Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations slammed the US government for the lack of commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Addressing the United Nations Disarmament Commission in New York on April 2, Gholam Ali Khoshroo denounced the US government for failing to honor its NPT commitments.

“The statement by a certain nuclear-weapon State that it wants more nuclear weapons to remain at the ‘top of the pack’ indicates that such extremely irresponsible policies will continue,” the Iranian envoy deplored.

In February 2017, US President Donald Trump expressed a desire for America to be an unparalleled military power, saying he wants to build up the US nuclear arsenal to make it “top of the pack.”

At least three people are being treated for gunshot wounds after a female shooter opened fire at YouTube headquarters in San Bruno, California. The suspect was found dead inside the building.

The woman believed to be the shooter was found dead inside the building, said San Bruno Police Chief Ed Barberini. The shooter was killed by a self-inflicted gunshot wound, Barberini reported. “We have no information to suggest there is somebody else [involved],” he told reporters.

Police found a total of four victims with gunshot wounds, he said, two inside the building and two more at a nearby business. Police were still clearing the building as of 2:30 pm local time, when Barberini spoke with reporters.

About 1,700 people work at the YouTube campus, located just off Interstate 280 south of San Francisco. One YouTube employee tweeted he “heard shots and saw people running.”

The San Francisco General Hospital, a major trauma center, received three patients ‒ two women and a man. The man is in critical condition and one of the women is in a serious condition, according to hospital spokesman Brent Andrew. Hospital officials confirmed all those injured received gunshot wounds. None of the patients have underwent or are due to undergo surgery at this time, according to the hospital.

“We are coordinating with authorities and will provide official information here from Google and YouTube as it becomes available,” Google, which owns the video sharing website, said in a tweet. “We advised all other employees in the Bay Area, and people with meetings scheduled, to stay away from the area, and that there is no need to take any action. We have provided employees a helpline.”

By Steve Herman

Troops are to be dispatched to the U.S. border with Mexico to thwart further illegal immigration, President Donald Trump told reporters Tuesday.

“We are preparing for the military to secure our border between Mexico and the United States,” said Trump at a news conference alongside leaders of three Baltic countries.

Trump said a meeting was to be held “in a little while” with Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and others to discuss the plan.

“I think that it’s something that we have to do,” the president said in response to a question from a reporter at the afternoon event in the White House East Room.

The Pentagon responded to Trump’s plan to use military to guard the borders:

“We are still consulting with the White House,” a senior defense official said, promising more information.”

Two of Trump’s predecessors — George W. Bush and Barack Obama — sent National Guard units to provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support for border patrol agents.

It is not immediately clear whether Trump intends to dispatch the National Guard, which is a reserve military component composed of members or units from the individual states and territories, or regular military forces.

An opposition Democratic Party senator, Brian Schatz of Hawaii, who serves on the defense subcommittee of the Senate’s appropriations committee, quickly criticized the idea, stating on Twitter that “Our military has more important things to do than to be mobilized to fulfill” a campaign promise of Trump’s.

In the United States, the active-duty military is generally restricted from domestic law enforcement functions, which would include capturing people who have come across the borders.

At the news conference, the president also spoke of a “caravan” of more than 1,000 migrants from Central America that has been making a 2,000-kilometer (1,200-mile) journey from the Mexico-Guatemala border to the United States. He has mentioned the procession several times on Twitter in recent days, vowing that it must be stopped.

In the past several days, the caravan has been mentioned numerous times on the Fox News Channel, which is Trump’s preferred source of broadcast news.

Those in the caravan “thought they were going to just walk right through Mexico and right through the border” into the United States, Trump said. Trump praised a quick response from Mexico, who he said was acting to ensure it is “all being broken up.”

Mexico has reportedly offered refugee status to some of the migrants.

Trump earlier had warned Mexico that its free trade agreement with its northern neighbor would be jeopardized if it did not stop the caravan before it reached the U.S. border.

Securing the southern border was a centerpiece of Trump’s platform during his 2016 campaign for the presidency, and something he mentions frequently.

“The Mexican border is very unprotected by our laws,” Trump asserted Tuesday. “We don’t have laws. We have catch and release. You catch and then you immediately release. And people come back years later for a court case, except they virtually never come back.”

Trump has continually emphasized the need for a border wall — which on Tuesday he said must be “700 [1,127 kilometers] to 800 miles [1,287 kilometers] long.” He previously has demanded that Mexico pay for the wall, but that has not been emphasized recently by Trump in public remarks.

“We need the wall. We’ve started building the wall, as you know,” said Trump, adding that $1.6 billion has now been appropriated by Congress toward “building the wall and fixing the existing wall that’s falling down or was never appropriated in the first place.”

(RFE/RL) — The three Baltic presidents, after meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump, pledged to continue meeting NATO’s defense-spending obligations in the hope that the alliance will bolster security along NATO’s eastern flank.

“We will continue to commit 2 percent of GDP (gross domestic product) toward the development of our military capabilities for the purposes of both strengthening NATO’s posture and contributing to international security,” Latvian President Raimonds Vejonis said after the April 3 White House summit.

Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid and Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite also vowed to continue meeting NATO’s defense-spending obligations, indicating they hope the United States will beef up forces in their region.

But although the three Baltic presidents urged Trump to do more to deter Russia by bolstering the U.S. military presence, Trump did not announce any specific new U.S. military deployments.

Instead, Trump praised Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia for meeting NATO’s defense-spending obligations — and said other NATO countries must do so as well.

“Your commitment to burden-sharing is an example, really, that other NATO nations and partners all around the world will have to all get together and bear,” Trump said while standing beside the Baltic presidents at a joint press conference after their meeting. “Some of them do not make the same commitment. Hopefully, they soon will.”

Grybauskaite said Trump’s pressure on other NATO states to meet their defense-spending obligations is critical for security.

“Without the leverage and pressure, there would be no additional spending in our defense in NATO,” Grybauskaite said. “There would be no additional decisions for rotating military forces of the United States in our countries. There will be no willingness to look into the matter of air defense, which we need very much.

“From all these points of view, we trust that our partner and ally is investing seriously in the future of our defense – not only our regions, but NATO’s territorial defense and in the peace and security of the world as it was before,” Grybauskaite said.

Grybauskaite, Kaljulaid, and Vejonis are among the strongest critics of Russia in the European Union and were visiting Trump amid mixed signals about his intentions toward the Kremlin.

As the White House talks were under way, Trump told them that “nobody has been tougher on Russia than Donald Trump.”

“Ideally, we want to be able to get along with Russia,” Trump said. “Getting along with Russia is a good thing, not a bad thing. Now, maybe we will [get along] and maybe we won’t.”

Asked by a reporter if Russian President Vladimir Putin is a friend or a foe, Trump said, “We’ll find out. I’ll let you know.”

The meeting came after Trump’s administration raised the possibility of the U.S. president hosting Putin at the White House.

But Washington also recently imposed a new round of sanctions targeting Russian individuals, companies, and intelligence agencies.

The White House also expelled 60 Russian diplomatic staff – calling them “Russian intelligence officers” — in reaction to Moscow’s alleged poisoning of a former Russian spy in Britain.

A senior Lithuanian official told the AFP news agency before the talks that the three Baltic leaders want Trump to more frequently send Patriot long-range air-defense missiles to NATO military exercises in the Baltics.

The official said they also want to become a part of NATO’s larger European antimissile shield.

“I hope that the United States and other allies understand that the airspace of the Baltic states must be better protected and defended,” Grybauskaite told her country’s public broadcaster LRT ahead of the visit.

“It is important that [U.S. troops] are here on a permanent rotational basis in all Baltic states,” she said.

Last year, NATO deployed four multinational battalions to Poland and the Baltic states as tripwires against possible Russian adventurism, while the U.S. military sent a Patriot battery to Lithuania for drills.

U.S. Vice President Mike Pence in July raised the possibility of deploying Patriots in nearby Estonia.

Citizens of the Baltic states were rattled by Trump’s campaign rhetoric in 2016 questioning NATO’s relevance and his unwillingness to criticize Putin, public opinion polls showed.

But polls showed the public mood changed after Trump decided to boost funding for U.S. forces in Europe and provide antitank missiles to Ukraine to defend against Russia-backed separatists.

The Baltic-U.S. summit also included a business forum where Lithuania signed deals to boost imports of liquefied natural gas from the United States to reduce reliance on Russian natural gas.

The Baltic states, with a combined population of just 6 million people, were occupied and annexed by Moscow during World War II.

The trio broke free from the crumbling Soviet Union in 1991 and joined both the European Union and NATO in 2004.

By Fatima Abo Alasrar*

Yemen’s society has fragmented. The formal and informal ties that hold citizens and groups together continue to fray. Late last year, groups of displaced people from the northern Houthi-controlled areas were turned away by local authorities from the temporary southern capital of Aden as a result of fear and mistrust. Other travelers across the country risk death for having the wrong accent at a checkpoint. All over Yemen, identity politics are shaping the way people deal with one another. Without social cohesion, the peace process will face fundamental problems that could threaten the country’s existence.

Social cohesion has always been dismissed as something that could be addressed after the end of the civil war rather than before. This relegation of social cohesion to an aspect of little consequence can in part be attributed to the assumption that Yemen’s social fabric is strong. After all, observers are often deceived by the level of civility and cordial attitudes that Yemenis have for one another in formal settings. It could also be attributed to the manipulation of facts at the state level, including controlling the narrative on aggrieved communities through media blackouts and misinformation. The civil war and chaos that ensued are ultimately the result of this weakened fabric being torn to shreds on both the state and societal level.

Many of the cultural stereotypes and misconceptions that undermined social cohesion in the first place were seeds sown by the state to suppress opposition. “The state pursued divisive agendas that ultimately led to its own fragility and destruction through granting privileges for groups that had no right to acquire them,” said Ahmed Al-Saleh, founder of the Aden Foundation for Strategic Studies, adding that “justice is needed if people are to trust the state.” One such example is the state’s propagation of the image that all southerners are Marxists who don’t adhere to Islamic values. Such allegations only serve to alienate a portion of the population and further undermine social cohesion.

To make matters worse, concepts that one would normally associate with the strengthening of social cohesion were leveraged as a means for further manipulation by the state. Terms like “nation” and “unity” were actively deployed in order to suppress dissent. For example, when people from the south expressed any criticism of the government, they were dubbed as “infilsali,” meaning “separatists.” According to a Yemeni resident: “One feels insulted hearing the word ‘unity’ because it was used to justify oppression in the name of national identity.” The state chose to use the concept of unity as a weapon to subjugate and intimidate.

In the absence of a strong national identity, groups have strengthened their own sense of identity through various means, including holding prejudiced views against others that oppose them. The Houthis were the masterminds of this technique. Their tactics are clearly seen in their infamous anti-Saudi and anti-Western slogans, such as “Death to America.” The Houthis also ritually conduct “forced cultural indoctrination tours,” in which they compel government employees and soldiers alike to attend workshops geared toward enforcing their sectarian beliefs. Although this may seem fanatical, such rituals often serve as the furnaces in which both cohesion and identity are forged.

In the south, grievances and exploitation serve as the fodder that fuels the formation of social cohesion. Southerners’ identity is intimately rooted in their former experience as a progressive, independent country before unification in 1990. Many southerners feel that unity overshadowed their cultural identity and reminisce about their former civil state, as opposed to the heavily tribalized state known by their neighbors in the north.

But most important for southerners is the issue of security. The overarching lack of state security services has led many southerners to become increasingly distrustful of outsiders in recent years. The rising number of Al-Qaeda and Daesh attacks, which are almost exclusively focused on the south, bear the hallmarks of the structural violence that southerners have faced since unification.

Whether distrust, prejudice, poverty or security is the impetus for the formation of a group’s identity, all narratives converge on a similar “us versus them” mentality. With the presence of so many different identities vying for control, conflict is inevitable. In Yemen, civil war has served to exacerbate this toxic mindset, but it is important to remember that, at the core of everything, it was the prolonged disintegration of social cohesion that caused such regional fragmentation. At this point, it is nearly impossible to reconcile Yemen as a unified state, but if equilibrium is ever to be restored in the future, it is important to remember the factors that stripped Yemen of its identity in the first place.

• Fatima Abo Alasrar is a senior analyst for the Arabia Foundation in Washington DC. Twitter: @YemeniFatima 

President Donald Trump promised to “make America great again”. The slogan defined his campaign and his presidency. His bluster was often forgiven because of the sentiment attached to that slogan—it inspired a hope that Trump’s policies would protect the U.S. economy and ensure that the declining standard of living of Americans would be reversed. A year into his presidency, there is little evidence of any improvement. Inequality continues to define the American economic landscape—CEOs, new government data show, can make up to a thousand times more in their salaries than their employees. It is impossible to suggest that high inequality and joblessness should be the character of a Great America. Red hats with that slogan are easy to produce, but it is a bitter pill if these are made—as they often are—in Bangladesh, China and Vietnam.

President Trump has now announced a tariff policy on aluminium and steel, which he hopes will redouble efforts by the manufacturing sector to kick-start a languid economy. Trump framed his tariff policy around the framework of national security rather than economics. Other powers, mainly China, he said, were “assaulting our country”. It was to prevent this assault that the U.S. would build a high wall around these key sectors of its manufacturing. It was clear that this was less about economics and more about politics when Trump announced speedily that “good friends”—Canada, Mexico, Australia—would be excluded. Australian and Canadian firms are major producers of aluminium through Rio Tinto and through the subsidiaries of the American aluminium giant Alcoa. The largest aluminium producers in the world are Chinese and Russian, but the materials are mainly used in Eurasia rather than exported to the U.S.

Chinese export of steel to the U.S. accounts for merely 3 per cent of the U.S.’ steel imports. The major countries from where steel goes to the U.S. are Canada, which will likely be excluded from the tariff, and Brazil, which will not be excluded. Brazil’s private steel companies, Gerdau and CSN, are subsidised by very favourable loans from the government bank, BNDES. Brazil’s right-wing government, already in the midst of political turmoil and with little guarantee that it will be able to win the elections later this year, has asked the Trump administration for an exception. If Trump gives Brazil the exception, the policy will appear to be more smoke and mirrors than based on reality.

China is the rhetorical target of Trump’s policy, even though Chinese firms export neither aluminium nor steel to the U.S. But this anti-China move is part of a process at the Trump White House. Trump had released a national security report that identified China as a “strategic competitor”, and the 2017 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance has strong words that China is a cyber-thief and a cyber-spy.

Trump’s advisers on tariff policy are Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, Economic Adviser Peter Navarro and Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer. These three men share an obsession with China. They believe that China is undermining America’s capacity to become great again. Their views are grounded less in economics and more in politics.

U.S. businesses fear retaliation

The tariff policy pointed its fingers at China. Trump has defined the project of making American great again in opposition to China. It is as if a halt to China’s advance will somehow contribute to the greatness of America. But it is clear that Trump will not be allowed to push too hard against China and that his policies will not impact China negatively. Commercial lobbies in the U.S. responded negatively to Trump’s China policy because they feared retaliation. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and 44 other such associations wrote a stinging letter to Trump asking him not to impose tariffs against China. If the U.S. did so, they wrote, it would “trigger a chain reaction of negative consequences for the U.S. economy”. Apple, Google and Walmart are among the firms that say that they would not like a trade war with China. They rely upon China for production and for markets. It would be catastrophic for them if China fought back.

Interestingly, the data on U.S.-China trade deficits used by the Trump administration as a dog whistle about Chinese “unfairness” are out of date. The statistic bandied about is that China has an advantage of about $375 billion over the U.S.— a very high number. However, this is an illusion. Most of the goods that come to the U.S. from China are not entirely made in China but are made along the global circuits of production—some are even made in the U.S.

Components come from around the world into China, where they are utilised in the goods produced for exports. When the value of these components is factored in, the trade deficit drops to $200 billion (based on the World Input Output Database). The U.S. consumption patterns benefit not only China but a range of countries, including the U.S. An attack on China will impact many other countries more than China itself.

Europe’s retaliatory tariffs indicate that the Europeans are not in a trade war but want to send a political message to the U.S. They have put tariffs on blue jeans and on cranberries. The latter is significant. It is a key industry in Wisconsin, House Representative Paul Ryan’s State. It is a little message to Ryan and to America’s iconic product (blue jeans). Cecilia Malmstrom, the European Commissioner for Trade, said that a trade war was not on the cards. “A trade war has no winners. If it does not happen, all the better.”

China is likely to file a lawsuit against the U.S. in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The U.S. has shown a propensity to ignore the WTO when its rulings are adverse. In 2002, President George W. Bush slapped a 30 per cent tariff on steel on national security grounds. The WTO ruled against the U.S.; Bush ignored the WTO. The Europeans imposed tariffs on goods made in congressional constituencies that were up for re-election. Bush abandoned the tariffs to make sure that his party would not be hurt in the mid-term elections. The retaliatory tariff on cranberries harks back to that feint by the Europeans.

But the U.S. had been developing bilateral treaties outside the WTO and multilateral arrangements that it dominated in order to undermine the WTO. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), whose purpose was to exclude China, was a way to develop new trade standards favouring the West—standards such as new kinds of intellectual property protections, new forms of investor settlement mechanisms and restrictions on state-owned enterprises. Trump had trashed the TPP in the early part of his presidency, but there are now signs that he might return to that table if it enables him to push China off balance.

This column originally appeared on Frontline (India).

By Zahid Hussain

Four members of a Catholic family were killed in a militant attack in southern Pakistan a day after the minority community celebrated Easter.

The deadly gun attack took place on April 2 in the Shah Zaman area of Quetta, the capital of restive Balochistan province.

The so-called Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack in a statement carried by its Aamaq news agency.

“Four Christian relatives were going to a nearby market on an auto-rickshaw when two unknown gunmen on a motorbike opened fire on them,” police officer Moazzam Jah Ansari told ucanews.com. “It was a targeted attack and an act of terrorism.”

Police said the casings of 9mm bullets were recovered from the crime scene.

Pervaiz Masih, Tariq Masih, Imran Masih and Firdous Bibi died in the attack while a 10-year-old girl was injured.

A neighbor, Aftab, told ucanews.com that Pervaiz Masih, a rickshaw driver, was taking his relatives to an ice cream shop when they were targeted just outside their home.

“Pervaiz Masih had been living in Quetta for 10 years. His relatives came from Lahore and Dubai for the first time to celebrate Easter with him on March 29,” Aftab said.

“They came back from a dinner and were going out to eat ice cream in a nearby market when gunmen sprayed bullets at them. The bodies are being sent back to Lahore for burial.”

Aftab said the whole community was in a state of shock.

A day earlier, Gul Hussain, a member of the minority Shia Hazara community, was gunned down in Quetta. A sit-in is being staged by the community to demand action against the perpetrators.

In October last year, a hand grenade was thrown at a Pentecostal church in the same area.

A week before last Christmas, two suicide bombers stormed a packed Christian church in Quetta, killing at least nine people and wounding up to 56. Islamic State claimed responsibility for the carnage.

By Wilawan Watcharasakwet

hai authorities seized about $68.6 million (2.14 billion baht) worth of meth in the past week and arrested 11 suspects, officials said Tuesday, underscoring a U.N. report describing Thailand as a major transit point for drug trafficking in Southeast Asia.

Police seized 788 kilograms (358 pounds) of crystal methamphetamine and more than nine million meth pills from an abandoned pick-up truck Monday night in the northern Chiang Rai province, near the Mekong River, police Lt. Gen. Sommai Kongvisaisuk, commander of the Narcotics Suppression Bureau (NSB), told reporters in Bangkok.

The river divides Thailand and Laos and is within the drug-producing region known as the Golden Triangle, which includes parts of northern Thailand, Laos and Myanmar.

The seizure came less than a week after police confiscated 651 kilograms (295 pounds) of crystal meth on March 28 in Songkhla province, in the country’s Deep South, officials said.

The drugs were trafficked into northern Thailand by a syndicate that uses the Mekong River in order to smuggle meth into Malaysia, police Maj. Gen. Chayapoj Hasunha, chief of the NSB’s intelligence division, told BenarNews.

“Malaysia has become a hub to distribute the drugs through Indian Ocean, Australia, United Kingdom, Europe and North America,” he said.

Drug-related arrests in Thailand are on the rise, with at least 900 arrests so far this year, compared with 453 in 2017, NSB officials told a news conference last month.

The “steep increase” in seizures of meth in Southeast Asia denotes a growing demand of the drug in the region, where 287 million methamphetamine tablets were seized in 2015, according to the 2017 report of the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

Most of those seizures took place in Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam, UNODC said.

Thai police said a meth pill worth 200 baht (U.S. $6) in Thailand could be sold up to 500 baht (U.S. $16) in Malaysia and even more in Australia, one of the world’s largest consumer of crystal meth.

On March 20, a Thai court sentenced Xaysana Keopimpha, a Laotian dubbed as an “ASEAN Drug Lord,” to life in prison over narcotics-smuggling charges.

The 43-year-old headed a transnational Southeast Asian network that supplied millions of caffeine-laced methamphetamine tablets known as “yaba,” Thai authorities said after they arrested him in January 2017 at Bangkok’s main airport.

The market for crystal meth, a potent central nervous system stimulant, has grown rapidly in recent years in the country, which has about 2.89 million drug users in 2014, the latest year for which figures are available, according to the UNODC report.

“Transnational criminal groups continue to target Thailand as a major transit location for the trafficking of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals to international markets, and also as a destination country for illicit drugs,” the report said.

The changes made to the CCP constitution to allow President Xi Jinping an indefinite stay of power have led to concerns about Beijing’s long-term geopolitical gameplan. At the same time, with great power comes great responsibility. What China does in the region will be closely watched.

By Benjamin Ho and Hoo Chiew-Ping*

Following recent changes to the Chinese constitution that allow President Xi Jinping to extend his leadership beyond two-term limits, many commentators – both inside and outside China – have raised concerns over how this would affect China’s international relations.

In “How China is Challenging American Dominance in Asia,” The New York Times noted that “the stakes could hardly be higher [given] the two powers are seeking to reshape the economies and political systems of the world’s most populous region in its own image”.

China’s Relations and Global Norms

Separately, Professor Wang Gungwu highlighted lessons from China’s history whereby party infighting led to the country being weakened and torn apart when faced with external invasion. This reaffirmed that “only a strong party can save China and such a party needs sustained leadership” while providing the impetus for Xi to ensure that he would remain in power to forestall potential challenges that would impede China’s growth.

Chinese thinkers increasingly concentrate on “global governance” and how China – as a great power – ought to translate its growing geopolitical clout into issues of governance beyond its shores. Given Xi’s certainty to rule China for the next 10-15 years (barring health issues), it is likely that greater weight will be attached to China’s international relations and the type of leadership it is expected to provide.

In the past two years, Xi alluded to China playing a more proactive role in global matters, from climate change, to opening economies and the promotion of the Belt Road Initiative. At the same time, many remain unconvinced of Beijing’s long-term intentions, as they perceive China to be acting solely in its own interests, unconcerned with the well-being of other nations. This is particularly so in two areas: the South China Sea disputes and denuclearisation in the Korea Peninsula.

South China Sea Disputes

The South China Sea disputes have cast a long shadow over China’s relations with Southeast Asia. While Chinese diplomats and the ASEAN counterparts have worked hard the past year to ensure that differences over the issue have not escalated into open argument, the disputes are far from being resolved (notwithstanding ongoing work to conclude a Code of Conduct).

A fundamental problem lies in how the practice of international relations and diplomacy is being conceptualised. Professor William Callahan of the London School of Economics argues it has been taken for granted that the United Nations or ASEAN would convert China to its model of international relations.

But the instability of mainstream concepts, on the one hand, and the increased use by Chinese scholars and officials of traditional concepts, on the other, suggests that conversion can work in different ways: “either mutual socialisation, or Greater China converting the rest of the world to its own model of world politics”. In this respect, the stakes involve not just control of economic resources or population, but a more foundational problem of “whose rules matter”.

In recent interviews with scholars and policymakers in Vietnam and Indonesia, there is a pervasive sense that China is attempting to rewrite the rules of the international system to benefit itself without due concern or sensitivity for the countries it was dealing with.

China’s preference for a bilateral approach in resolving disputes suggests that it remains wary of attempts that purport to canvas international opinion, believing that these moves are attempts to entrench Western interests and priorities. Such beliefs do not help Beijing cultivate better relationships with ASEAN countries.

Denucleariation of Korean Peninsula

The prospect of China asserting strong influence over the Korean Peninsula remains uncertain, notwithstanding Kim Jong-Un’s visit to Beijing recently. Although China has often been portrayed as an ally and enabler of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), especially in the West, the relationship is much more complex. As Kim Heungkyu of Asan Institute points out, China is embroiled in the nuclear crisis and yet it has little effective ways to control the DPRK.

The DPRK has become a strategic burden to China. Chinese scholars such as Zhang Weiqi (Suffolk University) add that China’s influence over North Korea is not as great as many think. Historical research by Shen Zhihua (East China Normal University) finds that North Korea does not see China as a friend or brother.

China’s position on the Korean Peninsula is “no war, no chaos, and no nuclear”. During the tensions in 2017, China cooperated with the Trump administration in dialling up economic pressure against the DPRK (although only to a certain extent), and proposed the so-called “double suspension” of nuclear or missile testing on the DPRK side and joint exercises on the US-ROK side. The recent inter-Korean rapprochement and the upcoming Kim-Trump summit are touted by many within China as exactly China’s solution.

But the Kim-Trump summit has the potential to sideline China and undermine China’s interests as well. Some Chinese analysts argue that China has made a strategic mistake in cooperating with the Trump administration. China increased sanctions but received little affirmation and praise and some of its domestic enterprises continued to be targeted and sanctioned.

In their eyes, China risks undermining the status quo and stability of the DPRK, which could cross its own border, but there is no reciprocation from the Trump administration, which is threatening a trade war.

From National Power to International Image

Chinese national power (guojia quanli国家权力) is no longer in doubt. Nevertheless, its international image （guoji xingxiang国际形象）, which is perceived by many to still suffer from its revolutionary Maoist past, remains problematic. China’s relations with the Asia-Pacific region are critical to its international image.

If China is to be seen as more than just “looking out for itself,” it must demonstrate that its approach to global governance reflects standards that are internationally valid. Consequently, for China’s image promotion to work, a less Sino-centric way of relating to the world is needed, particularly in its diplomatic relations with its closest neighbours. If Beijing is to be a global leader it must convince others that it can marry its greatness with responsibility.

*Benjamin Ho is an associate research fellow with the China Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore and a PhD Candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Hoo Chiew-Ping is a senior lecturer at the National University of Malaysia and an associate fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS-Asia). This was originally published as Pacific Forum PacNet #24.

Asia-Pacific countries cannot influence decisions in the US, but they can pursue a three-pronged response that should enhance their resilience to possible global shocks generated by Trump’s protectionist policies.

By Pradumna Bickram Rana and Xianbai Ji*

United States President Donald Trump has taken a radically different approach to trade than his predecessors leading to a rise in American protectionism. Trump has launched a series of unilateral moves, the most recent being increasing tariffs on steel and aluminum imports on national security grounds.

Trump has put together a team of trade hawks that have sneered at the multilateral trading system. Perhaps the most protectionist actions proposed by the team so far is the plan to impose tariffs on US$60 billion worth of Chinese imports. More protectionist actions are likely.

Accelerating Mega FTAs

Uncertainties regarding continued access to the US market have forced Asia-Pacific countries, for whom trade is an economic lifeline, to adopt a three-pronged policy response: accelerate the signing of mega free trade agreements (mega FTAs), enhance regional connectivity, and deepen interregional economic cooperation.

Japan and Australia have taken the lead in pushing through the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP or TPP11) without America. This agreement was signed on 8 March 2018 and is expected to come into effect early next year, once it is ratified by at least six of the 11 members. Although Japan hopes to have the agreement approved by the Diet this summer, other countries may take longer. For example, Malaysia has already announced a longer timeline for ratification.

Although 22 US-supported TPP provisions have been suspended or amended, the revised CPTPP is still a gold standard agreement: it eliminates tariffs on 95 percent of merchandise trade while containing many groundbreaking rules relevant to 21st-century trade. The CPTPP offers large economic benefits even without US participation.

Using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, we estimate that the net benefit of CPTPP to all its members would be 0.3 percent of their combined gross domestic product (GDP) in the medium run. All 11 CPTPP countries would benefit, albeit less than if the US were in the accord.

Several other countries may also join the CPTPP. South Korea says it is assessing the CPTPP’s effect before making a decision. Indonesia and Thailand, and even Britain, have expressed interest in joining the accord. Trump said that he is open to rejoining the trade deal, but only if it involves a “better deal for the United States”. This may not happen any time soon.

East Asia’s RCEP & BRI

Asian countries have also accelerated negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Success of the CPTPP should give a boost to RCEP, and the negotiating parties are optimistic that it can be concluded later this year under Singapore’s ASEAN chairmanship. To fast-track RCEP, the idea of an “RCEP minus X” formula is gaining traction.

Since RCEP is a mega free trade area (FTA) comprising mostly developing countries, it is not as transformative as the CPTPP. But its conventional free trade agenda would still confer significant benefits. Our estimates show that RCEP would generate welfare gains of $127 billion, compared to $35 billion from the CPTPP. Cambodia and Thailand are likely to benefit the most from RCEP.

In addition to pursuing mega FTAs, Asia-Pacific countries have stepped up efforts to enhance regional connectivity through infrastructure development. The headline-grabbing activity is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), spearheaded by President Xi Jinping since 2013. The BRI aims to connect more than 70 countries across the Afro-Eurasian supercontinent via large-scale projects including railways, roads, bridges, ports, and pipelines.

Criticism of a lack of transparency and China’s debt-trap diplomacy notwithstanding, the BRI is largely seen as an attractive proposition for many developing countries that are in need of investment finance.

Apart from RCEP and BRI, in 2016 ASEAN unveiled the new Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity. The plan envisions a “seamlessly and comprehensively connected and integrated ASEAN” by 2025. It includes several major region-wide infrastructure projects such as the ASEAN Highway Network.

Alternatives to BRI

There are two other connectivity proposals that can be viewed as alternatives to the BRI. India is collaborating with Japan under the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor proposal to develop maritime connectivity across Africa, India, and Southeast Asia. Australia, India, Japan, and the US are involved in another partnership, known as the Indo-Pacific Partnership. The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor and the Indo-Japan Partnership proposals are still at the consultation stage.

The third prong of the Asia-Pacific response to rising US protectionism is the promotion of interregional economic cooperation.

On 5 March 2018, the Philippines ratified its FTA with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Australia and New Zealand hope to start their trade negotiations with the European Union (EU) this year, and ASEAN hopes to resume its stalled region-to-region FTA negotiations with the EU in the next few months. South Korea signed FTAs in February with a number of Central American countries. Singapore is negotiating an FTA with the Pacific Alliance.

An Evolving Regional Trade Architecture

Going forward, Asia-Pacific countries’ three-pronged response to a protectionist shift in the US will most likely continue. What shape could the evolving regional trade architecture take?

Our CGE model suggests that instead of joining just one mega FTA, countries would benefit from joining both. For example, Vietnam’s real GDP would increase by either 1.5 percent from the CPTPP or 3.3 percent from RCEP, but if the country joins both, its real GDP would increase by 4.2 percent.

This means that once the CPTPP is ratified, the CPTPP-only countries (Canada, Mexico, Peru, and Chile) should seek RCEP membership. Similarly, the RCEP-only countries (Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand) should seek CPTPP membership.

This would result in a 20-country bloc in the Asia-Pacific region with membership in both the CPTPP and the RCEP. The advantage of dual membership would be access to the Chinese and Indian markets for CPTPP members and valuable exposure to high-quality trade rules for RCEP members. Additionally, countries would not have to choose sides between the Japan- and Australia-led CPTPP and the ASEAN- and China-led RCEP.

Perhaps, ironically, President Trump has done more to promote regional and interregional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific than these countries would have done on their own.

*Pradumna B. Rana is associate professor and coordinator of the International Political Economy Programme in the Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. Xianbai Ji is a PhD candidate at RSIS holding the Nanyang President’s Graduate Scholarship. An earlier version appeared as a Council of Councils Global Memo, an initiative of the Council on Foreign Relations.

By Dr Subhash Kapila

Grave geopolitical consequences are likely to flow for global security and stability by the ongoing confrontation between United States and the West with Russia. Highlighted in my past SAAG Papers was that the United States cannot afford two sets of Cold Wars with its global predominance under challenge.

Singularly invisible in United States & West geopolitical discourses is the total lack of an assessment that in 2018 which is the most long-range and potent threat to Western democracies— China or Russia?

Obviously, China is the most potent threat to US National Security interests’ intent on challenging United States global predominance and endangering the security of US Allies in the Indo Pacific and its strategic partners.

The United States in 2018 must be ruing the day in 1972 when then US President Nixon and his Sinophiles advisers like Henry Kissinger inflicted the “Nixonian Moment” on the United States. In the decades that followed American strategic permissiveness has resulted in China emerging as United States most potent adversary—a fact conceded by present US President designating China as such.

The United States is in the danger of repeating the Nixonian Moment once again by pushing Russia into China’s strategic embrace by renewing all over again another Cold War with Russia.

China is a revisionist power with aspirations to attain strategic equivalence with the United States and hence the major source of military confrontations with the United States. The United States and China are destined for an inevitable military conflict in the coming decades.

Comparatively, even a resurgent Russia has a historical record of management of the global system with the United States by limiting regional conflicts even at the height of the first Cold War spanning 45 years.

Ingrained in this strategic push-over of Russia are two grave consequences for the United States & West. The first that Russia would be pushed into a full strategic embrace by China much that Russia resents being viewed as a satellite of China.

Secondly, what may have ended up as two sets of different Cold Wars embroiling the United States by its adversaries now has ingrained in it the possible fusion of the two Cold Wars with China and Russia into one larger global Cold War between United States & West and the China-Russia Axis so emerging.

Two sets of geopolitical and strategic dangers hover on the horizon for the United States more pointedly. While Asian countries because of their fears of a militarily threatening China have recently pivoted towards the United States in the China-induced confrontation spanning the Indo Pacific, these very Asian nations would not line-up with the United States & West Cold War confrontation with Russia. Simply, for no other reason because Russia by itself does not figure in Asian threat perceptions.

The other danger for the United States is that West European countries lining up with the United States and in sympathy with Britain may have in solidarity expelled Russian diplomats but when it would amount to a full-blown Cold War confrontation with Russia, these very West European nations would chicken-out from a confrontation with Russia prompted by economic reasons and their dependence on Russian gas supplies.

With a Cold War against the United States generated by China since 2001 to which the United States was dismissive for most part of the decade and now shaken out of its reveries by China’s attaining full-spectrum dominance of the global commons in the South China Sea, the year2018 was an inopportune time for the United States to get embroiled in yet another different set of Cold War with Russia.

The United States & West perceptively appear to have been spoiling for a confrontation with Russia as the Russian provocation on British soil of a poisonous attack on a former Russian spy and his daughter was hardly the stimulus for the breakout of an all-out confrontation between United States & West.

US President Trump in his first year made wise moves to reset US relations with Russia but was ambushed by the Cold War gladiators on Capitol Hill who have not yet got over their earlier post-World War II Cold War animosities with Russia.

In this ongoing Cold War confrontation between United States & West and Russia the major question that begs an answer is that who would blink first to de-escalate the confrontation? The question brooks no easy conclusions keeping in mind that Russia in a resurgent mode is intent on carving its own spheres of influence and the United States& West trying to limit Russia within confined limits.

Overall, China is the biggest gainer and must be smiling all the way from Beijing to the Great Wall of China. At no geopolitical or strategic costs to China itself, China has gained on two counts. China gains an existential strategic weight of Russia on its side and which has the potential of the China-Russia quasi-strategic nexus turning into a full-fledged China-Russia Axis.

More importantly, China will be strategically comfited as the ongoing United States & West Cold War confrontation diverts global strategic attention away from the China Threat menacing Indo Pacific Asia.

In Conclusion, one would advise caution for the United States & West not pushing Russia into a geopolitical corner as a full-fledged Cold War by the United States & West with Russia carries more grave challenges for the United States having to contend with two simultaneous Cold Wars with powerful adversaries which it cannot afford. Strategic prudence would dictate to the United States to stop the ongoing escalation with Russia.

By Michael Lelyveld

The sound and fury over a threatened trade war between the United States and China may signify relatively little to either economy, at least so far, analysts say.

Initially, both U.S. and Chinese stock markets dropped sharply with losses of about 4 percent on March 22-23 after President Donald Trump announced plans for U.S. $60 billion (377 billion yuan) in tariffs on Chinese goods in retaliation for intellectual property (IP) violations.

The penalties under Section 301 of a 1974 trade law came on top of the earlier imposition of a 10-percent tariff on aluminum and a 25-percent charge on foreign steel under Section 232 of a 1962 law dealing with national security risks.

After temporary exemptions from the metals curbs were granted to Canada, Mexico, the European Union and other countries, it appeared that the tariffs were aimed largely at China. Beijing vowed to take “all necessary measures” in response.

But by the following Monday last week, many of the clouds cleared as the Dow Jones Industrial Average jumped 2.8 percent on reports of U.S. negotiations with China and a reciprocal deal on metals with South Korea.

The Dow closed last week with a 2.4-percent gain, while China’s Shanghai Composite Index edged up 0.5 percent.

Talks with China have covered areas including greater access to the financial services sector, lower tariffs on U.S. autos and Chinese imports of semiconductors, The Wall Street Journal said.

The reports sent a signal that all issues would be on the table during the 15-day period set for specific Section 301 tariffs to be announced. The affected sectors are expected to be made public by the end of this week.

“We’re having very productive conversations with them,” U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin told Fox News on March 25.

Speaking on March 28 to CNBC television, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer said the tariffs were unlikely to take effect before early June.

Among the reasons for optimism is the modest size of the penalties that have been announced so far, in relation to the huge bilateral trade volumes between the world’s two biggest economies.

Numerous reports cited estimates that the U.S. $60 billion in tariffs would cut China’s gross domestic product by only 0.1 percentage points, while the steel and aluminum penalties would cost even less.

Some analysts questioned whether China’s economy would even suffer that much.

“The tariffs only matter to China to the extent that exports are actually lost, which will be much less value than $60 billion,” said Derek Scissors, an Asia economist and resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington. “The (Section) 232 impact in China is tiny,” Scissors said.

‘Made in China 2025’

The $60-billion tariff target is also small in relation to the decades-old complaints from U.S. manufacturers about the cost of forced technology transfers and IP theft in China.

The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) has estimated that the annual cost of IP violations and the loss of trade secrets to the U.S. economy is over U.S. $225 billion (1.4 trillion yuan) and could be as high as U.S. $600 billion (3.7 trillion yuan).

“China … remains the world’s principal IP infringer,” the Seattle-based NBR said in a report last year.

China has gained much of its automotive technology by forcing foreign car makers to form joint ventures with domestic manufacturers as a price of doing business in the country.

U.S. industries fear that similar strategies are behind Beijing’s “Made in China 2025” initiative that would promote home-grown development of robotics and other high-tech sectors with IP from abroad.

“While Beijing has signaled a willingness to compromise on other matters, the intractable standoff over its core industrial policy could prolong a trade fight that has already shaken markets and led to concerns about a full-blown trade war,” The New York Times said on March 26.

Although the stakes are enormous, the steps on both sides so far may have minimal impact.

On March 23, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOC) announced plans to impose tariffs on 128 U.S. products including fruit, wine, and seamless steel tubes.

On Sunday, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) said that retaliatory measures would take effect today. These include a 15-percent tariff on 120 categories of U.S. fruits and “related products” and a 25-percent tariff on eight categories of pork and related products, the official Xinhua news agency said.

A drop in the bucket

While the penalties would hit U.S. producers in those sectors, the previously announced cost of U.S. $3 billion (18.8 billion yuan) would be a drop in the bucket compared with the U.S. $635 billion (4 trillion yuan) in bilateral goods trade last year.

China also made clear that its limited retaliation was in response to the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs rather than the Section 301 charges for IP theft.

The moves suggested a cautious approach to retaliation rather than the wildfire of a trade war that many experts had feared.

“Beijing’s initial response has been muted, setting the stage for what could be a methodical escalation of retaliatory measures,” The Times said in an earlier report.

In a statement today, the MOC laid out its case for China’s first round of tariffs.

China “has acted in restraint to avoid confrontation with the United States,” it said, concluding that cooperation “is the only valid option” for the two countries.

Escalation would raise the costs on both sides, but China’s steps against major U.S. exports like Boeing aircraft and soybeans have so far been kept in reserve.

In making his announcement of the Section 301 tariffs, Trump also repeated his demand that the trade deficit with China should be reduced by U.S. $100 billion (629 billion yuan).

That would be a far cry from trying to eliminate the U.S. $375-billion (2.3-trillion yuan) deficit entirely. The limited target so far has no timetable and could be achieved flexibly, perhaps by lowering China’s 25-percent tariff on imported cars.

China’s responses to the U.S. demands have been largely hortatory rather than hostile.

“China hopes that the United States will make rational and cautious decisions and choices,” Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said on March 26.

“Some age-old trade issues cannot be settled overnight,” Premier Li Keqiang told a visiting U.S. congressional delegation on March 27, Xinhua reported.

“To launch a trade war could never solve problems, and runs counter to the fundamental principles of trade,” said Li.

Economic impact of tariffs

On the less optimistic side, the impact of tariffs on the Chinese economy could exceed the minimal estimate of 0.1 percentage points of GDP if retaliation gets out of hand.

“The direct negative effect on China’s economy from a trade war is relatively limited, but it could affect market sentiment,” said Scott Kennedy, deputy director of China studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

“In the short run, this could hurt China’s stock market, and in the long run might shake investor confidence that China is a stable place to do business. That in turn may affect overall investment trends,” Kennedy said by email.

But analysts have dismissed the idea that China’s GDP growth rate could slip as low as 6.2 percent, the minimum level that the government must maintain through 2020 to keep the Chinese Communist Party’s long-standing pledge to double GDP in a decade.

Last year, China pumped up its economy with credit-fueled stimulus measures to overshoot its 6.5-percent target with growth of 6.9 percent, achieving its first annual increase since 2010.

The government has announced the same growth target of “about 6.5 percent” for 2018 and has packed its regulatory agencies and the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) with officials who say they intend to keep credit under control.

The new regulators could face a tough choice on stimulus policies if economic growth starts to drop significantly, but analysts doubt that the damage from tariffs will go that far.

“We’re still a very long way from that kind of potential damage to China’s economy,” said Kennedy.

“Unless something entirely unexpected occurs, China will have no problem reaching its 6.5-percent growth target this year, even if that means adding a little more juice (stimulus) to get there,” he said.

By Madalin Necsutu

Amidst ongoing controversy over the charges, the Chisinau District Court reached its decision after six hours of deliberation.

Six men accused of plotting the assassination of Moldova’s most influential oligarch, Democratic Party leader Vlad Plahotniuc, were sentenced late Monday night to between three and 20 years in jail.

Moldovan prosecutors originally had requested prison terms of between 11 to 24 years for the six alleged contract killers.

Accused ringleader Valery Zobolotny, the deputy chairperson of the sports-charity IFAVIS, will be behind bars for 20 years. The other five – Vasily Dragulyu, Ivan Kozhokar, Igor Melnik, Stepan Kirov, Dmitry Shevchenko -were sentenced from between three to 11 years in prison.

All six pled not guilty.

Initially, prosecutors brought charges against seven individuals, but one of the men, Iurie Parhomenco, did a plea bargain with investigators. In January, he was sentenced to five years and four months in jail.

The state investigation claimed that the seven acted on orders from Grigory Karamalak (also known as «Bulgaru» or «The Bulgarian), a Moldovan who lives in Moscow, in exchange for $200,000. Karamalak, the chairperson of the Russia-based IFAVIS, also has been charged in the case. He recently dismissed the accusations as «clownery» to Newsmaker.md and has denied any involvement.

Plahotniuc, whom Karamalak described as a personal acquaintance, has not commented publicly on the sentencing. The Democratic Party “firmly condemned this criminal act” soon after the suspects’ arrest in April 2017.

To detain the seven men, Moldova coordinated with Ukraine, which kept them under surveillance for several months before their arrest.

At the time, questions were raised about the grounds for the charges after the Moldovan authorities released video footage of the accused supposedly drawing in the sand their plan of attack on the Chisinau building where Plahotniuc has an office.

The 2003 invasion of Iraq is the best-known example of America’s Government and press lying to fool its public to invade a foreign country that actually posed no threat to U.S. national security (so that America’s Defense Department was obviously America’s Aggression Department, and even its very name was a lie). However, that fraud and its resulting mega-violence were unfortunately typical, not at all exceptional, for the brutal American regime. This crucial but ugly fact will be documented here, so as to destroy (by clear facts) the lying U.S. regime’s supposed credibility — and this refers to both the Republican Party and the Democratic Party wings (and their ‘news’media), of our ruling aristocracy. (Same for America’s lapdog, UK.)

First, however: it’s important to document that both Americans and Brits were lied (and that word should be not only a noun, but also a verb, because “deceived” is far too soft a term for so heinous a consequence) into invading and occupying Iraq:

A crucial date was 7 September 2002, when George W. Bush and Tony Blair both said that a new report had just been issued by the IAEA saying that Saddam Hussein was only six months away from having a nuclear weapon. The IAEA promptly denied that it had issued any such “new report” at all, and the ‘news’ media simply ignored the denial, which the IAEA then repeated weeks later, and it again was ignored; so, the false impression, that such an IAEA report had been issued, remained in the publics’ minds, and they consequently favored invading Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein before there would be, as Condoleezza Rice warned the next day following Bush-Blair, on September 8th, a “mushroom cloud”. It was all just lies — lies that were believed by the public, at the time, and even believed by many for a long time after we invaded.

Some of these lies were derived from torturing detainees — torturing them to say what the U.S. and British regimes wanted them to say. But all were concocted by the perpetrating dictators. Like CIA Director George Tenet told his boss, George W. Bush, fooling the public into invading Iraq would be a “slam-dunk.”

Even today, many Americans still are successfully suckered into believing that torture extracts truths, instead of the desired lies, from suspects, to serve as ‘evidence’, in this ‘democracy’.

So: that’s the reality behind America’s destruction of Iraq — it was based upon lies from the Government, which were stenographically published and broadcast to the public as being truths, while the actual truths were being simultaneously hidden from the public — and the truth that the regime was lying didn’t get to reach us until we had already invaded and occupied the targeted country. That’s what happens when an evil regime fools its public, into supporting and doing its aristocracy’s invasion, at the taxpaying public’s expense, and psychopathically ignoring the massive horrors it is imposing upon the residents in the attacked country. This is psychopathy being displayed by a dictatorship — one that claims to be a ‘democracy’ and that demonizes other governments that it claims to be (and some of which, occasionally, are) dictatorships. With the ‘anti-communist’ excuse gone, only these types of lies still work; so, they’re used non-stop.

Here are other such instances:

Right now, the Obama-Trump regime, which use Al Qaeda in Syria to train and arm jihadists from around the world to go to Syria to fight and overthrow Syria’s Government and replace it by one that will be a stooge-regime of the U.S. aristocracy’s allied Saudi aristocracy (the Saud family), is, yet again, violating Trump’s promise to leave Syria as soon as ISIS is defeated. In contrast to the U.S. regime’s promises, Trump stays on in Syria after ISIS’s defeat and tries to carve out the northeastern part of Syria, now relying mainly upon Kurdish forces in Syria’s northeast, but also upon Al Qaeda-led jihadists in Ghouta and elsewhere, to serve as America’s “boots-on-the-ground,” for establishing the stooge-regime that the U.S. aristocracy and its allied Saudi and Israeli aristocracies want to control that land, so as to construct through it oil and gas pipelines to increase the invading aristocracy’s profits.

How can a news-consumer tell if a supposed ‘news’-medium is honest about Syria? Here’s a simple and reliable method: If the ‘news’-medium uses the term ‘rebels’ instead of “jihadists” or “terrorists” in order to refer to the people who are trying to overthrow and replace Syria’s Government, then you know it’s lying, because those aren’t ‘democrats’ in any sense: they are jihadists-terrorists who are aiming to establish in Syria a fundamentalist-Sunni, Wahhabist-Salafist, and rabidly anti-Shia, dictatorship there, which will be basically run by the Sauds. For example, on 2 April 2018, the BBC headlined “Uncertainty Over Rebel Deal in Ghouta” instead of “Uncertainty Over Jihadist Deal in Ghouta” or “Over Terrorist Deal,” and so the BBC is clearly a lying propaganda-outlet that cannot reasonably be believed, but whose reports one instead must independently verify before citing or quoting to others. Similarly, the prior day, the Telegraph had bannered “Ghouta ‘deal struck’ as rebel fighters evacuated” and thus made clear that it too is propaganda, not reliable news-reporting. To show how consistent these types of deception are through time, the Telegraph, on 6 March 2013, had headlined an editorial “To end the conflict in Syria, President Bashar al-Assad has to go” and called his overthrow “Our moral obligation”. And, just two days later, they bannered “US and Europe in ‘major airlift of arms to Syrian rebels through Zagreb'” — which ‘news’ would have been real news-reporting if only those ‘rebels’ (and what they actually represented) had been at all honestly described. The basic technique of propaganda is to lie in the framing of an issue. It’s so routine as to be endemic in the ‘news’-reporting in any dictatorship.

For yet another example: Any ‘news’-medium that refers to the overthrow in 2014 of Ukraine’s democratically elected Government, and its replacement by a racist-fascist (nazi) rabidly anti-Russian dictatorship, as having been not a coup but instead a ‘revolution’, is a rotten lying propaganda-medium, nothing better than that.

If the word “revolution” is used to describe the 2014 Ukraine overthrow, and the word “rebels” is used to refer to the fighters for the overthrow of Assad, not only is the medium consistently propaganda, but it is consistently pumping to precipitate World War III.

In my “The Nations that Accept Nazism Today” I documented that under Obama there were three: U.S., Ukraine, and Canada. And then in my “Trump Continues Obama’s Support of Nazism”, I documented that the number had declined to two — and now it was only U.S. and Ukraine. Those two news-reports (and my prior ones about Obama’s having backed nazism at the U.N.) were distributed free to all media, but only a few tiny media published any of them. The dictatorship needed to hide this shocking news from the public, not broadcast it to the public. The mainstream media (and some of the non-mainstream media) are fake-news media — and this comprises almost all of the ‘news’-media. On international relations, they’re just loaded with lies, and the key terms right now are, for Syria, “rebels” versus “jihadists”; and, for Ukraine, “revolution” versus “coup.”

*Investigative historian Eric Zuesse is the author, most recently, of They’re Not Even Close: The Democratic vs. Republican Economic Records, 1910-2010

In a landmark decision Tuesday, a federal jury found the former president of Bolivia and his minister of defense responsible for extrajudicial killings carried out by the Bolivian military, which killed more than 50 of its own citizens and injured hundreds during a period of civil unrest in September and October 2003.

The decision comes after a ten-year legal battle spearheaded by family members of eight people killed in what is known in Bolivia as the “Gas War.” It marked the first time in U.S. history a former head of state has sat before his accusers in a U.S. human rights trial. The jury awarded a total of $10 million in compensatory damages to the plaintiffs.

Both the former Bolivian president, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, and his former defense minister, José Carlos Sánchez Berzaín, have lived in the United States since they fled Bolivia following the massacre in 2003. In Bolivia, in 2011, former military commanders and government officials who acted under Sánchez de Lozada and Sánchez Berzaín’s authority were convicted for their roles in the 2003 killings. Both Sánchez de Lozada and Sánchez Berzaín were indicted in the same case, but could not be tried in abstentia under Bolivian law.

“After many years of fighting for justice for our family members and the people of Bolivia, we celebrate this historic victory,” said Teófilo Baltazar Cerro, a plaintiff and member of the indigenous Aymara community of Bolivia, who were victims of the defendants’ decision to use massive military force against the population. “Fifteen years after they fled justice, we have finally held Sánchez de Lozada and Sánchez Berzaín to account for the massacre they unleashed against our people.”

In Mamani v. Sánchez de Lozada and Sánchez Berzaín, the families of eight Bolivians killed filed suit against Sánchez de Lozada and Sánchez Berzaín in 2007, alleging that the two men planned and ordered the extrajudicial killings. The verdict affirms the plaintiffs’ claims that the two defendants were legally responsible for the extrajudicial killings and made decisions to deploy military forces in civilian communities in order to violently quash opposition to their policies. In addition to the deaths, hundreds of civilians were shot and injured.

The three-week trial included the testimony of 29 witnesses from across Bolivia who recounted their experiences of the 2003 killings. Twenty-three appeared in person. Eight plaintiffs testified about the deaths of their family members, including: Etelvina Ramos Mamani and Eloy Rojas Mamani, whose eight-year-old daughter Marlene was killed in front of her mother when a single shot was fired through the window; Teófilo Baltazar Cerro, whose pregnant wife Teodosia was killed after a bullet was fired through the wall of a house; Felicidad Rosa Huanca Quispe, whose 69-year-old father Raul was shot and killed along a roadside; and Gonzalo Mamani Aguilar, whose father Arturo was shot and killed while tending his crops.

One witness, a former soldier in the Bolivian military, testified about being ordered to shoot at “anything that moves” in a civilian community, while another recounted witnessing a military officer kill a soldier for refusing to follow orders to shoot at unarmed civilians. Witnesses recounted how tanks rolled through in the streets and soldiers shot for hours on end. Others testified about how the president and minister of defense committed to a military option instead of pursuing dialogue with community leaders to reach a peaceful resolution.

In 2016, a U.S. appeals court held that the plaintiffs could proceed with their claims under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), which authorizes suits for monetary damages in U.S. federal court for extrajudicial killings. Sánchez de Lozada and Sánchez Berzaín then sought and were denied a review by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2017, and the case moved forward in U.S. District Court. After a review of the evidence gathered by both sides, District Court Judge James I. Cohn ruled on February 14 that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence to proceed to trial.

“The plaintiffs demonstrated immense courage in relentlessly pursuing justice for over a decade,” said Judith Chomsky, a Center for Constitutional Rights cooperating attorney for the plaintiffs. “They have set an example for anyone fighting for accountability for human rights abuses worldwide.”

“This win is not only a momentous victory for the plaintiffs and the people of Bolivia, but affirms that no one is above the law,” said Tyler Giannini, Co-Director of Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic.

“The plaintiffs’ victory sends an unmistakable signal to perpetrators around the world that they can be held to account for human rights abuses in the United States,” added Susan Farbstein, Co-Director of Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic.

After the jury announced its verdict, the defendants made a motion asking the judge to overturn the jury’s finding of liability against both defendants. Both parties will submit briefing on this issue in the coming weeks.

The family members are represented by a team of lawyers from the Center for Constitutional Rights, Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic, and the law firms of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Schonbrun, Seplow, Harris & Hoffman, LLP, and Akerman LLP. Lawyers from the Center for Law, Justice and Society (Dejusticia) are cooperating attorneys.

Turkey has been applying for the EU membership since 1987 when Turgut Ozal, the 8th President of Turkey submitted an application. But until today, the have failed to convince the EU as well as the EU member states that they are fit to be a part of the European community via the EU.

There are many factors that might have contributed to the failure of Turkey’s application. One of the factors that has been heavily debated is on the historical perspectives based on the culture and identity. The European identity is one of the core importance in discussing about EU membership or enlargement process. The question that is being asked here is whether Turkey has that European identity within their country. In addition if we look at the history of Europe’s relation with the Ottoman Empire in the past would also be a deciding factor too as some Europeans would remember the shadows of conflict between both sides back in the day. The Ottoman Empire and its Muslim identity as well as the Christian Europe might have also shaped the minds of Europeans when Turkey applied for EU membership (Multuler & Taskin, 2007)

“While the cacophony of European contradictions works towards a self-elimination of the EU from the MENA/Euro-Med region, Turkey tries to reinsert itself. The so-called neo-Ottomanism of the current government is steering the country right into the centre of grand bargaining for both Russia and for the US. To this emerging triangular constellation, ambitious and bold PM Erdoğan wishes to beat his own drum. … Past the Arab Spring, Turkey wakes up to itself as the empiric proof that Islam and modernity work together. In fact, it is the last European nation that still has both demographic and economic growth. … Moreover, Ataturk’s Republic is by large and by far the world’s most successful Muslim state: It was never resting its development on oil or other primary-commodity exports, but on a vibrant socio-economic sector and solid democratic institutions. … The very outcome will be felt significantly beyond the Arab region and will reverberate all across the Sunni Muslim world.” (Bajrektarevic, Anis, 2016)

Besides the factor of history, culture and identity there were also war and human rights issues that hindered Turkey’s application to the EU. Turkey got involved in a bloody Kurdish revolution in South-East Anatolia during the mid-1980s. Turkey was accused of abusing human rights as well as persecuting the minorities during the revolution. Turkey’s failure to improve human rights and the rights of minorities made it difficult for them to be accepted into the EU.

In addition, the EU also raised doubts about Turkey’s ability in implementing the necessary social, political and economic adjustments needed to enter the EU. This was mentioned by the EU back in the 1990s but until today these issues still exist in Turkey. Government-led restrictions on media freedom and freedom of expression in 2015 went hand in- and with efforts to discredit the political opposition and prevent scrutiny of government policies in the run-up to the two general elections (Human Rights Watch, 2015). Recently, President Tayyip Erdogan has been arresting political activists, journalists and other critical of public officials since the attempted military coup happened in 15th July 2016. (Amnesty International, 2016). These are all the issues that has definitely contributed and effected Turkey’s EU membership application.

Another factor that has contributed to the failure of Turkey’s EU membership application is the fact that they currently occupy the northern part of Cyprus till this day. The issue of Cyprus and Turkey became significant when Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 in retaliation to Greece that had already occupied Cyprus since 1964 (Fitzgerald, 2009). At present, the Turkish troops occupy the northern part of Cyprus whereas the southern part of Cyprus is currently independent and has its own government. The connection between the Cyprus issue and the membership of Turkey into the EU became noticeable when Cyprus and Turkey both became candidates for EU membership and it was announced at the 1999 Helsinki Summit. Both countries were destined to join the European Union and at that time, it was confirmed that the situation in Cyprus was not involved in the decision making for the candidature. There were not precondition that was mentioned. But it was important for Turkey to play an active and important role in bringing about a settlement in Cyprus.

But on May 1, 2004, Cyprus was accepted as an EU member state and Turkey remained on the sidelines. The membership of Cyprus in the EU has made in even difficult for Turkey to become a member and it constitutes an important obstacle for EU accession of Turkey. This is because Turkey cannot become a member of the EU without recognizing the Republic of Cyprus. Since it joining the EU, Cyprus has used its veto to prevent the EU from passing the so-called direct trade regulation needed to lift tariffs on good from Northern Cyprus. (Barysch, 2010).

In addition, Cyprus as a member of the EU has also used its veto to block Turkey’s negotiations on accession with the European Union (Kambas, 2015). Cyprus have also said that it will not end its veto for the time being. These shows that the Cyprus issue is definitely one of the stumbling blocks for Turkey to strike any sort of deal with the EU and this deal includes their EU membership application.

Is the Cyprus issue one of the crucial factors that is currently effecting Turkey’s membership application after it became an EU member state in 2004. The first part of the paper will discuss about the Cyprus issue before it became an EU member state whether there were also other factors that affected Turkey’s membership application. The first part will discuss a little about history and then move on to Cyprus issue from 1974 until 2004. The second part will discuss about the Cyprus issue after it became an EU member state in 2004 where it seems that the Cyprus issue was definitely a very crucial factor that is currently affecting Turkey’s membership application.

Greek And Turkish Intervention In 1974

Cyprus became an independent nation in 1960 after both the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots agreed to sign the London-Zurich Agreement (BBC News, 2016). The agreement guaranteed the right of the Turkish minorities that were around 18% of the population as well as the rights of the Greek majority which comprised around 80% of the population at that time.

Prior to that, both the Greeks and Turkish Cypriots had demanded the British to give them independence. While Cyprus was already an independent country, their first President of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios said to have proposed constitutional changes called the Akritas Plan that would abolish power sharing in Cyprus and at the same suppress Turkish Cypriots. (Ellis, 2010). There were also sources that said Deputy President of Cyprus and also Turkish Cypriot Community Leader, Fazil Kutchuk wanted to break away from the state and set up a separate administration with the help of Turkey (Charalambous, 2014). These lead to communal violence and Turkey withdrawal from power sharing. There were already problems that were happening internally in Cyprus as both the leaders of Greek and Turkish Cypriots had a feud over the constitution and there was an ethnic divide.

The situation in the Republic of Cyprus became worst in July 1974 when there was an intervention by Greece when they overthrew ruling government of President Archbishop Makarios in Republic of Cyprus (Nugent, 1999). The military coup was led by Nikos Sampson who had had the support of the military regime in Greece as they wanted a union (enosis) to be achieved betweenCyprus and Greece (Smith, 2014). Supporters of President Makarios rejected the idea of union (enosis) as they wanted to be an independent nation.

In the same month and year, Turkey also intervened in Republic of Cyprus with operation Atilla. Their reason for intervening is to protect the rights to the Turkish Cypriots (Hislop, 2014). Both coups resulted in a civil war that broke out between both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots with the help of both countries as well. The coup by Greece collapsed and the war had ended in August 1974 as the Turkish military were able to capture one-third of the island and it was in the northern part of Republic of Cyprus. They had occupied Famagusta and the Karpas Peninsula. The intervention in 1974 forced a partition as the island  was separated along the Green Line that was already in place since 1963 as it was drawn up by the UN forces due to the ongoing domestic conflicts (Fitzgerald, 2009). Greek Cypriots living in the north were forced out to the south and vice versa for the Turkish Cypriots living in the south when they fled to the north. Republic of Cyprus was now divided into two states

The Divided Cyprus

Up till today, Republic of Cyprus is divided into two states. The UN Security Council has warned the Turkey to withdraw its troops but they have failed to do so. There are almost 35,000 Turkish troops stationed in the Northern Cyprus (Nugent, 1999). Immediately after the war, Turkish Cypriots established an independent administration.

There was an effort for peace talks between both north and south Cyprus but it collapsed and as a result of that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was formed in 1983. The southern Cyprus was known as The Republic of Cyprus (ROC). The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is only recognized by Turkey and it not recognized internationally by the UN whereas the Republic of Cyprus is recognized internationally by the UN and not by Turkey (Comfort, 2005). This means that the northern Cyprus depends wholly on Turkey for survival as it does not have ties internationally. Northern Cyprus has so far maintained its existence and rebuffed all attempts by the world body to submit to the current Cyprus government in the south. (Bhutta, 2016). They believed that they are an independent nation of their own. The Green Line which was supposed to be a temporary ceasefire has not become permanent. People from both sides are not allowed to communicate with each other although they have been effort to change this when the Turkish Cypriots opened the barricades along the Green Line for visitors on both sides of the divide. (Hislop, 2014).

A divided Cyprus has definitely made things more complicated between the two sections of the country as well as the relationship between Turkey and Republic of Cyprus (southern Cyprus). The Republic of Cyprus feels that stationed troops in northern Cyprus is definitely seen as a threat and an occupying force. (Comfort, 2005).

The Cyprus Effect On Turkey’s EU Membership Application Until 1990

Turkey started to eye the EU membership for many decades since it was named as the European Community (EC) back then. Turkey’s official membership application was in 1959 when it applied to become a member of the European Community (EC). The application was rewarded with the Ankara Agreement which was signed by both Turkey and the EU in 1963. (Gerhards & Hans, 2011). The Ankara Agreement was not an agreement that guaranteed full membership yet but it was the first step towards full membership in the future.

The Ankara Agreement signed in 1963 was limited to only trade and financial matters. In 1970, there was another milestone in the application when both Turkey and the EU signed the 1970 Additional Protocol establishing a 22 year transnational period leading to customs union (EUEC, 2008). Although protocol was signed, Turkey strategy for economic development was not in line with EC and there was going to a re-negotiation on the deal was signed. At an early stage, Turkey EU membership application was more towards dealing between only the EU and Turkey. There were obvious third party that was involved in making sure that negotiations failed. Turkey’s initial membership application was not yet effected by the Cyprus issue.

The interventions in Cyprus by Greece and Turkey definitely impacted Turkey’s quest for the EC membership. After 1974, it could be said that the EC took a very careful approach in identifying Turkey as a possible candidate for the EC. The division of Cyprus definitely had an effect on Turkey’s membership application. Besides the Cyprus factor, there were also other strong factors that affected the relationship between the EC and Turkey. Both parties had a rough relationship because of the domestic politics in Turkey at that time. Unfavorable domestic political developments in Turkey and most importantly the military coup that happened on September 12, 1980 made Turkey’s possible EC membership totally irrelevant (Grigoriadis, 2003). During this period, Turkey isolated themselves from EU until the civilian government took power in 1983.

There was also another important factor that was effected Turkey’s EU membership application during this time. In 1981, while Turkey was in isolation due to its domestic problems, Greece became an official EU member. This basically meant that as an EU member Greece had veto powers to indirectly stop Turkey from becoming an EU member at that time. As an EU member, Greece was always able to affect EU policies on its benefits with respect to Turkey as well as theCyprus issue (Basturk, 2013).

In addition, Greece’s ascension as the EU member at that time had given Greece the ultimate opportunity to point the finger at Turkey of being an invader in relation to the Cyprus issue which was a breach of the idea of an ‘European’ identity which was based the values of peace and democracy. (Ulusoy, 2009). Despite of all these factors, Turkey applied for full EU membership in 1987 but as expected the EU felt that Turkey was not ready for the membership. In December 1989 the EU decided that it will not accept any members at that moment of time. In terms of Turkey application, the EU said to have had concerns about developmental gap between the EU and Turkey which meant that Turkey could not fulfil its obligation s of developing from the EU economic and social policies (Grigoriadis, 2003). In addition to the mentioned reason, the EU also referred to Turkey’s ongoing disagreements with Greece as well as the Cyprus issue. Besides that, the EU was also referring to the fact that the human rights issue and treatment of the minorities in Turkey would still need improvement (Hale, 2000). Thus for this reasons Turkey’s EU membership application in 1987 was rejected by the EU.

It could be said that at this point of time the influence of Greece in the EU could be seen as even more vital factor than the Cyprus issue itself. This is because the issue related to Cyprus was initially being strongly voiced out by Greece rather than the EU. We could analyze that after Greece’s ascension into the EU in 1981, the voice on the Cyprus issue by Greece became more vocal thus it definitely affected Turkey’s EU membership application. The Greek policy towards Turkey’s membership was always portrayed as a crucial factor for the lack of progress in the EUTurkey relations. In the minds of many Turkish citizens, Greece was the only obstacle to the accession of their country into the EU although Turkey was not eligible yet for the membership during the 1980s and 1990s (Georgiades, 2000). But by looking at it on a different angle, it could also be said that Turkey’s domestic politics also played a major role in their membership application. The military regime in Turkey during their isolation between 1980-1983 gave the window of opportunity for Greece to become an EU member and influence the EU in some way.

The situation might have been a little different if Turkey did not isolate themselves. They might have influenced the EU too in making sure that Greece was not a member of the EU. Although it seems that the Cyprus issue played a major role in Turkey EU membership application, but it can be argued that it played an indirectly role altogether as the ascension of Greece into the EU and Turkey domestic politics played a more crucial role during this period of time until 1990 that ultimately affected Turkish EU membership application.

Cyprus Effect Non-Crucial Factor 1990-2004

Turkey EC membership application seemed to have hit a new blow when Republic of Cyprus applied to become the member of the EU as well in 1990. The application by EU definitely shocked the Turkey and northern Cyprus. Turkey feared that they would face another obstacle if Republic of Cyprus became an EU member. Turkey insisted that the application should not be allowed by the EU as it is against the International Law and the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey received advice from international law expects. Article 8 of the Republic of Cyprus states that Republic of Cyprus cannot be a member of an international organization unless both Turkey and Greece are a member of it too (Mandelson, 1997).

But this failed to convince theEC as they taught that the issue of Cyprus’ accession is an eminently political debate and law can adapt itself to any political solution. But looking at it from another point of view, Turkey as also not abiding by the law as they were not following the European Court of Human Rights by not respecting the property rights of the Greek Cypriots in northern Cyprus (Suvarierol, 2003). It could be seen that Turkey one way or another  was practicing double standard.

But looking at it clearly, the Cyprus issue was again not the crucial point here that was hindering Turkey’s EU membership application. The collapse of the communism in 1992 definitely had an impact on Turkey’s membership (EUEC, 2008). The communist bloc of the Soviet Union ended hence granting opportunity for the EU to establish a European bloc within the Central and Western European countries. In addition to that also, the countries that were finally released of communism were also performing poorly in terms of economy hence it needed all the help they could get from the European community via the EU. These countries were also given priorities because they were seemed to more culturally part of Europe than Turkey. This resulted in the prioritization of the Central and Western European countries as member states and Turkey fell down the picking order.

Besides the fall of the communist bloc, continuous pressure from Greece also contributed to Turkey’s EU membership application. The Copenhagen Criteria which was discussed in 1993 became Greece’s attack on Turkey. Greece used it as a tool to point fingers at Turkey. Greece criticized Turkey’s miserable human and minority rights record as well as their military influenced democracy. (Grigoriadis, 2003) Turkey who initially failed to meet the political criteria choose to then focus on the economic criteria.

The EU gave priority to Turkey to complete the negotiations of the EU-Turkey customs union. But Greece again showed their influence when they used their veto policy to block the customs union agreement between Turkey and the EU (Grigoriadis. 2003). Greece seemed to be using the veto for its own national interest but they were not going to be convinced easily.

Besides that, Greece were also very influential in making sure that Cyprus became one of the candidates that would join the EU. The deal was that Greece would lift its veto over Turkey’s customs union with the EU in return for the EU’s agreement to start accession talks with the Greek Cypriots on behalf of the whole island of Cyprus (Oguzlu, 2002). Turkey’s customs union agreement came into force in January 1996 (EUEC, 2008) after Greece lifted its veto on the customs union in March 1995 (Suvarierol, 2003). Greece was influential once again when the 1999 Helsinki Summit finally granted candidateship to Turkey. This is because there was a precondition where Turkey would need to resolve their issue with Greece before starting EU membership negotiation (Oguzlu, 2002).

In the same summit, Cyprus was also given candidateship without any pre-condition on their internal issue. The EU Accession Partnership Document for Turkey was publicized by the European Commission in November 2000. Once again Greece stood in the way of Turkey’s EU membership as they continued to pursue their agenda when they persuaded 14 fellow EU members to add another condition to the EU Accession Partnership Document by adding that Turkey should also resolve the Cyprus issue before negotiating EU membership (Franz, 2000). This generally shows that the Cyprus issue was again only an indirect factor to Turkey’s EU Membership because Greece were making all the important decisions directly. They did not only use the Cyprus issue as tool but also managed to influence other members states as well to make sure that Turkey was unsuccessful in their membership application.

It is not fair also to point fingers only at Greece because there were other EU member states too that did not want Turkey to become an EU member. German Foreign Minister at that time had an opinion that Turkey still have a long way but are already in line to be in EU but they were still lacking behind in terms of human rights referring to the Kurdish situation and also stressed aboutTurkey’s relationship with Greece and Cyprus as well as some economic problems (Hurriyet Daily News, 1997).

Besides that, during the Luxembourg Summit in 1997 Greece, Germany and Luxembourg opposed Turkey’s candidature for the EU (Muftuler, 2003). In addition there were also concerns among the EU member states regarding the distribution of votes in the Council of Minister as well as the number of seats in the European Parliament. This is because both criteria’s are based on size of population of the member states. The concern here was that Turkey might have the second highest population after Germany if it becomes an EU member state. It would mean that Turkey could influence the decision making in the European Union because they would have the second most number of votes in the European Parliament (Muftuler, 2003). The EU member states excluded Turkey as they wanted to make some changes to the population voting  system if possible during the Nice Treaty. As a whole the Cyprus issue is once again not crucial as they were definitely other factors that hindered Turkey’s EU membership application. Concerns about Turkey’s population and the influence that they could have over the EU was definitely another dominant factor that made EU hesitant to grant EU membership to Turkey at that point of time.

Another important factor also during this time is when Turkey failed to live by the Copenhagen Criteria politically but they were brilliant economically as they achieved almost all the criteria. The EU Commission Progress Report in the year 2000 and 2001 demonstrated that the political aspect of the Copenhagen Criteria was one of the challenges faced by Turkey. There were still no improvements in terms of human rights although steps were taken to improve them. In addition, there was still problems related to the democratic structure of Turkey as civilian control over the government was yet to be addressed that time. As a whole, the period the between 1990 to 2004 could be concluded in a way that the Cyprus issue was crucial in Turkey’s EU membership application. The Cyprus issue was only an indirectly as they had no prior say in whatever that was happening in the EU. The crucial factor here was Greece as they played a major role in the decision making process as they used the veto power to their advantage to block EU-Turkey deals.

Cyprus Effect After 2004

The Republic Cyprus became an EU member on May 1, 2004. The Cyprus that became an EU member is the only the southern part of Cyprus. This is because the “Annan Plan” that was presented by the United Nations did work out as expected. The “Annan Plan” received mixed reactions from the southern and northern Cyprus. The initial reactions by Turkish Cypriots are that they were not in favor of the whole plan (Suvarierol, 2003). But the Turkish Cypriots began to grow into the plan and basically started to support “Annan Plan”. Civil societies in the Turkish part of Cyprus held demonstrations in support of a unified Cyprus.

The Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas who was against unification was voted out of office in the December 2003 election (Kyris, 2012). It was for the first time in history that a pro-unification party won the election. The election results definitely showed that the Turkish Cypriots were definitely routing for unification as well a future in the EU. In general, the Turkish Cypriots approved the Annan Plan and was ready to unify their country.

However at the other side of the island in Cyprus, the Greeks Cypriots initially supported the “Annan Plan” whole heartedly without any shadow of a doubt. But elections in the 2003 changes the whole scenario when Tassos Papadopoulos became the new leader of Republic of Cyprus. The new leader was pretty much against the whole “Annan Plan” and wanted to make sure that the Greek Cypriots voted against unification of the island. Papadopoulos started to create conditions to make sure the people reject the UN Resolution Plan with the help of many political and social elites created (Anastasiou, 2007).

Besides that, a few days before the referendum Papadopoulos appeared to be emotionally telling his people through the television that the Greeks Cypriots should reject the “Annan Plan” (Kyris, 2012). On 24th April 2004, On April 24, 2004, just a week from Cyprus’ entry into the EU, the results of the voting were out as 64.9% of the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the “Annan plan” and they definitely wanted unification while but in a turn of events the Greek Cypriots rejected the “Annan Plan” 75.8% of Greek Cypriots voted against the plan (Ulosoy, 2008). As a result of this, The Republic of Cyprus remained a divided island as only the Southern part of the island entered the European Union (Basturk, 20 13). This was definitely a blow to Turkey as this was the make or break decision that might have given the green light for Turkey EU membership.

The accession of only southern Cyprus into the EU definitely hampered the Turkey’s membership application into the EU. The Cyprus issue became one the major and crucial factors that affect Turkey’s negotiation process in becoming an EU member.

Cyprus as an EU member now has direct power in term of veto to block Turkey from becoming an EU member. In addition, Cyprus also has the power to block any sort of deals in between Turkey and EU. The discussion over Turkey’s EU membership application started in 2005 where there needs to be a screening process for 35 chapters. Between 2005 and 2014, Turkey has completed the screening process in 33 of the chapters required for its accession while the balance of the other two chapters does not require negotiation.

One of the important elements that is slowing the progress and making it difficult  for the Turkish EU accession is the fact that 17 of the chapters remain blocked either by the EU or member states individually (Dagdeverenis, 2014). In the case of Turkey, delays and slow progress in discussion are mainly due to the Cyprus issue. This is because the EU Council have blocked at least 8 chapters in December 2006. This was done when Turkey refused to recognize Cyprus and to ratify the Additional Protocol of the Ankara Association Agreement by not allowing Cyprus vessels and aircrafts to use Turkey’s ports and airports (Barysch, 2010). This block by the EU Council was due to the Cyprus issue that definitely became a crucial factor forTurkey’s EU membership application after 2004 as Cyprus became a member of the EU.

In addition to the 8 chapters blocked by the EU Council, the Cyprus issue again appears as even Cyprus chose to veto at least 6 chapters that is required for Turkey’s accession into the EU (Chislett, 2015). These six chapter are related to six chapters: (1) freedom of movement for workers; (2) energy; (3) judiciary and fundamental rights; (4) justice, freedom and security; (5) education and culture; and (6) foreign, security and defense policy (Chislett, 2015). Hence this means that a total of 14 chapters are blocked due to the issue of Cyprus and this has again slowed down negotiation for the accession process for Turkey.

This shows that the veto power that Cyprus received after entering EU in 2004 has now become an important tool to block and slow down Turkey’s EU membership application. In addition to that, the failure of Turkey in recognizing Cyprus as an EU member has also contributed to the slow process of Turkey’s membership into the EU which is definitely closely related to the Cyprus issue. This proves that after 2004, the Cyprus issue has definitely become an important and crucial factor that has impacted Turkey’s EU membership application.

Besides the blocking of chapters by the EU Council and Cyprus in relation to the Cyprus issue, since becoming an EU member Cyprus has definitely become aggressive towards Turkey.

In 2014, the Greek Cypriots said that it would file a complaint to the EU leaders to block Turkey’s attempts in joining the European Union (Middle East Eye, 2014). This was in response to Turkey’s gas exploration expedition done in the waters claimed by Cyprus. Turkey said to have send a warship into the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to conduct seismic surveys which was definitely a threat to the safety of Cyprus. President Nicos Anastasiades said that formal complaints will also be lodged with the U.N. Division for Oceans and Law of the Sea, the International Maritime Organization and possibly with the U.N. Security Council (CNS News, 2014). This again shows that the Cyprus issue has definitely become a crucial factor because since becoming an EU member in 2004 Cyprus has been very brace and aggressive towards Turkey and are definitely making it hard for Turkey to become an EU members states.

In 2015, Cyprus showed their aggressiveness again when they pledged to block Turkey’s stalled accession negotiations to join the EU. This is because Turkey has not done enough to reunite the divided island of the Republic of Cyprus. In order to restart negotiation, there needs to be a consent from all EU members (Zalan, 2015). Cypriot Foreign Minister Ioannis Kasoulides mentioned that Cyprus is sticking to the veto for as long as Turkey doesn’t live up to its obligations.

The Greek Cypriot administration threatened to block Turkey’s bid until the Turkish “occupation” of northern Cyprus is ended (TRT World, 2015). This act by Cyprus again shows how far does the Cyprus issue is currently the crucial factor towards Turkey’s EU membership process. The accession of Cyprus into the EU has given it power to basically rule over Turkey in their bid for an EU membership. The 14 chapters that are currently blocked and vetoed definitely shows that the Cyprus issue is a crucial factor towards Turkey’s dream of being an EU member since 2004. In addition to that, Cyprus’s bravery and confidence after 2004 also shows that they are not afraid of Turkey as they hold a huge advantage over them. Although there are other factors that affect Turkey’s EU membership application after 2004, I would personally argue that the Cyprus issue is the most crucial factor that stands in the way of Turkey and its membership application to the EU.

Is Godot About To Arrive?

In conclusion, the Cyprus issue was not significant or crucial in Turkey’s EU membership application before it became an EU member in 2004. This is because the Cyprus issue was only an indirect factor rather than a direct factor. During the initial phase of Turkey’s membership application there was more two way discussion without any external interference as it was not yet influenced by the Cyprus issue.

Later on, it seemed that Greece was having a bigger say than Cyprus when talking about the EU membership application. This happened after Turkey isolated themselves for three year which paved the way for Greece to become an EU member. The Greece factor was even more crucial during this stage rather than the Cyprus factor as they were voicing out for Cyprus.

Between 1990 and 2004, the Cyprus issue was once again not crucial. This is because it was the end of Cold War and countries from Central and Western Europe were being prioritized as possible candidates. The EU wanted to unify the former communist in one community. Turkey was on sidelines as other European countries were preferred. Besides that, there were continuous pressure from Greece in terms of pin pointing Turkey human rights record as well as their military democracy. There were also other EU members states that did not favor Turkish it would become a member. One of their concern was Turkey might be able to influence the European Parliament if it entered the EU because it will have more seats in parliament due to their population. The Cyprus issue is not much of a crucial factor here during this period.

Once Cyprus became an EU member in 2004, the troubles came along for Turkey. This is because the Cyprus issue became a crucial factor that affected Turkey’s EU membership directly this time. Cyprus used its veto to block 6 chapters that were important to make sure that Turkey’s EU membership negotiation could take place. But due to this veto, Cyprus has basically slowed down the negotiation process.

In addition, since becoming a member Cyprus have been brave to stand up to Turkey. This is because they now have the power to veto Turkey-EU membership negotiation just like they did in 2015. This was because Turkey was not taking steps to end their occupation in Northern Cyprus. It is indeed proven that the Cyprus issue only became a crucial and dominat factor after 2004 once it became an EU member. The veto power that they currently have place an important in making sure that Turkey does not become an EU member and Cyprus definitely stands in the way of Turkey’s EU membership even in the future.

About the author:
Aaron Denison, Research Assistant at the Kuala Lumpur-based Asia-Europe Institute. His research interest is on Inter-Korean Relations, Regionalism in the European Union (EU), as well as on ASEAN and Asia-Pacific.

REFERENCES

1. Muftuler, M & Avrim, T. “Turkish Accession to the European Union: Does Culture Play a Role.” Ankara Review of European Studies 6, no.2 (2007): 31-50.
2. Oguzlu, T. “The EU as an Actor in the Solution of the Cyprus Dispute: The Questions of
‘How’?” Journal of Ethno politics and Minority Issues in Europe 2 (2002): 1-25
3. Drevet, F.J “The European Union and the Cyprus Issue.” Notre Europe Policy Paper 58, (2012): 9-44
4. Bajrektarevic, A., Geopolitics – Energy – Technology, LAP Academic Publishers, Germany (2016): 44
5. Grigoriadis, I. N. “The Changing Role of the EU Factor in Greek–Turkish Relations.” Paper presented at the Hellenic Observatory, London School of Economics and Political Science, (2003): 1-11
6. Kyris, G. “The European Union and the Cyprus problem: a story of limited impetus.” Eastern Journal of European Studies 3, no 1 (2012): 87-99.
7. Muftuler, M. Turkey in the EU’s Enlargement Process: Obstacles and Challenges. EBSCO Publishing, 2003.
8. Basturk, M. “The Issue of Cyprus in the EU Accession of Turkey.” Claremont-UC
Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 4, (2011): 15-22
9. Suvarierol, S. The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey’s Road to Membership in the European Union, London & Portland: Frank Cass, 2003
10. Hans, S & Gerhards, J. “Why not Turkey? Attitudes towards Turkish membership in the EU among citizens in 27 European countries” Journal of Common Market Studies (2010): 1-25
11. Bhutta, A.T. “The Cyprus Issue and Turkey’s Quest for EU Membership.” Journal of European Studies 29, no 2 (2013): 65-100
12. Dagdeverenis, D “Turkey’s EU Accession Process 2005-2014 and the EU Conditionality.”
EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper no. 3 (2014): 1-26
13. Comfort, A. “Turkey and the problem of the recognition of Cyprus.” European Parliament (2005): 1-5
14. Nugent, N. “The Next EU Enlargement and The Cyprus Problem.” Paper presented at the Sixth Biennial International Conference of the European Community Studies Association (1999): 1-21
15. Network of European Union Center of Excellence (EUCE) “Turkey’s Quest for EU Membership.” European Union Center (2008): 1-8
16. Bahcheli, T. Turkey and the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2006
17. Georgiades, H. Greece and the EU-Turkish Relationship, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2000
18. Ulosoy, K. “The Europeanization of Turkey and its impact on the Cyprus problem.” Journal of Southern Europe and The Balkans 10, no 3 (2008): 309-329.
19. Maurice H. Mendelson, EU and Cyprus: An Expert View – Opinion on the Application of
Republic of Cyprus to Join the European Union, Lefkoșa, 1997
20. Anastasiou, H. “Nationalism as a Deterrent to Peace and Interethnic Democracy: The
Failure of Nationalist Leadership from the Hague Talks to the Cyprus Referendum.” International Studies Perspectives, 8 (2007): 190 –205.
21. Chislett, W. “Turkey’s 10 years of EU accession negotiations: no end in sight.” Working Paper 14, Elcano Royal Institute, (2015): 1-29
22. Zalan, E. “Cyprus to block restart of Turkey-EU talks.” EUobserver, 20 October 2015, https://euobserver.com/political/130758 (accessed on 17th October 2016)
23. Kambas, M. “Cyprus says cannot lift veto on Turkey’s EU talks.” Reuters, 19 October
2015, https://euobserver.com/political/130758 (accessed on 20th October 2016)
24. Ellis, R. “The scandalous history of Cyprus.” The Guardian, 3 March 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/mar/03/cyprus-turkey-eu-uk (accessed on 20th October 2016)
25. Charalambous, L “Why dwell solely on the Akritas plan?” Cyprus Mail, 26 January 2014, http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/01/26/why-dwell-solely-on-the-akritas-plan/ (accessed on 20 October 2016)
26. Hislop, V. “Famagusta, the ghost town at the heart of Cyprus.” The Telegraph, 17 August 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/cyprus/11038580/Famagustathe-ghost-town-at-the-heart-of-Cyprus.html (accessed on 20 October 2016)
27. Hislop, V. “The day my family fled Famagusta: How life changed forever when Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974.” Daily Mail, 11 October 2014,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/you/article-2786705/the-day-family-fled-famagustalife-changed-turkey-invaded-cyprus-1974.html (accessed on 20th October)
28. Smith, C. “Cyprus divided: 40 years on, a family recalls how the island was torn apart.” The Guardian, 6 July 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/06/turkishinvasion-divided-cyprus-40-years-on-eyewitness-greek-cypriot-family accessed on 20th October 2016)
29. Fitzgerald, P. “The Turkish invasion of Cyprus.” The Finer Times, 12 December 2009, http://www.thefinertimes.com/War-in-The-Middle-East/the-turkish-invasion-ofcyprus.html (accessed on 20th October 2016)
30. “Cyprus profile – Timeline.” BBC News, 20 January 2016 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17219505 (accessed 22 October 2016)
31. “Greek Cypriots vow to veto Turkey’s EU membership.” TRT World, 19 October 2015 http://www.trtworld.com/europe/greek-cypriots-vow-to-veto-turkeys-eu-membership- 9697 (accessed on 22th October 2016)
32. “Cyprus to block Turkey’s EU membership bid over drilling.” Middle East Eye, 22 October 2014 http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/cyprus-block-turkeys-eu-membership-bid- over-drilling-1187823501 (accessed on 22nd October 2016)
33. “Cyprus to block Turkey’s EU bid over gas dispute.” CNC News, 21 October 2014 http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/cyprus-block-turkeys-eu-bid-over-gas-dispute (accessed on 22nd October 2016)
34. “Turkey: Events of 2015.” Human Right Watch, 2015 https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2016/country-chapters/turkey (accessed on 23rd October 2016)
35. “Turkey: Human rights in grave danger following coup attempt and subsequent crackdown.” Amnesty International, 18 July 2016
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/07/turkey-human-rights-in-grave-dangerfollowing-coup-attempt-and-subsequent-crackdown/ (accessed on 23rd October 2016)

The National Clean Energy and Environment Fund was established in 2011 by the Ministry of Finance in order to fund research initiatives directed towards finding cleaner sources of energy.

Heralded as a revolutionary step towards an environmentally aware development plan, this Fund has been under pressure to perform – and repeatedly disappointed. However, the initiative, the vision and the potential of the Fund cannot be easily dismissed at this juncture. Considering the national environmental funds of several countries around the world – such as Laos, China, Poland, New Zealand etc. – one can see the extent of possibilities offered by such a scheme. Funds across the globe have been established with distinct governing mechanisms, for a variety of purposes, and often different avenues of contributions.

In this paper I seek to scrutinize the Fund in order to evaluate its true potential. In Part 2, I examine the functioning of the Fund, in order to understand the administrative aspect of it. In Part 3, I lay out the major problems with the Fund’s manner of functioning. In Part 4, I analyse the best practices of Poland (4.1), New Zealand (4.2) and Kenya (4.3). I also analyse the present regime of India, in order to offer two ancillary suggestions (4.4). Finally, I discuss the possible impact of the usage of the Fund, in order to fully comprehend the gravity of the benefits of wise usage (5).

2. The National Clean Energy and Environment Fund (NCEEF)

According to the Guidelines issued by the Ministry of Finance in 2011, the National Clean Energy Fund,1 is created for ‘funding research and innovative projects in clean energy techniques’.2 Therefore, the Guidelines state that any research for developing environmentally cleaner technology would be eligible for funding under this scheme.3 Paragraph 2.1 of the Guidelines include an indicative list of projects which are so eligible, although today, environmental initiatives are also eligible for funding.4 These include broad yardsticks – such as projects for developing cleaner fossil energy, projects for finding alternate sources of energy, etc.5

2.1 Financing the Fund

A special clean energy cess collected by the Central Board of Excises and Customs on coal produced and imported is the revenue which is directed towards the fund, essentially implementing the polluter pays principle.6 Since 2011, this cess has increased from INR 50 to INR 400 according to the 2016 budget.7 By virtue of the increased coal production in recent times, the NCEEF has therefore grown by mammoth proportions.8 However, according to noted journalist Aruna Chandrasekhar:

‘Only 32% of the cess collected in 2016-’17 will go to the National Clean Energy Fund. Questions regarding this large quantum of unspent funds went unanswered by the Ministry of Finance’s Department of Expenditure at the time of publishing.’9

Therefore, pet projects that the Government finds suitable are financed by the Fund, although they are not strictly research oriented.10 Subsequently the usage of the fund has now officially been extended to also fund environment initiatives, such as those pertaining to nuclear power, Project Tiger, Project Elephant etc.,11 thereby moving beyond the purview of research initiatives only.12 To be in sync with the objectives, the Clean Energy Cess on Coal has now been renamed the Clean Environment Cess in 2017.13

2.2 Assessment of Proposals under NCEEF

The Preliminary examination of an application for funding goes through the Administrative Department, after which the Department of Expenditure of the appropriate ministry incorporates its comments on the Draft.14 Thereafter, the Administrative Department addresses these comments and forwards it to the Inter- Ministerial Group (IMG) – which approves of the scheme.15

3. Problems with the Fund

At present, there exist several problems with the manner of usage of the Fund.

First, as explained by Srinivas Raman,16 the brunt of the tax is being faced by the consumers, with producers’ profit still intact.17 Ergo, the cess does more harm than good at this juncture, by virtue of the widespread usage of coal as a fuel in Indian households, which is directly affected by the increased cost of the fuel. The purpose of the cess – to deter coal consumption and explore other sources of energy – has not been realised significantly, as despite increasing costs, coal continues to be the popularly used household fuel.

Second, the Fund should not rely exclusively on the cess from importation of coal or lignite, and instead, look for other avenues for remuneration. Funds of other countries such as Poland and New Zealand allow for other contributors.18 An example of such other contribution is in the press release of the Ministry of Mines.19 According to it, a District Mineral Foundation would be set up to work for the ‘persons and areas affected by mining related operations’.20 It is to be funded by contributions made by the holders of the mining lease given by the State government.21 The Press Release made on August 1, 2017 also refers to the Pradhan Mantri Khanij Kshetra Kalyan Yojana (PMKKKY), which is exclusively for the benefit of the people who are detrimentally affected by mining activities.22 The fund created by the PMKKKY scheme is based on the contributions made by the miners. These institutional mechanisms display the working of the polluter pays principle and its viability. A similar exercise would greatly benefit the NCEEF as it would reduce the burden on the consumers paying the coal cess currently.

Third, as delineated by Mr. Sunil Mitra,23 the fund at present is being used to fill the gaps in the budgetary requirements of approved Plans.24 This is essentially because a clear budgetary structure of projects to be financed by the fund, as well as a residuary fund to fund large-scaled initiatives are lacking. The pronounced absence of a system of accountability, enforcement, and transparency of initiatives continues to be the basic problem in the functioning of the Fund. If the Polish system, (as subsequently analysed) is to be taken as a prototype, then using the funds as a stopgap measure for lapses in budgets of other ministries will cease.

Fourth, at present, the fund is used towards research projects that the IMG approves. The IMG constitutes of the Finance Secretary who serves as the Chairperson, the Expenditure secretary (member), a revenue secretary (member), and finally representatives from the Ministries of Power, Coal, Chemicals & Fertilizers, Petroleum & Natural Gas, New & Renewable Energy and Environment & Forests.25 Conspicuously, no experts are mandated in the panel to approve of these research initiatives, with the discretion left to the IMG.26 Furthermore, no yardsticks to measure the viability of the project, the expectations or goals it is proposed to achieve, and whether they are in sync with long term agendas of the government, have been decided. Therefore at present, a research project can be approved without any reasons and solely at the discretion of the IMG. Furthermore, the progress of these projects has as of yet not been tracked, and continues to be dubious.27 Aside from these issues, the specific reasons for which the fund has been used by the researchers or organisations also needs to be made publicly available.

Fifth, the fund need not only be used for research projects. Although an umbrella term of ‘environmental initiatives’ has been added to the purposes for which the fund may be used, proper identification and earmarking of the initiatives needs to be done, in order to ensure that corrupt practices don’t dilute it. In such a scenario, identification of the differences in the groups involved as stakeholders including vulnerable groups based on age, sex, caste or disability is necessary. Without such a clear delineation, the desired objective of developing and implementing clean energy practices may not achieved.

Sixth, until recently, the working of the NCEEF was under a shroud which was unraveled by the Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability with the filing of an RTI in 2012.28 Since then although greater transparency has existed, it has not done enough to assuage the concerns of the stakeholders.29 Improper, unstructured manner of approving budgets, lack of publicly available particulars regarding eligibility criteria, as well as a remarkable silence on the progress made by these initiatives make this fund’s functioning disappointing.

Finally, as pointed by Mr. Pandey,30 the NCEEF does not encourage research initiatives, and continues to remain a non-promoted endeavour.31 Marketing the benefits of the Fund to the appropriate audiences, would go a long way in funding and incentivising the numerous environmentally sustainable initiatives undertaken in the country. Keeping a cap of 40% of the project cost as the maximum contribution to be made by the NCEEF is also discouraging,32 as large scale initiatives often need a more flexible ceiling.33 Furthermore, tie-ups with non-governmental organisations, as well as academic institutions would go a long way in raising awareness about the fund as well as motivating individual researchers.

4. Lessons without borders

This Part of the paper explores the Environmental Funds of different regimes in order to compile some of the best practices to implement in India.

4.1 A Comparison with the Polish Environment Fund

At this juncture, perhaps the Polish system of environmental funding offers takeaways to work out a better method of financing environmental projects as well as research initiatives. Presently, the Environmental Funds of Poland (the National and Voivodeship Funds) are financed by the charges paid by users of the environment – i.e. companies – and ‘fines as well as revenues from interest on granted loans’.34 In such a model, revenues aren’t hinged exclusively on importation, and come from varied sources.35 Furthermore, the two predominant funds are supplemented with District Funds on Environment Protection, and are managed by the district government units.36

Although some aspects of the Polish system are already in place in the Indian regime, two distinct practices can still be borrowed. First, the fund includes revenues and charges by companies, and not just a cess on importation. Although the PMKKKY and the DMF both receive contributions from miners, a range of industries – such as industries releasing toxic effluents, conducting deforestation activities, etc – are left out of the scope of such funds, since these are administered by the Ministry of Mines. Industry-specific funds financed by the companies/establishments causing environmental damage could also aid in solving the allocation problem. Funding research towards improving the environment damaged by the activities of a particular industry becomes easier if funds are collected on an industry-specific basis. Ergo, aside from the funds created by mining activities, funds must be separate for other activities which lead to environment degradation.

Second, the district level creation of funds further narrows down the usage of the fund. As per this model therefore, fund must be based on a district or state level (whichever is more suitable to the Indian situation), and the scope must be further narrowed down to an industry specific usage.

As per the suggested model thus, state level funds are created instead of the burgeoning NCEEF. However, in order to mitigate the risks and associated damages of projects that operate beyond the state level, the funds collected by environmental charges and fines may be transferred to the central NCEEF. Furthermore, instead of levying a cess of INR 400, a reduced amount may thereafter be levied in order to assuage the ‘First’ and ‘Third’ problems indicated previously.

4.2 The Environment Funds of New Zealand: An objectives-based approach

Under the aegis of the Ministry of Environment of the New Zealand government, several funds for specific environmental projects exist. These include the Freshwater Improvement Fund, the Community Environment Fund, the Waste Minimisation Fund, the Contaminated Sites Remediation Fund, and the Environmental Legal Assistance Funds.37 As discussed in point ‘Second’ above, industry specif funds may be useful, as will funds which identify specific objectives. Currently, the funds are utilised on an ad hoc basis, depending on who applies for the fund. Instead of such extensive discretion placed on the IMG, either objectives or industries must be identified, based on which the fund may be spent. In fact, as per the eligibility criteria set out to award funding from the Community Environment Fund, successful applications must be in sync with the Ministry of Environment’s key priorities, as laid out in ‘A generation from now – Our long-term goals’.38 Such a comprehensively laid out plan for environment protection would be extremely useful in deciding the best uses of the fund. Identification of objectives, and methods of fulfilling them would go a long way in finding the best areas for using the NCEEF.39

4.3 Ideas from the National Environment Trust Fund Green Environment Fund (NETGEF), Kenya

The NETGEF of Kenya has a different outlook for promoting sustainable enterprises – by offering low interest loans to small and medium green enterprises.40 In order to assess which enterprises are eligible for such a subsidy, the applicant enterprises must specify the climate mitigation impact undertaken by them.41 In fact, as per the Concept Note of the NETGEF released on 31st August 2016,42 the applicant enterprises must also provide estimates of the social benefits.43 Ergo, the Concept Note identifies the need to lay out sustainable programs for women, youth and other vulnerable groups in collaboration with groups such as Women Enterprise Fund, the National Council for Persons with Disabilities, etc.44

Understanding the needs of different groups as stakeholders in sustainable development is perhaps the pivotal difference between the NETGEF and the NCEEF. Furthermore, a subsidy on interest paid for loans especially to incentivise small and medium enterprises to go green, and adopt environmentally sustainable practices would go a long way in starting eco-friendliness at the grassroots of India. It addresses the ‘Fifth’ problem indicated above.

4.4 Other suggestions

As the General Circular No. 21/2014 released by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs suggest,45 contributions made to trusts/societies/ Section 8 companies for purposes enshrined in Schedule VII of the Companies Act 2013 would also count as corporate social responsibility. Environmentally sustainable initiatives by companies are included as part of corporate social responsibility as per this Schedule.46 If the proposal of district or state level funds is implemented, it would be advised that corporate social responsibility also include contributions made to the Environmental Fund of the particular district/state. In fact, several companies direct their CSR funds to achieving environmental sustainability, and Guidelines have been issued at prior instances to manage such CSR contributions.47

Just as the project for the development of the ‘Intra-State Transmission System under the Green Energy Corridor Project in the States of Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu’48 indicates, a systematic method of assessing projects would be vastly beneficial. The methodical disbursement of fund in this case includes – disbursement in installments, photographic periodical reviews of progress of the projects, monthly reports on the activities conducted, return of money not utilised, etc.49 A similar exercise for all projects for which funding has been granted, must be undertaken, in order to tackle the ‘Fourth’ and ‘Sixth’ issues raised above.

5. Conclusion

The potential of the NCEEF is vast, with its ever-growing flow of revenue, and the broad eligibility criteria established in the 2011 Guidelines. However, decisive measures must be taken in order to optimally realise this potential. Considering the suggestions made by comparing policies across jurisdictions, identifying a utility framework for the fund is the primary task at hand. In addition to this, allocating a part of the funds for creating awareness so as to motivate communities and researchers to develop environmentally sustainable practices is pivotal. Unlike many other developing countries with a similar environment fund, India does not face a dearth of money supply. Additionally, the layout as given for the Intra-State transmission corridor proves that appropriate management of such a fund would possibly achieve the objectives for which the fund was established.

1. http://finmin.nic.in/sites/default/files/Guidelines_proj_NCEF.pdf (Last visited on January 29, 2018).
2. Ibid
3. National Clean Energy & Environment Fund, available at http://doe.gov.in/sites/default/files/NCEF%20Brief_post_BE_2017-18.pdf (Last visited on January 29, 2018).
5. Supra note 2.
6. Dinesh C Sharma, Clean energy tax for India (quoting William Gracias), available at http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.nujs.ac.in/stable/pdf/20696445.pdf?refreqid=search:abcc8038c5657fcaf70b8239bd1e9c9d (Last visited on January 29, 2018).
7. Budget 2016: Govt doubles Clean Energy Cess on coal to Rs. 400 per, available at https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/budget-2016/industry/Union-Budget-2016-Govt-doubles-Clean-Energy-Cess-on-coal-to-Rs-400-per-tonne/articleshow/51191619.cms (Last visited on January 28, 2018).
8. Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, National Clean Energy Fund, available at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=124495 (Last visited on January 28, 2018).
9. Aruna Chandrasekhar, How the Ganga and GST are hijacking India’s clean energy fund, available at https://scroll.in/article/841910/how-the-ganga-and-gst-are-hijacking-indias-clean-energy-fund (Last visited on January 29, 2018).
10. Ibid
11. Ibid
12. Ibid
13. Ibid
14. Framework and Performance of the National Clean Energy Fund, available at http://www.cbgaindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Policy-BriefFramework-Performance-of-National-Clean-Energy-Fund-NCEF.pdf (Last visited on January 29, 2018).
15. Ibid
16. Srinivas Raman, Climate Finance in India: A Case of Policy Paralysis – Analysis, available at http://www.eurasiareview.com/30082017-climate-finance-in-india-a-case-of-policy-paralysis-analysis/ (Last visited on January 27, 2018).
17. Ibid
18. See Part 3.
19. Ministry of Mines, Payment of Mineral Royalty to Districts, available at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=169339 (Last visited on January 28, 2018).
20. Ibid
21. Ibid
22. Ministry of Mines, Pradhan Mantri Khanij Kshetra Kalyan Yojana (PMKKKY) launched by Government of India: Ministry of Mines & Steel calls it a revolutionary and unprecedented scheme, available at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=126983 (Last visited on January 28, 2018)
23. Supra note 16.
24. Ibid.
25. Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs, Creation of National Clean Energy Fund, available at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=71517 (Last visited on January 29, 2018).
26. Supra note 2.
27. Supra note 2.
28. Gyana Ranjan Panda & Narendra Jena, Evaluating the Performance of the National Clean Energy Fund, available at http://www.epw.in.ezproxy.nujs.ac.in/system/files/pdf/2012_47/37/Evaluating_the_Performance_of_the_National_Clean_Energy_Fund.pdf (Last visited on January 29, 2018).
29. Ibid
30. Ibid
31. R. Pandey, Existing Framework and Operation of NCEF: A Review, available at http://www.springer.com/cda/content/document/cda_downloaddocument/9788132219637-c2.pdf?SGWID=0-0-45-1467922-p176797351 (Last visited on January 29, 2018).
32. Ibid
33. Supra note 28.
34.The System of Financing Environmental Protection in Poland, available at https://nfosigw.gov.pl/download/gfx/nfosigw/en/nfoopisy/1/5/7/the_system_of_financing_environmental_protection_in_poland.pdf (Last visited on January 28, 201).
35. Ibid
36. Ibid
37. Funding, available at http://www.mfe.govt.nz/more/funding (Last visited on January 28, 2018).
38. Community Environment Fund application and funding process, available at http://www.mfe.govt.nz/more/funding/community-environment-fund/funding-and-application-process (Last visited on January 28, 2018).
39. A Generation from now: our long term goals, available at http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/about-us/generation-now-our-long-term-goalsa (Last visited on January 28,. 2018).
40. Concept Note, National Environment Trust Fund Green Environment Fund (NETGEF), available at https://www.greenclimate.fund/documents/20182/893456/15750_-_AfDB_-_National_Environment_Trust_Fund_Green_Environment_Fund__NETGEF_.pdf/8b4c6c2b-e6f3-4e99-9aaa-7f15c159a21f (Last visited on January 28, 2018).
41. Ibid
42. Ibid
43. Ibid
44. Ibid
45. Ministry of Corporate Affairs, General Circular No. 21/2014, available at http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/General_Circular_21_2014.pdf (Last visited on January 29, 2018).
46. Schedule VII, Companies Act, 2013.
47. Draft Guidelines for Afforestation for Banking Institutions under Corporate Social Responsibility Funds, available at http://naeb.nic.in/Reports/CSR_gl.pdf (Last visited on January 29, 2018).
48. Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, dated June 27, 2017, available at http://mnre.gov.in/file-manager/UserFiles/Revised_guidelines_for_GEC_2706
49. Ibid

By Ilkin Shafiyev

Two new solar power plants are planned to be commissioned in Azerbaijan in the near future, Nizami Asgarov, chief technologist of Azerbaijan’s Azguntex company, told Trend April 3.

The power plants will operate on solar panels manufactured by the company, he added.

“The power plant in Baku’s Sahil settlement is fully ready for operation,” he said. “It is only left to connect solar generating facilities to the common electricity grid. After the start of its operation, it is also planned to commission a similar solar power plant in Sumgait city, where the work has almost been completed.”

Presently, solar power plants in Azerbaijan operate in the cities of Gobustan and Samukh, the Baku settlements of Pirallahi and Surakhani, he noted.

“For example, the solar power plant in Gobustan almost completely meets the city’s needs in electricity,” he said. “The task is to increase the number of such power plants and make full use of alternative energy opportunities.”

Azguntex plant was opened in April 2012. The lifespan of solar panels is 30-40 years.

China, keen on great power status, must be strategic on global risks, avoiding resentment over export-led growth while rebalancing its economy.

By Stephen Roach*

The Chinese economy is at a pivotal point in its modern history. On the occasion of this 40-year anniversary of reforms and opening, it is tempting to look backward and celebrate the extraordinary accomplishments of economic development. The greater challenge is to look forward to 2050 and the aspirational goals of what the Chinese Communist Party and its leadership have dubbed as China’s New Era. Gazing that far into the future is always a leap of faith, but never more so than when China’s most important trading partner, the United States, throws down the gauntlet of a potential trade war.

The transition ahead is daunting to the say the least. On the one hand, it entails a full complement of internal adjustments aimed at the structural rebalancing of the Chinese economy – from manufacturing to services, from exports to household consumption, from surplus saving to saving absorption, and from state-directed to market-based resource allocation. Some progress on this journey is already evident. While the Chinese economy is a good deal less dependent on the vicissitudes of external demand than was the case before the 2008 global financial crisis, exports still account for fully 20 percent of the nation’s GDP, or about half the share going to household consumption. However, with consumer-led rebalancing still in its very early stages and not yet strong enough to buffer unexpected shocks elsewhere in the economy, any disruption in the global climate could prove problematic for China.

Significantly, the rebalancing of China’s internal economic structure cannot occur in a vacuum. Important shifts in the global economy and in China’s relationships with other major economies in the world also have a critical bearing on the outcome. In that vein, China has much to learn from recent developments in a volatile and crisis-torn world – including lessons from the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, the 2008 global financial crisis and the long string of “lost decades” in Japan, In each of these cases, the lasting impacts of volatile and destabilizing outcomes underscore both the severity and complexity of the global challenges China is likely to face in the next phase of its economic transition.

Japan, as modern Asia’s first troubled growth miracle, offers three lessons especially relevant for a debt-intensive Chinese economy: First, avoid the currency suppression of a mercantilist, export-led growth model and the trade tensions it provokes from the rest of the world. Second, do not ignore the potentially lethal interplay between asset bubbles and leverage. And third, avoid subsidizing ossified zombie companies and the risks they pose to underlying productivity growth. While China has grounds for concern on all three counts, its recent focus on deleveraging and stability – especially the establishment of a new financial stability oversight committee – are hopeful signs that it can avoid the Japan syndrome. At the same time, the recent shift in state-owned enterprise reform strategy toward the mixed ownership restructuring approach of China Unicom is worrisome in that it promotes a structure of cross shareholdings reminiscent of Japan’s keiretsus, the epicenter of that nation’s protracted post-bubble zombie problems.

Notwithstanding China’s progress on the road to rebalancing, it is still facing a legacy of pressures traceable to its original growth strategy. China’s export-led growth miracle — drawing on the strength of global demand that supported the global distribution of goods from an increasingly powerful Chinese export machine — has made it the largest exporter in the world. Unfortunately, trouble was brewing in an increasingly crisis-prone world. The underpinnings of external demand for Chinese exports turned out to be built on quicksand. Following the unprecedented 10.5 percent plunge in global trade in 2009, growth in global trade has averaged only 3 percent. China, the world’s biggest exporter, could hardly dodge that bullet. Washington’s recent imposition of tariffs has made that into an urgent reality. The Trump administration has moved from rhetoric to action in its campaign to defend US workers from the president has called “the carnage of terrible trade deals.” China is the target.

The US strategy is seriously flawed. The Trump administration, focused on reducing an outsized bilateral trade deficit with China by initiating aggressive tariffs and other sanctions, doesn’t appreciate the scope of America’s multilateral trade deficits with 102 nations. This macroeconomic imbalance stems from a shortfall in domestic saving that is about to worsen as federal budget deficits rise following the enactment of large tax cuts in late 2017. And that’s where the problem goes from bad to worse. If the United States opts for protectionism at a time when its current account and multilateral trade imbalances are likely to widen, financial markets could come under considerable pressure. And then another lesson of Japan could come back to haunt those economies that have become overly dependent on asset appreciation as the sustenance of growth.

Notwithstanding these potential risks, the broad consensus of forecasters has turned increasingly optimistic in assessing seemingly synchronous prospects for the world economy. That’s very much the view in still frothy financial markets following a brief correction in early February, with aftershocks in March. A decade after the global financial crisis, long-awaited hopes of post-crisis healing appear to have finally taken hold. Those hopes may prove short-lived, however. As central banks start to normalize monetary policy, excess liquidity will be drained from overvalued financial markets — putting pressure on asset-dependent economies, with collateral damage to major trading nations like China.

All these considerations should weigh heavily on China as it frames macroeconomic policies and reforms for the years ahead. Particularly worrisome would be a premature celebration of its New Era – hailing the final destination of a long journey without paying attention to the pitfalls that might be encountered along the way. This requires a deepening of China’s strategic approach to meeting its economic challenges, shifting its focus from the quantity to the quality of growth, from the targets of state-directed industrial policy to the forecasts of a market-driven private economy, and from imported technologies to the indigenous innovations required to escape the dreaded middle-income trap.

For 40 years, strategy has been one of China’s greatest strengths. That may be all the more essential for a nation aspiring to great power status by 2050. History tell us that nations are truly great only if they draw strength from within. Yale historian Paul Kennedy famously warned of the destabilizing interplay between shifts in relative economic power and global stability – cautioning against the temptations of geostrategic overreach without attending to the foundations of strength at home. China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative raises especially important questions in that context.

In the end, China’s powerful economic takeoff was a levered play on globalization, global trade and ultimately the global economy. Yet the lessons of Japan, the Asian financial crisis and the global financial crisis underscore the systemic perils of an externally focused growth strategy. In the 19^th Party Congress of October 2017, President Xi Jinping and the party leadership focused attention on the “unbalanced and inadequate” characteristics that have emerged as the so-called principal contradiction of China’s great successes in the first stage of its development. Staying the old course is no longer an option for a nation and a party determined to resolve this contradiction. China’s experience over the past 20 years underscores that it should not take global risks lightly. The threat of a trade war with the United States drives this point home. For China, clarifying its new course becomes all the more urgent as a result.

*Stephen Roach, a faculty member at Yale University and former chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia, is author of Unbalanced: The Codependency of America and China (Yale University Press: 2014). This article is based on a paper prepared for the 19^th Annual China Development Forum, March 24 to 26, 2018, in Beijing.