The game is afoot. Israel, believe it or not, is demanding that seven Arab countries and Iran pay $250 billion in compensation for what it claims was the forceful exodus of Jews from these nations during the late 1940s. 
The events Israel is citing allegedly occurred at a time when Zionist Jewish militias were actively uprooting nearly 1 million Palestinian Arabs and systematically destroying their homes, villages and towns throughout Palestine.

The Israeli announcement, which reportedly followed “18 months of secret research,” should not be filed under the ever-expanding folder of shameless Israeli misrepresentations of history. It is part of a calculated effort by the Israeli government, and specifically by Minister for Social Equality Gila Gamliel, to create a counter-narrative to the rightful demand for the “right of return” for Palestinian refugees ethnically cleansed by Jewish militias between 1947 and 1948.

But there is a reason for the Israeli urgency to reveal such questionable research: The relentless US-Israeli attempts of the last two years to dismiss the rights of Palestinian refugees, to question their numbers and to marginalize their grievances. It is all part and parcel of the ongoing plot disguised as the “deal of the century,” with the clear aim of removing from the table all major issues that are central to the Palestinian struggle for freedom.

“The time has come to correct the historic injustice of the pogroms (against Jews) in seven Arab countries and Iran, and to restore, to hundreds of thousands of Jews who lost their property, what is rightfully theirs,” said Gamliel.

The language — “to correct the historic injustice” — is no different from that used by Palestinians, who have for 70 years and counting been demanding the restoration of their rights as per UN General Assembly Resolution 194. The deliberate conflating of the Palestinian narrative with the Zionist narrative is aimed at creating parallels in the hope that a future political agreement would see both grievances cancel each other out.

Contrary to what Israeli historians want us to believe, there was no mass exodus of Jews from Arab countries and Iran, but rather a massive campaign orchestrated by Zionist leaders of the time to replace the Palestine Arab population with Jewish immigrants from all over the world.

To hold Arabs and Iran responsible for this bizarre and irresponsible behavior is a transgression on the true story, in which neither Gamliel nor her ministry are interested.

On the other hand, and unlike what Israeli military historians often claim, the events in Palestine in 1947-48 (and the purges of the native population that followed in 1967) were a premeditated act of ethnic cleansing. They were part of a drawn-out and carefully calculated campaign that, from the very start, served as the main strategy at the heart of the Zionist movement’s “vision” for the Palestinian people.

“We must expel the Arabs and take their place,” wrote Israel’s founder, military leader and first prime minister David Ben-Gurion in a letter to his son Amos in 1937. That was over a decade before Plan D, which saw the destruction of the Palestinian homeland at the hands of Ben-Gurion’s militias, came into effect.

Palestine “contains vast colonization potential,” he also wrote, “which the Arabs neither need nor are qualified to exploit.” This clear declaration of a colonial project in Palestine, communicated with the same kind of unmistakable racist insinuations and language that accompanied all Western colonial experiences throughout the centuries, was not unique to Ben-Gurion. He was merely paraphrasing what was, by then, understood to be the crux of the Zionist enterprise in Palestine at the time.

As Palestinian professor Nur Masalha concluded in his book, “Expulsion of the Palestinians,” the idea of the “transfer” — the Zionist term for ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian people — was, and remains, fundamental in the realization of Zionist ambitions in Palestine.

What this meant in practice, as delineated by Palestinian historian Walid Khalidi, was that Jewish militias systematically attacked all population centers in Palestine, without exception. “By the end of April (1948), the combined Haganah-Irgun offensive had completely encircled (the Palestinian city of) Jaffa, forcing most of the remaining civilians to flee by sea to Gaza or Egypt; many drowned in the process,” Khalidi wrote in “Before Their Diaspora.” 

This tragedy eventually grew to affect all Palestinians throughout their historic homeland. Tens of thousands of refugees joined up with hundreds of thousands more on various dusty trails throughout the country, growing in numbers as they walked further, before finally pitching their tents in areas that were then meant to be “temporary” encampments. Alas, these became the Palestinian refugee camps of today.

None of this was accidental. The determination of the early Zionists to establish a “national home” for Jews at the expense of the country’s Palestinian Arab population was communicated openly, clearly and repeatedly throughout the formation of early Zionist thought, and the translation of those well-articulated ideas into physical reality.

Seventy years have passed since the Nakba — the catastrophe of 1948 — and neither has Israel taken responsibility for its actions nor have Palestinian refugees received any measure of justice, however small or symbolic.

For Israel to be seeking compensation from Arab countries and Iran is a moral travesty, especially as Palestinian refugees continue to languish in camps across Palestine and the Middle East.

Indeed “the time has come to correct the historic injustice” — not of Israel’s alleged pogroms carried out by Arabs and Iranians, but the real and most tragic destruction of Palestine and its people. 

By Cornelia Meyer*

Developments at the end of 2018 and the beginning of 2019 proved that we need to put more emphasis on understanding automated oil trading programs and algorithms. Volatility was high. We went from a booming crude market in early October to bust, then to boom again at the start of this year. 

Volatility is the lifeblood of traders, and the enemy of producers and consumers. How can oil companies decide on their investment programs, and consumers gauge their operating expenses, when the price is all over the place? 

The last two weeks are a case in point as Brent rallied almost 15 percent since Jan. 1. The rally was supported by Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Venezuela cutting their December production by nearly 870,000 barrels per day (bpd), which was partially offset by higher-than-expected exports from Iraq and Libya. 

In December, OPEC+ agreed to reduce production by 1.2 million bpd. An extraordinary supply overhang, resulting from larger-than-expected Iranian exports after the US granted eight countries exemptions from sanctions, had necessitated this measure. 

The January rally was also supported by macroeconomic sentiment: Expectations that a US-China trade deal might be in reach, and equity markets that performed well. The Dow Jones closed 2 percent up on the week.

Larger-than-expected demand from China’s independent refiners helped, and the Energy Information Administration (EIA) reported a draw in US crude stocks of 1.7 million barrels for the week ending Jan. 4. The question is to what degree fundamentals drive the market, and to what extent other considerations. The answer lies in part in what drives automated trading programs, which is a black box to many. 

OPEC+ has done a fine job in balancing the market. When the alliance was formed in the winter of 2016, observers were skeptical about whether the 24 countries would have the discipline to cooperate. The naysayers were proven wrong. OPEC+ compliance was stunning, often exceeding 100 percent. 

This was no mean feat. Credit goes to the diplomatic skills of Mohammed Barkindo, secretary-general of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the co-chairs of the Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee, which oversees compliance: Saudi Energy Minister Khalid Al-Falih and his Russian counterpart Alexander Novak.

OPEC achieved its goal as far as the fundamentals were concerned. Barrels were added and taken off the market as required. Still, the last two years were highly cyclical, with markets oscillating from bust to boom then back to bust. The market is increasingly driven by forces other than the physical fundamentals. 

In North America, automated trading programs, which are driven by algorithms, have become increasingly prominent. The down cycle in the fourth quarter of 2018 can to a large degree be attributed to these programs. At the year-end, macroeconomic sentiment was driven by the fear of a US-China trade war, lower economic forecasts and a falling stock market. 

The programs considered this to a far greater degree than the fact that barrels came off the market, and oil demand is expected to grow by around 1.4 million bpd in 2019, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). 

The decision by OPEC+ to take 1.2 million barrels out of the market in early December only gave short respite from the downward trajectory of the oil price. Things worsened considerably toward the year-end when investors needed to wind down investments for tax reasons, trading was thin, and desks were mainly manned by junior staff. 

The latter were more likely to execute on stop-loss orders without being guided by experience or having the clout to consult with clients. In other words, pricing was to a large extent at the mercy of the automated programs and their algorithms. Oil lost 30 percent between its high in October and the year-end.

OPEC+ gets a lot of credit from oil companies and consumers for its attempts to balance the market. The reason is simple: Producers need a predictable price range in order to be able to draw up investment plans, and consumers need to plan their budgets and hedging arrangements.

Automated trading renders the quest to balance markets difficult because the parameters go well beyond counting physical barrels. The use of automated trading programs is steadily increasing. This means the powers that be in OPEC+ need to understand what drives these algorithms. Communication will no longer be just about barrels, but also informed by the type of information that drives the algorithms.

• Cornelia Meyer is a business consultant, macro-economist and energy expert. Twitter: @MeyerResources

The only redeeming aspect to Trump’s presidency is he brings us back to basics. And what could be more basic than the difference between democracy and dictatorship?

Democracy is about means, not ends. If we all agreed on the ends (such as whether to build a wall along the Mexican border) there’d be no need for democracy.

But of course we don’t agree, which is why the means by which we resolve our differences are so important. Those means include a Constitution, a  system of government based on the rule of law, and an independent judiciary.

A dictatorship, by contrast, is only about ends. Those ends are the goals of the dictator – preserving and accumulating personal power. To achieve those ends, a dictator will use any means necessary.

Which brings us back to Trump.

The conventional criticism of Trump is that he’s unfit to be president because he continuously breaks the norms of how a president should behave.

Trump’s norm-breaking is unsettling, to be sure, but Trump’s more fundamental offense is he continuously sacrifices means in order to preserve and accumulate personal power.

He thereby violates a president’s core responsibility to protect American democracy.

A president who shuts down government in order to get his way on a controversial issue, such as building a wall along the border with Mexico, and offering to reopen it as a concession when his opponents give in, is not protecting democracy.  

He is treating the government of the United States as a bargaining chip. He is asserting power by any means possible. This is the method of a dictator.

A president who claims he has an absolute right to declare a national emergency and spend government funds that Congress has explicitly refused to appropriate for the ends he seeks, is also assuming the role of a dictator.

A president who spouts lies during a prime-time national television address over what he terms an “undeniable crisis” at the southern U.S. border, which is in fact no crisis at all, is using whatever means available to him to preserve and build his base of power.  

The real international threat to America is not coming from Latin America. It is coming from a foreign government intent on undermining our democracy by propagating lies, turning Americans against each other, and electing a puppet president.

We do not know yet whether Trump colluded with Vladimir Putin to win the 2016 election. What we do know so far is that Trump’s aides and campaign manager worked with Putin’s emissaries during the 2016 election, and that Putin sought to swing the election in favor of Trump.

We also know that since he was elected, Trump has done little or nothing to stop Putin from continuing to try to undermine our democracy. To the contrary, Trump has obstructed inquiries into Russian meddling, and gone out of his way to keep his communications with Putin secret, even from his own White House.  

The overall pattern is clear to anyone who cares to see it. Trump’s entire presidency to date has sacrificed the means of democracy to the end of his personal power.

He has lied about the results of votes, and established a commission to investigate bogus claims of fraudulent voting. He has attacked judges who have ruled against him, with the goal of stirring up the public against them.

He has encouraged followers to believe that his opponent in the 2016 election should be imprisoned; and condemned as “enemies of the people” journalists who report unfavorably about him, in an effort to fuel public resentment – perhaps even violence – against them.

To argue, as some Trump apologists do, that whatever Trump does is justified because voters put Trump in power, is to claim that voters can decide to elect a dictator.

They cannot. Even if a majority of Americans were to attempt such thing (and, remember, Trump received three million fewer votes than his opponent in 2016), the Constitution prohibits it.  

The choice could not be clearer. Democracy is about means, while dictatorship is about ends. Trump uses any means available to achieve his own ends.

We can preserve our democracy and force Trump out of office. Or we can continue to struggle against someone who strives to thwart democracy for his own benefit.

In the months ahead, that choice will be made, one way or the other.

One of the new Democratic House majority’s top priorities is so-called campaign finance reform legislation. Contrary to the claims of its supporters, campaign finance reform legislation does not limit the influence of powerful special interests. Instead, it violates the First Amendment and burdens those seeking real change in government.
The First Amendment of the Constitution forbids Congress from interfering in any way with any citizen’s ability to influence government policies. Spending money to support candidates and causes is one way individuals influence government policies. Therefore, laws limiting and regulating donations to campaigns and organizations that work to change government policies violate the First Amendment.

One very troubling aspect of campaign finance reform laws is forcing organizations involved in “electioneering” to hand over the names of their top donors to the federal government. Electioneering is broadly defined to include informing the public of candidates’ positions and records, even if the group in question focuses solely on advancing issues and ideas. Burdening these types of organizations will make it harder for individuals to learn the truth about candidates’ positions.

America has a long and distinguished tradition of anonymous political speech. Both the Federalist and the Anti-Federalist papers where published anonymously. As Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote in NAACP v. Alabama, where the Supreme Court upheld the NAACP’s right to keep its membership list confidential, “Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”

Supporters of groups with “dissident beliefs” have good reason to fear new disclosure laws. In 2014, the IRS had to pay 50,000 dollars to the National Organization for Marriage because an IRS employee leaked donors names to the organization’s opponents. Fortunately, the Trump administration has repealed the regulation forcing activist groups to disclose their donors to the IRS. Unfortunately, Congress seems poised to reinstate that rule.

In recent years, we have seen the rise of authoritarian political movements that think harassment and even violence against those with differing views are acceptable tactics. Can anyone doubt that activists in these movements would do all they could to obtain the lists of donors to groups that oppose their agenda? They may be able to obtain the lists either by hacking government databases or by having a sympathetic federal employee “accidentally” leak the names.

As long as businesses can profit by currying favor with politicians and bureaucrats who have the power to reward or punish them via subsidies and regulations, powerful interests will find a way to influence the political process. These special interests seek out and reward politicians who support policies favoring their interests. So foreign policy hawks can count on generous support from the military-industrial complex, supporters of corporatist health care systems like Obamacare can count on generous support from the health insurance-pharma complex, and apologists for the Federal Reserve can count on support from the big banks.

Special interests do not favor free-market capitalism. Instead, they favor a mixed economy where government protects the profits of large business interests. That is why big business is more likely to support a progressive or a “moderate” than a libertarian. Campaign finance and donor disclosure laws will make it harder for grassroots liberty activists to challenge the corporatist status quo. Those wishing to get big money out of politics should work to get politics out of all aspects of the economy.

This article was published by RonPaul Institute.

A senior Sudanese parliamentarian says a draft military deal with Russia on mutual navy port visits could pave the way for Moscow to build a permanent military base on the Red Sea coast.

Major General Al-Hadi Adam, the head of Sudan’s parliamentary defense committee, told Russia’s Sputnik news agency on Saturday said the agreement set the guidelines for the entry of Russian and Sudanese warships to the ports of the two countries, hailing it as a step towards establishing strategic relations.

“The date of the requested port call is being discussed. It will be approved if the two countries make an agreement. This deal will pave the way for more agreements and greater cooperation…possibly a Russian base on the Red Sea,” the official said.

Musa pointed out that several regional states had already allowed foreign countries to build military bases in their territories, adding that Sudan, just like those countries, had the right to allow Russia to establish a military base on its territory.

Last week, Russia’s legal information portal website reported that the Prime Minister of Russia Dmitry Medvedev had approved the draft agreement on port calls with Sudan.

According to the draft agreement, “the entry of warships shall be made after notification has been given not later than seven working days prior to the scheduled date of entry.”

The draft document stressed that “within the framework of the Agreement, no more than seven warships can be present simultaneously, in the territorial sea, inland waters and ports of the receiving State.”

It does not, however, provide for the building of a military base in Sudan.

In November 2017, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir met with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, in the Russian city of Sochi, where both leaders expressed their desire to enhance military ties.

During the visit to Russia, Bashir even offered to build an airbase for Russia on its Red Sea coast.

He also suggested re-equipping the Sudanese army with Russian-built airplanes and military arsenal including surface-to-air missiles.

The Sudanese president also asked Putin to help protect his country from the “aggressive” United States.

Russia is considered as a key ally of the Sudanese government against Western pressure.

Original article

(RFE/RL) — U.S. President Donald Trump says he has “never worked for Russia,” in response to reports that raised questions about his ties to President Vladimir Putin, reports which he called a “big fat hoax.”

Trump’s comments to reporters on January 14 at the White House followed a report in The Washington Post that said the U.S. president “has gone to extraordinary lengths to conceal details” of his conversations with Putin.

A separate report in The New York Times revealed that the FBI had opened a counterintelligence probe in 2017 into whether Trump was working for Russian interests after he sacked the bureau’s director in 2017.

This alleged inquiry was eventually merged into an ongoing criminal probe of Trump’s relations with Russia before his election in 2016, led by Special Counsel Robert Mueller.

Speaking outside the White House before departing for New Orleans, Trump called former FBI and U.S. Justice Department officials “known scoundrels” and “dirty cops.”

Trump’s remarks to the media on January 14 came after he denied in a January 12 interview with Fox News that he had hidden details of his conversations with Putin from administration officials, saying he is “not keeping anything under wraps,” but did not directly answer the question of whether or not he had worked for Russia.

Citing current and former U.S. officials, The Washington Post said that on at least one occasion, in Hamburg in 2017, Trump took away his interpreter’s notes following talks with Putin and instructed that person not to discuss what had transpired with other officials.

Trump also told Fox News that he had “a great conversation” with Putin during their one-on-one, nearly two-hour meeting in Helsinki in July 2018.

The U.S. president has said the Mueller investigation is “a witch hunt.”

At least three different congressional committees have also been probing various aspects of Russia’s alleged interference in the 2016 election.

The U.S. intelligence community has concluded that Russia engaged in a campaign of hacking and propaganda to sway voters during the election, largely aimed at bolstering Trump’s chances at the presidency.

Russian officials have repeatedly denied any such effort.

Chinese investments in North America and Europe fell by 73 percent last year as a result of tightened US scrutiny of foreign takeover deals and Beijing’s restrictions on outbound investments.

Data from law firm Baker & McKenzie showed that Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into the United States have also turned negative, falling to the lowest in seven years. Chinese investments in the US fell by 83 percent, while growing by 80 percent in Canada.

Last year, Chinese companies completed just $4.8 billion in new business acquisitions and investments in the US, down 84 percent from $29 billion in 2017 and 90 percent from $46 billion in 2016.

With the $13 billion in US asset sales by Chinese companies, net Chinese investment in the United States dropped by $8 billion in 2018.

Rhodium Group consultancy warned on Monday the pressures would persist this year, adding that the “dark cloud over US-China relations” was unlikely to disappear.

“The pipeline of pending Chinese investments in the US is at a five-year low, and most hurdles weighing on China’s US investment are poised to persist or deepen,” the group said. It cited the continuation of Beijing’s strict outbound capital controls and the effects of its campaign to cut debt and risky lending.

Tougher regulatory controls also led to the cancellation of 14 Chinese investment deals in North America (with a combined value of $4 billion) and seven in Europe worth $1.5 billion.

“Some deals are still getting done despite new investment screening regulations, trade tensions and Chinese investment controls,” said Michael DeFranco, global head of M&A at Baker McKenzie.

“But all parties in a prospective transaction need to conduct plenty of due diligence and take in-depth regulatory advice to assess if a deal is viable,” he added.

by Gjergj Erebara

Following a dispute with President Ilir Meta over the new Foreign Minister, Prime Minister Edi Rama on Monday said he would temporarily take over the job himself.

Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama on Monday said he would take over the position of Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, following a row with President Ilir Meta on the nomination of Gent Cakaj as the new minister.

Meta refused to decree Cakaj, claiming he “lacked credibility” for the high-profile job. Since the dispute blew up last Thursday, Meta and Rama have exchanged angry words on social media.

“The President has not decreed the dismissal of the Foreign Minister,” Rama wrote on Twitter on Monday, adding that the legal deadline for the President to do so had already expired.

“This is another violation of the constitution, which will be dealt with along others in the new Constitutional Court. Up to that day, which will come soon, I will be de jure in this position because we do not have time to lose in search of a president,” he added.

It is unusual for a prime minister in Albania to hold another ministerial portfolio. However, previous presidents have never rejected the prime minister’s choices for ministers. The constitution does not give the President such powers.

However, Meta last October refused to appoint a new Minister of Interior and last week blocked the new Foreign Minister as well.

The constitutional court cannot rule on such conflicts currently, as the ongoing vetting process prompted most of its judges to retire, or get fired, for unjustified wealth or links with suspected criminals.

The process of nominating new members of the court is expected to last months.

Meanwhile, Albania along with Macedonia awaits the decision of the European Council on whether to open membership negotiations or not. The decision is expected in June.

President Meta was elected to his post with support of Rama’s Socialist Party in April 2017. However, only months later, Meta’s former party, the Socialist Movement for Integration, now headed by his wife Monika Kryemadhi, was ousted from the ruling coalition.

Now in opposition, it has repeatedly called on protesters to bring Rama’s government down.

Meta has not just refused to nominate Cakaj as Foreign Minister. In an unusual Facebook post on Friday, Meta claimed he would not bow to Rama, adding a long list of crimes supposedly committed by Rama.

“The one who dares to threaten prosecutors, judges, police officers, opposition and witnesses, the one who orders the falsification of public procurement tenders, made a fatal mistake by threatening the President of the Republic,” Meta wrote, without mentioning Rama by name. “There is no any power in the world that can blackmail the President,” he added.

By Victor Mambor

The trial of a Polish man accused of aiding separatist rebels in Indonesia’s easternmost Papua province began Monday after the defendant was compelled to attend, his lawyer said.

Jakub Fabian Skrzypski, 39, and Simon Magal, 30, an alleged Papuan separatist, appeared in Wamena District Court after Skrzypski reportedly refused to come to court last week. A December hearing was adjourned after the Polish national requested a translator.

“Jakub finally went to court after being forced to do so by the public prosecutor,” one of his lawyers, Latifah Anum Siregar, told BenarNews.

Chief prosecutor Ricarda Arsenius said the defendant had been “persuaded” to come, not forced. “Initially he objected. But after we persuaded and gave an explanation, Jakub wanted to be present in court,” he said.

Reading from a 14-page indictment, prosecutors said Skrzypski first visited Papua in 2007 as a tourist, but with an agenda of meeting armed separatists and to “convey the Free Papua issue to the European world in the form of journals or his writing.”

Skrzypski and Magal, his co-defendant, often communicated over the Messenger application and the Polish national came to Papua a second time in mid-2018, the indictment said.

“Defendent Jakub Fabian Skrzypski went to Wamena and met with some people in the headquarters of the TNP OPM [in] Puncak Jaya,” Ricarda said, using an acronym armed Papuan separatists.

“On 15 July 2018, defendant Simon Magal asked defendant Jakub, ‘can West Papuan fighters work with Poland on procurement of weapons?’ and Jakub answered, ‘I know, I am trying to meet something.’”

The defendants are expected to respond to the charges at the next court session on Jan. 21.

Skrzypski, arrested on Aug. 26, 2018, in Wamena, is the first foreigner indicted on a  treason charge in Papua, according to Siregar.

“Article 106 of the Criminal Code is an allegation against those suspected of committing treason. And article 55 of the Indonesian Criminal Code is known as ‘participation,’ meaning that the crime was carried out jointly,” she said, explaining criminal code articles cited in the indictment.

If found guilty, the two could face up to 20 years in prison, or a life sentence.

Two French journalists, Thomas Dandois and Valentine Bourrat, were investigated for treason in 2014 but eventually sentenced to two and one-half months in prison for misusing a tourist visa.

Foreign media access is restricted in Papua and West Papua, Indonesia’s two easternmost provinces, which make up about one-fifth of Indonesia’s land mass. The region is one of Indonesia’s poorest, with low literacy rates and high rates of infant and maternal mortality.

In early December, a Papuan separatist group claimed responsibility for an attack that left 19 construction workers dead. The victims had been building roads and bridges in remote Nduga Regency.

When visited by a BenarNews reporter at Jayawijaya police jail last week, Skrzypski denied being involved in arms smuggling or propaganda on behalf of Papuan rebels.

“I am not a blogger or filmmaker, journalist or activists. I am not a military trainer and I do not have that background. I am not an arms dealer,” Skrzypski told BenarNews on Jan. 9.

He complained of poor conditions in detention and said police had little evidence against him.

“The cells are very small and the bathroom is not taken care of. The water is filthy. The detention room is cold and there are mosquitos,” he said.

During interrogation, police kept showing a photo of him in Switzerland and one of him shaking hands with someone as evidence, he said.

“What do those photos prove? Are they trying to trap me for some political reason, their own ambition, or personal gain?” he asked.

By Tushar Ranjan Mohanty*

Former Member of National Assembly (MNA) and Muttahida Qaumi Movement-Pakistan (MQM-P) leader, Syed Ali Raza Abidi (46), was shot dead near his residence at Khayaban-e-Ghazi Street in the Phase-V area of the Defence Housing Authority (DHA) in Karachi, the provincial capital of Sindh on December 25, 2018. Abidi was elected to the National Assembly in the 2013 General Elections from Karachi’s NA-251 constituency.On November 13, 2017, he had resigned from his National Assembly seatin protest against the talks between MQM-P leader Farooq Sattarandand Pak Sarzameen Party (PSP) leader Syed Mustafa Kamal, to forge an alliance between the two parties, stating that “this is not what I believed in and stood for”. The talks, however, failed. Abidi then contested the July 25, 2018, General Elections from Karachi’s NA-243 constituency as the MQM-P candidate, but lost to Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) leader Imran Khan, who eventually became the Prime Minister (PM) on August 18, 2018.On September 2, 2018, Abidi tendered his resignation from the MQM-P’s “basic membership” citing “personal reasons”.

Two MQM activists, including the former Union Council Secretary, were among four persons killed in separate incidents in Karachi on December 8, 2018. Intisar Alvi (40),  MQM’s former Union Council Secretary, was shot dead in a targeted attack in Jahangirabad area when he was sitting at a teashop near his home at Petal Wali Gali in Gulbahar. MQM worker, Mohammad Abid (40) was shot dead in a targeted attack near Gol market in Paposh Nagar, North Nazimabad Town.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Sindh registered a record low of 46 fatalities, including 25 militants, 12 civilians, and seven Security Force (SF) personnel through 2018. There were 243 such fatalities, including 114 civilians, 23 SF personnel, and 106 terrorists, in 2017. Overall-terrorism related fatalities in 2018 thus registered an 81.06 per cent decline in comparison to 2017.

Other parameters of violence also witnessed considerable diminution. While Sindh accounted for 20 major incidents (each involving three or more fatalities) of violence, resulting in a total of 199 deaths in 2017, 2018 witnessed eight such incidents, accounting for 33 fatalities. One of the major attacks of the year was the November 23, 2018, Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) suicide attack on the Chinese Consulate at Block 4 in the Clifton area of Karachi. At least six people, including three civilians, two Policemen, and a private security guard, were killed. Three terrorists involved in the attack were also killed by SFs. No Chinese national was hurt. Claiming responsibility for the attack, BLA disclosed that the attackers had been tasked to target the consulate.

There was also a considerable decrease in the number of explosion-related incidents in 2018. In comparison to 10 blasts resulting in 89 fatalities and 57 injuries in 2017, year 2018 recorded six explosions resulting in 17 fatalities and 14 injuries.

Incidents of sectarian attacks also declined from three in 2017to just one in 2018, with resultant fatalities dropping from 93 to one, respectively.

Except for one incident of civilian killing and one incident of arrest, both from the Hyderabad District, all other incidents in 2018 were reported from Karachi District. Sindh has a total of 29 Districts.

Meanwhile, on December 31, 2018, the Pakistan Rangers (Sindh) released a performance report of its ‘Karachi Operations’ between the period September 4, 2013 and December 31, 2018. The report claimed that 2013 recorded 57 incidents of terrorism, which increased to 66 in 2014 and further to 199 in 2015. The number of incidents decreased to 16 in 2016. No such incident was reported in 2017. Two incidents were recorded in 2018. Also, incidents of target killings saw a steep decline:  965 in 2013; 602 in 2014; 199 in 2015; 89 in 2016; 45 in 2017; and nine in 2018. Similarly, recorded cases of extortion also declined: 1,524 in 2013; 899 in 2014; 303 in 2015; 101 in 2016; 65 in 2017; and 51 in 2018. Incidents of kidnapping also decreased from 174 in 2013 to 115 in 2014, 37 in 2015, 26 in 2016, 18 in 2017 and 13 in 2018.

Much of this success has been due to the ongoing operation of the Pakistan Rangers (Sindh). The report claimed that at least 15,838 operations were carried out during this period. A total of 11,619 terrorists and other ‘criminals’ were handed over to the police and 2,210 terrorists, 1,881 target killers, 852 extortionists and 227 kidnappers were arrested. A total of 169 kidnapped people were also successfully rescued. The operations were not without SF casualties; 28 Rangers were killed in the line of duty and another 100 were injured. In 2018 alone, four Sindh Rangers were killed. The Rangers also recovered 13,224 weapons and 876,083 bullets of different weapons.

One of the major achievements in 2018 included the killing of Ghaffar Zikri aka Saeen, the last ‘commander’ of the third generation of Lyarigangsters, who carried a bounty of PKR 2.5 million on his head. Ghaffar Zikri was killed in a Police encounter on October 2, 2018. During the encounter Zikri allegedly used his four-year-old son as a human shield and tried to escape by throwing grenades at the Police. The child was also killed in the exchange of fire, while two Police personnel sustained bullet wounds.

The Pakistan Rangers (Sindh) were called in on September 4, 2013, when violence in the city was surging, with a total of 1,553 fatalities recorded in 2012. The fatalities increased further to 1,668 in 2013. Since then, the Ranger’s operations in Karachi have been extended on a 90-day basis, requiringthe Provincial Government’s requisition to the Federal Ministry of Interior, for approval of each extension. The latest extension was given on October 8, 2018, which ended on January 5, 2019. There has been no report till the time of writing regarding further extension.

The Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Qamar Javed Bajwa during his visit to the Pakistan Rangers (Sindh) Headquarters on November 17, 2018, stated, “Karachi is the engine of national economy and we shall further improve its security environment so that positive business trajectory is maintained.”

Meanwhile, different parameters show that the general law and order situation in Sindh remained far from satisfactory. According to the Sindh Police, as many as 1,520 people were murdered across the Sindh Province in 2017,and another 1,298 were killed in 2018.On December 21, 2018, the Citizens-Police Liaison Committee (CPLC) issued a list of street crimes in Karachi during 2018, and noted a hike in the rate of such crimes in the city. According to the report, between January 1, 2018, and December 20, 2018, at least 26,972 motor cycles and 1,319 cars were snatched or stolen. 34,188 cell phones were also snatched over the same period, with miniscule rates of recovery of the stolen devices. On December 4, 2018, during a meeting of the Sindh Chief Minister’s Apex Committee, Inspector General of Police (IGP) Kaleem Imam stated that the number of extortion cases in the city had increased over the preceding 11 months, and 14,051 citizens had been robbed of their cell phones. The Chief Minister was also told that 12,187 mobile snatching cases had been reported in 2013.

After becoming Prime Minister, Imran Khan, during his maiden official visit to Karachi on September 16, 2018, expressed concern over the reported surge in street crime in the metropolis, and called for coordinated efforts to purge the city of criminal activities, which he linked with the city’s “growing underclass”.

Keeping in view the unabated street crimes, the Karachi Police established a new ‘street watch force’ on October 13, 2018, comprising 1,870 Police personnel.Additional Inspector General (AIG) Dr. Amir Ahmed Shaikh announced that the force would be deployed at “hot spots” where street crimes are rampant.He pointed out that new motorcycles had been provided to SFs: 80 to South and City areas, 80 to District East and 20 each to Malir, West and Korangi.

The Pakistan Rangers operations have marginalised terrorist and organized criminal gangs, but persistent street crimes remain a cause of concern and retains the potential for a resurgence of organized activities once the operational deployment of the Rangers is withdrawn.

*Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

By Ajit Kumar Singh*

In the evening of January 8, 2019, orchestrating their first significant incident of violence in the new year, Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres stormed into the house of a civilian identified as Suresh Hupendi in Niche Kamta village under the Amabeda Police Station limits in Kanker District and forcibly took him along with them. His dead body was found on the outskirts of the village the next day. A Maoist banner recovered from the spot branded the deceased a ‘police informer’.

Since the beginning of 2019 this is the lone Maoist linked fatality recorded in Chhattisgarh (data till January 13, 2019).

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Chhattisgarh recorded 249 fatalities, including 60 civilians, 57 Security Force (SF) personnel, and 132 Maoists, in Maoist-related violence in 2018. In 2017, there were a total of 169 fatalities, including 32 civilians, 59 SF personnel, and 78 Maoists. Thus, a spike of 32.12 per cent was recorded in terms of overall fatalities. Moreover, Chhattisgarh in 2018 maintained its TOP position in terms of fatalities (249 out of a total of 412 countrywide) recorded in a State during the course of a year, with Maharashtra at a distant second with 58 fatalities. Chhattisgarh has topped the list since 2014. Jharkhand recorded the highest fatalities in 2013, a total of 131 as against 128 in Chhattisgarh, which stood at the second position that year.

A cursory analysis of fatalities in all three categories (civilian, SF, and Maoist) suggest that civilians faced significantly increased pressure in the State through 2018, with fatalities in this category increasing 87.5 per cent, in comparison to 2017, from 32 to 60. Civilian fatalities in 2018 were the highest recorded in the State since 2010, when civilian fatalities stood at 72. The 2018 civilian fatalities are the fifth highest recorded since the formation of CPI-Maoist on September 21, 2014. The highest of 189 fatalities was recorded way back in 2006. A low of 25 civilian fatalities was recorded in 2014. Civilian fatalities in Chhattisgarh have been escalating since, barring a dip in 2017.

Other parameters of violence also indicate that the Maoists retain significant operational capabilities in Chhattisgarh. Six incidents of abduction, in which seven civilians and two SF personnel were abducted (one civilian was killed while others were released after ‘warnings’; the two SF personnel were killed), were reported in 2018, as against three such incidents, in which 14 civilians were abducted in 2017 (12 were released after ‘warnings’ in 2017, two were killed). 17 incidents of arson were reported in 2018 in addition to 18 such incidents in 2017. The Maoists also orchestrated at least 28 incidents of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) blasts adding to 32 such incidents in 2017.

The number of Districts from where killings were reported also increased through 2018. Out of a total of 27 Districts in Chhattisgarh, fatalities were reported from 13 in 2018: Sukma (88), Bijapur (70), Dantewada (34), Narayanpur and Rajnandgaon (15 each), Kanker (11), Bastar (four), Gariyabandh and Kondagaon (three each), Kabirdham (two), and Balrampur, Dhamtari, and Koriya (one each). 10 Districts recorded such fatalities in 2017 – Sukma (62), Bijapur (29), Narayanpur (25), Rajnandgaon (16), Dantewada (15), Kanker (11), Bastar (six), Kondagaon (three), and Bilaspur and Gariyabandh (one each).

According to the SATP database, based on underground and over-ground activities of the Maoists in 2018, seven Districts (Bastar, Bijapur, Dantewada, Kanker, Narayanpur, Rajnandgaon, and Sukma) were categorised as highly-affected; three (Balrampur, Gariabandh, and Kondagaon) were  moderately affected; while Dhamtariand Kabirdham and Koriya, were marginally affected.

Significantly, on April 16, 2018, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) disclosed that at least 30 Districts were categorized as ‘worst Maoist-affected’, across seven States. Eight of these Districts fell in Chhattisgarh: Bastar, Bijapur, Dantewada, Kanker, Kondagaon, Narayanpur, Rajnandgaon, and Sukma. On April 16, 2018, MHA also disclosed that the number of Maoist-affected Districts covered under the Security Related Expenditure Scheme (SRE) scheme had decreased from 126 in 10 states to 90 in 11 states. 14 of these 90 districts were in Chhattisgarh. In addition to the eight worst-affected Districts mentioned, the other six Districts were Balod, Balrampur, Dhamtari, Gariyabandh, Mahasamund, and Kabirdham.

Violence in the Bastar Division remains the principal challenge for the State in particular and the country at large. According to SATP, in 2018, the Bastar Division accounted for 90.76 per cent of total killings reported in the State, as against 89.34 per cent in 2017. Since 2005, the Bastar Division has accounted for a total of 93.61 per cent of all fatalities in the State – 1,495 out of a total of 1,597. The Division has accounted for 19.80 per cent of total of 8,063 fatalities recorded  across India since 2005.

The Bastar Division was created in 1999, when the Bastar District was divided into the present-day Districts of Bastar, Dantewada, and Kanker. On November 1, 2000, the Division became part of the newly created state of Chhattisgarh. The Bastar Division was further subdivided in 2007 and 2012, and currently comprises seven Districts – Bastar, Bijapur, Dantewada, Kanker, Kondagaon, Narayanpur, and Sukma – in the southernmost region in the State. The Division shares its borders with Maoist-afflicted regions of neighbouring States, including Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, and Telangana.

Nevertheless, in a significant achievement, during the 2018 State Assembly Polls, the 18 constituencies in the eight worst affected Districts of Chhattisgarh, including seven in the Bastar Division, and the neighbouring Rajnandgaon District, recorded an average of 76.39 per cent polling on November 12, 2018. During the 2013 Assembly Polls as well, these 18 Assembly constituencies recorded a 75.53 per cent voter turnout. At least 76.34 per cent voters cast their vote during the second phase of the two-phase Chhattisgarh State Assembly Elections held on held on November 20, 2018, in 72 Assembly seats spread across the 19 remaining Districts of Chhattisgarh. During the 2013 Assembly Polls, these 72 Assembly constituencies had seen a voter turnout at 78.5 per cent of registered voters. After completion of both phases of the 2018 Assembly elections, the average voter turnout worked out at 76.35 per cent as against 77 per cent in 2013. The high voter turnout despite continuous CPI-Maoist calls to boycott the elections, was a clear manifestation of the Maoists diminishing ‘popular support’.

SF successes have been sharply reflected in the improved kill ratio against the Maoists in 2018, 1: 2.31 as against 1:1.32 registered in 2017. Out of 13 years since 2005, the ratio has been in favour of SFs for eight years, and the best ratio of 1:3.69 was achieved in 2016. The kill ratio has favoured the SFs after 2015, in which year it stood at an adverse 1.09:1.

At least 354 Maoists were arrested in 2018, adding to 377 such arrests in 2017. At least 438 Maoists were arrested in 2016 and 230 in 2015. Mounting SF pressure also resulted in the surrender of 354 Maoists in 2018, in addition to 327 such surrenders in 2017. There were 1,210 surrenders in 2016 and 282 in 2015.

Several additional measures were taken during the course of 2018 to counter Maoist violence, in addition to the measures taken in the past. According to an August 5, 2018, report, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) has taken responsibility, for the first time, to ensure the completion of a vital 4.5-kilometres stretch of an RCC (Roller Compacted Concrete) road between Bhairamgarh and Keshkutul in the southern Bijapur District. Significant improvements in Police capacity are also on record in the District. According to a September 18, 2018, report, two Police Stations – Bhopalpatnam and Madded – in Bijapur were found to be in accordance with the requirements of the Quality Management System International Standards Organisation (ISO) 9001:2015 certification [maintenance of law and order, prevention & detection of crime, establishing peace and tranquillity and achieving other policing activities]. Bastar range Inspector General of Police (IGP), Vivekanand Sinha disclosed,

Meanwhile, the newly-elected Chief Minister Bhupesh Baghel in an interview published on December 26, 2018, stated,

On December 23, 2018, the Chief Minister Baghel had stated, “Naxal issue cannot be tackled with the barrel of gun” and “social-economic-political way is another route to solve the issue.” Earlier, on December 19, 2018, talking about his Government’s strategy towards Maoist violence, the Chief Minister had asserted that his Government was not interested in “figures of encounters and body count of Naxals” but is rather keen on initiating a dialogue with ‘all stakeholders’. He added that “the policy of bullet-for-bullet has failed miserably and it’s time to give a new thought to the issue.” The CM, however, categorically stated that “there is no question of withdrawing security forces (from Naxal-affected areas). Whatever system is going on, will be continued till further strategy is devised. The immediate withdrawal of forces can prove to be suicidal.” According to reports, around 65,000 SF personnel, including 45,000 Central Armed Police Forces and 20,000 state police personnel, were posted in seven districts of Bastar Division. Only 40 percent of the total posted personnel, i.e. around 26,000, would ordinarily be operationally deployed. 

Though the Chief Minister has made ambiguous statements on the proposed anti-Naxal strategy, the newly-appointed Director General of Police (DGP), D.M. Awasthi, clearly declared, in a December 24, 2018 interview,

The huge voter turnout in the Maoists’ Bastar heartland in particular and across Chhattisgarh as well, clearly demonstrates that the Maoists have little ‘popular support’ in the State. This appears to have unsettled the rebel leadership and is one of the reasons that more and more civilians are being killed, to instil fear among the masses. Clearly, SFs will need to intensify operations, both to protect the civilian population, and also to ensure that the gains of the past are not frittered away in petty political games, as has been the case on occasion in the past.

*Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

Prabowo Subianto enters the 2019 Indonesian presidential election with less elite support and financial resources compared to incumbent president Joko Widodo. However, he has gained strong backing at the grassroots level by tapping the mobilising power of the conservative Islamic figures and organisations.

By Alexander R Arifianto*

Prabowo Subianto enters the 2019 Indonesian presidential election with lukewarm elite support as well as lack of financial resources to fund his campaign. This is in contrast to his opponent – incumbent president Joko Widodo (Jokowi) – who has gathered endorsements from the majority of political parties, national and regional politicians, retired military officers, and other notables.

Having entered the presidential contest in every election since 2004, Prabowo does not seem to spend a lot of time on the campaign trail this election and also does not have the large pool of campaign aides he used to have in previous elections. Instead, Sandiaga Uno, his vice presidential running mate, has been travelling widely across Indonesia to give stump speeches and pay visits to markets, mosques, and other campaign sites. Sandiaga, a 49-year-old businessman who is one of the richest in Indonesia, is also presumed to have provided much of the financing for Prabowo’s campaign.

The Seemingly Lacklustre Campaign

Observers have noted that unlike in previous elections, neither Prabowo nor his brother Hashim Djojohadikusumo, has committed significant financial resources from their own coffers this time.

Indeed, Prabowo seems to have difficulty raising funds from big donors – tycoons and large corporations – which tend to favour the status quo and throw their support behind Jokowi. A gala dinner held in Jakarta in late November 2018 to raise money from a group of Chinese Indonesian tycoons collected less than 500 million Rupiahs (S$47,990) – a paltry sum compared to fundraising activities conducted by him during the 2014 presidential election.

The lack of funding and enthusiasm for the Prabowo campaign has stagnated his popularity ratings. Tempo magazine reported last month that even in surveys commissioned by his own campaign team, Prabowo’s electability hovers around 20 to 32 percent – a far cry from Jokowi’s.

However, writing off Prabowo’s chances might be a premature move, as he still commands strong support at the grassroots level, mainly from conservative Muslim activists and organisations that were part of the 2016/17 Defending Islam movement against former Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama. They constituted Prabowo’s hardcore supporters who have tirelessly worked to support his campaign and are responsible for his strong showings in a number of key provinces.

Links with the Defending Islam Movement

Prabowo’s core supporters come from modernist-oriented, theologically conservative Muslim clerics, activists, and organisations. They include not only hardline Islamist organisations like Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and Islamic Followers Forum (FUI), but also activists of more mainstream Islamic groups like Muhammadiyah; Daniel Anzar Simandjuntak, former chairman of Muhammadiyah’s youth wing who now serves as the campaign’s chief spokesperson.

He is also backed by two Islamist parties – the National Mandate Party (PAN) affiliated with Muhammadiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS).

These activists were linked together by their activities with the 2016/17 Defending Islam movement under the GNPF Ulama banner and in the #2019ChangePresident (#2019GantiPresiden) movement that gained steam last year. While the latter movement is technically separate from the Prabowo campaign, it has a clear aim to replace Jokowi in the 2019 general election and has unambiguously endorsed Prabowo’s presidential bid.

Finally, Prabowo has gained the support of many former government officials and retired military officers who used to be part of the Jokowi administration but have now been sidelined for one reason or another. They include Sudirman Said (former Minister of Energy and Natural Resources), Rizal Ramli (former Coordinating Minister of Economic Affairs), and retired General Gatot Nurmantyo (former TNI Chief of Staff).

Having these former senior officials on board give the Prabowo campaign more clout to attack Jokowi’s policy (particularly his economic policy) as a failure as well as giving legitimacy to Prabowo’s proposed “People’s Economy” (Ekonomi Kerakyatan), which is promoted as an alternative to the liberal economic policies adopted by the administration.

Identity Politics Remains Salient

However, as Prabowo’s strongest supporters are the conservative Islamic activists and organisations, his campaign continues to base its strategy on attacks questioning Jokowi’s Islamic credentials and his policies that allegedly undermine the interests of the majority of Muslim followers (ummah) in Indonesia.

That is why the campaign has tacitly supported Islamic mobilisation efforts – including by the Action to Defend the Oneness of God (Aksi Bela Tauhid) conducted in October and November 2018 to protest the alleged burning of a flag containing the Islamic article of faith by an activist of Ansor – Nahdlatul Ulama’s youth wing. In other demonstrations the campaign’s involvement is more overt.

Prabowo appeared as a keynote speaker in the second anniversary of the Defending Islam movement on 4 December 2018 at Jakarta’s National Monument park, in front of an approximately one million protesters.

Prabowo’s campaign supports these rallies in order to energise its primary base and constituency. At the same time, however, it assures identity politics continue to play an important role during the election campaigns, promoting further polarisation and divisions within the Indonesian society.

Nevertheless, the tactic works to assure Prabowo is leading in the polls in a number of key provinces with significant numbers of observant Muslim population (for instance in West Sumatra and Banten) or is running neck-and-neck with Jokowi in others (for instance in West Java, North Sumatra and South Sulawesi).

Notwithstanding Prabowo’s lacklustre enthusiasm and financial support, this does not mean he does not stand any chance to win in April’s general election. Prabowo has many hardcore supporters who are highly committed and dedicated to carry him to victory. They can potentially make up for his lack of other resources in order to stage a potential upset in the coming presidential election.

*Alexander R Arifianto PhD is a Research Fellow with the Indonesia Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. This is part of an ongoing RSIS series on the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Election.

There have been several pieces in recent weeks about the drop in birth rates in recent years. Birth rates declined in the recession and they have not recovered even as the economy has improved.

As these pieces point out, economics plays a big role in the drop in birth rates. Young adults often are having difficulty finding and keeping jobs that provide a decent wage. This was certainly true in the downturn, but it is still often the case even now with the unemployment rate at 50-year lows.

In addition, the United States badly lags other rich countries in providing support to new parents. We are the only wealthy country that does not guarantee workers some amount of paid parental leave or sick days. While many companies offer these benefits, millions of new parents, especially those in lower paying jobs, cannot count on any paid leave. (It is important to note that many states and cities have required paid family leave and/or sick days in the last two decades, making up for the lack of action by the federal government.)

Child care is also a huge problem for young parents. Quality care is often difficult to find and very expensive. This leaves many young parents, especially mothers, struggling to provide care for their children even as they hold down a job.

These are real and important policy concerns. People should be able to have children without undue hardship. We also want to make sure that children have decent life prospects. Having parents that are not overstressed and access to good quality child care are important for getting children on a good path is school and their subsequent careers and lives.

For these reasons, leave policy and child care need to be near the top of the policy agenda. However, the fact that people are having fewer kids is not a good rationale for supporting these policies. A stagnant or even declining population is not a public policy problem.

The pieces noting the prospect of a declining population usually treat it as self-evident that this is a bad development. It isn’t. The prospect of fewer traffic jams and less crowded parks and beaches does not sound especially scary.

There are some who see a declining population as a threat to the United States status as a world power. It’s not clear that this is especially true. Indonesia ranks 4th in world population with 270 million people, more than four times the population of the United Kingdom, but Indonesia does not usually get listed among the world’s most powerful countries. More importantly, many of us don’t necessarily like everything the United States does as a world power, so doing somewhat less of it may not be a bad thing.

If we focus on the economics of a stagnant or declining population the standard story is that we will have a smaller number of workers to support each retiree. This is true, other things equal, but also not an especially big deal.

First, the “other things equal” is a big qualification here because for the foreseeable future we are likely to be able to get as many working-age people we want from the rest of the world by relaxing immigration restrictions. Working at even the lowest paying jobs in the United States is likely to offer a huge improvement in living standards for hundreds of millions of people in the developing world. This means that if we are worried about having too few workers at some point in the future, we just need to open the door to more immigrants.

But even pulling out the impact of immigrants, the reality is that we have been seeing a fall in the ratio of workers to retirees pretty much forever. Life expectancies have been rising as people have better living standards and better health care. (Recent years have been an exception, where life expectancies have stagnated.) In 1950 there were 7.2 people between the ages of 20 and 65 for every person over the age of 65. This ratio now stands at just 3.6 to 1.

Over this 70-year period, we have seen huge increases in living standards for both workers and retirees. The key has been the growth in productivity which allows workers to produce much more in each hour of work. (We also have a much higher rate of employment among workers between the ages of 20 and 65, as tens of millions of women have entered the labor force.)

The impact of productivity growth swamps the impact of demographics, as can be shown with simple arithmetic. The Social Security Trustees project that the ratio of people between the ages of 20 and 65 to people over age 65 will fall to 2.8 by 2070. In its “high-cost” scenario, which assumes both lower birth rates and higher life expectancies, this ratio falls to 2.03. Let’s take a more extreme case and assume it falls to 1.8.

Not everyone in the age 20 to 65 group works. Let’s assume an employment rate for this group of 75 percent. Of course, this can vary depending on economic conditions. In a tight labor market, with wages being bid up, more people are likely to choose to work.

This is also the case with people over age 65. Many already are working and we can expect this number to increase over time as the people in these older cohorts are increasingly educated and there are more employment opportunities that are not physically demanding. But for purposes of this exercise, we’ll assume no one over age 65 works.

I’ll also assume that retirees get on average 75 percent of the income of a worker. This is considerably more than the average Social Security benefit, but it should in principle include other sources of income for retirees. I treat their income as a tax on the working population.

Here’s the basic picture.

I have assumed a 1.4 percent annual rate of real wage growth, which is roughly the projection used by the Social Security trustees. The index number in the first row should be understood to be hourly compensation since the trustees assume that an increasing share of compensation will go to non-wage benefits, primarily employer-provided health care insurance.

As can be seen, in spite of the projected fall in the ratio of workers to retirees, the after-tax wage would still be considerably higher in 2070 than it is today. While before-tax income slightly more than doubles in the middle scenario, after-tax income still rises by almost 91 percent. Even in the extreme demographic case, after-tax income still rises by more than 66 percent over this period.

I then played with a more rapid productivity growth scenario where I assumed that productivity growth averaged 1.7 percent annually.[1] In this case, before-tax income in 2070 would be 236 percent of its 2019 level. In that case, even in the extreme demographic scenario shown in the last column, after-tax income would be 151.7. This is higher than the 149.6 level shown in the middle scenario with the standard wage growth projection.

In other words, the impact of a modest increase in the rate of productivity growth will more than offset the impact of even very extreme demographic assumptions. And, a 1.7 percent rate of productivity growth is hardly unrealistic. The economy saw a 3.0 percent average rate of productivity growth in the period from 1947 to 1973 and again from 1995 to 2005.

So it is certainly possible that the rate of productivity growth will again accelerate. Or to take the other side, the slowdown of productivity growth from its 1995–2005 pace, to the rate of the last dozen years of less than 1.5 percent, was largely unexpected. While the impact of this slowdown on living standards, if sustained, will swamp any conceivable impact of changing demographics, it has received far less attention.

One final point on this topic: the robots will take all the jobs story is a scenario of massive increases in productivity growth. It is truly incredible, we can find stories of demographic collapse in the media, where we don’t have enough workers to change the bedpans for us old-timers. While on the next page there will be stories of robots eliminating the need for workers in large, and growing, areas of the economy.

In principle, one of these can be a problem, but it doesn’t make sense that both a shortage of workers and a shortage of work can be a problem at the same time. Such is the state of economic debates in the United States.

Notes.

[1] This assumes away issues with deflators in the measure of productivity. The analysis also implicitly assumes that the median worker gets the same share of wage growth as the average worker. This would not be true if wage income is redistributed upward, as has happened over the last forty years. However, this upward redistribution is separate from the demographic issue.

This article originally appeared on Dean Baker’s blog.

On Jan. 1, 5.5 million women in the Indian state of Kerala (population 35 million) built a 386-mile wall with their bodies. They stood from one end to the other of this long state in southwestern India. The women gathered at 4 p.m. and took a vow to defend the renaissance traditions of their state and to work towards women’s empowerment. It is not an exaggeration to say that this was one of the largest mobilizations of women in the world for women’s rights. It is certainly larger than the historical Women’s March in Washington, D.C. in 2017.

Kerala’s government is run by the Communists. It is not easy for a left-wing government to operate in a state within the Indian union. The Central Government in New Delhi has little desire to assist Kerala, which suffered a cataclysmic flood last year. No assistance with the budgetary burdens of relief and reconstruction, and no help with financing for infrastructure and welfare services. The Communist government has a wide-ranging agenda that runs from its Green Kerala Mission — a project for stewardship of the state’s beautiful environment — to its fight for women’s emancipation. The Left Democratic Front government believes that dignity is a crucial a goal as economic rights, and that it is centrally important to fight against everyday humiliation to build a truly just society.

Over the course of the left’s government in Kerala, it has pushed ahead the agenda against everyday humiliation. For instance, in 2017, the government provided free sanitary pads for young women in school. The logic was that during their periods, young women who could not afford sanitary pads avoided school. Prejudices against menstruation had become a barrier to equal education. The government called this project “She Pad,” which benefited students and teachers. Pinarayi Vijayan, the Chief Minister of Kerala, said of the effort, “Menstrual hygiene is every girl’s right. The government is hoping that initiatives like these will help our girls to lead a life of confidence.”

A hundred miles north of Kerala’s capital — Thiruvanthapuram — sits a temple for Ayyappan, a celibate god. Women between the ages of 10 and 50 had not been permitted into the temple due to a belief that the celibate god would not be able to tolerate women who menstruate. The Indian Supreme Court took notice of this and, in September 2018, declared that the temple must allow all women to enter. The Left Democratic Front government agreed with the courts. But the temple authorities, and the far-right groups in the state, disagreed. When women tried to enter the temple, the priests blocked them, assisted by the far right. The situation was at a deadlock.

Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan called upon progressive organizations across the state to start mobilizing the citizens toward the building of a Women’s Wall (Vanitha Mathil) on Jan. 1. The energy in the state was electric. Women gathered at hundreds of mass meetings across the state. They recognized immediately that this was not a fight only to enter a temple, but this was a fight principally for women’s emancipation, for the right of women, as Vijayan had said, “to lead a life of confidence.”

The public meetings in November and December galvanized the opposition to the far right, arguing that women have every right to enter public spaces, including religious buildings. January began in anticipation. Women had been organized by districts and knew where to go. Women of all ages and backgrounds, from schoolteachers to members of the fishing community, began to line up around 3 p.m. After taking an oath, they marched through their towns and cities. They exuded joy and confidence, a freedom that should warm the hearts of sensitive people.

Strikingly, the media outside India paid little attention to this global, historical event. Press coverage in the United States was nearly absent. Internationalism in our time is such a façade, with so little care to amplify the bravery of people around the world. When the Women’s March took place in Washington, D.C., newspapers in Kerala reported it in detail. The favor was not returned. Silence was the answer.

Two days after the Women’s Wall, the right-wing in Kerala went on a rampage. Their members attacked the leaders on the left and threw bombs at government buildings. Over 700 people — mostly men on the far right — were arrested that day.

Walking down a main shopping street in Thiruvanthapuram, I see visible signs of the far-right’s attack. On one side of the street are posters and signs of left organizations torn and broken during the day of rampage by the far right. On the other side of the street, far-right supporters sit on a hunger strike.

Even liberals have taken the side of the far right. One liberal politician said that while he favored women’s rights, he also favored the temple’s rights. But the temple has no rights, nor does tradition. As Gandhi wrote almost a hundred years ago, “If I can’t swim in tradition, I’ll sink in it.” Neither the temple nor tradition trumps the rights of women to live with confidence. If a tradition is discriminatory, it deserves to be set aside.

There are no half measures in this debate in Kerala. The mood is that one must not walk away from one’s principles.

5.5 million women in Kerala — one in three women in the state — took to the streets to champion the emancipation of women. What brought them to join the Women’s Wall was that the Left Democratic Front government took a clear position, a principled position: that menstruation should not be used as a penalty against women’s full participation in society. Clarity defines the struggle. It is a lesson worth learning around the world.

By Santo D. Banerjee

South Africa has called on the international community in general and the UN Security Council in particular to provide the necessary support to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in the aftermath of the December 30 provincial and presidential elections that will be the first democratic transfer of power in the country’s history.

“The DRC has come a long way in its quest for peace and security,” Ambassador Jerry Matthews Matjila, South Africa’s Permanent Representative to the UN in New York told the Security Council during a three-hour debate on January 11 on preliminary results announced one day earlier, which put Félix Tshisekedi in first place for President, and the swift and varied reactions of some stakeholders.

Providing a snapshot of developments on the ground from Kinshasa via video-teleconference, Leila Zerrougui, UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), said millions of Congolese had shown their commitment to the political process and their determination to exercise their democratic right to vote.

“We must therefore show our collective solidarity with them as the electoral process is finalized and as the Democratic Republic of the Congo prepares to undertake the first peaceful transfer of power in the country’s history,” she said.

Agreeing with the MONUSCO head, the South African Ambassador called on “all parties to preserve the generally peaceful climate of the elections, and take-up any reservations or disputes through the proper mechanisms and processes provided for in the constitution of the DRC and its electoral laws, and thus refrain from any violence or incitement thereof”.

He emphasized: “We must ensure that as Members of the Security Council, our words and actions should contribute positively to the aspirations and collective will of the people of the DRC.”

South Africa is a non-permanent member of the 15-nation Security Council for 2019-2020 along with Cote d’Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea whose two-year membership expires end of 2019. China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States are five permanent members with the power to veto decisions they disapprove.

Ambassador Matjila said: “Congo is rich. But Congolese are poor.” He expressed South Africa’s concern about “the continuous illicit exploitation of DRC’s natural resources.” Since its independence, the DRC has been subjected to interference by external factors in determining its future. “The abundant resources that the country is blessed with have in many ways led to the scramble for these resources to the detriment of its people,” he said.

In the DRC, parts of the economy are informal and sometimes illicit links between politics and illicit economic activities have existed for a long time. An estimated value of illicit natural resources exploitation in easten DRC is valued at over USD 1.25 billion per year, stressed the South African diplomat.

South Africa, he said, has been keenly supportive of the efforts to ensure peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In 1998, late President Nelson Mandela hosted a historic meeting between former leaders of Zaire/DRC, Mabuto Seseseko and Laurant Kabila off the cost of DRC and averted a potentially destructive civil war. In 2002 South Africa hosted the groundbreaking Inter-Congolese Dialogue that led to drafting of the Constitution and hosting of the first ever-inclusive multiparty democratic elections in that country, Ambassador Matjila recalled.

Summarizing the work of their respective election observation missions, the African Union’s Permanent Observer and Zambia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, who led a monitoring team for the Southern African Development Community (SADC), agreed on the need for all stakeholders “now (to) pursue disputes peacefully through the existing legal framework and political dialogue”.

Corneille Nangaa Yobeluo, President of the Independent National Electoral Commission of the DRC, also via videoconference from Kinshasa, said it is critical for the international community to support the new authorities while relevant judicial bodies deal with any challenges. 

Recalling that despite difficulties and “complete and utter distrust” among all stakeholders, including the international community, the elections unfolded smoothly.  Yet, it was no surprise that the Catholic Church was challenging early results. It had disputed election outcomes in 2006 and 2011, he said, stressing that the January 10 announcement was in line with the law and challenges should be addressed through relevant existing mechanisms.

Meanwhile, Marcel Utembi Tapa, Archbishop of Kisangani and President of the National Episcopal Conference of the Congo, recalling efforts of the Catholic Church over the years to promote democracy in the DRC, said the Electoral Commission’s preliminary results did not match its own estimates.

To address the discrepancy, he asked the Electoral Commission to publish as soon as possible its data from each polling station and the Security Council to invite stakeholders to prioritize peace pending the final election outcome.

Council members also raised concerns about health crises and sporadic violence, with many calling for calm following the milestone elections and encouraging political actors to use existing legal avenues to resolve differences.

Urging the international community to conduct itself in a responsible manner, Russia’s Vassily A. Nebenzia warned that any speculation on the voting results is unacceptable, as it would generate far-reaching repercussions in the DRC and countries of the region. The Council must maintain unity to take a pacific, balanced approach in a manner that fully respects the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s sovereignty, he said.

Echoing a common view among Council members from the continent, Equatorial Guinea’s representative Amparo Mele Colifa said all of Africa is proud of what the Congolese people have achieved.

The DRC representative Ignace Gata Mavita Wa Lufuta extended gratitude to the Council for supporting his country’s efforts to restore peace and stability, summarized the current political landscape and the horizon ahead. The Government recognized the elections as an important threshold, despite delays until March due to health and security concerns in certain areas.

The next important steps are publishing the final vote count and handling concerns about preliminary figures in a manner that conforms to the Constitution, electoral laws and existing mechanisms and institutions. In this regard, it is not wise for the international community to make demands that would supplant the primacy of these institutions.

The results should not “add fuel to the fire”, he said, but should lead to all stakeholders showing restraint up until the announcement of the final election results and the historic handover of power. It is critical that the peaceful environment seen during the elections continues during the publication of the results.

He commended the Congolese people, President Joseph Kabila Kabange, who respected the Constitution in steering the country through free and fair elections, and the Government and Electoral Commission for their important roles. He noted that the electoral cycle should continue, calling on stakeholders to play their part in the successful culmination of this process.

Turning to humanitarian and security concerns, he raised alarm over outbreaks of violence, including flourishing terrorist groups that are launching attacks against Government forces and United Nations peacekeepers in Beni and Butembo.

Pointing to the Secretary-General’s report on MONUSCO collaborating with armed groups to free recruited children in Ituri and Kivu, the DRC Permanent Representative to the UN wondered how the Mission could work with the same groups the Government was trying hard to eradicate.

In addition, the Government was focusing on addressing the needs of populations displaced by these armed groups. Other concerns include the resurgence of certain diseases, with authorities working with the World Health Organization (WHO) to address the Ebola virus outbreak.

Even with these challenges, the country is poised to enter a new era, he said. “The Democratic Republic of the Congo is drafting a new chapter in its history,” he added. Asking the international community and friendly nations to provide the necessary support for further progress on his country’s journey into a new, peaceful era, he extended thanks to regional and international partners for their critical assistance in the past.

By Bruno Husquinet*

Churches think in centuries and are not bound to short-term political mandates. On January 5, 2018 the Patriarch of Constantinople implemented his decision to grant independence to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, a move that upset Moscow. To understand the current developments, it is worth looking back at this centuries-long history of fluid relationship between Constantinople, Kiev and Moscow.

Constantinople-Kiev: Christianization

In 882, Oleg of Novgorod moved his capital to Kiev and continued the work of Rurik to unite Slavic tribes, setting the stage for the history of Kievan Rus. The prediction of Saint Andrew was unfolding. It is said that during the first century, when Andrew the Apostle traveled to what is now Kyiv, he climbed onto a hilltop overseeing the Dnepr River. There he planted a cross, prophesizing the future of the great Christian city and the role it would play.

The Slavs were a loose union of tribes, whilst Constantinople was flourishing. In 980, Vladimir the Great ruled in Kiev and endeavored to consolidate and expand further his territories. In 988, he conquered the city of Kherson, in Crimea, where a bishop see had been established since the fourth century. Although accounts vary on the conversion of Vladimir, what is clear is that the Byzantine emperor sent his sister Anna to marry Vladimir, uniting Kiev and Constantinople. When Anna arrived, Vladimir converted to Christianity, restored Kherson to Constantinople, and returned to Kiev with Crimean ecclesiastics. It is undeniable that economic and political reasons influenced his choice to convert as his agenda leaned toward the Christian world.

Although the Byzantine emperor appointed the head of the clergy in Kiev, he faced opposition from the Kievan princes who did not endorse a filiation of churches from Constantinople, nor did they submit to the emperor’s authority to make Kievan Rus a colony of the Byzantine Empire. Relations with the empire were complicated: Constantinople did not mingle directly in Kiev’s internal affairs but would not let the princes interfere in religious matters. In other words, the authority of Constantinople over Kiev was exerted through the clergy, who enjoyed considerable powers in Kievan Rus. As a consequence, the first inclination toward creating an independent church appeared. Yaroslav the Wise proclaimed Hilarion of Kiev the first non-Greek metropolitan in 1049. Nonetheless, Constantinople regained control over the appointment of the head of the church in Kiev. Constantinople never bestowed upon Kiev the right to appoint its own Slavic metropolitan, establishing a red line that would trigger immediate action from Constantinople. For centuries to come, the position would mostly be held by Greeks, who remained outside of internal Kievan politics. As Kiev had grown to be a major economic center, it was in Constantinople’s interest to stay on good terms with its Slavic neighbor, gaining importance on the international scene.

Yaroslav the Wise passed away in 1054, a key date as it is the year of the schism between Rome and Constantinople.

Kiev chooses Constantinople over Rome

Opinions on rites and theological elements diverged over time between Rome and Constantinople, in part because of linguistic differences. Latin became dominant in the West while Greek was the language of choice in the East. Because of the status of language as a major cultural vehicle, the use of different languages impacted religious rites. Gradually, Rome imposed the closure of churches following the rites as practiced in Constantinople and Constantinople did the same to churches following the practices of the Western Church. Eventually, the Roman pope Leo IX and Michael Cerularius of Constantinople excommunicated each other in 1054.

Humbert of Silva Candida, the papal legate who delivered the excommunication to Patriarch Michael Cerularius, decided to stop by in Kiev on his way back to Rome from Constantinople. The newly converted Kievan Rus represented an attractive potential ally for Rome, especially given that the young federation of Slavs was expanding in size and importance on the international scene. Since integrating with this new community of Christians would strengthen their hand against Byzantium, Rome’s envoy visited the Grand Prince of Kiev with the aim of convincing him to join Rome. Yet Yazislav, the new Grand Prince of Kiev, refused any allegiance to Rome. The clergy in Kiev would remain on the Orthodox side with Constantinople in the great East-West schism.

But rivalries amongst Slavs were fierce. In 1169, the pious Grand Prince of Vladimir-Suzdal Andrey Bogolyubsky sacked Kiev and took many religious pieces, including a highly revered Byzantine icon of the Mother of God of Odigitriya, one of the holiest in Russian Orthodoxy. He initiated the construction of many churches in Vladimir-Suzdal, near today’s Moscow and converted more Slavic tribes. He is also renowned for having made the first attempt to set up a new eparchy to compete with Kiev. Around the year 1170, he bypassed the Kiev Patriarchate and directly requested of the Patriarch of Constantinople, Luka Khrizovergus, that he established an eparchy in Vladimir. He also asked for the new metropolitan to have the same rank as the one in Kiev. The patriarch declined his request, but the competition with Kiev had begun.

Moscow enters the scene

The Mongol invasion spread quickly from east to west and reached Kiev in 1240. The city was destroyed and almost its entire population was dispersed. Kiev, the beautiful jewel of a city was shattered. Some sixty years after the destruction of Kiev, the city was still not recovering. So, the metropolitan Maksim moved his residence from Kiev further east to Vladimirin 1299. Nonetheless, he kept his title of Metropolitan of Kiev and All Rus. The transfer of the religious center from Kiev was a major move, the consequences of which greatly affected the future of Orthodoxy and lay power as well. At that time, the Mongol dominated the region. The first union of Slavs, the Kievan Rus had disappeared and new states had not formed yet.

In a short span of three decades, major events shaped the face of the new power that emerged in Moscow, the capital of the Grand Duchy of Moscovy.

Under the relative religious tolerance of the Mongols, the church consolidated its power and the metropolitan Piotr moved to Moscow in 1325, giving the sign that the city was one of the leading politico-religious centers.

In the meantime, Constantinople was mired in its own problems and the Eastern Roman Empire was suffering through its last days. As the Vatican was entering the Renaissance era, it was eager to end the 1054 schism, especially to its own advantage. Thus the Catholic pope was well inclined to help Constantinople, which had asked for help and unity in resisting the Ottoman threat. At the Council of Florence in 1439, the Catholic Church and the Patriarch of Constantinople signed an agreement that should have put an end to the schism. At that time, Constantinople was still appointing the Metropolitan of Kiev and All Rus, and it counted on the support of Moscow to endorse the agreement. But reality dictated otherwise as Russia had gained much distance from Constantinople and its issues. The Patriarch of Constantinople died soon afterward, and it was decided that his signature was nonbinding for the Orthodox churches. Only Constantinople still hoped that the union with Rome would save them from the Ottomans. But a decade later, in 1453, Constantinople fell under the control of the Ottomans.

Moscow-based bishops decided to emancipate themselves from Constantinople, which had compromised with the Catholics to save itself, yet was now under Muslim rule. For the first time, Moscow elected its own head of the church, independently from Constantinople. Although the autocephaly of the Russian Orthodox Church was recognized only in 1589, the church became de facto independent in 1448, with Jonah as its first metropolitan. One of his first objectives was to maintain religious unity in territories over which his predecessors had authority. Eventually, in 1458, the canonical territories over which the metropolitan professed corresponded to those over which the Grand Prince of Moscow ruled. This transition was reflected in his title, which changed in 1461 to Metropolitan of Moscow and All Rus. The Russian Church was now an actor of importance that saw itself as the guardian of Orthodoxy, the Third Rome.

The new Autocephalous Church asserts itself

The remaining element was the recognition of autocephaly by Constantinople. Without the approval of its peers, the self-proclaimed autocephaly has no validity in the Orthodox world.

The Ottomans imposed heavy tributes on patriarchates that fell under their territorial control. Economically weakened, the patriarchates lost considerable weight, especially Antioch, which had been weakened and forced into exile several times due to centuries under the dominion of Arabs and crusaders. In 1586–1587, the patriarch of Antioch, Joachim V, engaged in a journey to collect donations from other Orthodox churches. In Moscow, the future tsar Boris Godunov offered his support and seized this political moment to stir ambitions of an official autocephaly. Two years later, the patriarch of Constantinople, Jeremias II, traveled to Moscow with the same objective of collecting money. During his stay, he would have discussed with Boris Godunov the possibility of remaining the Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarch but being based in Russia. Finally, after lengthy negotiations, Jeremias II decided to give autocephaly to the Russian Orthodox Church and returned home. The recognition was made official in 1589 with the concurrence of the other three original patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem.

In 1589, the Russian Orthodox Church for the first time had a patriarch at its head, Job of Moscow. There were now five patriarchs: Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, and Moscow. And the tsar was the guardian of Orthodoxy.

Kiev, the Tsarist Empire and the church

Peter the Great launched many reforms to modernize Russia, following European model. He replaced the patriarchate with a committee termed the Holy Synod, placing a bureaucrat, the Chief Procurator, as its de facto head and the tsar’s eyes and ears in the church. With authority over religious matters and control over the appointment of bishops, Peter succeeded in relegating the church to the status of a ministry or state department, with clerics placed in charge of spiritual matters.

Catherine the Great continued the policies of Peter the Great. She entertained the Austro-Russian idea of dissolving the Ottoman Empire. As part of this scheme, she nurtured plans to embark on a “Greek Project”: re-establishing a Greek Byzantine empire to replace the Muslim Ottoman Empire, which had gained ground in continental Europe. For instance, she supported the Daskalogiannis Rebellion in Crete in 1770, in which Cretans rose up against the Turks. In reality, she was rather indifferent to religion: she embraced the project, promoted by Prince Potemkin, for geopolitical rather than religious reasons. Yet it did not materialize, and no alliance with Austria came into being. In 1783, Catherine decided to annex Crimea, putting an end to the revolts occurring there and, most importantly, pushing the Ottoman Empire back across the Black Sea. Crimea became a Russian province and part of Novorossiya or “New Russia” in 1784.

Religion politics in Russo-Turkish Wars

Eventually, tensions between the Russian and Ottoman empires had reached a climax, and war broke out in 1787. The conflict lasted for five years but was decided to Russia’s advantage. Russia was therefore able to consolidate its positions around the Black Sea but never captured Constantinople, the gateway to the Mediterranean’s warm waters and an Achilles heel for Moscow to this day. Even though the Treaty of Jassy, signed at the end of the war on January 9, 1792, recognized the Russian territorial gains, relations with the Ottoman Empire remained tense. Russian expansion benefited from momentum on the world scene shaken by the French and American revolutions. Consequently, nobody really reacted to Russian expansion until the situation in France had stabilized. But Napoleon reaction was short-lived.

Alexander’s victory over Napoleon gave him a new sense of divine mission, and by 1814, the tsar had grown more religious and prone to messianism. His religious awakening triggered his initiation of the Holy Alliance between Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Signed in Paris in 1815, this alliance aimed to promote Christianity but was also a reaction to the Napoleonic Wars. The Great Powers wanted to ensure a balance of power in Europe and avoid revolutions. During the two hectic decades that followed, the Catholic Church remained strong and Napoleon III pursued a pro-Catholic agenda, as proven by his 1849 expedition to restore the pope. He posed as the champion of Catholicism in Europe, which in part explained his decision to engage in the Crimean War against Russia.

With its territorial gains and advances well into the Black Sea region, Russia represented a growing threat for the Ottoman Empire and its French and British allies. Paris, together with London, backed the Ottoman Empire, whose western territories in the Balkans saw many uprisings, such as those of the Orthodox Serbs and Orthodox Greeks.

The trigger of the Crimean War of 1853–1856 was religious, but the roots were indisputably linked to the fear of Russia’s growing influence in the weakened Ottoman Empire. At the beginning, quarrels between Catholic and Orthodox monks arose in Palestine about their prerogatives. As the matter had reached serious levels, Tsar Nicholas I intervened and asked the Sultan to recognize the right of Russia to protect the Christians of the Ottoman Empire according to the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, signed after the war of 1774. This right gave the Russian Orthodox Church further predominance over the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The document also gave Russia access through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. This privilege was certainly not pleasing to France or England.

Catholic France declared that it wanted to have authority over the Eastern Christians, a decision contradicting a previous agreement that gave Russia the right to protect Christians. The French Catholic Emperor Napoleon III promised support to the Sultan if he were to resist this Russian “aggression.” Stung by the humiliating conditions of the treaty following the Ottoman defeat, the Sultan agreed. Consequently, a new war erupted between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. As promised, France, joined by England, intervened in support of the Sultan to preserve the territorial integrity of his empire.

The protection of holy places and Christians became the source of an international war with several fronts around the Black Sea, including in the Caucasus. The war was eventually lost by Russia, which was then forced to hand over several territories around the Black Sea. As a result, France gained influence in the Holy Lands.

Moscow – Constantinople Competition

World War I put an end to both Russian and Ottoman empires. Under the Soviet, religion was undermined, priests were killed and churches destroyed. So, the Russian church found itself in a state of confusion when the Soviet government collapsed. The church was divided and weak. During the final years of the twentieth century, the ROC stabilized and consolidated its power over its canonical territory thanks to the support of the Russian authorities. It also reasserted its stance within the Orthodox Church worldwide. By far the largest in terms of parishioners and with growing wealth, the Russian Orthodox Church overshadowed the patriarch of Constantinople.

The later did not enjoy much freedom under the new Turkish rule. In addition, it had lost jurisdiction in the Balkans in the nineteenth century. Turkish authorities imposed that the Patriarch should be a Turkish citizen, usually of Greek origin, and such candidates are rare. All in all, the Patriarch of Constantinople has been in an increasing difficult position for centuries, and Moscow has proved to be a strong challenger. In 2016, the ROC asked to convene the Pan-Orthodox Council in Crete and not in Istanbul as Turkish authorities had downed a Russian jetfighter deployed for operations in Syria. Based on this security argument, the Council agreed to change location. Nonetheless, local Orthodox churches, namely the Bulgarian Church, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch, and the Serbian and Georgian Orthodox churches refused to participate because of disagreements over the agenda. The ROC suggested solving those issues to guarantee full attendance, even if it meant postponing the Council. Eventually, the disputes were not resolved and the ROC decided to cancel its participation. By so doing, the ROC expressed a defiant message about the role and authority of the Constantinople Patriarchate. Tensions never resolved and the situation in Ukraine added insult to injury in the relation between Constantinople and Moscow.

Moscow – Kiev: rivals once more

Since the mid seventeenth century, Kiev remained largely under the rule of the Tsar and then Soviet Moscow. Ties binding Ukraine and Russia were strong especially in the field of alimentation, industry and energy.

After the end of the Soviet Union, the Western European World and Russia have tried to attract Kyiv into their respective spheres of influence, a game from which Kiyv benefitted. In 2014, the tables turned drastically with the Euromaidan revolution that toppled President Yanukovych.  Incapable of averting Ukraine’s choice of the EU, Moscow was concerned that Ukraine might ally with NATO. Russian authorities treated the situation as a security matter and actively supported the separation of the autonomous region of Crimea and its attachment/annexation to Russia. The situation spiraled out of control and a kinetic conflict erupted in the Donbas, leading to serious readjustments in international affairs.

Against the backdrop of the complex international relations prevailing in the early twenty-first century, interests of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian state have overlapped in Ukraine. The question of religion and allegiance to the Kyiv or Moscow patriarchate has become a matter of identity and call for resistance among some Ukrainians against Russia in 2014. This unfortunate confusion resulted in intra-Orthodox confrontation with the killing of orthodox priests and the destruction of orthodox churches. In a vicious circle, religious and political differences fueled each other.

Many critics have interpreted the positions of the Russian church and the Russian authorities as two sides of the same coin. Consequently, the Russian church became synonymous with Russian interference in Ukraine, and as such the separation as we see it unfolding was almost a fait accompli.

The creation of an autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church is another turn in this fluid relationship between the three historic cities of Constantinople, Kyiv and Moscow. And it is hardly to be the last move…

This article was published by Modern Diplomacy

By Michael Lelyveld

China is importing record volumes of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to meet its air quality targets and may have no alternative for the next several years, experts say.

In November, China’s LNG imports soared 48.5 percent from a year earlier to 5.99 million metric tons, according to customs figures. In the 11-month period, imports of 47.52 million tons climbed 43.6 percent from a year before, the official Xinhua news agency said.

Total natural gas imports, including both pipeline gas and LNG, rose 31.9 percent to a record of 90.39 million tons last year, the General Administration of Customs said Monday.

Last year marked the second in a row of LNG growth rates of over 40 percent as the government presses ahead with its wintertime fuel-switching policy to reduce heating with high- polluting coal.

Despite higher costs and infrastructure problems, the government has shown determination to pursue the gas policy as the gap between domestic production and consumption grows.

In November, China’s gas output jumped 10.1 percent from a year earlier, but the daily consumption rate also rose to a new record on Nov. 21, Reuters reported, citing the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC).

A detailed study released last month by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies suggests that China faces a critical period between now and 2020 with implications for the international LNG market, depending on how far the government pushes its fuel-switching campaign.

Total natural gas consumption in 2020 will range between 300 billion and 400 billion cubic meters (10.6 trillion and 14.1 trillion cubic feet), based on minimum and maximum estimates of coal-to-gas switching, said the study by senior researchers and analysts at Osaka Gas Co., Ltd. of Japan.

Central Asian pipeline network

Domestic gas production is likely to contribute 180 billion to 200 billion cubic meters (bcm), or anywhere from 45 to 67 percent of consumption. In the first 11 months of 2018, China’s gas output inched up 6.6 percent from a year earlier to 143.8 bcm, Reuters said, citing National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data.

China can fill some of the gap with imports of pipeline gas, but capacity and supplies will be limited, the study said.

The country’s major Central Asian pipeline network from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan is nearing its rated capacity of 55 bcm per year. Efforts are planned to boost the volume to 65 bcm with new compressor stations, but progress on building a fourth strand of the system through Tajikistan appears stalled.

Last year, the Central Asian system increased supplies by 21 percent to 46.9 bcm, according to state-owned Turkmengaz, as reported by Azerbaijan’s Trend News Agency.

Another import pipeline through Myanmar is expected to deliver only modest volumes to China in 2020, estimated at 4 bcm, despite its 10-bcm capacity.

And Russia’s mammoth Power of Siberia gas pipeline project, scheduled to open next December, will supply China with only 6 bcm in 2020, the analysts said. By then, the total of pipeline gas available to China will reach only 55- 65 bcm, they said.

The rest of China’s demand will have to be filled by LNG imports, although the conclusions are subject to a host of variables.

Last year, China overtook South Korea to become the world’s second-largest LNG importer, surpassed only by Japan.

According to the study, China had 19 receiving terminals for the tanker-borne fuel with an annual capacity of about 59.6 million tons as of last August. The volume is the equivalent of about 81 bcm.

By 2020, new terminals and other infrastructure could raise LNG import capacity to as much as 70 million tons, or about 95 bcm.

‘Virtually impossible to meet projected demand’

Although some of China’s terminals have already operated at more than 100 percent of their rated capacity, the study concludes that “it will be virtually impossible to meet projected demand” if China sticks to its maximum target for switching from coal to gas.

Capacity constraints will also keep China from meeting its 2020 target for raising the natural gas share of its primary energy supply to 10 percent, the study said. Gas is believed to account for about 6 percent of the country’s energy mix now.

The authors also see implications for LNG demand beyond 2020 if Russia’s plans for larger volumes of pipeline gas are delayed.

The study said that “LNG demand will depend above all on steady growth in natural gas imports from Russia from 2020 onward. If imports from Russia grow steadily, this makes it more likely that LNG imports will slow from 2020. Conversely, if natural gas imports from Russia do not, for some reason, grow as planned, dependence on LNG will increase further.”

The conclusions suggest that China may have to pursue more moderate targets or build even more LNG infrastructure to avoid excessive reliance on Russian supplies.

Mikkal Herberg, energy security research director for the Seattle-based National Bureau of Asian Research, said the report highlights both pluses and minuses for China as gas demand rises at astronomical rates.

On the plus side, the finding that eastern LNG import terminals were able to operate at over 100 percent of rated capacity suggests there may be elasticity in the system, said Herberg.

On the downside, the average 82-percent utilization rate of all terminals as of mid 2018 is a sign that the system will be running “pretty close to flat out” with the larger volumes expected in 2020, he said.

Although the international LNG market is expected to be well supplied over the next two years, any glitch in China’s system could lead to sudden shortages.

“It’s still a pretty rickety LNG and gas supply logistics system bumping up against stunning increases in LNG use,” Herberg said by email.

“Lots can go wrong, especially if there’s a very cold winter in 2019 or 2020,” he said. “The system will be running so tight that things will get very difficult, and serious regional supply shortages would inevitably occur.”

‘Industry and market indigestion’

Vessel traffic at China’s receiving terminals is likely to become intense if current growth rates continue.

The study noted that in December 2017, the NDRC issued emergency measures in response to gas shortages, ordering 39 LNG cargoes in addition to the 248 that had already been planned for the winter season.

The potential for disruption came into focus over the weekend after a liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) carrier leaked gas into the water near Dongying port in east China’s Shandong province, Xinhua reported.

The incident on Saturday due to a valve malfunction on a South Korean-registered tanker is being monitored for environmental impacts, Xinhua and China Global Television Network (CGTN) said.

Ships have been warned to avoid the area. Xinhua reported Monday that the leak had been stopped.

Other reports have raised questions about the availability of LNG carriers (LNGCs) to respond to high demand growth and winter emergencies.

According to the latest count by the Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA), the world fleet of LNGCs consisted of only 467 tankers in mid-2018.

The low rate of orders for new vessels suggests that China’s demand growth could exceed fleet capacity.

“Considering that LNGC construction takes between two and three years, fleet capacity is expected to remain almost flat in 2020 (and possibly 2022) unless new orders are placed in the coming months,” the IEA said in its October report.

Some of those concerns may have been eased by a rush of new orders late in the year, a report last month by lngworldshipping.com said.

But the lengthening list of potential problems suggests that China has entered a high-risk period as it strives to meet its air quality and energy goals.

“Any country trying to raise LNG imports at the pace and scale of China over the past few years would experience monumental ‘industry and market indigestion,'” said Herberg.

China’s soaring demand for LNG has already played havoc with shipping costs, affecting the entire Asian market.

Spot charter rates for LNG carriers in November rose fivefold since May to U.S. $190,000 (1.3 million yuan) per day, Japan’s Nikkei Asian review reported on Jan. 2.

“We did not expect that we would run short of vessels so quickly,” an unidentified official at a major Japanese shipping company was quoted as saying.

The financial gap that emerging markets have to bridge is huge; between $1 trillion and 1.5 trillion annually is needed for investment in infrastructure.

By Mihir Swarup Sharma

For the head of the World Bank Group to quit unexpectedly would have been big news under any circumstances. But, the reason outgoing president Jim Yong Kim gave for his resignation last Monday is even more revealing. Kim said he was leaving the world’s most influential development and infrastructure-building agency to join a private-sector infrastructure investment fund because he believed “this is the path through which I will be able to make the largest impact on major global issues like climate change and the infrastructure deficit in emerging markets.” One can hardly imagine a more potent indictment of the World Bank’s role in the developing world than having its head vote with his feet.

The truth is that Kim isn’t wrong. The World Bank has simply not been effective enough at what is supposed to be its core task: mobilising funds for infrastructure investment in poorer countries. The financial gap that emerging markets have to bridge is huge; between $1 trillion and 1.5 trillion annually is needed for investment in infrastructure. And how much can multilateral development banks raise in total? All of them put together — not just the World Bank but also regional MDBs such as the Asian Development Bank — can spend about $116 billion a year, according to the Center for Global Development’s Nancy Lee. Worse, only about $45 billion of that goes into infrastructure investment.

Now, one response to this problem could be to capitalise these banks better. But, as we’re likely to discover in the battle between the Trump administration and the rest of the world that is now inevitable after Kim’s resignation, the US isn’t terribly interested in multilateral institutions such as the World Bank. (This is a striking contrast to China, which is looking to scale up the institutions it dominates, such as the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank.) So, more money for the World Bank is out — and even if it was committed, it wouldn’t come close to addressing the “infrastructure deficit” that Kim talks about.

So where will the rest of the money have to come from? Well, from our pockets, that’s where. It’s savers across the world whose money will need to be agglomerated and sent overseas to where it can best be put to work — in the developing world. In other words, private finance will have to step in and put just a fraction of the $90-plus trillion of rich-country savings into emerging-market infrastructure.

This is where the World Bank has fallen short. Back when it was set up, in the 1940s, the bank was supposed to work closely with the private sector, not to make grants or loans of its own money. It was meant, in fact, to be an underwriter of sorts.

Henry Morgenthau, the US treasury secretary back when the Bretton Woods institutions were being designed, was pretty clear about what the bank’s role: “The primary aim of such an agency should be to encourage private capital to go abroad for productive investment by sharing the risks of private investors in large ventures … The most important of the Bank’s operations will be to guarantee loans in order that investors may have a reasonable assurance of safety in placing their funds abroad.” But, as pointed out by Chris Humphrey and Annalisa Prizzon of the Overseas Development Institute, that isn’t how things panned out. In fact, in 2013, less than two percent of the total funds mobilised by all development finance institutions took the form of loan guarantees.

Instead of working with the private sector, the World Bank has become a slack, bloated, public-sector bureaucracy that survives by flattering its host governments and playing it safe with donors. Most of its lending is direct to governments. That is great for all concerned: The bank’s staff just have to monitor the lending process; most need minimal specialist skills. Donor governments can maneuver to use the bank as a tool of their foreign policy. And recipient governments control where the cash goes — frequently into their own state-controlled companies or institutions. Nobody needs to work very hard as long as everyone gets along, which is why the bank goes out of its way not to confront, for example, major “customers” such as the Indian government.

There have been efforts to change this lazy equilibrium in recent years. Since early in Kim’s term, the World Bank and other multilateral development agencies have attempted to de-prioritise concessional loans as an instrument and raise the profile of guarantees. Kim’s premature departure, though, tells us all we need to know about how successful that effort has been.

This article originally appeared on Bloomberg and is reprinted with permission

The U.S. Department of Defense and Qatar’s Ministry of Defense signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) concerning Qatar’s support of DOD activities at Al Udeid Air Base (AUAB) during the second U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue in Doha, Qatar Jan. 13. 

The MOU will help promote interoperability, support regional stability, and reaffirm the U.S.-Qatar defense relationship, according to the Pentagon.  It also represents a positive step towards the eventual formalization of Qatar’s commitment to support sustainment costs and future infrastructure costs at AUAB, which the State of Qatar proposed at the first U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue in January 2018.  

Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Michael Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of State, jointly witnessed the signing ceremony.  The Principal Director for Middle East Policy in the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense Ms. Jennifer Zakriski and Brigadier General Fahad al-Sulaiti, Director of the International Military Cooperation Authority, General Headquarters, Qatar Armed Forces signed the MOU on behalf of their respective governments. 

Separately, both the U.S. and Qatari delegations to the Strategic Dialogue hailed the many achievements in the bilateral military relationship in the past year, including joint exercises, U.S. ship visits to Doha, and the implementation of standard operating procedures designed to facilitate customs, immigration, and operational processes that will deepen the security and military partnership. 

Since 2003, Qatar has hosted U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and Special Operations Command (SOCCENT) Forward Headquarters and U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT) at AUAB, the largest U.S. military installation in the Middle East with over 11,000 U.S. and Coalition service members.  AUAB has served as the primary staging ground for most air operations in the campaign to defeat ISIS. 

The U.S. and the State of Qatar have had a longstanding and multi-faceted bilateral military relationship which is guided by shared goals to combat terrorism, deter criminality in the Arabian Gulf and promote regional security and stability, the Pentagon said in a statement.

So good afternoon, everyone. I had a brief but very productive trip. I had a chance to meet with the Saudi foreign minister, with King Salman, and then, ultimately, with Crown Prince Salman; discussed the issues that relate to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States as they pertain to what I was trying to accomplish on this trip, right.

The context for this conversation was the efforts that the Trump administration is making to create a stable and peaceful region here in the Middle East. So our conversations spanned a wide range of those set of objectives. We certainly talked about our effort to counter Iranian malign influence, but we spoke about all the issues in the region, ranging from the continued efforts of Hizballah; we talked about the fact that the – the work that was done in Sweden on Yemen was good, but we need both sides to honor those commitments. To date, the Iranian-backed Houthis have chosen not to do that.

We spoke about human rights issues here in Saudi Arabia – women activists. We spoke about the accountability that – and the expectations that we have. The Saudis are friends, and when friends have conversations, you tell them what your expectations are. And I think the Trump administration has made clear our expectation that all of those involved in the murder of Khashoggi will be held accountable.

So we spent time talking about human rights issues, the Khashoggi case in particular, and we also talked about Syria and the President’s decision to withdraw our 2,000 uniformed personnel from Syria and what that means and how we will continue the campaign against ISIS/Daesh, and the other important interests that the United States has in the region and that the Saudis share as our partner in those efforts.

With that, I’m happy to take any questions.

MR PALLADINO: Let’s start with Nick.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary —

SECRETARY POMPEO: Yes, Nick.

QUESTION: — in the President’s tweets this morning about Turkey, he referenced the idea of a 20-mile safe zone but didn’t say much beyond that. Could you elaborate a little bit on what he meant? That tweet’s caused some confusion.

SECRETARY POMPEO: Only to say that we continue to have conversations with all the players involved in our goal. Remember the objective is to create a political process that will lead to the Saudi[1] people having the opportunity to create a nation for themselves – a unified Syria where the people of Syria have the opportunity to create a good outcome for themselves. So it’s in that context that we address all of the various issues there, whether it’s the Iranian influence there, the Russians’ activities. And in – with respect to those tweets, the issues along the Syrian-Turkey border in the north, we continue to have conversations. I spoke with my foreign minister counterpart yesterday to have conversations about what that will look like. The President’s aim there, I think, is the one that we have been talking about for some time, which is that we want to make sure that the folks who fought with us to take down the caliphate in ISIS have security, and also that terrorists acting out of Syria aren’t able to attack Turkey. Those are the twin aims.

And so the precise methodology which by we will achieve that – that security for both of those elements along that border – is something we’re still working on. And so if we can get a space – call it a buffer zone, others might have a different name for it – if we can get the space and the security arrangements right, this will be a good thing for everyone in the region.

MR PALLADINO: Andrea.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary —

SECRETARY POMPEO: Yes, ma’am.

QUESTION: — thank you very much for doing this. Can you elaborate on what your expectations are regarding Khashoggi and what the crown prince responded and whether you believe it’s credible that this plot could have been hatched and carried out without his knowledge?

SECRETARY POMPEO: Our expectations have been clear from early on: Every single person who has responsibility for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi needs to be held accountable. And the crown prince – I spoke about this with King Salman as well – they both acknowledged that that accountability needed to take place. They talked about the process that’s occurring inside of the country, both the investigative process and the judicial process that’s taking place, and they reiterated – it’s not new – they reiterated their commitment to achieve the objective, the expectations that we have set for them.

QUESTION: Did he still describe it as a rogue operation?

SECRETARY POMPEO: I’m not going to talk about the details of the conversations. They – the expectations that we’ve set for them are very clear. We’ve spoken about this a great deal and their continued commitment to continue to pursue all those connected is something that they have not wavered from since the first time we’ve had conversations with them.

QUESTION: (Off-mike.)

MR PALLADINO: Okay. Barbara. Barbara next, actually. Let’s go to Barbara.

QUESTION: Sir, in terms of the discussions you’re having about the arrangement along the Turkey-Syria border, there have been some rumors that that might involve an Arab force that’s acceptable to both sides. That’s one of the things on the table. Can you say anything about that? And also, can you say anything about the women activists in jail? Did you get any commitments about whether they might be released or how they’ve been treated or what the situation is with that?

SECRETARY POMPEO: We spoke in particular – we spoke about a number of human rights issues, certainly including the women’s rights activists. Their commitment was that the process – the lawful, judicial process here would take place, they would do so quickly, and that they would continue down that path. They understand the concerns that some have and they are going to do their best to communicate as appropriate. So – and your first question was about Syria and the Arab forces.

QUESTION: There’s a – one of the things out of the discussions was an Arab force.

SECRETARY POMPEO: I don’t – there’s lots of things under discussion. There are lots of possibilities about how we might achieve the end state that I described in my earlier response.

MR PALLADINO: Okay, Matt.

QUESTION: Yeah, I just wanted – you had mentioned that you talked with the Turkish foreign minister yesterday. You talked to him again, after Saturday, or what was that – you told us —

SECRETARY POMPEO: I spoke with – no, I’ve had one conversation on this trip with him. The day —

QUESTION: Okay, so there wasn’t a second one?

MR PALLADINO: We —

SECRETARY POMPEO: There hasn’t been a second one.

MR PALLADINO: We did the release, so you’ve got the readout of that call, correct?

QUESTION: Yeah, I do, but I just want to make sure there wasn’t a second call.

SECRETARY POMPEO: There’s only been a single call.

QUESTION: Especially because of the threat that appears to be implied in the President’s tweet about devastating Turkey economically if the Kurds are hurt. Can you offer any —

SECRETARY POMPEO: The administration has been very consistent with respect to our requirement that the Turks not go after the Kurds in ways that are inappropriate. If there are terrorists, we’re all about taking down extremists wherever we find them. I think – I think the President’s comments this morning are consistent with that.

QUESTION: What did he mean by economic devastation?

SECRETARY POMPEO: You’d have to ask – you’d have to ask him.

MR PALLADINO: Okay.

SECRETARY POMPEO: I – we’ve applied sanctions in many places around the world. I assume he’s speaking about those kinds of things, but you’d have to ask him.

Yes, please.

MR PALLADINO: Adam.

QUESTION: Yes, thank you. Two brief ones for you. I was hoping you could elaborate just briefly on how U.S. and Saudi in these talks are specifically working to combat Iran in Yemen and Syria. What do they expect? What are you communicating back? And I was also hoping you could tell us a little bit about the nature of your conversations with the President on the trip. What has he communicated – expectations – and what have you communicated back?

SECRETARY POMPEO: You mean with President Trump?

QUESTION: Yeah.

SECRETARY POMPEO: During the trip we’ve talked about lots of things, many of which have nothing to do with the Middle East. The world goes on while I travel. So we’ve had conversations about —

QUESTION: Has he had specific expectations for this trip specifically?

SECRETARY POMPEO: Oh, yes, we had – yes, but most of those we had conversations about over the weeks that preceded this trip as we were laying out those conversations. So I’ve certainly provided him updates on the conversations I’ve been having on the trip as well, but in terms of the expectations and the things we’re hoping to achieve, it’s been pretty consistent with what all of the United States Government agreed to along with the President in preparation for the trip. What was – your second question was about Iran?

QUESTION: The first was —

SECRETARY POMPEO: Yeah.

QUESTION: — hoping you could just characterize the conversations you just came from in terms of Iranian action in Yemen and Syria, what the Saudis are expecting, what you’re communicating back.

SECRETARY POMPEO: So this all – step back and this all starts with extremism in whatever form you find it. In this case you have Iranian-backed Houthis, Iranian-backed Hizballah, Iranian-backed Shia militias in Iraq, Iranian-backed forces in Syria, and in each case the root of the challenge stems from the revolutionary nature of the Islamic regime and their efforts abroad. And so they’re focused on doing the things they can do. I talked to – I shared with the crown prince and with the king, if I recall correctly, my conversations to help Iraq as well. We want an Iraq that is independent, sovereign, and how it is we might do that – there are lots of economic things we can do to assist Iraq in getting back on its feet, which will permit them to be more independent and have more control and be more sovereign. I shared with the crown prince my conversations when I traveled to Iraq.

So we had a chance to have a wide series of conversations about how it is – America’s continued effort on the economic and financial front – to attempt to convince the Iranian people that America is serious about empowering them and creating opportunities for the Iranian people. We talked about each of those things today.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR PALLADINO: Let’s go to Tracy.

QUESTION: Hi, yes. Did you come away from your meeting with the crown prince reassured or convinced or more optimistic that they’re really going to get to the bottom of the Khashoggi case? Any kind of assurances? Any kind of change?

SECRETARY POMPEO: No change. They’ve provided assurances since the beginning.

QUESTION: So nothing has changed? It’s the same line?

SECRETARY POMPEO: They still are working through their fact-finding process. You should know that the United States continues to work through its fact-finding process as well. That is, our efforts to uncover the facts surrounding this. And then, consistent with the President’s commitment to hold everyone accountable, we continue inside the United States Government to do that as well.

MR PALLADINO: Let’s go to Matt.

QUESTION: Are you leaving satisfied —

MR PALLADINO: Matt. Matt.

QUESTION: To follow up on that —

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary —

SECRETARY POMPEO: Yes.

MR PALLADINO: Matt. Go ahead, Matt.

QUESTION: — The Washington Post reported that no detailed records exist within the U.S. Government of President Trump’s meetings with Vladimir Putin. Is that true?

SECRETARY POMPEO: I’ll leave that to the White House. These were presidential conversations. I’ll —

MR PALLADINO: Let’s go to Edward.

SECRETARY POMPEO: — let the White House respond to that.

MR PALLADINO: Edward.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, two questions. One is: How do you reconcile your calling for full accountability with the CIA’s assessment, which they’ve already made, that the crown prince himself ordered the killing? That’s the first question.

SECRETARY POMPEO: Yeah.

QUESTION: The second one is: What are the specific policy tools you want these countries to exercise in regard to these Iranian-backed militias? Like, are you implying that they should put their own forces in the field or are there other policy tools that you’re (inaudible)?

SECRETARY POMPEO: So, first one first: I don’t talk about CIA assessments. Second one: All of the tools that independent nations exercise to attain their independence and sovereignty, we are hopeful we can collectively – the United States certainly, but countries throughout the Middle East – I spoke with King Abdullah about this; I spoke with – I spoke with President Sisi about this. Each of those countries – I spoke – I spoke with the Emiratis about this. Each of those countries wants to do what it can to build out that independent, sovereign Iraq, to help their government get on its feet and have the Iraqi independence that we’ve been working on, the United States has been working on for now decades. And so all the tools available with regard to their security forces, yes, we want those security forces to be in the control of the Iraqi Government and we want them to have full control over all of their security forces, just in the same way we expect that of every sovereign nation.

QUESTION: But the question is more about the militias throughout – the Iranian-backed militias throughout the region.

SECRETARY POMPEO: Throughout the – that’s the region. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: You – but you talked specifically about Iraq.

SECRETARY POMPEO: Yes, that’s certainly the region, but we have – sure, you have Iranian-backed forces in —

QUESTION: Syria.

SECRETARY POMPEO: — in Syria, you have them in Lebanon, you have them in Yemen. It’s a five-capital strategy, right? This has been the – this is the history of Iran’s efforts: five capitals. And our effort is to make sure that the Iranian people get control of their capital and that it becomes a nation that is normal and isn’t conducting terror campaigns that are unrivaled anyplace else in the world.

MR PALLADINO: Francesco.

QUESTION: With the Khashoggi murder, there was a lot of talk back in D.C. – back in D.C. about, most broadly, the behavior of the crown prince. Do you share the view that his behavior can be a concern for the relation with the United States? Did you ask him to change his behavior, that there might be something around that?

SECRETARY POMPEO: So the United States relationship is with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. That’s who – that’s who our partner is; that’s who our strategically shared interest is with. So I had – I spoke with the ruler in Saudi Arabia, the king, and the crown prince, and the foreign minister, and we spoke about a wide range of issues. And where we’re working closely together and being successful we want to redouble our efforts, and where friends think the other one is falling short I was very clear and candid about those things where America is not satisfied, where they’re not meeting our expectations. And they – and they appreciate that.

By the way, you should know they shared places they think America may not be doing everything. I mean, this is – this is how friends engage. You have conversations where you’re not always exactly in the same place, and each tries to ensure that the other understands their position and why it is they’re there, and then you do your best to move forward together.

MR PALLADINO: Conor.

QUESTION: I essentially had the same question, Mr. Secretary. There are a lot of different areas where people think that the crown prince has extended the kingdom too far – in Yemen; the episode with Saad Hariri from Lebanon. He will be around for a long time as a young man and a leader in this kingdom. Do you think that he needs to be chastened at all on his behavior?

SECRETARY POMPEO: I’ll – I don’t even know where to begin to respond to a question like that. Remember what the United States has; it has a deep, longstanding relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. And so its leaders are going to act for – in their country’s interest. That’s their obligation, the same way mine is to act in America’s best interests. And so we shared with them places we think that the kingdom isn’t doing what it is we wish that they would do. And when they’re doing the things we’re – that make good sense for partners and friends, we were – we tell them about that and we redouble our efforts there.

MR PALLADINO: Two more questions.

SECRETARY POMPEO: It’s the ninth – about the ninth question that’s been the same question, so if there’s – if there’s anything anybody else might like to talk about, I’m —

QUESTION: I have a very different – I have a very different one.

MR PALLADINO: Let’s go to Courtney.

SECRETARY POMPEO: — I’m happy to take a shot at something a little bit different, perhaps. It’s been a very productive trip and we’ve talked about lots of really important things, and we ought to talk about those here this afternoon.

QUESTION: A different question. Mr. Secretary, how did – how did the Saudi leaders react to your comments in Doha yesterday talking about trying to resolve the Gulf dispute and the – and improving the prospects for (inaudible)?

SECRETARY POMPEO: Yeah, I had – yeah, actually we spent more time talking about the remarks in Cairo, which they thought were well placed and consistent with both America’s policy and what it is they hope we’ll continue to do. That is, they think we have the right understanding of the challenges that are here in the Middle East, that this administration does. But we did talk about how we might put the Gulf back in a better place. I think they’d like to see that too. It’s a matter of us all figuring out how to do it together, but mostly, those countries figuring out how they can put it back together. We’ll —

QUESTION: How —

SECRETARY POMPEO: We can certainly – we can certainly provide assistance and support, but at the end of the day, those countries have to get back together. My conversation with them was to share places where it diminishes our capacity to all work together, and I, for that reason, have a keen interest and America has a keen interest in putting those countries back in a better place together.

MR PALLADINO: Lesley, go ahead.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, first of all, condolences. I’m sorry for your loss.

SECRETARY POMPEO: Thank you very much.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.) Second of all, I just want to be clear about the President’s tweet and how it’s affected the relationship with Turkey given that the lira has been very hard-hit today. Do you think that, in any way, this could compromise your plans for a withdrawal and that Turkey would continue to go ahead with this plan for it to step in?

SECRETARY POMPEO: It’s a fair question. So I haven’t had a chance to have any conversations with the Turks as of yet, since the President’s tweets went out, but I will. I’m sure I’ll talk to them before too long. I don’t think it changes the President’s decision for our 2,000 uniformed personnel to depart Syria. I don’t think it’ll change that. I think in some ways it sets – it just demarks the importance that we place on this, the importance that we – we want a secured border for all of the parties, not even just the Turks and the Kurds; there are Arabs, there are Christians in the region that we want – we want that to be a place where there isn’t violence as there’s been over these past years. We want – and a good part of that region, there are still – depending on how you define the region, there are still millions of displaced persons in that region too. We want to take that violence level down so that we can begin to return the displaced persons to that region as well. I actually think the President’s remarks are pretty clear about what America hopes to achieve in these conversations with all of the parties, the Turks certainly included amongst them.

MR PALLADINO: Last question, Michele.

QUESTION: Yeah. When you talked in Cairo about rejecting false overtures from enemies, which I assume is Iran, does that rule out the possibility of humanitarian dialogue about prisoners? There’s a new – another American that we’ve learned of since you’ve been on this trip. And then, real quickly, did you raise the April Corley case in Egypt?

SECRETARY POMPEO: Yes on the April Corley case, and with respect to conversations about prisoners, there are few things that occupy more of my mind than getting Americans back from everyplace, and the Iranian regime has been particularly brutal with respect to the unlawful detention of Americans. I mean, Bob Levinson goes back now years. I don’t want to say more than to say that we are very focused. We have the whole team, certainly at the State Department but across the entire United States Government, that night and day tirelessly is working to return Americans wherever they’re wrongfully detained. And that certainly includes folks that are held inside the Islamic Republic of Iran as well. I’ll take one – I’ll take one more.

QUESTION: Can Oman be helpful on that?

SECRETARY POMPEO: Yes, they have – they have – Oman has historically been helpful on that. I’m sure this will be part of my conversation in what I guess is now my final stop. So, yeah.

Anyway, all right. Well, thank you all very much. Thanks. Thanks for your time.

MR PALLADINO: Okay, thank you, all. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

QUESTION: Thank you.