simply want our rights recognized and protected. We have just as much right to demand our language be respected as Russian speakers do in the Baltic countries, but Moscow respects only the latter demands.

One can fully understand Khakimov’s advocacy of a party, Valeyev says; but it is less important whether it is called a party, something that would require a change in Russian law, or a social movement which would not. But a party is certainly possible if it is not purely Tatar but ethnically neutral as existing law would require as long as it promoted Tatar concerns.

There are serious limitations in the work of popular fronts, social centers, and autonomies because their leaders have been discredited in the minds of many. A new movement or party, “a Tatar Party (social organization) must be above regional, group, class and even religious preferences.”

Tatars “must find a variant which allows them to get around without the problems of registration, assemblies and congresses,” Valeyev says. “It is possible to begin already today, via the Internet.” The problems Tatars now face are very real, and the neglect of these problems by existing parties is all too palpable. As a result, Tatars need to organize and act now.

The United Nations Security Council on Monday failed to adopt the draft resolution that reflects regret among the body’s members about “recent decisions regarding the status of Jerusalem,” with a negative vote by the United States.

The text, tabled by Egypt, reiterated the United Nations’ position on Jerusalem and would have affirmed “that any decisions and actions which purport to have altered, the character, status or demographic composition of the Holy City of Jerusalem have no legal effect, are null and void and must be rescinded in compliance with relevant resolutions of the Security Council.”

The text would also have called on all States “to refrain from the establishment of diplomatic missions in the Holy City of Jerusalem.”

A negative vote – or veto – from one of the Council’s five permanent members – China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States – blocks passage of a resolution.

Therefore, the draft was rejected despite support from the other four permanent members and from the 10 non-permanent members.

The vote followed a briefing by Nickolay Mladenov, Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace process, who said that the Israel-Palestinian conflict has not seen significant positive moves towards peace during the reporting period from 20 September to 18 December.

He said that the security situation in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory has become more tense in the wake of US President Donald Trump’s decision on 6 December to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, citing an increase in incidents, notably rockets fired from Gaza and clashes between Palestinians and Israeli security forces.
Uncertainty about future of peace process looms over situation on the ground

“None of the developments on the ground can be divorced from the broader context in which they are happening: uncertainties about the future of the peace process; unilateral actions that undermine the two-state solution; occupation; and violence,” Mr. Mladenov told the Council.

The Special Coordinator’s briefing mainly focused on the status of implementation of Security Council resolution 2334, which was adopted in December 2016 by 14 votes, with the US abstaining.

In that text, the Council reaffirmed that Israel’s establishment of settlements in Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, had no legal validity, constituting a flagrant violation under international law and a major obstacle to the vision of two States living side-by-side in peace and security, within internationally recognized borders.

It underlined that it would not recognize any changes to the 4 June 1967 lines, including the status of Jerusalem, other than those agreed by the two sides through negotiations.

“The United Nations maintains the view that Jerusalem is a final status issue that must be resolved through direct negotiations between the two parties on the basis of the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions taking into account the legitimate concerns of both the Palestinian and the Israeli sides,” Mr. Mladenov stressed, warning that there is a growing risk that the parties may revert to more unilateral actions.

He said that since the US decision, the Palestinian leadership canceled meetings with visiting Vice-President Mike Pence, and called for the establishment of a new mechanism to achieve peace.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has also vowed to seek unilateral recognition of Palestine and to seek full membership in international organizations in the absence of a meaningful peace process, Mr. Mladenov added.

Regarding Israel’s settlement activities, housing construction in occupied Palestinian territory has continued, with significantly more units advanced and approved in 2017, he said.

For instance, in East Jerusalem, the increase has been from 1,600 units in 2016 to some 3,100 in 2017.

In addition, 2017 has seen worrying legislative, judicial and administrative initiatives that aim to change the long-standing Israeli policy concerning the legal status of the West Bank and the use of private Palestinian land, Mr. Mladenov warned.

By Jim Garamone

US President Donald J. Trump on Monday announced a new national security strategy rooted in a whole-of-government approach that stresses the economic might of the United States.

In a written statement, Defense Secretary James N. Mattis called the strategy “clear and comprehensive.”

“As the world’s most lethal armed force, the men and women of the United States military ensure our diplomats always speak from a position of strength,” he said. “Supported by our allies and partners, we will continue to defend our common security interests as we protect America from those seeking to threaten the freedoms we enjoy.”

Trump announced the new strategy during a speech at the Reagan Building near the White House. The national security strategy sets the stage for the national defense strategy and the national military strategy.

“With every decision and every action, we are now putting America first,” the president said. “We are rebuilding our nation, our confidence and our standing in the world.”

In addition to the military aspect of national security, the new strategy includes homeland defense, border security, trade policy and economic strength. Still, military power does play a part, and the president noted the $700 billion National Defense Authorization Act he signed last week.

“We are demanding extraordinary strength, which will hopefully lead to long and extraordinary peace,” he said. “We are giving our courageous military men and women the support they need and so dearly deserve.”

ISIS and Other Threats

Trump also spoke about specific threats such as Iran, North Korea, Russia and China, and he touted efforts against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

“Following my trip to the Middle East, the Gulf States and other Muslim-majority nations joined together to fight radical Islamist ideology and terrorist financing,” he said. “We have dealt ISIS one devastating defeat after another. The coalition to defeat ISIS has now recaptured almost 100 percent of the land once held by these terrorists in Iraq and in Syria. Great job.”

To keep this momentum moving, the United States must integrate every dimension of national strength, “and we must compete with every instrument of our national power,” the president said. “With the strategy I’m announcing today, we are declaring that America is in the game, and America is going win.”

Vital Interests

The strategy advances four vital national interests. The first is to protect the American people, the homeland and the American way of life. “We cannot secure a nation if we do not secure our borders,” Trump said. “So for the first time ever, an American strategy now includes a serious plan to defend our homeland.”

In addition, the strategy also calls on America to confront, discredit and defeat radical Islamic terrorism and ideology, and to prevent it from spreading into the United States. “We will develop new ways to counter those who use new domains, such as cyber and social media, to attack our nation or threaten our society,” he said.

The second pillar is economic. “For the first time, American strategy recognizes that economic security is national security,” the president said. “Economic vitality, growth and prosperity at home is absolutely necessary for American power and influence abroad. Any nation that trades away its prosperity for security will end up losing both.”

Preserving Peace Through Strength

Preserving peace through strength is the third pillar of the new strategy. “We recognize that weakness is the surest path to conflict, and unrivaled power is the most certain means of defense,” Trump said. “For this reason, our strategy breaks from the damaging defense sequester. We’re going to get rid of that.”

Trump said the strategy calls for a total military modernization, and reversing previous decisions to shrink the force. “It calls for streamlining acquisition, eliminating bloated bureaucracy, and massively building up our military, which has the fundamental side benefit of creating millions and millions of jobs,” he added.

New military domains of space and cyberspace have key roles in the strategy, the president said. “This strategy outlines important steps to address new forms of conflict, such as economic and political aggression, and our strategy emphasizes strengthening alliances to cope with these threats,” he said. “It recognizes that our strength is magnified by allies who share principles and our principles, and shoulder their fair share of responsibility for our common security.”

Advancing American Influence

Finally, the strategy seeks to advance American influence, which begins with building wealth and power at home. “America will lead again,” Trump said. “We do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone, but we will champion the values without apology.”

The United States values strong alliances and partnerships, based on cooperation and reciprocity, the president said. “We will make new partnerships with those who share our goals and make common interests into a common cause,” he added.

“We will pursue the vision we have carried around the world over this past year, a vision of strong, sovereign and independent nations that respect their citizens and respect their neighbors, nations that thrive in commerce and cooperation, rooted in their histories and branching out toward their destinies.”

Within hours of Akayed Ullah, a Bangladeshi immigrant, allegedly detonating a pipe bomb in New York City on Dec. 11, severely injuring himself and wounding four others, a most comprehensive official and media narrative emerged.

The formulation of the narrative concerning Ullah’s motives, radicalization and assumed hate for the US was so immaculate, one would have thought it took authorities months, not hours to compile such evidence.

However, the exact nature of what truly happened matters little. Not only was Ullah instantly found guilty by the media, in fact all Muslims and immigrants were as well.
Following each attack of this nature, Muslims in the US mobilize to fend off accusations concerning their faith, their values and their allegiance to the country in which they live.

But it is not an easy fight to win. When President Donald Trump is tweeting anti-Muslim propaganda and his administration exploits every opportunity to advance anti-immigrant initiatives, the small, beleaguered community of Muslims in the US can do little to stop the rising tide of Islamophobia.

The media has played a major role in propagating the negative attitudes toward Muslims and Islam, which, in turn, provide much-needed public support for the government to continue with its anti-Muslim measures.

Compare such attitudes with the way in which mass shootings carried out by white American men is communicated by the government and media alike.

Although mass killings by white males have proven to be the deadliest in the US, the discussion generated in the media and official discourses are centered mostly on the mental illnesses of white attackers. In other words, there is a consensus that violence perpetrated by members of the white community is not inherent to that community’s race, culture or religion.

Five years after Adam Lanza killed 20 first graders and six adults at the Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut, many are still at work trying to analyze the supposed mental illness that drove him to commit such a reprehensible act.

The fact that Lanza was carrying more than 30 pounds of weapons seemed superfluous. Many pundits and politicians still refuse to engage in a discussion about guns.

The “mental health” argument is also championed by Trump himself.

“Mental health is your problem here,” Trump said in a statement in response to a mass shooting by Devin Kelly, a white male who killed more than two dozen people in a Texas church in November.

Resorting to easy answers when white men kill is now the norm. Killers of other races, skin colors and nationalities, however, get entirely different treatment.

As soon as the news emerged of Ullah’s alleged bombing in New York, the Trump administration moved with full force to target immigrants.

The incessant media coverage and stubborn government targeting of Muslims have led to an unprecedented hysteria which, in turn, has led to numerous incidents of Muslims being targeted because of their faith. Many accounts of Muslims being removed from airplanes, often kicking and screaming, are becoming a fact of life in the US.

When Khairuldeen Makhzoomi was kicked off a Southwest Airlines flight last year for speaking Arabic on the phone, the agent who escorted him reprimanded him for using his mother tongue in public considering “today’s political climate.”

Anila Daulatzai was also dragged down the aisle of a plane. She was “profiled, abused, interrogated, detained, and subjected to false reporting and the trauma of racist, vitriolic public shaming precisely because she is a woman, a person of color, and a Muslim,” her attorney told the Washington Post.

While this hysteria plays into the hands of opportunistic US politicians, the facts suggest that violence is hardly a Muslim phenomenon.

Newsweek reported statistics showing that white men have committed most of the country’s mass killings. Since 1982, the “majority of mass shootings — 54 percent — were committed by white men,” the figures show.

Stephen Paddock, the white man who massacred 58 people and wounded hundreds more in Las Vegas in October, was only one of an ever-growing list.

Countless government officials and journalists have fanned out to find out why Paddock would carry out such a heinous act, as if a white man’s violence is a rare event in a country supposedly threatened by blacks, Mexicans and Muslims.

Yet the truth is that the white man’s profile is the most violent in the US. Research conducted by Eric Madfis from the University of Washington argued in 2014 that, in the US, “middle-class Caucasian heterosexual males in their teenage years and in middle age commit mass murder… in numbers disproportionately high relative to their share of the population.”

He ascribed this finding to “white entitlement” and “heterosexual masculinity,” among other reasons.

Still, a whole race, gender or religion are not held suspect; a rule that applies to some and excludes others.

Certainly, anti-Arab and Muslim sentiment in the US has been around for generations, but it has risen sharply in the last two decades. Arabs and Muslims have become an easy scapegoat for all of America’s instabilities and failures.  But demonizing and humiliating brown-skinned men and women is certainly not the way out of the economic, political and foreign policy quagmires which America’s ruling elite has invited upon its country.

Such unlawful and undemocratic behavior may feed anti-Muslim hysteria a little longer, and give fodder for useless efforts in targeting innocent men and women. But, in the long run, it will do the country much harm, damaging its democratic institutions and contributing to the culture of violence, founded on entitled white men touting guns and killing innocent people.

Yale astronomers have taken a fresh look at the nearby Alpha Centauri star system and found new ways to narrow the search for habitable planets there.

According to a study led by Professor Debra Fischer and graduate student Lily Zhao, there may be small, Earth-like planets in Alpha Centauri that have been overlooked. Meanwhile, the study ruled out the existence of a number of larger planets in the system that had popped up in previous models.

“The universe has told us the most common types of planets are small planets, and our study shows these are exactly the ones that are most likely to be orbiting Alpha Centauri A and B,” said Fischer, a leading expert on exoplanets who has devoted decades of research to the search for an Earth analog.

The new study appears in the Astronomical Journal. Co-authors are John Brewer and Matt Giguere of Yale and Bárbara Rojas-Ayala of Universidad Andrés Bello in Chile.

The Alpha Centauri system is located 1.3 parsecs (24.9 trillion miles) from Earth, making it our closest neighboring system. It has three stars: Centauri A, Centauri B, and Proxima Centauri. Last year, the discovery of an Earth-like planet orbiting Proxima Centauri set off a new wave of scientific and public interest in the system.

“Because Alpha Centauri is so close, it is our first stop outside our solar system,” Fischer said. “There’s almost certain to be small, rocky planets around Alpha Centauri A and B.”

The findings are based on data coming in from a new wave of more advanced spectrographic instruments at observatories located in Chile: CHIRON, a spectrograph built by Fischer’s team; HARPS, built by a team from Geneva; and UVES, part of the Very Large Telescope Array. “The precision of our instruments hasn’t been good enough, until now,” Fischer said.

The researchers set up a grid system for the Alpha Centauri system and asked, based on the spectrographic analysis, “If there was a small, rocky planet in the habitable zone, would we have been able to detect it?” Often, the answer came back: “No.”

Zhao, the study’s first author, determined that for Alpha Centauri A, there might still be orbiting planets that are smaller than 50 Earth masses. For Alpha Centauri B there might be orbiting planets than are smaller than 8 Earth masses; for Proxima Centauri, there might be orbiting planets that are less than one-half of Earth’s mass.

In addition, the study eliminated the possibility of a number of larger planets. Zhao said this takes away the possibility of Jupiter-sized planets causing asteroids that might hit or change the orbits of smaller, Earth-like planets.

“This is a very green study in that it recycles existing data to draw new conclusions,” said Zhao. “By using the data in a different way, we are able to rule out large planets that could endanger small, habitable worlds and narrow down the search area for future investigations.” This new information will help astronomers prioritize their efforts to detect additional planets in the system, the researchers said.

Likewise, the continuing effort by Fischer and others to improve spectrographic technology will help identify and understand the composition of exoplanets.

For God’s sake, are they crazy?

They congregate in the marketplace, boys of 15, 16 years, take stones and throw them at our soldiers, who are armed to the teeth. The soldiers shoot, sometimes over their heads, sometimes straight at them. Every day there are wounded, every few days there are dead.

What for? They do not have the slightest chance of changing the policy of the Israeli occupation. Only very rarely do the boys hit a soldier and cause him a slight injury.

Yet they go on. Why?

A friend of mine sent me an article by a respected Palestinian. He described his first demonstration, many years ago.

The way he tells it, he was 15 years old, living in a village under occupation, hating Israeli soldiers. With a group of friends of the same age, he went to the center of his village, where a line of soldiers was waiting for them.

Each of the demonstrators picked up a stone – no lack of stones in an Arab village – and threw it at the soldiers. The stones fell far short, causing no harm.

But – and here the adult man grew ecstatic – what a wonderful feeling! For the first time in his life the boy felt that he was hitting back! He was no longer a despised, helpless Palestinian! He was upholding the dignity of his people! The old leaders may be subservient! Not he, not his friends!

For the first time in his life he was proud, proud to be a Palestinian, proud to be a courageous human being.

What a wonderful feeling! For this feeling he was ready to risk his life, again and again, ready to become a Shaheed, a witness, a martyr.

There are many thousands like him.

Reading this description was exciting, because it reminded me of something in my own remote youth. When I was exactly the same age, 15.

It was in May, 1939. The British rulers of Palestine had just published a White Paper, putting the dampers on our Zionist vision. The world war was drawing close, and the British Empire needed the support of the Arab world.

A few months earlier, I had joined the National Military Organization (commonly called the Irgun), the most militant underground organization devoted to the fight against the British colonial regime. The last push for me was a disturbing event: for the first time the British had hanged a Jewish “terrorist”. I was determined to fill his place.

In the evening I received an order: tomorrow noon we shall start a demonstration against the White Paper. Be ready in Allenby street, near the Mugrabi cinema.

Long before the time, I was there, waiting with growing excitement. At noon exactly, a bugle sounded. I ran to the assembly point, together with hundreds of other Irgun members. Repeating slogans that someone shouted, we started to march along the street, then Tel Aviv’s main thoroughfare.

Halfway down the street there stands the Great Synagogue, with its external staircase. Somebody ran up it and delivered an impassioned speech, ending with the Biblical verse “It I forget thee, oh Jerusalem / May my right hand wither…”

From there we marched to our destination: the district offices of the British administration. Some daring fellows ran up, broke open the doors and started to throw down heaps of official papers. We burned them in the street.

Suddenly British soldiers appeared on the scene. Shots were fired, either over our heads or at us. It was the first time in my life I was shot at.

We ran away, through a hole in the fence by the railway line. After a few hundred meters we found each other again. We were ecstatic, happy beyond measure. We had shown those bloody British that Jews can fight back. We had risked our lives for our fatherland. We had made our people proud of us.

That was 79 years ago. I remember it as if it were yesterday. And I completely understand the ecstasy of the Palestinian boys, the “children of the stones”, who today risk their lives, throwing stones in futile demonstrations.

Our leaders treat the children-of-the-stones with disdain, much as the British authorities treated us then. What can they achieve? Nothing. Our – and their – pitiful demonstrations were/are ridiculous.

But a boy of 15 is a powerful force. His pride in fighting back grows with the years. It is a force that cannot be subdued. The more of them are killed, the stronger they get. The heavier the hand of the oppressor, the stronger the determination of the oppressed. It’s a law of nature.

In today’s Hebrew Empire, from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River, there is already a slight Palestinian majority – something like 8.2 million Arabs to 7.8 million Jews. This fact is generally hidden in official statistics. Since the Palestinian birthrate is much higher than the Jewish one (except for Orthodox Jews), the Arab majority will inexorably grow. Greater Israel will become more and more an apartheid state.

What is the answer of the Israeli Right to this? There is no answer. Some on the fringes dream of a mass exodus of the Arabs, like the one of 1948. But no people makes the same mistake twice. Whatever happens, the Palestinians will cling to their soil. They call this steadfastness “sumud”.

I have in my head a poem by one of our national poets from before 1948: “No people retreats from the bulwarks of its life.” The Palestinians are like all other peoples. Like us.

Lately, a new political fashion has emerged, especially among Arabs. They declare that there is only one choice: either Two States or One State. If the Israeli leadership, aided and abetted by President Trump, rejects the Two State solution, the One State solution will take its place. Jews and Arabs will live in one joint state, from the sea to the river. End of the Zionist dream.

This is nonsense. If some Arab politicians think that this prospect will frighten Israelis into accepting the Two State solution, they are sadly mistaken. True, some right-wing Israelis talk about this possibility, but they know that this would be hell.

One State? What would the army look like? Who would command it, who would be the soldiers? With an Arab majority in the Knesset (which would presumable change its name to Majlis) fighting a daily battle against the Jewish factions? With the standard of living of the Jews vastly higher than that of the Arab citizens? Who will control the police? Endless questions without answers.

The simple fact is that there is no choice between a Two State and a One State solution, because One State is no solution at all, but a pipe-dream. Or a nightmare.

So, is there no choice? Of course, there is. There always is.

The choice is between the Two State solution and No Solution. Eternal war.

Incidence of cervical cancer in young women is set to decline 75 per cent by 2040 with deaths close to eradicated, however older women will face greater risk according to research led by Queen Mary University of London, published today in The Lancet Public Health.

Women aged 50-64 will see a 62 per cent increase in incidence which could lead to a 143 per cent rise in mortality (183 in 2015 to 449 in 2040).

Jo’s Cervical Cancer Trust funded and commissioned a team at Queen Mary University of London, including Peter Sasieni, Professor of Biostatistics and Cancer Epidemiology, and Dr Alejandra Castanon, Epidemiologist – who authored the research – to develop a new model that enabled the charity to explore incidence of cervical cancer in England up to 2040. This includes the impact of changing cervical screening coverage, and introducing both HPV primary screening and the 9-valent human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine could have.

Cervical cancer is the most common cancer in women under 35 in the UK but, according to the model, this will shift dramatically by 2040 with the burden of the disease moving to older women. Among younger women, born after 1991 who have benefited from the introduction of the HPV vaccination programme in 2008, eradication of the cancer is firmly on the horizon.

The research finds that:

• Incidence among 50-54 year olds will increase 50 per cent (177 cases in 2015 to 265 cases in 2040)
• Incidence among 60-64 year olds will climb 54 per cent (144 cases in 2015 to 222 in 2040) and mortality 109 per cent (79 to 165 deaths a year)
• The introduction of more effective vaccination and screening test could see incidence more than halve among 25-44 year olds (1,313 cases in 2015 to 599 in 2040)
• Screening attendance is declining year-on-year, having fallen 3.4 per cent in England since 2012, and if it were to decline to 66 per cent (currently 72 per cent), among 60-64 year olds alone incidence will rise 71 per cent and mortality could rise 128 per cent.

While vaccination uptake is currently high, the research clearly highlights the importance of not being complacent as if uptake were to drop to 40 per cent, incidence in 25 to 44 year olds would increase by 38 per cent (to 945).

Dr Alejandra Castanon from Queen Mary said, “We used a novel method to estimate cervical cancer incidence rates up to 2040. It combines three levels of modelling making it very flexible. In contrast to a microsimulation model, our model can take into account how year of birth affects risk of cervical cancer throughout a woman’s life. In addition, the model is flexible in that we can change the screening coverage, the screening test and the vaccine type and observe their effect on cancer incidence. This study shows how the age-specific incidence of cervical cancer will change over the next 20 years. Women currently aged between 25 and 40 will remain at high risk of cervical cancer throughout their lives, whilst women younger than 25 will see their risk decrease by around 50%. This has implications for the way we invest in and target screening.”

Robert Music, Chief Executive, Jo’s Cervical Cancer Trust, said: “We are on the path to eradicating cervical cancer among young women which is extraordinary. However, we are faced with an immediate challenge among women who will be over 50 in 2040. This research should serve as a wake up call and the need for action. Continued declining cervical screening attendance will cost lives at all ages and must not happen. We are faced with an aging population and risk among older women rocketing, therefore changes to the programme which could reduce this risk must be explored, including increasing the screening age from 64 and self testing. We want to see cervical cancer become a disease of the past with no more women losing their lives to the disease. Jo’s Cervical Cancer Trust are today launching an ambitious new strategy to 2022 setting out our role in reaching eradication and call on others to join us.”

The model underlines how primary HPV screening will be of utmost importance in reducing risk of the disease among women born before 1991. The researchers and charity warn that delays in rolling it out will only exacerbate the burden of disease among this age group, and increasing screening coverage must remain a critical challenge and priority.

The mass conviction on November 27, 2017, of more than 60 people involved in demonstrations at Kuwait’s parliament in 2011 included convictions for assembly and speech, Human Rights Watch said. Kuwait’s judiciary should vacate the convictions that punished peaceful speech or assembly and repeal laws criminalizing peaceful speech and protest.

Human Rights Watch reviewed the 182-page Court of Appeals decision, which found 67 people guilty of a range of charges, sentencing them to between one and nine years in prison with labor, including opposition leader Musallam al-Barrack who was sentenced to nine years. The vast majority received sentences for using force against police, but the court also found 65 people guilty of participating in an unlicensed public assembly or gathering, and 16 of crimes that appear to violate free speech, including insulting the emir and offending police. The court sentenced one defendant to an additional two years on charges of insulting the Emir and offending police alone.

“These heavy-handed sentences smack of intimidation and retaliation for criticism of authorities,” said Lama Fakih, deputy Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. “Regulating protests is one thing, but sentencing people to prison for offending the authorities only serves to intimidate others from speaking out.”

Kuwait frequently prosecutes people for speech offenses, such as for offending the authorities. Human Rights Watch maintains an interactive website featuring some of the high-profile cases.

In November 2011, during the so-called Arab Spring, the protesters reportedly entered Kuwait’s parliament building as hundreds of people demonstrated outside, calling on Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah to step down over corruption claims. In response, Kuwait’s emir, Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah, said the protest had been a threat to the country’s security and stability and called for stricter security measures. In December 2013, a Kuwaiti court had cleared the protesters, who included members of parliament, of all charges. But prosecutors appealed to the Court of Appeals, leading to the mass convictions.

One of the defense lawyers told Human Rights Watch that the people convicted on November 27 had appealed the sentence to the Court of Cassation. He said that more than 30 defendants had already turned themselves in and that police had arrested two others.

Kuwaiti authorities have long-restricted freedom of assembly and expression, and should repeal laws that criminalize peaceful assembly and expression, Human Rights Watch said.

Kuwaiti authorities have invoked several provisions in the constitution, penal code, Printing and Publication Law, Misuse of Telephone Communications and Bugging Devices Law, Public Gatherings Law, and National Unity Law to prosecute journalists, politicians, and activists for criticizing the emir, the government, religion, and rulers of neighboring countries in blogs or on Twitter, Facebook, or other social media.

In 2016, Kuwait amended the election law to bar all those convicted for “insulting” God, the prophets, or the emir from running for office or voting in elections. The law is likely to bar some opposition members of parliament from running for office or voting in future elections.

The Cybercrime Law, which went into effect in 2016, includes far-reaching restrictions on internet-based speech, such as prison sentences, and fines for insulting religion, religious figures, and the emir.

“These convictions come amid a clampdown on freedom of expression and assembly across the Middle East,” Whitson said. “Kuwait should be setting itself apart in the region as a tolerant and open country that respects freedom of expression and protest and dissenting views.”

(Civil.Ge) — Head of the Georgian State Security Service, Vakhtang Gomelauri, who is visiting Minsk, met with his Belarusian counterpart Valery Vakulchik.

During the meeting, Gomelauri and Vakulchik signed an inter-state agreement on exchange and protection of classified information.

According to the Georgian State Security Service, the agreement is aimed at regulating the security procedures for exchanging and protecting the classified information, and will establish a “solid legal ground” for exchanging information “in security and law enforcement fields, as well as in foreign affairs and other areas.”

The Belarus State Security Committee, issued a press release as well, saying the document would create “a legal ground for exchanging and mutual protection of state secrets of the Republic of Belarus and Georgia in bilateral cooperation of state institutions and organizations of both states.”

According to the Georgian State Security Service, the country has signed similar agreements “with up to twenty NATO and EU member states, as well as with the United States.”