By Jeoffrey Maitem, Mark Navales and Richel V. Umel

A failure to ratify a Muslim autonomy law in the southern Philippines early next year could ignite fresh violence in the troubled region, with Islamic State-linked militants potentially exploiting the situation to boost their waning ranks, analysts warn.

On Jan. 21 some two million voters are expected to vote on ratifying the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL). President Rodrigo Duterte signed off on it in July, four years after the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) ended a separatist rebellion, which began two decades earlier and left tens of thousands of people dead and parts of the south in deep poverty.

If the law fails to bring development – as promised by MILF leaders-turned-politicians – it could drive many southerners back into the arms of militant groups, said Ramon Beleno III, head of the political science and history department at Ateneo De Davao University in Davao City.

“There are challenges ahead like how it will be implemented. There is opposition from other sectors. And if it they are not addressed, that situation will lead to another armed group,” he told BenarNews.

The law gives people in the south control over many local government functions, including taxation and education, and will allow Muslim Filipinos to incorporate Islamic law into their justice system.

The upcoming plebiscite is expected take place in the predominantly Muslim provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur. It will also include six towns in Lanao del Norte and the cities of Cotabato and Isabela in Basilan.

However, with a few weeks left before the vote, large segments of the Muslim population have not been educated about the concept of autonomy and the implications of BOL, according to Beleno.

“Many people do not understand it. There must be massive explanation on the ground about the consequences if they accept it or not. There were many promises under the new set-up, but if they are not met, we will have a problem,” he said.

Under the set-up MILF would gradually disarm, with its members integrating into the Philippine armed forces.

But the absence of the former fighters from the frontlines could lead to a power vacuum, which more hardline groups inspired by Islamic State (IS) militants could fill, MILF chief Murad Ebrahim has warned.

BOL: ‘A political experiment’

Already, militant groups are testing the resolve of the army and police.

In late July 2018, a car bomb set off by militants at a checkpoint in southern Basilan island killed 10 people. Meanwhile, dozens of militants who escaped from southern Marawi city last year after a five-month battle with government forces are busy with frenzied recruitment efforts, the military has said.

“The BOL will require the MILF to stop fighting the Philippine through a military struggle and this will be a big contribution to peace in Mindanao,” Rommel Banlaoi, and expert at the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research, told Benar.

“However, there are still threats to peace emanating from the military activities of other groups,” he said.

Apart from holdover militant veterans of the Marawi battle, the military should be wary of extremist groups, including the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and Abu Sayyaf, and watch out for a possible revival of the Ansar al-Khilafah Philippines (AKP), Banlaoi said.

Among other things to consider, MILF’s many fighters would be left to relearn military discipline under the strict guidelines of their former battlefield foes, he said. The government has estimated MILF’s strength at 10,000 fighters, but the former rebel group has claimed that its forces are three times as big.

Banlaoi said he recently visited MILF areas in the south, and he had reason to believe that “there can be more than a million armed people who can fight on behalf of the MILF.”

“Thus, BOL will require the MILF leadership to tell all their armed followers in their mass base not to use their arms to fight the central government,” he stressed, while acknowledging that the process of decommissioning MILF’s entire arsenal could be difficult.

The Bangsamoro Organic Law is not a “panacea” for multifaceted problems of conflicts in the south that have been aggravated by the presence of IS, Banlaoi argued. Rather, it is a “political experiment that we all hope will work,” he said.

Also, he said, the law could not be expected to “automatically stop the influx of foreign fighters” to the south, and could “even attract some foreign fighters to come to the south to oppose what they perceive as cooptation with the infidels.”

In such a case, he warned, MILF and the new Bangsamoro government must not lose time formulating ways to prevent more foreign fighters from infiltrating local territory.

“Otherwise, foreign terrorist fighters working in tandem with local fighters can undermine the peace aspired by all,” Banlaoi stressed.

Opposition

The south’s Muslim population is not entirely united behind BOL. Some local groups have expressed their opposition to the autonomy law.

In October, Sulu provincial Gov. Abdusakur Tan II questioned its legality in a petition before the Supreme Court, arguing that the law was unconstitutional.

And Cynthia Giani, the mayor of Cotabato city, has been actively campaigning against her city’s inclusion in the expanded autonomous region.

“Whatever comes out of the plebiscite, we really have to respect it but I believe that no matter how hard you campaign to residents of Cotabato City, they have a mind of their own. What the people feel is different from what Manila people perceive,” Giani said.

MILF leaders, at the same time, have warned of trouble brewing should the measure be defeated in next month’s vote, particularly in Basilan, the bailiwick of the Abu Sayyaf Group, and in Cotabato, an administrative capital of the Muslim government.

The Abu Sayyaf, or Bearers of the Sword, is the most brutal of militant groups operating in the southern Philippines. It has been engaged mostly in banditry, kidnapping and bombings.

One of its commanders, Isnilon Hapilon, became the head of the Philippine Islamic State faction. In May 2017, he led an attack and take-over of Marawi city, a major Muslim trading hub. The siege and ensuing five-month battle destroyed the city and left at least 1,200 people dead, mostly militants.

“There should be smooth acceptance from the people. Otherwise, it will spark another group to come out,” Beleno, the political scientist, said.

The negotiations in the recently concluded COP24 in Katowice produced a critical rulebook for the 2015 Paris Agreement. Equally important is the Silesia Declaration signed during the conference. It exhorted relevant stakeholders to ensure a just transition for segments of populations affected by climate agenda.

By Margareth Sembiring*

The latest round of climate negotiations at the COP24 (Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) in Katowice, Poland recently highlighted the perennial tension between environmental and economic concerns.

This was evidenced in one key point of contention surrounding the position of oil-producing countries namely the United States, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Kuwait that did not wish to “welcome” the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5oC launched in October 2018. Instead, they were only willing to take “note” of it. Indeed, the tension between caring for the environment and ensuring income streams has to date failed to halt the Earth’s temperature from increasing.

Environmental vs Economic Concerns: The Silesia Declaration

Considering these countries’ reliance on fossil fuels for their national revenues, it is not too difficult to understand their reluctance to fully sign up to the report. The fossil fuels sector is believed to be the main culprit behind the changing climate. Climate mitigation efforts that are commonly referred to as, among others, low-carbon economy and sustainable development normally target this sector.

They often suggest a transformation towards the use of cleaner energy such as renewable energy sources. Although the solutions seem straightforward, the mechanisms behind them are less so. Not only such transition entails economic risks for countries that have thus far relied on fossil fuels for domestic growth, it may also mean a loss of livelihoods for a large number of people who have depended on the sector for a living.

This concern was captured in the Solidarity and Just Transition Silesia Declaration championed by the host Polish government. Poland currently uses coal to produce about 80% of its electricity and it aims to reduce coal use as part of its efforts to fight climate change. While getting onboard of climate actions, it also recognises the need to address the issues surrounding potentially-affected workforce.

Most notably, the Silesia Declaration emphasises the need for “creation of decent work and quality jobs” for segments of society that will have to transfer to other sectors or lose their sources of income because of the climate agenda. This will facilitate a successful transition to low carbon and climate resilient economy.

In light of the tension between environmental and economic concerns, this is arguably one of the most critical aspects that states and relevant stakeholders must address to fully embrace sustainable development. The Silesia Declaration is not the first to highlight its importance. In 2015, the International Labour Organization (ILO) published “Guidelines for a Just Transition towards Environmentally Sustainable Economies and Societies for All.”

The document recommends comprehensive reforms in areas such as macroeconomic and growth policies, industrial and sectoral policies, enterprise policies, skills development, occupational safety and health, social protection, active labour market policies, rights, social dialogue and tripartism to allow states and societies embrace sustainable economies. However, under the shadow of other negotiated materials for the rulebook for the 2015 Paris Agreement, which was the main agenda of the COP24, this critical concern seems to fall out of priority with only 54 leaders and parties signing the declaration.

Case of EU and Palm Oil

One example that can illustrate the urgency of such just transition is the case of the European Union (EU)’s plan to phase out palm oil use for its biofuel production by 2030. The Resolution that the EU Parliament passed in April 2017 clearly cited the environmental woes associated with palm oil plantations as the basis for such decision. These included deforestation, forest fires, biodiversity loss, and climate change.

As the world’s biggest palm oil producers, Malaysia and Indonesia reacted to the plan. They pointed out to the potential economic repercussions especially increased unemployment and poverty. Subsequent revised Renewable Energy Directive (REDII) agreed by the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU in June 2018 in the end ascertained that palm oil imports to the EU will neither be banned nor restricted, but emphasising instead on the need to improve and clarify the sustainability of the sources.

The dynamics at the international level coincided with the plunging global price of Crude Palm Oil (CPO) that has continued since mid-2017. Consequently in Indonesia, the price of palm oil fresh fruit bunches went down to Rp 600 (SGD 6 cents) per kg in November 2018. For smallholder farmers who accounted for about 40% of total Indonesian oil palm acreage, this was a devastating news as the sales of fresh fruit bunches can barely cover the costs of production.

Indonesia Domestic Response

In response to increasingly anxious small farmers whose income mostly come from their palm oil crops, President Joko Widodo recently advised them to discontinue growing palm oil and plant other commodities like coffee, bitter bean and mangosteen instead. Notwithstanding other aspects, the proposed ban has largely been perceived as a major factor that contributed to the price downward trend.

While the future of the CPO price and the fate of small growers in Indonesia and elsewhere remain uncertain for now, this case highlights the importance of a just transition that bridges environmental and economic concerns. Under climate actions, certain sectors like the fossil fuels and palm oil are under strong pressures to either go greener or lose market share.

When millions of people depend on these affected sectors for their livelihood, it is critical that the right preparations are put in place to ensure that they can continue to live a decent life. Despite a lack of limelight, the Silesia Declaration therefore sent a very important message for states and relevant stakeholders to follow up.

*Margareth Sembiring is an Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.

By JD Flynn

A man who says he was serially sexually abused by Archbishop Theodore McCarrick testified Thursday as part of a Vatican investigation regarding the archbishop’s history of sexual abuse and misconduct.

James Grein testified Dec. 27 in a canonical deposition conducted by officials of the Archdiocese of New York, the Associated Press has reported.

Grein’s attorney, Patrick Noaker, told CNA that the New York officials were acting as “auditors,” or delegates of the Holy See, adding that Grein was told that his testimony was part of an administrative process at the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, the Vatican office charged with investigating and adjudicating charges of clerical sexual abuse.

Grein claims that McCarrick, who was a family friend, began abusing him in the late 1970s, when he was 11 years old and McCarrick was in his late 30s and a priest of the Archdiocese of New York.

In July, Grein told the New York Times that the abuse continued for the next 18 years, he said, during which time McCarrick was consecrated a bishop and served as auxiliary bishop of New York, and diocesan bishop of Metuchen and then Newark.

Grein’s testimony this week alleged that McCarrick repeatedly groped and assualted him during confession, his lawyer said. Grein also testified that McCarrick sexually assualted him in a car, later telling the boy’s mother that Grein had spilled a soda, in order to explain a mess in the car.

In November 2000, McCarrick was appointed Archbishop of Washington, where he served until his 2006 retirement. In 2001, he was elevated to the College of Cardinals. About a week after Grein’s allegation was published in the New York Times, McCarrick resigned from the College of Cardinals.

Noaker told CNA that the Archdiocese of New York invited Grein to make a statement for the Vatican about one month ago. The lawyer said he got a call last week asking that Grein testify as soon possible.

The lawyer said that he was told the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith is considering trying McCarrick for three canonical crimes the archbishop could have committed while abusing Grein: the broad prohibition in canon 1395 §1 prohibiting “persisting with scandal in..[an] external sin against the sixth commandment;” the specific prohibition in canon 1395 §2 prohibiting sexual abuse against a minor; and the crime of solicitation of a penitent in the confessional, established in canon 1387.

A trial or administrative penal process pertaining to those crimes could lead to McCarrick’s laicization. Noaker said he was told that that the “Vatican wants this finalized by the second week of February- the entire case” against McCarrick.

In June, it was announced that a New York review board had found charges that McCarrick had abused another youth to be “credible and substantiated.” While additional allegations of coercive and abusive sexual behavior were subsequently made against the archbishop, he was until now expected to face canonical charges only in the initial case of abuse.

Grein’s testimony suggests that the archbishop could now be canonically tried for abusing multiple victims.

A spokesman for the Archdiocese of New York told CNA that he was unable to provide details on how Grein’s testimony might fit into Vatican procedures against McCarrick. This was “not an archdiocese of New York process,” Joe Zwilling told CNA. “This is a Vatican process.”

Noaker told CNA the abuse McCarrick is alleged to have committed during the sacrament of confession has had profound effect on Grein.

“McCarrick integrated the abuse into the sacrament,” Noaker said, alleging that McCarrick would molest Grein’s genitals while discussing the virtue of chastity. “That really hurt James.”

“This case illuminated for me how damaging it is for someone to be as vulnerable as they are when they come into confession and then to be sexually manipulated during that sacrament.”

The lawyer said that testifying against McCarrick has been difficult for Grein. When Grein recounted a particularly troubling incident, Noaker said, “he closed his eyes, and you could see him going back to that moment, and it was especially gruesome sexual assault, and it was upsetting just to be there.”

“He came out pretty worn out.”

“He has been so courageous, to go back to these moments,” Noaker said.

While many victims take pains to avoid addressing their sexual abuse, he said, Grein has approached the matter head on.

“Turning around and running at it is not without its pains.” Noaker added. “He did it knowingly and willingly, but not happily.”

Grein has filed a claim in a victims’ assistance program, the Independent Reconciliation and Compensation Program of the Archdiocese of New York, Noaker said, but has not yet received indication of whether he will be offered a financial settlement. Noaker said he expects notification to be forthcoming.

The lawyer said that Grein is most interested in healing from his abuse.

“He really wants his Church back. He just wants to be able to go to Church again, and find peace again, and, you know sure, I’m not sure we’re going to get that for him,” Noaker said.

“He said probably ten times yesterday, ‘I just want my Church back. I would like to have Jesus in my life again.’”

A friend called my attention to this Project Syndicate piece by Kenneth Rogoff, a Harvard economics professor and former chief economist at the I.M.F. Rogoff  argues that Russia will need major economic reform and political reform in order for its economy to get back on a healthy growth path.

In the course of making his argument, Rogoff makes a quick and dirty case that the fact Putin was able to win re-election despite the economic downturn in 2015-2016 resulting from the collapse of world oil prices, shows that the country is not a western democracy.

“The shock to the real economy has been severe, with Russia suffering a decline in output in 2015 and 2016 comparable to what the United States experienced during its 2008-2009 financial crisis, with the contraction in GDP totalling about 4%. …..

“In a western democracy, an economic collapse on the scale experienced by Russia would have been extremely difficult to digest politically, as the global surge in populism demonstrates. Yet Putin has been able to remain firmly in control and, in all likelihood, will easily be able to engineer another landslide victory in the presidential election due in March 2018.”

First, the I.M.F. data to which Rogoff links, does not support his story of an economic collapse in Russia. The reported decline in GDP is 2.7 percent, not the 4.0 percent claimed by Rogoff. And, it is more than reversed by the growth in 2017 and projected growth in 2018. In other words, there does not seem to be much of a story of economic collapse here.

But the idea that a Russian government could not stay in power through an economic downturn, if it were democratic, is an interesting one. According to the I.M.F., Russia’s economy shrank by more than 25 percent from 1992 to 1996 under Boris Yeltsin, a close U.S. ally. Yet, he managed to be re-elected in 1996 despite an economic decline that was an order of magnitude larger than the one under Putin from 2014 to 2016. By the Rogoff theory, we can infer that Yeltsin should not have been able to win re-election through democratic means.

This article originally appeared on Dean Baker’s Beat the Press blog.

It doesn’t bode well for accountability or fiscal probity that in unceremoniously shit-canning his Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, the petulant President Donald Trump elevated in his stead as acting secretary Mattis’s number two, Deputy Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan.

If you said, “Shanahan who?” welcome to the club. This was about as invisible a bureaucrat as you could imagine. And little wonder. Shanahan is a guy who, like the president who nominated him to his post as the number two civilian leader of the Pentagon, has never served in the military, and whose experience prior to that was basically as a middle management cog at Boeing. His positions there included vice president and general manager of several Boeing operations and, as a career peak, senior vice president of supply chain operations.

Now I’m the last person to claim that someone running what should, in all honesty, be still called the US War Department instead of the absurdly euphemistic Defense Department, ought to come to the job having had some experience in the military, but still, all in all this seems to be a pretty thin resume for a guy taking charge of the agency that accounts for more than half off all discretionary spending by the federal government, and someone who is charged with advising the president on key issues relating to national security.

Shanahan, in his brief role as Deputy Secretary of War/Defense, was dragged out of his bureaucratic obscurity only once, as far as I can tell, and that was on November 15, when he held a press conference to announce that the Pentagon had failed its first-ever outside audit. (I guess Mad-Dog Mattis wasn’t mad enough to want to have to take responsibility for that embarrassing debacle.)

As I reported at the time in the lead paragraph of my cover story in the current issue of the Nation Magazine headlined: “Exposing the Pentagon’s Massive Accounting Fraud,” Shanahan told the assembled media scrum, “We failed the audit, but we never expected to pass it.” He went on to claim that the Pentagon should actually get credit for trying, saying, “It was an audit on a $2.7-trillion organization, so the fact that we did the audit is substantial.”

Shanahan managed, with the assistance of a friendly press corps who were either inappropriately polite or simply historically ignorant, to cover up the reality that the Pentagon had actually been forced by Congress to finally submit to an attempted audit by 1200 auditors from the nation’s leading audit firms after 27 years of stonewalling a Congressional mandate to develop an auditable set of books.

Like all his predecessors in the leadership of the Pentagon dating back to 1990, when Congress passed the CFO Act requiring all federal departments and agencies to have auditable books and regular outside audits, Shanahan did his best during his short tenure to avoid making the Pentagon’s budget and spending record transparent and understandable.

The reality is that under Shanahan and his soon-to-be-cashiered boss Sec. Mattis, as under prior Pentagon leaders, neither Congress nor any inquisitive media (if there still are any), nor any of us taxpayers have the remotest idea how the Pentagon spends the astonishing trillion or so dollars that are annually shoveled its way by the US Treasury Department, and that’s the whole point of keeping the budget totally opaque and filled with purely fake numbers called, in the Pentagon’s darkly humorous jargon, “plugs.” Nor, it would appear, does this guy who is so ready to excuse himself and the department for this abject and apparently willful failure at a first audit exercise, plan to let us learn more in the future.

Probably the best thing that can be said about Acting Secretary Shanahan is that he probably won’t be top dog at the Pentagon for long. President Trump is no doubt poring through his ever briefer list of potential cabinet candidates willing to work for such a mercurial, egotistical and buck-passing chief executive, trying to find someone he can persuade to be permanent (sort of) Secretary of Defense (sic).

At this point, if it were serious about finding out how the Pentagon really spends all its money, Congress would be demanding that the president nominate a leading accountant for the post of Pentagon Secretary.

Meanwhile all we’ve got running the place is a guy who made light of the biggest audit failure in the history of accounting, and then tried to get credit for simply allowing outsiders to look at the colossal and indecipherable mess that passes for the Pentagon’s bookkeeping before throwing up their hands and saying an audit couldn’t be done.

The CEO and CFO of Enron both did hard prison time for a much less dramatic accounting fiasco. Shanahan got promoted.

Today’s news featured two important stories about the Daghestanis and the Vaynakh nations, one highlighting the ways in which the birthrate in both Muslim areas has fallen far more radically over the last year than anywhere else in Russia and the second showing that Daghestanis are modernizing far more rapidly than the Vaynakhs.

According to Rosstat, the number of children born in Daghestan in October fell by 24.6 percent from the same period a year earlier. The equivalent figures for Chechnya and Ingushetia, the two Vaynakh republics, were 26.2 percent and 10.8 percent respectively (riaderbent.ru/v-dagestane-i-chechne-rezko-upala-i-rozhdaemost-i-smertnost.html).

All three republics thus had far greater declines than that in Russia as a whole, where the number of newborns was 2.7 percent lower this October than in October 2017.  These enormous declines in the North Caucasus almost certainly reflect the coming together of three different developments.

First, Rosstat is now using new statistical measures, and these may have failed to count all the newborns in the North Caucasus, thus overstating the decline in births there. Second, there has been a secular decline in the birthrate among Muslim nationalities, one that is bringing their birthrates closer to the historically much lower rates among non-Muslims like the Russians.

And third, the declines clearly reflect the deteriorating economic situation in the region, one that is driving many younger men to move away to work as migrant laborers in major Russian cities and thus be less likely to father children at home.  That is a problem that the also economically hard-pressed Russians mostly do not have.

A new study, entitled The Values of Vaynakh Muslim: Results of a Poll was posted on the Kavkaz-Uzel portal today. (The full study in Russian is available online at kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/itogi_oprosa_vaynahov_musulman/; it is summarized at kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/329697/.)

The new study focuses on the Vaynakhs but draws on earlier research on Daghestanis to compare and contrast the Chechens and Ingush, on the one hand, and the various nationalities of Daghestan, on the other.  The compilers stress that their study is suggestive rather than definitive; but their findings are nonetheless intriguing.

Their overarching conclusion is that “traditional relations in Daghestan have been undermined to a much greater extent than in Ingushetia and Chechnya and that individualization of attitudes and openness to social contradictions has become the norm” in Daghestan but not in Chechnya or Ingushetia. 

“Among Daghestanis,” they suggest their data show, “the destruction of  generational hierarchies is much more significantly expressed than among the Vaynakhs, with generational hierarchies more important for Sufis and traditional Muslims than for traditional and [so-called] ethnic Muslims.”

The Vaynakhs overall are more suspicious of outsiders than are the Daghestanis, the study suggests, and more deferential to elders than are Muslims in Daghestan. What is especially interesting is that non-traditional Muslims among the Vaynakhs are “more inclined to trust people than Daghestanis, but traditional Muslims among the Vaynakhs are less so.”

Super luxury passenger vessel M.V. Marella Discovery of Marella Cruises with 1,732 passengers and 764 crew on board made her maiden call at the Port of Colombo recently.Managing Director of Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA) Capt. Athula Hewavitharana said that the Port of Colombo was honoured by the presence of Marella Discovery in Colombo.

Marella Cruises (formerly Thomson Cruises) is a British cruise line offering cruise holidays around Europe, the Caribbean and Asia.Marella Discovery is approximately 264 meters in length and 32 meters wide having 902 state rooms with a capacity to accommodate up to 2,074 passengers.The excursions organised by Aitken Spence Travels had over 1,000 passengers joining in to enjoy the city and immediate locations of Sri Lanka such as the Colombo heritage walk, exploring the city of Galle and Sri Lankan river safari.

Marella Discovery commenced its voyage from Europe calling at Italy, Crete and moving onto Egypt, Jordan, Oman, U.A.E. and several ports in India on her way to Sri Lanka and will thereafter cruise towards Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia. The vessel that cruised under the flag of Malta called Colombo from Cochin, India and Sabang, Indonesia is her next port of call.

To mark the maiden call of the vessel at the Port of Colombo plaque exchanges were held between the Master of the vessel, SLPA, local agents – Aitken Spence Shipping Ltd and travel operator, Aitken Spence Travels Ltd.

On behalf of the Sri Lanka Ports Authority Capt. Athula Hewavitharana, Managing Director exchanged plaques with the Master of Marella Discovery, Capt. Christopher N. Dodds, IqramCuttilan, Managing Director of Aitken Spence Shipping and NalinJayasundera, Managing Director of Aitken Spence Travels exchanged plaques with the Master on behalf of the Aitken Spence Group subsidiaries.

By Kabir Taneja

Last week, US President Donald Trump took to Twitter to announce that he would withdraw troops in Syria who had been aiding anti-ISIS and anti-Assad groups, leading the Western coalition against ISIS operating under the Operation Inherent Resolve umbrella. However, the president’s announcement that the US has “defeated” ISIS, one that was conveyed to American allies, perhaps characteristically for the current administration, via Twitter, is an ill-informed and ill-conceived outlook on Syrian crisis with both regional and international ramifications.

The narrative of ISIS being “defeated”, is not new, and Trump’s position that he intended to withdraw US troops from the conflict is also not an overnight development. In March 2018, at a rally in the state of Ohio, the president announced that the US would withdraw from the Syrian theatre soon. While the decision to do so was perhaps known, it is the manner in which it was executed that became inherently problematic.

The reactions to the president’s tweets on the issue from allies such as Britain, France and Israel, who in all likeliness found out about the decision via social media, was in unison to condemn this move. Britain, America’s closest ally, stood strongly against the decision reiterating that the ISIS threat is still ‘very much alive’.

The fallout of this Twitter decree by the president was significant. US Secretary of Defense, Gen. James Mattis, a veteran who was scoffed at by a large section of US media prior to his appointment for being a hawk resigned.

In a turn of events over the past two years, Gen. Mattis was today seen as the most reasonable Trump official and one that could reign in erratic decision making in the White House. To make matters worse, the chief of Operation Inherent Resolve against ISIS, Brett McGurk, who had led the US response in Syria and Iraq, and was seen as the one critical element keeping the Western coalition together, quit two months earlier than his intended retirement after Mattis’s announcement. Both Mattis and McGurk, had repeatedly re-affirmed US support to anti-ISIS groups in Syria, this was seen as a betrayel to their promises by their own leadership.

The retention and momentum of anti-ISIS operations by President Trump was handed over to Turkey over a phone call, despite Ankara’s history of clandestinely allowing ISIS to fester in Syria and Iraq during its formative years in order to create some sort of buffer against the Kurds, their bid for an independent nation and Turkish fight against Kurdish group Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane (PKK or the Kurdistan Workers’ Party). Turkey’s presence in the northern parts of Syria is not new, and while current concentration of ISIS presence is situated in and around the desert regions of Deir Ezzor, which is south and deep into Syria, far away from the Turkish border, it remains to be seen how Ankara, if at all, plans to operate in Syria now. The Turkey-backed militias also include Islamist groups, who while being anti-Assad, intend to develop their own Islamist structures around the territories they command. Meanwhile, ISIS itself has gone from commanding geography near the size of the United Kingdom to almost nothing, however, this loss of territory does not amount to the end of ISIS itself. Even in its pre-ISIS avatar, the group and its thinking had prevailed through multiple names, including Al Qaeda in Iraq. Reports of ISIS claimed attacks in Iraq continue, and the power vacuums and the region’s social-political sectarian smorgasbord remain active challenges.

While it is true that foreign powers and their military interventions are not the solution, and have proven to be counter-productive more than often, pulling the plug on ongoing operations only gives space for the resilience of terror groups in the region to stage comebacks whether in behemoth organized forms such as the Islamic State or in their traditional design, that of smaller insurgency movements.

Benjamin Bahney and Patrick B. Johnston in their important 2017 essay published by Foreign Affairs magazine titled ‘ISIS Could Rise Again’ highlight the fact that ISIS already has a good record of resurgence, and the group has a “tried-and-true playbook for bringing itself back from near death”. ISIS has seen resilience within Iraq and Syria while also maintaining sizeable control in its two main foreign establishments, namely Afghanistan and Libya. While ISIS Khorasan expanded in Afghanistan at an intense pace, using infrastructure of the Haqqani Network to build an ecosystem that rivals that of the Taliban in some spaces such as Kabul, it continues to claim attacks in Libya, a residue nation after an arguably ill-planned intervention by Western powers in 2011. The latest attack in Tripoli, the Libyan capital, was claimed by ISIS while this piece was being written. Pro-ISIS groups in the African Sahel, also continue to fester.

The Kurds have been at the forefront of the fight against the so-called Islamic State, receiving much of the training from NATO states and American troops serving as “advisers” to the conflict.

While the future of Syria post the defeat of the caliphate has been unclear for a long time, such an abrupt withdrawal by the US is perhaps less surprising than the manner in which it was conducted by the White House, keeping both the Pentagon and NATO allies in the dark. This supersedes on what is the premier cause for concern. It is not the withdrawal itself, but the deft manner in which it was conducted, without debate or due process keep its allies in mind, causing uneasiness over America’s role in the global order, and the undermining of its institutions. To put it in perspective, this withdrawal was also followed by a troop-reduction in Afghanistan, a country that in its seventeenth year of war against the Taliban, as part of America’s ‘war on terror’, is precariously balanced today on the possibility of a Taliban victory. One of the major fears in countries such as India, which has big stakes in Afghan security, is that Trump could also initiate a complete pull out of Afghanistan without consulting partner nations or regional players, potentially leaving a second-time failed state open to all elements.

It is important to reiterate that the US deployed its troops against ISIS primarily as advisers, and it has been the locals, the Iraqi armed forces in Iraq and Kurdish militias in Syria that had been the biggest aid to Western operations to defeat the Islamic State. While ground troops were deployed in strategic roles, it has been the Western air power that has played an absolute critical role in the degrading of the caliphate. Without this air support, the outcome of the campaign could have been drastically different. The US-led coalition would still be required, after a military campaign, to conduct capacity building measures to make sure resurgence of ISIS, or another ISIS-like entity is avoided.

A Taliban commander is known to have once said to the US invasion of Afghanistan that ‘they (US) have watches, but we have the time’. That one side, if willing, can wait out a far superior enemy in a conflict. A reformation of ISIS as an insurgency, emboldened by an end of the supply and training channels of anti-ISIS campaigns, specifically the Kurds, could be just this waiting to happen once again. While the US campaign in Syria has been convoluted since the Obama administration’s utterly muddled approach to the issue, the current ad-hoc thinking to re-mold American foreign policy by way of systemic institutional anarchy is only going to aid anti-democratic powers across the world. Including ISIS.

It should be a sign for this Indian giant, a company that has done much to illustrate the ethical and moral bankruptcy in Australia’s political classes. Despite support stretching from Canberra to rural Queensland, lifted by the fantasy of job creation, Adani is yet to dig the earth of what would have been one of the largest mining complexes on the planet.

For one thing, a downsizing was announced suggesting a more compact operation that would supposedly fly under the radar of detractors. From its initial, lofty ambitions of a $16.5 billion investment, Adani Mining chief executive Lucas Dow now suggests a less extravagant $2 billion reliant on existing rail infrastructure. Even here, the mission to establish a new coal mine seems grotesque given the dire warnings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. While Adani mines, the world cooks.

There is more than a sense that Adani is a poisoned chalice best avoided by all concerned – unless you are an Australian energy or resources minister incapable of evaluating history or the future prospects of fossil fuels. This point is particularly problematic given the admission by Indian officials that coal is going off the books at such a rate that the Carmichael project is destined to become the most muddle headed of white elephants. Indeed, existing thermal coal power in India costs twice what renewable generation does.

The outlook for such analysts as the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis is glum for the coal romantics and fossil fuel adorers. “Exports have declined since 2015,” goes its report last month, “and more contraction is expected. High export revenues entirely reflect current high prices which are themselves partially a result of declining investment in thermal coal mining.”

Banks have refused to grant a line of finance. Insurance and reinsurance companies have resisted supplying cover for the coal mine – among them, AXA, SCOR, FM Global, QBE and Suncorp. Some insurance companies – Allianz, Munich Re, Swiss Re, Zurich and Generali – have environmental policies that preclude engagement with the project.

The hope for Adani is that various ditherers and the morally lax might still be in the market to cover this enterprise of pure environmental buccaneering: US re-insurer giants such as AIG, AXIS Capital and Berkshire Hathaway have yet to make their stance on this clear.

Such reluctance was prompted, in no small part, by the efforts of 73 environmental organisations, topped by a letter to 30 global insurance and reinsurance companies sent earlier this month. Such groups have been unrelenting in emphasising the dangers posed by the Carmichael project. These do not only entail the mining operations themselves but the rail line linked to the export terminal that would threaten the Great Barrier Reef. Biodiversity and a World Heritage Site remain vulnerable targets before a company renowned for its rapacity towards worker and environment.

Other animals have also become talismans of resistance to the project, assuming titanic proportions for opponents. The Black-throated finch has become something of an activists’ cult, marked by the Black-throated Finch Recovery Team’s insistence that Adani’s reassurances in their protection and preservation are, at best, woeful. A promise to conduct surveys twice a year hardly counted, and the experts were being given the cold shoulder in what was deemed a “closed book consultation”. Adani insists on those who sing appropriate tunes.

The company’s response has been that of a diligent, agonised box ticker keen on following process. “The claims that the process has not been ‘followed on a number of different levels,’” went a rebuking spokesperson for the company last year, “is without basis as Adani has followed the legislation and conditions set in close consultation with the Federal and Queensland governments.”

Then there is a sticking point that refuses to go away: Adani’s promised, seemingly unquenchable thirst. Up to 12.5 billion litres of water drawn from the Suttor River in central Queensland is being sought to aid the open-cut coal effort. The misnamed Environment Minister’s portfolio, inhabited by the near invisible Melissa Price, did not feel any pressing concerns for conducting an assessment on how damaging such a move would be.

Again, Adani is there with qualifiers and dismissive counters, which are hard things to pull off, given the persistent trouble of drought in Queensland: the issue of the mandatory water trigger, which comes into play in such significant projects, should only apply to water used in the coal extraction process, rather than its overall plan of water usage which it has conveniently softened as a water strategy. As the Australian Department of the Environment and Energy explains, “stand-alone proposals which involve only associated infrastructure, such as pipelines, are not captured by the water trigger because they do not directly involve the extraction of coal”. Such bureaucratic riddling does well in Canberra.

The Australian Conservation Foundation is not impressed, and is taking the matter to the Federal Court. By not considering the issue of how broad the water trigger was, Price had erred in a matter of law. As things stand, Price and her colleagues, in connivance with Adani, are erring on a lot more besides, making the campaign against the mine a fundamental counter against permissible and ultimately scandalous environmental vandalism.

US President Donald J. Trump’s campaign to cripple Iran economically by imposing harsh economic sanctions and force either changes in Iran’s regional policies or even better, regime change, have gotten off to a relatively slow start. With much of the international community pledging to salvage the 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program after Trump withdrew from the deal in May, the United States is discovering that enforcing the sanctions that aim to reduce Iranian oil exports to zero, cripple its shipping industry, and cut the Islamic republic out of the international financial system is easier said than done. While Iran will likely feel significant pain, Europe, China, and Russia have pledged to soften the blow to the degree possible by continuing to purchase Iranian oil, invest in the Islamic republic and create mechanisms to do business in currencies other than the US dollar.

The jury is out on whether that persuades Iran that the advantages of sticking to the nuclear agreement outweigh the disadvantages. That in turn could depend largely on Europe’s ability to ensure that Iran is not excluded from the Brussels-based Society for the Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) international financial messaging system used by more than 10,000 banks worldwide for their more than 30 million transactions a day or is able to create one or more special purpose vehicles to which China, India, South Korea, Japan, and Turkey, who accounted for 70 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2017, would have access.

A Stuttering Start

President Trump’s severe economic sanctions appeared to be manoeuvring an obstacle course even before they kicked in on November 5 despite US estimates that the measures had already led to a reduction of Iranian oil exports from 2.7 million to 1.6 million barrels a day. The impression that the sanctions were getting off to a modest start was reinforced by the fact that the United States gave eight countries, including the major importers of Iranian oil — China, India, South Korea, Japan, Italy, Greece, Taiwan and Turkey – 180-day waivers that, according to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, had already reduced their purchases from the Islamic republic.  China, India, South Korea, Japan, and Turkey accounted for 70 percent of Iranian oil exports in 2017.(3) Earlier the US Treasury issued a license that allows an Iranian-backed gas field in the North Sea that accounts for three percent of Britain’s gas supply to keep operating.(4)

Pompeo said the waivers were designed to “ensure a well-supplied oil market.” He mentioned two of the eight countries had pledged to reduce their imports to zero within the six-month period of the waiver, while the other six had agreed to “greatly reduced levels.”(5) Trump defended the waivers, saying he was going slow on the imposition of the sanctions to prevent shocks in the oil market and a spike in prices. “I could get the Iran oil down to zero immediately, but it would cause a shock to the market. I don’t want to lift oil prices,” Trump told reporters.(6

The United States has also trumpeted the fact that the sanctions sparked the collapse of the Iranian currency, the rial, wreaking havoc on the average Iranian. Unemployment is shooting up, especially among the country’s youth, inflation is spiralling higher because of the cost of imported goods, and there have been water and power shortages due to a lack of infrastructure investment after years of on-again, off-again sanctions.(7) Raising fears that Iran would ration fuel and hike prices, the government in December reintroduced fuel cards to put a halt on smuggling of up to 40 million litres a day.(8) Smuggling of other subsidized goods such as pharmaceuticals and foodstuffs as well as non-subsidized items like textiles has reportedly increased sevenfold in recent months.(9)

The Trump administration hopes the sanctions will complicate the Iranian support for groups like Lebanon’s Hezbollah Shiite militia and the Houthis in Yemen, as well as its military operations in Syria by forcing the Islamic republic to reduce military spending. It bases its hope on the fact that in the decade prior to the lifting of sanctions as part of the 2015 nuclear agreement, Iranian military spending dropped by 30 percent, “one of the highest percentage decreases in military spending globally,” according to Iranian researchers Sajjad F. Dizaji and Mohammad Farzanegan.(10)

The researchers argued that the difference in the sanction regime prior to the agreement and the current US measures is that the Trump administration’s sanctions are unilateral rather than multilateral. “While unilateral sanctions are not shown to influence Iran’s military burden significantly, the impact of multilateral sanctions is negative and statistically significant,” Dizaji and Farzanegan said. Military expenditures, moreover, account for only three percent of Iran’s gross domestic product.(11) Even so, the International Crisis Group concluded that the period of multilateral sanctions and reduced military expenditure “coincided with what many consider the most significant expansion of Iran’s military intervention in the region.”(12)

Reality Kicks In

The implication of Trump’s and Pompeo’s remarks on waivers was that increased production by suppliers such as Saudi Arabia and Russia, while compensating for the reduced Iranian oil sales, could spark a fight for market share, which could fuel price increases. They also suggested that the United States believed that there was currently not oil in the market to replace Iranian crude. The United States’ assumption appears to be that Iran, a country with a long experience in circumventing sanctions, may have an oil industry that remains robust despite its travails.

The waivers recognized that the countries involved had no immediate alternative sources for oil. Three of the eight waiver recipients — Greece, Italy and Turkey — are members of NATO. Japan and South Korea have mutual defense treaties with the United States and play key roles in the North Korea denuclearization initiative. India, the world’s largest democracy, is crucial to the administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy, which seeks to unite countries in the region to counter China’s growing assertiveness. China is the largest importer of Iranian oil. Forcing it to seek alternatives would have sparked shock tremors in the market.

US officials attribute their apparent success in already reducing Iranian exports to the strength of their alliances and the fact that countries and companies do not want to risk being barred from access to US markets.(13) Japan and South Korea stopped buying Iranian crude ahead of the sanctions. Japan nonetheless negotiated a waiver for 100,000 barrels per day, down from the 165,000 barrels it was buying prior to the threat of US measures while South Korea was granted a quota of 200,000 barrels a day.(14) The two countries said they were looking to renew imports in January.

India is officially asserting that it is importing at the agreed rate of 360,000 barrels per day.(15) By the same token, Indian claims that it had significantly reduced imports prior to the waiver are countered, says energy analyst Ellen R. Wald, quoting TankTracker com. The online monitor of oil tankers reported that Indian oil imports from Iran remained virtually unchanged in recent months. Iranian exports are frequently hidden by tankers that make stops at multiple Gulf ports and at times shut down their responders to camouflage their movements. “The data on oil movements show conclusively that Iran’s oil exports have not decreased nearly as much as the media narrative has suggested… Oil speculators and the Trump administration have been led to believe that the threat of impending sanctions on Iran’s oil is removing so much from the market that oil prices could skyrocket to $100 per barrel this year. The actual data on Iran’s oil exports contradict this,” Wald said.(16)

Moreover, relatively unnoticed was a non-oil related waiver granted to India that allows it to maintain its infrastructural investment in the Iranian port of Chabahar on the shore of the Arabian Sea, a mere 70 kilometres from the Chinese-backed Pakistani port of Gwadar.(17) The port would facilitate Indian links to Central Asia by bypassing arch rival Pakistan, contribute to economic development in Afghanistan and pre-empt Chinese efforts to gain a foothold in Chabahar. Similarly, there is no indication that the US will sanction Russian, Chinese, and European companies assisting Iran with its nuclear sites, Fordow, Arak, and Busher.(18)

China is one joker in the pack. It negotiated a waiver for 360,000 barrels per day but retains the right to production from fields in Iran in which Chinese companies have a stake. They include China National Petroleum Corp’s (CNBC) 75 percent stake in Iran’s MIS and the North Azadegan oilfield. China moreover has a history in busting sanctions against Iran. In the years prior to the nuclear agreement, China used the Bank of Kunlun, established in 2006 in its troubled, oil-producing north-western region of Xinjiang as its handler of Iranian oil payments in violation of US and UN sanctions. The bank was sanctioned by the US Treasury for its business with Iran, including transferring funds to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps. Kunlun in October halted yuan and euro denominated payments from Iran in anticipation of the US sanctions.(19)

Turkey is another joker. Refusing to bend to the US sanctions would enhance its goal of exploiting its geography to become a gas and oil transit hub. To do so, Turkey will have to extend its current gas agreement with Iran that risks losing its Turkish market share to producers like Qatar, Russia Azerbaijan and the United States. The question is whether Iran can make a gas agreement sufficiently attractive in terms of pricing as well as facilitating Turkish objectives in Syria where it is determined to stymie Kurdish aspirations.

Payments and pricing are but one, albeit the most immediate issue. Longer term, Iran will face significant difficulty if it can’t secure the technologies to enhance production from its predominantly mature oilfields. Iran currently uses out-of-date technologies like pumping natural gas into the old oil fields to produce ever-dwindling amounts of oil. That is likely to become untenable with retail, commercial and industrial gas consumption on the rise. Countries like China and Russia are unlikely to meet standards of technologies developed in the United States and Europe.” As long as Washington can prevent it from obtaining vital enhanced oil recovery technologies, Iran’s economy will become increasingly fragile,” said energy scholar Micha’el Tanchum.(20)

The November sanctions constituted round two. Earlier sanctions imposed in August targeted Iran’s steel, aluminium and auto sectors by limiting access to raw materials and essential parts. They prompted together with the prospect of the November sanctions major European companies like Total, A.P. Moller-Maersk, Peugeot, Renault, Airbus, Alstom and Siemens to withdraw from Iran. “There is a primacy of the (US) political system. If that primacy is ‘This is what you are going to do,’ then that is exactly what we are going to do. We are a global company. We have interest and values and we have to balance both,” said Joe Kaeser, the chief executive of German industrial conglomerate Siemens.(21) Put more forcefully, Pompeo’s special advisor on Iran, Brian Hook, quipped: “If you are the CEO of a European company and you are given the choice between doing business in the United States market or the Iranian market, that is the fastest decision you will ever make as CEO.”(22)

With Iran pushing Europe to put in place mechanisms to counter the US sanctions, European leaders are struggling to neutralize the measures while ensuring that European entities are shielded against being barred from the US market for doing business with Iran. European authorities have so far to convince the continent’s companies that they are able to do so.

Walking a Tightrope

If the withdrawal of European companies is one indication of the difficulty in countering sanctions, SWIFT, the financial messaging system, is another. SWIFT is caught between a rock and a hard place. The Trump administration has so far refrained giving it a waiver. As a result, SWIFT’s board of directors made up of representatives of major international banks risk being slapped with travel bans and asset freezes if the organization continues to do business with Iran.

To counter the US threat, the European Union invoked in July a blocking statute that makes US court decisions and administrative actions regarding sanctions on Iran void in Europe. It also prohibits Europe-based firms from discontinuing their business ties to Iran due to foreign sanctions.(23) The blocking statute was intended to not only shield European companies but also convince Iran that it was in its interests to remain committed to the nuclear accord.

“It’s a difficult exercise because the weight of the U.S. in the global economy and financial system is obviously relevant. But we are determined to preserve this deal,” said European Union foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini.(24) How difficult is evidenced by the fact that European measures have so far failed to produce convincing results. Without referring to the US sanctions, SWIFT said in early November that it was disconnecting an undisclosed number of unidentified Iranian banks.(25) Some 30 Iranian banks are connected to SWIFT. The impact that a disconnection from SWIFT would have was evident in 2012 when SWIFT complied with UN and EU sanctions. The disconnection wiped off almost half the value of the Iranian oil sector reducing revenues from oil exports from US$92.5 billion to USS52 billion.(26)

The odds in a US-EU battle over SWIFT are, however, not unequivocally in Washington’s favour. US sanctions would significantly impact the global financial system and threaten America’s dominant position. “We must increase Europe’s autonomy and sovereignty in trade, economic and financial policies,” said German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas.(27) Europe appears to be putting its money where its mouth is by developing a system of its own that would handle financial transactions with Iran and be immune to US sanctions. Dubbed a special purpose vehicle, the system would be open to Russia and China, both of which are signatories to the nuclear agreement, as well as other countries. European officials were also looking at a barter system that would allow Iran to sell oil and use the proceeds to purchase goods or technology from Europe.(28)

The special purpose vehicles would be designed to reduce the number of financial transactions with Iran by bundling them and to shield commercial banks by limiting their role. The advantage of multiple vehicles would allow sanctions busters to differentiate between sanctionable and non-sanctionable transactions. They could also cater to different business segments including small and medium-sized enterprises that often have no exposure to the United States, the oil industry, as well as sectors like automotive and aviation. European officials privately concede that oil traders are unlikely to avail themselves of the special vehicle(s).

The vehicles could be stand-alone state-owned banks or clearing houses for companies that transfer money to Iran, repatriate funds from the country, or engage in barter trade with it.(29) The vehicles would avoid cross-border transactions that would be easier to monitor by US authorities by arranging that a European importer of Iranian goods gets paid by a European exporter. They would further coordinate payments in ways that exporters would be paid from funds outside of Iran while importers would be paid by funds within Iran.

Iran scholar and media company owner Esfandyar Batmanghelidj and policy analyst Axel Hellman argued that Europe could kickstart its vehicle initiative with one is that is focussed on the humanitarian sector that is not included in the sanctions regime. “Companies active in food and pharmaceuticals…have the longest-standing and arguably most important presence in Iran. Companies like Nestle, Novo Nordisk, Sanofi, and Unilever—which sell the high-volume packaged foods, cleaning products, and medicines that households depend on—are at the heart of the most important commercial ecosystem in Iran, which includes Iran’s private sector and its vibrant consumer class… Despite the exemptions for trade in food, medicine, and many consumer products, Iran’s trade in these goods is restricted by the limited number of European banks willing to receive payments from Iranian importers. The SPV would serve to increase the volume of trade that can be conducted given the current state of banking ties,” Batmanghelidj and Hellman said.(30)

The European initiative is but one effort fuelled by the threat of sanctions against SWIFT to develop alternative systems including ones using blockchain, a technology that uses cryptography, that is already being considered by Russia and Iran.(31) Russia already uses a significantly cheaper alternative to SWIFT for domestic payments and is marketing it to foreign institutions.(32) China is developing a similar system.(33)

Conclusion

The jury is out on the likely effectiveness of crippling sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States aimed at forcing the Islamic republic to alter its regional policy. Similarly, the fate of the 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear agreement hangs in the balance after the US withdrew from the deal and re-imposed sanctions. The success of US policy and the agreement’s continued viability depend on the ability of Iran’s oil buyers and world powers, including Europe, China, Russia, India, Japan and South Korea to cushion the impact of the sanctions. They also depend on the degree to which the United States is forced to allow exemptions to the sanctions in its effort to balance its harsh approach towards Iran with its other geo-political concerns. The record so far suggests that Iran will endure significant pain but like in the past will be able to maintain its policy. The question is whether an opening for renewed negotiations that would address the concerns of the United States and its allies and cater to Iranian aspirations and needs will occur only when US President Trump leaves office or whether Trump may ultimately decide that talks are in the interest of both parties.

Source: This article was published by Al Jazeera Center for Studies and reprinted with permission

REFERENCES

(1)   Jo Harper, Germany urges SWIFT end to US payments dominance, Deutsche Welle, 27 August 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/germany-urges-swift-end-to-us-payments-dominance/a-45242528

(2)   Javier Blas, In Big Win for Trump, U.S. Sanctions Cripple Iranian Oil Exports, Bloomberg, 28 September 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-18/in-big-win-for-trump-u-s-sanctions-cripple-iranian-oil-exports  

(3)   Ibid, Blas

(4)   David Sheppard, US Treasury grants licence for Iranian-backed UK gasfield, Financial Times, 9 October 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/3471e0a6-cb90-11e8-b276-b9069bde0956  

(5)   Myra P.Saefong, Here’s what U.S. waivers on Iran oil sanctions mean for the global crude market, MarketWatch, 2 November 2018, https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-what-us-waivers-on-iran-oil-sanctions-would-mean-for-the-global-crude-market-2018-11-02

(6)   Humeyra Pamuk and Timothy Gardner, U.S. renews Iran sanctions, grants oil waivers to China, seven others, Reuters, 5 November 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-iran-oil/as-u-s-starts-oil-sanctions-against-iran-major-buyers-get-waivers-idUSKCN1NA0O8

(7)   James M. Dorsey, Can the US make Iran sanctions stick? The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, 4 August 2018, https://mideastsoccer.blogspot.com/2018/08/can-us-make-iran-sanctions-stick.html

(8)   Bijan Khajehpour, Iran reintroduces fuel cards to combat smuggling, Al-Monitor, 3 December 2018, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/12/iran-fuel-cards-reintroduction-smuggling-sanctions-economy.html?utm_campaign=20181204&utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Daily%20Newsletter

(9)   Bijan Khajehpour, Smuggling surges as US sanctions hit Iranian rial, Al-Monitor, 31 October 2018, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/10/iran-smuggling-foreign-exchange-rial-devaluation-sanctions.html

(10) Sajjad F. Dizaji, Do Sanctions Really Constrain Iran’s Military Spending? Bourse & Bazaar, 26 November 2018, https://www.bourseandbazaar.com/indicator-articles/2018/11/12/do-sanctions-really-constrain-irans-military-spending

(11) Mohammad Ali Shabani, Why US sanctions won’t ‘starve’ Iran of means to pursue its regional policy, Al-Monitor, 30 November 2018, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/11/iran-regional-policy-sanctions-impact-pompeo-starve-syria.html?utm_campaign=20181203&utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Daily%20Newsletter

(12) International Crisis Group, The Illogic of the U.S. Sanctions Snapback on Iran, 2 November 2018, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/B064-the-illogic-of-the-us-sanctions-snapback-on-iran.pdf

(13) Nikkei Asian Review, Japan halts Iran oil imports under US pressure, 30 August 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-Relations/Japan-halts-Iran-oil-imports-under-US-pressure   

(14) Irina Slav, Japan, South Korea To Resume Iranian Oil Shipments In January, OilPrice,  20 November 2018, https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Japan-South-Korea-To-Resume-Iranian-Oil-Shipments-In-January.html  

(15) Osamu Tsukimori and Jane Chung, Japan, South Korea plan to resume Iran oil imports from January: sources, Reuters, 19 November 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-sanctions-japan-southkorea/japan-south-korea-plan-to-resume-iran-oil-imports-from-january-sources-idUSKCN1NO0R4  

(16) Ellen R. Wald, Here’s How Iran Hides Its Secret Oil Trade, Forbes, 10 October 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenrwald/2018/10/11/heres-how-iran-hides-its-secret-oil-trade/#79378eca363f  

(17) Vinay Kaura, a special exemption that passed under the radar: India was allowed to continue its infrastructural works for the development of Chabahar, a strategic harbor in southern Iran opposite Oman, FirstPost, 8 November 2018, https://www.firstpost.com/india/us-grants-sanctions-waiver-to-india-on-chabahar-port-is-at-the-centre-of-washingtons-south-asia-strategy-5516891.html  

(18) Shemuel Meir, Not so fast, Bibi: Why new sanctions won’t bring down the Islamic Republic, +972, 25 November 2018, https://972mag.com/fast-bibi-new-sanctions-wont-bring-islamic-republic/138823/  

(19) Chen Aizhu and Shu Zhang, Exclusive: As U.S. sanctions loom, China’s Bank of Kunlun to stop receiving Iran payments – sources, Reuters, 23 October 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-iran-banking-kunlun-exclusive/exclusive-as-u-s-sanctions-loom-chinas-bank-of-kunlun-to-stop-receiving-iran-payments-sources-idUSKCN1MX1KA  

(20) Micha’el Tanchum, Trump’s Iran Sanctions Could Work, Foreign Policy, 20 November 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/20/trumps-iran-sanctions-could-work/  

(21) John Defterios, What impact will US sanctions on Iran actually have? CNN, 7 August 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2018/08/06/middleeast/us-iran-sanctions-impact-intl/index.html  

(22) US State Department, On The Record Briefing With Brian Hook Senior Policy Advisor to the Secretary of State and Special Representative for Iran, 3 December 2018, https://translations.state.gov/2018/12/03/on-the-record-briefing-with-brian-hook-senior-policy-advisor-to-the-secretary-of-state-and-special-representative-for-iran/  

(23) Lili Bayer, EU shield looks flimsy against Trump’s Iran sanctions, Politico, 17 July 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/iran-sanctions-donald-trump-eu-federica-mogherini-business-shield-looking-flimsy/

(24) Ibid. Bayer

(25) Reuters, SWIFT system to disconnect some Iranian banks this weekend, 9 November 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-iran-sanctions-swift/swift-system-to-disconnect-some-iranian-banks-this-weekend-idUSFWN1XK0YW  

(26) Leonid Bershidsky, How Europe Can Keep Money Flowing to Iran, Bloomberg, 18 May 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-05-18/how-europe-can-keep-money-flowing-to-iran  

(27) Ibid. Harper

(28) Farnaz Fassihi and Laurence Norman, Europe’s Payment Channel to Salvage Iran Deal Faces Limits, The Wall Street Journal, 25 September 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/europe-plans-special-vehicle-to-maintain-companies-ties-to-iran-avoid-u-s-sanctions-1537855415

(29) Ellie Geranmayeh and Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, Bankless task: can Europe stay connected to Iran?, European Council for Foreign Relations, 11 October 2018, https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_bankless_task_can_europe_stay_connected_to_iran  

(30) Esfandyar Batmanghelidj and Axel Hellman, How Europe Could Blunt U.S. Iran Sanctions Without Washington Lifting A Finger, Foreign Policy, 4 December 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/03/how-europe-can-blunt-u-s-iran-sanctions-without-washington-raising-a-finger-humanitarian-spv/

(31) Adam Reese, Russia, Iran Discuss SWIFT-Free Interbank Settlements, ETHNews, 17 May 2018, https://www.ethnews.com/russia-iran-discuss-swift-free-interbank-settlements-enabled-by-blockchain  

(32) Anastasia Alekseevskikh, Russian SWIFT equivalent goes abroad (?????????? ?????? SWIFT ???? ?? ?????), Izvestia, 15 February 2018, https://iz.ru/708312/anastasiia-alekseevskikh/rossiiskii-analog-swift-idet-za-rubezh  

(33) Mizuho Bank, RMB Cross-border Interbank Payment System, 5 December 2017, https://www.mizuhobank.com/fin_info/cndb/rmb/pdf/cips.pdf

By Kriti M. Shah

Seventeen years after the United States first entered Afghanistan, the Americans may finally be coming home. President Trump has ordered for the beginning of a reduction in troop numbers in the country, following his decision to pull military forces from Syria as well. US assistance has been crucial in building Afghanistan a military, democratic institutions, civilian organisations as well as an independent media. While there is no doubt that Afghanistan today, is a much stronger, hopeful nation than it was before 2001; if the US objective when they entered the country, was to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda and ensure that Afghanistan is never used as a launch pad for terrorist attacks, they have failed in their mission.

The war Afghanistan has been the US’s longest war yet, costing the US over a $1 trillion. Their role in the country is two-fold, a bilateral counter terrorism mission along with the Afghan forces and participation in Operation Resolute Support, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or NATO’s mission in the country to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces. According to reports, over 7,000 American soldiers could return home in the coming weeks.

Today the Afghan government controls only half or 56.3% of the total districts in the country. Since 2001, over 2,400 American soldiers have been killed in the country and since 2015, more than a staggering 28,000 Afghan police officers and soldiers. Failure to defeat the Taliban militarily has led previous US administrations to explore the idea of political reconciliation with the Taliban. Over the years, this idea has evolved and expanded. The Taliban has moved from being seen as a terrorist group, to an insurgency movement to an armed political movement with strong, conservative political aspirations. In September 2018, Washington appointed a special representative to Afghanistan with the objective of getting the Taliban and the government to the negotiating table. The prolonged nature of the conflict in the country has created a large number of international stakeholders. A number of nations, along with the United States, such as Norway, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Iran, Pakistan, Russia and China, have at some stage and diplomatic level had dialogues with the Taliban, complicating the process as well as reducing prospects for regional consensus on ending the war. All of this has made peace, an elusive dream for Afghans and Americans alike.

Given the situation on the ground and the inability of the international and Afghan forces to collectively defeat the Taliban, the consequences of a drawdown in forces will significantly impact and alter the political climate and security situation in the country.

Trump cannot be faulted for wanting to end the war and score a domestic political victory by bringing the troops home, but the tactical implications of a withdrawal matter and affect American national security interests.

First and foremost, a US drawdown at a time when the Taliban control and contest a large amount of territory, shows the group that they have been successful in resisting United States forces. The Taliban does not have to seize control over the entire country in order to win, they just have to hold on until the US gives up. After a 17 year-long involvement in the country, war-weary Washington is showing signs of doing just that. A reduction in forces allows the Taliban to bolster their efforts to gain more territory, thereby putting the Kabul government who are seeking peace, in a weaker bargaining position with the group.

This in turn, will mean that by its own standards, Pakistan has been successful in using jihad as a tool to meet its foreign policy objectives. Islamabad’s sponsorship and assistance of terrorist groups to fight US forces in Afghanistan remains a part of the nation’s national security strategy. Should the US leave Afghanistan, or the Taliban make military or political gains vis-à-vis the government, Pakistan’s tactic of militant sponsorship will be vindicated.

Not only will this further weaken the Kabul government, that already suffers from political infighting and heavy corruption, it will enhance the Pakistani state’s control beyond its own territorial borders.

When a terrorist group is backed by a state, it serves little purpose to negotiate with the terrorist group and not the state that sponsors them. An end to the Afghan war, will need to coincide with a harsh, long-term change in strategy towards Pakistan. Unless terrorist and radical militant infrastructure is systematically dismantled from Pakistan’s core, the problem of South Asian jihad will continue to plague the region for generations. The rise and resilience of the Islamic State Khorasan (ISKP), in eastern Afghanistan along the Pakistan border demonstrates that terror activity along the Durand Line is active, just as it was in the before, the hotbed that caused the September 2001 attacks in the first place.

Whether the United States follows through on its plan to withdraw forces, now or later is irrelevant. The question is, what sort of peace can Afghans afford to make now? Will political reconciliation mean a power sharing agreement with the Taliban? Will Afghan forces who have suffered immeasurably at the hand of Taliban fighters, be asked to fight alongside them? What will the government have to concede in order for there to be peace in the country? The answers are unclear and nobody seems to be asking the questions.

The Taliban today is different from the one led by Mullah Omar before. The organisation is no longer a monolith, divided into smaller factions with a number of deserters moving to fight under the ISKP flag. Despite the loss of two of its leaders, the group has managed to retain certain organizational cohesion, further strengthened by commanders who are more tech-savvy and social-media friendly.

Taliban’s ability to remain standing despite the might of US forces, has been a popular recruitment tactic and morale booster for the fighters to continue. They are now more assertive than ever, attacking US and Afghan forces with impunity.

The United States must therefore, not underestimate or downplay the Taliban’s ideological commitment to what they want from the future in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s conditions are for there to be a complete withdrawal of international forces, a removal of Taliban leaders names from international blacklists and a larger role for Islamic law in Afghan institutions. They refuse to negotiate with Kabul, because they believe they have no political authority to negotiate. The Taliban government was overthrown by the US and it is from them that they need assurances they will never return. The US must however strongly state their intention, that the international community will continue to make long term commitments to further develop and strengthen the country. The justification given to the perceived morality in negotiating with terrorists to achieve peace, comes from a place of desperation. It is tempting to leave the country and return home after 17 years, and let Afghans deal with the Taliban as they see fit.  However, the Afghan quagmire of insecurity means that the US exit will make the country more prone to external manipulation and increase the odds of Afghanistan falling back down the slippery slope of radical militant Islam.

The Syrian army said it entered Manbij on Friday for the first time in years, after the Syrian Kurds urged Damascus to protect the town from the threat of impending Turkish military offensive, though Turkish President Erdogan has termed the handover a “psyops” by the Kurds.

If Turkey mounts an offensive in Manbij, it would be the third invasion by the Turkish armed forces and their Syrian militant proxies in the Kurdish-held areas in northern Syria. The first Operation Euphrates Shield in Jarabulus and Azaz in northern Syria lasted from August 2016 to March 2017, immediately after the foiled coup plot against the Erdogan administration in July 2016. And then, Turkey mounted Operation Olive Branch in the Kurdish enclave of Afrin in northwestern Syria that lasted from January to March 2018.

In order to simplify the Syrian theater of proxy wars for the readers, it can be divided into three separate and distinct zones of influence: the Syrian government-controlled areas, the regions administered by the Syrian Kurds and the areas occupied by the Syrian opposition.

Excluding Idlib in northwestern Syria, which has been occupied by the Syrian opposition, all the major population centers are controlled by the Syrian government: which include, Damascus, Homs, Hamah, Latakia and Aleppo, while the oil-rich Deir al-Zor has been contested between the Syrian government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, and it also contains a few pockets of the remnants of the Islamic State militants alongside both eastern and western banks of the Euphrates River.

The regions administered by the Syrian Kurds include the Kurdish-majority Qamishli and al-Hasakah in northeastern Syria, and the Arab-majority towns of Manbij to the west of the Euphrates River in northern Syria and Kobani to the east of the Euphrates River along the Turkish border.

The Turkish “east of Euphrates” military doctrine basically means that the Turkish armed forces would not tolerate the presence of the Syrian PYD/YPG Kurds – which the Turks regard as “terrorists” allied to the PKK Kurdish separatist group in Turkey – in Manbij and Kobani, in line with the longstanding Turkish policy of denying the Kurds any Syrian territory to the west of the Euphrates River in northern Syria along Turkey’s southern border.

Excluding the western Mediterranean coast and the adjoining major urban centers controlled by the Syrian government and the Kurdish-administered areas in the northeastern Syria, the Syrian opposition-dominated areas can be further subdivided into three separate zones of influence.

Firstly, the northern and northwestern zone along the Syria-Turkey border, in and around Aleppo and Idlib, which has been under the influence of Turkey and Qatar. Both these countries share the ideology of Muslim Brotherhood and have provided money, training and arms to Sunni Arab militant organizations, such as al-Tawhid Brigade, Zenki Brigade and Ahrar al-Sham, in the training camps located in the border regions between Turkey and northern Syria.

Secondly, the southern zone of influence along the Syria-Jordan border, in Daraa and Quneitra and as far away as Homs and Damascus. It was controlled by the Salafist Saudi-Jordanian camp which provided money, weapons and training to the Salafist militant groups, such as al-Nusra Front and Jaysh al-Islam in the suburbs of Damascus, until those militant outfits were evicted from southern Syria by the offensives of Syrian armed forces and allied militias with the backing of Iran and Russia.

Here, let me clarify that this distinction is quite overlapping and heuristic at best, because al-Nusra’s jihadists have taken part in battles as far away as Idlib and Aleppo, and after its eviction from southern Syria, al-Nusra Front, which rebranded itself to Hayat Tahrir-al-Sham in January 2017, has found its new redoubt in Idlib in northwestern Syria alongside the Muslim Brotherhood-sponsored militant groups, though it belongs to the Wahhabi-Salafi denomination espoused by Saudi Arabia.

And thirdly, the eastern zone of influence along the Syria-Iraq border, in Raqqa and Deir al-Zor, which was held by a relatively maverick Iraq-based Salafist militant outfit, the Islamic State, until Deir al-Zor was recaptured by the Syrian government forces, and Raqqa and parts of Deir al-Zor governorate to the east of Euphrates River were cleared by the US-backed and Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces.

It’s worth noting that before the Russian intervention in September 2015, leaving the western Mediterranean coast and Syria’s border with Lebanon, the Baathist and Shi’a-led Syrian government was surrounded from all three sides by hostile Sunni forces: Turkey and Muslim Brotherhood in the north, Jordan and the Salafists of the Gulf Arab States in the south, and the Sunni Arab-majority regions of Mosul and Anbar in Iraq, which were then occupied by the Islamic State, in the east.

The ethnic and sectarian conflict in Syria and Iraq is actually a three-way conflict between the Sunni Arab militants, the Shi’a-led governments and the Kurds. Although after the declaration of a war against a faction of Sunni Arab militants, the Islamic State, Washington also lent its support to the Shi’a-led government in Iraq, the Shi’a Arabs of Iraq are not the trustworthy allies of the United States because they are under the influence of Iran.

Therefore, Washington was left with no other choice but to make the Kurds the centerpiece of its policy in Syria after a group of Sunni Arab jihadists overstepped their mandate in Syria and overran Mosul and Anbar in Iraq in early 2014, from where the United States had withdrawn its troops only a couple of years ago in December 2011.

The so-called “Syrian Democratic Forces” are nothing more than Kurdish militias with a symbolic presence of mercenary Arab tribesmen in order to make them appear more representative and inclusive in outlook.

Regarding the Kurdish factor in the Syrian civil war, it would be pertinent to mention here that unlike the pro-America Iraqi Kurds led by the Barzani clan, the Syrian PYD/YPG Kurds as well as the Syrian government have been ideologically aligned, because both are socialists and have traditionally been in the Russian sphere of influence.

Moreover, as I have already described that the Syrian civil war is a three-way conflict between the Sunni Arab militants, the Shi’a-led government and the Syrian Kurds, and the net beneficiaries of this conflict have been the Syrian Kurds who have expanded their areas of control by aligning themselves first with the Syrian government against the Sunni Arab militants since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in August 2011 to August 2014, when the US policy in Syria was “regime change” and the CIA was indiscriminately training and arming the Sunni Arab militants against the Shi’a-led government in the border regions of Turkey and Jordan with the help of Washington’s regional allies: Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, all of which belong to the Sunni denomination.

In August 2014, however, the US declared a war against one faction of the Sunni Arab militants, the Islamic State, when the latter overran Mosul and Anbar in early 2014, and Washington made a volte-face on its previous “regime change” policy and started conducting air strikes against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, thus shifting the goalposts in Syria from the previous unrealistic objective of “regime change” to the achievable goal of defeating the Islamic State in order to save its credibility as a global power.

After this reversal of policy by Washington, the Syrian Kurds took advantage of the opportunity and struck an alliance with the US against the Islamic State at Masoud Barzani’s bidding, hence further buttressing their position against the Sunni Arab militants as well as the Syrian government.

More to the point, however, for the first three years of the Syrian civil war from August 2011 to August 2014, an informal pact existed between the Syrian government and the Syrian Kurds against the onslaught of the Sunni Arab militants, until the Kurds broke off that arrangement to become the centerpiece of Washington’s policy in the region.

In accordance with the aforementioned pact, the Syrian government informally acknowledged Kurdish autonomy; and in return, the Kurdish militias jointly defended the Kurdish-majority areas in northeastern Syria, specifically al-Hasakah, alongside the Syrian government troops against the advancing Sunni Arab militant groups, particularly the Islamic State.

Finally, everyone has their own axe to grind in Syria, as there are no permanent allies or foes in international politics, only interests are permanent. It’s all about maintaining the balance of power. But whenever the US throws its weight behind a faction, it invariably disrupts the delicate equilibrium.

The allies of Washington then tend to assume that they are negotiating from a position of strength with the weight of a global power behind them; and under the mistaken assumption, they overreach themselves and encroach upon the rights of their regional adversaries.

Three days after death reared its ugly head on the stormy day tempest Ompong struck burying more than 50 unsuspecting people in Itogon, Philippines, Andres Agwilang, miner, 54, father of three, was one the countless volunteers digging for possible survivors.

He moved towards a grassy loft to rest and bent to touch a wild weed with yellow bright flowers that survived the storm. “Lord, even in the midst of our darkest hours, your beauty gives us hope”, he murmured in his dialect.

What is in a flower that attracts humans and exudes beauty and radiance?

Scientists Try to Explain Why

Several scientists tried explaining this. Geophysicist Dr. Zbigniew Motyka who currently works at the Department of Technical Acoustics and Laser Technique, at Główny Instytut Górnictwa in Poland says the question has connections to physics, aesthetics, science and art, “People perceive flowers attractive because of immanent physical properties e.g. symmetry or color composition, which makes us think of them as beautiful,” he said.

He quotes Aristotle in metaphysics, ”All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight.”

“For not only with a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer seeing to everything else. The reason is that this, most of all the senses, like sight, makes us know and brings to light many differences between things.”

French visual scientist Dr. Louis Brassard agrees but goes further saying “human’s perception of flowers being beautiful is not only due to aesthetic appreciation but also because of mammalian feeling.”

“Humans have a higher level of aesthetic pleasure where what is pleasurable is what reveals some fundamental forms of our own perception. ,and appreciation of beauty is one, ” Dr. Brassard said.

“More primitive animals are attracted by food, water, mate, shelter and are repulsed by predators and this does not change during their life. Mammals can learn new mode of actions and their mode of actions can take place over long period of time like appreciation of beauty (episodic world).”

“They can be attracted by aspects of the world with high probability to promote certain long term mode of actions. So they have attractions not to immediate target of action but to favorable conditions for desired long term action goals,” he wrote to elaborate.

Beauty in the Eye of the Beholder

But do all humans see flowers as beautiful?

“Only a fool can argue against the universal truth that flowers are beautiful but in order to understand why we find flowers beautiful, we have to understand visual beauty in general and we have to understand why the plant/pollinator interactions lead to the evolution the flower forms and colour and odor that are beautiful for us, highly reputable Emeritus Professor of Connective Tissue Medicine Dr. Jonathan Edwards of University College London said.

We find things beautiful because of reflectance, emission and transmission spectrum that is relatively narrow (pure colour) and salient (i.e. not brown or green). We find coloured stones beautiful, and coloured skies. This spectral specificity and salience in biological structures function in a symbiotic relationship, as for flowers for insects and berries for birds and mammals and so for us this may just be an exaptational effect – we are drawn to structures that evolved as salient signs for others, he explained.

But how and why have we evolved a sense that some things are beautiful, regardless of usefulness? And what makes flowers, in general terms, more beautiful than berries?

Dr. Edwards answered his question saying flowers have a complexity and specificity of shape/structure, each one rather different from another. For symbiosis this is important as the color and shape of flowers consistently morphed over a period.

The beauty of flowers make relate to intricacy, specificity and consistency in shape. Gardeners revel in the subtle variations in form of their flowers, the delicacy and symmetry of the white jasmine, the voluptuousness of the paeony, the precision of a clematis star, he cited as examples.

Beauty of Flowers a Form of Communication

Ecologist Dr. Marcel M. Lambrechts of the French Centre d’Ecologie Fonctionnelle et Evolutive says there is a difference between insects being attracted towards different types of flowers the way humans are attracted.

Humans’ attraction to flowers is likely an exaptation – of no usefulness in itself but a sign of a useful attraction to things that show ordered complexity he explained but may that we also sense flowers as a sign – a form of communication.

“There is a ‘picture mode’ of perception that our brains can switch on and off, allowing us to recognise, for instance, caricatures, and more simply, just flat images as being images. Even within flat images, like a playbill at a theatre, we unconsciously sort letters and picture and assign them different ‘notional’ spaces. Pictorial communication is so important to us that flowers get caught up in this different type of perception,” he said.

To this, Dr. Edwards doubts. Humans have not yet even identified a survival value for liking flowers nor do people consistently prefer different flowers over a long period or do their tastes change, he said. A lot of flower preference comes with sentimental association, he added

Dr. Lambrechts says some creatures, including humans, are attracted to ‘super stimuli’ in this context, domesticated flowers that are much bigger/more colourful/etc. more efficiently attracting humans,

And if humans are ‘instinctively’ attracted to flowers, why are women more attracted than men?

Lambrechts explains some species/individuals are more plastic in behaviour than other species/individuals, and their level of phenotypic plasticity has a genetic basis. meaning attractiveness to many flowers in humans has in at least some level a genetic/instinctive basis.

Flowers’ Beauty Only A By-Product

Do flowers exude beauty for humans to behold? Unfortunately no, said Claude de Phamphilis a plant evolutionary biologist of Penn State University.

“The beauty of flowers is a by-product of the biological change a plant undergoes to attract pollinators with the purpose of ensuring genetic continuity.”

Pleasing the human eye is far from the physiological intents, de Pamphilis said, Scent, color, and size all attract a diversity of pollinators, which include thousands of species of bees, wasps, butterflies, moths, and beetles, as well as vertebrates such as birds and bats.

Plants and trees reproduce their kind through the process of pollination where the transfer of pollen from a male part of a plant to a female part of a plant, takes place, enabling later fertilization and the production of seeds.

The scientists’ points of view matter not to Andres Agwilang, a devout born again Christian. To him, where a flower blooms, so does hope.

“When flowers appear on Earth, the season of singing has come”, he quoted the Bible’s Song of Songs at Chapter 2, verse 12

(Note: In the Itogon landslide tragedy, just 2 survivors were rescued, 70 died, and 45 left missing).

About the Author: Dr. Michael A. Bengwayan wrote for the British Panos News and Features and GEMINI News Service, the Brunei Times, and US Environment News Service. In the Philippines, he wrote for DEPTHNews of the Press Foundation of Asia, Today, the Philippine Post, and Vera Files. A practicing environmentalist, he holds postgraduate degrees in environment resource management and development studies as a European Union (EU) Fellow at University College, Dublin, Ireland. He is currently a Fellow of Echoing Green Foundation of New York City. He now writes for Business Mirror and Eurasia Review.

The process of forming a new government in Latvia has become an exciting political show. And show must go on. And it really goes on. After three unsuccessful attempts to find a candidate for the prime-minister post who could overcome disagreement between political parties, President Vejonis hopes that Krišjānis Kariņš after all will gain support and will be able to form the government.

Though this question remains open, it is already known that For Development/For alliance (after 2018 Latvian parliamentary election it is the 4th largest party in Latvia) has decided to support a government proposed by the New Unity’s Krišjānis Kariņš and is delegating Artis Pabriks, Juris Pūce and Ilze Viņķele for ministerial positions, told the alliance’s representative Laila Spaliņa.

For Development/For proposes Pabriks for the position of defence minister, Puce for environmental protection and regional development minister and Viņķele for health minister.

For Development/For co-chairman Pūce believes that Pabriks’ previous job experience as minister of foreign affairs and defence makes him a good candidate for defence minister and vice-premier. Pabriks would be able to “successfully introduce a comprehensive defence system in Latvia, coordinating the work of various institutions and cooperation between the public and private sector.”

It must be noted, that Artis Pabriks is a controversial person in Latvian politics. Though he has some political support, Latvians do not like him. His statements very often became headlines and were severely criticised by his colleges and ordinary people.

For example in 2006 he had an idea to create movies and documentaries that objectively would reflect the history of the country. Another question is how this objectiveness was understood. “I think, that Latvia is not so poor and we could allocate at least two million euros …”, said Pabriks in the interview to Neatkarīgā. Latvians did not like the idea to spend money on its realization.

He also has not achieved yet one of his aims: to persuade Russia to accept the fact of Latvia’s occupation. He wanted public recognition, and he insisted that Russia conduct public survey or referendum where he hopes people admit Latvia’s occupation.

His political incompetence is visible to the naked eye. Russia will never rewrite its history and will never admit something that downplays its significance on the international arena. But the worst thing in the internal affairs in Latvia is lack of new politicians, lack of new ideas and thus lack of new possibilities to male life better.

Latvians who want to see new faces in politics could not really expect changes in the defence system because of a new “old” minister. Everything will remain the same. Why then a new government?

*Viktors Domburs is an engineer, born in Latvia, and now lives in the United Kingdom.

The stability and peace in the Central Eurasian region particularly Afghanistan has been significant for India’s Eurasian approach. India along with the United States has long been involved in this region to maintain stability and peace. However, the recent decision by the US President Trump to retrench American forces in the Greater Middles East (Syria and Afghanistan) has marked the end of protracted phase of the US-led military assault on toppling the Taliban regime. It could prompt Taliban and other unknown possibilities to regain ground in Afghanistan (Asian Roundabout). Additionally, the resignation of India’s staunch supporter, the US Secretary of Defense James Mattis is one more dent on New Delhi’s strong advocate in the Eurasian region vis-à-vis China.

The argument is that Trump Administration’s unintelligible mixture of America First approach and external trajectories in international politics has made India’s Eurasia connect approach an unpredictable factor. In the background of such developments, the question is that how India would redefine its strategy for Eurasian connectivity with having no option but to factor these into its strategic designs?

Afghanistan Factor: Indo-US Embrace to Stretch out to Eurasia

The Idea of rewiring Eurasia geo-economically, geopolitically and strategically with India’s regional interests has gained importance after the US had intervened in the region. This military intervention was the outcome of terrorist attacks on World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001, the day which is usually called as “the day the world changed” in 21st century. Since 2001, the region particularly Afghanistan has remained a battleground for America and NATO forces. It has increased the importance of Afghanistan in India’s connectivity and security strategies towards the Eurasian region.

Also, the US presence altered India’s diplomatic perceptions about China [Pakistan] and Russia as exclusive state actors having separate ideological orientations in the region. However, the US wanted India to help counter terrorism activities given its strategic proximity with the latter which, in turn, heightened India’s prospects for energy transit and trade connectivity via Afghanistan. Thus, it has provided base to interest convergences between India and the US over regional as well as global issues.

Former Indian PM Manmaohan Singh (2004-14) and President Obama (2009-17) shared good terms of relations. Meanwhile, the United States supported India’s connectivity programmes like Chabahar Port, International North-South Corridor (INSTC), Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline and trade-transit infrastructure in Afghanistan. The INSTC also includes the violence-prone country Syria. India helped the US-led peace mission by contributing providing $70 million and technical assistance to revamp Tajikistan’s Ayni airbase for anti-Taliban fighters during 2003-2010.

Given India’s constructive presence and increased risks in Pakistan, the US introduced the idea of establishing Northern Distribution Network (NDN) in 2009 in Afghanistan and beyond. It had drastically changed geostrategic settings in the Eurasian region. Although Pakistan’s role as a frontline state had plummeted India’s geopolitical stakes for brief period, India found room by offering itself as security stabilizer and peace provider in the region. It signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement (2011) with Afghanistan given the expected withdrawal of American forces. Thus, both India and the US recognized the Afghanistan as a transit hub to meet energy and strategic needs without any “Great Game.”

The incumbent Indian PM Modi (2014-present) has also continued this momentum with more candour. The series of Indo-US Strategic Dialogue mechanisms used to give strong foundation to their strategic matters over security and stability. The third (2012) and fifth (2014) rounds of strategic dialogues have been particularly focused on global and regional hotspots such as the Greater Middle East including Afghanistan.

As per Ministry of External Affairs’ press release (June 2014), both India and the US have shown commitment to amplify their counter-terror cooperation on stability and peace in a war-prone country. These engagements show that how Afghanistan has become a determining factor for Indo-US proximity in the Eurasian region. Geopolitically, geo-strategically and economically, they have been converging over various points of debates/discussions both at the regional and global levels. But a recent array of changes and re-re-definition of American interests under Trump’s administration has left India in limbo about its position over unpredictable geopolitical turbulence in the region.

Trump’s Geopolitical Paradoxes

Under Trump administration, the US foreign policy particularly South Asia policy has been undergoing profound and complex changes, creating metamorphic challenges. The strategies and decisions like America First policy, withdrew from Climate Change Agreement, JCPOA, CAATSA, protectionism, troop retrenchment have put several America’s allies and enemies on the tightrope walk about the future fault lines in the US foreign policy towards them.

A Brookings Institute strategic expert Hanlon (2016) argued that Barack Obama was the only American President whose policies remained centered on the single war in South Asia (Afghanistan) for the entirety of his regime. In contrast, his successor, President Donald Trump adhered to a different worldview by sticking its policies to protectionism and nationalism with the start of his presidency. To date, his stand on South Asia policy remained uncertain and ambiguous which has created internal geopolitical paradoxes over its foreign policy trajectories. This approach has not only changed the behaviour of its allies including India but also worried them about the future course of his strategy.

During and after his presidential election campaign, his motto of America First Policy remained focused on complete end of military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan. He tweeted that, “why are we continuing to train these Afghanis who then shoot our soldiers in the back? Afghanistan is a complete waste. Time to come home!” Under the motto of America First, he adopted the protectionist policies against many counties like China, Russia and Canada including India. He resolved to put unnecessary ban over Muslim counties in the Greater Middle East to do business in America.

Mohan (2018) argued that it was a surprising departure from traditional American foreign policy. It provoked widespread unease among Asian spectators particularly India, as a paradigmatic shift in the US South Asia policy could undermine New Delhi’s current geopolitical stake for Eurasian connectivity. However, soon after one and a half year, he turned down his decision in geopolitical terms only and continued his aggressive approach towards the world trading system. The redefinition his South Asia policy brought Afghanistan again to the forefront in the international politics.

The reorientation of Trump Administration’s “Afghan Policy” revalidated India’s role in the South Asian region. It led India to call upon the international community to fight against terrorist activities emanating from the Af-Pak region. Since, the 2014-withdrawal led to the resurgence of Taliban which meanwhile took control over 63 per cent contested and uncontested territory of Afghanistan, India strongly supported the US-led NATO mission for stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas.

Although, the US has given driver seat to India in its strategic mission, recent Trump’s announcement to retrench American troops from the Greater Middle East pushed Delhi back to the front. Kabalan (2018) said to Aljazeera that the US withdrawal would trigger another round of conflict in the Greater Middle East which would result into the start of new “all against all war” in the region. These “all” include the regional powers like Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Islamic State (ISIL), and India may be the last in the list to procure its connectivity projects in the region.

It is seen that the announcement was revealed in the background of Trump Administration’s direct talk with Taliban at Abu Dhabi brokered by Pakistan which arguably conveyed concerns for India. Trump replaced his “absolute win over terrorism” rhetoric with “reconciliation and rebuilding America” one. Thus, Trump’s policies have been undergoing geopolitical paradoxes and dualism towards the South Asia region. From America’s First policy rhetoric to reintroduction of Afghan Policy and again redefinition of America’s military strategy in region has made Washington policy an unpredictable factor for its allies including India.

Another geopolitical paradox is the implementation and withdrawal of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Although it was signed in 2015 during the Obama regime, critics perceive that Trump had withdrawn from JCPOA without any strategic reason to fulfill his pledge taken during the presidential election campaign. Beauchamp (May 2018) on Vox Media argued that it was against the will of five other signatories—Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany, who expressed their concern. Trump has done so without presenting any evidence against Iran that the latter is not complying with the deal. It is important to mention that Iran along with Afghanistan have been significant to India’s Connect Central Asia Policy and other connectivity projects like INSTC, Chabahar Port etc.

The passage of Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) in the US Congress in August 2017 has given strategic substance to JCPOA withdrawal. It came into effect on January 2018 to put sanctions against Iran including Russia and Korea. Putting sanctions against Iran and Russia did not go in the favour of Washington’s so-called “Global Strategic Partner” India.

There is another factor that despite being critic of China-led Belt Road Initiatives, the US sent delegation to China’s Belt and Road Forum in 2017. It had not only shocked its Western allies but India also. As Washington has been familiar with India’s sovereign issue with China over the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Trump’s immediate u-turn stunned Indian policy observers.

Last but not least, the internal tussle on Trump’s foreign policy paradoxes has resulted in the departure of some prominent administrators. The US Defense Secretary Jim Mattis was one of them who always advocated for Indo-US strong relations in South Asia. Undoubtedly, sudden changes in the US administration would mean that it will give Trump free hand in determining new policy directions based on his dispositions.

India’s Unpredictable Concerns Factoring the United States

From the above analysis, it can be said that the US South Asian policy has been upholding and retaining its significant place among the regional powers which are striving for rewiring/reconnecting the Eurasian region. Insofar as India is concerned, the redefinition of America’s interests by Trump has made New Delhi’s Eurasia strategy more unpredictable than ever before. For Eurasian connectivity, Russia, Iran, Syria and Afghanistan have been significant strategic actors in India’s energy trade and connectivity programmes.

The isolating policies of the US would expose the region towards potential geopolitical conflicts. Given the fear of Washington’s absence, Russia and Iran’s Taliban outreach, Sino-Pak axis, Turkey dilemma, resurgence of ISIL in Syria and Iraq are potential trajectories making Indian governments worried about its geopolitical profile in the region.

India has been working on many infrastructural and connectivity projects like TAPI, INSTC and Chabahar Port. The growing leverage of transit countries due to changing sphere of influence would create possibilities of cancellation and renegotiation of these projects. It could hamper India’s economic investment and geopolitical synergy. Thus, the real challenge for India would be to fill the gap by offering itself as a security and peace provider.

Although, many ideal critics envisions that the US withdrawal from the Greater Middle East will bring stability and peace in the region, that every country wants to run their governments without external intervention. But, realistically, it is the not accurate time to leave volatile regions on their own destinies. The violence-prone countries like Syria and Afghanistan are still lacking the strategic vision to deal with internal and external issues.

Moreover, declining power the US would cut down its hegemonic sway in the region which would allow Russia to take position. Already these dynamics have increased geo-strategic competitions between India and China. This strategically competing environment has created a room for middle powers like Pakistan and Iran to capitalize realignments against each other. India’s strategic rivals Pakistan’s growing affinity China and Russia would be crosshairs for it. India’s relations with the US would be a challenge to balance these embryonic power equations.

Lastly, Trump’s stratagem has been indeed a metaphoric and temeritous than that of previous administrations. The more interesting facts show that how consequential dynamics in the Eurasian region will affect India’s position in Afghanistan and the region, given the unpredictable gestures of Trump’s South Asian Policy. These dynamics would possibly be paradoxical in geopolitical terms which would happen either in Washington’s policy directions or in independent manner. India should take these dynamics and unavoidable geopolitical turbulences into account while defining its alignments and interests within the Eurasian region. For it, India needs a pro-active strategy with both strategic and economic sways. It would be in India’s interest to identify geopolitical synergies and geo-economic convergences among stakeholders in the Eurasian region.

*About the authors: Sandeep Singh, Ph.D. (Ph.D Research Scholar), Department of South and Central Asian Studies, School of Global Relation, Central University of Punjab, Bathinda, India; Dr. Bawa Singh is teaching at the Department of South and Central Asian Studies, School of Global Relations, Central University of Punjab, Bathinda, India.

Amnesty International has published a 200-page comprehensive report on the massacre of political prisoners in Iran, 30 years after it actually took place. Its main focus is the dark days of 1988 massacre of 30,000 political prisoners in Iran.

Had the 1988 massacre been given enough international attention it deserved back then, Iranian people would not have faced unbridle human rights abuses in the years that followed. Impunity for crimes in those days, embolden the regime over the years to the extent that it is leveling the graves of the same victims all over Iran.

“The UN establishes an independent, impartial and effective international mechanism to help bring those responsible for these abhorrent crimes to justice,” the “Blood soaked” history of 1988 massacre of political prisoners in Iran will be put to rest”, the report concludes.

The human rights watchdog also says that these are crimes against humanity and the perpetrators should be hauled before the international criminal court.

Massacre of political prisoners

There are different accounts of the 1988 massacre of political prisoners in Iran because of the level of secrecy the Iranian regime officials wrapped around it. Many former and current top regime’s officials flatly deny gruesome events of that summer.

What really happened?

In the summer of 1988, Khomeini’s ambiguous war with its neighbor Iraq came to a halt when his top brass Revolutionary Guards commanders foresaw a crushing and imminent defeat if he did not stop the war soon. War with Iraq served as a cover for internal suppression.

At home Khomeini had a powerful opposition and he needed to get rid of the existential threat to his absolute rule, the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI /MEK). He saw thousands of political prisoners as a potential asset for the opposition.

Khomeini hastily put together a committee to exterminate the prisoners. It of course needed some kind of religious green light. His infamous hand written fatwa did the trick.

The “Death Commission” – as it is known among Iranian political prisoners – was born to set in motion one of the most heinous crimes against humanity the world had seen in the 20th century. The commission oversaw the massacre of 30,000 political prisoners in the summer of 1988, mostly members and supporters of MEK.

On the eve of 28th anniversary of the 1988 massacre in the summer of 2016, Maryam Rajavi, President of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) tasked the members of the opposition to embark on a worldwide campaign called “Movement for Justice.”

The campaign is seeking justice for fallen victims of the theocratic regime in 1988. The final goal is to get the UN Security Council to hold the Iranian official –past and present- accountable for 1988 crimes and stand trial before an international court for crimes against humanity.

Early whistleblower

Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri was the first whistleblower of 1988 massacre in Iran. Montazeri, the handpicked successor of Khomeini, was sacked for his public objections to mass executions in 1988. He spent the rest of his life under house arrest and died in 2009. His son leaked an audiotape of his conversation with the members of Death Commission in 2016.

In the moving tape, Montazeri can be heard telling a meeting of the “Death Commission” in 1988 that they are responsible for a crime against humanity. He said: “The greatest crime committed during the reign of the Islamic Republic, for which history will condemn us, has been committed by you. Your names will in the future be etched in the annals of history as criminals.”

Rewarding the culprits

In the present Iranian regime, culprits of crimes in a twisted logic are rewarded. Some members of the Death Commission still hold high offices in the country. Ebrahim Raisi is one of them. He was a low level cleric at the time and in return for his services was elevated in the rank and files of the mullahs’ hierarchy.

Raisi is a close confidant of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Currently Raisi is the custodian of Astan Quds Razavi, the wealthiest charity foundation in charge of Iran’s holiest shrine in Mashhad, northwestern Iran, with very close ties to Khamenei’s powerhouse.

Raisi and Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi – Iran’s Justice Minister in Hassan Rouhani’s cabinet – were two of the four members of the Death Commission who were tasked by then Supreme Leader Khomeini to summarily execute political prisoners. In the summer of 1988, the Commission handed down 30,000 death sentences.

The kangaroo courts hardly lasted more than three minutes on average. Some of the political prisoners who miraculously survived the slaughter have written or spoken of their ordeals. The judges asked a simple question: Do you still believe in Mojahedin? And depending on the answer, one could go to gallows. The gruesome accounts of survivors, especially female prisoners, often leave the listeners in shock.

Pour-Mohammadi has since admitted his role in the “Death Commission” and boasted that he was proud to “carry out God’s will and he has not lost sleep over what he did.”

Alireza Avaie another member of the commission replaced Pour-Mohammadi as Rouhani’s Justice Minister in his second cabinet. His personal record in participating in human rights violations goes a long way back when he was partner in crime with the likes of Ebrahim Raisi.

“The abject failure of the UN and international community to pursue truth and justice for the atrocities committed by Iranian authorities has had catastrophic consequences not only on survivors and victims’ families but also on the rule of law and respect for human rights in the country. Iran’s authorities must no longer be allowed to shield themselves from accountability for their crimes against humanity,” said Philip Luther Amnesty International’s Advocacy Director for the Middle East and North Africa.

*Reza Shafiee is a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). He tweets @shafiee_shafiee.

After Donald Trump’s surprise announcement in a tweet on December 19 to withdraw 2,000 American troops from Syria after a telephonic conversation with the Turkish President Erdogan on December 14, the decision to scale back American presence in Afghanistan by 7000 troops has also reportedly been made and the announcement is imminent.

It would be pertinent to note here that after Donald Trump’s inauguration as the US president, he had delegated operational-level decisions in conflict zones such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria to the Pentagon.

Secretary of Defense James Mattis and the former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster represented the institutional logic of the deep state in the Trump administration and were instrumental in advising Donald Trump to escalate the conflicts in Afghanistan and Syria.

They had advised President Trump to increase the number of American troops in Afghanistan from 8,400 to 14,000. And in Syria, they were in favor of the Pentagon’s policy of training and arming 30,000 Kurdish border guards to patrol Syria’s northern border with Turkey.

Both the decisions have spectacularly backfired on the Trump administration. The decision to train and arm 30,000 Kurdish border guards infuriated the Erdogan administration to the extent that Turkey mounted Operation Olive Branch in the Kurdish-held enclave of Afrin in northern Syria on January 20.

Remember that it was the second military operation by the Turkish armed forces and their Syrian militant proxies against the Kurdish-held areas in northern Syria. The first Operation Euphrates Shield in Jarabulus and Azaz lasted from August 2016 to March 2017.

Nevertheless, after capturing Afrin on March 18, the Turkish armed forces and their Syrian jihadist proxies have now set their sights further east on Manbij, where the US Special Forces were closely cooperating with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, in line with the long-held Turkish military doctrine of denying the Kurds any Syrian territory west of River Euphrates.

Thus, it doesn’t come as a surprise that President Trump replaced H.R. McMaster with John Bolton in April; and in a predictable development on Thursday, James Mattis offered his resignation over President Trump’s announcement of withdrawal of American troops from Syria, though he would continue as the Secretary of Defense until the end of February till a suitable replacement is found.

Regarding the conflict in Afghanistan, on November 9 Russia hosted talks between Afghanistan’s High Peace Council, the members of the Taliban from its Doha, Qatar office and representatives from eleven regional states, including China, India, Iran and Pakistan. The meeting showcased Russia’s re-emergence as a proactive global power and its regional clout.

At the same time when the conference was hosted in Moscow, however, the Taliban mounted concerted attacks in the northern Baghlan province, the Jaghori district in central Ghazni province and the western Farah province bordering Iran.

In fact, according to a recent report by the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), the US-backed Afghan government only controls 55% of Afghanistan’s territory. It’s worth noting that SIGAR is a US-based governmental agency that often inflates figures.

Factually, the government’s writ does not extend beyond a third of Afghanistan. In many cases, the Afghan government controls district-centres of provinces and rural areas are either controlled by the Taliban or are contested.

If we take a cursory look at the insurgency in Afghanistan, the Bush administration toppled the Taliban regime with the help of the Northern Alliance in October 2001 in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attack. Since the beginning, however, Afghanistan was an area of lesser priority for the Bush administration.

The number of US troops stationed in Afghanistan did not exceed beyond 30,000 during George Bush’s tenure as president, and soon after occupying Afghanistan, he invaded Iraq in March 2003 and American resources and focus shifted to Iraq.

It was the Obama administration that made Afghanistan the bedrock of its foreign policy in 2009 along with fulfilling then-President Obama’s electoral pledge of withdrawing the US troops from Iraq in December 2011. At the height of the surge of the US troops in Afghanistan in 2010, the American troops numbered around 140,000 but they still could not manage to have a lasting effect on the relentless Taliban insurgency.

The Taliban are known to be diehard fighters who are adept at hit-and-run guerrilla tactics and have a much better understanding of the Afghan territory compared to foreigners. Even by their standards, however, the Taliban insurgency seems to be on steroids during the last couple of years.

The Taliban have managed to overrun and hold vast swathes of territory not only in the traditional Pashtun heartland of southern Afghanistan, such as Helmand, but have also made inroads into the northern provinces of Afghanistan which are the traditional strongholds of the Northern Alliance comprising Tajiks and Uzbeks.

In October 2016, for instance, the Taliban mounted brazen attacks on the Gormach district of northwestern Faryab province, the Tirankot district of Uruzgan province and briefly captured [1] the district-centre of the northern Kunduz province, before they were repelled with the help of US air power.

This outreach of the Taliban into the traditional strongholds of the Tajiks and Uzbeks in northern Afghanistan bordering the Russian client states Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan has come as a surprise to perceptive observers of the militancy in Afghanistan.

It is commonly believed that the Taliban are the proxies of Pakistan’s military which uses them as “strategic assets” to offset the influence of India in Afghanistan. The hands of Pakistan’s military, however, have been full with a home-grown insurgency of the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) since 2009 when it began conducting military operations in Swat and Pakistan’s tribal areas bordering Afghanistan.

Although some remnants of the Taliban still find safe havens in the lawless tribal areas of Pakistan, the renewed vigour and brazen assaults of the Taliban, particularly in the Afghanistan’s northern provinces as I described earlier, cannot be explained by the support of Pakistan’s military to the Taliban.

In an August 2017 report [2] for the New York Times, Carlotta Gall described the killing of the former Taliban chief Mullah Akhtar Mansour in a US drone strike on a tip-off from Pakistan’s intelligence in Pakistan’s western Balochistan province in May 2016 when he was coming back from a secret meeting with the Russian and Iranian officials in Iran. According to the report, “Iran facilitated a meeting between Mullah Akhtar Mansour and Russian officials, Afghan officials said, securing funds and weapons from Moscow for the insurgents.”

It bears mentioning that the Russian support to the Taliban coincides with its intervention in Syria in September 2015, after the Ukrainian Crisis in November 2013 when Viktor Yanukovych suspended the preparations for the implementation of an association agreement with the European Union and tried to take Ukraine back into the fold of the Russian sphere of influence by accepting billions of dollars of loan package offered by Vladimir Putin to Ukraine, consequently causing a crisis in which Yanukovych was ousted from power and Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula.

Although the ostensible reason of Russia’s support – and by some accounts, Iran’s as well – to the Taliban is that it wants to contain the influence of the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province in Afghanistan because the Khorasan Province includes members of the now defunct Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which is Russia’s traditional foe, the real reason of Russia’s intervention in Syria and support to the Taliban in Afghanistan is that the Western powers are involved in both of these conflicts and since a new Cold War has started between Russia and the Western powers after the Ukrainian crisis, hence it suits Russia’s strategic interests to weaken the influence of the Western powers in the Middle East and Central Asian regions and project its own power.

Finally, although the main reason of the surge in Taliban attacks during the last couple of years is the drawdown of American troops which now number only 14,000, and are likely to be scaled back to 7,000 in the coming months, the brazen Taliban offensives in northern and western provinces of Afghanistan, bordering Iran and Russian clients Central Asian States, lend credence to the reports that Russia and Iran are also arming the Taliban since 2015 in line with their “strategic interests” of containing Washington’s influence in the region.

Sources and links:
[1] Concerted Taliban onslaughts on Kunduz, Faryab, Uruzgan, Farah and Helmand:
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/afghanistan-taliban-captures-ghormach-district-161011141613477.html
[2] In Afghanistan, U.S. Exits, and Iran Comes In:
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/05/world/asia/iran-afghanistan-taliban.html

The current crisis between Russia and the West is the product of many fundamental geopolitical differences in both the former Soviet space and elsewhere. All trends in bilateral relations lead to a likely conclusion that fundamental differences between Russia and the West will remain stalled well into the future. The successful western expansion into what was always considered the “Russian backyard” halted Moscow’s projection of power and diminished its reach into the north of Eurasia – between fast-developing China, Japan, and other Asian countries, and the technologically modern European landmass.

What is interesting is that as a result of this geopolitical setback on the country’s western border, the Russian political elite started to think over Russia’s position in Eurasia. Politicians and analysts discuss the country’s belonging to either Western or Asian civilization or representing a symbiosis – the Eurasian world.

As many trends in Russian history are cyclic so is the process of defining Russia’s position and its attachment to Asia or Europe. This quest usually follows geopolitical shifts to Russia’s disadvantage.

In the 19th century, following a disastrous defeat in the Crimean War (1853-1856) from Great Britain and France, the Russian intellectuals began thinking over how solely European Russia was. Almost the same thing happened following the dissolution of the Russian Empire in 1917 and break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. Though in each case the Russians were reacting to European military or economic expansion with discussions, the reality was that a turn to the East was impossible as most developed territories were in the European parts of the Russian state. Back then, the Russians, when looking to the East, saw the empty lands in Siberia and the Russian Far East.

What is crucial nowadays is that Russia’s pull to the East is now happening due to the presence of powerful China bordering Siberia. This very difference is fundamental when discussing Russia’s modern quest for their position in Eurasia.

Today, Europe is a source of technological progress, as are Japan and China. Never in Russian history has there been such an opportunity to develop Siberia and transform it into a power base of the world’s economy.

Russia’s geographical position is unique and will remain so for another several decades, as the ice cap in the Arctic Ocean is set to diminish significantly. The Arctic Ocean will be transformed into an ocean of commercial highways, giving Russia a historic opportunity to become a sea power.

Chinese and Japanese human and technological resources in the Russian Far East, and European resources in the Russian west, can transform it into a land of opportunity.

Russia’s geographical position should be kept in mind when analyzing Moscow’s position vis-à-vis the China-US competition. However, apart from the purely economic and geographical pull that the developed Asia-Pacific has on Russia’s eastern provinces, the Russian political elite sees the nascent US-China confrontation as a chance to enhance its weakening geopolitical position throughout the former Soviet space. Russians are right to think that both Washington and Beijing will dearly need Russian support, and this logic is driving Moscow’s noncommittal approach towards Beijing and Washington. As a matter of cold-blooded international affairs, Russia wishes to position itself such that the US and China are strongly competing with one another to win its favor.

In allying itself with China, Russia would expect to increase its influence in Central Asia, where Chinese power has grown exponentially since the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. Although Moscow has never voiced official concerns about this matter, that is not to deny the existence of such concerns within the Russian political elite.

However, if Moscow chooses the US side, the American concessions could be more significant than the Chinese. Ukraine and the South Caucasus would be the biggest prizes, while NATO expansion into the Russian “backyard” would be stalled. The Middle East might be another sticking point where Moscow gets fundamental concessions – for example in Syria, should that conflict continue.

Beyond grand strategic thinking, this decision will also be a civilizational choice for the Russians molded in the perennial debate about whether the country is European, Asiatic, or Eurasian (a mixture of the two). Geography inexorably pulls Russia towards the East, but culture pulls it towards the west. While decisions of this nature are usually expected to be based on geopolitical calculations, cultural affinity also plays a role.

Tied into the cultural aspect is the Russians’ fear that they (like the rest of the world) do not know how the world would look under Chinese leadership. The US might represent a threat to Russia, but it is still a “known” for the Russian political elite. A China-led Eurasia could be more challenging for the Russians considering the extent to which Russian frontiers and provinces are open to large Chinese segments of the population.

The Russian approach to the nascent US-China confrontation is likely to be opportunistic. Its choice between them will be based on which side offers more to help Moscow resolve its problems across the former Soviet space.

This article was published at Georgia Today

“The President announced an apparently impulsive decision that shook the world, showed little sign of nuanced consideration, confounded top advisers and by the end of the day left Washington in chaos and confusion.” So goes a typical contribution from CNN, this time by Stephen Collinson, pooh-poohing President Donald Trump’s decision to pull out some 2,000 US troops based in Syria.

Trump had, whether intentionally or otherwise, touched a sentiment that has seethed underneath the US character at stages of the imperium’s muddled history. “Torn between nostalgia for a pristine past and yearning for a perfect future,” scribbled that self-important sage and practitioner of US foreign relations, Henry Kissinger, “American thought has oscillated between isolationism and commitment.”

Isolationism has become a pejorative used to scold and denigrate any movement that supposedly moves the US imperial machine away from its policing role. Cheered on from the international relations galleries, the US as an international sergeant has hardly bettered the world, often finding its clay feet in countries it needlessly deployed forces to. (It’s all in the name of national security, of course.) Nor can it ever have been said to be truly isolationist in any strict sense.

Between the War of 1812 against Great Britain and the Spanish-American War of 1898, the US maintained a posture of intervention, interference and influence at the regional level, thus designating it an assertive “hemispheric” power. “Security,” suggested historian John Lewis Gaddis, “could best be assured… by making certain that no other great power gained sovereignty within geographic proximity of the United States.”

It also proved a violation of that keen injunction made by the all too intelligent President John Quincy Adams in his July 4th address in 1821, one that still sums up the US mission in all its doomed sanctimonious glamour. “Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will be her heart, her benedictions and her prayers be.” But be wary of going abroad “in search of monsters to destroy”; to do so might make the US “dictatress of the world” while no longer being “the ruler of her own spirit”.

Trumpland is a tense, manic place, one where chiding allies and high-fiving authoritarian figures might be permissible; but it is also one that eschews the stifling nature of relationships that entangle. Alliances, like love affairs, can cloy after awhile. Accusations of infidelity and poor bedroom performance are bound to follow.

Such an approach is bound to leave powers collaborating with Washington in the lurch, a point exemplified by the latest Syria announcement. “Does the USA,” tweeted Trump on Thursday, “want to be the Policeman of the Middle East, getting NOTHING but spending precious lives and trillions of dollars protecting others who, in almost all cases, do not appreciate what we are doing? Do we want to be there forever? Time for others to finally fight…”

For Trump, no one should have raised an eyebrow, or had a complaint. “Getting out of Syria was no surprise. I’ve been campaigning on it for years, and six months now, when I very publicly wanted to do it, I agreed to stay longer.” In what was a classic deferral of authority in the Syrian campaign, a backhanded admission of sorts, he noted how “Russia, Iran, Syria & others are the local enemy of ISIS.” Why do their blood shedding work? “Time to come home & rebuild.”

Where Trump reverts to full throttle idiosyncrasy (his critics would term it immodest derangement) is his novel assessment of attitudes of those three states at imminent US withdrawal. “Russia, Iran, Syria & many others are not happy about the US leaving, despite what the Fake News says, because now they will have to fight ISIS and others, who they hate, without us.” The focus, rather, was on the US “building by far the most powerful military in the world. ISIS hits us they are doomed!”

To round off the announcement, one of the last stalwarts resisting the fever of resignation and sacking that has afflicted the administration, announced his departure. US Defence Secretary General Jim Mattis added his name to a pre-Christmas evacuation party that has made the Trump tenure one of the most eventful in US history. His view on leaving remained that of the more orthodox defenders of the US imperium, with its umbrella of “alliances”.

“While the US remains the indispensable nation in the free world,” he banally enunciated in his resignation letter, “we cannot protect our interests or serve that role effectively without maintaining strong alliances and showing respect to those allies.”

Other politicians keen to keep the US brand in foreign military theatres were also dismayed at the move. House Democrat leader Nancy Pelosi was “shaken by the news because of the patriot that Secretary Mattis is.” The general had proven to be “a comfort to many of us as a voice of stability in the Trump administration.”

Senator Lindsay Graham (R-S.C.), having argued that the US troops stationed in Syria were “vital to our national security interests” (he never coherently articulated how) seemed personally stung by the announcement. “I’m going to give you an honest evaluation. I am willing to support a Democrat if he followed sound military advice. I’m willing to fight a Republican if you don’t.”

After reading Mattis’ resignation letter, Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) felt that the US was “headed towards a series of grave policy errors which will endanger our nation, damage our alliances & empower our adversaries.” For Rubio and his extensively spread ilk in the foreign interventionist complex, Adams’ warning of 1821, given an awkward Trump twist in 2018, is not just history but another, very distant country. Empire is its own global and lengthy commitment; to withdraw from any theatre is an admission that it is running out of gas and giving cheer to rivals.

Many times in a recent speech, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan expressed his hope for emulating China and Malaysia to make a robust shift from third world country to a developing Pakistan. I thought, it worthwhile to review the economical, educational, political and social growth of the three countries, Singapore, China and Malaysia. In this article, I portray the development trajectory of Singapore and will cover China and Malaysia in subsequent articles.

Singapore — officially Republic of Singapore — got independence from UK in 1963 and was merged to Malaysia by British. But it was separated due to ideological differences and became a sovereign nation in 1965. Despite of being in turmoil and a lack of natural resources at an early stage, Singapore turned into the robust, developed Asian tiger economy. And now it is a global hub for education, entertainment, capital, innovation, technology, transport, tourism and trade.

Singapore follows the Westminster parliamentary form of governance structure. The state constitution established democracy as the political system. The chief power owned to the Cabinet headed by Prime Minister. The legislative structure is based on English laws. Singapore judicial system is considered one of the most reliable in Asia.

Corruption: Singapore has been consistently marked is one of the least-corrupt countries by Transparency International. The whole credit goes to a strong government that always is focusing on meritocracy and good governance and hence it is the grassroots behind political stability and economic growth.

Rule of Law: The 2011, World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index declared Singapore as a country blessed with highly order and security, corruption-free and effective criminal justice, among top countries. But mysteriously, freedom of speech and freedom of assembly was linked to Police administration’s permission and a specific area (speakers corner) is devoted for such public activities.

Economy: The robust economy growth made Singapore an Asian Tiger very similar to Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan. The average growth rate was about 6 percent between 1965 and 1995, that had transformed the living standards of populations. Its economy is the most innovative, competitive, dynamical and business friendly. The 2015, Index of Economics Freedom and Ease of Doing Business Index marked Singapore as the top easiest and freest place to do business for the past decades.

The 2106, Economist Intelligence Unit, rated it the world expensive city for consecutive three years. The chief reason behind such a fragile and robust economy is the catching attraction of many foreign investors due to its skilled work force, low tax rates, advance infrastructure and zero-tolerance against corruption. It is second largest investor in India, and 14th largest exporter in the world.

Employment: Singapore is ranked, having the lowest unemployment rates among developed countries. According to the measure between, 2005 and 2014, the unemployment rate remained below 4%. The government consistently provides myriad aid programs to the homeless and needy through the ministry of social and family development. The government, day after day is busing in giving citizens, free money, baby bonus, subsidy for health care, fund to disable, laptops to poor students and much more. This shows, how Singapore believed in individual investment and development. Singapore government, care much foreign workers as foreign workers made 80 percent of construction industry and around 50 percent service industry.

Industry Sector: Singapore is now a leader in the current industry sector, being 3rd largest oil-refining and trade center, world’s largest oil producer and a major hub for ship repairing services. The chief production to be exported, are the refined petroleum, integrated circuits, and computers. Singapore largest companies are in the telecom, transportation, and banking. Information and communication technology is one of the key factors to stable economy.

Education: The schooling model of Singapore has three stages, primary, secondary and pre-university education, with primary stage as compulsory. The curriculum emphasis on the improvement of English, the mother tongue, mathematics and science. Singapore students are much competent in math and science. As the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD)’s global school performance ranked its primary and secondary students FIRST, among 76 top counties in 2015, that highlighted the high education standards there.

The developmental trajectory by Singapore in politics, education, industry and economy just briefed above, have consistent grassroots of fair and transparent governance system, which underdeveloped countries must learn to shift themselves in to developing one.

*Irfan Khan, Researcher at QAU, Islamabad and writer at Daily Time, Dunya Blogs, Naya Daur, and EACPE