A new initiative to advance women’s entrepreneurship in Asia-Pacific was launched on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in New York, by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), with financial support from Global Affairs Canada.

Women who establish businesses have the potential to achieve economic independence, overcome extreme poverty and improve the well-being of their families and communities. However, many women entrepreneurs face major disadvantages in accessing sufficient finance and technology that prevent them from achieving their full potential.

This unique project seeks to address the challenges and constraints faced by women entrepreneurs through a holistic, multi-pronged approach integrating innovative finance, technology and policy. It will empower women entrepreneurs in the region by utilizing innovative financing mechanisms and providing access to technology.

Launching the project at a High-level side event, Mr. Hongjoo Hahm, Officer-in-Charge of ESCAP, emphasized that innovative financing mechanisms, such as FinTech solutions and women’s bonds, are emerging to address challenges and increase access to financial resources. However, a paradigm shift to support women entrepreneurs is critical if these promising mechanisms are to be truly inclusive.

“Our ambitions for the initiative are high and we cannot do this alone,” said Mr. Hahm. “We will need to work with governments, bilateral donors and private sector companies. But most importantly, we will need to work with and for the aspiring women entrepreneurs to better understand their needs and aspirations. Only by doing this will we effectively harness their potential to help us all to meet the ambitions of the Sustainable Development Goals.”

Ms. Louise Blais, Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the UN in New York, called for new approaches to tackle the challenges faced by women entrepreneurs. Women-owned micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) have significant financing needs that can be met through innovative financing mechanisms that leverage both public and private financial resources. This would be to the benefit of women entrepreneurs and those they support: their families, employees, and communities.

The event organized by ESCAP, showcased pioneering financing approaches to address barriers women entrepreneurs face in accessing finance, and provided a forum to promote learning from interaction of cross-cutting women’s empowerment, financing, technology and innovation communities.

By Gustavo Flores-Macías and Mariano Sánchez-Talanquer*

(FPRI) — As it approaches its 25^th year of existence, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) faces its biggest challenge. Signed in 1992 by the governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States to eliminate barriers to trade and investment, NAFTA has for more than two decades provided a workable framework for integration and exchange. Since entering into force in 1994, overall regional trade has more than tripled, with sectors like auto manufacturing and agriculture experiencing major transformation. Total foreign direct investment among member countries has grown from some $127 billion in 1994 to $972 billion in 2017, based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. American machinery and foodstuffs have flooded the Mexican market, vehicle production in Mexican territory has boomed, numerous U.S. companies have developed unprecedented presence in Mexico, and Mexican avocados have become a staple of the American diet.

At the same time, NAFTA has remained a bone of contention in domestic politics for the unequal gains and social dislocations brought in its train. Although the agreement has bolstered the North American region’s competitiveness in global markets and average consumers in all three countries have benefitted from greater product diversity and lower prices, economic anxiety, when not outright political resentment, has accumulated among losers from the trade agreement, from small Mexican agricultural producers to manufacturing workers in the American rust belt. For those affected, the slow and uneven recovery from the global financial crisis of 2008 finished twisting the knife into an already hurting wound. Amidst the political mobilization of such discontent, NAFTA as we know it is on the brink of collapse.

Of course, not only NAFTA, but also core norms and institutions of the international order are under fire. The World Trade Organization (WTO), the United Nations (UN), and even the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have become targets of harsh treatment and sharp criticism from the global hegemon. From an economic standpoint, the trade deficit—which, despite theory and evidence to the contrary, President Donald Trump considers an unequivocal sign of being taken advantage of—is bigger with China than with Mexico. Yet, NAFTA is arguably unique for what it evokes among certain sectors of American society: precisely the type of economic, cultural, and social-status (including racial) anxieties that fuel deep partisan polarization, and ultimately propelled President Trump to power. Symbolically, the agreement occupies a special place in the politics of scapegoating.

It is no coincidence that terminating NAFTA, which Donald Trump characterized as “the single worst trade deal ever approved” in the first 2016 presidential debate, was a key promise in his path to the presidency. The “American” way of being, living, and winning, so the argument goes, has been compromised by elite-imposed globalization, permeable borders, harmful trade deals, immigration, and unbridled sociodemographic change. Such abstract evils find corporeal expression in NAFTA, a trade agreement with Canada and none other than the United States’ still developing, low-wage, migrant-producing, violence-ridden, and Spanish-speaking southern neighbor.

Although many dismissed the fiery rhetoric as mere campaign strategy, the Trump administration has, in line with its promise, turned protectionism into practice. To date, measures include pulling out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in January 2017, adopting a series of tariffs on steel and aluminum on purported national security grounds, and engaging in a tariff back-and-forth with China, in what appears to be the early stages of a trade war. In May 2017, President Trump confirmed to Congress his intention to renegotiate NAFTA to reverse what he considered intrinsically unfair conditions in the agreement, or else pull out of it altogether.

More than a year after renegotiations officially started in August 2017, and having successfully split talks with Mexico and Canada into separate tables, the Trump administration and the Mexican government announced a preliminary bilateral understanding. The political clock, however, is ticking rapidly. Hasty negotiations with Canada, ongoing at the time of writing, must produce a deal by September 30 if a rebranded trilateral agreement is to be signed before Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto steps down on November 30 to make way for Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the leftist-nationalist figure who won the Mexican presidency in July by a landslide.

Time is also critical for President Trump. With the U.S. Congressional midterm elections in November and a new—possibly more hostile—Congress sworn-in in January, the president is at risk of failing to deliver on one of his central promises. Where do things stand with the revised agreement, and how might the newly negotiated terms influence economic exchange in the North American region? What is the political logic driving NAFTA’s demise or overhaul?

Renegotiation in Context: Mutual Dependence, Conflicting Priorities

As the three governments sat at the negotiation table, they each faced the reality of deep economic integration and mutual dependence. However tempting, NAFTA could not be terminated with the stroke of a pen—at least not without inflicting significant economic self-damage and incurring political costs. In all three countries, important constituencies benefit from the current trade agreement.

This is no less true for the United States, the party who forced the others into the re-negotiation. With a dynamic domestic economy, international trade only represents about a quarter of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), yet, in raw numbers, the country is still among the largest exporting economies in the world, only second to China. This simple fact implies that the economic fortunes of a large share of the American workforce and their employing companies depend on access to foreign markets. NAFTA’s contribution is anything but trivial: Canada is the United States’ first export market, and Mexico the second. The Department of Commerce estimates that U.S. exports to Canada and Mexico supported 2.8 million jobs in 2015, one out of every four export-supported jobs in the country.

The reestablishment of pre-NAFTA trade barriers would not only make certain goods more expensive for consumers—a burden that falls more heavily on the economically disadvantaged—but also hit several politically sensitive sectors harshly. Exports to Canada and Mexico in the agricultural and food industries, for instance, have more than quadrupled under NAFTA. Not surprisingly, the warnings of the Secretary of Agriculture appear to have been crucial in making President Trump reconsider the exit option. After all, despite his general antagonism toward free trade—and particular distaste for NAFTA—the president would not want to alienate members of his own electoral coalition.

The constraints entering into the negotiations were even tighter on Mexico. According to the World Bank, international trade reached a whopping 78% of the Mexico’s GDP in 2017, up from some 30% pre-NAFTA. Yet, despite free trade agreements that span economic relations with 46 countries, more than 80% of the country’s exports have the U.S. market as their destination. More than a choice, healthy commercial relations with the northern neighbor are a necessity for governments of all stripes. The incoming administration of López Obrador, once a sharp critic of NAFTA, rushed to send signals of moderation and goodwill, in fact working jointly with President Peña Nieto’s team in the final negotiations in Washington, D.C.

Mutual dependence notwithstanding, Mexico and the United States thus approached negotiations with varying degrees of concern regarding NAFTA’s termination. For President Trump, the reality of economic integration imposed limits on impulsive action, but he has become invested in the promise of restoring manufacturing jobs and bringing purported foreign freeloading to a halt, all of which requires a tall wall—physical, but above all symbolic—along the border with the southern neighbor. NAFTA as we know it had to go.

For Mexico, the American threat of withdrawal risked a grim economic scenario. To add complexity to an already delicate matter, the combination of a leftist president-elect—who will enjoy a congressional majority for the first time in the history of Mexican democracy—and a long lame duck period further raised concern and uncertainty among investors. Put shortly, the country found itself drawn into a high stakes renegotiation it had not asked or wished for, and which would reach its defining moments during the sensitive period of transfer of executive power. Under these circumstances, preserving the agreement became the top priority for Mexican negotiators, who were willing to make major concessions—for critics, too willing.

Renegotiation: American Demands, Mexican Concessions

The original U.S. position pushed for significant changes to NAFTA, including adopting a sunset provision and modifying rules of origin for the automobile industry—the most dynamic sector in the agreement and, politically, at the core of the promise of reviving American manufacturing. In particular, the U.S. sought to increase the minimum North American content in the auto industry to reach duty-free privileges from 62.5 to 85%, with an additional requirement that 50% of auto content must be made on U.S. soil. Further, the U.S. pursued the elimination of NAFTA’s chapter 19, the dispute settlement mechanism which allows expert international panels to adjudicate controversies without resorting to domestic courts. Finally, the U.S. demanded that the new agreement include a clause mandating the automatic termination of the agreement every five years, unless the three countries explicitly decided to ratify it.

Although both Mexico and Canada initially deemed these controversial proposals unacceptable because they would disproportionately favor the U.S., Mexico eventually agreed to a modified version of the White House’s requests in the bilateral negotiation. On August 27, the two countries announced that a “preliminary agreement in principle” had been reached, putting Canada in the spotlight. While the details of the agreement have not been made public, the terms of the deal appear to skew heavily toward the United States’ original demands. Rather than risking the end of NAFTA, the Mexican government seems to have accepted some version of the main changes proposed by the Trump administration, without obtaining much in exchange.

One view is that Mexico’s heavy economic dependence on the U.S., President Trump’s open hostility to NAFTA, and the power asymmetry between the two countries would inevitably result in worse terms for Mexico. Further, with the looming inauguration of a leftist government and in the event of U.S. exit, circumstances could conspire to materialize a nightmarish scenario of capital flight, speculation, sudden depreciation of the peso, and full-blown economic crisis. With such high stakes, Mexican negotiators understood the current deal as a way to accomplish the immediate goal of avoiding major economic damage, regardless of the outcome of negotiations between the U.S. and Canada. In their view, Mexico may have paid a high price, but it bought itself an insurance policy in the face of severe risk and pending the return of more politically auspicious times, when a new U.S. administration could reconsider the current protectionist drive.

However, another view considers that despite the sound and fury, the negative consequences for U.S. business sectors of ending NAFTA and the pressure to deliver on an agreement before the November midterm elections significantly constrained the White House, whose tough rhetoric should have been interpreted as the standard negotiation tactics of the times. For critics, the negotiation team made a strategic mistake in submitting to President Trump’s divide-and-conquer strategy, instead of joining forces with Canada and vindicating the three-sided spirit that has characterized the agreement since its inception. More importantly, Mexico could have leveraged the strong dependence of certain U.S. industries on NAFTA—many in Republican territory—and Trump’s rush to tout the deal’s overhaul before the midterms to extract at least some concessions.

In addition, the timeline for President Trump to score a legislative victory with a new agreement is tight at best, a constraint Mexico could have taken advantage of to maintain the status quo. On August 31, President Trump notified Congress of his intent to sign an agreement with Mexico—and Canada “if it is willing”—under the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), which grants the executive the power to (re)negotiate trade agreements and hold them to an up-or-down congressional vote with no amendments. From that date, the President has 30 days to present the final text (hence the September 30 deadline to incorporate Canada) and 90 days to sign the deal—that is, by the end of November, just before executive power changes hands in Mexico. Yet, there are additional roadblocks. Under TPA law, the U.S. International Trade Commission has up to 105 days after the President enters into a trade agreement to submit a report on the likely economic impact of the agreement (see section 105(c)(2)-(3)). U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer has urged the ITC to issue its assessment “as soon as possible after the agreement is signed,” presumably to settle the matter before the end of the year. Within the 105 days deadline, however, exactly when to do so is at the ITC’s discretion.

Then, there are additional procedural and political hurdles that relate to Canada, who found itself having to rush back to the negotiating table to try to reconcile its own interests with the terms negotiated between the U.S. and Mexico. President Trump has expressed his willingness to proceed without Canada, which in principle limits Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s room to maneuver—he will have to decide whether he considers the current terms better than no deal, contrary to what he had stated.

Should negotiations with Canada fail, President Trump would like to proceed with the U.S.-Mexico deal as NAFTA’s replacement. But, his May 2017 notice of intention to Congress invoked TPA to initiate talks with Canada and Mexico to renegotiate the trilateral pact, not to enter into a new bilateral agreement. As a result, the very applicability of the current TPA process to a deal that excludes Canada is in question. And politically, it is at best unclear whether such an agreement would meet the required legislative support. Strong opposition is likely to emerge among legislators from states for whom Canada is the main trading partner, regardless of partisan affiliation.

What all these technicalities add up to is that to enter into effect any new deal and associated changes in legislation will most likely need to go through the next U.S. Congress, where President Trump could be hostage to Democrats should they win control of the House in November. His administration could reignite the threat of unilaterally withdrawing from the agreement and unwinding North American free trade if Congress does not go along, but a Democratic Congress could itself fight back. In the meantime, the current NAFTA would continue to live. Critics of the Mexican government’s strategy thus consider that, given President Trump’s time constraints and key Republican districts’ dependence on continued trade with Mexico, negotiators surrendered the advantages of multilateralism and submitted to pressure all too quickly.

While the counterfactual is difficult to establish, Mexico may have indeed missed an opportunity to call President Trump’s bluff and reach a more balanced deal. Under the preliminary bilateral understanding reached at the end of August, 75% of automobile content must be sourced in North America (up from 62.5%), and between 40% and 45% of content must be produced by workers earning at least $16 an hour. This change is aimed at shifting part of the automobile production back to the U.S. (and potentially Canada, should an understanding be reached). Thus, the North American auto sector, now reliant on less-demanding requirements and frictionless cross-border flows that allow for intra-industry efficiencies, risks losing competitiveness at a global scale—and thus market share and jobs, making President Trump’s victory pyrrhic, at least in economic terms.

In principle, automobile companies could opt for assuming the costs of “most-favored nation” tariffs on autos, currently set at 2.5%, if they find the new regulations too difficult to comply with, instead of relocating production and readjusting supply chains. However, the U.S.’ invocation of “national security” considerations to impose tariffs on steel and aluminum—which have already thrown the World Trade Organization into crisis—would foreclose this circumventing path, as the U.S. could unilaterally raise tariffs on automotive imports on the same grounds. In fact, the U.S.-Mexico deal reportedly includes a side agreement that caps duty-free imports from Mexico to 2.4 million vehicles and $90 billion on auto parts per year. Beyond these levels, Mexican auto exports would, as those of other countries, be subject to punitive national security tariffs of up to 25 percent—should the U.S. government decide so.

The Mexico-U.S. agreement would also eliminate dispute settlement panels for some industries (although it appears that they will be preserved for energy and infrastructure companies). On the U.S. demand for a five-year sunset clause, a compromise appears to have been reached: the agreement would remain in effect for an initial 16 years, yet subject to review after six years.

Whether Canada will finally join the deal, and how the terms of the agreement might change in the process, remains to be seen. Dispute-settlement mechanisms, increased access to Canada’s market for U.S. dairy products, and culturally protected industries remain among the main sticking points in the negotiations.

Steps toward De-institutionalization

In the midst of this uncertainty, three things are clear. The first is that the terms of the agreement seem to have missed important opportunities to modernize NAFTA. The preliminary Mexico-U.S. deal includes areas neglected in NAFTA’s original text, including energy, information technology, intellectual property, digital trade, and more advanced environmental regulations. Mexico also agreed to strengthen legislation to protect workers’ rights, which—if enforced—may increase labor costs but help moderate sharp inequalities in the economic returns to capital and labor, with the latter appropriating only about a quarter of national income (compared to a declining, but still substantially larger 60% in the U.S.). However, there appear to be setbacks to liberalization in areas such as government procurement, land transportation, and rules of origin for textiles. And rather than contributing to shared prosperity, the net effect of changes to the automobile sector on jobs could be negligible or even negative, as increased production costs, reduced competitiveness, and higher prices—or instead an even stronger shift toward automation—could well place a cap on the return of manufacturing jobs to the U.S.

Second, NAFTA has also become much less predictable, eroding a key objective of trade agreements. Beyond tariff reductions, perhaps the main contributions of trade deals are stabilizing expectations for economic actors and limiting cronyism in trade policy. Under clear and common rules embedded in a stable institutional framework, firms know what to expect and need not engage in constant politicking to secure favorable treatment. In contrast, the new NAFTA, if enacted, will make it more difficult for investors to plan for the medium to long terms precisely because of the increased uncertainty about the permanence of the rules of the game. Worst of all, they may become more dependent on friendly relations with political powerholders. Permanent influence-peddling and arm-twisting could become the new normal in trade politics.

Further, without the mechanism of dispute settlement panels, firms will also find it riskier to invest in certain contexts where domestic courts would rule on cases of unfair trade practices. Workers in export industries could also face less job security. Overall, the agreement’s shorter time horizon makes the rules more vulnerable to short-term political calculation by whoever happens to hold the levers of power in each country, each time.

Arguably, the hardball tactics and capriciousness during the renegotiation itself have already eroded the very stability and predictability that trade agreements are meant to provide. As of today, the preliminary deal remains vulnerable, its definitive content unofficial, and even the number of members uncertain. In all, the new rules and ways represent steps toward the de-institutionalization of North American economic relations.

As a result, both Canada and Mexico will likely look to reduce their exposure to NAFTA by cultivating alternatives. Although their economic dependence on the U.S. does not allow for major departures in the short term, the rational strategy is to strengthen economic ties with other countries and regions, including the European Union and China, and resort to other avenues such as the TPP.

Finally, should a final agreement be reached along the lines of the preliminary deal with Mexico, President Trump will take home an important political victory. In the campaign leading to the November elections, he will be able to relay to voters that his administration has fulfilled a central campaign promise by rejecting the original NAFTA, extracting concessions from Mexico (and potentially Canada), and reasserting U.S. dominance. Although the new deal will not necessarily benefit American consumers and might even hurt them through higher prices and layoffs, the renegotiation is consistent with the protectionist message that was central to President Trump’s successful presidential campaign. While reassuring for some, the weakening of NAFTA is yet another manifestation of the increasing precariousness of the liberal international order, which, paradoxically, the U.S. had underwritten since World War II.

*About the authors:
Gustavo Flores-Macías is an Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University.

Mariano Sánchez-Talanquer is an Academy Scholar in the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies at Harvard University

Source:
This article was published by FPRI

By Daniel Lacalle*

I find it amusing to read some analysts stating that the Chinese government’s stealth yuan devaluation has offset the impact of tariffs.

A 10% tariff hurts a small part of the economy. However, a 10% devaluation hurts all Chinese citizens equally and massively.

The yuan devaluation is not a tool for exports. Devaluations are a form of price control and a disguised reduction of salaries. As such, they hurt more than what they aim to protect.

However, with rising household and corporate debt. the yuan devaluation is a shot in the foot of the economy, as purchasing power is being diminished and loan repayment capacity is falling. It is wrong to believe that a devaluation does not pose a problem for debt incurred in yuan. Margins are falling because the yuan is devalued, but costs are not falling in tandem.70% of corporate costs do not fall with the yuan, they rise -energy,  fixed costs, imported goods and services-  and working capital requirements have been rising, as we have seen in the published earnings of most of the companies in the Shanghai Index. Around 65% of the index generates returns below the cost of capital and most companies pay interest charges with additional debt, according to Moody’s, and evident in the second quarter results published.

Household disposable income is also falling as inflation appears underestimated by official figures. Most independent analyses see real inflation closer to 2 percentage points higher than official data shows. Living costs have risen much faster than the headline inflation suggests, and the recent devaluations add to this problem, which makes debt-repayment capacity suffer with a weaker currency.

There are numerous reasons why we should worry about China’s decision to end its control of credit growth. The government has been encouraging riskier lending by cutting deposit reserve rates and pumping liquidity into the system.

The silent bailout, which has led to the PBOC injecting hundreds of billions of dollars into the financial system, is not reducing the excess risk-taking, it is encouraging it.

Industrial Production is showing evident signals of slowdown and fixed investment as well.

The housing bubble is clearly a threat and credit growth is losing steam.

China money supply growth exceeds the US one, while a significant part of fixed investment and credit goes to low productivity sectors or returns below cost of capital.

The idea that the yuan is “gold-backed” clearly disappears when we look at the total gold reserves compared to money supply. Gold reserves are less than 0.25% of China’s money supply.

Unfortunately, China’s stealth devaluation is not making the country more competitive, it is making household and corporate debt riskier as the purchasing power of the yuan is diminished.

Meanwhile, foreign exchange reserves remain almost 20% below the peak level and the PBOC has abandoned its objective of fighting against excess debt.

The yuan devaluation is not solving the economy’s problems. By maintaining misguided capital controls and avoiding necessary structural reforms, the devaluation is accelerating the problems of the Chinese economy while hurting savers, workers and pensioners in the country.

Originally published at dlacalle.com 

About the author:
*Daniel Lacalle has a PhD in Economics and is author of Escape from the Central Bank Trap, Life In The Financial Markets and The Energy World Is Flat.

Source:
This article was published by the MISES Institute

The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) fired 6 ballistic ground-to-ground missiles and launched drone attacks on terrorists’ positions in Eastern Euphrates region in Eastern Syria in revenge for the September 22 Takfiri terrorist attacks in Ahwaz city which killed dozens of Iranian people.

During the operations codenamed Zarbat-e Moharram (Blow of Moharram) carried out at 2:00 AM (local time) on Monday the headquarters of Takfiri terrorists near Albu Kamal region in Eastern Euphrates was attacked from Kermanshah province in Western Iran, 570km away from the targets.

The missiles were of Zolfaqar and Qiam classes with ranges of respectively 750km and 800km. At least one of the missiles bore slogans ‘Death to America’, ‘Death to Israel’, ‘Death to Al Saud’ and a Quranic verse meaning ‘fight against the friends of Satan’. They travelled over the Iraqi airspace and hit Eastern Euphrates region in Syria.

Also, a few minutes after the missile strikes, 7 IRGC drones targeted the terrorists’ positions in the region.

According to reports, heavy damage has been inflicted on the terrorists’ infrastructures and positions.

26 people were killed and 69 others were wounded in an attack by al-Ahwaziya terrorist group during the nationwide military parades in the Southwestern city of Ahwaz on September 22.

The terrorists attacked the bystanders watching the annual Armed Forces’ parades, marking the start of the Sacred Defense Week, commemorating Iranians’ sacrifices during the 8 years of the Iraqi imposed war on Iran in 1980s, in disguise of the IRGC and Basij (volunteer) forces, killing and wounding several people, including innocent women and children.

None of the officials participating in the military parades in Ahwaz city in Khuzestan province was injured in the attack.

The number of the terrorists who carried out the attack in Ahwaz had on September 22 been put at 4 by Spokesman of the Iranian Armed Forces Brigadier-General Abolfazl Shekarchi. The general had explained that three of them were killed and the last one was captured by security forces.

He told FNA that none of the terrorists could escape, noting that other reports about the details of the attack are not confirmed.

Later the intelligence ministry put the number of terrorists at five, naming them as Ayad Mansouri, Foad Mansouri, Ahmad Mansouri, Javad Sari and Hassan Darvishi who were killed on the scene of the clashes with the Iranian security forces after riddling people with bullets.

Meantime, Head of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps Public Relations Department and IRGC Spokesman General Ramezan Sharif said that the terrorists who attacked people during the Armed Forces’ parades in Ahwaz were affiliated to al-Ahwaziya stream which is nourished by Saudi Arabia.

He added that the terrorists aimed to overshadow the magnificence of the Iranian Armed Forces’ parades.

General Sharif said that people were also invited to watch the parades and the terrorists both fired at people and the Armed Forces.

He said that such attacks were precedent and al-Ahwaziya terrorist group had earlier fired at the convoys of people who visited the Southern cities of Iran which resisted against Saddam’s aggression during the 8-year Iraqi-imposed war against Iran in 1980s.

The IRGC had also in June 2017 launched heavy missile strikes against the ISIL terrorists in Syria in retaliation for two terrorist attacks in Tehran which killed and wounded tens of people.

A senior ISIL commander along with at least 360 other terrorists were killed in the IRGC’s missile attacks on their bases in Deir Ezzur.

Sa’ad al-Husseini, nom de guerre Abu Sa’ad, a senior Saudi commander of ISIL was killed in the airstrikes.

Also, reports confirmed at the time that the missile attacks have inflicted heavy damage on ISIL and killed at least 360 terrorists.

The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps launched 6 missile strikes at ISIL centers in Syria’s Deir Ezzur in retaliation for the June 7, 2017, twin terrorist attacks in Tehran, the IRGC said in a statement, adding that the mid-range missiles were fired from bases in Western Iran.

“The Takfiri terrorists’ command center, concentration points and logistical centers used for assembling cars for suicide attacks in Deir Ezzur region in Eastern Syria came under attack by the IRGC moments ago in a move to punish the terrorists for the twin attacks on the Iranian parliament and the holy shrine of the late founder of the Islamic Republic, Imam Khomeini, on June 7,” the statement issued by the IRGC Public Relations Office said.

“A number of mid-range ground-to-ground missiles fired from the IRGC Aerospace Force bases in Kermanshah and Kurdistan provinces targeted the Takfiri terrorists in this operation and struck them with lethal and crushing blows,” the statement said.

Head of Iran’s Plan and Budget Organization said the administration is going to implement five new packages of measures to regulate the foreign currency market.

In comments at a working breakfast with business people in Iran’s Chamber of Commerce on Monday, Mohammad Baqer Nobakht said President Hassan Rouhani’s administration will start implementing five new packages soon.

He said the packages are meant to regulate the currency market and deal with other economic challenges, including an improvement of the livelihood conditions.

Nobakht then outlined plans regarding two of the packages on employment and settlement of the problems that contractors are facing.

In late August, Rouhani appeared before the parliament to give an explanation about his administration’s performance following the decline of the national currency’s value and controversial economic policies.

On Sunday, the Iranian presidential office’s chief of staff, Mahmoud Vaezi, highlighted the role of the US, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in volatility in the country’s currency market.

On May 8, US President Donald Trump pulled his country out of the JCPOA, which was achieved in Vienna in 2015 after years of negotiations among Iran and the Group 5+1 (Russia, China, the US, Britain, France and Germany).

The US also re-imposed sanctions against Iran, announced plans to get as many countries as possible down to zero Iranian oil imports, and launched a campaign of “maximum economic and diplomatic pressure” on Iran.

Meanwhile, Iran’s market has experienced a hike in the value of foreign currencies and gold coin prices in recent months.

There has been growing demand for dollars among ordinary Iranians, who fear more plunge in the value of their assets and growing price of goods, even those not imported from abroad.

One year after Stephen Paddock went on his rampage, killing 58 people and injuring more than 800, at a Las Vegas concert, the media are still in a fog trying to explain what happened. Here is how I analyzed it last year, adding a few updated comments.

Pundits on both the right and the left cannot understand why there is no apparent political or religious motive involved in the Las Vegas killings. There doesn’t have to be: Paddock was socially ill, a loner whose boredom was relieved by taking risks—flying single-engine planes and engaging in high-stakes gambling. Consistent to the end, his life ended in a blaze of excitement.

The media have a hard time thinking outside the box. So when politics and religion are taken off the table, one of the few things left for them to chew on is race. Take the Associated Press story, “Terrorism, Race, Religion: Defining the Las Vegas Shooting.”

The AP is impressed that Paddock was “a white gunman” who attacked “a mostly-white country music crowd.” So what? Blacks kill each other in the streets of Chicago all the time. If AP has something it wants to impute to Paddock’s race, it should say so. But it chose not to, and that’s because there is nothing there. However, that didn’t stop it from looking at this story through a political lens.

For example, the AP story mentions the role of Islamic extremists in acts of terror, which is undeniable, but then it tries to “balance” the piece by noting Norwegian mass killer Anders Breivik; he is described as a “neo-Nazi” who gunned down 77 people in 2011.

Breivik was never a neo-Nazi. In fact, as Norwegian social scientist Lars Gule said, he was a “national conservative, not a Nazi.” Nor was he a Christian, as some said he was: he put his faith in Odinism. In terms of his politics, the Jerusalem Post called him out for his “far-right Zionism.” So what was he? He was a deranged man who was high on drugs when he struck.

The problem with Breivik, like Paddock, was his persona, not his politics. He was initially diagnosed as having paranoid schizophrenia, and shortly thereafter he became increasingly isolated and withdrawn. He was subsequently declared criminally insane.

A second round of psychiatric evaluations said his problem was best understood as an antisocial personality disorder, not a mental illness; he was also diagnosed as having a narcissistic personality disorder.

Those conditions are clearly reflected in the life of Stephen Paddock (click here to read my account). And just as Paddock had a severely dysfunctional upbringing, so did Breivik. His parents divorced when he was a year old, and his mother brutalized him: she “sexualized” him, beat him, and told him that she “wished that he were dead.”

Obviously, most people raised in a lousy family do not turn out to be mass killers. But when a background like the one Breivik, and Paddock, endured is coupled with other psychological and social factors, it makes a lot more sense to probe these personal experiences than it does to look exclusively at external matters.

There is a whole world out there besides politics, religion, race, sex, and sexual orientation, though this escapes most pundits these days. Unfortunately, those looking to blame anyone or anything but the culprit—”the guns did it”—are totally blind to this reality.

Just as it is important not to simplify complex issues, the temptation to over-analyze must also be resisted. Sometimes the answer is right before our eyes.

Pennsylvania State Rep. Mark Rozzi should recuse himself or abstain from voting on any future bills that would amend the statute of limitations on the sexual abuse of minors.

Rozzi claims he was sexually abused by a priest, now deceased (whom he never reported or told anyone about at the time) when he was 13. If Pennsylvania law is revised to allow a two-year lookback so that alleged victims can resurrect old claims, Rozzi would be in a position to reap a substantial paycheck.

Now it may be that Rozzi’s motives are pure and his efforts at amending the law have nothing to do with ingratiating himself. Still, there is the appearance of impropriety, and that alone demands that he not participate in any more of these proceedings.

There is a rational explanation as to why India and Brazil, two countries with vast populations and large and growing economies, are not permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC).

The council — made up of five permanent and 10 rotating members — was designed to reflect a world order that was born from the horrific violence of World War II. It was as simple as this: Those who emerged on the side of the victors were granted permanent membership and a veto power that would allow a single country to defy the will of the entire international community. This unfair system, which has perpetually weakened the moral foundation of the UN, remains in effect to this day.

The 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in New York reflected both the impotence of the UN’s ability as a global platform to address pressing problems, and also the chaotic political scene resulting from the organization’s lack of unity. The misuse of the veto, the lack of accountability and the unfair representation at the UNSC — for example, not a single African or Latin American country is a permanent member — have emasculated an organization that is meant, at least on paper, to uphold international law and achieve peace and global security.

While Richard Falk, the former UN Special Rapporteur, advocates the “need for a stronger UN,” he argues that “from the perspective of current geopolitical trends, (the UN) seems to have declined almost to the vanishing point with respect to overarching challenges that states acting on their own cannot hope to overcome.”

Some of these problems are interconnected and cannot be redeemed through short-term or provisional solutions. For instance, climate change often leads to food shortages and hunger, which, in turn, contribute to the rising levels of migration and, consequently, to racism and violence.

Late last year, the UN’s World Food Program (WFP) reported that global hunger is, in fact, increasing, despite all attempts to curb it and to, ultimately, achieve the declared goal of “zero hunger.” According to the WFP, 815 million people suffered from hunger in 2016 — an increase of nearly 40 million from the previous year. The UN body called the latest figure an “indictment on humanity.”

The failing fight against climate change is another such indictment on humanity. The Paris Agreement of 2016 was a rare shining moment for the UN, as leaders from 195 countries consented to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions through the lowering of their reliance on fossil fuels. The excitement, however, soon died out. In June 2017, the US government pulled out of the global accord, putting the world once more in peril of global warming, with its devastating impact on humanity. This decision by the Trump administration exemplifies the foundational problem within the UN; where one country can dominate or derail the whole international agenda, rendering the UN practically irrelevant.

Interestingly, the UN was established in 1945 to replace a body that, too, was rendered irrelevant and ineffective: The League of Nations. But if the League of Nations lost its credibility because of its inability to prevent war, why has the UN survived all these years?

Perhaps, then, the UN was never established to tackle the problems of war or global security in the first place, but rather to reflect the new power paradigm that caters to those most invested in the existence of the organization in its current form. As soon as the UN was established, the US and its allies rose to dominate the global agenda.

As experience has shown, the US is committed to the UN when the international organization serves the US agenda, but is uncommitted whenever the organization fails to meet Washington’s expectations. For example, former President George W. Bush repeatedly censured the UN for failing to support his unlawful war efforts against Iraq. In a speech before the General Assembly, in 2002, Bush asked: “Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding or will it be irrelevant?”

“The purpose of its founding” here, of course, refers to the US agenda that has remained a
top UN priority for decades. US ambassadors to the UN have worked ceaselessly to undermine various UN institutions that refuse to toe the American line. The current incumbent, Nikki Haley, is far more aggressive than her predecessors, as her antagonistic language and undiplomatic tactics — especially in the context of the illegal Israeli occupation and apartheid in Palestine — further highlight the deteriorating relationship between Washington and the UN.

Indeed, the UN is not a monolithic institution. It is a supranational body that simply reflects the nature of global power. After World War II, the UN became divided around political and ideological lines as a result of the Cold War. At the end of the Cold War era, in the early 1990s, the UN became an American tool reflecting the US quest for global domination.

Starting from 2003, the UN has entered a new era, in which the US is no longer the only hegemonic power; the rise of China and Russia as economic hubs and military actors, in addition to the rise of regional and economic blocs elsewhere, is causing a greater and growing challenge to the US at the UNSC and various other UN institutions. Although the General Assembly remains largely impotent, it is still able to, occasionally, challenge the dominance of great powers through its support of other UN bodies, such as UNESCO, the International Court of Justice, the World Health Organization and so on.

The world is vastly changing, yet the UN continues its operations based on an archaic and faulty formula that crowned the winners of World War II as the world’s leaders. There can be no hope for the UN if it continues to operate on the basis of such erroneous assumptions, and it should not take another global war for the UN to be reformed to reflect this new and irreversible reality.

By Cornelia Meyer*

It went down to the wire, but a deal was reached between Canada and the US to salvage their accord with Mexico, saving the trilateral nature of North America’s trade relationship.

The new treaty, dubbed the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), is a reworking of the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). President Donald Trump has made good on his election promise to review global trade arrangements, NAFTA in particular. The three nations had negotiated for more than a year until they finally reached consensus. There is now a 60-day congressional review period before the US president can sign the USMCA.

In late August, Mexico agreed to a regime where 75 percent of car parts were produced in North America and 40 to 45 percent of parts had to be manufactured by workers earning an hourly wage of at least $16. The question then was what would happen with Canada. Both Trump and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau were equally petulant, insisting that the most important thing was that any deal was good for their respective countries. Trump even threatened to go it alone with Mexico. That was a brave statement. Canada is the second largest export market for the US after the EU, with $341 billion of American goods and services sold in Canada last year.

The result of the standoff was that Canada agreed to limit exports of vehicles to 2.6 million and give US farmers access to its dairy markets. The latter pretty much mirrors what Canada agreed with the EU in a deal approved by the EU Parliament in February 2017.

What Donald Trump risked during this exercise was alienating his two neighbors — especially Canada. He also put at risk the 6 million US jobs that are tied to NAFTA-related trade. NAFTA was in force for a quarter of a century and this created certain realities, particularly in the highly integrated supply chains of the automotive sector, where parts get shipped back and forth between borders.

Yet the USMCA deal was struck, and markets reacted positively, with the Mexican peso and Canadian dollar gaining in strength. Markets are happy to see trade deals being done, such as the one between the US and South Korea in September.

While this is all positive, the biggest trade war — between the US and China — shows no sign of abating. China even refuses to come to the negotiating table as long as the threat of a levy on an additional $200 billion worth of Chinese exports to the US is on the cards. Trump may have a point when he bemoans Chinese non-tariff barriers, attitudes toward foreign investment and the country’s disregard of intellectual property rules. However, when he focuses on bilateral trade of goods he misses the issue, and foregoes an opportunity to build a broad-based international coalition to achieve his goals.

The issue goes well beyond the US’ relationship with China. Trump is undermining the entire global trade architecture, of which the US has acted as the sponsor and guarantor since World War II. He abrogated the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was an important treaty devised by the Obama administration and which would have limited Chinese influence in the Asia-Pacific. In other words, Trump was actually playing into the hands of China.

More importantly, Trump is turning trade into a zero-sum bilateral game. Trade, by its very nature, is multilateral and needs the World Trade Organization (WTO) to act as impartial arbiter and midwife to multilateral deals. In that context, it is not a harbinger of good news that the US administration blocked the reappointment of one of four remaining WTO appeals judges. In many ways this goes against US interests. The US has won many an arbitration case in the WTO, and may at some stage need an impartial body to adjudicate disputes, such as when one of its bilateral trade deals runs into trouble.

Why should seemingly unaffected regions such as the Arabian Gulf be concerned about trade disputes between distant countries? Gulf states are looking to boost manufacturing to create jobs for their young, and an open trading system will be required to sell these goods overseas. On top of that, a large share of global oil consumption goes on transporting goods by truck, plane and ship — and any localization of supply chains would result in shrinking demand for freight. The world at large has every interest in keeping the borders and shipping lanes open to ensure the economic wellbeing of billions.

* Cornelia Meyer is a business consultant, macro-economist and energy expert. Twitter: @MeyerResources

Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) has described as “inaccurate” a report claiming the Kingdom has stopped a plan to build the world’s biggest solar-power-generation project.
The Wall Street Journal reported Saturday that the $200 billion project with SoftBank was placed on hold by the Kingdom.

“The Public Investment Fund continues to work with the SoftBank Vision Fund, and other parties, on a number of large-scale, multi-billion dollar projects relating to the solar industry, which will be announced in due course,” a fund spokesperson was reported as saying in the Saudi Press Agency.

“The announcement in March 2018 clearly stated that this includes solar generation projects and joint plans to develop large-scale solar panels manufacturing facilities in Saudi Arabia for solar power generation. This will be complemented by R&D and training components. These plans to develop a leading champion for the industry remain on-track and in-line with the timeline that would be anticipated for projects of this scale and ambition” the spokesperson added.

Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is the PIF chairman, and Masayoshi Son, chairman of SoftBank, inked an agreement earlier this year to establish the largest solar power plant in the world with enough capacity to power 140 million homes.

Investors in electric car maker Tesla were buoyed by news that Elon Musk will have to step down as chairman of the firm. The company’s shares surged 16 percent in Monday’s trading following the decision.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged Tesla with fraud, alleging that CEO Elon Musk issued “false and misleading” statements. It was found guilty of disseminating such misleading information in connection with a tweet posted by Musk in August, saying he was considering taking the electric carmaker public at $420 a share.

On August 7, Musk told his 22 million Twitter followers that he might take Tesla private at $420 per share, with “funding secured.” The regulator decided that Musk “knew or was reckless in not knowing” about false information contained in his posts.

On Saturday, Musk settled the charges with the SEC, agreeing to pay a fine of $20 million and step down as chairman of the board for at least three years. He has retained his post as CEO.

The surge of more than 16 percent in shares before the US market opening on Monday comes after Tesla’s stock plummeted 14 percent on Friday, accounting for billions of dollars in losses. The SEC charges against Musk shaved about $7 billion off Tesla’s value.

Musk will reportedly buy $20 million worth of Tesla’s stock at the next trading opportunity, according to a Bloomberg report, citing a person familiar with the matter. Musk is Tesla’s largest investor, holding a 20-percent stake in the company.

In emails leaked to CNBC, Musk hinted that Tesla was “very close” to being profitable and told staff to “ignore the distractions.” Tesla has never reported a net profit and has been burning through cash since it was created in 2003. The company’s losses exceeded more than $1 billion in recent quarters.

By Ajit Kumar Singh*

On September 30, 2018, a Policeman was killed and his rifle was snatched when suspected Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) militants attacked Police Station Shopian in Shopian District The slain Policeman, identified as Saqib Mohiudin, was manning the entry gate of the Police Station when the attack took place at around 6 am [IST].

On September 21, 2018, terrorists abducted and killed three Special Police Officers (SPOs) in the Shopian District. The terrorists abducted SPOs Firdous Ahmad Kuchey and Kuldeep Singh – both residents of Batgund village, and SPO Nisar Ahmad Dhobi, resident of Kapran village. Police later recovered bodies of the three SPOs from nearby Wangam village. The SPOs were shot multiple times. A civilian, Fayaz Ahmad Bhat, a resident of Kapran village, who was also abducted along with slain SPO Nisar Ahmad Dhobi, was let off.

On August 22, 2018, terrorists fired upon and killed a Policeman, identified as Fayaz Ahmad Shah in Awgam village of Kulgam District. Shah was coming out from a local mosque after prayers and was on his way home, when terrorists fired at him. Shah, who had joined as an SPO, had recently been promoted to the rank of constable.

On the same day, a Policeman identified as Mohammad Yaqoob was killed by terrorists in the Louswani area of Pulwama District. Mohammad Yaqoob was fired upon by the terrorists at point-blank range outside his home at Louswani village.

These incidents are neither a new development nor indicative of any significant shift in terrorist strategy. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least 34 policemen have been killed in the current year so far (data till September 30, 2018), of whom 28 were killed in incidents of targeted killing (whether on or off duty). During the corresponding period of 2017, a total of 23 policemen had been killed, all in incidents of targeted killing. Through 2017, a total of 30 policemen were killed, 27 of them in incidents of targeted killing.

According to a September 22, 2018, media report, at least 1,660 police personnel have been killed by terrorists in Kashmir since 1990. Though it is not clear that how many of these 1,660 policemen were SPOs, according to SATP data at least five of 27 policemen killed in incidents of targeted killing in 2018 were SPOs, while another three joined as SPOs, but were later absorbed into the State Police Force.

Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has 78,348 policemen in position against a sanctioned strength of 89,954. In addition, there are over 30,000 SPOs to assist the Policemen. This entire Police Force has played a significant role in fighting Pakistan-backed terrorism and helped dramatically improve the security situation in the State.

The Police and SPOs are soft targets, as they are not as well equipped and trained as their counterparts in the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) and the Army units deployed in the State. These vulnerabilities are increased further as they live within the general population with their families, and not in fortified camps, as is the case with Army and CAPF personnel. Since the people working in the Police are local residents, their killing instills a wider fear across the population.

The fall of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) – Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) coalition Government in June 2018, has brought about a measure of political uncertainty in the State. The process of local body elections in the State has now commenced, with the State Election Commission (SEC) announcing, on September 15, the poll schedule for Municipal Elections in J&K. The municipal election will be held in four phases starting from October 8 and ending on October 16. Counting will be held on October 20 after all the phases are over. The entire electoral exercise will be completed by October 27. Then on September 16, SEC announced a nine-phase schedule for Panchayat (village level local self-Government institution) elections in the State, beginning November 17 and ending December 11, with the entire election process to be completed by December 17.

On August 27, 2018, the fourth election to the 30-seat Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council (LAHDC) Kargil had been held, with more than 70 per cent of the electorate turning out to exercise their franchise. Elections were held on 26 seats, of which the National Conference (NC) bagged 10 seats, the Congress, eight; PDP, two; and the BJP, one. Five seats were won by independents. The remaining four seats will be filled through nominations.

The last Panchayat elections in the State were held in 2011, and were quite successful. Over 79 percent of the electorate had exercised their right to vote, between April 13 to June 27, 2011, in the Panchayat elections. Though the Panchayats completed their term in July 2016, elections could not be held because the security situation in the state remained fraught.

With the election process in motion once again, terrorist efforts to disrupt the process are escalating. The targeting of Policemen is part of this effort. However, an unnamed senior police officer asserted, “There is no fear psychosis among policemen, no matter which wing they are affiliated with. But militants are trying to create that (fear)…”

This time around, however, the beginnings are not encouraging. The two political formation dominant in the Valley – the PDP and the National Conference – have already announced their decision to boycott the panchayat elections, unless the Centre and the State Government clarify their stance on Articles 370 (autonomous status of J&K) and 35A (special rights and privileges of ‘permanent residents’)of the Indian Constitution. The two articles have been a critical element in the polarizing politics of the BJP, which holds power at the Centre. 35A is the subject of ongoing litigation in the Supreme Court, and each hearing provokes significant political tremors in the Valley.

Further, there does appear to be a pall of fear in some areas of the State, dampening the enthusiasm for election. According to reports, no nomination has been received for the five wards of the Frisal Municipal Committee in Kulgam District. Only five nominations have been received in 17 wards of the Bijbehara Municipal Committee in Anantnag District. Both these Districts fall in the South Kashmir region, which has recorded the maximum number of killings of Policemen in 2018, thus far. In contrast, 198 nominations were received for 41 wards in the Udhampur District.

The state machinery is under pressure to conduct these elections successfully as the Assembly and Parliamentary elections fall due. It is useful to recall here that only seven per cent polling was reported in the Srinagar Lok Sabha by-election held on April 9, 2017. Widespread violence was reported during the polls. Eight persons were killed in police firing and over a hundred were injured in clashes between protesters and SFs on polling day. Former J&K Chief Minister and National Conference leader Farooq Abdullah had won the seat, defeating his nearest PDP rival, Nazir Ahmed Khan. During 2014, the Parliamentary constituency had recorded a low 25.86 per cent poling against an average of 49.52 per cent for the State. The national average was 66.4 per cent. In Assembly Elections held in 2014 the state had recorded 65.52 per cent polling.

Another significant reason for the increasing number of targeted killings of Policemen is the substantial loss – both in terms of quality and number – suffered by terrorists in recent years. According to SATP data, at least 184 terrorists have been killed in the current year, so far, as against 160 terrorists killed during the corresponding period of 2017. The total number of terrorists killed through 2017 stood at 218, the highest recorded in this category since 2010, with 270 such fatalities. Significantly, operational successes in the recent years have been primarily due to the improvement in the quality of intelligence gathered, the credit for which goes substantially to the SPOs and local policemen. The targeting to these cadres is, consequently, also a measure of the desperation with which the terrorist formations are fighting to stem the tide of their own losses.

Further, despite relentless efforts, Islamabad has failed in its attempt to push Kashmir back into the chaos of the 1990s and early 2000s. The overall security situation in the state is far from alarming and “much of the panicked assessment of the troubles in J&K” is misleading. Crucially, residual violence is extremely localised. Just five of 82 tehsils in the state have accounted for over 48.71 per cent of all fatalities in 2018; and for over 65 per cent of all reported stone-pelting incidents [SATP data till September 30, 2018.

Targeted killings of SFs, primarily Policemen and SPOs, are likely to continue, even as candidates in the panchayat elections will come under threat. The protection of every single candidate in these elections is an imperative, and will have a crucial impact on participation in the coming Assembly and National Elections.

*Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

By Deepak Kumar Nayak*

In an audacious attack, on September 23, 2018, Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres gunned down Kidari Sarveswara Rao, a Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) from the ruling Telugu Desam Party (TDP) and Siveru Soma, a former MLA, also belonging to TDP, near Livitiput village in Dumbriguda mandal (administrative sub-division) in the agency area of Visakhapatnam District. More than 50 armed Maoists targeted the duo when they were travelling in two cars to the village to have a meeting with the girijans (the tribals of the Agency area) who were agitating to press their demand for the closure of mines at Araku, allegedly obtained by MLA Rao in the name of his brother-in-law B. Rajendra. The tribals claimed that the mines were contaminating water resources in the region. According to the Police, both Rao and Soma had received threats from the Maoists in the past. With a clear plan, Maoists surrounded the duo when they were going towards the village with little security and killed them.

Commenting on the attack, Chiruvolu Srikant, Deputy Inspector General (DIG) of Police, Visakhapatnam Range, disclosed, “The Maoists opened fire from point-blank range first at former MLA Soma and then at the MLA (Rao), killing both of them on the spot.” The Maoists also took away the weapons, including two 9 mm pistols and one 9 mm carbine from the three PSOs (personal security officers), accompanying the leaders, before the security persons could react and open fire.

Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister (CM), and TDP chief Nara Chandrababu Naidu, condemned the attack, stating, “Kidari and Siveri’s efforts for development of tribals and agency areas are unique…”

The last ‘successful’ attack on legislators in then undivided Andhra Pradesh was orchestrated on August 15 (Independence Day), 2005, when an action team of the People’s War Group (PWG) brutally killed the Chittam Narsi Reddy, then MLA from Makthal Assembly, belonging to the ruling Indian National Congress, and eight others at Narayanpet in the Mahboobnagar District. The dead included the legislator’s youngest son, C. Venkateshwar Reddy; Narayanpet Municipal Commissioner D.V. Ram Mohan Rao; the MLA’s driver Srinu; bodyguard Raja Reddy; the Revenue Development Officer`s Secretary, Sayanna; and Congress workers Ravinder Reddy, Mohan and Lokeshwar Reddy. The group was participating at a public function to launch work on a cement road.

There have been two earlier attacks in the State targeting legislators, though these were unsuccessful. The first recorded attack was reported in 1998, when cadres of the Communist Party of India (Marxist Leninist) – People’s War (also, the People’s War Group, PWG) carried out an attack near Kathlapur village in Karimnagar District, targeting the then Chief Minister, N. Chandrababu Naidu, while he was campaigning for the Metpally Assembly by-election. Though Naidu survived the attack, the constables present on the spot sustained severe injuries.

Almost five years, later, on October 1, 2003, Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu was again targeted by PWG cadres, who triggered a powerful landmine blast that ripped through Naidu’s motorcade on a forest road between Tirupati and Tirumala in Chittoor District. Though Naidu again survived unharmed, five persons, including the State’s Information Technology Minister, B. Gopalakrishna Reddy, suffered injuries.

The latest incident clearly suggests that concerns regarding Left Wing Extremism (LWE) threat in Andhra Pradesh are well-founded, though the Maoist prowess has long been on the wane. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), during the current year, till September 30, 2018, two incidents of LWE-linked killing have been recorded in the State, in which three persons, all of them civilians, including the September 23 killings, have died. In the corresponding period of 2017, at least six persons, including two civilians, one Security Force (SF) trooper and three extremists were killed. Through 2017, a total of nine fatalities, including five civilians, one SF trooper and three extremists, were registered. The highest number of fatalities, at 320 (including 132 civilians, 21 SF personnel and 167 Left-Wing Extremists), were recorded in 2005, in then undivided Andhra Pradesh. Fatalities in LWE-related violence in the State have seen a continuous decline since 2006, with the exception of transient reverses in 2010, 2013 and 2016. Cumulative fatalities in LWE-linked violence in Andhra Pradesh since 2005 stand at 742, including 276 civilians, 37 SF personnel, and 429 extremists.

According to an August 9, 2018, report, the Maoists have decided to organise more village meetings to augment their cadre base, with a focus on the Galikonda area of Ananthagiri mandal in Visakhapatnam District, an area which they once dominated, but where they have weakened considerably. The same report also revealed that the Maoists’top leadership had entrusted this revival to Boda Anjayya aka Naveen, ‘chief’ of the Korukonda Area Committee, and a trusted lieutenant of Gajarla Ravi aka Uday, currently in-charge of the Andhra-Odisha Border Special Zonal Committee (AOBSZC) region.

Earlier, on June 16, 2018, West Godavari District Superintendent of Police (SP), M. Ravi Prakash disclosed that, in their struggle to revive, the Maoists were using Polavaram, Velairpadu and Kukunuru mandals in the West Godavari Agency areaas a shelter zone.

According to the latest data released by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) on March 27, 2018, eight Districts [Anantapur, East Godavari, Guntur, Kurnool, Prakasam, Srikakulam, Visakhapatnam and Vizianagaram] of Andhra Pradesh are afflicted by LWE-violence. One of these, Vishakhapatnam, is still among the 30 worst Maoist-affected Districts in the country, listed by UMHA.

Meanwhile, UMHA has taken some new measures for the development of Andhra Pradesh. On August 3, 2018, replying to an answer in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of the India Parliament), Minister of State for Finance, P. Radhakrishnan, stated that under section 46 (3) of Andhra Pradesh Re-organisation Act, 2014, a Special Development Package for the seven backward Districts of the State, amounting to INR 21 billion, had been announced, with INR three billion going to each District. An amount of INR 10.5 billion (three instalments of INR 3.5 billion at INR 500 million per District) had been disbursed for backward areas and a further amount of INR 10.5 billion would be released in a second phase. The Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, identified Anantapur, Kurnool, Srikakulam, Visakhapatnam, Vizianagaram, YSR Kadapa and Chittoor, as backward Districts. The first five of these are in the list of eight LWE affected Districts in the State.

Earlier, on July 19, 2018, Ram Kripal Yadav, Minister of State in the Union Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD), in his reply in the Lok Sabha (the Lower House of India’s Parliament), stated that MoRD, inter alia, was implementing the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), Deendayal Antyodaya Yojana –National Rural Livelihoods Mission (DAY-NRLM), Deen Dayal Upadhyay – Gramin Kaushalya Yojana (DDU-GKY), Pradhan Mantri Awaas Yojana – Gramin (PMAY-G), Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) and the National Social Assistance Programme (NSAP) to bring about overall improvement in the quality of life of the people in rural areas including Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, through employment generation, strengthening of livelihood opportunities, promoting self-employment, skilling of rural youths, provision of social assistance and other basic amenities. These are expected to impact further on the dwindling Maoist recruitment base in the State.

Andhra Pradesh has fought the Maoist with extraordinary success, transforming itself from the country’s worst affected State through the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s, to one that is, at worst, marginally affected. Despite the reverses they have suffered, however, it is clear that the Maoists have not given up, nor have they lost their capacities to strike against high value targets. It is unlikely that the September 23 killings will go unanswered, and the Police is likely to intensify operations against the surviving LWE elements, most of whom find relative safety across State borders in the Andhra-Odisha-Chhattisgarh trijunction. A review of security for high-value targets also appears to be overdue, to ensure that complacency has not crept in to create new vulnerabilities.

*Deepak Kumar Nayak
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

As a kid I was always a head shorter than other boys, which meant I was bullied – mocked, threatened, sometimes assaulted.

Childhood bullying has been going on forever. But in recent years America has become a culture of bullying – the wealthier over the poorer, CEOs over workers, those with privilege and pedigree over those without, the whiter over the browner and blacker, men over women.

Sometimes the bullying involves physical violence. More often it entails intimidation, displays of dominance, demands for submission, or arbitrary decisions over the lives of those who feel they have no choice but to accept them.

The Kavanaugh-Ford hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee on September 27 was a window into our bullying culture.

On one side: powerful men who harass or abuse women and get away with it, privileged white men intent on entrenching their power on the Supreme Court, men vested with the power to take away a woman’s right to choose what she does with her body.

On the other: women with the courage to tell what has happened to them, to demand an end to white male privilege, and to preserve and enlarge their constitutional rights.

Dr. Ford was poised, articulate, clear and convincing. More than that: She radiated self-assured power.

Brett Kavanaugh, by contrast, showed himself to be a vicious partisan – a Trump-like figure who feels entitled to do and say whatever he wants, who suspects left-wing plots against him, who refuses to take responsibility for his actions, and who uses emotional bullying and intimidation to get his way.

Whatever happens to Kavanaugh, a large portion of the American public will never trust him to be impartial. Many will never believe his denials of sexual harassment. Most will continue to see him as the privileged, arrogant, self-righteous person he revealed himself to be.

Which brings us to the coming midterm election.

It’s not really a contest between Democrats or Republicans, left or right. It’s a contest between the bullies and the bullied. It’s about the power of those who are rich, white, privileged, or male – or all of the above – to threaten and intimidate those who aren’t.

And it’s about the courage of the bullied to fight back.

Donald Trump is America’s bully-in-chief. He exemplifies those who use their wealth to gain power and celebrity, harass or abuse women and get away with it, lie and violate the law with impunity, and rage against anyone who calls them on their bullying.

Trump became president by exploiting the anger of millions of white working class Americans who for decades have been economically bullied by corporate executives, CEOs, and Wall Street.

Even as profits have ballooned and executive pay has gone into the stratosphere, workers have been hammered. Their pay has gone nowhere, their benefits have shrunk, their jobs are less secure.

Trump used this anger to build his political base, channeling the frustrations and anxieties into racism and nativism. He encouraged Americans who have been bullied to feel more powerful by bullying people with even less power: poor blacks, Latinos, immigrants, Muslims, families seeking asylum.

This bullying game has been played repeatedly in history, by self-described strongmen who pretend to be tribunes of the oppressed by scapegoating the truly powerless.

Trump is no tribune of the people. He and his enablers in the Republican Party are working for the moneyed interests – the Koch Brothers, Sheldon Adelson, other corporate and Wall Street chieftains – by cutting their taxes, eliminating regulations, slashing public services, and allowing them to profit off public lands, coastal waters, and privatized services.

The moneyed interests are America’s hidden bullies. They have enlarged their net worth by repressing wages (or pushing the companies they invest in to do so), and enlarged their political power through gerrymandering and suppressing votes (or pushing their political lackeys to do so).

Their capacity to bully has grown as the nation’s wealth has become concentrated in fewer hands, as the economy has become more monopolized, and as American politics has become more engulfed by big money.

It is time to fight back against the bullies. It is time to join together to reclaim economic and political power.

It begins with the midterm elections, November 6.

This week we witnessed the horrible spectacle of Nikki Haley, President Trump’s Ambassador to the United Nations, joining a protest outside the UN building and calling for the people of Venezuela to overthrow their government.

“We are going to fight for Venezuela,” she shouted through a megaphone, “we are going to continue doing it until Maduro is gone.”

This is the neocon mindset: that somehow the US has the authority to tell the rest of the world how to live and who may hold political power regardless of elections.

After more than a year of Washington being crippled by evidence-free claims that the Russians have influenced our elections, we have a senior US Administration official openly calling for the overturning of elections overseas.

Imagine if President Putin’s national security advisor had grabbed a megaphone in New York and called for the people of the United States to overthrow their government by force!

At the UN, Venezuela’s President Maduro accused the Western media of hyping up the crisis in his country to push the cause for another “humanitarian intervention.” Some may laugh at such a claim, but recent history shows that interventionists lie to push regime change, and the media goes right along with the lies.

Remember the lies about Gaddafi giving Viagra to his troops to help them rape their way through Libya? Remember the “babies thrown from incubators” and “mobile chemical labs” in Iraq? Judging from past practice, there is probably some truth in Maduro’s claims.

We know socialism does not work. It is an economic system based on the use of force rather than economic freedom of choice. But while many Americans seem to be in a panic over the failures of socialism in Venezuela, they don’t seem all that concerned that right here at home President Trump just signed a massive $1.3 trillion dollar spending bill that delivers socialism on a scale that Venezuelans couldn’t even imagine. In fact this one spending bill is three times Venezuela’s entire gross domestic product!

Did I miss all the Americans protesting this warfare-welfare state socialism?

Why all the neocon and humanitarian-interventionist “concern” for the people of Venezuela? One clue might be the fact that Venezuela happens to be sitting on the world’s largest oil reserves. More even than Saudi Arabia. There are plenty of countries pursuing dumb economic policies that result in plenty of suffering, but Nikki and the neocons are nowhere to be found when it comes to “concern” for these people. Might it be a bit about this oil?

Don’t believe this feigned interest in helping the Venezuelan people. If Washington really cared about Venezuelans they would not be plotting regime change for the country, considering that each such “liberation” elsewhere has ended with the people being worse off than before!

This article was published by RonPaul Institute.

Dozens of Pakistani Christians gathered outside the United Nations offices in Geneva, Switzerland, to protest the persecution of their coreligionists in their homeland.

They gathered for the Sept. 27 rally from several Western European countries where they have received asylum, including Germany, France, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

The protesters wielded signs and placards that read “Save Pakistani Christians” and “Stop targeting Christians in Pakistan.”

Speaking through bullhorns, their representatives called on the U.N. to apply pressure on Pakistan to repeal its dreaded blasphemy laws, which are often used by the dominant Muslim majority against religious minorities.

Four members of the European Union’s parliament also participated in the rally in support of Pakistan’s Christians. They urged their parliament’s human rights committee to devote more attention to the situation of religious minorities in Pakistan.

“The protest was organized by different human rights NGOs to draw the attention of the United Nations to the suffering of Christians in Pakistan due to blasphemy and other discriminatory laws,” Asher Sarfraz, a Pakistani Christian rights advocate who lives in Germany and participated in the event, told ucanews.com.

Hundreds of Christians have fallen foul of Pakistan’s draconian blasphemy laws on what rights advocates have called trumped-up charges. People convicted of blasphemy are sentenced to long prison terms and sometimes death. Many of the accused have been lynched by irate mobs.

“[Many Christians] have been falsely accused of blasphemy and other crimes,” said Sarfraz, who is CEO of Christians’ True Spirit, which advocates on behalf of persecuted Christians in the South Asian nation. “They are easy targets under false pretenses.”

Pakistan’s government claims that the rights of religious minorities are fully upheld in the conservative Muslim nation. Christians, however, insist that they have long faced both deep-seated prejudice and institutionalized discrimination because of their faith.

“For decades religious minorities in Pakistan, especially Christians, have been victims of discrimination and all sorts of oppression,” Sarfraz said.

Most of the country’s four million Christians languish in grinding poverty, reduced to lowly menial jobs such as garbage collecting and street sweeping. Many better-paying jobs and government positions remain inaccessible to them.

There have also been numerous reported cases of Christians being targeted by vigilante Muslim mobs and unscrupulous individuals. Arson attacks on Christian homes and other crimes are common. Local Christian say that officials are often reluctant to act against the perpetrators in such cases.

“Christian women and young girls are kidnapped, raped, forced to convert to Islam and forced to marry Muslim men,” Sarfraz said. “The situation for Christians in Pakistan is getting worse and worse. We want the U.N. and the world to take notice.”

By Karl Romano and Luis Liwanag

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s anti-drug campaign that has left thousands dead has saved the country from becoming a “narco-state,” the country’s top diplomat has told the United Nations.

Speaking before the UN’s 73rd General Assembly in New York on Saturday, Foreign Secretary Alan Peter Cayetano said that Duterte’s war on drugs was meant to protect the citizenry from its effects and that suspected drug dealers and addicts killed were slain in legitimate operations.

“As a sovereign and democratic country led by duly-elected president, we are on track in salvaging our deteriorating country from becoming a narco-state or a state held hostage by the high and powerful who ignore the plight of the poor, powerless and marginalized or both,” Cayetano said in a speech, copies of which were made available Monday.

He said that the government respected human rights for all, although the government would not shirk its responsibility if made to choose between an innocent civilian and a drug trafficker.

“In cases where we have to choose between protecting the rights of law-abiding citizens and law enforcers versus the rights of drug lords and criminals, it is clear we will protect the former,” Cayetano said. “Who wouldn’t? Wouldn’t you do the same?”

His statement came two days after Duterte for the first time openly acknowledged that extrajudicial killings had happened in his 2-year-old government.

“My only sin is the extrajudicial killings,” Duterte said on Thursday, the first time that he had acknowledged that state agents had acted under presidential orders.

Earlier, he had maintained that the estimated 4,500 drug addicts and dealers slain in the drug war were killed when they put up a fight against police officers.

Rights groups have placed the number of those slain at close to 12,000 – a shocking figure that eclipses the number of activists slain during the 20-year authoritarian rule of Ferdinand Marcos, who was toppled by a civilian-back military revolt in 1986.

Not an admission, spokesman says

Presidential spokesman Harry Roque insisted on Monday that the president’s statement did not amount to an admission because “he did not explicitly admit to the crime of murder.”

“I’d like to emphasize that there is actually no crime under domestic law or international law as EJK,” Roque told reporters, using the local acronym for extrajudicial killings.

“In fact this is a misleading term because killing in our Constitution and in our laws is never legal so there is no such thing as extrajudicial killings. So it’s either a lawful killing or an unlawful killing,” he said.

He said that some critics were quick to jump on the statement because they think that it would bolster their complaints before the Hague-based ICC, where Duterte faces two complaints of murder and crimes against humanity, one of which was filed by relatives of people slain in the drug war.

Duterte has been angered by the ICC and as withdrawn the Philippines from an international treaty that created the court. But experts have pointed out that the withdrawal process would take a full year after a country files its notice of abrogation.

Roque reiterated that “there is no pending preliminary investigation in the ICC as of yet.”

He emphasized that the ICC could not assume on taking on the case because the Philippines has a “working criminal justice system.”

“Those who have complaints against the president, better file their complaints against him here in the Philippines,” he said.

‘Seems to be a confirmation’

But Vice President Maria Leonor Robredo said the president’s admission could only work against him.

“First of all, that’s long been debated. A lot of people say extrajudicial killings exist. The government denies it. It seems to be a confirmation that the critics are right in saying that a lot of these killings are above the law,” Robredo said.

The Philippine leader has previously removed Robredo from his cabinet, accusing her of undermining his government.

Robredo, a lawyer and a known critic of Duterte’s war on drugs, said she found it insulting for the families who lost their loved ones to the anti-drug campaign when government officials clarified the president was not serious in his public admission.

“There is no stronger piece of evidence than a confession,” she said. “That in itself is evidence.”

Jeoffrey Maitem from Cotabato City contributed to this report.

By Michael Lelyveld

Warming relations have renewed prospects for delivering Russian energy supplies through Mongolia to China as rising demand competes with historical mistrust.

Hopes for transit through Mongolia appeared to brighten last month following a meeting of the three countries’ presidents at Russia’s Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok.

Mongolian President Khaltmaagin Battulga took the occasion to repeat his appeal for new oil and gas pipeline routes through his country, eliciting a positive response.

“This is all in the works,” said Russian President Vladimir Putin on Sept. 12, Interfax reported.

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s reaction to the pipeline plan was not reported, but in a speech at the forum, Xi called for regional cross-border links.

“We need to make connectivity a priority. We need transnational infrastructure,” Xi said, according to Platts Commodity News.

“Based on the principles of mutual trust, … China is willing to work with Mongolia to seize opportunities, remove interferences and solidly carry out exchanges,” Xi said earlier in June.

In a further sign of improving relations, contingents from both China and Mongolia joined in Russia’s massive Vostok-18 military exercises in Siberia last month.

In June, the three countries agreed to establish a “China- Russia-Mongolia economic corridor.” Last month, Battulga also hailed China’s cooperation on a high-voltage transmission project as the start of a Northeast Asian electricity grid.

According to a recent report by Mongolia’s English-language UB Post, a cooperation agreement has been signed for a trans-Mongolian gas pipeline project by China Railway 25th Bureau Group Co., Ltd. and a Chinese investment company “that could not be identified in English.”

No further details on the agreement have been available.

Support for Mongolian energy transit has been building since the first trilateral meeting in 2014 with then-President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.

That meeting followed two weeks after Xi’s icebreaking visit to Ulan Bator, marking the first trip by a Chinese president to neighboring Mongolia in 11 years.

Four years of bridge building have so far produced a series of optimistic statements on the pipeline possibilities but, so far, few results.

“We generally support the idea,” Putin said in June during the last trilateral meeting. “But of course, as always in such cases, you need to thoroughly work out the feasibility,” he said at the last SCO summit in China’s port city of Qingdao.

Complicating factors

Behind each of the positive statements are a series of complicating factors and considerations that have slowed developments down.

From Russia’s standpoint, building a gas pipeline across the Mongolian steppe is likely to be faster and easier than completing its planned 2,800-kilometer (1,740-mile) western route through a narrow corridor to Xinjiang over the remote Ukok Plateau of the Altai Mountains.

Among other problems, the Altai nature reserve area has been designated as a world heritage site by UNESCO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

The proposed mountain route through the Kanas Pass is said to be at an elevation of 2,650 meters (8,690 feet).

Despite the drawbacks, Russia’s monopoly Gazprom has pushed the Altai project for over a decade as its preferred option to supply China, even as it rushes to complete its 4,000-kilometer (2,485-mile) Power of Siberia eastern route.

The giant pipeline is scheduled to open in December 2019.

The Power of Siberia line is designed to deliver 38 billion cubic meters (1.3 trillion cubic feet) of gas per year while the Altai project would supply 30 billion cubic meters annually.

A Mongolia route could break the Altai impasse, avoiding both the mountains and restive Xinjiang, which already has a surplus of resources and pipelines.

“I don’t think the Chinese are particularly interested in Altai, in spite of the change in rhetoric,” said Edward Chow, senior fellow for energy and national security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

Chow said the project would “get gas to the wrong place” in China, far from its biggest consuming markets in the east.

“From an energy supply and logistics point of view, it strikes me that Mongolia makes more sense,” he said.

‘In the works’

But Russia’s reports on a Mongolian option stress that all of its gas routes “are direct pipelines from Russia to China without transit states.”

The argument makes Putin’s comment that something is “in the works” all the more remarkable, suggesting that Russia’s policy on the Altai route could be subject to change.

When asked about the Altai plan at the Vladivostok meeting, Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak told Reuters that President Xi had set the task of “concluding the agreement of a contract on gas supplies … in the nearest future.”

“All the technical conditions have been agreed,” Novak said, repeating a statement that Russian officials have been making for years.

Officials said they had been tasked with signing a contract for gas supplies from the western route by the end of this year, but the completion of the Altai pipeline was originally set for 2015.

From China’s standpoint, the openings to Mongolia have been aimed at steadily building trust with investment in projects such as renovating Ulan Bator’s shantytown districts.

The unusual aid for a social welfare project in a neighboring country may be needed to overcome historic resentment in Mongolia, which gained independence from China in 1911. Past reports suggest that China’s commercial mining investments in Mongolia have stirred public anger.

“From the steppe to the streets of the capital, Ulan Bator, Mongolians evince a distrust of Chinese,” the Associated Press reported in 2012. “Almost everyone says China is stealing Mongolia’s coal.”

Leaning towards Russia

Although China is Mongolia’s top trading partner, the country has leaned heavily toward Russia since Soviet times.

In the past, mistrust between Mongolia and China has worked both ways with regard to energy transit.

Before Russia opened a direct branch to China for oil exports from its East Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline in 2011, it tried to supply China through two Trans-Siberian Railway routes.

Most of the oil traffic was routed through the more distant Zabaikalsk border crossing with China to the east, avoiding Mongolia, while smaller volumes were shipped across Mongolia through the Naushki crossing in southern Siberia.

After a series of complaints over high tariff costs on both routes, the Mongolia traffic was halted entirely in 2007 amid reports that China considered it less secure. The border between the two countries is 4,700 kilometers (2,920 miles) long.

A decade later, Russian energy supplies and routes to China have increased dramatically along with Chinese demand, particularly for gas.

China’s gas consumption rose 15 percent last year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), and increased by 17.5 percent in the first half of 2018 as the government pursued its push for cleaner-burning fuels.

The question is whether conditions have changed enough for China to rely on Mongolian transit.

In an interview, Chow said the statements at the latest meeting of the three presidents should not necessarily be taken as signs of progress on either the Altai or Mongolian supply routes.

“My instinct is that every time Xi and Putin meet, they have to announce something, and gas seems to be one of the favorite topics,” he said. “They can’t meet and not have something to announce.”

Moscow has continued to press its case for the Altai project because it would rely on its well-developed resource base in Western Siberia, which also serves Europe, spurring competition for Russian gas.

But Chow said that China wants nothing to do with the Russian strategy.

“It does nothing for the Chinese,” he said.

Recent data shows that Asia is now the world’s biggest arms market; moreover, the region is increasingly demanding more sophisticated types of weapons. This is good news for Chinese and US defence firms, who are the largest suppliers of arms to Asia.

By Richard A. Bitzinger*

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) recently released its data on the global arms trade for 2017, and it is big news for Asia as a whole, and for China and the United States in particular.

In the first place, SIPRI confirms that Asia (including the Indian subcontinent and Oceania) has remained the world’s single largest arms market for the past decade. According to the Institute, Asia accounted for a plurality (42 percent) of all international arms transfers for the period 2013-2017, easily outpacing the Middle East (the world’s other large arms market) at 32 percent. While its market share was down slightly from 2008-2012 (when it took 46 percent), Asian arms transfers were actually up during the more recent period, as globally arms exports have increased.

Asian Arms Buys: Boosting the US

Some of the world’s largest arms buyers are in Asia. According to SIPRI, during the period 2013-2017, five of the ten biggest arms importers were in the region: India, China, Indonesia, Australia, and Pakistan. Vietnam, South Korea, and Taiwan were among the top 15 largest arms importers. India, in fact, alone accounted for 12 percent of all arms transfers during this period, maintaining its position as the world’s largest arms buyer for the past several years (just ahead of Saudi Arabia). Indian arms imports increased by 24 percent between the periods 2008-2012 and 2013-2017.

All these arms purchases have been enabled by a continuing upward trend in military spending in the region. According to SIPRI, defence expenditures in Asia and Oceania in 2017 was up 3.6 percent over 2016 and 59 percent higher than a decade earlier. So there is plenty of money available for new weaponry.

Two of the biggest beneficiaries of this rise in Asian arms imports are the United States and China. According to SIPRI data, the US captured 34 percent of the global arms market for the period 2013-2017, easily beating Russia, the world’s second largest arms exporter (which took only a 22 percent share). US arms transfers in 2017 were the highest in nearly 20 years. Moreover, US exports of arms grew by one-quarter between 2008-2012 and 2013-2017, further widening the gap between it and all other arms exporters.

Asia accounted for one-third of all US arms exports during the period 2013-2017. Its biggest customers in the region were Australia and Taiwan. While Russia still leads the US in overall arms sales to Asia (accounting for 34 percent of all transfers to the region), the US has stolen business from Russia’s traditional customers.

In India, for example, which accounted for 35 percent of all Russian arms exports during 2013-2017, the US has become New Delhi’s second largest weapons supplier. In fact, between 2008-2012 and 2013-2017, Indian arms purchases from the US increased by 557 percent! Indonesia, which bought fighter jets from Moscow, is also diversifying its arms suppliers, to the benefit of Washington.

China: The New Big Supplier

China is also benefiting from the uptick in Asian arms transfers. China’s exports of major arms grew by 38 percent between 2008-2012 and 2013-2017, and it captured 5.7 percent of the global arms market during the latter period (although this was only good enough for fifth place, behind the US, Russia, France, and Germany).

Most of Beijing’s biggest weapons buyers are in Asia, and during the period 2013-2017, the region accounted for 72 percent of all Chinese arms transfers. The two biggest buyers were Pakistan and Bangladesh, which together bought over half of all Chinese arms exports. Pakistan, in fact, now buys around 70 percent of its arms from China.

Beijing has chalked up some impressive overseas sales, including deals to export eight Yuan-class submarines to Pakistan and three to Thailand. China has also sold tanks to Myanmar and antiship cruise missiles to Indonesia, as well as armed drones to Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, and Egypt.

At the same, China is starting to scale back its imports of arms, as its domestic defence industries continue to improve and develop and produce globally competitive military systems. This is particularly bad news, in the long run, for Russia, which presently accounts for the bulk of all Chinese arms purchases.

What Will the Next Five Years Hold?

Of course, sales are always about the future, not the past. For the Asian arms market, however, the next five years will likely resemble the past five. Regional tensions in the Indian subcontinent, in the South China Sea and across the Taiwan Strait, and particularly in and around the Korean peninsula will continue to drive increases in defence spending, which will in turn will continue to impact regional arms acquisitions.

Asia, therefore, will continue to crave the newest and most advanced armaments of all types. In particular, we should see steady purchases of modern fighter jets, air defence systems, and navy ships. We should in particular see an uptick in sales of weapons systems that were hitherto rarely found in Asian militaries, such as advanced submarines and precision-guided air-to-ground munitions.

These trends in arms purchases make Asia a continuing “must have” market for the world’s leading – and aspiring – arms exporters. That in turn will require that the world’s leading arms manufacturers – many of whom depend heavily upon overseas sales for their survival – will have to continue to come up with products that will meet the increasingly stringent demands of their Asian customers.

*Richard A. Bitzinger is a Visiting Senior Fellow with the Military Transformations Programme in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.

French singer and songwriter Charles Aznavour has died at 94 after a career lasting more than 80 years, a spokesman has confirmed, according to BBC.

The performer, born to Armenian immigrants, sold more than 180 million records and featured in over 60 films.

He was best known for his 1974 hit She and was awarded a star on the Hollywood Walk of Fame in 2017.

Aznavour married three times and had six children. He was named entertainer of the century by CNN in 1998.

The singer was born in Paris in 1924 to Armenian parents who fled the country’s genocide to begin a new life in the French capital.

Aznavour’s lyrics drew on his own experiences of growing up in deprivation as an immigrant.

He recorded more than 1,200 songs in seven different languages and performed in 94 countries.

Aznavour sung for presidents, popes and royal families and at a number of humanitarian events.

He was heavily involved in charity work and founded an organisation after the 1988 Armenian earthquake with friend Levon Sayan.

In 2009 he was appointed ambassador of Armenia to Switzerland and he also became Armenia’s delegate to the United Nations in Geneva.