Currently, the attention of mainstream media is focused on the situation in the battered enclave of Eastern Ghouta. More than 80,000 civilians have already fled the region via humanitarian corridors despite numerous threats from terrorists, and the humanitarian situation there is being improved day by day. However, the same cannot be said of Raqqa that lies in ruins.

Almost four years since 2013 till 2017 Raqqa was run by ISIS terrorists. The residents who were unable to flee the city had to obey the laws of jihadists. Those who had refused to comply with the rules of ISIS were subjected to torture or publicly executed on the city’s streets.

In October 2017, after five months of grueling battle, the U.S. backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) ended the battle for de facto ISIS capital. However, the U.S. media were silent about the price of victory in Raqqa.

Yet, during the city’s assault, several Syrian experts pointed to the irresponsible and ill-considered actions of the U.S.-led international coalition. The coalition strikes frequently led to the numerous victims among civilians and extensive destruction of civilian infrastructure instead of the elimination of terrorists.

On October 19, 2017, USA Today with the reference to the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported, the total civilian death toll at over 1,800, and around 80% of the city is completely destroyed.

Actually, much more people suffered from terrorist attacks as well as actions of the so-called liberators. This is evidenced by mass graves containing bodies of dozens of civilians and Syrian servicemen found in the outskirts of Raqqa.

At the same time, a woman told France 24 journalists that all her relatives had been killed by a coalition airstrike and their bodies were still under the rubble of her house. She also said the Kurdish commanders had tried to extort money for the alleged reconstruction of Raqqa instead of any assistance or support.

Notably, due to the rise of daily temperatures, the dead bodies lying under the rubble start to decompose very rapidly. Then putrefaction enters to the soil and groundwater that could lead to numerous disease outbreaks and dangerous epidemic.

Indeed, after the total liberation of Raqqa by SDF and American servicemen, the locals are still oppressed. This time the acts of aggression come from Kurds.

Nowadays the locals face yet another threat in the shape of improvised explosive devices, which have been left by terrorists. According to Human Rights Watch statement, homemade landmines have killed and injured at least 500 civilians, including more than 150 children, in Raqqa, Syria since the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) was pushed out of the city in October 2017.

Such information sounds shocking and raises many questions to the SDF ‘engineering units’ that started demining works only one month after its full liberation.

Nowadays Raqqa looks like a ghost town with ruined and uninhabitable houses as the restoration works have not started in full swing. Moreover, the water and electricity supply have not yet been restored.

In comparison, demining and dismantling the explosive devices in Aleppo by the Syrian sappers with the support of the Russian colleagues began just after the liberation of the city and took only three months.

Furthermore, the American authorities have repeatedly stated their intention to take an active role in the restoration, mine-clearance as well as assistance to the locals after the full liberation of the city from ISIS. After the city fell under the control of SDF Washington preferred to break its promises.

So, the U.S. is directly responsible for the current catastrophic humanitarian situation in Raqqa. Turning the city into ruins Washington tries to cover up the war crimes committed by its forces and block entrance of the humanitarian aid sent by the UN. Such illegal actions give up hopes of the locals on returning to peace.

The West has been sharply divided in its reaction to Vladimir Putin’s decisive win in the Russian presidential election; while some European leaders have sent warm wishes to Putin in the hope of closer ties with Moscow, some others have taken advantage of the moment to say the strained relations would be irreversible under Putin.

Congratulations poured in from around the world after Putin garnered almost 77 percent of the vote, with an estimated turnout of 67 percent. But much of Europe was considering how to react to Putin’s election for a new six-year term.

The first European nation who broke the silence was Germany, whose Foreign Minister did not hesitate to call Russia a “difficult partner” under Putin.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel later congratulated Putin and expressed hope for further constructive cooperation.

“Today, it is vitally important to continue dialogue and maintain relations between our countries and nations. With this in mind, we should take efforts for constructive work on major bilateral and international problems to find proper solutions. I wish you success in your work to resolve the tasks facing you,” she told Putin in her message.

Meanwhile, French President Emmanuel Macron wished Putin “success for the political, democratic, economic and social modernization” of Russia.

Putin received the warmest message in the European Union from Italy’s right-wing parties. Matteo Salvini, leader of League party, quickly congratulated Putin in a tweet, saying, “Good job, president.”

Other European states, including Georgia and Poland, however, warned of what they called the “growing Russian threat.”

“There is a ‘now moment’ in the United States; there is a ‘now moment’ in London; there is a ‘now moment’ in Brussels … a moment of comprehension of the [threats] to security for all nations that are challenged by Russia,” said Georgian President Giorgi Margvelashvili.

Poland’s Foreign Ministry criticized Russia for holding the presidential elections in Crimea, calling it “illegal.”

U.S. President Donald Trump, however, has yet to congratulate his Russian counterpart on the reelection, according to the White House that said a phone call between the two leaders has yet to be set up.

Washington announced last week that it was enacting new sanctions on Russia, over accusations that Moscow had interfered in the U.S. 2016 presidential election. Moscow has consistently denied the allegation.

Britain has also yet to react to Putin’s victory, since it has engaged in a row with Moscow after the recent nerve agent attack against former spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia in the English city of Salisbury.

The UK government blamed the attack on Russia, but Moscow denies the allegations over the use of the banned substance within the UK borders.

On the other side of the world, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe congratulated Putin in a phone call and the two leaders agreed to work together for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, according to the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

From the northeast corner of Africa, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi sent his “warmest congratulations” to Putin, according to a statement.

Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and his father King Salman also sent congratulations and wished the Russian president “constant good health and happiness and his people steady progress and prosperity.”

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also sent a congratulatory message to Putin and praised what he called “trust and understanding” between Tel Aviv and Moscow.

Iran, China, Syria, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Venezuela, Bolivia and Cuba were among the first countries to congratulate Putin.

Original article

Former French President Nicolas Sarkozy was in police custody on Tuesday, March 20 morning, where he was to be questioned as part of an investigation into suspected irregularities over his election campaign financing, an official in the French judiciary said, according to Reuters.

The probe related to alleged Libyan funding for Sarkozy’s 2007 campaign, Le Monde newspaper reported.

A lawyer for Sarkozy could not be reached immediately for comment.

The United Nations should urge the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord and competing authorities in eastern Libya to create conditions conducive to a free and fair vote before rushing to hold general elections in 2018, Human Rights Watch said today.

For elections to be free and fair, they need to be held in an environment free of coercion, discrimination, or intimidation of voters, candidates, and political parties, Human Rights Watch said. Three key elements should be respected: protection of free speech and assembly; rules that are neither discriminatory nor arbitrary in excluding potential voters or candidates; and the rule of law, accompanied by a functioning judiciary that is able to deal fairly and promptly with disputes concerning the elections. The judiciary should be prepared to fairly resolve disputes around campaigns and elections, such as on registration, candidacies, and results. Election organizers need to ensure that independent monitors have access to polling places.

“Libya today couldn’t be further away from respect for the rule of law and human rights, let alone from acceptable conditions for free elections,” said Eric Goldstein, deputy Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “The authorities need to be able to guarantee freedom of assembly, association and speech to anyone participating in the elections.”

The UN has publicly supported holding elections in 2018. It is essential for UN officials and the Security Council to join forces to press all Libyan parties to ensure that the conditions for a credible nationwide election can be met before organizing one, Human Rights Watch said.

During a meeting brokered by President Emmanuel Macron of France in July 2017 between Prime Minister Fayez Serraj, of the Government of National Accord, and Khalifa Hiftar, commander of the Libyan National Army forces based in eastern Libya, both agreed in principle to hold speedy elections, within the first half of 2018. Currently, there is no comprehensive plan or guarantees, to secure protection for freedom of association and assembly and the rule of law.

Serraj later told the French foreign minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, during a meeting in Tripoli that his government was “pushing ahead” for 2018 elections. Agila Saleh, head of the Libyan House of Representatives, based in eastern Libya, which supports Hiftar’s group, has called for parliamentary and presidential elections “as soon as possible to end disputes over the legitimacy and competition for political positions in Libya.”

The UN Security Council and the European Union back the Government of National Accord, which is supported by armed groups and militias in western Libya, but has limited control over territory. The other, rival, Interim Government based in the eastern cities of al-Bayda, Tobruk and Benghazi, is also supported by the Libyan National Army, which controls large swaths of eastern and southern Libya, with the exception of the eastern city of Derna.

Violence following the last Libyan general elections in 2014 led to the collapse of central authority and key institutions, notably law enforcement and the judiciary. The result was two opposing governments competing for legitimacy. Armed groups have, since then, kidnapped, arbitrarily detained, tortured, forcibly disappeared, and killed thousands of people, with impunity. The protracted conflicts have decimated the economy and public services, and internally displaced 165,000 people.

Jeffrey Feltman, under-secretary-general for political affairs, pledged the UN’s support for organizing “inclusive” elections in 2018. The special representative to the UN secretary general and head of the UN Support Mission in Libya, Ghassan Salamé, has often publicly expressed his wish for general elections in 2018, while acknowledging the lack of a constitutional framework and suitable conditions in Libya.

In an effort in September to reinvigorate a stalled political process amid violent conflicts, Salamé announced a new Action Plan for Libya. The plan included consensus for limited amendments to the existing Libyan Political Agreement, followed by a national conference, a constitutional referendum, and legislation to provide for parliamentary and presidential elections. The EU, EU member states – including France – and the United States, have all endorsed the Action Plan. No date has been announced for these steps.

Restrictive laws have undermined freedom of speech and association in Libya, and armed groups have intimidated, harassed, threatened, physically attacked, and arbitrarily detained journalists, political activists, and human rights defenders. The penal code stipulates criminal penalties for defamation and for “insulting” public officials and the Libyan nation or flag and imposes the death penalty for “promoting theories or principles” that aim to overthrow the political, social, or economic system.

Laws on peaceful assembly unnecessarily limit citizens’ ability to freely express themselves through spontaneous and organized demonstrations and protests, with unduly harsh penalties. Authorities should ensure that any restrictions on public gatherings are strictly necessary for protecting public order.

The criminal justice system has all but collapsed. Civilian and military courts in the east and south remain mostly shut, while elsewhere they operate at reduced capacity. Armed groups have threatened, intimidated, and attacked judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and government officials. Law enforcement and criminal investigation departments around the country are only partially functional, often lacking the ability to execute court-issued summons and arrest warrants. Libya’s courts are in no position to resolve election disputes including on registration and results.

Prison authorities, often only nominally under the Ministries of Interior, Defense, and Justice of the two rival governments, hold thousands of detainees in long-term arbitrary detention without charges. Armed groups operate their own informal detention facilities. Under article 44 of the Libyan Political Agreement, the Government of National Accord should ensure that the authority to arrest and detain anyone is strictly limited to statutory law enforcement bodies, in compliance with Libyan and international law.

The High National Elections Commission, responsible for organizing elections, was established in January 2012 by the National Transitional Council. It announced the official start of the election process on December 7, with voter registration. By February 15, more than 2.4 million people had registered, its statistics show. As of March 8, 6,267 Libyans living abroad had registered. The commission extended the deadline several times, most recently until March 31. The International Organization for Migration estimates that at least 141,000 Libyans lived in the diaspora in 2015, although recent figures could be much higher.

Voter registration should be inclusive, accessible, and ensure that the largest number of eligible Libyans inside and outside the country can register, Human Rights Watch said. Provisions should also be made to register people held in long-term arbitrary detention without a criminal conviction since there is no legal basis for disqualifying them. The elections commission should also ensure regular transparent audits of its voter register to rule out any inaccuracies.

The legal framework for holding elections remains opaque. The election commission can only hold elections if the House of Representatives passes an elections law. Libya has only an interim Constitutional Covenant, adopted in 2011. A draft constitution proposed by the Constitution Drafting Assembly in July has yet to be put to a national referendum. The election commission has yet to clarify the legal framework for participation by political parties, and how independent and international monitors can be brought safely to all areas where voting is planned.

As a party to international human rights treaties, Libya is bound by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which guarantee freedom of speech, expression, and association. Libya is also bound by the 2002 African Union Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, which state that democratic elections must be held under “democratic constitutions and in compliance with supportive legal instruments,” and under a “system of separation of powers that ensures in particular, the independence of the judiciary.”

On any given day, 20 percent of Americans account for nearly half of U.S. diet-related greenhouse gas emissions, and high levels of beef consumption are largely responsible, according to a new study from researchers at the University of Michigan and Tulane University.

To estimate the impact of U.S. dietary choices on greenhouse gas emissions, the researchers built a database that assessed the environmental impacts involved in producing more than 300 types of foods. Then they linked the database to the findings of a nationally representative, one-day dietary recall survey involving more than 16,000 American adults.

They ranked the diets by their associated greenhouse gas emissions, from lowest to highest, then divided them into five equal groups, or quintiles. The researchers found that the 20 percent of U.S. diets with the highest carbon footprint accounted for 46 percent of total diet-related greenhouse emissions.

The highest-impact group was responsible for about eight times more emissions than the lowest quintile of diets. And beef consumption accounted for 72 percent of the emissions difference between the highest and lowest groups, according to the study.

“A big take home message for me is the fact that high-impact diets are such a large part of the overall contribution to food-related greenhouse gases,” said U-M researcher Martin Heller, first author of a paper scheduled for publication March 20 in the journal Environmental Research Letters.

The study estimated the greenhouse gas emissions associated with food production only. Emissions related to the processing, packaging, distribution, refrigeration and cooking of those foods were not part of the study but would likely increase total emissions by 30 percent or more, Heller said.

“Reducing the impact of our diets–by eating fewer calories and less animal-based foods–could achieve significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in the United States. It’s climate action that is accessible to everyone, because we all decide on a daily basis what we eat,” said Heller, a researcher at the U-M Center for Sustainable Systems in the School for Environment and Sustainability.

If Americans in the highest-impact group shifted their diets to align with the U.S. average–by consuming fewer overall calories and relying less on meat–the one-day greenhouse-gas emissions reduction would be equivalent to eliminating 661 million passenger-vehicle miles, according to the researchers.

That hypothetical diet shift, if implemented every day of the year and accompanied by equivalent shifts in domestic food production, would achieve nearly 10 percent of the emissions reductions needed for the United States to meet its targets under the Paris climate accord, the authors wrote. Though President Trump announced his intention to withdraw the United States from the accord, many states and municipalities are still working to meet the emissions targets.

In the United States in 2010, food production was responsible for about 8 percent of the nation’s heat-trapping greenhouse gas emissions. In general, animal-based foods are responsible for more greenhouse gas emissions per pound than plant-based foods. The production of both beef cattle and dairy cows is tied to especially high emissions levels.

For starters, cows don’t efficiently convert plant-based feed into muscle or milk, so they must eat lots of feed. Growing that feed often involves the use of fertilizers and other substances manufactured through energy-intensive processes. And then there’s the fuel used by farm equipment.

In addition, cows burp lots of methane, and their manure also releases this potent greenhouse gas.

“Previous studies of diet-related greenhouse gas emissions have focused mainly on the average diet in a given country. This study is the first in the United States to look instead at self-reported dietary choices of a nationally representative sample of thousands of Americans,” said Diego Rose, principal investigator on the project and a professor of nutrition and food security at Tulane University’s School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine.

By linking their database of environmental impacts to the individual, self-reported diets in the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, the U-M and Tulane researchers were able to estimate the distribution of diet-related impacts across the entire U.S. population on a given day.

They found that Americans in the highest-impact quintile consumed more than twice as many calories on a given day–2,984 versus 1,323–than those in the bottom 20 percent. But even when the findings were adjusted for caloric intake, the highest-impact quintile was still responsible for five times more emissions than the lowest-impact group.

Meat accounted for 70 percent of the food-associated greenhouse gas emissions in the highest-impact group but only 27 percent in the lowest-impact group.

Over the past 34 years, rainfall in Uganda has decreased by about 12 percent even though many of the global climate models predict an increase in rainfall for the area, according to an international team of researchers. Rainfall levels in Uganda impact agriculture, food security, wildlife habitats and regional economics as well as the prevalence of certain diseases.

“We didn’t plan to study the climate,” said Steven J. Schiff, Brush Chair Professor of Engineering in the Departments of Neurosurgery, Engineering Science and Mechanics and Physics, Penn State. “But we realized we needed the information to study infections. The biggest need for infant brain surgery in the developing world is infection-caused hydrocephalus.”

While there are congenital cases of hydrocephalus, infectious disease causes the majority of cases in Uganda. Infections are the cause of large numbers of infant deaths during the first four weeks of life and half those deaths take place in sub-Saharan Africa. Those who do not die, often develop hydrocephalus, a buildup of fluids in the brain cavities that can cause head deformation and cognitive deficits. It is estimated that there are 100,000 to 200,000 such cases each year in sub-Saharan Africa.

“Previous research showed that intermediate levels of rainfall are associated with peaks in the number of cases of hydrocephalus,” said Schiff. “We had to take a careful look at rainfall. We had county-level information, but we had to get down to the village level.”

Paddy Ssentongo, assistant research professor, Center for Neural Engineering and Engineering Science and Mechanics, Penn State, worked with several government agencies in Uganda to establish a collaboration. Using census data, election data and village boundary information, combined with weather and climate data from the African desk of the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, they managed to fuse village details with satellite rainfall data over the past 34 years. They reported their results in a recent issue of Scientific Reports.

“Uganda is a developing country dependent on rain-fed agriculture,” said Ssentongo. “If it depends on agriculture then you look at rainfall. If rainfall isn’t dependable, farmers lose crops.”

Another consideration, according to Ssentongo, is that understanding the fluctuations in rainfall can help municipalities and national governments plan infrastructure to improve growth and the economy. Resilience needs to be built into agricultural planning to adjust to the decrease in rainfall in the greater Horn of Africa over these past four decades. In addition, the Bwindi Impenetrable National Park in Southwest Uganda is also affected by the drier climate and the Bwindi Forest is the last habitat of the mountain gorilla.

For these reasons, the Ugandan government was very interested in fully understanding the climate data and supplied detailed geospatial data so they could have location-specific climate data for planning.

The researchers found that the rainfall predicted for East Africa on a decadal scale by models using the effects of the El Niño Southern Oscillation and the Indian Ocean Dipole did not account for as much of the rainfall fluctuations as expected for the past 34 years. This is in part because the rainfall fluctuations fall during shorter timespans than decades.

Uganda has two rainy seasons, one from March to May and one from October to December. The rainy seasons have higher malaria rates, but are also related to a variety of bacterial and viral infections that have seasonal and rainfall related rates. Hydrocephalus also has a pattern related to the rainfall seasons which varies by location.

“With climate data at this level, we can pinpoint the address of every baby with hydrocephalus and correlate that to a square on the satellite rainfall maps,” said Schiff. “We can know how much rain had been falling on that address when the infant became ill.”

The researchers’ goals are to identify vulnerable areas for epidemic diseases, particularly neonatal sepsis and through this identification develop ways to prevent and treat these diseases.

“We can’t track the disease causes unless we take the major environmental conditions into account,” said Schiff.

New Delhi has no choice but to deftly manage Sino-Indian relations.

By Harsh V. Pant

With Xi Jinping emerging as the ‘President for life’ in China, a new political order is taking shape in India’s most important neighbour. Gone is the reticence of yore in proclaiming that China will bide its time. The new leadership is keen on China projecting power not merely in its immediate vicinity but also far from the nation’s shores. The old order that Deng Xiaoping had so carefully nurtured to protect the Middle Kingdom from the insecurities of one man rule and all that comes with it has been consigned to the dustbin. And in its place a highly centralised, hierarchical and authoritarian political order has emerged with Xi Jinping at its very core.

Xi began his second term as head of the party and military last October at the end of a once-every-five-years party congress. His real source of authority emanates from him being the CPC’s General Secretary — a post that has no term limit – as well as being  the head of the powerful Central Military Commission.  His political doctrine, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” is now part of the amended constitution. After the National People’s Congress voted overwhelmingly in favour of a constitutional amendment last week which gives Xi the right to remain in office indefinitely, Chinese President Xi Jinping is now officially the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong. The National People’s Congress has also appointed close Xi ally Wang Qishan who was previously in charge of corruption investigations in China to the largely ceremonial post of vice-president.

Large scale changes in the governmental structures are also in the offing with the Congress passing them in line with Xi’s priorities which include cracking down on corruption, stablising the economy and environmental protection. These new initiatives and restructuring will include setting up a powerful new financial regulator as well as a super ministry to deal with the environment. This reorganisation will see the number of ministerial-level bodies getting reduced by eight to make the government in order to improved delivery efficient.  A new Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission is being set up to address growing concerns around financial risk and bad debt. On the foreign policy front, a new international development cooperation agency will now prioritise how China spends its tens of billions of dollars in overseas assistance, including those part of its ambitious the Belt and Road Initiative.

The world is now looking at a much more confident China which is sure of its political helmsmanship. While a new reality a dawning in the West that for all the hopes that it had about democracy in China, it is more authoritarian today than it was a few years back. The liberal fallacy of democracy riding on the coattails of economic liberalisation have been belied and it is not readily evident if a West which is some completely mired in its own internal dysfunctionalities has the ability and the willingness to match Chinese ambitions. The leader of the pack, the US, is so distracted by the Trump induced domestic drama that it has little time to carve out a coherent strategy vis-a-vis Beijing despite blowing hot and cold. And so the challenge for a country like India is going to be even more severe in the coming years.

Unfortunately, we are also giving signs of growing incoherence in our China policy precicely at a time when coherence and a clear eyed view is most needed. Discouraging government officials from attending a planned public event titled ‘Thank You India’ being organised in New Delhi on 1 April, 2018, and then publicising it has been a public relations disaster without it being clear how this will firm up ties with India. In Maldives, New Delhi decided that asserting its interests would be tantamount to provoking the Chinese, so we have taken a step back, letting China roll all over us. And a think-tank in Delhi has been asked to postpone an annual conference just because its deliberations may annoy the Chinese. China’s response too has been predictable. Its Foreign Minister Wang Yi have resorted to usual clichés by suggesting that it was time for the Chinese dragon and Indian elephant to dance together rather than fight each other. “The Chinese dragon and the Indian elephant must not fight each other but dance with each other. If China and India are united, one plus one will not equal two but 11,” was his mantra. Use of such clichés often implies exactly the opposite that there is no hope in the bilateral ties at all.

By ignoring China threat, Indian policy makers over the last two decades not only exacerbated the trust deficit with China and have also made it virtually impossible to stand up to China even on issues which are vitally important to India. The power differential between the two has grown at an alarming rate. It cannot be rectified in a few years time but the way our defence procurement and strategic thinking is evolving makes it amply clear that few in the policy establishment have an interest in getting this right. New Delhi has no choice but to deftly manage Sino-Indian relations but pandering to Chinese concerns, real and imagined, did not result in a change in Chinese behaviour in the past and it won’t result in any sort of a ‘rest’ of Sino-Indian relations today.

This article originally appeared in DailyO.

A proposed joint development (JD) in the West Philippine Sea (WPS) between the Philippines and China has revived debates on how best to move forward in the longstanding regional flashpoint. There should be no debate – the Philippines should enter into the JD, even if the partner is a state-owned entity, as long as it can deliver. Most importantly, JD does not necessarily impact adversely the 2016 arbitral ruling and the Philippine sovereignty and sovereign rights position on the WPS. The Philippine service contract (SC) system may offer a solution for both countries and can accommodate a JD. This approach to JD can enhance the country’s energy security, create jobs, promote technology and knowledge transfer, and contribute in dispute management.

According to Philippine law, the government may directly undertake exploration and development of indigenous petroleum resources or indirectly by awarding SCs to technically competent and financially capable entities, local or foreign. Service contractors, in return, can partake of the revenue sharing to collect their service fees and operating expenses.

Pragmatism as regional norm

Southeast Asian countries are inclined to take a pragmatic approach on contested resource-rich areas. In fact, the Philippines is the only Southeast Asian country that has yet to enter into a JD with a neighbor over a disputed maritime area. Malaysia and Thailand (1979 MoU; 1990 JD Agreement), Malaysia and Vietnam (1992), Thailand and Vietnam (1997), Indonesia-Malaysia-Vietnam (2000), Vietnam and China (2000), Cambodia and Vietnam (2001), and Brunei and Malaysia (2009) have all entered into various forms of JD. It is no coincidence that Malaysia and Vietnam, the most active in JDs, are among the region’s largest energy producers. State-owned energy firms (e.g., Malaysia’s Petronas, Petrovietnam, Indonesia’s Pertamina, Thailand’s PTT) are at the forefront of these deals. Even tiny Timor Leste had a JD with Australia (2003), a case of a small and big neighbor setting aside dispute for a pragmatic resource cooperation.

The 1982 UNCLOS noted the dilemma of countries in need of harnessing resources in disputed maritime areas without diminishing their claims. Provisional arrangements in the exclusive economic zone (Part V Art 74 para 3) and continental shelf (Part VI Art 83 para 3) are enshrined in the constitution of the oceans and there is considerable jurisprudence and global state practice on it. Maritime delimitation need not even precede or its absence need not constitute an effective impediment as proven by some of the above-cited JDs.

Recognizing attendant political and legal risks, most JD agreements use standard clauses saying that such interim practical undertakings will not jeopardize or affect the claims or positions of contracting parties. Even the controversial 2005 Tripartite Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) between the Philippines, Vietnam and China carried a similar clause: “WHEREAS, the Parties recognize that the signing of this Agreement shall not undermine the basic position held by the Government of each Party on the South China Sea issue.”

Constitutional openings

Political will is a key element of JD and President Duterte seems determined to turn the concept into reality. The Philippine Constitution (Art XII Sec 2) allows the president to enter into agreements with foreign companies for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals and petroleum, providing cover for JD. The exclusive use and enjoyment of marine wealth applies to all maritime zones, but curiously omitted is any mention of the continental/insular shelf, where seabed minerals, like oil and gas, are extracted. Perhaps the framers of the 1987 Constitution wanted to allow for the JD option given that provisional arrangements were encouraged by the 1982 UNCLOS.

Furthermore, the Constitution and Philippine petroleum law (PD 87) have no expressed prohibition on partnering with a state-owned firm. China’s key strategic sectors, such as energy, power, transportation, telecommunications and banking, are in the hands of the state so it is only likely that it will nominate a state-owned firm to work with its Philippine counterpart (e.g., state-owned PNOC) to implement a JD if both sides agreed to it.

The 60/40 ownership ratio (in favor of the Philippines) stipulated in the Constitution is not an obstacle. The ratio does not apply to the SC stake/interest per se, but rather to the net proceeds arising from production sharing – at least that is how the Department of Energy has interpreted it. As such, SC57 has the following ownership stake breakdown: 51 percent CNOOC, PNOC 28 percent and Mitra (Malaysian firm), 21 percent. SC38 in Malampaya, the country’s largest operating natural gas field, has a more lopsided breakdown in favor of foreign entities – 45 percent owned by Shell, 45 percent by Chevron and only 10 percent by PNOC. This works well for joint developments, which are more concerned with cost and benefit sharing between contracting parties than ownership.

Search for a face-saving formula

Like any sovereign state, Philippines awarded offshore SCs in WPS without taking into account others’ claims, but the persistence of disputes affected the attractiveness of these SCs. The difference between a SC and JD seem clear from the Philippine standpoint, but the Chinese may prefer ambiguity for good reason. China can take part in a Philippine service contract (under Philippine law) and promote it domestically (in China) as JD (to save face at home), a point I made in an earlier piece.

China has shown interest in being a Philippine service contractor – not even technically a JD partner. In 2006, CNOOC bought a 51 percent stake in SC57 (Calamian), but this was not acted upon. And, in 2013, CNOOC and the Philippine private energy firm Philex discussed partnership for SC72 (in Recto Bank), which is within China’s nine-dash line claim. These were reported as commercial deals and there was no substantial mention of JD. These examples are lost opportunities for both sides, especially Manila. It could have engaged China (via CNOOC) to explore and develop oil and gas in WPS under domestic law. It is likely China might want to package participation in a Philippine-based SC as JD for domestic public consumption.

Moving forward

Improving bilateral relations and confidence-building measures since 2016 are creating favorable conditions for the resumption of upstream activities in the area. JD will send a good signal to industry and make the Philippines attractive again to big players, including regional SOEs. JD is a political as much as commercial undertaking and government saw it as a realistic, feasible, and promising way forward in the WPS. Duterte can use his high public approval as a mandate to proceed. CNOOC has long expressed its interest in working with Philippine and/or other foreign partners. Manila should be open to all willing and capable partners, regardless where they come from, and this seems to be the position of the current administration.

The present Philippine government has several cards to play. Duterte enjoys tremendous goodwill from China. JD is more important for Manila from an energy standpoint given increasing energy requirements and aging fields, while it is more important for Beijing to score political (at home) and diplomatic (peripheral diplomacy) points. Beijing may take a softer line and agree to be a contractor for SCs 57 or even 58 (further west), but may take a firmer stance for a JD in SC72. Proximity and existing infrastructure also work in Manila’s favor. Palawan and Luzon are the nearest landmasses to WPS and there is a downstream infrastructure in Batangas and Bataan provinces (in Luzon) that can be bolstered to serve a burgeoning market. Lastly, the administration may have decided not to assert the 2016 arbitral ruling now, but that does not mean it cannot leverage it.

This article was published by CSIS.

By Medea Benjamin*

Saudi Arabia’s 32-year-old Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, heir to the Saudi throne after eliminating his rivals, is on a two-week whirlwind visit to the United States starting March 19. He plans to cement his ties to the Trump administration, shore up support for his war in Yemen while whipping up more opposition to Iran, and make lucrative business deals. From political meetings with Donald Trump and Congress to cultural events at DC’s Kennedy Center, a talk at MIT, gatherings with tech leaders in Silicon Valley and oil executives in Houston, the prince will be selling dolled-up versions of both his repressive kingdom and his favorite product from the House of Saud: himself. But don’t get sucked into the media hype, seeded by well-paid PR firms, that the prince is a reformer who is bringing substantive change to the kingdom.

MbS, as he is known from his initials, is really a brutal bully responsible for bombing and starving Yemenis. He’s also gunning for a war with Iran, blaming Iran for the Middle East turmoil. Meanwhile, he recklessly imposed a blockade of Qatar that has divided the Gulf States and tried to force a bizarre showdown with Hezbollah in Lebanon by holding Prime Minister Hariri hostage. Recent reports reveal that he has even been holding his own mother under house arrest, hidden from her husband King Salman, for fear she would stand in the way of her son’s ruthless power grab.

Yes, it is true that MbS is making some positive reforms. Women will soon be able to drive and the morality police are not as repressive. Movie theatres are opening, and more cultural events are allowed (although they must all pass government muster and most are gender-segregated). But these reforms are minor in the larger picture of a kingdom that brooks no dissent internally and is committing war crimes abroad. According to Human Rights Watch, “Mohammed bin Salman’s well-funded image as a reformist falls flat in the face of Yemen’s humanitarian catastrophe and scores of activists and political dissidents languishing in Saudi prisons on spurious charges. Baby steps on women’s rights reforms don’t paper over Saudi Arabia’s systemic abuses.”

The prince’s most destructive policy is his war on Yemen (bin Salman is head of both the military and the economy). Started in March 2015 in what the prince thought would be a quick and dirty campaign to defeat the Houthi rebels, the relentless Saudi bombing campaign and restrictions on humanitarian aid have turned Yemen into the world’s greatest humanitarian disaster. The US participation in this Yemen war includes selling the Saudis billions of dollars in weapons (Saudi Arabia is the number one purchaser of US weapons) and providing in-air refueling of their bomber planes. Bin Salman’s visit is coming at precisely the time when the Senate is embroiled in a debate over Resolution 54, a bipartisan resolution that would end the unauthorized US military participation in the Yemen conflict. The prince will certainly use his visit to shore up support for the war, painting it as a fight against the Iran-backed Houthis rather than Saudi interference in Yemen’s internal affairs.

To consolidate his power at home before the death of his father, King Salman, MbS has just pulled off a heist that would make bank robber Butch Cassidy green with envy. He rounded up hundreds of his rival elites and held them hostage in the gilded Ritz-Carlton Hotel until they turned over billions of dollars, real estate and shares of their companies to his control. According to a New York Times exposé, some detainees were subjected to such physical abuse that 17 were hospitalized and one died in custody, with a neck that appeared twisted, a badly swollen body and other signs of abuse.

The whole affair was framed as a fight against corruption, but all transactions were conducted in secret and outside the law. Those who  have been released are banned from travel and are afraid to denounce bin Salman for fear of further reprisals. Meanwhile, the prince who is portrayed as a Saudi Robin Hood taking from the elite to spread to the poor bought a $500 million yacht from a Russian vodka financier, a $300 million French chateau described as “the world’s most expensive home,” and a $450 million Leonardo da Vinci painting purchased at a Christie’s auction–the most expensive painting ever sold.

So don’t be fooled. Beneath the veneer of reform is a young man who believes that his bloodline gives him the right to become the next absolute monarch in a family that has ruled the nation with an iron fist since its founding in 1932. The Saudi kingdom is still governed by an intolerant version of Islam, Wahhabism, and spreads that ideology around the world. The government still represses the Shia minority and non-Muslims, and remains a country where atheism is a capital offense and all churches are banned. Free speech and free association are forbidden. There are no national elections and political parties are banned, as are unions and most civic organizations. Criticizing the Saudi regime can lead to flogging, harsh jail sentences or beheading.

While Saudi Arabia will soon lose the distinction of being the only country in the world where women can’t drive, the regime continues to be the world’s most misogynist, gender-segregated country. The guardianship system gives men authority over the most important decisions in women’s lives, and women are forced to be covered in black from head to toe when they are out in public.

A repressive kingdom ruled, de facto, by a cunning, 32-year-old strongman who has made hundreds of internal enemies among the elite and conducts foreign policy in a more impetuous manner than Donald Trump is a recipe for disaster. The United States should not be arming and abetting this regime and investors dazzled by the prince’s charm offensive and gobs of money should take a second look. If Saudi Arabia is indeed to move into the 21st century, it must stop being governed by royalty.

*Medea Benjamin is cofounder of the peace group CODEPINK and author of Kingdom of the Unjust: Behind the US-Saudi Connection.

India’s Middle East foreign policy has been on a road to de-hyphenating Indo-Israel relations with that of its support for Palestinian self-determination. The question that arises is how much India’s Israel policy was hyphenated with Palestine and why? The answer to this question has to be found in the trajectory of historical engagement of India with Arab-Israel conflict.

India’s Palestine policy has been influenced by among others factors, Indian national freedom movement and nonaligned policy. The case against colonialism and racism was expressed by Indian leadership in universal terms as they spoke for the end of colonialism everywhere. There was also a clear position of Indian National Congress (INC) that Independent India would stand for democracy, constitutionalism, pluralism and individual freedom. In contrast, Zionist movement which gained sympathy in the Christian world in the face of the plight of Jews in Germany relied on imperialist powers for their cause.

At that time Gandhi said that Palestine is not an empty land waiting for Zionist to settle and it was wrong and inhumane to impose the Jews on the Arabs. Indian leadership believed that it was unfair what the Zionists are doing behind veil of British colonialism against Arabs. Although the Indian leadership stand was guided by ethical values, but it also came to associate with an INC policy of using Palestine factor to serve domestic Hindu-Muslim unity. On the other hand right wing groups saw Israel as a means to express their anti-Muslim agenda.

Also to counter Pakistan’s quest for creating a Pan-Islamic alliance with Middle Eastern states, India put its bet on valuing friendship with secular regimes of the Arab world especially the regimes of Egypt and Syria. These secular regimes also took a pro-India stand on Kashmir. Furthermore, India and Arab republics were users of Soviet Union military hardware, which added Soviet factor to India’s Middle East policy.

With the 1967 Arab-Israel war, Israel came to control all historical Palestine which was in 1948 divided by the United Nations between Arab and Jews. India’s public position was that Israel should withdraw from the Palestinian territory captured in the war. India also supported the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a representative of Palestinian nation.

However the international climate in 1990s changed in favor of Israel as both capitalism and US were victorious from the ideological and geopolitical competition with the Soviet Union. The international criticism that US was quick to mobilize its military might against Iraqi occupation of Kuwait but defends Israeli occupation, led to US sponsored Arab-Israel peace process. With the beginning of the peace process, India normalized its relations with Israel in 1992. Although the Oslo Peace Process failed to end the occupation or pressure Israel to stop settlements activities, India has not looked back since then. Many in India argued that we cannot afford to go back, as India cannot be more pro-Arab than Arabs.

At the time there was no Indian Muslim outcry against this decision as it was a period when communal tensions were at their highest. The Muslim political representation was falling and political right was on rise. The Arab world was also divided on sectarian basis and Saudi Arabia led camp had come realize that Israel is the counterweight against the rising power of Iran. Israel has also offered to India, military technology, which other states were not willing to share at that time.

Subsequently, the BJP led government of AB Vajpayee tried to de-hyphenate India’s Palestine policy from its relations with Israel. There was now a high level of political engagement. When world was reluctant to invite Israeli PM Shimon Peres for alleged role in massacre of Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Beirut in 1982, India opened the red carpet for him in New Delhi in 2003. A decade of INC led United Progressive Alliance was also marked by highly robust bilateral relations with Israel.

However in UN, India continued to support Palestinian cause, for example, its vote in favour of Palestinian membership in United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and non-Member Observer State status in the UN.

When BJP came back power in 2014, the ties with Israel witnessed a colossal shift. India left behind its reluctance to openly engage with Israel at the highest level. Both President and Prime Minister made their maiden visits to Israel. PM Modi even visited the grave of Theodre Herzl, the founder of the Zionist movement. India also abstained when Israeli policies in occupied territories were discussed in UN. This led to criticism that India has abstained from its decades long principled stance on Palestine.

To balance his clear pro-Israel tilt, PM Modi made a high profile visit to Palestine in February 2017. The visit was also utilized to make it visible that India has fully de hyphenated Israel and Palestine policy. He reiterated India’s support for Palestine but avoided any reference on status of Jerusalem which has become a controversial issue since the US decision to shift its Israeli embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

To conclude, India has elevated marginal status of Israel since 1992 to a strategic level partner. The Indo-Israel political process has become a normal diplomatic activity and decisions in the UN and its bodies pertaining to Israeli policies in occupied territories are taken to strike balance in relations rather taking sides. Therefore, when it comes to criticism of Israeli policies in occupied territories, India has begun to follow abstention which many European states do and when it comes to define the status of occupied territories, it has begun to go along with the majority of states, as it did in December 22, 2017 in response to the US decision on changing status of Jerusalem. Thus, in the light of history and current developments it can be said that India’s Palestine policy is not derived from some principle of fairness but from the pragmatic rationale of national interest.

*Shakeel Maqbool is an officer in the Ministry of Finance, Government of India
besides having a Research Fellowship in Political science, and Mumtaz Ahmed Shah is pursuing PHD in International relations from IIT Madras, India.

Iran’s recent proposal for Pakistan to join the Chabahar Port may reflect its lack of trust on its counterpart “India”. India may stop the development of this project under the US pressure. Besides, Indo-US strategic robust strategic partnership can put pressure on Iran because US-Iran relations are not cordial.

In this context, Iran cannot rely only on India in terms of long run cooperation and it needs more strategic partners in order to avoid any sort of monopoly of both India and the US on the Chabahar Port.

There are two factors which may reflect Iran’s aspirations behind its offer to Pakistan to join its Chabahar Port. First: Iran did this in order to sidestep any Indian domination with the help of America on the Chabahar Port to reach Central Asian energy reserves. Second: Iran may want to counterbalance Saudi Arabia’s inclination towards Pakistan.

Iran wants to expand its market as it owns the world’s second largest gas reserves.

China-Pakistan strategic partnership is enhancing to counterbalance Indo-US growing influence in the South Asian region. Moreover, the development of Gwadar Port and the construction of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) under China’s Belt and Road Initiative are the serious concerns for India and the US.

Up till now, India is silent over Iran’s offer to Pakistan. If Pakistan accepts this offer in order to enhance its bilateral ties with Iran, It is quite possible that India might exclude itself from the Chabahar project because India always alleges Pakistan for terrorism claiming that terror and trade cannot go together.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, it has handed over its Gwadar Port on a lease to China for its development. The port remained undeveloped since last several years because of Pakistan’s fragile economic condition. China is pursuing its strategic objectives through heavy investment mainly to enhance its trade with Middle East, Africa and Europe through the Gwadar Port. Therefore, Pakistan cannot afford any investment on any other project such as Chabahar Port.

Simultaneously, there is no urgency for Pakistan to join Chabahar Port to reach to Central Asia (CA). It can access CA through linking Peshawar to Kabul which would connect Pakistan with Central Asian energy rich states under its CPEC. However, Iran has also offered China to join or invest in Chabahar Port project. China has already immensely invested in Iran such as a Chinese state-owned investment firm provided a $10 billion credit line for Iranian banks, Iran’s central bank last year. It is fact that Iran is important to China’s trade ambitions as it develops its trillion-dollar “Belt and Road” strategy aimed at boosting its ties to Europe and Africa.

Furthermore, China’s Export–Import Bank committed to a further $10 billion in loans, while the China Development Bank signed preliminary deals with Iran for $15 billion in infrastructure and production projects. Bilateral trade of Iran and China was just $31 billion in 2016 but it jumped more than 30 percent in the first six months of 2017. Since the lifting of sanctions on Iran, Beijing has opened two credit lines worth $4.2 billion to build high-speed railway lines linking Tehran with Mashhad and Isfahan, the Iran Daily reported, last year.

Hereafter, it is quite practicable for China to invest in Chabahar Port to fulfill its energy demands. On the other hand, China’s cordial friend “Pakistan” has more to do in order to secure its CPEC project. Pakistan may appreciate Iran’s bid to join Chabahar Port and demonstrate its willingness to join this after the successful completion of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor least till the the completion of CPEC second phase by 2025. Simultaneously, Pakistan cannot carry out the responsibility to take part in the development of both ports (Chabahar and Gwadar). In this regard India may some reservation on Pakistan’s joining.

Moreover, Pakistan is being placed in the grey list of Financial Action Task Force for sponsoring terrorism. US military aid suspension of $2 billion to Pakistan is a New Year gift to Pakistan from the US in the beginning of 2018. It reflects that, Pakistan is being isolated from the regional politics by the Trump Administration and India’s growing influence in the region. Therefore, Pakistan is seeking other strategic partners other than the US such as Russia and China but not at the cost of Pak-US relations. In this context, a heavy responsibility upon Pakistan is to sustain satisfying relations with its neighbors including Iran.

Pakistan-Saudi Arabia cordial relations and the Former’s troops in Saudi Arabia may be a current point of concern for Iran. Iran perceives that these troops will be used in Saudi-led coalition forces in Yemen against Houthi rebels (backed by Iran). Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff responded on this reservation that Pakistan has sent its troops on the basis of training mission.

Iran’s Foreign Minister, Zarif has likened Iran’s relations with India to Pakistan’s ties with Saudi Arabia in his recent trip to Pakistan, “Our relations with India, just like Pakistan’s relations with Saudi Arabia, are not against Islamabad as we understand Pakistan’s relations with Saudi Arabia are not against Iran.”

In a nutshell, the security and stability of Afghanistan has huge importance. No development project can successfully be completed unless Afghanistan remains unstable. The recent Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s invitation to hold unconditional peace talks with the Taliban in the month of February is applauded by many countries including Pakistan and the US. China also has put weight behind this. Almost all states have appreciated Ghani’s initiative pursuing their own strategic interest and to complete their development project in the region. Initially the Taliban did show cold response against these peace talks. One could be optimistic that Afghanistan’s security situation will be improved under political solution in near future. All the developments are linked with stable Afghanistan.

*Asia Maqsood has degree of M. Phil in Defence and Strategic Studies from Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad. She has done Masters in International Relations from the same Institute. She frequenyly writes on China Pakistan affairs, CPEC, South Asia’s Regional Issues which have been published in various national, international blogs and newspapers. She can be reached at asiamaqsood.09@gmail.com

By Antonio Emmanuel R. Miranda*

In his policy speech at the National Diet in November 2017, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe denounced the nuclear provocations of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as the most severe risk to Japan’s national security in its postwar history. Within the same year, the DPRK conducted one nuclear bomb test and 23 missile launches, including test launches of intermediate-range ballistic missiles in August and September that flew over Hokkaido. Asserting its ideology of “self-reliance”, the DPRK regime under Kim Jong-un has reiterated its intention of further boosting its nuclear arsenal that can incapacitate Japan and even reach the North American continent. In response, Japan augmented its stance on the DPRK by implementing maximum diplomatic pressure. Prior to his reelection, Abe addressed the UN General Assembly in September 2017 to appeal for international support in disabling Pyongyang’s capacity to develop more nuclear weapons and missiles, emphasizing that dialogue has proven to be ineffective in denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.

The escalation of tensions has become a rallying call to enhance defense cooperation among Japan’s allies in the Asia-Pacific region. Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera described the rapid development of the DPRK’s nuclear program as “unprecedented, critical, and imminent” at the 2017 ASEAN+3 Defense Ministers’ Meeting in Clark, Philippines. As part of its proactive security policy, Japan is investing in its strategic partnerships with the US and South Korea to enhance the region’s collective ability to deter a nuclear war and maintain peace. In doing so, Japan faces numerous challenges that complicate the formulation of coordinated responses that would establish the foundations of nuclear disarmament in the region.

A “symmetric” Japan-US alliance

As long as the DPRK continues its provocative nuclear policy, the Japan-US alliance will be spurred to become stronger and more relevant. Buoyed by warmer personal relations between Prime Minister Abe and US President Donald Trump after the latter’s first state visit in Tokyo, the two countries’ diplomatic and defensive approaches more closely resonated against the DPRK. For instance, joint military trainings between the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the US Pacific Command that project their combined strength can be expected to continue and even intensify.

Japan’s ramped-up capacity-building efforts for its national defense signal its desire to establish a more equitable security relationship with the US. Guided by the principles of “self-help and mutual aid” under the 1952 US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, Japan is seeking to assume more responsibilities needed to develop its own capacities to respond to provocations and resist attacks. With a record defense budget exceeding JPY 5 trillion for 2018, it has approved the acquisition of F-35A joint strike fighters and the land-based Aegis Ashore missile defense system from the US. Compared to the mobile Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), the Aegis Ashore is a static and cost-effective system that only requires two location sites to cover Japan’s territory. With Trump’s active support for the acquisition of these equipment, the US welcomes Japan’s defense initiatives as being mutually beneficial to their interests. Nonetheless, a transition towards an enhanced security relationship still requires strategic coordination in light of the key role of the US in Japan’s security architecture. The presence and operations of US bases throughout the country are significant assets that support the strategic interests of the US and the activities of the SDF.

Rapprochement with South Korea

Among the East Asian countries threatened by their geopolitical proximity to the DPRK, South Korea remains an important partner for Japan. Thus, Japan intends to explore avenues to rejuvenate its bilateral relations with South Korea. Considering the similarities in their defense postures toward the DPRK and their respective military ties with the US, the two countries would be naturally inclined to bind themselves in a stronger partnership that strengthens the impact of trilateral cooperation and joint military exercises within the region. During the fifth meeting of the joint chiefs of staff of the US, Japan, and South Korea in October 2017, the three military organizations expressed their consensus in pursuing coordinated efforts to develop readiness for future provocations while reiterating their unified call for the total suspension of the DPRK’s nuclear program for violating international norms. Security cooperation is crucial as the three countries are expected to immediately respond to possible nuclear attacks.

However, the lack of closure on territorial disputes between Japan and South Korea impede greater cooperation. The countries’ conflicting claims to the Liancourt Rocks¹ are inextricable from unresolved animosities during the Second World War, and have led to political confrontations between their governments. While enhancing regional security is still a mutual priority, South Korea would oppose aggressive steps towards Japan’s full remilitarization that is reminiscent of its wartime past.

Understanding paradoxes in Japan’s security policy

Departing from its traditional image as a pacifist state, Japan is undergoing a major shift in its security policy as it aspires to a proactive presence in East Asia. Since the DPRK’s nuclear threats necessitate a pragmatic response, the current trajectory of Japan’s security relations indicates its alignment to nuclear deterrence. While it stands firm with its non-nuclear principles that prohibit the use of nuclear weapons within its territory, its heavy dependence on the US nuclear umbrella is central in its security policy. Consistent with this stance, Japan has not signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons along with other states who possess nuclear weapons.

Some challenges to Japan’s augmented defense posture are deeply rooted in its own traumatic experiences in nuclear warfare. Fierce internal opposition question the agenda of conservative government factions to enhance the security roles of the SDF. Since the inauguration of the first Abe administration in 2006, the Japanese people have become more divided on Abe’s pledge to revise the war-renouncing clause of the 1947 Peace Constitution which prohibits the maintenance of any war potential. Although such amendments are necessary in lifting the legal ambiguities of the SDF, opposition to the proposal grew to 54 percent in January 2018, marking the prevailing stigma of war in the Japanese psyche. Such weak public support could undermine the legitimacy of its proactive security measures. Moreover, the spike of accidents involving US and SDF assets that can potentially harm Japanese citizens could challenge the sustainability of Japan’s expanded military responsibilities. As such, the benefits of capacity-building measures with security partners can be overshadowed by increased risks to the Japanese people.

Japan as an East Asian military power?

Noting the unpredictability of the DPRK’s nuclear program, it may indeed be necessary for Japan to proactively enhance its own defense capabilities to protect itself. In the long term, it is inclined to adopt a two-track policy approach that combines diplomatic pressure and power-projection strategies with the US and South Korea to dissuade the DPRK from further acts of provocation or aggression. At its current pace, Japan’s potential to emerge as a major power in the Asia-Pacific region lies on its prudence in exercising these strategies with restraint, so as to allay fears of excessive rearmament and open conflict. As Japan continues to rely on the effectivity of the US nuclear guarantee, its security policy is not expected to advance further to an offensive stage. Regardless, such strategies should be managed deftly in order to lessen the risks of miscalculation and subsequent harm towards its own citizens.

The Philippines is strategically positioned as Japan’s most sympathetic partner in its complex mission to clear the “nuclear clouds” in the Korean Peninsula. Both countries have to manage their aspirations of a nuclear-free world within the reality of US deterrence. To accomplish this common goal, security relations between Japan and the Philippines can be strengthened through the alignment of their security policies that utilize diverse strategies for regional peace and stability. As labelled by President Rodrigo Duterte in his visit to Tokyo in 2017, a “golden age” of strategic relations with Japan is a valuable opportunity to improve the defense capabilities of the Philippines and fortify solidarity in denuclearization. This would not only magnify the prospects of a peaceful resolution of the crisis, but also mitigate the liabilities of nuclear deterrence. 

About the author:
*Antonio Emmanuel R. Miranda is a Foreign Affairs Research Specialist with the Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies of the Foreign Service Institute. Mr. Miranda can be reached at armiranda@fsi.gov.ph. The views expressed in this publication are of the authors alone and do not reflect the official position of the Foreign Service Institute, the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Government of the Philippines.

Source:
CIRSS Commentaries is a regular short publication of the Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies (CIRSS) of the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) focusing on the latest regional and global developments and issues.

Endnote
¹  The Liancourt Rocks are also known as Dok-do in South Korea, and Takeshima in Japan.

By Jayshree Sengupta

A new Trans Pacific Partnership agreement has been signed in Santiago, Chile, on 8 March. The original TPP agreement, comprising US plus 11 countries (Japan, Chile, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Mexico, Peru, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei and Vietnam), was signed  in 2016 but was not ratified because US President Donald Trump withdrew from it.   Now it has been rechristened CPTPP or Comprehensive Progressive Trans Pacific Partnership. It has to be ratified by least 6 member states to be effective. This is important because many members were just made to sign it but they may think it over later and withdraw.

President Trump, after taking up office in January this year, refused to sign the original TPP claiming that it was against the interests of the United States. Because it was largely drafted by US corporations during Obama’s presidency, Trump objected to it and said that it contained some controversial clauses.

Despite President Trump withdrawing, the 11 members of the original mega regional agreement did not want the TPP scrapped and went ahead without the US to draft a new agreement. The new treaty of 11 Pacific Rim countries incorporates changes in some 22 controversial provisions in the 632 pages agreement in order to accommodate Trump’s wishes regarding America’s interests. The grouping is very keen to woo back President Trump so that CPTPP becomes an important mega Regional Trading Agreement of the world, currently covering 13.5 percent of the global GDP.

Trump may or may not relent and in all probability will not sign the agreement. He has started a trade war involving two of the member countries — Canada and Mexico — belonging to the CPTPP.  No one knows when it will end or what the consequences will be.

India and China are not part of this mega agreement but are part of RCEP —Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership – which is even bigger with ASEAN 10, India, China, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea, but it is on hold.

Both these two partnerships, in which negotiations are behind closed doors, are a relatively new phenomenon. The main purpose of these mega trade agreements is to facilitate trade and investment within a region with low tariffs and an enabling investment environment. They seek to lay down rules and regulations for regional commerce.

The most significant revisions in CPTPP are in chapters on investors’ ability to litigate and the new agreement limits the ability to litigate relative to the original TPP. The intellectual property rights chapter has also been modified and the length of patent protection for innovative medicines has been shortened and technology and information protection have been narrowed. Copyright periods for written materials have also been shortened but the chapter on state owned enterprises has more or less remained the same. On government procurement, the new agreement permits government contracts to be open to foreign bidders.

On the whole, US may not see the new CPTPP favourably because, according to Peterson Institute in Washington, US has moved from a position of gain of $131 billion under TPP to a loss of $2 billion under CPTPP. Under it, American farmers will face higher duties as compared to Australian and Canadian farmers when selling to Japan and other CPTPP markets. But  there will be $147 billion in global income gains.

Perhaps not so interested in global income gains, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been keen to push the agreement through in the hope that US will join it. Trump did say at the World Economic Forum in Davos that “would do TPP if we were able to make a substantially better deal.” Japan has worked hard to keep the agreement alive and with help from Australia and others to draw Trump into it to check China’s growing influence in the region.

RCEP on the other hand has the two rising Asian powers — India and China. The negotiations are slated for completion at the end of 2018 but there are many delays in sight. India is not keen on signing it on the existing terms and conditions and is afraid of reducing tariffs to negligible levels. Already it has trade deficits with countries in the RCEP with which it signed Free Trade Agreements in the past —South Korea, ASEAN and Japan. With China the deficit is $51 billion. India has already resorted to duty hikes on 45 imports in order to promote the Make in India campaign and to fob off Chinese imports.

It can be argued that it is in India’s interest to join the RCEP because the region is a  big one and India will benefit by gaining entry into it. The RCEP has a combined GDP of $49.5 trillion and will cover a population of 3.5 billion. By signing the RCEP, India will be able to promote its services exports. It would help if the RCEP countries allowed Indian IT professionals and skilled workers to take up short term work in their countries. The only problem is the vast differences in language and scripts between India and the ASEAN region. Also, India may be able to enter the Global Value Chain more smoothly in many sectors by signing the RCEP. Currently its participation in GVC is confined to one or two manufactures.

The negotiations for the RCEP had begun in 2012 but various differences among members resulted in a stalemate. Those against have pointed out that it will not be to India’s advantage to sign RCEP because it remains weak in many sectors as compared to the other members and may face tough competition in textiles, plantations, automobiles, engineering and pharmaceuticals.

The higher IPR standards in the RCEP could also affect India’s export of generic drugs especially to Africa.  In agriculture, India is not prepared to face competition from some of the RCEP members. Hence there is strong resistance within India from various quarters to signing of the RCEP. India’s SME sector will especially face tough competition from China and it is this sector where future jobs can be created because the top notch manufacturing units in India are going for robotics and automation in a big way. We have to rethink about whether opening up through big tariff reduction especially to China is at all desirable in the present juncture.

In all probability, both the mega trade parternships will remain in cold storage while the world waits and watches President Trump’s latest moves on the trade front.

By Samuel Tadros*

“Greetings, softer than the breeze of Barada …. I send my tears, which will never dry, O Damascus.” The opening line of Ahmed Shawqi’s famous poem was written as news of the Syrian defeat by the French in 1920 reached Egypt. Less than two years earlier, Faisal I had entered Damascus and raised the flag of Arab nationalism. The jubilation was felt across the Levant. Egypt, confident in its own newly discovered national identity, had little appetite for the illusions of Arab nationalism, but the pain of Damascus could not be ignored. Euphoria would visit the city again in 1958 as the Damascene crowd crowned Nasser the region’s indisputable king, but those moments were few and short lived, and soon gave way to disappointment. That city would know little but pain as coup gave way to coup, before the specter of Hafez Al-Assad rose tormenting its inhabitants.

Nearly seven years have passed since the outbreak of protests in Syria calling for change. By now, many illusions have been shattered. First was the illusion of the ‘reformer son’ of the late strongman. The shy, eye doctor was surely different from his father. John Kerry and Nancy Pelosi had fallen for his charm during the Bush years, and the Obama administration still held the same hope. It was not to be. Syria’s great poet Nezar Qabbani had described the breed well in his Autobiography of an Arab Man of the Sword “I decided to ride this people from now until Judgment Day.” The son of the butcher of Hama would outshine his father adding the names of Aleppo, Homs, Daraa, and countless others to his list of butchery. Next was the illusion of a regional solution led by Turkey. Erdogan may have fancied himself an Ottoman sultan, but Suleiman the Magnificent, he was not. A more appropriate resemblance was with Abdul Hamid II, a ruler of a crumbling state daydreaming of grandiose designs,

There was, of course, the hope of a future democratic Syria, as many brave young Syrians dreamed of, but the Syria of 2011 was a country that had known little but cruelty. “Men are not angels,” Fouad Ajami had written of Libya’s descent into carnage, “these were the hatreds and the wrath that the ruler himself had sown; he had reaped what he had planted.” The sectarian divides had been too large to overcome and the wounds too deep to heal. Then there was the illusion of the Syrian conflict remaining within the country’s borders, but as Charles Hill has written “Syria is the roundabout in which all the forces face one another and spin off consequences, for good or ill, around the compass.” What happens in Syria can never remain just in Syria, as the Iraqis soon discovered. We turn to Ajami again; “If the Sunni Arabs had lost Baghdad to the Shia, there was suddenly within grasp the prospect of restoring Damascus.”

Most painful was the illusion of a world consciousness that would be moved by atrocities and a U.S. President who had drawn a red line. Obama, a man who “has made a fetish of caution,” as Ajami described him, had little interest or sympathy for the children of the Levant. An accommodation with Iran would be signed in Vienna with the blood of Syrians.

A year ago, President Trump came into office riding a wave of discontent, not just of economic frustrations, but also disillusionment with America’s adventure in the Middle East. Long gone were the days of enthusiasm for the fall of Saddam’s statue. Candidate Trump had made his skepticism of nation building in the Middle East known, and his skepticism was warranted. America had visited the region once already, and had no appetite for another try. In between Bush’s adventure and Obama’s inaction, the administration has chosen a middle course: bombing Assad for his use of chemical weapons, allowing the Pentagon to send more troops and to keep them there, and drawing a red line east of the Euphrates, as the Russians soon discovered; but troop levels and firepower is no political strategy, let alone a political solution and settlement.

If America has lost its excitement for adventure, and Obama’s abandonment has been exposed for its hollowness, neither are the current measures equipped to achieve a much better result. The Islamic State may be defeated for now, but a fire smolders under the ashes. Assad continues his savagery aided by Russian airpower and Iranian militias. Israel’s security is threatened by an expanding Iranian presence, and Turkey is unhappy with the U.S. assistance to Syria’s Kurds. Besides half a million killed, there are more than five million refugees with not only no prospect of returning home, but with others soon to follow as enclave after city falls to Assad’s bombardment. Confusion reigns supreme. The U.S. is an ally of the Kurds east of the Euphrates, but abandons them west of the river; it will neither accept an Assad victory nor is it interested in his defeat.

At the center of the U.S. failure to develop a coherent strategy towards Syria lay two illusions that continue to shape the administration’s approach to the conflict. The first illusion is that there remains and should remain a country named Syria. Writing of Sykes Picot, Ajami had warned that “it is rarely a good idea to draw maps in a hurry,” but equally problematic is accepting those same maps as set in stone. Even if Assad were to manage to defeat the various militias fighting him, rebuilding Syria as a functional state is beyond his abilities, let alone within his interests. Neither will the Sunni majority accept him, nor does he want a Syria with an overwhelming Sunni majority. “The bonds between them and their rulers,” as Ajami warned, “have been severed.” Too much blood has been spilled and the wound will not heal. More likely is an Assad strategy of emptying the country of as many Sunnis as possible and achieving a more balanced demographic balance, even if this means giving up some territory on the periphery of his core territory.

A more problematic illusion is that of an Assad regime fighting militias. While the United States has removed its Ambassador from Syria, it has technically remained committed to a mindset that views Assad and his cronies as a regime, albeit a brutal one. The reality is starkly different. There is today no Syrian regime. There are instead various militias fighting each other, and Assad is merely the leader, if we can even call him that as the Russians humiliation of him during Putin’s December 2017 visit exposed.

Abandoning these two remaining illusions would allow the United States to think clearly about what its goals in Syria should be. While the U.S. cannot completely end the Syrian civil war, curtailing the level of destruction and bloodshed remains an objective, not merely on humanitarian grounds, but also on strategic grounds, as the prolonged violence will continue to attract foreign intervention and have a spillover effect on neighboring countries destabilizing them further. While a military confrontation with Russia is to be avoided, a Russian victory has to be denied. A Putin victory in Syria would embolden him further in expanding his influence in the Middle East, undermining U.S. interests and sending a clear message that he is the new sheriff in the region.

And while stopping Iranian involvement in the Levant is a long term project, checking Iranian moves and containing those remains within immediate U.S. interests. Most important in this regard is reinforcing the Israeli red line in the southern part of Syria, ensuring that no Iranian expansion takes place in the area. Instead of hoping for a permanent solution to the Syrian civil war, the U.S. should aim for an equilibrium in Syria. The United States is incapable of stopping Syrians and their neighbors from killing each other, but it can surely remove their ability to inflict so much death and increase their costs of doing so.

How to go about achieving these goals? As things stand, there is no reason for Assad and his masters to compromise. From the Russian and Iranian perspective, they are winning. With the current cards in their favor, what is needed is a reshuffling of the deck to force the parties to come to an agreement. As long as Bashar Al Assad remains in the picture, there is little reason to believe a settlement of sorts is possible. As such, the U.S. should explore ways to offer a combination of carrots and sticks to Alawites and other supporters of Assad, assuring them that no massacre would take place if Assad is removed, while also inflicting damage to the Assad militia’s power. The goal should be to convince enough supporters of Assad that there is no path forward for victory in Syria and that an accommodation, without Assad, is both possible and desirable for their long term interests. Assad has no place in the future of Syria, and a settlement of scores with the man responsible for the deaths of countless American soldiers in Iraq is long overdue.

What of the Syrians longing for a better future? The world is a cruel place. In 2011, a path forward for them could have been devised, a path that would have avoided countless deaths and destruction, but we are not in 2011. For these inhabitants of the land once known as Syria, I have little to offer, beyond returning to another line from Shawqi’s poem “Children of Syria, leave behind your wishes … Forget your dreams, just forget them!”

About the author:
*Samuel Tadros, Senior Fellow Hoover Institution

Source:
This article was published by the Hudson Institute

The fall of Afrin on March 18th accomplishes one of the main objectives of the Turkish military operation code-named ‘Olive Branch’. Olive Branch is successor to ‘Operation Euphrates’ in 2016-7 but both of these Turkish military forays into Syria were essentially designed to contain a rising presence of US-armed Kurdish forces on the border with Syria. With Free Syrian Army (FSA) units in the lead, supported by Turkish air and land forces, Afrin, located along the Turkish-Syrian border just west of Manbij, was retaken. The Afrin bulge had been vacated by Syrian government forces early in the Syrian crisis in 2012 and was gradually populated by Kurdish YPG fighters.

In Turkey, the fall of Afrin has been met with great celebration. This type of nationalistic outpouring is exactly what Turkish President Erdogan has been waiting impatiently for. Many domestic Turkish observers and pundits have been critical of Erdogan’s Syrian strategy pointing to the financial hardship of housing so many Syrian refugees fleeing the battles. Now his Syrian gamble, which was to oppose Assad from the beginning, has appeared to pay off. A blow against the so-called Kurdish terrorists known as the YPG coincides with the 103rd anniversary of the great Turkish victory at Gallipoli over the French, British and Australians in 1915. The Turkish press, some fractious elements of which are either sitting in prison and or out of a job, have responded in kind to the immense outpouring of Turkish national ardor. Even the street on which the American Embassy is located in Ankara has been renamed Olive Branch street in honor of the ongoing military operation in Afrin and northern Syria.

With the fall of Afrin, the American dream of putting together an all Kurdish 30,000 force to repress any return of ISIL is now dead in the water. By the Turkish manouver, Ankara has also effectively crushed the Kurdish mini-state idea along the Turkish border and neutralized American-armed YPG forces in Manbij to the east. The US forces are now basically doing for free what the Turks have done in Afrin that is, managing and controlling their Kurdish allies and preventing attacks on targets inside Turkey. The Turks do not need to move east since the Americans are already doing their job for them. This fact also plays into the outpouring of Turkish nationalism, a part of which studies have shown to be based on anti-American sentiment.

Erdogan has effectively out foxed the belated American response to arm the Kurds. The fall of Afrin has struck a serious blow to the role of US forces in addition to safeguarding Turkish soil from any potential Kurdish attack. The Kurdish allies (PYD) are left holding the bag with no mini-state, no 30,000 man armed force along the Turkish border and now are required to watch the conduct of the Turkish operation. US forces cannot oppose Turkish forces even if they choose to move on to Manbij and further. The spectacle of two NATO partners duking it out in Syria would make Putin even smile. The present American mandate of arming and training the Kurds has been dealt a serious blow and gives credence to the Russian and Iranian view that America has no role in Syria. Meanwhile US forces must manage their YPG forces and prevent any attacks on Turkish soil. NATO obligations would require no less. The genius of Erdogan, given the US President Trump’s policy anarchy in Washington, is complete. The State Department is in disarray after the ugly firing of former US Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Rex Tillerson and its reaction to the fall of Afrin calling for caution smacks of a lack of leadership. The Turkish administration has vigorously criticized State’s response.

Trump’s rudderless foreign policy déconfiture has meant that Turkey is a key player in Syria. The US is not.

The loss of Afrin is a reminder for the Kurds that without a regional champion to support their cause for rights and a homeland, little can be accomplished. Poor leadership, generational and ideological cleavages and especially trusting the West has been their downfall. The West was content to have the Kurds take on ISIL and destroy it but payback may be very long in coming. When it comes to angering a NATO allay, all bets are off. Perhaps the best choice would have been to support the Kurdish youth when the Syrian crisis broke out and oppose Assad. Instead, the Kurds lacked unity and failed to support their natural FSA partners and activists.

The Turkish claim that the Kurdish ‘terrorists’ are united PKK (Kurdish Workers Party), PYD and others is simply false and is used as a pretext for Operations Euphrates and Olive Branch.

Ankara has declared that Turkish troops in Afrin are scheduled to leave once they have achieved full control by it and its FSA allies. According to Turkish PM, Turkey will hand over control to the local population. The question is whether the exodus sparked by the Turkish assault of Afrin has modified the nature and size of that same population. It indeed has and the streams of Kurdish refugees heading for Syrian government lines is proof positive. Why would the Turks hand over territory to a local population that became a PYD controlled area? This would compromise the main objective of operation Olive Branch. Resettlement by Sunni pro-rebel FSA men and their families is a distinct possibility.

Meanwhile in eastern Ghouta things are not going well for the Syrian rebels who are being pounded by Syrian state and Russian land and air forces. Some families have ‘escaped’ to government positions while pockets of resistance are being reduced. It. Was inevitable that sooner or later Bashar would need to address the rebel problem just ten miles from the capital Damascus. What will happen to those who have left eastern Ghouta remains to be seen. In the past, fears for the worse have often proved true in the case of Syrian state security agencies.

The events of March 2018 have some observers concluding that the days of easy victories may be over for Bashar and his allies. To the north, the fall of Afrin has put the Turks nearer to the front line and provided a badly needed victory for its FSA allies. Care will have to be taken by Russian and Syrian warplanes when attacking Idlib. In March, another Russian warplane was downed by rebels and its pilot, who ejected, was immediately shot rebels. Instead of diminishing, Russian casualties are growing. If the Syrian government insists on moving into Idlib, a remaining Syrian enclave, casualties will mount. There will be no mercy shown to any Russian or Syrian pilot. Increased casualties will have a direct impact on Russian public opinion, which is much more concerned by Crimea than it is regarding the Syrian intervention. Moreover, any comparison between the Russian invasion of Afghanistan iin 1979 and its intervention in Syria changes dramatically the tone of public opinion in Russia. The defeat of ISIL also eliminates a major obstacle to Russia downgrading its forces in Syria.
To the south, although they are clearing out the rebel enclave near the capital, government forces will have to take care attacking the rebel pockets to the south in Deraa as Israel has increased its military presence throughout 2017 and 2018. Netanyahu’s visit to Moscow in January 2018 was intended to warn Syria via Russia to stay well away from the Israeli border. Iranian and Iranian proxy support of Bashar al-Assad has contributed to Israel’s heightened interest.

The Turkish FSA victory at Afrin means that Syrian government forces, if they want to reduce Idlib like they did Aleppo and eastern Ghouta, will have to do it in front of the largest army in the region. Bashar should not jump to the conclusion that the Turks are now neutral given their adherence to the Astana Group and its peace efforts. The Syrian conflict has continued to boil and the Turkish armed forces are now taking a more active role. Erdogan’s preference is still a Syria minus Bashar al-Assad and his cohorts.
And what if Turkey decides to move south or west? It is improbable that it will but what if? From a longer-term perspective, who is going to rebuild the broken cities of Syria? In the absence of any visible international appetite for rebuilding Bashar’s Syria, the only reasonable option is Turkey. Its construction companies have considerable expertise gained in places like Iraq, Turkmenistan and elsewhere in the region. Turkey’s proximity to Syria is another reason for its future role. All this must be of concern to the Syrian government authorities as they begin to look beyond the conflict to postwar strategies of reconstruction. Their political crimes will continue to haunt them in this period and make Bashar’s continued presence in Damascus an unsuitable option.

In the Syrian conflict, of the three Astana process partners (Turkey, Iran and Russia), Turkey has the most cards to play as evidenced by the fall of Afrin.

*Dr. Bruce Mabley is a former Canadian diplomat having served in the Middle East, and is the director of the Mackenzie-Papineau think tank in Montreal.

British leaders prepare citizens for a post-Brexit trade agreement with the European Union that brings more pain than benefits.

By Jolyon Howorth*

British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson famously quipped that “my policy on cake is pro-having it and pro-eating it.” Brexit, he implied, would allow the United Kingdom to enjoy a custom-designed trade relationship with the European Union and unfettered access to global markets. But the European Council has denounced the UK’s negotiating stance as “cherry picking,” and Prime Minister Theresa May discovers that the politics of cake is leading to the worst of all worlds. The cabinet cannot agree on the recipe, and Parliament lacks a majority on any approach. The country has no consensus, and the EU shows solid determination to ensure that Johnson’s policy on cake will prove to be half-baked, with no cherries either.

The “agreement” reached this week confirms that there will be a transition period until December 2020, offering some relief to business. On the most vexed issues – Northern Ireland, the UK’s “three baskets” and customs-union membership – the two sides are anxious to avoid a breakdown at this stage and kicked the can down the road. On fisheries, the UK cannot totally escape EU regulations. A Scottish conservative MP remarked: “It would be easier for someone to drink a pint of cold sick than to sell this as a success.” The UK is permitted to discuss trade agreements with third countries during the transition, but the EU is confident that this will demonstrate to London just how difficult such negotiations will prove to be.

From the onset, the EU rejected UK cherry-picking. Instead, the EU insists that the UK faces a choice: Either it remains, like Norway, a full member of the Single Market, in which case it continues to accept all EU rules and regulations and pay into the collective budget as rule-taker rather than rule-shaper, with no voice at the table. Or it negotiates a free-trade agreement with Brussels, such as that between Canada and the EU, giving it some trade with the Single Market but denied most other benefits — including “passporting rights” for financial services, a lion’s share of the UK economy – allowing firms to operate throughout the bloc without securing a license from each member country. A third option, building steam, is for the UK to remain a member of the European Union Customs Union, whose members trade without duties, taxes or tariffs among themselves, and charge the same tariffs on imports from outside the EU. The Labour Party has embraced this option, as have significant numbers of Tory MPs. But members of the Customs Union cannot negotiate free trade agreements with third countries. None of these options is acceptable for hard-core Brexiteers, and May has ruled out all.

In a 2 March speech, the prime minister finally recognized that the country needed to “face up to some hard facts.” These included, she noted, restricted access to the UK’s hitherto most lucrative market; the continuing influence of the European Court of Justice over many aspects of British legislation; and clear constraints on the UK’s ability to depart from European regulatory standards. For most hardline Leavers, these “facts” are unpalatable, calling into question the rationale for Brexit. Yet the government’s own internal calculations – immediately leaked to the press – demonstrate conclusively that, under any of the Brexit scenarios, the UK will be worse off than it would have been had it not voted to leave. It is gradually dawning on Britons that there are no winners from this process.

May nevertheless indicates that the UK has every intention of cherry-picking. The plan is to divide UK trade with the EU into three baskets. In the first would be sectors such as pharmaceuticals, cars and aerospace where London would continue to abide by EU regulations, including acceptance of oversight by the European Court of Justice. In the second would be sectors such as financial services with special ad-hoc arrangements worked out between London and Brussels. In the third would be sectors, such as agriculture, where the UK would remain free of EU constraints. Such an approach is non-negotiable in Brussels, dismissed by Council President Donald Tusk as “out of the question.” Yet the UK government continues to assume that it can persuade EU negotiators to accept the unacceptable.

The reason lies within the deeply divided Tory party. The Tories are far from reaching consensus on what exactly the UK is attempting to negotiate. Recognition of “hard facts” is a nod to Remainers who predicted doom and gloom and a message to the British people that life would not be the land of milk and honey promised by Brexiteers. Acceptance of EU rules and regulations for sectors in the first basket is a form of soporific cake for Tory Remainers such as Chancellor Philip Hammond, who can continue to hope that all is not yet lost. Moreover, all but the hardest Brexiteers are growing nervous about the prospect of total exclusion from European markets. But May’s reiteration of the government’s red lines on free movement of people and the UK’s determination to negotiate trade agreements with third countries pacifies the true believers in a hard Brexit. In other words, the “strategy” is to avoid making any strategic choice since that would precipitate the moment of truth when the Tories would appear to all the world as without strategy.

May’s approach is a creative charade, fooling nobody in Brussels and seen by increasing numbers of commentators as a self-inflicted wound. During the referendum campaign, May supported the Remain camp. After the result was known, to become prime minister, she went with the flow of British opinion, embracing “Brexit means Brexit.” To show determination, she precipitated declaration of Article 50, prematurely triggering the two-year time-frame for discussions. To boost her negotiating position, she called a general election – and lost. She did not need to take these steps. The sensible course would have been to explore what the outlines of a viable Brexit might be, both within the UK and in EU discussions. If such an arrangement proved palatable to both politicians and people, Article 50 could then have been triggered, the entire process conducted sensibly and consensually. Instead, May finds herself in an impossible bind.  She recognizes that most Britons, particularly those in the industrial wastelands who voted fervently for Brexit, will be worse off after the UK leaves. She appears to consider it her duty to ease citizens’ transition towards this somber new world. Asked point blank whether she personally thought Brexit would prove worthwhile, she could not answer.

Commentators agree that May cannot remain in power much longer. There are several scenarios for the succession. A palace coup mounted by disgruntled Tories seems unlikely in the near term for the simple reason that none of the potential challengers could secure loyalty of a majority of the party. Most analysts see the crunch coming when the government finally reveals the package negotiated with the EU, assuming that it succeeds in doing so.

At that point, a 2017 House of Commons decision dictated that “the people” should have the last say. That implies one of two options. Either the House will be called upon to vote on the package, which will not satisfy the Brexiteers. It seems unlikely that the government could secure a majority for that package. And if not, there would have to be a general election. At that point, May would be replaced as Tory leader with most pundits predicting a win for Labour. The prospect of ushering Jeremy Corbyn into Downing Street is sufficiently horrifying for most Tories that the alternative option – a second referendum on a known package – would be preferable.

A new Tory leader could put the question to the people. If they voted it down, that leader might resign in favor of yet another leader, but the Tories could cling to power. Thus, history would repeat itself, the second time as farce. David Cameron called the first referendum to strengthen his power base. He failed miserably and the country paid the price. The second referendum would be called for precisely the same reason. The outcome would be uncertain, little would be resolved, but the Tories could hope to continue in government. King Alfred, it is said, burned the cakes. The Tories are setting fire to the kitchen.

*Jolyon Howorth has been a visiting professor of political science and International affairs at Yale since 2002, dividing his teaching among the Political Science Department, the Jackson Institute and Ethics, Politics and Economics. He has published extensively in the field of European politics and history, especially security and defense policy and transatlantic relations – with 15 books and more than 250 journal articles and book chapters. He is the Jean Monnet Professor of European Politics and Emeritus Professor of European Studies at the University of Bath.

By Justin Conrad*

(FPRI) — Discussions concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have lately shifted to when, rather than if, the group will ultimately be defeated. After being pushed out of longtime strongholds in places like Mosul and Raqqa, the group no longer appears to pose the kind of entrenched threat that prompted the intervention of global powers just a few short years ago. Surprisingly, the game of poker offers important lessons about the group’s changing strategy amid its current circumstances. One reason why poker is such a popular game is because it offers players with weak hands the opportunity to turn the tables on stronger opponents. While ISIS undoubtedly weakens with every passing day, the potential threat it poses remains at an all-time high. If the global community no longer takes this threat seriously, or shifts attention to other issues, ISIS could successfully reverse its fortunes.

The most important rule of thumb for poker players is to never place a bet when the odds of winning are smaller than the expected payoff. For instance, when the odds of winning a hand are 4 to 1, and the expected return on a bet is 3 to 1, experienced players know to avoid wagering their money. This is known as the “Strict Calculation Matrix” and it ensures that players only place bets when they are in a relatively strong position. But there is one important exception: the concept of “implied odds.” If additional cards are to be drawn, the future (implied) odds could change in a player’s favor, even if that player currently holds a losing hand. This is often the case in many popular variants of poker, such as Texas Hold ‘Em. Players with weak hands therefore continue to bet based solely on their expectations of the future.

All terrorist groups, including ISIS, hold weak hands. While ISIS finds itself in a particularly dire situation at the moment, the group has always been in a position of weakness relative to its enemies. Even at its strongest, such as when the group seized Mosul, ISIS anticipated a day when it would be strong enough for a large-scale fight against the governments of Syria, Iraq, and their allies. The most important clue to this anticipation of the future is their intense focus on apocalyptic prophecies. In fact, the title of the group’s former online publication, Dabiq, was named after the prophesied site of Armageddon. But today, with its military forces routed, ISIS’s apocalyptic visions seem more distant than ever, and the concept of implied odds especially relevant.

With its conventional capabilities diminished and territorial control slipping away, ISIS is likely to refocus its energies on surviving until it can fight again in the future. To do this, its best chances lie in transitioning from an experiment in state-building to a low-level insurgency relying primarily on terrorism. But to successfully reverse its fortunes, it needs a “big hand” to get back in the game—an attack or set of attacks so shocking that it demonstrates the group’s resilience to both enemies and supporters. To accomplish this, the group is pursuing two important strategies.

First, ISIS is accelerating its calls to the “soldiers of the caliphate” around the world, hoping to inspire individuals to commit brutal attacks. The group still maintains sophisticated media and communications operations which it is leveraging to encourage sympathizers to launch attacks, particularly in Western countries. This strategy has generated the few high-profile attacks for the group in recent months, such as December’s subway bombing in New York City. Expect such attacks to become more, rather than less, frequent in the coming months.

Second, despite its declining operational capacity, the group is likely more focused than ever on planning a major, catastrophic terrorist attack. Just as the 9/11 attacks served to reinvigorate al-Qaeda, ISIS is undoubtedly hoping to pull off an attack so sensational and so barbaric that it would shore up support and re-brand the group as a growing, rather than declining, threat. We know that the group tried to access a nuclear power plant in Brussels, for instance, but a devastating, headline-grabbing attack could be carried out in a variety of ways.

These strategies are risky, of course, but they offer the best chances for the emergence of “ISIS 2.0.” And since the strategies rely on terrorist attacks to salvage the credibility of the organization and attract new supporters, the true demise of the organization cannot be achieved through military means alone. Like all terrorist organizations, the key to ISIS’s decisive defeat lies in comprehensive and sustained military, diplomatic, legal, and communications operations. This includes redressing the grievances of the populations in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere who are most attracted to the group’s messaging. If the U.S. and its allies turn their attention to other problems around the world, as lately seems to be the case, ISIS might launch that one attack that shifts the odds back in its favor. As Boko Haram has demonstrated in Nigeria, terrorist groups thought to be “defeated” may only grow more violent. The U.S. and its allies should make a sustained, long-term commitment to ensuring that ISIS’s weak hand never improves.

About the author:
*Dr. Justin Conrad is the author of Gambling and War: Risk, Reward, and Chance in International Conflict (Naval Institute Press), Associate Professor of Political Science, and a reserve officer in the United States Navy.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI.

The European Committee of the Regions (CoR) published a report Tuesday in Brussels detailing the consequences of Brexit on trade and the economy in the EU27 regions and cities. Based heavily on data gathered from a joint survey with EUROCHAMBRES, the report reveals a lack of awareness, information and preparation and recommends greater flexibility in state aid rules and inter-regional cooperation.

A year ahead of the scheduled departure of the UK from the EU, uncertainty surrounding the nature of the future EU27-UK relationship complicates the process of adjustment for many EU regions. This uncertainty which was also not eased out by the latest transition deal is compounded in many cases by a lack of analysis of the likely impact on local economies. In turn, this restricts local and regional authorities’ capacity to formulate strategies to address the adverse effects of the UK leaving the EU on their economies.

“The results of both this report and the CoR’s territorial impact assessment show that there will be no winner from Brexit and that Europe’s local and regional authorities already know it. After the UK, Irish regions will be the most economically and socially impacted by Brexit because of their close relations and direct border with the UK. However, regions in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Italy and Spain also anticipate a severe impact. Whilst still difficult to assess the precise consequences for each European region or city, it is already possible and necessary to take action at European level to counter negative impacts and soften the blow,” said Michael Murphy, Head of the Irish delegation in the CoR and member of Ireland’s Tipperary County Council.

The CoR and EUROCHAMBRES conducted a survey of regional and city authorities and chambers of commerce to feed into a process of analysing and debating the exposure of EU27 regions and cities to Brexit. This resulted in the report presented at a joint briefing in Brussels, summarizing the expected economic and social effects and the impact on public administrations, and setting out conclusions and recommendations.

“The survey results show that chambers sense a greater exposure to the effects of Brexit. This is not surprising given that EU27 businesses will directly feel the additional friction in trade that will result from the UK leaving the EU customs union and single market,” said Arnaldo Abruzzini, CEO of EUROCHAMBRES. “We must now seek to minimize that friction, which requires precise quantitative and qualitative feedback, so it’s worrying that this process also reveals a lack of analysis in many regions of the specific effects of Brexit. This needs to be addressed swiftly if the EU27’s regions, cities and businesses are going to be well-placed to adjust effectively.”

The report concludes that there is a need for more specific, localized impact studies to get a better understanding of the potential impact and of the linkages across and between business sectors. Awareness raising and information sharing will further help businesses, notably SMEs, to be better prepared to face the ensuing structural and economic adjustments.

The report also echoes proposals from the CoR’s opinion on “The European Commission Report on Competition Policy 2016”, drafted by Mr Murphy, to allow greater flexibility of State aid rules. It further highlights the importance of continued interregional cooperation between EU27 and UK regions post-Brexit and the need for territorial cooperation programs and macro-regional strategies to share information and pool resources.

The CoR started a process of analyzing and debating the exposure of EU27 regions and cities to Brexit, to prepare for the repercussions of the UK’s withdrawal and the potential asymmetric territorial impact within the EU27 (with some regions substantially affected). The process resulted in a shared report and included a discussion between CoR members and the chief EU negotiator Michel Barnier, the adoption of a resolution, a study, a Territorial Impact Assessment workshop and a survey in cooperation with EUROCHAMBRES.

The dedicated CoR interregional group on Brexit, made up of 29 members from seven Member States, will meet for the first time in Brussels on March 23, 2018.

By Dr Subhash Kapila

China in the 21st Century may have a mighty military machine and a threatening missiles arsenal capable of hitting Continental United States but the Great Wall of China on land and the Great Sea Wall of artificially constructed & fortified islands in South China Sea still have not made China unassailable

China may have a 21st Century Emperor President Xi Jinping presiding over a formidable military machine and since 2013 got away with its military adventurism but China’s very pursuit of the Great Chinese Dream enunciated by its now life-long President have added increasingly to its strategic vulnerabilities.

The Indian policy establishment and its associated intelligence agencies should focus on study of China’s strategic vulnerabilities and keep them under close scrutiny as such China vulnerabilities can be suitably be exploited to off-set China’s preponderant military power.

China in 2018 as a ‘revisionist power’ on an impatient trajectory to gain trappings of a Superpower has generated a strategic polarisation within Asia and a similar reaction at the global level. What the United States could not achieve through diplomacy for decades, China by its threatening moves and military brinkmanship has handed it over on a plate to the United States.

China’s strategic and military might have been overblown both on scale and magnitude I suspect by the US Pentagon to persuade US Congress to release greater amounts of defence spending sequestered for long by Congressional restraints.

Admittedly, China as compared to a decade back has a mighty military force capable of exerting political and military blackmail and coercion on its peripheral borders but it still lacks both force projection and force configurations to mount operations even upto the Gulf Region or on the scale that the United States and Russia can do.

Objective assessment of Chinese military power in simplistic terms rather than the complex formulas devised by China to measure Comprehensive Military Power of is adversaries should necessarily take into account China’s geopolitical and strategic vulnerably imposed by China’s security environment. It is not a simple derivation of its military capabilities and its aggressive impulses.

In terms of geopolitical vulnerabilities, China stands located between two mighty nations of United States and Russia. Also to add to this complexity is China’s underbelly of China Occupied Tibet facing a Subcontinental power like India.

China and the United States are in a Cold War confrontation in 2018 and the same could be stated of China and India. Russia may be in a strategic nexus with China, but it is only a tactical expedient.

China’s maritime flank on the Pacific littoral is studded with nations in varying stages of military alliance with the United States. Maritime polarisation against China has emerged strongly against China after its South China Sea military aggression. Japan is an Emerged Power strongly allied with United States and its security architecture in Asia Pacific.

In terms of geopolitical sub regions of Asia, China is friendless.. In East Asia, other than North Korea, the rest of the region is not favourably disposed towards China. In South East Asia, China may have succeeded in dividing ASEAN but overall other than Cambodia and to some extent Thailand, China cannot count on anyone after its military imperialism in South China Sea.

South Asia presents a serious geopolitical challenge to China despite the emergence of the China-Pakistan Axis and foisting a “Two Front Military Threat” to India as an arch rival of China. China perceptibly may seem to have gained ground in Nepal, a toehold in Sri Lanka and a tight grip over the Maldives. It is targeting a Chinese embrace of Bhutan and Bangladesh.

Other than Pakistan, China cannot sustain its influence on its gains in South Asia by economic doles to poor economies. The fabric stitched by China in South Asia is fraying, including Pakistan where the average Pakistani is questioning Pakistan Army’s furthering China’s gains at the expense of China’s ‘colonisation’ of Pakistan.

China is not the dominating power in South Asia. It has to contend with an India engaged in reducing power differential with China. China however has been able to achieve two major geopolitical objectives placing it at an advantage in South Asia, namely:

• China till lately was able to limit India geopolitically within South Asian confines. But with PM Modi coming into power in mid-2014, India has broken out on the larger Asian and global stage.
• China by its concubinage relationship with Pakistan and forging a China-Pakistan Axis has imposed a Tw o–Front War military threat on India. Here again under PM Modi and his Government to put India’s war preparedness on a war footing after abject neglect during the previous Government 2004-2014, India is confident to battle a Two Front War from the China-Pakistan Axis.

In the Middle East, China is no game-changer with a power tussle in the region ongoing between the United States and Russia.

Overall, in Asia, despite China’s exponential military expansion the balance of power geopolitically is stacked against China with the US military alliances and US strategic partnerships with countries like Japan, South Korea, India and Australia.

In the strategic domains, China stands greatly limited against the geopolitical and military coalitions opposing it. China in the absence of major countervailing power on its side is unable to bring ‘Force Multipliers” on its side. Russia is considered by China as its satellite nation and with the Russians claiming that the so-called Russia-China strategic nexus was only quasi-strategic in nature and content.

China’s internal security and domestic political environment cannot be said to ideally imparting comprehensive strengths to China against a virtually isolated China and where China-generated military turbulences on its peripheries can haunt and challenge its internal cohesion.

China’s border regions like Xinjiang and Tibet are in a state of unrest evidenced by China’s larger outlays on internal security budget outweighing its external security expenditures for the last two years.

With the slowing down of the Chinese economy and reduction in China’s manufacturing exports, domestic discontent is bound to grow with reduced incomes and unemployment. Added to this is the danger lurking of violent disturbances likely to be generated by thousands of senior Party officials, Army Generals and others convicted on false charges of corruption to remove those opposing President Xi Jinping’s ascendancy to unprecedented hold on China’s political and military power.

On balance therefore, one finds an explosive mix of internal security and domestic unrest waiting to be ignited by a solitary incendiary spark originating externally or internally, or both.

Each of these strategic vulnerabilities outlined in brief but when amplified in detail wold indicate assessments that China despite its over-rated military power for various reasons has under-rated strategic vulnerabilities which limit its space and freedom for unrestrained political and military adventurism. But then has not the world witnessed that in the situation in which China is moving as visible in 2018 has resulted in Hitlerian aggression when thwarted in the “revisionist impulses” and in this case President Xi Jinping’s “Great China Dream.”

India which is the most prominent target in Chia’s strategic and military cross-hairs has to be most seriously concerned as what stands in-between Chinese President’s “Great China Dream” realisation is India as the most serious contender.

India’s war-preparedness against a China-Pakistan imposed “Two Front War” scenarios must be placed on a fast-track mode and the Indian policy establishment not lulled into complacency of an under-emphasised or de-emphasised ‘China Threat’ by certain sections in the Indian policy establishment.

Concurrently, the Indian policy establishment should minutely scrutinise China’s strategic vulnerabilities so that these could be exploited by India to off-set the power asymmetry with China.

In a brief conclusion, what needs to be reiterated is that China is not as unassailable as made out to be by strategic analysts. China has equally prominent strategic vulnerabilities which sap its mighty machine in the ultimate analysis. As far as India is concerned, it should shed its 1962 Syndrome and with a national political unanimity that China has to be comprehensively be “Stood Upto” without seeking escapist routes of easy options—- a noticeable propensity in the civilian element managing India’s security.

By Lisa Vives

Australia’s national security minister has proposed fast-tracking immigrant visas for white South Africans facing “horrific circumstances” under Cyril Ramaphosa, the country’s President since February 15, 2018. He was elected head of the African National Congress in December 2017.

Barely a month into his presidency, Ramaphosa vowed to speed up the seizure of land from white owners and turn the properties over to blacks. “This original sin that was committed when our country was colonized must be resolved in a way that will take South Africa forward,” he declared.

The resolution calling for expropriation without compensation was introduced by the self-described radical and militant Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), and passed 241 votes in agreement, and 83 votes against.

Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton said Australia should speed up the visas for white farmers who, he claimed, are being “persecuted” since the South African President endorsed transferring land ownership from whites to blacks, in some cases without compensation.

“These people deserve special attention,” Sutton said. “From what I’ve seen they do need help from a civilized country like ours.”

The Minister’s offer to white farmers echoes the racist beliefs promoted by The Daily Telegraph, an Australian tabloid newspaper published in Sydney – a branch of News Corp, founded by Rupert Murdoch.

Miranda Devine, in a recent column, asked for “compassion and taxpayer largesse” for “our oppressed white, Christian, industrious, rugby and cricket-playing Commonwealth cousins” who would easily adapt to Australian culture.

Columnist Caroline Marcus, also of News Corp, dismissed the ANC’s ambitious land reform program as “reverse racism”. “The truth is,” she wrote, “there are versions of this anti-white, vengeance theme swirling in movements around the western world, from Black Lives Matter in the U.S. to Invasion Day protest back home.”

“The situation has become so bleak,” she continued, that “being a farmer in South Africa is now the world’s most dangerous job.”

Views of Australia’s far right like these reprise a “white genocide” meme popular in alt-right circles abroad, observed Jon Piccini, writing for The Conversation, a South African news site.

Australian Minister Dutton’s remarks brought swift condemnation from the South African Foreign Ministry which said a “full retraction is expected”.

In a statement that appeared in The New York Times and Al Jazeera, South Africa’s foreign ministry declared: “There is no reason for any government anywhere in the world to suspect that any South African is in danger from their own democratically elected government. That threat simply does not exist.”

The statement added that South Africa regretted that the Australian government “chose not to use the available diplomatic channels to raise concerns or to seek clarifications on the land distribution process in South Africa”.

Australia’s foreign minister, Julie Bishop, also took issue with the Australian minister. “There are no plans to treat South African visa applicants any differently under Australia’s humanitarian via program.”

White farmers own almost three-quarters of South Africa’s agricultural land, even after 23 years of government efforts to redistribute land to the black majority, City Press reported, citing a land audit by farm lobbying group Agri SA.

Some 73.3 percent of agricultural land is owned by whites, down from 85.1 percent in 1994, the year South Africa first held democratic elections, the newspaper reported in October 2017.

Black ownership has increased markedly in some of the country’s most fertile provinces. Black farmers own 74 percent of the land in KwaZulu-Natal and 52 percent in Limpopo, City Press reported, citing the report.