The presence of evangelical churches in the political life of various Latin American countries has increased significantly in recent years.
By Carlos Malamud*
The presence of evangelical churches in the political life of various Latin American countries has increased notably in recent years, clearly seen in the outcome of the many elections held in the region. Among the most prominent elections contested in 2018, particularly striking developments in this respect include the victory of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Fabricio Alvarado’s progress to the second round of voting in Costa Rica and the role played by the Social Encounter Party in Mexico, which has allied itself with Andrés Manuel López Obrador and helped his election as President .
The decline of politics, traditional parties –especially
those on the left– and democratic institutions, together with the
retreat of the Roman Catholic Church in the greater part of the region,
have contributed to this development. Another factor is the emphasis
placed on a values-based discourse and support for the family as central
strands of the evangelical rhetoric. Thanks to this, and with
considerable popular endorsement, they have succeeded in boosting
conservative prospects in large parts of Latin America.
Analysis
The boundary between religion and politics, or between
divine and temporal power, has never been clear and remains blurred to
this day. The conflict between the two powers has been a recurring
feature throughout history and at times has been accompanied by acute
tension and even violence. Christian democratic parties in both Europe
and Latin America were a permanent feature of the 20th century, and they
frequently succeeded in securing power, as in Chile, Venezuela, Costa
Rica and Guatemala. In our own day, certain strains of radical terrorism
take on an Islamist cloak, while a range of religious fundamentalisms
vie to increase their presence in the most varied parts of the world. A
simultaneous development in Latin America has been the emergence of
political movements of an evangelical nature that have acquired
considerable heft in the political affairs of their countries and have
even become a phenomenon of wider regional significance.
These days it is possible to find an evangelical church or
place of worship in virtually any part of the continent, however poor or
marginalised it might be. The strong and permanent bond between the
pentecostal and neo-pentecostal churches on the one hand and the popular
sectors and the poorest strata of their societies on the other has
enabled them to impinge on regional politics in a way that no other
party or movement has been able to achieve. If this is combined with
their particular ideological orientation it may be concluded, as Javier
Corrales has done, that evangelical churches are ‘giving conservative
causes [in Latin America], and especially political parties, new
strength and new constituencies’.
Indeed, Corrales goes further in asserting that ‘the rise
of evangelicalism is politically worrisome. Evangelicals are fuelling a
new form of populism. They are supplying conservative parties with
nonelite voters, which is good for democracy, but these voters tend to
be intransigent on issues of sexuality, which feeds cultural
polarisation. Intolerant inclusion, which is the classic Latin American
populist formula, is being reinvented by evangelical pastors’.
The advent of evangelicalism in Latin America
Marta Lagos, the Director of Latino barómetro, has been unequivocal about the rise of evangelicalism: ‘there is a tremendous influence of the evangelical church, especially among the poorest people… the candidates are going for the evangelical vote’. We are thus witnessing a wholly novel phenomenon in Latin America, the growing spread of evangelical churches, essentially pentecostal and neo-pentecostal.
The latter have managed to increase their political
presence in a range of countries while also making inroads as
institutional representatives, both in executive and in legislative
positions, starting with national and regional parliaments. It is
important, however, to distinguish between the more traditional and
longstanding evangelical churches, such as the Methodists, from the more
modern pentecostalist and neo-pentecostalist churches, especially those
linked to the ‘charismatic movement’, as the former have a different
approach to politics.
The origins of this expansion can be traced to the many
proselytising campaigns of certain US protestant churches in the
mid-20th century that ended up establishing themselves mainly in Central
America. In South America, meanwhile, the evangelical churches’ nucleus
of expansion was Brazil, to such an extent that these days it is
possible to find Brazilian pastors preaching in all Latin American
capitals and in many of the larger cities.
As pointed out above, however, the combination of religion
and politics is nothing new and nor is the combination of evangelicalism
and politics. Alberto Fujimori, when he was virtually unknown to the
general public in Peru, secured the support of some evangelical churches
for his presidential bid. Pastor Carlos García, the leader of the
Baptist Church, was his running-mate on the ticket that Cambio 90
presented for the 1990 presidential elections and was elected as Second
Vice-President.
The support given by García and other evangelical church
figures in Peru was essential in ensuring Fujimori’s success. It was
they who collected the signatures needed to register Cambio 90 as a
political party, enabling it to take part in the elections. They also
collaborated in setting up local committees throughout the country as a
way of securing greater public support. In addition, some 50 evangelical
supporters ran as Cambio 90 candidates for election to Congress, of
whom 14 were elected as deputies and four as senators. Disappointment
with the new President soon set in, however, given that he not only
failed to achieve the levels of development that he had promised but
also failed to secure for his congregations the same benefits as the
Roman Catholic Church enjoyed.
A more recent event clearly illustrates the incessant rise
of the evangelical influence in the political life of Latin American
countries and the favourable treatment they regularly receive from
politicians, from both left and right. In 2014, two months prior to the
most closely-fought elections in the country’s history, numerous
politicians attended the opening of the Temple of Solomon in central São
Paulo, a mega-church covering 100,000 square metres with a capacity for
over 10,000 worshippers.
Among those present, despite her past as a guerrilla and
her self-professed agnosticism, was the then President of the country,
Dilma Rousseff, from the Brazilian Workers’ Party (PT). Also in
attendance was the Vice-President Michel Temer (currently leader of the
national government but preparing to hand over to Jair Bolsonaro). They
were joined by a significant group of Ministers in his cabinet, plus
Geraldo Alckmin, the governor of São Paulo, and Fernando Haddad, the
city’s Mayor. These were the highest elected officials of the state and
the city of São Paulo and later became the respective presidential
candidates for the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) and the PT in
the general election of 2018. The inauguration was also attended by
numerous governors and some of the most prominent members of the
National Congress. The unveiling of the temple, which became a sort of
multi-party convention, was a revealing portrait of the political
importance that the evangelicals had succeeded in acquiring over the
preceding years in the country’s politics.
This ambitious project was masterminded by Bishop Edir
Macedo, head of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God and, apart
from being one of the main evangelical figures in Brazil, an extremely
wealthy individual. Macedo, who had previously endorsed Lula, was on
this occasion one of Bolsonaro’s main backers to win the election. The
most influential tools deployed by the latter, a former army
officer-turned-politician, include social media and the powerful network
of audio-visual media led by TVRecord, owned by Macedo.
In Mexico, the Movimiento de Renovación Nacional
(Morena, or National Regeneration Movement) and the PT forged an
alliance with the evangelical Social Encounter Party as it sought to
build broader support for Andrés Manuel López Obrador in the run-up to
the decisive presidential elections of 2018. Although the election
results show that López Obrador would have won anyway, the alliance
proved to be a very useful means of achieving his goals and tipping
opinion polls in his favour. Thanks to the partnership he was able to
secure an overwhelming win and comfortable majorities in both chambers
of the federal Congress.
Proof of the importance López Obrador places on his
proximity to the evangelicals is the fact that, over the course of six
months, the man who is now President-elect swung from saying he would
never associate himself with Social Encounter to proposing, on the very
day the ultraconservatives announced his candidacy, a ‘moral’
constitution for the country. At Easter 2018, in the middle of
electioneering, López Obrador said that he was ‘a Christian in the
broadest sense of the word, because Christ is love’.1
Guatemala now has an evangelical President, Jimmy Morales,
despite the little-to-no political experience he had at the time of
being elected. Costa Rica was on the point of having another evangelical
as President, Fabricio Alvarado. In Chile Sebastián Piñera courted the
evangelical vote at the last election, to the extent of inviting four
evangelical bishops to join his campaign team. In Venezuela and Colombia
the evangelical pastors Javier Bertucci and Jorge Antonio Trujillo ran
as candidates in the presidential election, in spite of little
likelihood of success. More recently, Jair Bolsonaro was elected as the
new Brazilian President with the full backing of the evangelical
churches.
The evangelical insertion into politics
In order to put their political aspirations into practice,
there is one factor that evangelical groups can count on that
traditional parties, especially the most conservative, lack: proximity
to the masses, people who are tired of elites and who were traditionally
drawn to left-wing groupings. They also rely on an extensive network of
places of worship widely distributed throughout the countries in which
they operate and on a powerful system of media outlets, comprising
hundreds and indeed thousands of radio and TV stations, many of them
focusing on the local community, plus a strong presence on social media.
The evangelicals are thus not only exploiting the spaces
vacated by the Roman Catholic Church but also the widespread public
disenchantment with politics and governments. With their strong presence
in the most densely-populated neighbourhoods, evangelical churches
provide all manner of services to a wide range of people, especially the
least advantaged, from healthcare to childcare to help in seeking work.
The fact that they offer a broad variety of services to the community
provides them, in return, with a more than notable degree of popular
support, something that no party –certainly no left-wing party– no NGO
and no other political or social movement is capable of matching.
In general, there does not tend to be any regional pattern
to the political and campaigning strategy adopted by evangelical
churches. In some countries they may take to the street in opposition to
particular legislative proposals that they deem contrary to their
beliefs. In others they have their own political groups making their
point. Sometimes they even put forward their own presidential
candidates.
Going beyond particular national circumstances, however,
manifestations of evangelical involvement in politics are emerging more
and more stridently in the Latin American political landscape. Up until
recently, most of the aspirations of the evangelical churches that
participated in politics and the parties they supported focused on the
local and provincial levels and in gaining a parliamentary foothold
rather than fighting for executive power. In light of recent election
results. however, this seems to be changing rapidly.
The situation provides a fair portrait of the goals and
limitations that characterise evangelical political efforts. What is
clear, however, and this is one of their main characteristics, is that
they tend to exert increasing pressure on political debate in terms of
their values-based agenda: the family, gender and sexuality. And
although, as Javier Corrales argues, the ‘ideology of evangelical
pastors is varied’, when it comes to subjects such as gender and
sexuality, they usually make much of their ‘conservative, patriarchal
and homophobic values’.
As pointed out above, evangelicalism’s moral and political
agenda focuses on the defence of family values, which fundamentally
entails opposition to abortion, in vitro fertilisation,
same-sex marriage, divorce and euthanasia. Apart from issues related to
the defence of Christian family values, their platform tends to centre
more on the rejection of particular proposals than on support for any
specific policies. Among the raft of things that they reject, the
mis-named ‘gender ideology’ plays a prominent role. The war they wage on
this has enabled them to win substantial kudos among their followers.
It is not, however, an area where evangelical leaders enjoy exclusive
dominion, since the Roman Catholic hierarchy and a large section of the
priesthood have openly voiced their opposition to it too.
This definition, stemming from profoundly conservative
roots, is typically used to discredit any attempt to defend sexual
diversity or gender variation, indicating that it is fundamentally
ideological in nature rather than a scientific approach to the problem,
consistent with the approach of psychologists and other medical and
behavioural professionals. As Corrales points out, ‘the ideology of
gender allows them [the evangelicals] to call for the protection of
children as cover for their homophobia’.
Another core strand that has mobilised the followers of
pentecostalists and neo-pentecostalists has been the fight against
corruption and outrage at the role played by politicians in corruption
cases. With all these issues it is possible to discern a remarkable
convergence between the evangelical churches, the Roman Catholic
hierarchy, certain social-Christian movements and political parties of a
conservative hue. This proximity is much more visible on certain
specific occasions, especially when the degree of scandal turns them
into media causes célèbres.
Up until now, however, evangelical leaders, their political
associates and their spokespeople in the news media have not tended to
make pronouncements on other issues at the heart of government, such as
the economy and international relations. It remains to be seen whether
this trend will continue, given their greater institutional presence in
the highest echelons of their respective countries’ administrations,
Worshippers who follow the evangelical denominations are
highly disciplined. They take a lead from the opinions of their
preachers, even in terms of voting. Regardless of the candidates’
profiles, when voters get to the ballot box what counts is not only
their political allegiance but also the recommendation of church elders.
It is a mechanism similar to the one that has existed for decades in
communist parties dominated by the idea of democratic centralism.
In light of its recent surge and the discipline exercised
at the ballot box, the evangelical vote has been highly sought-after by
almost all candidates, irrespective of their political or ideological
leanings. It is a phenomenon that Colombia, Brazil and Mexico are each
acquainted with, as are other Latin American countries with elections
looming. In 2019 elections are due be held in Guatemala, El Salvador,
Panama, Argentina, Uruguay and Bolivia, providing fresh opportunities to
assess the influence of the evangelical vote in these countries.
In Brazil, the evangelical power in parliament centres
around the so-called Bible Group. In the previous legislative term, the
evangelical churches mustered 81 congressmen (out of 513) and three
senators (out of 81). It is a question of having a cohesive and
highly-organised parliamentary group that enables them to block
initiatives against the church. Coming under this heading are all
attempts to legalise abortion and same-sex marriage, which has been
sanctioned by the Brazilian Supreme Court since 2014. Showing its
support for Bolsonaro has been a group known as 3B (standing for biblia, bala and buey
or bible, bullet and ox), which includes advocates of carrying weapons
for self-defence (bullet), large-scale agricultural producers and the
meatpacking industry (ox).
The pressure exerted by evangelical churches has even led
to the closing down of some art exhibitions on the grounds of
immorality. This occurred with the exhibition titled Queermuseu, cartografías da diferença na arte brasileira,
run by the Santander Cultural Centre in Porto Alegre, which was forced
to close a few days after it opened in September 2017. Arguing that
Banco Santander was sponsoring an exhibition that fostered ‘paedophilia,
zoophilia and pornography’, both the Free Brazil Movement (MBL) and a
range of evangelical groups orchestrated an unremitting campaign on
social media that forced the organisers to shut down exhibition.
The evangelical churches’ social presence
The presence of evangelical churches in Latin America and
the number of their followers has grown steadily in recent decades,
although their growth has been uneven. There is a twofold dynamic
underlying the phenomenon. First there is the incessant growth in the
number of non-Roman Catholic Christians, something that presents an
enormous challenge to the various episcopal conferences; secondly,
politicians and parties have been increasingly discredited, paving the
way for new options to emerge.
The number of evangelical worshippers currently accounts
for rather more than 20% of Latin America’s population. The figure is
all the more striking when considering that only 60 years ago they
barely represented 3% of the population, according to statistics from
the Pew Research Center. More than 10% of the population in Mexico is
evangelical; in Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Argentina and Panama
it is said to be in excess of 15%; in Costa Rica and Puerto Rico it is
as high as 20%; the figures cited for Brazil fluctuate between 22% and
27%; and in some Central American countries, such as Guatemala, Honduras
and Nicaragua, the figure exceeds 40%.
As pointed out, the rise of evangelical churches needs to
be seen in relation to the parallel process of Roman Catholicism in
retreat. Instead of ‘liberation theology’, which in the 1960s and 70s
brought the widespread involvement of revolutionary priests, workers and
peasants, evangelical preachers have had a great deal of success in
introducing their faithful to so-called ‘prosperity theology’. This is a
concept that clearly illustrates the principles and interests that
motivate their faithful.
Roman Catholics in Latin America currently number 425
million, which according to the latest Latinobarómetro accounts for 60%
of the regional population. It is a significant figure, because it means
that 40% of the world’s Roman Catholics are Latin American. Another
important consideration in this context is that Pope Francis (Jorge
Mario Bergoglio), elected in 2013, is an Argentine. Despite their
dominance, however, there is no denying the fact that the Roman Catholic
majority has shrunk significantly since recording a figure of 80% in
1996.
The question that arises from this twofold process of a
falling Roman Catholic population and a growing evangelical one is how
far it can be attributed to the systematic attack on liberation theology
ordered by the Vatican and the various regional ecclesiastical
hierarchies. In a sense, abandoning the ‘preferential option for the
poor’, which was characteristic of liberation theology, entailed the
abandonment of the masses by the Roman Catholic church.
In some evangelical churches, alarming signs of a certain
degree of paramilitarisation are starting to be seen. One of the
clearest examples is the so-called ‘Gladiators of Christ’, affiliated to
the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, which involves the faithful
receiving training with military overtones. While this is by no means a
new phenomenon, either within or beyond Latin America, as shown by the
activities of the Peruvian Roman Catholic organisation Sodalitium of
Christian Life, which sought to persuade its followers to live
communally as ‘soldiers of Christ’, it needs to be closely monitored.
The Sodalitium, a group run by laypeople, was recognised by
Pope John Paul II in 1997 as a Society of Apostolic Life under Canon
Law. Another association of Roman Catholic laypeople is Tradition,
Family and Property (TFP), which was founded in Brazil after the Cuban
revolution and later spread to large parts of Latin America, engaging in
an active crusade against liberation theology.
The main question thrown up by the ever-growing presence of
the Gladiators of Christ is: what will happen if the neo-pentecostalist
churches at a certain juncture go from staking their claims through the
ballot box and decide to move on to direct action? As Javier Corrales
has argued: ‘There is a return to the classic Latin American
polarisation of the 19th century between conservative and anti-clerical
groups, which produced a great deal of political tension even up to the
mid-20th century’.
Conclusions
In recent years evangelical churches have been acquiring an
increasingly central role in the political life of Latin America. The
growing dissatisfaction with democracy and the marked deterioration of
traditional political parties and democratic institutions is one factor
that has speeded up the process, but not the only one. Other elements to
be borne in mind are, first, the strong presence of pentecostalist and
neo-pentecostalist denominations among the masses, helped by the
withdrawal of left-wing parties and the Roman Catholic church, and
secondly, the inclusion in their rhetoric of a unwavering defence of the
so-called values-based agenda, which includes the rejection of same-sex
marriage, abortion and divorce, among other issues.
Although these churches initially restricted their
involvement in politics to the local and regional levels, their
new-found protagonism has encouraged them to set their sights higher.
Thus a greater presence in national politics has become evident, with
notable breakthroughs such as those that have recently been secured in
Guatemala, Brazil, Mexico and Costa Rica. It is not a self-contained
phenomenon, however. Such is the extent of their power and influence
that traditional politicians, of all political and ideological hues and
persuasions, are trying to win their blessing as endorsement for their
own causes.
That said, their value-based rhetoric has caused all the
societies in which they operate to become more polarised. Theirs is a
black and white view that does not countenance nuances and therefore
excludes any kind of compromise or negotiation. This Manichaeism, with
its populist appeal, has served to strengthen conservative prospects in
Latin America, hastening the decline of left-wing parties and even
Bolivarian viewpoints. At the same time, if the growing influence of the
evangelical churches in regional and national politics continues
unchecked, the possibility cannot be ruled out of serious reversal as
far as the separation between church and state is concerned, although
the former would no longer be represented by the Roman Catholic
hierarchy but by these newly-ascendant religious groups.
*About the author: Carlos Malamud. Senior Analyst, Elcano Royal Institute | @CarlosMalamud
Source: This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute.
Original version in Spanish: La expansión política de las iglesias evangélicas en América Latina.
This phrase is reminiscent of Lula’s ‘Lulinha, peace and love’ slogan
devised just before the 2002 election, in his fourth attempt to become
President of Brazil, aimed at overcoming the antipathy of traditional
sectors, something he easily succeeded in doing thanks to his alliance
with the right and the incalculably valuable collaboration of Edir
Macedo.
