Assam, if not its Barak valley, is definitely burning. At least, if someone follows the media reporting and related contents, it’s convincing that the Brahmaputra valley of the northeastern State has been witnessing an uproarious situation for few weeks now. Other Sates, precisely Meghalaya, maintains their stand in favour of Assam.

Few observers may compare the situation to the days of Assam agitation, which culminated in 1985 with an accord signed by the agitators and the Union government in New Delhi. Millions of participants in the six years long agitation wanted to deport all illegal migrants (read Bangladeshi nationals) from Assam (means India), but the leaders agreed in the accord to accept all the migrants till 25 March 1971 in the State.

The agitation witnessed the sacrifices of over 850 martyrs and thousands others in different shape and sizes, who all wanted to deport the illegal migrants with the national cutoff year (1951). But the accord only agreed to identify only those people, who entered Assam after 24 March 1971, as illegal foreigners. Need to be mentioned that the accord was never placed in the Parliament for endorsement.

After more than three decades of signing of the accord, the people of Assam (more precisely the civil society group representatives and media stalwarts in Brahmaputra valley) are fantasizing of another uprising. This time it is against the Centre’s initiative to grant citizenship to those religious asylum seekers from Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Hundreds of Assam based organizations, including few from other parts of the region, are on the streets asking the central government to withdraw the citizenship amendment bill 2016. They came out with clear demand that the Narendra Modi led government’s move to grant citizenship to those asylum seekers (including Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi and Christians from the three neighboring countries and must had taken shelter in India prior to 31 December 2014) must be abandoned.

Their logic includes that Indian citizenship cannot be conferred on the basis of religion as it is a secular country and if done it would go against the spirit of the constitution. The other one, which has been supported by 95% protesting organizations, argues that Assam has already taken the burden of numerous illegal migrants (from 1951 to 1971) and it must not get more migrants, as they would destroy the State’s demography and Assamese as a language.

The protest escalated when the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) over the amendment arrived in Guwahati in the first week of May for hearings. A number of indigenous organizations, local politicians, intellectuals, media personalities etc of the State assembled on the venue and raised their voices against the bill.

However, subsequent hearings in Silchar of Barak valley witnessed a different picture as most of their organizations supported the bill.

Otherwise almost all organizations in Brahmaputra valley and showing a rare unity the editors of prominent newspapers and news channels based in Guwahati came out with strong statement opposing the Centre’s move.

They not only issued media statements elaborating their point of views, but also met the State chief minister Sarbananda Sonowal, responding whom the Bharatiya Janata Party’s leader assured that he would not do anything wrong to Assam.

But contrary to all hue and cries, a forum of nationalists came out with a media statement, which was subsequently published in various newspapers and alternate media space, emphasizing on rational debates over the pertinent issue rather than creating sentiments with manipulated facts among the common people.

Patriotic People’s Front Assam (PPFA) claimed in the statement that ‘a section of Assamese intellectuals and civil society groups tried their best to project the citizenship amendment bill in a bias perception, as if, the whole initiative is Assam centric’. Those biased individuals also stated that once it turns into a law, millions of Bengali Hindu people from Bangladesh would be dumped into Assam and the practice will continue for decades to come, it added.

The PPFA statement also claimed that the motivated elements ‘cleverly avoided the fact that those asylum seekers are not merely Bengali Hindus, but also a mix of Rajbongsi, Hajong, Jayantiya, Bishnupriya, Chakma, Garo, Khasi, Boro, Adivasi etc people’. Moreover, all these people became the victims of Pakistan’s partition game plan and had to live in a foreign land, for the creation of which they were not at all responsible, the statement asserted.

Extending support to the amendment, the PPFA however insisted that the asylum seekers from the neighbouring countries must be distributed judiciously across the vast country. Moreover, those who prefer to stay legally in Assam, they should adopt the Assamese language as their medium of instruction, as it would ‘help in promoting the Assamese culture and contributing for a stronger and safer India’.

The PPFA also reiterated its old stand to detect all illegal immigrants from the then East Pakistan (and later Bangladesh) with the cut-off year of 1951 as it is applicable to the entire nation. It argued that the spirit of Assam movement (1979 to 1985) was to deport all foreigners since 1951, for which the martyrs-Khargeswar Talukder being the first, sacrificed their lives.

The forum also claimed that the migrants who entered India between 1951 and 16 December 1971 should be treated as East Pakistani nationals, as Bangladesh emerged as a sovereign nation only after 16 December (certainly not on 25 March 1971 as often reported in the media) following the surrender of Pakistani forces under the leadership of AAK Niazi to the Muktijoddhas (forces of Bangladesh freedom struggle).

It clarified that Bangla father of the nation Sheikh Mujibur Rahman only declared the independence of Bangladesh on 25 March of 1971. But till 16 December of the year, the land was very much under the control of Pakistani authority and hence it cannot be termed as Bangladesh (so the residents as Bangladeshi nationals), the statement pointed out.

Finally the PPFA statement argued that if the deportation of illegitimate immigrants (read Bangladeshi) becomes impossible or too difficult to deal with, because of serious humanitarian and international crisis, the Union government should think of offering work permits (without voting rights) to them with an aim to resolve the issue amicably.

For reasons best known to the State’s media outlets, the PPFA statement was neither discussed nor followed up. However, few other organizations including Hindu Jagaran Mancha, Akhil Bhartiya Vidyarthi Parishad etc came out with official statements supporting the citizenship amendment bill. They claimed that the initiative would not affect the Assamese community as a whole, but it would help the nation to a great extent.

Slavery was abolished in Islam 1500 years ago. Against this backdrop the Muslims of Indo-Pak subcontinent revolted against the “British Rule” to get rid of their clutches / slavery. The Muslim political thinkers and Ulemas reached to the conclusion that Muslims cannot live with Britishers and Hindus on the basis of “Two Nation Theory” in line with Allama Muhammad Iqbal (late) and Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (late) political wisdom. The revolt against British was culminated into “War of Independence” in 1857. This laid stone and paved the way for an Islamic state now known as “Pakistan”. The Hindus were also benefited with the creation of Pakistan and thereafter a Hindu sate “India” also came on the world globe.

After the independence in 1947 Pakistan is maintaining cordial relations with neighbouring and other countries of the world. Unfortunately the Hindu psyche and their Slave Mentality could not be changed even after 70 years and the Indians still owe allegiance from core of their heart to her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain (UK). Even today the Indian Prime Minister HE Narendra Modi pay homage to British Government and submit reports on daily basis. The classic example is the recent visit of Narendra Modi to London (April 2018) in which he in a question and answers session at Central Hall Westminster (London) revealed before the audience regarding surgical strikes carried out by Indian Army against Pakistani troops deployed along LoC.

Indian PM in a bid to muster support and financial assistance from British Government for his forth coming election’s 2019 propagated and boosted his concocted version that Indian authorities kept on calling Pakistani counterparts in Islamabad to collect dead bodies of Pakistani soldiers from LoC. The information disseminated to the Britishers against Pakistan was false and far from truth.

Un-fortunately, the Indian Intelligence Agencies, its Army and Foreign office have made it a routine to interfere in the internal matters of the peripheral countries in a bid to accomplish their hegemonic designs which the Indian leadership has been claiming from time to time including Narendra Modi false / tall claim of creation of Bangladesh in 1971. The Indian Army is also following the foot prints / aggressive policies of Indian political leadership. General Bipon Rawat (Indian Army Chief) and Lt Gen AK Bhaat, Corps Commander Srinagar in their media briefings have been threatening Pakistan Armed Forces and Kashmiri Muslim freedom fighters / organizations of dire consequences, they committed atrocities / brutalities on the innocent Muslims / minorities by using lethal weapons including Anti-Tank Guided Missiles, Mortar guns and chemical agents.

India to fulfill its hegemonic designs in South Asia and enhance its influence, the Indian Defence Minister Mst Nirmala Subramanian visited various foreign countries to purchase military equipment worth US 5.6 billion including SA-400 missile system F-35 fighter aircraft from Israel and 80 MI-70 helicopter to augment mobilization of Indian troops and LEA’s to crush innocent Muslims of IHK and Sikhs of Khalistan movement. Indian government in addition to further enhance the barbaric activities of its intelligence / security agencies, RAW, Intelligence Bureau, Bureau of Investigation, Special protection group and National Security Guards are allowed to import i arms, / ammunition, telescopic silencer short guns, with night vision capabilities and hand grenades from US / Israel without the scrutiny and permission of Indian parliament and Indian Defence Ministry. These sophisticated arms / ammunition will be smuggled and supplied to various terrorist groups in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nepal by RAW / MOSAAD / CIA. In Nepal RAW has established a front organization by the name of Islami Sangh Nepal and in Bangladesh Faleh-e-Insaniyat Foundation to impart training to terrorists in fabricating improvised explosive devices. The arms / ammunition are also supplied from RAW establishments to dissident / terrorist groups to carry out violence and instability in the peripheral countries.

Excellency Modi we have tried to highlight the chronological sequence of events and nefarious activities being carried out by your Government, Senior Army officers, RAW / Intelligence Bureau and Law Enforcing Agencies. The scrutiny / analysis for the reasons behind aggressive behavior pattern / attitude are the outcome of Hindu mechanism of hereditary, aggression, frustration and anxiety in Indian society. They have fallen prey to psychotic disorder and negative Edipis Complex. To live in the “Global Village” of civilized nations it is high time on the part of Indian Government to change its policies and attitude in order to prove themselves as a civilized mature and affectionate nation towards its neighboring countries.

*Jamshed Jamshed is a freelance journalist who regularly contributes to several publications.

US-China negotiations on trade war, ended last week, assured by Chinese honest intent for significant imports from USA. Chinese media hogged the headlines saying that the negotiation was a great success, as both sides had shown willingness to address the trade balance. Surprisingly, the fact is that there was no deal and no road map. The negotiation in fact only remained an exchange of sweet words of willingness to avert a trade war.

The underlying question is that can China substantiate its large imports from USA to avert the trade war? Submitting a suspense signal, the US treasury Secretary Steven Munchin said, “ We are putting the trade war on hold.”

Against the backdrop of historically inflicted adverse relations between the two countries and the yawning gap of trade deficits, it is doubtful that only the overwhelming intent will help to fulfill the desired results. Ahead of the talks, US side negotiators insisted for China’s pledge to reduce trade deficit by US $ 200 billion by 2020. The Joint Statement didn’t make any such reference. To this end, the genuineness of the aversion of trade war remained in dark.

Does it reflect a distant dream of the end of US – China trade war in near term? China is an export base economy and USA is the biggest importer of Chinese goods. China’s assertion for economic and political expansionism through BRI ( Belt and Road Initiative) to sustain its export base economy do not warrant the fidelity of the intents. Against this backdrop, a colorful negotiation without any roadmap does not sense much.

China is the biggest drag on the US trade deficit. USA dipped into yawning trade deficit after China emerged the biggest trade partner of it. Over 47 percent of the US trade deficit was attributed by Chinese dumping of goods in 2017. Trade deficit in goods surged year-after-year by hooping margin from US $ 318 billion in 2013 to US $ 375 billion in 2017 .

The crux of the matter is that how will the trade deficit be balanced. Will China increase imports of goods or curtail exports of goods voluntarily or invest more in USA to generate more employment, which was affected by large imports from China.

The USA’s major items of imports from China’s are electrical machinery, machinery, furniture and bedding, toys and sports and footwear. They accounted for 63.5 percent of USA’s imports from China in 2016 and in value terms , they were US $ 294 billion.

Against these, there were five major items of USA’s exports to China that accounted for 55 percent of USA’s exports to China in 2016 and in value terms, they were US $64 billion. Items were soybean, aircraft, electrical machinery, machinery and vehicles.

Given these wide disparity, if the trade deficit is to be reduced by US $ 200 billion by 2020, as demanded by US authority, China has to increase imports of these five major items from USA by three-fold by 2020. This is an uphill task for China.

Does China really have the appetite to absorb such large imports from USA within the stipulated time period? China is the hub for global workshop. It imports raw materials and intermediates and produce consumption goods for export. China’s major items of imports from the world are crude oil, electronic integrated circuits, iron ore, coal and vehicles. Crude oil import alone accounts for over ten percent of China’s total import, which is US $ 200 million worth. Will China import crude oil from USA to balance the trade? Certainly not. Given this basket of imports, it is almost an impossible task for China to avert the trade war by resorting to bulk imports, when the country is already reeling under over-capacity.

Failing this, the option remains for the USA is to entangle China in currency war. This brings to memory the USA’s currency war against Japan in the end-eighties, when Japan failed to curtail trade deficit with USA. To drub cheap Japanese exports, the coterie of five developed nations, initiated by USA, signed an agreement to appreciate Japanese yen in relation to US Dollar in Plaza Hotel in New York in September 1985. The agreement made the Japanese exports costlier.

Until 1985, Japan was the main lever to augment the USA trade deficit. It accounted for 37 percent of US trade deficit. To thwart the impact of Japanese yen appreciation and to sustain their exports, the benchmark for Japanese corporate growth, Japanese corporate shifted their plants to South East Asian countries. This led to a major hollow in investment in Japan.

What India should do in such circumstances. India is also engulfed by wide trade deficit , with China emerging the biggest trade partner. Despite using several WTO weapons, like anti-dumping duties, safeguard measures, China remains the main lever to drag India into wide trade deficit. Given the situation, should India take a lead in siding USA?

The point of the fact is that there is a turnaround in India- China economic relation since Modi regime, despite the border tiff. Business interests preceded the border tussle. Unlike his predecessors, Mr Modi tried to woo Chinese investment to uptick Make in India initiative and generate employment. Eventually, these yielded results. Chinese companies gushed with investment in India. Six top brand Chinese smartphone makers ( Xiaomi, Oppo, Oneplus, Gionee, Vivo, Huawei) established their manufacturing facilities in India.
Given the Chinese penchant to invest in India, Sino-India relation has made a strategic shift from politically dominated to business relation. In these perspectives, it is better for India to lie low in USA-China trade war.

Views expressed are personal

On Monday, May 21, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo delivered a rant against Iran before the right-wing Heritage Foundation in Washington. It was a bullying speech to push the Iranian leadership to surrender unconditionally to US demands. If the Iranian people are unable to contrive “regime change” the US will do it by military means, perhaps together with Israel, which Pompeo didn’t say. But everybody knows that Israel is hell-bent to crush Iran.

All the other twelve orders he required from Iran to fulfill, are blatant violations of all norms of international law and the UN Charta. Pompeo made a revealing statement, either accidentally or out of lack of knowledge, that, if Iran surrenders to the US demands they can look forward to rejoining the “league of nations.” The League of Nations was the predecessor organization of the United Nations from 1920 to 1946.

The disregard and disrespect for the United Nations and the accords, which the US was party to, such as the Iran deal, convey an impression as if the US is planning to undermine, if not destroy the United Nations. Such an idea comes to mind by the appointment of John Bolton, the Stalin-like mustache Ziocon extremist, who said about the United Nations after 9/11: “The Secretariat building in New York has 38 stories. If it lost ten stories, it wouldn’t make a bit of difference”.

The following twelve strings demanded Pompeo from Iran:

1. Declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) a full account of the prior military dimensions of its nuclear program and permanently and verifiably abandon such work in perpetuity.
2. Stop enrichment and never pursue plutonium reprocessing, including closing its heavy water reactor.
3. Provide the IAEA with unqualified access to all sites throughout the entire country.
4. End its proliferation of ballistic missiles and halt further launching or development of nuclear-capable missile systems.
5. Release all US citizens as well as citizens of US partners and allies.
6. End support to Middle East “terrorist” groups, including Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
7. Respect the sovereignty of the Iraqi government and permit the disarming, demobilization and reintegration of Shia militias.
8. End its military support for the Houthi rebels and work towards a peaceful, political settlement in Yemen.
9. Withdraw all forces under Iran’s command throughout the entirety of Syria.
10. End support for the Taliban and other “terrorists” in Afghanistan and the region and cease harboring senior al-Qaeda leaders.
11. End the Islamic Revolutionary Guard corps-linked Quds Force’s support for “terrorists” and “militant” partners around the world.
12. End its threatening behavior against its neighbors, many of whom are US allies, including its threats to destroy Israel and its firing of missiles at Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and threats to international shipping and destructive cyber attacks.1

Iran’s president Rouhani rejected off hand these impudent demands, saying “Who are you to decide for Iran and the world?” In contrast to the US, Iran complied to every jota of the nuclear deal, officially known under its awkward title “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPOA). Not Iran or the other signatories broke their words, but the US did.

Neither can’t their word be trusted, nor their signature has any value. Kim Jong-un should be on the qui vive entering an agreement with the Trump administration. The “Libyan Model” is already hanging over Kim Jong-un like a sword of Damocles.

Shouldn’t Iran turn the tables and confront the US with the following questions and damask US hypocrisy concerning Israel’s substantial nuclear arsenal and biochemical arsenal?

1. Give the Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) full access to your military nuclear program.
2. Stop the enrichment, the reprocessing of plutonium and the processing of radioactive material in conventional ammunition and using it in war zones such as Iraq or Israel is doing in the Gaza Strip.
3. Allow unrestricted IAEA inspections in your country.
4. Stop all arms exports, especially to regimes like Israel and Saudi Arabia.
5. Release all Iranian prisoners and prisoners of Iranian allies and partners.
6. End the support of terrorist groups around the world (for example, IS, al Qaeda, Taliban, various militias in Syria).
7. Respect the sovereignty of all countries of the world, and do not interfere in their internal affairs, especially in matters of national security and defense of a country.
8. Stop all military support for Saudi Arabia and stop the illegal and barbaric war against the innocent Yemeni people.
9. Withdraw all your occupation troops from Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Germany, South Korea, Japan, etc.
10. Stop supporting terrorism worldwide and making attacks under the title “IS” or “Al-Qaida”.
11. Stop all foreign intelligence activities of your intelligence services, especially secret killer operations.
12. Stop playing World Police and threaten other countries. Instead, take care of the problems in your own country. You have more than enough of that.

Besides these mirror questions to Pompeo’s ridiculous demands, Iran has the right to put the Israeli secret and illegal atomic and biochemical weapons programs under the scrutiny of the IAEA. It’s known that Israel has a massive stockpile of nuclear weapons and a second strike nuclear capability thanks to the submarines, which were given as a “gift” by Germany out of guilt. They gót two as a bargain price. As long as Israel’s nuclear arsenal remains unspecified, the US and the international community has no right to bully Iran to strip its country and its non-existent atomic arsenal.

The problem that the US has apparently with Iran neglects the central question about the elephant in the room, which is Israel and its obsessive Prime Minister. He has pushed President Trump in this confrontational position. Under Obama, Netanyahu tilted at windmills, but with Trump, he can play a cat-and-mouse game. In his administration ardent Zionists, Israel Firster and political pro-Israel extremists have a say. For rational diplomacy, the prospects are gloomy. Iran better prepares for war. One can only hope Russia will stick to its words and supply Iran not only with his SS-400 anti-missile system and its other sophisticated weapons that Iran can defend itself against an American-Zionist attack.

One of the fundamental contentions towards the moderation discourse is the attempt to define its meaning. Many Muslim societies seek to define moderation in Islam to fit their own social context. In the case of Saudi, its current moderation effort is tied to its socioeconomic developments. As such, it is not holistic as it exists within the constraints of the country’s political structure. It is also not theologically grounded – even though it rests upon Islamic values. Moderation in Islam requires theological yardsticks seeing as it is essentially a concept within religion. Hence, the contribution that these contextualised efforts make become inefficacious to the moderation discourse without theological grounds.

Recent news and reports on Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MBS) effort to requite the country from hard-line to “moderate Islam” raises questions to the moderation discourse of Saudi Arabia. The Crown Prince acknowledged the intolerance that is taking place in his own society and has vowed to moderate their community’s religious discourse1. In his argument, Saudi Arabia was not a hard-line country in the past but only came to be as such in the last few decades, blaming the instances following 19792. He explains that previous Saudi leaders were not able to tackle the geopolitical events of that time and saw his country as being reactionary to them.

He also recognised that the ultraconservative ideas have become an obstacle for the country’s socioeconomic developments, especially in meeting the needs of its young generation. They face a future of high unemployment despite holding high education qualifications3. To address this, there is a need for Saudi to move away from oil dependency and diversify their economies. This means relying on non-oil or non-energy-based economy that is to open its country further to foreign investments and their presence in the country4. This is also part of Saudi’s Vision 2030 campaign that includes rigorous plans for the reformation of Saudi’s governance and socio-economic conditions.

Changes in domestic and religious policies

In an attempt by MBS to moderate Saudi’s Islamic discourse, the country’s domestic and religious policies experienced a reform. He stripped off the arresting powers from the ‘Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice’ and had its policing functions curbed5; he appointed more moderate clerics into the Council of Senior Scholars6; he allowed public assemblies such as music concerts and movie screenings7.

Also, he overturned an issue that has marred the country’s human rights reputation by the lifting of the ban on women driving8. These were previously significant markers of how ultraconservative Saudi was.

Still, these efforts are for the objective of liberalising and modernising the Saudis. This is in the hopes of opening up the nation and transforming Saudi Arabia into an international investment powerhouse, thereby creating a much more business-friendly environment which will attract large volumes of global capital9. A striking demonstration of this is particularly in the reimagination of the role of women portrayed in the marketing videos of Vision 2030’s megacity project, Neom10, where affluence and socialising are emphasised. Reforming the Saudis’ lifestyles becomes vital in synchronising the changes to both the religious and socioeconomic dynamics of the Saudi society.

It is through modifying Saudi’s domestic and religious policies from the standpoint of the religion that can allow MBS to change the nation’s stand against the ultraconservative ideas that have long been rooted in his society. This therefore becomes the motivation behind MBS’s efforts for moderating Islam in the country.

Saudi Moderate Islam: How Far?

The Crown Prince justifies these moves as a return to the Saudi Arabia in pre-1979 where he claimed it was more open and moderate. However, the ultraconservative ideas – often associated with Ibn Wahhab – have been rooted in Saudi society since the Wahhab-Saud pact that cemented the arrangement for Saudi Arabia’s political-religious leadership. This arrangement has been further preserved by Ibn Wahhab’s direct descendants – the Al-Shaykh family. Despite current changes in the domestic and religious policies, Saudi’s ultra-conservative character still stands strong especially in relation to law and order relating to those of other faiths.

Ultra-conservative practices such as the principle of male guardianship, describing Shia and Sufi Islam using derogatory terms in books, laws that defines atheists as terrorists, and advising Muslims not to associate with the “kafirs” – Jews and Christians – still persist11. A Human Rights Watch survey of religion textbooks produced by the Saudi education ministry for 2016-2017 concluded that students as young as first grade in Saudi schools are being taught hate speech towards those of a different faith12.

These ultra-conservative and exclusivist views have been built upon the doctrinal beliefs of Wahhabi Islam. While non-violent in its origin, the doctrines have been made as a basis for conceptualising the specified ‘religious other’ as adversaries – thereby informing the formation of violent imperatives of terror groups such as IS and AQ. These doctrines have taken on a life of its own as anti-Shiite, anti-Iran and anti-West rhetoric are further added into the mix. Consequently, these have manifested into pseudo-religious practices of excommunication, justifying violence and encouraging bloodshed. Inadvertently, it was exported out of Saudi Arabia into various other Muslim nations where it has brought about the same outcomes of religious violence, intolerance and exclusivism13. It is from these that Saudi’s association with Wahhabi Islam has been taken to have played a part in the development of global jihadism and terrorism.

MBS sees this, and his most recent effort at rectifying the situation was to send out a strong message of Saudi’s position as a Western ally in the global counter-terrorism effort14. His moderation efforts thence represent his intention to not only change the mindset of his people towards modernizing and liberalising Saudi Arabia, but also to convince its global coalitions that Saudi no longer stands for the ultraconservative ideals that have had its role in fuelling radicalisation and jihadism. His moderation efforts have centred around the Islamic values of moderation, tolerance, excellence, discipline, equity, transparency, compassion, mercy and other positive communal values15 – values that are promoted strongly in the Islamic religious traditions. This is explicitly manifested in his effort to build a progressive and modern society, especially with the younger generation with his Vision 2030 campaigns. Yet, the question remains; how far can he take his moderation efforts to serve these goals?

Restraints in Saudi’s Moderate Islam

Saudi’s political structure stands as the first and most challenging factor for MBS’s moderation efforts. The kingdom was built upon the two pillars erected by the Wahhab-Saud pact: Al-Saud family taking charge of the political affairs, and Al-Shaykh family (of the Ibn Wahhab tradition) taking charge of religious affairs16. This system has been preserved for over 250 years, in which its own society has deeply internalized the politico-religious understanding that came out of the arrangement. Even when a Wahhabi cleric appeared on a Saudi television news programme to prohibit the killing of civilians and denounce Osama bin Laden’s legitimacy to call jihad in the 9/11 attacks, young men called the station and defied the Wahhabi cleric – arguing that the 9/11 attacks were part of a righteous jihad against the West17.

The Al-Shaykh has been regarded as the kingdom’s official religious guides, and they are known for keeping strictly within the boundaries of Ibn Wahhab’s ideas. Despite MBS efforts, the Al-Shaykh remains rigid on significant issues and continue to exercise their power in the kingdom’s religious policy-making. As an example, the most recent banning of pilgrims to visit the Cave of Hira’ reflected the continuation of an ultraconservative stance as it was determined that such activities are likely to amount to heresy18. This example shows how unlikely it is for MBS to go far in his moderation efforts as the Al-Shaykh – a strong second pillar of the nation – continue to act as a bulwark for the country’s domestic ultraconservative religious policies.

The kingdom’s nationalist identity also includes its religious character that has been rooted in the Wahhabi understanding of Islam. Their foreign policies have reflected this. The oil boom of the 1970s coupled with the political rivalries of Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran led to the widespread of Saudi-funded building of mosques and religious engagements all around the world, which was seen as an attempt to spread the Wahhabi doctrine19. Doing so ensured that the Saudis maintained their position as the religious epicentre of the Middle East, and the main reference of global Islam. The effects of this are still felt today. For example, the Saudis had received a 99-year rent-free lease of the Grand Mosque in Brussels in exchange for cheaper oil prices to Belgium. This included allowing Saudi-backed imams to serve the Muslim community in Brussels. However, the mosque had its Saudi-backed imams retracted for preaching the Wahhabi branch of Islam which were leading to the spread of radical ideas. In line with his moderation efforts, MBS has reacted accommodatingly to the decision made by Brussels20. Still, Wahhabi schools and preachers have already been established across the world, which have similarly raised concerns of the spread of radical ideas through the preaching of Salafism in the guise of Wahhabi Islam.

Yet, even with a change in Saudi’s foreign policies, the geopolitical developments of the region will still push Saudi Arabia into a corner. Saudi Arabia’s ongoing involvement in the war in Yemen is highly indicative of the political motivations that Saudi holds in keeping itself as a religious superpower within the region. This has been demonstrated on multiple accounts – the Meccan siege, the rise of Ikhwanul Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood), the global spread of jihadism, the Syrian Civil War and most recently, the Saudi-led coalition in the war in Yemen.

These instances have shown Saudi’s tendency to assert its identity as both a political and religious superpower, which involves them asserting their own character and brand of Islam to strengthen their assertion. It is therefore difficult to expect a radical change in Saudi’s foreign policies or the way in which Saudi sees itself on the global stage. It is undeniable that the ultraconservative ideas of Wahhabi Islam do hold value to the assertion of Saudi Arabia as a religious superpower on the global stage. While it is worthy to note that the Saudis are responding more liberally to the most recent geopolitical development – the Arab Spring – it is still focusing on changes in the domestic sphere rather than on the international level.

It is in facing these three main challenges that MBS’s efforts at promoting ‘moderate’ Islam will not be able to go far, at least for now. The limitations that Saudi was structurally built upon will hinder MBS’s attempt to ‘moderate’ the Saudi Islam. Saudi’s moderation of Islam is therefore not a holistic concept even though it was guided by Islamic principles. While MBS’s efforts are motivated by political and socioeconomic objectives, its contribution to the moderation discourse is lacking. Its shortcomings can be partly attributed to the lack of participation by moderate religious scholars in developing the idea, seeing as the religious sphere of the country is dominated by the ultraconservative scholars of the Al-Shaykh.

Moderating Islam: Other Efforts

Saudi Arabia is not the only country attempting to ‘moderate’ Islam. There have been efforts put forth by Muslim communities around the world to ‘moderate’ Islam, by refining the understanding of Islam to fit the current contextual living of Muslims today. Some efforts are regional, while some are community-specific.

The largest effort was the Amman Declaration that involved 552 signatures from 84 countries21. Though it was not labelled as an effort in ‘moderating Islam’, it offered three points that demonstrated its form of moderate Islam: 1) acceptance of various prominent jurisprudential and theological school of thoughts including from Shiite, Ibadi and Thahiri, rendering it impermissible to declare them as apostates or to endanger their blood, honour and property – by extension, it is also impermissible to declare any other group who declares themselves as Muslim and believes in God. 2) Showing acknowledgement that the commonality between the various schools of Islamic jurisprudence is strong, and the differences are only with regards to ancillary issues, to which the Amman Declaration sees it as a mercy; 3) Emphasising the need for an individual to meet the various personal qualifications required by each Islamic school of thought and adhere to the methodology of the schools before being able to issue a fatwa (religious edict)22.

The second prominent effort, “The Open Letter to Baghdadi” – albeit regarded as a counter-ideology effort – contributes to the moderation effort for its presentation of the religion’s moderate stance vis-à-vis the ultraconservative and violent readings by the terror group, ISIS, led by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. The Open Letter establishes 24 religious stances across various issues23 – slavery, women’s rights, Shari’ah matters, and more – which were aimed at representing the brand of Islam that is truer to its essence; unlike the manipulated pseudo-Islam concocted by the group. Thus, it was in this way that the effort also demonstrated another form that represents moderate Islam. Although different from the Amman Declaration, both efforts hold on to the same values of tolerance, inclusivism and an aversion to hate speech and religious bigotry.

A more recent effort to ‘moderate’ Islam is the Marrakesh Declaration of 2016, where it was focused on ensuring the rights of religious minorities in predominantly Muslim-majority countries. This declaration resonated the values imbued within the Medinan Charter declared by the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) himself. It called for a review of any materials or education curricula that instigates aggression and extremism. It also encouraged ground-up and top-down means of ensuring just treatment of religious minorities in Muslim countries and recollecting the centuries-worth of joint living on the same land to restore mutual trust across different religious communities24.

Most importantly, the declaration affirms as unconscionable to employ religion for aggressing upon the rights of religious minorities in Muslim countries25. These similarly represent the values held by the Amman Declaration and the Open Letter to Baghdadi, thereby demonstrating a strengthened form of the concept of moderate Islam.

In terms of country efforts, Malaysia’s moderation effort has been met with resistance from hardliners who hold political power. Malaysia’s challenge is in the growing conservatism within the population that is enabled by the authoritarian approach of the government on issues of religion26. The effort of the G25 – a group of high-ranking former civil servants and diplomats – to publish a book promoting moderate Islam was banned by the government. The book “Breaking the Silence: Voices of Moderation – Islam in a Constitutional Democracy” was written to counter intolerance backed by religion. Yet, Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi signed on the ban on the reason of it being “likely to be prejudicial to public order” and “likely to alarm public opinion”27. Hence, this ground-up moderation effort became restrained.

For the case of Singapore, moderation efforts have come in both top-down and ground-up approaches since 200528. The Muslim community within Singapore – particularly the religious scholars – have continued to develop academic literature on the development of the moderate Islam concept. Through book publications, public education, academic conferences and forums, the concept of moderate Islam being developed is particular to promoting inclusivist views that emphasise the nation’s history of community living that brought to the growth of the nation29. Additionally, the Singaporean government has had multiple crack downs on religious preachers deemed to spread exclusivist and intolerant messages30. Mr Ismail Menk of Zimbabwe, Mr Haslin Baharim of Malaysia and Mr Yusuf Estes have been banned from preaching in Singapore for holding views that threaten the multi-religious fabric of the Singaporean society. In this way, the moderation effort in Singapore parallels the effort of the Marrakesh Declaration, where there is a strong focus of the role of the Muslim community within a plural state.

It is hence worthy to note that coalition efforts stand a better chance at developing a holistic concept of moderation in Islam, whereas country efforts tend to be tied to its own society’s characteristics. The moderation concept produced by country efforts tend to exist within the country’s political and socioeconomic limitations instead. Despite the different forms of moderating Islam, all these efforts share similar values; reiterating Islam’s emphasis – not limited to – on peace, tolerance, compassion and mercy while rejecting bigotry, hate speech and violence be it towards other communities or towards Muslim themselves.

Conclusion

In all, the concept of ‘Moderation in Islam’ varies from one to another, depending on the constraints that the country has. In the case of Saudi, its efforts in defining moderate Islam is dependent on its political structure and socioeconomic demands. As much as Saudi strives to claim that it is promoting a global brand of ‘moderate Islam’, this concept is tied down by its socioeconomic motivations. Thus, it is not sufficient to comprehend Saudi’s definition of moderate Islam as the all-embracing depiction of the concept that the moderation discourse hopes for. However, it can be said that all the moderation efforts may hold similar values, although not in the same form.

While the concept of moderate Islam is being developed, the effort to ‘moderate’ Islam vis-à-vis ultraconservative ideas will continue to face the persisting challenge of hard-lined doctrines and laws. With all these constraints, MBS has to work within them and try to negotiate with the Al-Shaykh for the refining of their country’s religious edicts, rulings and doctrines. These include the doctrine of al-wala’ wal bara’, blasphemy laws, hudud laws and hate rhetoric. This will be a tall order as the task is further compounded by the ongoing issue of sectarianism and inter- and intra-religious conflict. While some of these challenges are unsettling due to geo-political reasons, some are not insurmountable and can be moderated through creative and contextual interpretations – as seen from the other efforts discussed in trying to develop moderate Islam.

*About the authors:
Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff and NurulHuda Binte Yussof are Analysts at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.
*Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff

Notes:
1. Chulov, Martin. 2017. “I Will Return Saudi Arabia To Moderate Islam, Says Crown Prince”. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/24/i-will-return-saudi-arabia-moderate-islam-crown-prince [accessed May 1, 2018].
2. Barmin, Yury. 2018. “Can Mohammed Bin Salman Break the Saudi-Wahhabi Pact?”. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/mohammed-bin-salman-break-saudi-wahhabi-pact-180107091158729.html [accessed May 1, 2018].
3. Noack, Rick. 2017. “Saudi Arabia Wants to Return To ‘Moderate Islam’. Skeptics Say It’s A Marketing Ploy”. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/10/25/saudi-arabia-vows-to-return-to-moderate-islam-but-critics-wonder-what-it-will-look-like/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.49d94a0141e3 [accessed May 1, 2018].
4. Noack, Rick. 2017. “Saudi Arabia Wants to Return To ‘Moderate Islam’. Skeptics Say It’s A Marketing Ploy”. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/10/25/saudi-arabia-vows-to-return-to-moderate-islam-but-critics-wonder-what-it-will-look-like/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.49d94a0141e3 [accessed May 1, 2018].
5. Barmin, Yury. 2018. “Can Mohammed Bin Salman Break the Saudi-Wahhabi Pact?”. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/mohammed-bin-salman-break-saudi-wahhabi-pact-180107091158729.html [accessed May 1, 2018].
6. Barmin, Yury. 2018. “Can Mohammed Bin Salman Break the Saudi-Wahhabi Pact?”. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/mohammed-bin-salman-break-saudi-wahhabi-pact-180107091158729.html [accessed May 1, 2018].
7. Barmin, Yury. 2018. “Can Mohammed Bin Salman Break the Saudi-Wahhabi Pact?”. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/mohammed-bin-salman-break-saudi-wahhabi-pact-180107091158729.html [accessed May 1, 2018]
8. The Straits Times. 2018. “Saudi Arabia Says to Lift Driving Ban On Women From June 24”.
https://www.straitstimes.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-says-to-lift-driving-ban-on-women-from-june-24 [accessed May 1, 2018].
9. Noack, Rick. 2017. “Saudi Arabia Wants to Return To ‘Moderate Islam’. Skeptics Say It’s A Marketing Ploy.”. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/10/25/saudi-arabia-vows-to-return-to-moderate-islam-but-critics-wonder-what-it-will-look-like/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.49d94a0141e3 [accessed May 1, 2018].
10. Noack, Rick. 2017. “Saudi Arabia Wants to Return To ‘Moderate Islam’. Skeptics Say It’s A Marketing Ploy.”. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/10/25/saudi-arabia-vows-to-return-to-moderate-islam-but-critics-wonder-what-it-will-look-like/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.49d94a0141e3 [accessed May 1, 2018]
11. Dorsey, James M. 2018. “Bangladesh Looks to Saudi Arabia In A Twist of Irony”. The New Arab. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2018/4/24/bangladesh-looks-to-saudi-arabia-in-twist-of-irony [accessed May 1, 2018].
12. Dorsey, James M. 2018. “Bangladesh Looks to Saudi Arabia In A Twist of Irony”. The New Arab. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2018/4/24/bangladesh-looks-to-saudi-arabia-in-twist-of-irony [accessed May 1, 2018].
13. Dorsey, James M. 2018. “Bangladesh Looks to Saudi Arabia In A Twist of Irony”. The New Arab. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2018/4/24/bangladesh-looks-to-saudi-arabia-in-twist-of-irony [accessed May 1, 2018].
14. Kilgour, David. 2018. “Reforming Saudi Arabia”. The Epoch Times. https://www.theepochtimes.com/reforming-saudi-arabia_2489038.html [accessed May 1, 2018].
15. Vision2030.gov.sa. 2018. http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/node/259 [accessed May 1, 2018].
16. Kilgour, David. 2018. “Reforming Saudi Arabia”. The Epoch Times. https://www.theepochtimes.com/reforming-saudi-arabia_2489038.html [accessed May 1, 2018]
17. Commins, David Dean. 2009. The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. London: I. B. Tauris. p. 6.
18. Rashid, Ruzaini. 2018. “Arab Saudi Larang Lawatan Ke Jabal Thur Jabal Noor Semasa Umrah”. BERITA Mediacorp. https://berita.mediacorp.sg/mobilem/singapore/arab-saudi-larang-lawatan-ke-jabal-thur-jabal-noor-semasa-umrah/4008106.html [accessed May 1, 2018].
19. Commins, David Dean. 2009. The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. London: I. B. Tauris. pp. 152-153.
20. Carbonnel, Alissa De, and Stephen Kalin. 2018. “Giving Up Control of Brussels Mosque, Saudi Arabia Sends a Signal”. U.S. News. https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2018-02-12/giving-up-control-of-brussels-mosque-saudi-arabia-sends-a-signal [accessed May 1, 2018].
21. The Grand List of Endorsements of The Amman Message and Its Three Points. 2018. Ammanmessage.com. http://ammanmessage.com/grand-list-of-endorsements-of-the-amman-message-and-its-three-points/ [accessed May 1, 2018].
22. The Three Points of The Amman Message V.2. 2018. Ammanmessage.com. http://ammanmessage.com/the-three-points-of-the-amman-message-v-2/ [accessed May 1, 2018].
23. Council on American Islamic Relations. 2014. “Open Letter to Baghdadi”. http://lettertobaghdadi.com/14/english-v14.pdf [accessed May 1, 2018].
24. Marrakesh Declaration. 2016. “Executive Summary of The Marrakesh Declaration on The Rights of Religious Minorities in Predominantly Muslim Majority Communities”. http://www.marrakeshdeclaration.org/files/Bismilah-2-ENG.pdf [accessed May 1, 2018].
25. Marrakesh Declaration. 2016. “Executive Summary of The Marrakesh Declaration on The Rights of Religious Minorities in Predominantly Muslim Majority Communities”. http://www.marrakeshdeclaration.org/files/Bismilah-2-ENG.pdf [accessed May 1, 2018].
26. Teoh, Shannon. 2017. “Moderate Islam Key to Malaysia”. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/moderate-islam-key-to-malaysia [accessed May 1, 2018].
27. The Straits Times. 2017. “Malaysia Government Sparks Anger with Ban on Moderate Islam Book”. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysia-govt-sparks-anger-with-ban-on-moderate-islam-book [accessed May 1, 2018].
28. Moderation in Islam. 2004. 1st ed. Singapore: PERGAS
29. Moderation in Islam. 2004. 1st ed. Singapore: PERGAS
30. Ong, Yunita. 2017. “2 Muslim Preachers Banned from Singa

Bibliography
Ammanmessage.com. (2018). The Three Points of The Amman Message V.2 – AmmanMessage.com. [online] Available at: http://ammanmessage.com/the-three-points-of-the-amman-message-v-2/ [Accessed 13 May 2018].
Ammanmessage.com. (2018). The Grand List of Endorsements of the Amman Message and Its Three Points – AmmanMessage.com. [online] Available at: http://ammanmessage.com/grand-list-of-endorsements-of-the-amman-message-and-its-three-points/ [Accessed 13 May 2018].
Barmin, Y. (2018). Can Mohammed bin Salman break the Saudi-Wahhabi pact?. Al-Jazeera. [online] Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/mohammed-bin-salman-break-saudi-wahhabi-pact-180107091158729.html [Accessed 13 May 2018].
Carbonnel, A. and Kalin, S. (2018). Giving up Control of Brussels Mosque, Saudi Arabia Sends a Signal. U.S. News. [online] Available at: https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2018-02-12/giving-up-control-of-brussels-mosque-saudi-arabia-sends-a-signal [Accessed 13 May 2018].
Chatham House (2017). Vision 2030 and Saudi Arabia’s Social Contract: Austerity and Transformation. [online] Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/vision-2030-and-saudi-arabias-social-contract-austerity-and-transformation?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIhqvUn_T32gIV0zUrCh2fHAg0EAAYASAAEgL5Z_D_BwE [Accessed 13 May 2018].
Chulov, M. (2017). I will return Saudi Arabia to moderate Islam, says crown prince. The Guardian. [online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/24/i-will-return-saudi-arabia-moderate-islam-crown-prince [Accessed 13 May 2018].
Commins, D. (2009). The Wahhabi mission and Saudi Arabia. London: I. B. Tauris, pp. 6 & 152-153.
Council on American Islamic Relations (2014). Open Letter to Baghdadi. [online] Available at: http://lettertobaghdadi.com/14/english-v14.pdf [Accessed 13 May 2018].
Dorsey, J. (2018). Bangladesh looks to Saudi Arabia in a twist of irony. The New Arab. [online] Available at: https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2018/4/24/bangladesh-looks-to-saudi-arabia-in-twist-of-irony [Accessed 13 May 2018].
Ennasri, N. (2018). The war in Yemen: A modern-day Vietnam for the Saudi-led coalition. Middle East Eye. [online] Available at: http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/war-yemen-modern-day-vietnam-saudi-led-coalition-1829110718 [Accessed 13 May 2018].
Kilgour, D. (2018). Reforming Saudi Arabia. The Epoch Times. [online] Available at: https://www.theepochtimes.com/reforming-saudi-arabia_2489038.html [Accessed 13 May 2018].
Marrakesh Declaration (2016). Executive Summary of the Marrakesh Declaration on the Rights of Religious Minorities in Predominantly Muslim Majority Communities. [online] Available at: http://www.marrakeshdeclaration.org/files/Bismilah-2-ENG.pdf [Accessed 13 May 2018].
Noack, R. (2017). Saudi Arabia wants to return to ‘moderate Islam’. Skeptics say it’s a marketing ploy. The Washington Post. [online] Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/10/25/saudi-arabia-vows-to-return-to-moderate-islam-but-critics-wonder-what-it-will-look-like/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.49d94a0141e3 [Accessed 13 May 2018].
Ong, Y. (2017). 2 Muslim preachers banned from Singapore. The New Paper. [online] Available at: http://www.tnp.sg/news/singapore/2-muslim-preachers-banned-singapore [Accessed 13 May 2018].
PERGAS (2004). Moderation in Islam in the Context of Muslim Community in Singapore. 1st ed. Singapore: PERGAS.
Rashid, R. (2018). Arab Saudi larang lawatan ke Jabal Thur Jabal Noor semasa umrah. BERITA Mediacorp. [online] Available at: https://berita.mediacorp.sg/mobilem/singapore/arab-saudi-larang-lawatan-ke-jabal-thur-jabal-noor-semasa-umrah/4008106.html [Accessed 13 May 2018].
Sheline, A. (2017). Mohammed bin Salman’s Plan to Moderate Islam in Saudi Arabia. The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. [online] Available at: http://www.agsiw.org/mohammed-bin-salmans-plan-moderate-islam-saudi-arabia/ [Accessed 13 May 2018].
The Straits Times (2017). Malaysia government sparks anger with ban on moderate Islam book. [online] Available at: https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysia-govt-sparks-anger-with-ban-on-moderate-islam-book [Accessed 13 May 2018].
Teoh, S. (2017). Moderate Islam key to Malaysia. The Straits Times. [online] Available at: https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/moderate-islam-key-to-malaysia [Accessed 13 May 2018].
The Straits Times (2018). Saudi Arabia says to lift driving ban on women from June 24. [online] Available at: https://www.straitstimes.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-says-to-lift-driving-ban-on-women-from-june-24 [Accessed 13 May 2018].
Vision2030.gov.sa. (2018). Governance | Saudi Vision 2030. [online] Available at: http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/node/259 [Accessed 13 May 2018].

By Giancarlo Elia Valori*

Many oil futures denominated in yuan were launched on the Shanghai market at the end of March 2018 and quickly traded for 62,500 contracts – hence for a notional value of 27 billion yuan, equivalent to 4 billion US dollars.

The financial process of the new petroyuan, however, had already begun as early as 2016.

Hence there was obviously the danger of an internal financial bubble in China, but linked to the crude oil price – yet the Chinese government had decided that the fluctuation allowed for those contracts had to be only 5%, with a maximum 10% fluctuation only for the first day of trading.

Furthermore considering the average level of oil transactions in China, we can see that oil and gas imports could back financial operations totalling over 200 billion yuan.

According to industry analysts, the level of Chinese oil imports is expected to increase by approximately 2.1 million barrels per day from 2017 until 2023, which implies that the Chinese market will change the future level of oil barrel prices – be they denominated in dollars or in another currency.

Hence, from now on, China will explicitly challenge the “petrodollar” to create its petroyuan – with an initial foreseeable investment by the Chinese government, which will take place on the sale of a 5% shareholding of Saudi Aramco.

Nevertheless the prospect of an IPO on the Saudi “jewel in the crown” – which was also at the core of Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030, all focused on the Kingdom’s economic diversification – has been postponed to at least 2019.

The Saudi Royal Family is not at all homogeneous, both politically and for its different financial interests.

This is demonstrated by the attack – obscure, but thwarted with some difficulty -on Riyadh’s royal palace, launched by some armed units on April 21 last.

Should the sale of a 5% shareholding of Saudi Aramco finally take place, however, it would be the biggest IPO ever.

The magnitude of the deal is huge: according to the latest Saudi estimates, the company is worth 2 trillion US dollars – hence a 5% shareholding is at least equal to 100 billion dollars.

Moreover, China is doing anything to make Saudi Arabia accept payments in yuan – the first step to replace the old petrodollar.

If Saudi Arabia did not accept at least a large share of Chinese payments in yuan, it could be “blackmailed” and witness a decrease in an essential share of its oil exports. Not to mention the fact that – also with reference to Saudi Aramco-as the saying goes, sovereign funds and Chinese state-owned companies have “deeper pockets” than many prospective Western buyers.

Moreover President Trump is doing anything to make the IPO on Saudi Aramco end up in US hands. However, it cannot be taken for granted that he will succeed. In spite of everything, Mohammed bin Salman is not the heir of the old Saudi bilateralism vis-à-vis the United States.

Nonetheless, in his visit to China last March, Prince Mohammed bin Salman already signed contracts with his Chinese counterparts to the tune of 65 billion US dollars – and they are only petrochemical and energy transactions.

Furthermore this major Saudi oil company is considering the possibility of issuing yuan-denominated bonds, at least to cover part of the trade between the two countries.

Moreover, the US imports of Saudi oil have been steadily declining for some time, which makes the US role in the future post-oil diversification of the Saudi economy – the real big deal of the coming years – more difficult.

Over the next few months, however, the Chinese financiers are preparing to launch on the market a yuan-denominated oil future convertible into gold.

According to Chinese sources, it will be open to foreign investment funds and to the various oil companies.

Hence if the use of the dollar is gradually avoided, it will be possible -also for Russia and Iran, for example – to circumvent the sanctions imposed by the USA, the EU and the UN and fully re-enter -precisely through the yuan – the global oil and financial markets.

Moreover, the “petroyuan operation” is rapidly expanding to Africa.

Just recently, we heard about the definition of a three-year currency swap between China and Nigeria worth over 2.5 billion yuan.

As is well-known, the currency swap is a special derivative contract with which two parties exchange interest and sometimes principal in one currency for the same in another currency. Interest payments are exchanged at fixed dates through the life of the contract.

Hence 2.5 billion yuan are exchanged with 720 billion Naira.

Obviously, also in this case, there is no need for either of the two contracting parties to buy US currency for trading and exchanges, while Nigeria is currently China’s largest trading partner in Africa and China is the largest foreign investor in Nigeria.

All this happens in Nigeria, with African exports to China mainly consisting of oil and raw materials, exactly what is needed to keep China’s rate of development (and the yuan exchange rate) high.

The internationalization of the Chinese currency, however, is mainly stimulated by the following factors: the expansion of the cashless economy, which favours large Chinese and global operators such as AliBaba (Alipay) or WeChatPay; the Belt and Road Initiative, which pushes China’s investment and combines it with other monetary areas; the very fast globalization of Chinese banks and their adoption of the SWIFT gpi system; finally the development of the Interbank Paying System between China and the countries with which it trades the most.

Nonetheless there are some factors which still need to be studied carefully.

Meanwhile, Hong Kong is still the largest clearing center for the transactions denominated in yuan-renmimbi – with 76% of all transactions that currently pass through the island still under the Chinese special administration.

Still today the renmimbi account only for 1.61% of all international settlements, while 22 Chinese banks are SWIFT-connected.

Many, but not enough.

Moreover, as much as 97.8% of the yuan trading is still as against the US dollar, while the exchange between the yuan and the other currencies other than the US dollar is worth very little in terms of quantities of cash and liquidity traded.

Still today 80.47% of payments whose last beneficiary resides in China is denominated in dollars.

As to the international renmimbi reserves, it all began when, in September 2016, the International Monetary Fund announced that, for the first time, the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) would include the renmimbi.

In June 2017, the European Central Bank converted the value of 500 million euro into dollars (557 million US dollars) and then into renmimbi – equivalent to 0.7% of the total portfolio of ECB’s currencies, while in January 2018 the German Central Bank decided to include the renmimbi among its reserves.

Nowadays only 16% of China’s international trade is traded in the Chinese currency.

The real problem for the dollar is still the euro.

In fact, the transactions in US dollarsfell from 43.89% of total transactions in 2015 to 39.85% in 2017 while, in the same period, those denominated in euro rose from 29.39% to 35.66%.

However, as Vilfredo Pareto said, currencies are “solidified politics”.

In fact, China wants to use the renmimbi-yuan also in the Pakistani port of Gwadar and in its Free Economic Zone, which is the first maritime station of the Belt and Road initiative.

Furthermore the payments in yuan between China and the USA, which is still China’s largest trading partner – account for 5% only, while Japan – the second largest country by volume of transactions with China – already operates 25% of its transactions with the yuan-renmimbi.

Only South Korea – another primary commercial point of reference for China – does use the Chinese currency for a very significant 86% of bilateral transactions.

Certainly the oil market remains essential for the creation of petroyuan or, in any case, for the globalization of the Chinese currency.

Since 2017 China has overtaken the USA as the world’s largest oil and gas importer.

Furthermore, as early as 2009, the Chinese authorities have criticized the use of the US currency alone as a basis for international trade.

In fact, the Chinese political leadership would like to define a monetary benchmark among the main currencies and later build the progressive de-dollarization of trade on it.

Obviously the expansion in the use of the Chinese currency in global transactions, which peaked in 2015, corresponded to the phase when the yuan was undervalued and gradually and slowly appreciated as against the US dollar.

After the two devaluations of the yuan-renmimbi in the summer of 2015, the profitability of replacing the US dollar with the Chinese currency has clearly diminished.

Moreover, since the possession of the yuan is still subject to restrictions and checks, the globalization of the Chinese currency cannot fail to pass through the full liberalization of China’s currency and financial markets.

A project often mentioned by President Xi Jinping and implemented by the Central Bank, especially with maximum transparency on transactions and the end of the capital “shares”, in addition to the quick acceptance of a price-based financial system.

Moreover, all the currencies with which China trades in the oil markets are still pegged to the US dollar and, for the Chinese authorities, this is another difficulty to replace the US currency.

On the domestic side, the yuan has a big problem: it is a matter of investing Chinese savings, which are currently equal to 43% of GDP.

If we consider a similar investment rate, the Chinese economy is no longer sustainable.

Therefore, either all investment abroad is liberalized – but, for China, this would mean the loss of control over domestic savings – or the yuan becomes a new international currency, thus using it for long-term loans in the Belt and Road Initiative and for creating a market of yuan-denominated oil futures.

Hence, unlike petrodollars, the petroyuan is not a US internal way to use the Arab capital stemming from the energy market, but a large internal reserve of capital to meet the needs of an expanding economy and support China’s fresh capital domestic requirements.

For Swiss banks, however, the flow of renmimbi-denominated contracts will radically change the energy financial market, but in the long run, thus obliging many global investors to invest many resources only in the Chinese financial market.

It is worth reiterating, however, that the Chinese currency has not fully been liberalized yet – nor, we imagine, will it be quickly liberalized in the future.

In essence, China wants to govern its development and it does not at all want to favour the US single pole.

Hence either a small monetary globalization, like the current one, or the large and progressive replacement of the dollar with the renmimbi – but this presupposes the liberalization of the entire financial market denominated in the Chinese currency.

Moreover – but this would be fine for the Chinese government -foreign and domestic investors’ full access to the Chinese capital market should be granted.

It already happened in 2017 but, nowadays, it becomes vital for the geopolitical and financial choices made by President Xi Jinping’s China.

Hence, it is likely that in the future China would play the game that Kissinger invented after the Yom Kippur War, i.e. the game of the dollar surplus in the Arab world that is reinvested in the US market.

Obviously, this has kept the US interest rate unreasonably low with an unreasonably high US trade surplus.

A monetary manipulation made using one’s own strategic and military leverage.

Hence, with petrodollars, the USA has invented the monetary perpetual motion.

Therefore, if most of the Chinese oil market is denominated in yuan-renmimbi, a strong international demand for Chinese goods and services will be created or there will be a huge amount of capital to invest in the Chinese financial markets.

This will obviously change the role and significance of China’s engagement in the world.

With significant effects for the dollar market, which could be regionalized, thus highlighting the asymmetries which currently petrodollars hide: the US super-trade surplus and the simultaneous very low interest rate.

What about the Euro? The single European currency has no real market and it shall be radically changed or become a unit of account among new infra-European currencies.

About the author:
*Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “La Centrale Finanziaria Generale Spa”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group and member of the Ayan-Holding Board. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title of “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France

Source:
This article was published by Modern Diplomacy.

North Korea released fresh images of what it says was the demolition of a nuclear test site on the same day it expressed regret over President Donald Trump’s decision to cancel a June 12 summit with ruler Kim Jong-un.

North Korea on Friday said it was still willing to talk to the United States ‘any time in any form’ after Trump’s announcement, a decision Pyongyang described as ‘extremely regrettable’.

North Korea’s First Vice Foreign Minister said Kim had been preparing for the talks and expressed surprise at the cancellation.

President Donald Trump on Thursday called off his planned June summit with Kim Jong Un, blaming ‘open hostility’ from the North Korean regime and warning Pyongyang against committing any ‘foolish or reckless acts’.

In a letter to Kim, Trump announced he would not go ahead with the high-stakes meeting set for June 12 in Singapore, following what the White House called a ‘trail of broken promises’ by the North.

In his Friday statement, First Vice Foreign Minister Kim said the North Korean leader had been preparing for the summit to go ahead.

‘Our Chairman (Kim Jong-un) had also said a meeting with President Trump would create a good beginning and had been putting effort into preparations for it,’ Kim said.

The chances of success for the unprecedented face-to-face between Trump and Kim had recently been thrown into doubt, with the U.S. President pointing a finger a China for the change in tone.

On Thursday, Pyongyang hardened its rhetoric by attacking US Vice President Mike Pence as ‘ignorant and stupid’.

That broadside appeared to hit a nerve with Trump, leading to him abruptly pulling out of the talks.

‘Sadly, based on the tremendous anger and open hostility displayed in your most recent statement, I feel it is inappropriate, at this time, to have this long-planned meeting,’ read Trump’s letter to Kim, which was dictated word-for-word by the US leader, according to a senior White House official.

Earlier this week Trump appeared to blame Beijing for what he perceived as a ‘change in attitude’ from Kim, who visited China three weeks ago and met President Xi Jinping.

‘There was a difference when Kim Jong Un left China the second time,’ Trump said. ‘There was a different attitude after that meeting and I was a little surprised.

China has today urged the United States and North Korea to be patient and ‘show goodwill’.

‘The recent easing situation on the peninsula is hard won, the political settlement process is faced with a rare historic opportunity,’ foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang told a regular press conference.

‘Under the current circumstances we hope both the DPRK and the U.S. can cherish the recent positive progress, stay patient, show goodwill, move in the same direction and continue to stay committed to promoting the denuclearisation of the peninsula,’ Lu said, using North Korea’s official initials.

Just before Trump announced the cancellation of the talks, North Korea declared it had ‘completely’ dismantled its nuclear test site, in a carefully choreographed move portrayed as a goodwill gesture ahead of the summit.
Original source

Following the conclusion of an investigation that holds Russia responsible for the downing of a Malaysia Airlines passenger plane in 2014, the United Nations chief said on Friday that he “has taken note with concern of the latest report”.

On Thursday, according to media reports, the Dutch-led international investigation team announced that it was Russian military personnel who had deployed the Buk surface-to-air missile, that shot down the plane. Russia has denied any involvement in the plane’s destruction.

Speaking to journalists on Friday at UN Headquarters in New York, UN Deputy Spokesperson Farhan Haq said that Secretary-General António Guterres underlined a prior Security Council resolution demanding that “all states cooperate fully with efforts to establish accountability”.

“In such instances, establishing the truth about this event is an important part of achieving justice for the victims and their families,” Mr. Haq added.

All 298 people on board MH17, which was en route from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, died when it crashed on 17 July 2014, in Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine.

It claimed the lives of 193 Dutch nationals, 43 from Malaysia, and 27 from Australia. Other victims came from a variety of countries including Indonesia, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany and the Philippines.

One year after the incident, Malaysia introduced a draft resolution in the UN Security Council on a measure that would have established an international tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for the downing of MH17.

The 15-member body, however, failed to adopt the resolution following a Russian veto.

If one of the Council’s five permanent members casts a negative vote on a resolution, the text cannot be adopted.

On the first anniversary of that tragedy, Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary General at that time, issued a statement in which he said “the victims must be honoured by a collective effort to ascertain the truth about the incident and ensure that any persons determined responsible will be held to account.”

By Whitney Webb*

Several Air Force members charged with guarding some of the most powerful nuclear weapons in the United State’s arsenal have been busted as part of a drug ring that bought, sold, distributed and regularly used LSD and other mind-altering drugs.

The airmen, serving at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming as part of the 90^th Missile Wing, were caught by investigators following a slip-up by one of the servicemen on social media. Those involved were first caught in March 2016, but the details of their case have only recently been made public after records describing the incident were obtained by the Associated Press. Most of the servicemen entangled in the case were responsible for the security and defense of the nuclear weapons on-site as well as the base’s missile complex.

In total, fourteen airmen were disciplined, six of whom were convicted in courts martial for LSD use and distribution. Furthermore, the court documents detailing the incident made no mention of whether LSD’s secondary effects, such as flashbacks or serious, long-lasting problems that can develop after a negative hallucinogenic experience, had affected the soldiers’ behavior while on the job. Some of the soldiers admitted that, under the influence of hallucinogens, they would not have been able to respond if called to duty to respond to a nuclear security emergency.

While none of the airmen admitted to using LSD or other drugs while on duty, and were reportedly not accused of on-duty drug use, the AP’s report noted that “Air Force investigators found those implicated in the F.E. Warren drug ring used LSD on base and off, at least twice at outdoor gatherings. Some also snorted cocaine and used ecstasy. Civilians joined them in the LSD use, including some who had recently left Air Force service, according to two officials with knowledge of the investigation.”

The drug ring involving members of F.E. Warren Air Force Base is the latest scandal for the Air Force’s nuclear missile corps as reports of illicit drug use and widespread cheating on missileer’s proficiency tests at other nuclear-armed bases have been exposed in recent years. Drug use has been the thornier of the issues, as other bases have found the use of other drugs such as ecstasy and amphetamines to be surprisingly common. Some analysts have cited low morale and the young age and lack of experience of the servicemen serving at these bases as underlying problems that have allowed these issues to take root. Others have pointed to a lack of investment in the nuclear missile corps by the federal government.

Despite those lingering problems, the missile force has been thrust back into the spotlight due to President Donald Trump’s calls to strengthen the country’s nuclear might following threats exchanged with North Korea last year and the recent cancellation of peace talks aimed at resolving tensions between the two nuclear powers. However, the recent revelation given the low morale and prolific drug use of servicemen charged with guarding the country’s nuclear weapons may give Americans pause as to whether more nuclear weapons are the solution to the U.S.’ foreign policy conflicts.

About the author:
*Whitney Webb is a staff writer for MintPress News and a contributor to Ben Swann’s Truth in Media. Her work has appeared on ZeroHedge, the AntiMedia, Newsbud and 21st Century Wire, among others. She has also made radio and TV appearances on RT and Sputnik. She currently lives with her family in southern Chile.

Source:
This article was published by Truth in Media.

By Lee Enochs*

Elon Musk is at it again. The billionaire tech magnate continues to get richer and richer on the American taxpayer’s dime, highlighting the need to do as Murray Rothbard advised of reassessing the “partnership” of government and business.

At first glance, Elon Musk appears to be a quintessential capitalist success story. The South African born-American technology magnet, lead designer of SpaceX, and product architect of Tesla, Inc. is now ranked 25^th on Forbes Magazine’s list of the World’s Most Powerful People, and as of February 2018, Forbes has Musk listed as the 53 ^rd richest person in the world.

One might conclude that Musk’s staggering wealth was produced via faithful adherence to the timeless and inexorable principles of laissez-faire capitalism, where personal wealth is accrued through the federal government leaving commerce alone and staying outside the affairs of private industry. However, this perception of Elon Musk’s economic independence from government interventionism is largely a fabrication and carefully manufactured distortion since Musk has personally enriched himself through a whole lot of government favoritism and statist interference in the private sector economy.

At this point, Musk has received well over $5 billion in government support. Previous reports have shown over 80 percent of SpaceX’s contracts come right from Uncle Sam. Given that the government is most space contractors’ top customer, this may not seem like a big deal. In fact, last July one Mises Wire columnist argued that Musk is a “mixed hero” because, although living largely off government largesse, he has “successfully [executed]” big ideas that benefit consumers in the “‘really existing’ world.”

To be fair, this characterization may have seemed to be the case last summer, but like all creatures of government, Musk’s so-called successfully executed ideas are already starting to come crashing down.

SpaceX’s selling point has always been that it can sell cheaper rockets than those of his competitors, but a new report from the space industry’ inspector general found that SpaceX will soon have staggering 50% price increases “compared to its final CRS-1 mission price.”

SpaceX has indicated that the reason it has increased prices is that the company now has a “better understanding of the costs involved after several years of experience with cargo resupply missions.” This just means it overpromised and underdelivered as is typical in the world of government. In recent months, policymakers have also discovered that SpaceX rockets are far less reliable than those of many of its competitors. This was outlined in reports from December 2017 and January 2018 , in which the Department of Defense Inspector General and NASA’s Aerospace Safety Advisory Council described a list of security concerns they have with SpaceX – among them: 33 significant nonconformities.

We can only guess that SpaceX would cease to exist in the absence of government. But given the recent history of tumbling sales that have come with the end of governments’ support for electric vehicles, it is almost a certainty with Tesla.

As an Asian Review article outlined last November, just months after Hong Kong cut its tax breaks for electric vehicle owners, Tesla sales dropped to near zero. A sharp decline in business also resulted in Denmark as the country undertook its own slashing of government incentives. It is only a matter of time before the same occurs in the United States, where Tesla’s $7,500 tax credit is expected to soon phase out. In fact, Tesla is already the largest short in the entire U.S stock market.

Yet, like a catfish that can’t resist shiny new bait, many American politicians and appropriators, enamored with even a hint of technological wizardry, just can’t say no to wasting taxpayer money on Musk’s latest pet projects that do not deliver as promised.

One can only hope that the public will soon wake up and realize what Murray Rothbard warned of – that government exists “precisely to set up such ‘partnerships,’ for the benefit of both government and business, or rather, of certain business firms and groups that happen to be in political favor.”

Politics is driven by culture, so the sooner the American people wake up to this realization, the sooner a smaller government footprint will result. I won’t hold my breath.

Source:
This article was published by the MISES Institute.

Indigenous communities are rejecting non-indigenous energy projects in favour of community-led sustainable energy infrastructure.

The switch has led to some improvements in economic and social development as well as capacity-building for self-governance, according to a study from the University of Waterloo.

“Many indigenous communities decided to take back control of their own energy production and not rely so heavily on government utilities,” said Konstantinos Karanasios, lead researcher and PhD candidate at Waterloo’s Faculty of Environment. “By building solar, wind and hydroelectric power projects, they have been able to develop at their own pace, realize their own vision for environmental sustainability and learn valuable lessons about how to build and manage infrastructure projects.”

The study looked at 71 renewable energy projects, including wind, hydroelectric and solar power, installed between 1980 and 2016 in remote indigenous communities across Canada.

The small-scale projects examined demonstrated positive results environmentally and economically on an encouraging learning curve. From 2000 to 2016, solar projects in remote indigenous communities grew from two in 2006, to 23 in 2012 and 53 in 2016.

“Projects like these offer a blueprint for future larger projects in remote communities across Canada,” said Karanasios. “Furthermore, indigenous communities are showing all Canadians that community-led renewable energy projects can be successful and economically feasible.”

Remote communities in Canada have long-relied on non-renewable energy such as diesel fuel for electricity generation and economic development. Energy production from diesel fuel is often associated with high carbon emissions, spills, leakages, and service quality issues. Fossil fuel can also be unpredictable due to shifting governance regimes, fossil fuel prices and carbon emission policy, potentially restricting community development.

Centuries ago, a ship sank in the Java Sea off the coast of Indonesia. The wooden hull disintegrated over time, leaving only a treasure trove of cargo. The ship had been carrying thousands of ceramics and luxury goods for trade, and they remained on the ocean floor until the 1980s when the wreck was discovered by fishermen. In the years since, archaeologists have been studying artifacts retrieved from the shipwreck to piece together where the ship was from and when it departed. The equivalent of a “Made in China” label on a piece of pottery helped archaeologists reevaluate when the ship went down and how it fits in with China’s history.

“Initial investigations in the 1990s dated the shipwreck to the mid- to late 13th century, but we’ve found evidence that it’s probably a century older than that,” said Lisa Niziolek, an archaeologist at the Field Museum in Chicago and lead author of the study in the Journal of Archaeological Science: Reports. “Eight hundred years ago, someone put a label on these ceramics that essentially says ‘Made in China’–because of the particular place mentioned, we’re able to date this shipwreck better.”

The ship was carrying ceramics marked with an inscription that might indicate they were made in Jianning Fu, a government district in China. But after the invasion of the Mongols around 1278, the area was reclassified as Jianning Lu. The slight change in the name tipped Niziolek and her colleagues off that the shipwreck may have occurred earlier than the late 1200s, as early as 1162.

Niziolek noted that the likelihood of a ship in the later “Jianning Lu” days carrying old pottery with the outdated name is slim. “There were probably about a hundred thousand pieces of ceramics onboard. It seems unlikely a merchant would have paid to store those for long prior to shipment–they were probably made not long before the ship sank,” says Niziolek.

Plus, ceramics weren’t the only cargo onboard. The ship was also carrying elephant tusks for use in medicine or art and sweet-smelling resin for use in incense or for caulking ships. Both of these materials were critical to re-dating the wreck.

The resins and the tusks come from living things, and all living things contain carbon. A type of carbon atom called C-14 is unstable and decays relatively steadily over time. Scientists can use the amount of C-14 in a sample to determine how old it is. This analysis, known as radiocarbon dating, had been done decades ago and pointed to the shipwreck being about 700-750 years old. However, analytical techniques have improved, and the scientists wanted to see if the date held.

The amount of decayed carbon found in the resins and tusks revealed that the cargo was older than previously thought. When taken together with the place name inscribed on the ceramics, stylistic analysis of ceramics from known time periods, and input from experts overseas, the researchers concluded that the shipwreck was indeed older than previously thought–somewhere in the neighborhood of 800 years old.

“When we got the results back and learned that the resin and tusk samples were older than previously thought, we were excited,” said Niziolek. “We had suspected that based on inscriptions on the ceramics and conversations with colleagues in China and Japan, and it was great to have all these different types of data coming together to support it.”

The fact that the Java Sea Shipwreck happened 800 years ago instead of 700 years ago is a big deal for archaeologists.

“This was a time when Chinese merchants became more active in maritime trade, more reliant upon oversea routes than on the overland Silk Road,” said Niziolek. “The shipwreck occurred at a time of important transition.”

Niziolek also noted the importance of the Java Sea Shipwreck collection. “The salvage company Pacific Sea Resources recovered these artifacts in the 1990s, and they donated them to the Field Museum for education and research. There’s often a stigma around doing research with artifacts salvaged by commercial companies, but we’ve given this collection a home and have been able to do all this research with it. It’s really great that we’re able to use new technology to re-examine really old materials. These collections have a lot of stories to tell and should not be entirely discounted.”

A year after the Marawi seizure by militants, the rest of Southeast Asia is still reeling from it implications. Islamic State militant groups in the Philippines are regrouping and engaging in clashes with government security forces. Is the long-term solution a political one?

By Jasminder Singh*

In June last year, the pro-Islamic State coalition of militant groups tried to replicate the capture of Mosul and Raqqa in Iraq and Syria by occupying the Muslim city of Marawi in southern Philippines. The Marawi seizure ended after five months, at great cost to lives, property and more importantly, the image of the Philippines’ security forces.

A year later, the Philippines and the rest of Southeast Asia are still reeling from the consequences of the Marawi incident. Indeed, the question could be asked whether the the threat is really gone. If not, could the long-term solution be a broader political one?

Regrouping With New Leaders

Despite the death of key pro-IS leaders such as Isnilon Hapilon and Omarkhayam Maute, many other pro-IS leaders are still at large. They include Abu Turaifie and Abu Dar who are believed to have taken over the mantle of IS leadership in the Philippines.

Even more significant has been the regrouping of IS-affiliated militants in the Philippines, concentrated in Jolo and Maguindanao in south Mindanao. The Abu Sayyaf Group’s areas of influence, such as in Basilan, have been largely pacified.

Equally significant is the changing character of militant migration within the Philippines. Since the defeat of terrorist forces in Marawi, IS-associated militants have been undertaking a hijrah to Jolo and Maguindanao with some foreign terrorists joining them there.

The consequence of this new concentration and regrouping of militants is the emergence of new centres of terrorism in the country. The security situation there is likely to worsen in the face of the success of the Philippine Government and security apparatus in neutralising the pro-IS groups in Marawi; the lessons learnt from Marawi; and more importantly, the financial resources the terrorists acquired, strengthened by their desire for revenge.

Importance of Marawi Narrative

Prior to the Marawi Incident, Southeast Asian pro-IS militants tended to be motivated by narratives of IS successes in the Middle East, especially in Iraq and Syria. While IS has lost most of its territories in Iraq and Syria, the Marawi narrative continues to be a powerful source of inspiration and pride for Filipino and Southeast Asian militants.

Marawi has become a powerful tool for recruitment for terrorist groups in the Philippines and even the rest of Southeast Asia. For those who lost family members and friends ̶ more than 1000 people are believed to have died ̶ anger with the security apparatus can act as a powerful source of recruitment to the IS militant cause.

For those fighters who survived the Marawi Incident, this can act as a powerful motivation to undertake revenge attacks on the Philippine security forces and those who supported the Philippine Government in ending the pro-IS control of the city. The future role of the children and widows of Marawi is something to look out for.

IS Presence Post-Marawi

Until their defeat, the five months of control of Marawi brought a huge largesse to the terrorists. While many of those who were involved in securing financial support for the Marawi operation are believed to be dead, such as Dr Mahmud Ahmad, many others are still alive.

In this case, the role of Abu Dar, the new Maute group leader, is important. There is also the illusive figure of Myrna Mabanza who is believed to have facilitated financial support for the Marawi operation from abroad. With this financial largesse still in the possession of the terrorists who survived Marawi, there is immense potential to fund future attacks and support militant groups in the Philippines.

The defeat of the Marawi capture by the pro-IS militants has not ended pro-IS operations in the region. Pro-IS groups have continued not only their presence but also their operations, including in the Philippines. For the Malay-speaking world, pro-IS groups have relaunched their online magazine, Al-Fatihin.

In addition to continued skirmishes in the Philippines, as has been reported by IS’ mouthpiece, An Naba, Indonesia has borne the brunt of terrorist attacks affiliated with IS.This was illustrated this month by a string of attacks on a mobile police headquarters in West Java to church bombings in Surabaya. This shows the continued IS threat to the region.

Post-Marawi Southeast Asia

An important question following the collapse of Mosul and Raqqa is the status of Southeast Asian foreign fighters in the Middle East. While Katibah Nusantara leader Bahrumsyah has been reportedly killed, the threat posed by Southeast Asians who have fought or been deported from Turkey back home remains.

For Southeast Asia, there are three groups of IS-linked operatives that need to be factored: first, those who were involved in military operations in the Middle East, having migrated to ‘Islamic State’ and lived there, absorbing not only the propaganda but its lifestyle; second, those who tried to go there but failed, namely, the deportees; and finally, those who were inspired by IS in the region.

One-year after Marawi, it is useful to review the situation and its implications to signpost the threat to come in the months and years ahead for the Southeast Asian region. Abu Sayyaf, which formed the core group behind the Marawi Incident, remains largely intact with many of its operatives reverting to kidnapping for financial support.

As long as the Philippine Government does not legally endorse the Bangsamoro Basic Law, Muslims in Mindanao will continue to distrust Manila, in turn, providing a ready supply of recruits to IS-affiliated militant groups.

As long as Marawi City is not rehabilitated and thousands of Muslim Filipinos remain lodged in refugee camps, the government stands to lose the battle of ‘hearts and minds’ to the militants. Additionally, the power of the social media continues to draw recruits and provide an alternative narrative of the ‘evils’ of the Philippine Government, while in turn, strengthening and legitimising militant groups in Philippines.

With the security situation worsening in the Philippine neighbourhood, including Malaysia and Indonesia where pro-IS militants continue to operate, the threat posed by pro-IS militants in the post-Marawi setting will thrive in the foreseeable future.

*Jasminder Singh is a Senior Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

By Rahim Rahimov

Two post-Soviet Caspian Sea sub-regions – Central Asia and the South Caucasus – have experienced different conflict scenarios. The South Caucasus has been embroiled in protracted, large-scale armed conflicts, while Central Asians have managed to avert a serious armed conflict, remaining largely peaceful in spite of local, short-term, small-scale clashes, and the existence of factors that may have led – and still may potentially lead – to a serious military conflict.

Armenia and Azerbaijan could have pursued a staunch European path similar to Georgia and Ukraine, but the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict appears to have represented an effective barrier for them. The Georgian war of August 2008 and the Ukraine crisis of 2014 showcased Russia’s uncompromising rejection of European and Euro-Atlantic orientations of post-Soviet nations. Moscow’s reaction provides a clue to understanding the diverging conflict scenarios in the Caspian sub-regions.

In theory, Central Asian countries can’t pursue a European path because of their geographical location beyond Europe. The geographical factor and its implications have played an important role in Central Asia’s significant political and economic dependence on Russia. For landlocked Central Asia, Russia is viewed much more favorably as opposed to other immediate neighbors – China, Iran, and Afghanistan by virtue of a range of political, security and economic considerations. Yet Russia, together with China and Iran, are effectively countering any Western presence in the region. Therefore, Moscow has remained relatively satisfied with Central Asia, which has contributed significantly to the lack of serious armed conflicts there.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was the first violent dispute to break out in the former Soviet Union in late 1980s. Back then it was believed that it might cause a domino effect on other Soviet republics, including those in Central Asia, according to a declassified CIA file. Indeed, similar violent conflicts erupted later in Abkhazia and South Ossetia of Georgia, Transnistria of Moldova, and more recently, in Ukraine. But Central Asia has managed to avert a serious military conflict. Even now roughly three decades after the collapse of the USSR and the outbreak of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus, experts warn that territorial and border disputes with an ethnic dimension may turn out to be Central Asia’s “Karabakhs,” with even more dangerous consequences than the original. Following the annexation of Crimea, Western experts were worried about a “domino scenario” for Kazakhstan, as its northern regions that border with Russia are populated by ethnic Russian communities. But they miss significant factors contributing to the Nagorno-Karabakh and other conflicts in the South Caucasus, factors that are absent in the case of territorial and border disputes with an ethnic dimension in Central Asia. Those factors are, first and foremost, related to geography and hence the geopolitics of these two Caspian Sea sub-regions.

Central Asia Can’t Escape from Geography

 A European orientation for post-Soviet nations often necessarily implies a Euro-Atlantic or transatlantic dimension, as Europe and the United States are closely interconnected through NATO, transatlantic free trade, and other arrangements. Therefore, a post-Soviet state’s orientation toward Europe is immediately perceived by Moscow as Euro-Atlantic, hence anti-Russia. This was the case for the Eastern Partnership launched by the EU to upgrade its relations with six former Soviet republics in the South Caucasus and Eastern Europe – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. With the introduction of the Eastern Partnership, the EU drew a hard line in the Caspian Sea, with its western flank – the South Caucasus – being Europe and its eastern flank – Central Asia – falling outside the boundary.

 The logic behind such division was due to geography. Central Asian nations are geographically located beyond Europe and have no perspective, even in theory, to become part of Europe with a slight exception of Kazakhstan, whose western part – around 10 percent of its territory – falls within the European continent. And Russia geographically and figuratively separates Kazakhstan and therefore, Central Asia from Europe. The republic of Cyprus was admitted to the EU in 2004 in spite of the fact that it is geographically located in Asia and therefore included in the Asian Group of the United Nations. Unlike Kazakhstan, which is separated by the Caspian Sea and Russia from Europe, Cyprus is in the direct neighborhood of Europe. Similarly, EU candidate state Turkey has only 10 percent of its territory located on the continent, though it is directly adjacent to Europe.

Geography determines not only the political but also the economic orientations of Central Asia. It is due to geographical location that Azerbaijan managed to build export pipelines delivering Caspian oil and gas through Georgia and Turkey to Europe while Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the major Central Asian energy powers, have been deprived of such a luxury and remain dependent on the Russian route to gain access to European markets. Changing this would require a trans-Caspian infrastructure, but Russia together with Iran has managed to effectively block attempts to develop one. As a result, unlike the Central Asians, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the South Caucasus have achieved more economic and therefore, more political independence from Russia. In 2007, Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev suggested an idea of building a canal from the Caspian to the Black Sea in search of a less troubled access to Europe. This, as well as Astana’s interest in the proposed canal link between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, is symptomatic of Astana’s hopeless desire to break the curse of its landlocked geography.

A Snapshot of Disputes and Potential Conflicts in Central Asia

All Central Asia countries grapple with border and/or territorial disputes with ethnic dimensions to some degree. Negative Soviet legacies such as controversial definition and changes to borders, and practices of leasing lands such as pasture, water reservoirs, oil/gas deposits, and other facilities underpins various disputes in Central Asia, where dozens of contested enclaves exist. Furthermore, Kazakhstan is home to significant ethnic Russian populations, which could come to be involved in scenarios similar to that in Eastern Ukraine. Ethnic Russian communities’ share in the populations of the northern regions of Kazakhstan varies from 36 to 50 percent.  These figures were much higher in early 1990s when the Soviet Union collapsed.

Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have experienced tensions due to territorial and border disputes with an ethnic dimension. At one point, the short-lived Independent Kazakh Republic of Bagys was self-proclaimed in a disputed village on the Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan border in 2001. These Kazakh-Uzbek disputes appear to have been resolved following a 2002 bilateral border agreement.

Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan

Uzbekistan has border disputes other Central Asian countries. Indeed, there are border disputes, unresolved territorial claims, and ethnic problems between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan also has border disputes with Kyrgyzstan centering on the Fergana Valley, particularly the Uzbek-populated city of Osh. Moreover, there are four enclaves within Kyrgyzstan that are Uzbekistan’s territory, and one within Uzbekistan that is the Kyrgyzstan’s territory. In 2010, bloody clashes erupted, killing hundreds of people, most of whom were Uzbeks, and displacing tens of thousands. 76 percent of the 1378 km-long Kyrgyz-Uzbek border has been demarcated so far and agreed to, while the remaining 324 km-long portion, including 58 disputed points, remains to be settled.

Uzbekistan-Tajikistan

Uzbeks constitute the largest minority ethnic group (15 percent) in Tajikistan, while Tajiks make up 5 percent of Uzbekistan’s population. The 105 km-long portion of the Uzbek-Tajik border where these minority populations live is subject to various territorial disputes. The Uzbek side has planted land mines along the border. Yet there are other issues and disputes related to fighting terrorism, and Tajikistan’s controversial Rogun Dam project. In particular, Uzbekistan’s iconic and historic Samara and Bukhara cities are home to large ethnic Tajik communities hence making them prone to ethnic tensions. But following the deadly 1992-97 civil war in Tajikistan, its claims to those cities has largely faded. And the civil war, which also involved ethnic minorities, ended with the involvement of Russia and Uzbekistan.

Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have accomplished the delimitation of around 519 km of their 978 km-long shared border. The remaining 459 km segment, which passes through densely populated lowlands, is subject to mutual claims and includes 58 separately contested sections. Tajikistan also administers two enclaves within Kyrgyzstan’s Fergana Valley region, which complicate the existing border disputes between the two nations. Indeed, the most complicated bilateral border negotiations involve the Fergana Valley, where a myriad of enclaves exist, and all three countries, which share it – Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan – have both historical claims to each other’s territory and economic interests in terms of its transport routes, rivers, reservoirs, and industries. Whatever happens in the Fergana Valley significantly affects all three of these countries in their economic, political, and religious spheres.

Central Asian Geopolitics

Russia Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov blamed the West, particularly the United States and NATO, for the non-resolution of conflicts in the South Caucasus, and for the breakout of the Ukraine crisis. Had legally binding norms been introduced to maintain an equal and indivisible security space in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasia, then the conflicts such as the Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria would have been resolved long ago, according to Lavrov. “Our attempts to make those norms legally binding were rejected by Western nations” Lavrov said.

In other words, Russia wants legally binding obligations from the United States and its NATO allies that they won’t further expand into what is seen by Russia as its historical sphere of influence. This echoes President Vladimir Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference, which accused the West of betraying Russia by expanding into post-socialist Eastern Europe. He quoted the former NATO General Secretary Mr Woerner’s speech of May 17, 1990: “the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee.” Then, Putin popped up a rhetoric question: “Where are these guarantees?”

From the Russian perspective, in the absence of legally binding security guarantees from the West, the armed conflicts in Ukraine and elsewhere serve as a tool to block Western penetration into the post-Soviet South Caucasus and Eastern Europe. Central Asia is less prone to a similar Western presence, hence the lack of similar conflicts in Central Asia. The tool appears to be working, as the EU and NATO have made it clear that they wouldn’t be accepting new members with pre-existing conflicts within their territory. However, in another case, the EU has admitted the republic of Cyprus, which is divided into Greek and Turkish spheres. It doesn’t recognize the Turkish part – the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is recognized and supported only by Turkey. But the point is that the EU treats Turkey and Russia differently. While the EU ignores its long-time NATO ally and EU candidate member Turkey’s concerns and interests regarding the Cyprus conflict, it is absolutely fearful, mindful, cautious, and conscious of Russia.

“The EU doesn’t have to have and doesn’t want to have any exclusive kind of space, but rather share the cooperation with others, avoiding geopolitical games in the region [Central Asia],” said Peter Burian, the EU Special Representative for Central Asia. The statement shows that the EU is being careful not to antagonize Russia in Central Asia. Due to this cautious approach, along with Europe’s emphasis on human rights, rule of law, and democracy, Central Asian leaders tend to keep their distance from the West. This is a comfort to Russia as well as China, which are not renowned for promoting those values.

The Council of the EU’s EU Strategy for Central Asia concludes that relations will flourish or flounder on Central Asian countries’ commitment  to undertake reforms to strengthen democracy, fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, and to modernize and diversify their economy. “There’s a disconnect between the EU’s (and other Western nations’) stated strategy goals and what has transpired in the region over the past 25 years,” according to Catherine Putz. Central Asian leaders don’t appear to be very enthusiastic about issues concerning reforms, rule of law, democracy, human rights, etc. For instance, presidential changes have come either through death (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), revolution (Kyrgyzstan, 2010), civil war and the involvement of external actors (Tajikistan), or no change at all in the case of Kazakhstan, where communist era leader Nursultan Nazarbayev survived the collapse of the Soviet Union and has ruled since 1991.

Following the Andizhan events of May 2005, Uzbekistan sought better relations with Russia and China, who supported Tashkent’s handling of the unrest, in contrast to the United States’ and other Western countries’ criticism of it. In 2005, Uzbekistan, the once-partner of the West, closed its US military base, which was established in 2001, and quit the Washington-backed GUAM grouping of post-soviet nations including Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova.

Central Asia is in the same neighborhood as Iran and Afghanistan. Neither Central Asian elites nor ordinary populations are inclined or sympathetic to them. As contrasted to other neighbors, they find Russia more suitable. Russia offers a huge market for labor immigrants and agricultural products. In the case of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, Russia is also the major transit country to export their oil and gas to European markets. Moscow is a crucial security partner to fight religious extremism and counter cross-border inflows of violent extremists from Afghanistan and elsewhere. For instance, the 1280km-long Afghan-Tajik border is patrolled by Russian military, who were originally stationed in the country due to the Tajik civil war, and then were reassigned to protect the border with Afghanistan, where sizeable numbers of ethnic Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens live. Central Asian nations have largely refrained from accepting their fellow ethnic refugees from Afghanistan mainly due to security concerns. They see a potential security threat in refugees from Afghanistan.

Finally, there is the Turkish factor. Turkey and Central Asian countries, with the exception of Tajikistan, are ethnically and linguistically connected. On top of that, Turkey is a long-time NATO member and closely tied with Europe in spite of the current tensions between Ankara and its NATO allies, and ongoing rapprochement with Moscow against the backdrop of the Syrian civil war. Yet Turkey is geographically distant from Central Asia, unlike the case of the South Caucasus, where Turkey is an immediate neighbor and is the closest ally of Azerbaijan and maintains a strong partnership with Georgia.

Russia along with China is seeking to prevent a US presence in Central Asia, and they view the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as serving the purpose of counterbalancing US influence and thus preventing its domination in the region. Another regional power, Iran, is also aligned with Moscow and Beijing to avert a US and NATO presence in the region. In fact, the triangle of Russia-China-Iran has largely succeeded in doing so. Tehran’s role is particularly striking in keeping the Caspian Sea clear of a Western military presence.

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are the major countries in Central Asia in military, economic, territorial and population terms. And there is a perennial rivalry between Astana and Tashkent over regional primacy. This rivalry was a major reason for fading of the idea of a Central Asian Union, which had originally been proposed by Kazakhstan’s Nazarbayev in 2005 as a model for closer regional integration. “We have a choice between remaining a supplier of raw materials to global markets and waiting patiently for the emergence of the next imperial master, or to pursue genuine economic integration of the Central Asian region,” he said.

The Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) stands as another attempt at regional integration, but the regional bloc still lags in membership. Border and territorial disputes with Kyrgyzstan are the major obstruction to Tajikistan’s accession to the EAEU. Turkmenistan has declared itself a neutral nation and instead joined the Non-Alignment Movement, while Uzbekistan has so far refrained from joining either group.

“Russia has a vested interest in seeing regional border disputes resolved peacefully but many also argue that Moscow has at times been keen to take advantage of a manageable level of turmoil in Central Asia as a means to pull the CIS states back more closely into its sphere of influence” according to a report from the International Crisis Group. The Kremlin-tied Russian media makes far fewer negative mentions of Central Asia as compared to adversarial references to the Baltics, Eastern Europe, and South Caucasus regions. This is indicative both of Moscow’s relative satisfaction with the circumstances surrounding Central Asia and its priority to focus on Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. The implications of Central Asia’s geographic location appear to be reassuring Russia. This reassurance is further reinforced by changing perceptions of the West in the post-Soviet space due to circumstances in the South Caucasus and Eastern Europe. Indeed, European inaction in particular and Western toothless reaction in general as combined with the Russian actions regarding the Georgian events of August 2008 and Ukrainian events of 2014 has considerably discredited the reputations of the EU and NATO in the perceptions of post-Soviet countries, including Central Asians. This bolsters Russia’s ability to project its power in the region as Central Asians are absolutely cautious about closer Western involvement in the region. A major downside of this trend is that authoritarianism will likely persist in Central Asia in the foreseeable future. The upside is a reduced risk of border and territorial disputes turning into serious military conflicts.

The opinions, beliefs, and viewpoints expressed by the authors are theirs alone and don’t reflect any official position of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

Research conducted by Florida Atlantic University and Cleveland State University has, for the first time, quantified the relationship between the lack of paid sick leave and poverty in the United States. The data indicates that, even when controlling for education, race, sex, marital status and employment, working adults without paid sick leave are three times more likely to have incomes below the poverty line.

Findings also show that people with no paid sick leave benefits are more likely to experience food insecurity and require welfare services. Currently, only seven states mandate that employers provide paid sick leave benefits and nearly one-third of all workers in the United States lack these protections.

“Numerous studies have shown the negative effects lack of paid sick leave has on society, but this is the first time a direct correlation has been observed between the absence of these benefits and the incidence of poverty,” said Patricia Stoddard Dare, Ph.D., associate professor of social work at Cleveland State. “This adds to the growing body of evidence that paid sick leave is a key factor in health care affordability and economic security.”

Studies published in two academic, peer-reviewed journals, Social Work in Health Care and the American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, utilized data collected from the 2015 National Health Interview Survey to assess the effect of no paid sick leave on two key indicators of poverty, income and the need to utilize welfare services. On top of being three times more likely to live below the poverty line, working adults between the ages of 18 and 64 were also nearly 1.5 times more likely to receive income support from state and county welfare programs and nearly 1.4 times more likely to receive food stamps.

The authors argue that the main reason for these correlations are the higher cost of medical expenses, lack of preventive care and missed wages incurred by individuals and families who do not have paid sick leave benefits.

“Paid sick leave benefits serve as a structural mechanism for preventing working families from becoming the working poor,” says LeaAnne DeRigne, Ph.D., associate professor of FAU’s Phyllis and Harvey Sandler School of Social Work. “Given the public investments made in welfare, food stamps and other social services, mandating paid sick leave is a clear policy lever for reducing the need for these services among millions of individuals nationally.”

Qatar submitted documents to the United Nations on May 21, 2018, to join two core human rights treaties, following cabinet approval on March 14, Human Rights Watch said. But Qatar’s accession to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights includes formal reservations that will deprive women and migrant workers of the treaties’ protections.

Qatar rejected gender equality provisions in marriage, divorce, and child custody on grounds that they contravene Sharia, or Islamic law. It also declared it would interpret several provisions in line with Sharia, including on defining cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment – avoiding bans on capital and corporal punishment – minimum marriage ages, and freedom of religion. And it said it would interpret the term “trade unions” in accordance with its national law, limiting migrant workers’ rights to form unions.

“Qatar’s accession to these core human rights treaties is an important public commitment to uphold the rights of everyone in the country,” said Belkis Wille, senior Qatar researcher at Human Rights Watch. “But the government undercuts its own actions by falling back on tired and outdated carve-outs to reject equal rights for women and migrant workers.”

Qatar is the third country of the Gulf Cooperation Council states to ratify both covenants, following Kuwait and Bahrain.

Qatar’s reservations relating to equal rights between men and women in marriage, divorce, and child custody are done on religious grounds, a position similar to that of several other countries that cite Sharia or other religious personal status laws for making such reservations. Qatar’s personal status law discriminates against women by requiring a male guardian to approve their marriage. The law gives men a unilateral right to divorce while requiring women to apply to the courts for divorce on limited grounds and women are required to obey their husbands.

Qatar also provides that fathers retain guardianship over their children following divorce even if the mother has custody. In most cases, boys live with their mother until age 13 and girls until age 15, when they automatically move to their father’s custody unless the court rules otherwise or extends the custody in the best interest of the child. Women, but not men, lose custody if they remarry. Under inheritance provisions, female siblings receive half the amount their brothers get.

Qatar also said it will interpret the right to profess and practice one’s own religion so that it “does not violate the rules of public order and public morals, the protection of public safe[t]y and public health, or the rights of and basic freedoms of others.” While people of other faiths can practice their religion in Qatar, the penal code prohibits proselytizing.

Article 116 of Qatar’s Labor Law allows only Qatari nationals the right to form workers’ associations or trade unions. As a result, migrant workers, who make up over 90 percent of the workforce, cannot exercise their rights to freedom of association and to form trade unions.

The United States and North Korea have yet to call off a weekend meeting in Singapore between senior officials on both sides, despite uncertainties surrounding President Donald Trump’s decision to cancel his summit with Kim Jong Un.

The decision to cancel the summit was quickly met with a diplomatic response from North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan, who said in a statement on KCNA the North is willing to talk to resolve issues “anytime and in any format.”

On Twitter Friday morning Trump said the statement was “very good news.”

“Very good news to receive the warm and productive statement from North Korea. We will soon see where it will lead, hopefully to long and enduring prosperity and peace. Only time [and talent] will tell!” the president tweeted.

Trump then told White House reporters as he headed to Marine One the June 12 summit could still take place.

“We’ll see what happens. It could even be the 12th. We’re talking to them now. They very much want to do it. We’d like to do it. We’re going to see what happens,” he said, according to White House media pool reports.

The reversal of statements the president issued Thursday could mean the U.S.-North Korea working-level talks this weekend could still take place.

Joe Hagin, the deputy chief of staff for operations at the White House, was scheduled to travel to Singapore this weekend to make preparations.

Kyodo News reported senior North Korean officials were also seen en route to Singapore.

News of the cancelation drew mixed reactions from South Korean political parties Friday.

Ruling party lawmaker Choo Mi-ae said she remains hopeful.

“Though North Korea’s provocative statements led to [Trump’s] decision, I don’t think this is the time for us to be pessimistic or discouraged,” Choo said, according to Yonhap. “The North showed there is no change in its commitment to bringing peace to the Korean Peninsula.”

Late Thursday, President Moon Jae-in had expressed “profound regret” at Trump’s decision to cancel.

Moon had just returned to Seoul after meeting with Trump at the White House.
Original source

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif dismissed as “a complete lie” claims that the European parties to the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), plan to hold talks with the Islamic Republic on its missile program.

Speaking to the Tasnim News Agency, Zarif rejected a report claiming that the European Union (EU) plans to put forward a proposal to Iran outside of the framework of the JCPOA and start talks about the Islamic Republic’s missile power and regional influence, describing it as “a complete lie.”

“The EU, itself, dismissed the report,” he said, adding that the report is part of “a psychological operation” launched by the Zionist regime of Israel to spread such lies.

“We have said times and again that we are merely negotiating about the JCPOA and have no demands or words beyond the JCPOA,” the top diplomat said.

He further pointed to recent negotiations between the Iranian and European delegations to save the JCPOA following the US withdrawal from the deal and said that it cannot be said whether the results of the talks have been good or bad.

It remains to be seen what the Europeans would suggest to Iran, the top diplomat added, referring to the guarantees that the European Union (EU) should give Iran so that the country’s interests are protected after the US withdrawal from the JCPOA.

The Europeans have pointed to all important parts of the JCPOA that should be implemented, he said, adding that now, the question is how they would implement those parts.

The remarks came after a number of Iran’s top diplomats and administration officials on Sunday attended a closed session of the parliament about the future of the JCPOA.

Earlier this month, Zarif made a tight diplomatic trip for negotiations on how to save the JCPOA in the wake of the US withdrawal from the multilateral nuclear deal.

The foreign minister held meetings with Chinese and Russian officials in Beijing and Moscow and then traveled to Brussels for talks with the European parties to the JCPOA.

He was gauging international readiness to guarantee Iran’s interests if it decides to remain in the nuclear pact a week after US President Donald Trump announced that the US was walking away from the JCPOA.

In a speech from the White House on May 8, Trump accused Iran of sponsoring terrorism and seeking nukes before announcing the US withdrawal from the 2015 agreement between Iran and the Group 5+1 (Russia, China, the US, Britain, France and Germany).

Following the controversial decision, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said Iran weighs plans to remain in the agreement with the other five parties, provided that they ensure full benefits for Iran.

Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei has underlined that any decision to keep the deal running without the US should be conditional on “practical guarantees” from the three European parties to the JCPOA.

A highly precise method to determine past typhoon occurrences from giant clam shells has been developed, with the hope of using this method to predict future cyclone activity.

A team of researchers led by Tsuyoshi Watanabe of Hokkaido University has discovered that giant clams record short-term environmental changes, such as those caused by typhoons, in their shells. Analyzing the shell’s microstructure and chemical composition could reveal data about typhoons that occurred before written records were available.

With the global warming of the climate, scientists are concerned that major tropical cyclones such as typhoons and hurricanes will increase. To better predict the frequency of these weather patterns, understanding typhoons in the past warmer periods of Earth’s history is particularly important.

The giant clam Tridacna maxima species was specifically chosen due to its fast and highly precise shell growth rate; daily growth increments in the shell can be seen, similar to tree rings, allowing researchers to accurately investigate the clam’s paleoenvironment. Live specimens were sampled from the waters surrounding Okinotori Island, which lies in the middle of a common path taken by typhoons before making landfall in Japan and other parts of Asia. The team analyzed the shell growth increment of each year, measuring its thickness, stable isotope ratio, and the barium/calcium ratio. They then compared the data with the past environmental records such as typhoons and water temperatures.

With these methods, the team found the growth pattern and chemical compositions in the shells were altered by short-term environmental changes in the area. Cooler ocean temperatures and other environmental stresses brought on by typhoons disrupted shell growth and increased the barium/calcium ratio as well as the stable isotope ratio.

“Since microstructural and geochemical features are well preserved in giant clam fossils, it may now be possible to reconstruct the timing and occurrence of past typhoons to a level of accuracy that was previously impossible,” said Tsuyoshi Watanabe of Hokkaido University.

By Dr. Arshad M. Khan*

A short while ago on May 18, 10 students were killed and 13 wounded at Santa Fe High school just south of Houston, within its metropolitan area.  The shooter was a student who, as can now be expected, had been bullied.

While definitions of a mass shooting may vary, the Investigative Assistance for Violent Crimes Act of 2012 labels it as a killing of three or more persons excluding the perpetrator. Yet school violence per se is a problem in the US when half the incidents worldwide occur here and through February this year school shootings were averaging one a week.

Data on mass shootings compiled by Grant Duwe, a criminologist at the Minnesota Dept. of Corrections in St. Paul, goes as far back as 1915.  That is when a Georgia man killed his attorney, who he blamed for financial losses, and another five people, wounding 32 others in the rampage.

Of note in the data is the fact that Duwe’s annual rate of mass shootings calculated per 100 million people was minuscule prior to 1965.  For example, only three were recorded from 1950 to 1965.  The rate rose to 0.52 from 1970 to 1979, then skywards to about 1.44 per 100 million people annually from 2010.  What has caused this rise?  Well, everybody knows and nobody knows, meaning there is much anecdotal opinion but no serious research.

In a school shooting, a common narrative is the perpetrator was bullied but thousands of kids are bullied; what makes one into a mass killer?  Psychiatric problems are another frequent component of a shooter’s make up.  Again there are millions with such problems but a microscopic few taking to the extreme of a killing spree.

While a trigger has yet to be found, opportunity is a clearer aspect.  A putative mass shooter can only realize his hate into action if he has opportunity, namely, access to firearms.

While there may not be definitive research on such access and mass shootings in the US, we have conclusive evidence from Australia.  After a mass shooting killed 35 people in Port Arthur, Tasmania, there was shock and disbelief in the country.  Strict gun control laws soon followed.  A mandatory buy-back of existing firearms led to the surrender and destruction of 650,000 weapons.  The results are incontrovertible:  From1978 to 1996, Australia had 13 mass shootings; since 1997, it has had none.

If quick action by a majority party can be an advantage in a parliamentary form of government, as in Australia, the US constitution takes the opposite view.  Deathly afraid of tyranny, the founding fathers designed it to preclude hasty decisions.  They also ensured the office of President is weak.  And adding to his troubles, this officeholder is sometimes faced with opposition majorities in the House and the Senate.

Restriction on gun ownership can quickly hit the roadblock of the Second Amendment, buttressed as it is by the political muscle of the gun lobby.  Ratified on December 15, 1791, this Amendment states in no uncertain terms, “A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”

Some might argue a militia in the 21st century is outdated; the other side responds, it would constitute a powerful guerilla force.  Should the Second Amendment be revisited?  It’s a tough question for politicians fighting elections.  For the time being, Americans must live with the tragedy of over 36,000 gun-related deaths annually … including a visiting foreign student named Sabika Sheikh, who along with the dreams of her modest Karachi (Pakistan) family, perished at the hands of the Santa Fe High School shooter.

About the author:
*Dr. Arshad M. Khan is a former Professor based in the US. Educated at King’s College London, OSU and The University of Chicago, he has a multidisciplinary background that has frequently informed his research. Thus he headed the analysis of an innovation survey of Norway, and his work on SMEs published in major journals has been widely cited. He has for several decades also written for the press: These articles and occasional comments have appeared in print media such as The Dallas Morning News, Dawn (Pakistan), The Fort Worth Star Telegram, The Monitor, The Wall Street Journal and others. On the internet, he has written for Antiwar.com, Asia Times, Common Dreams, Counterpunch, Countercurrents, Dissident Voice, Eurasia Review and Modern Diplomacy among many. His work has been quoted in the U.S. Congress and published in its Congressional Record.

Source:
This article was published by Modern Diplomacy.