With new regional and international tensions, internal political quarrels, stagnating economies and worsening public services, many people in the Balkans will probably want to forget the past year as 12 wasted months.
From deepening political divisions and tensions
over the general elections in Bosnia, to worsened relations between
Kosovo and Serbia, and from mass protests in Serbia and Romania to the
arrests of so-called “Gulenists”, sought by Turkey, the Balkans saw a
good deal of turmoil and political and economic instability in 2018.
In addition to country reports looking at each country’s perspectives
in 2019, which promises to be at least as interesting as this year,
BIRN is offering this brief overview of the key developments in the
Balkan countries in 2018.
Bosnia in 2018: Politics overshadowed by elections
One of the defining events in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the general
election held on October 7. As in previous years, the election year was
dominated by radical rhetoric, populist moves and statements as well as
by blocked reforms. Before, during and after the ballot, there were
allegations of election fraud, none of which were upheld by the local
courts, however.
Another election-related controversy concerned the fact that the vote
took place under a part-annulled election law, which Bosnia’s state
parliament had failed to amend.
The law was missing the section regulating elections in Bosnia’s
Federation entity to the House of Peoples. The state-level
Constitutional Court struck it down two years ago.
Reform of this and other parts of the election law was a hotly disputed issue throughout the year.
Bosnian Croat parties complained that, under the current rules, far
more numerous Bosniaks used their superior numbers to outvote Croats and
in effect elect nominally Croat candidates.
This issue also triggered tensions between Bosnia and Croatia, which
also called for legislative and constitutional changes in Bosnia to
bolster Croats rights with other two ethnic groups.
However, some local and international experts insisted that the
ruling Croatian party in Bosnia, the Croatian Democratic Union, HDZ, and
its leader, Dragan Covic, did not truly want to resolve this issue so
much as to use it to block the formation of new governments and push for the re-creation of an autonomous Croat entity.
The elections, meanwhile, saw another victory of the three main
national parties, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats SNSD, of
Milorad Dodik, Covic’s HDZ and the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action,
SDA.
The SNSD and SDA candidates, Milorad Dodik and Sefik Dzaferovic, won seats on the state’s tripartite presidency.
However, in another controversy, the third, Croat, seat went to
Zeljko Komsic who clearly won thanks mainly to Bosniak votes. The
result, while fully legal, created more tension with the Bosnian Croat community and with Croatia.
The elections results also showed that the HDZ and SNSD could not be
left out in the formation of state and entity governments, while their
most likely coalition partner from the Bosniak parties would be the
SDA.
Late in December, Bosnia’s much-criticised Central Election
Commission finally fixed the broken election law, to allow the lawful
formation of a Federation government, but its decision was likely to end
up before the Constitutional Court, after Bosniak leaders said they
would challenge it.
Because of this and other political quarrels, formation of new governments and progress on key reforms remained uncertain.
Bulgaria in 2018: Euro-presidency success marred by scandals at home
Bulgaria showed two distinct faces in 2018. On one hand, it was the
European Commission’s darling, hosting the Council of the European Union
Presidency for the first time during the first six months of the year,
and organizing two international summits at which the EU first met
Turkey and then the Western Balkan states.
Despite the modest results of both events, Bulgaria showed good
organizational skills and seemingly pushed forward its agenda of joining
the passport-free Schengen area, at least partially, and the European
Banking Union in 2019.
But Bulgaria also showed another face during 2018 as Bulgarian
nationalists in government and MEPs backed Hungary’s nationalist leader
Victor Orban, when the EU decided to penalise him for undermining the
rule of law and the freedom of expression in Hungary.
A seemingly never-ending wave of public discontent against
controversial decisions or, in other instances, lack of adequate
measures, meanwhile shook the country and forced the government to
replace four ministers including one deputy prime minister in only a few
months.
Two other ministers, of Energy and Social Welfare, almost resigned, but Prime Minister Boyko Borissov did not let them quit.
The year started with the Save Pirin protests against the decision of
the government to allow some construction in the Pirin National Park
and UNESCO site, which activists fear could pave the way towards the
widespread destruction of the precious mountainous area.
The government’s troubles continued with the controversial attempted
sale of CEZ, the country’s largest energy supplier, to a small,
family-controlled company with connections to Energy Minister Temenuzhka
Petkova.
This was followed by an announcement that Bulgaria was re-starting
two large energy projects that looked likely to tighten Russia’s grip
over the country.
After a quiet summer, a new wave of discontent sprung up – first
after a badly communicated mass cull of sheep and goats in the Strandzha
region in August, and then after a deadly bus crash near Svoge, close
to Sofia.
This led to three ministerial resignations and half-hearted
admissions that corruption in the road infrastructure sector might have
contributed to the deaths of 20 people.
The topic of corruption in the field of public procurements was
heightened by the arrests of investigative journalists, Attila Biro from
Rise Project Romania, and Dimitar Stoyanov from Bivol-Bulgaria.
They were detained after they tried to stop the destruction of
evidence of public procurement fraud involving one of the largest
winners of public tenders for road repairs and construction, GP Group.
This was followed by the resignation of Deputy Prime Minister Valeri
Simeonov for offending protesting mothers of children with disabilities,
and by a 77-million-euros fine for not complying with EU competition
rules.
While the ruling GERB-United Patriots coalition continued to claim it
offered the country “stability”, the picture was, clearly, a lot less
rosy.
Kosovo in 2018: Raising the stakes with Serbia
In March, the Kosovo parliament finally ratified the long delayed
border agreement with Montenegro, a controversial deal that since 2015
had sparked violent clashes between the opposition and the ruling
coalition.
After three years of leading opposition to the border agreement with
Montenegro, Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj accepted the deal, with a
new annex that left open the possibility of “correcting” the exact
borders later on.
The European Union had insisted on the deal as one of the criteria
for granting Kosovo visa-free access to the passport-free Schengen area –
which had not happened by the time 2018 ended, however.
Meanwhile, that same month, tensions were sparked with Serbia
following the arrest of Marko Djuric, the head of the Serbian
government’s Kosovo office. Despite being banned from entering Kosovo by
the authorities, Djuric visited the Serbian stronghold of North
Mitrovica to participate in a debate with Kosovo Serb leaders.
After the arrest, Djuric was taken to Pristina in handcuffs with his
head held down before numerous journalists, photographers and TV crews.
Djuric later described the treatment as an attempt to humiliate him, and
Serbia, saying that he was “walked liked a dog”.
Further tensions with Serbia erupted in November when Kosovo imposed a 10-per-cent tax on Serbian and Bosnian imports.
Despite international pressure to withdraw the decision, the
government did the opposite and sharply increased the tax from 10 to 100
per cent, one day after Kosovo failed to join the international police
organisation Interpol at its general assembly in Dubai.
This setback was credited to strong Serbian lobbying. Haradinaj
stressed that Kosovo would not revoke the tax until Serbia recognised
Kosovo’s independence.
In December, the Kosovo parliament adopted another controversial
decision, a package of three draft laws expanding the competences of the
Kosovo Security Force, KSF, and creating a legal base for its
transformation into a regular army.
By adopting laws on merely changing the KSF’s remit, parliament
bypassed the need to adopt the regular constitutional changes required
to change the KSF into an official army – which Serbia and Kosovo Serbs
bitterly oppose.
Representatives of the main Kosovo Serb party, Srpska Lista, said the
new de-facto army would have no mandate to operate in mainly Serbian
north Kosovo – and it would challenge the vote before the Constitutional
Court.
Macedonia in 2018: Breakthrough marred by ex-PM’s escape
Macedonia in 2018 witnessed a major breakthrough, with the signing of the historic “name” agreement with Greece.
But this achievement was undermined by events at home, when the
scandalous escape of the former autocratic Prime Minister, Nikola
Gruevski, who had been sent to prison, caused major ripples.
After spending much of the first half of the year in hard
UN-sponsored “name” talks with Greece, on June 17, the two countries
finally signed an agreement on ending the decades-long dispute over Macedonia’s name, under which the country would be renamed Republic of North Macedonia.
The signing of the agreement won international praise and was
regarded as the most positive political development in the Balkans that
year.
However, it also stirred tensions as far-right nationalists in both countries staged sometimes violent protests.
At the consultative referendum that followed in September 30, the majority of Macedonian voters supported the agreement. But the turnout failed to meet the required 50 per cent threshold, which emptied the result of any real force.
Despite this setback, Prime Minister Zoran Zaev narrowly steered the
agreement through parliament and the process is expected to end by late
January. In return, Greece agreed to stop blocking Macedonia’s accession
to NATO and the EU.
Amidst renewed optimism over this breakthrough, Macedonia was shocked
in November when former Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, who was ousted
in May 2017, mysteriously fled the country, so avoiding serving a jail
sentence.
This was a major blow to Zaev’s government, which took power on a promise to deliver justice for the past regime’s crimes.
While some critics attributed the escape to government incompetence,
many suspected that Gruevski had been allowed to escape as part of an
elusive deal with the government.
Gruevski was supposed to report to start serving his two-year jail term on November 9, but failed to do so.
On November 13, a post on his Facebook account announced that he was
in Hungary, where he was seeking political asylum, having supposedly
received numerous threats to his life.
Hungary soon granted Gruevski asylum, a move attributed to Gruevski’s
long political friendship with Hungary’s leader, Viktor Orban. Albania,
Montenegro and Serbia meanwhile confirmed that Gruevski had used their
territory to flee to Hungary, and that Hungarian diplomats had aided his escape.
Moldova in 2018: Populism puts EU path in danger
Throughout 2018, Moldova witnessed growing political tensions and
quarrels, which posed a threat to the EU-Moldova Association Agreement
signed in 2014.
The worst political unrest occurred in June, after an allegedly
politically influenced court ruling cancelled the results of the mayoral
elections in Chisinau, which an opposition leader Andrei Nastase, had
won – fairly in the view of most observers.
Soon after, the European Commission suspended 100 million euros in
macro-financial, accusing Moldova of backsliding on democratic
standards.
As a counter-measure, aimed at getting more money into the budget,
all the main three institutions in Moldova – parliament, government and
the presidency – gave the green light to a highly controversial fiscal
reform.
Critics said the new law would enable people to clean “dirty” money
as it allows any Moldovan citizen to register and keep any illegally
gained financial gains or assets, as long as he or she pays a 3-per-cent
fee to the state.
Moldova also offered 5,000 passports to anyone wanting to purchase
Moldovan citizenship for a 100,000-euro donation to the government, or a
250,000-euro investment in any business in Moldova.
The name of the “new” citizens will also remain secret. The changes disturbed many in the country, and abroad.
Besides these and other decisions, which clearly went against
Brussels’ advice and demands, the ruling Democratic Party hardened its
nationalist rhetoric ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections, due
in February 2019.
By the end of 2018, relations between Moldova and EU had turned distinctly frosty.
Romania in 2018: Political turmoil and social uprisings
Romania experienced continuous political turmoil in 2018, with
politicians entrenched in a battle against prosecutors over the policies
of the National Anti-Corruption Directorate, DNA.
Street protests against the government intensified throughout the year, some ending up in violence.
Under the management of Laura Codruta Kovesi, the youngest and first
woman prosecutor to lead the DNA, the agency had in recent years
indicted hundreds of politicians and former dignitaries, many of them
Social Democrats. The Social Democrat-led government in Bucharest duly fired her in July.
The battered anti-graft agency lacks a new chief in 2019 as President
Klaus Iohannis has refused to appoint the government’s nominee, Adina
Florea, citing her cooperation with the intelligence services.
Kovesi’s dismissal came too late for Social Democrat strongman Liviu Dragnea, however.
He was sentenced to three-and-a-half years in jail in a second
corruption trial, although the June 21 verdict was not final and he is
now appealing the sentence.
Following a rally organized by the ruling party to show its large
support base on June 9, and following Kovesi’s dismissal, several
anti-government groups, including some based in Romania’s large
diaspora, announced a large protest of their own on August 10.
The rally drew tens of thousands of people from across Romania, but
ended in a violent clash with the riot police, which used tear gas to
disperse demonstrators around the government building in Bucharest.
The incidents on August 10 left hundreds wounded and police, as well
as the Interior Minister, faced harsh criticism for using
disproportionate force against peaceful protesters, including elderly
people and children.
Prosecutors started an investigation into the allegations of
violence, which the government dismissed, saying the use of force had
been “justified”.
The violent crackdown on August 10, as well as the push by the Social
Democrats to change the criminal codes and several laws on the
organization of courts and prosecutor’s offices – all designed to relax
the fight against corruption – resulted in the European Commission
slamming the government in November with the harshest report on the
country since it joined the EU.
Moreover, the fact that neighbouring Bulgaria simultaneously received
praise from the EU for its progress, and various politicians in
Brussels called for its speedy admission to the Schengen area, caused
further discontent in Romania.
The year ended with Romania still mired in controversies and rumours
that the cabinet was still mulling a decree on amnestying and pardoning
corruption convicts similar, to the one that triggered the
January-February 2017 protests – the biggest the country has seen since
1989.
Serbia in 2018: Worsening tension with Kosovo
Unresolved relation with Kosovo remained the main political issue in
Serbia. While EU increased pressure on both sides to resolve their
decade-long dispute over Kosovo’s independence, proclaimed in 2008,
their relations were dogged by arrests, cancelled meetings, exchanges of
strong words and import taxes.
Tensions in Serbia increased in March, after Kosovo police arrested the head of the Serbian government’s Office for Kosovo, Marko Djuric, for entering Kosovo despite a ban on his presence.
In September, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic scrapped a planned meeting with his Kosovo counterpart, Hashim Thaci, in Brussels.
He then paid a visit to the Serbian community in Kosovo instead.
After Kosovo war veterans blocked roads leading to the village of
Banje, south of the Ibar River, the Kosovo government cancelled Vucic’s
planned visit to the Serbian village, though it caused no problems about him holding a rally in the Serbian stronghold of North Mitrovica.
In his speech, the Serbian President praised Serbia’s late president
Slobodan Milosevic, a hate figure in Kosovo, sparking strong reactions
also from Kosovo officials.
Two months later, Kosovo imposed taxes on imports from Serbia and
Bosnia. The decision caused four mayors in Serb-majority municipalities
in North Kosovo to resign and to end their communications with Kosovo institutions.
Another row erupted between two countries in December. On December
18, at a UN Security Council session, called by Belgrade, when Kosovo’s
President Thaci defended
the controversial decision to transform the country’s lightly armed
security force, the KSF, into a de facto army, which Serbia claimed
would jeopardise peace in the region.
Besides rockier than ever relations with Kosovo, another key
development in 2018 in Serbia was the series of anti-government
protests, which started in early December, following the brutal beating
of the leader of opposition Serbian Left party, Borko Stefanovic. He was
assaulted late in November.
Thousands of people gathered weekend after weekend in the Serbian
capital, condemning the attack, the widespread corruption and political
violence in the country, and demanding that the public broadcaster give
them fairer treatment in its reports.
The calls for a fairer media were strengthened following an incident
on December 12 when the home of a journalist for the website Zig Info,
Milan Jovanovic, was shot at and then set on fire by unknown
individuals, apparently because of his reporting on local corruption.
On December 23, the Interior Minister, Nebojsa Stefanovic, said three persons had been arrested for this crime.
The latest BIRN report
on the state of the media in Serbia notes abuses of funding, lack of
pluralism in terms of content, an unclear legislative framework and
administrative pressure on independent media as some of the most
concerning issues.
While the street protests came relatively late in the year, the number of people attending them grew steadily.
The protests are expected to
continue in 2019, and their impact on the country’s political scene,
and on the regime of President Vucic, has yet to be tested.
Croatia in 2018: Sporting triumph – and shame, too
The event that Croats will surely remember most from last year is
winning the silver medal in the 2018 World Cup. After the national
football team took the silver, the country threw itself a massive party,
with hundreds of thousands of people pouring onto the streets to
welcome the players back from Moscow.
Marketing experts said it could be another great way to promote Croatian tourism.
However, another sector of the Croatian sporting world aroused less national pride.
On June 6 in a first-degree ruling, controversial football mogul
Zdravko Mamic was found guilty of siphoning money off from football
clubs and damaging the state budget.
This verdict was major news, but Mamic – who also holds Bosnian citizenship – fled there to avoid imprisonment at home.
Many commentators remained unsure whether this would mark an end to the endemic culture of corruption in Croatian football.
The key event for the Croatian economy was the much trumpeted rescue
of the indebted food giant Agrokor, Croatia’s biggest private company,
which found itself in major financial trouble from the beginning of
2017.
The firm was taken under state-appointed management in early 2017
under a special law dubbed the “Lex Agrokor” to avert its collapse and
the loss of more than 50,000 jobs across the Balkan region.
In October, a debt restructuring deal was confirmed by Zagreb’s High
Commercial Court. But many questions were left hanging in the air.
Experts noted that Agrokor’s new shareholders, the biggest of which is
Sberbank of Russia, with 39.2 per cent, have little interest in food
production.
While Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic claimed that the process of
saving Agrokor was a great success, and tried to close this topic, many
media and commentators said the country will not forget it so quickly.
A former member of his government, Martina Dalic, resigned in May as
Economy Minister and Deputy Prime Minister after leaked emails suggested
that she had used her position to help her friends and business
associates during the process of passing the law imposing state
management on Agrokor.
In December, the Conflict of Interest Commission decided that Dalic,
and the current Finance Minister, Zdravko Maric, violated the principle
of holding public office in connection with the Agrokor food and retail
conglomerate. However, the violation does not carry any penalties.
The fate of Ivica Todoric, Agrokor’s former owner, was also
uncertain. After spending a year in London, escaping pre-trial
detention, he was extradited to Croatia in November.
After only 13 days of pre-trial detention, he was released on paying a
million euros in bail. He is now on conditional release until the end
of the investigation process and the eventual filing of an indictment.
Interestingly, he has announced that he intends to run for elections.
Some “worldview” battles also erupted in 2018 in Croatia, as in other countries, between conservatives and liberals.
One of the main disputes was about so-called Istanbul convention, the
Council of Europe’s convention on preventing and combating violence
against woman and domestic violence. Conservatives noisily argued that
ratification of the convention would undermine family values and promote
a so-called gender ideology.
As in some other Balkan countries, Croatia also saw a great split
over the UN’s non-binding Global Pact on Migration, signed in Morocco,
which conservatives also denounced, insisting it would only encourage
more migration.
Turkey in 2018: Economic fears and rows with West
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan won
the presidential election for the second time by a tight margin, thanks
mainly to the alliance between his ruling Justice and Development
Party, AKP, and nationalist parties.
Erdogan maintained his majority in parliament but was obliged to draw on the support of nationalist allies to pass laws.
After the elections, the new executive presidential system, which was endorsed in a highly controversial referendum in 2017, took force.
The new system gives the President almost unchecked power and makes
him the only real decision maker in domestic and foreign politics.
Erdogan’s authoritarian rule continued to undermine Turkey’s once warm relations with the West.
Kati Piri, the EU rapporteur on Turkey, even said the EU should
formally suspend membership negotiations with Turkey. The EU also
reduced “pre-ascension funds” for Turkey by 105 million euros and froze
an additional 70 million euros of previously announced spending because
of “the deteriorating situation in relation to democracy, rule of law
and human rights worrying”.
The US was also displeased, imposing new sanctions on Turkey on
August 1, including not delivering F-35 fighter jets to Turkey as had
been agreed.
In response, Turkey tried to get closer with Russia, especially on
the issues of Syria, the defence industry, energy and the economy.
Turkey took steps in 2018 to get Russian S-400 missile systems and the
offshore section of Turkish Stream pipeline project was opened November
19.
Amid internal political quarrels and worsening relations with the US,
the EU and NATO, the Turkish currency, the lira, plummeted by more than
50 per cent between January and December 2018.
The drop in the value of the lira was followed by other alarming
indices in the economy and the government had to increase taxes and the
price of main commodities, including gas, electricity and petroleum.
This all also affected Turkey’s GDP growth, which shrank to a puny 1.6
per cent in the third quarter of 2018.
Besides strengthening his powers at home, Erdogan increased his hunt
for supporters of the exiled cleric Fethullah Gulen, whom he blames for a
failed coup attempt in 2016 and describes as the leader of the
“Fethullahist Terrorist Organisation”, or FETO.
Erdogan and his government pushed Balkan countries on every occasion
to shut Gulen-linked institutions and arrest his followers and deport
them to Turkey.
Turkey’s intelligence agency, the MIT, conducted two such operations. One was in Kosovo on March 29.
The other one was in Moldova
on September 6. The abduction of these alleged “Gulenists” to Turkey
caused consternation in both countries, with Kosovo leaders claiming not
to have been informed.
Several other court cases in which Turkey demanded the extradition of alleged Gulenists to Turkey continued in several Balkan countries.