By Arab News

By Ihab Abdel-Hadi

The controversial law enacted by Egyptian interim President Adly Mansour Sunday to impose restrictions on organizers of protests and demonstrations have triggered heated debate among politicians and experts.

Under the new law, organizers of public meetings are to offer a written notice to the Interior Ministry three days ahead, and the ministry has the right to cancel a protest 24 hours before it starts if it feels that the protest may represent a threat to security.

The interim government enacted the new law as university students in several governorates have been staging protests to mark 100 days since the dispersal of two Cairo protest camps demanding the reinstatement of President Muhammad Mursi, who was overthrown in July amid nationwide protests. Pro-government parties lauded the law as helpful to stop the spreading of violence in the Egyptian streets. Presidential spokesman Ihab Badwy said that the aim of the law is to protect peaceful protesters. Mohamed Hamed El-Gamal, a judge and former head of the country’s State Council, echoed him by saying the law is “to protect peaceful demonstrations while facing violent ones.” He said the law is good and doesn’t differ from similar laws in other countries. El-Gamal also noted that this law alone could not eliminate violence and instability, urging the interim government to be tough on the Muslim Brotherhood. “The new law will not be enough to stop violence if the interim government continued with its soft stance at the Brotherhood,” El-Gamal said.

Opponents, however, said the law could help little in stopping protests and violence. “The new law will not prevent people from coming to streets again,” Mohamed Ibrahim, member of the higher Committee of Freedom and Justice Party, the political arm of Muslim Brotherhood, told local news website Alyoum 7.

Ibrahim said that such laws should be issued by elected parliament and not by the interim government, adding such laws need a lot of debate and consultations with human rights organizations.

He pointed out that even the curfew and emergency state didn’t prevent Brotherhood supporters from coming to the street, so he doesn’t expect any change with the issuing of the new law.
Essam El-Sherif, coordinator of Free Front for Peaceful Change, said the new law is a tool of oppressing protesters. Egypt was in need of a law that helps to protect peaceful protests and preserve human rights, and at the same time gives security the proper tool to face violence, said Tarek Zaghlol, Executive Director of the Egyptian Organization for Human rights. “Protesters now also have responsibility to secure their protests against intruders who may resort to violence and expose them to danger,” Zaghlol told Xinhua.

He said that nothing will prevent Egyptians from coming to the street again if they felt that the government is using the law to violate their rights of peaceful protest.

- Xinhua News Agency

The article Egypt’s Protest Law Sparks Debate – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Palestine Chronicle

By Jeremy Salt

The agreement between the US and Iran is the best news coming out of the Middle East for some time. As Iran is not developing nuclear weapons it is not giving away too much, although it still went a long way to meeting US demands. Israel is furious.  Netanyahu has done his best to prevent this point being reached and will be striving hard to make sure it goes no further. He will be appealing to Congress over the head of the president, the traditional tactic of Israeli prime ministers when they can’t get their own way. Israel’s lobbyists will be fully mobilizing for what is being represented as the greatest challenge to Israel in its history.

This is a major blow to Israel and a well-deserved slap in the face for Netanyahu.  He has lost no opportunity to humiliate the US president so there is probably a personal element in all of this amidst the grander strategic considerations.  But the outcome is good for the Middle East and good for the US. The agreement sets up the development of a relationship which will reconfigure geostrategic realities. By signing it the US is implicitly accepting Iran’s right to maintain its own special relationship with Syria and Hizbullah. The Syria experience has clearly been a sharp learning curve. In the name of political transition the so-called ‘Friends of the Syrian People’ have unleashed the hounds of hell at the geographic heart of the Middle East. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is only the worst of the pack. The US administration has been backing away from its involvement and now clearly accepts that Bashar staying in power is the best option.

Both Israel and Saudi Arabia are dismayed at the refusal of their erstwhile allies to push the assault on Syria any further.  Now they have the agreement with Iran to contend with and they are furious. Some of the commentary in the Israeli media is nothing short of demented. These two states have now formed their own axis of resistance – resistance to change, resistance to peace, resistance to the end of occupation, resistance to the White House and resistance to common sense. The recent bombing of the Iranian embassy in Beirut can safely be regarded as the work of one of them if not involving both. The Saudis are completely obsessed with destroying Shi’ism and Shia across the region. If they keep going like this their own special relationship with the US is going to suffer as well but they have already dropped hints that they don’t care.

Now that the Americans are talking to Iran they might start wondering what all the fuss was about. They are getting on with the Iranian negotiators, who are far more civilized and sophisticated than shills like Netanyahu and louts like Avigdor Lieberman. Furthermore, while Israel is an occupying state that has repeatedly gone to war to defend its ill-gotten gains, Iran, as commentators are pointing out, has not launched an aggressive war for more than two centuries, so which country shapes up as the most stable ally for the US in the region?

Saudi Arabia is another story. It is one of the most reactionary states in the world. It buys people, politicians, entire governments and newspaper editors. Money is its true god. Much of the revenue from its oil has gone into arms purchases from the US and European governments, all of which know that if they want this bonanza to continue they have to remain silent in the face of Saudi Arabia’s flagrant abuses of human rights.  If there ever was a case for ‘regime change’ it is surely smack bang in the middle of Riyadh.

The agreement with Iran opens the way to significant commercial, political and strategic benefits for the US. It may well not be to Russia’s liking. By comparison, Israel is a dead weight around America’s neck from any perspective.  It bleeds the US Treasury of more than $3 billion in arms and economic aid every year. It spies on the US and regularly defies the US. It has killed US servicemen in pursuit of its own strategic ends. It opens no doors and is of no commercial or economic benefit to the US and the days when it might have served some purpose as an armory during US military actions in the Middle East have probably gone for good. The American people have made it perfectly clear they do not want their government to be involved in any more wars in the Middle East and peace certainly offers the US far greater rewards than war.

The nuclear issue always was a distraction. The real issue for Israel is Iran’s growing influence across the region and its refusal to back away from its strategic alliance with Syria and Hizbullah despite economic sanctions and regular threats of war. The ruins of Gaza are testimony to Israel’s determination to destroy anyone and any thing standing in its way. Palestine is the wellspring but dig deep enough into the ruins of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon and you will find Israel at the bottom. It will see the whole Middle East flattened rather than retreat from the territory it has seized through its wars of aggression. Since the war of conquest of 1948 it has launched six other wars against Egypt, Syria, Gaza and Lebanon, apart from shorter incursions, assassinations and aerial attacks such as those launched on Syria this year. By comparison the only war involving the Islamic republic of Iran is the one launched by Saddam Hussein in 1980.

Israel cannot afford to alienate the US. It needs American economic aid and weapons and it will need US support if it ever gets into a war which it can’t win. Israel’s defeats at the hands of Hizbullah confirm a picture of relative military decline over the past three decades.  Even Gaza with its miniscule defences has been able to withstand the fury of Israeli assaults.  The fortress state is beginning to crumble at its foundations and if Israel continues to alienate even its friends the day will come when it finds itself alone with its nuclear bombs.

This is an existential moment for Israel. It refuses to change, expecting its friends endlessly to accommodate its outrageous behavior. The White House is sending signals that it has had enough and indeed the agreement with Iran may even mark the beginning of the setting of the sun on the US-Israel ‘special relationship.’

- Jeremy Salt is an associate professor of Middle Eastern history and politics at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey. He contributed this article to PalestineChronicle.com.

The article A Dent In The ‘Special Relationship’ – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Iran Review

By Mohamad Javad Zarif, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran

In the past few weeks, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the P5+1 have endeavored to make use of the unique window of opportunity provided by the Iranian presidential election this past summer to resolve the nuclear issue, which has unnecessarily cast a shadow of insecurity and crisis over the region. While most in the international community welcomed this positive development, some of our friends in our immediate neighborhood have expressed concerns that this opening may be pursued at their expense.

Regrettably, a zero-sum mentality has been prevalent both in our region and around the world, and some may have even grown accustomed to taking advantage of hostility to Iran to pursue their interests. Still, I wish to reiterate that the Islamic Republic of Iran does not have any such illusions. We recognize that we cannot promote our interests at the expense of others. This is particularly the case in relation to counterparts so close to us that their security and stability are intertwined with ours.

Thus, notwithstanding the focus on our interactions with the West, the reality is that our primary foreign policy priority is our region.

Few things are constant in international politics, but geography is among them. A country cannot change its neighbors. In our interconnected world, the fate of one nation is tied to the destinies of its neighbors. The body of water that separates us from our southern neighbors is not just a waterway—it is our shared lifeline. All of us depend on it, not just for survival, but to thrive. With our fates so closely tied together, the belief that one’s interests can be pursued without consideration of the interests of others is delusional.

As the turmoil in our region evidences, no country is an island. Prosperity cannot be pursued at the expense of others’ poverty, and security cannot be achieved at the expense of the security of others. We will either win together or lose together. We are capable of working together, trusting one another, combining our potential, and building a more secure and prosperous region.

Sadly, the model for security and stability that has to date been imposed on our region has been one based on competition, rivalry and the formation of competing blocs. The only outcome has been the fostering of fresh imbalances and the emergence of unrealized or unstated ambitions that have repeatedly menaced the region over the past three decades.

So how do we move forward?

We must pinpoint areas of common interest and shared objectives. Then, we must find cooperative methods for achieving and maintaining those objectives.

There is far more that joins us than separates us. We need to have a sober appreciation of the fact that we have common interests and face common threats, and that we need to deal with common challenges and can make use of common opportunities. In short, we have a common destiny.

We all have an interest in preventing tension in our region, curbing extremism and terrorism, promoting harmony between various Islamic sects, preserving our territorial integrity, assuring our political independence, ensuring the free flow of oil, and protecting our shared environment. These are absolute imperatives for our common security and development.

To reverse the vicious cycle of suspicion and mistrust and move forward—to build confidence, and join forces in striving to build a better, more secure and more prosperous future for our children—it is imperative that we keep three points in mind.

First, it is crucial that we build an inclusive framework for confidence and cooperation in this strategic region. Any exclusion will be the seed of future mistrust, tension and crisis. The core of any wider regional arrangement should be limited to the eight littoral states. Inclusion of other states will bring with it other complex issues, overshadowing the immediate problems of this region and further complicating the complex nature of security, as well as cooperation among us.

Naturally, there are legitimate concerns about potential imbalances and asymmetries that might arise within a new system. Concerns about the domination or imposition of the views of any single country or group of countries must be taken into account and addressed. To build an inclusive system based on mutual respect and the principle of non-interference, we should envisage arrangements within the framework of the United Nations. The necessary institutional framework has already been provided in Security Council Resolution 598, which ended the disastrous war imposed by Saddam Hussein on Iran, Iraq and the entire region.

Second, we need to be clear that while our cooperation is not at the expense of any other party, and will in fact promote greater security for all, we are very much cognizant of the variety of interests involved in our region. The waterway that divides us is vital for the world, but the source of its importance is not identical for all actors. For us littoral states, it is our lifeline. For those who are dependent on us as major suppliers of their energy requirements, it constitutes a major element in their economic and industrial wellbeing. In contrast, for those who do not depend on our energy resources, our region is merely an important theater for extending their control in the international political arena and in international economic competition. Hence, we must bear in mind that there is a qualitative difference between the interests of the various players involved, and act accordingly.

Third, the international element of the instability in our region stems from the divergence of the nature of the interests of various outside powers and their competition. Their injection of extraneous issues only complicates an already complex security situation further. We must not forget that the paramount interest of such outside players may not always be stability, but in fact may depend on what can justify their presence. The presence of foreign forces has historically resulted in domestic instability within the countries hosting them and exacerbated the existing tensions between these countries and other regional states.

I am convinced that there is a genuine will to discuss these common challenges. The challenges and opportunities that we face are enormous. They range from environmental degradation to sectarian tension, from extremism and terrorism to arms control and disarmament, and from tourism and economic and cultural cooperation to confidence-building and security-enhancing measures. We must aim to initiate dialogue that results in practical and gradually expanding steps.

Iran, content with its size, geography, and human and natural resources, and enjoying common bonds of religion, history and culture with its neighbors, has not attacked anyone in nearly three centuries. We extend our hand in friendship and Islamic solidarity to our neighbors, assuring them that they can count on us as a reliable partner.

In our recent presidential election, which was a proud manifestation of the ability of an Islamic model of democracy to bring about change through the ballot box, my government received a strong popular mandate to engage in constructive interaction with the world, and particularly with our neighbors. We are dedicated to making use of this mandate to instigate change for the better, but we cannot do it alone. Now, more than ever, is the time to join hands to work towards securing a better fate for all of us; a destiny based on the noble principles of mutual respect and non-interference. We are taking the first steps towards this objective. We hope you will join us in this difficult, but rewarding, path.

Source: Asharq Al-Awsat
http://www.aawsat.net/

The article Iran FM Zarif: Our Neighbors Are Our Priority – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By RFE RL

(RFE/RL) — President Barack Obama has pushed back at critics of the new international nuclear agreement with Iran.

Speaking in San Francisco, Obama accused critics of playing political games instead of backing what was best for American security.

“Tough talk and bluster may be the easy thing to do politically, but it’s not the right thing for our security,” Obama said.

Obama was speaking following criticism from American ally Israel, as well as some lawmakers from the U.S. Republican Party, alleging that the deal hands advantages to Iran and weakens world pressure on the Islamic republic.

The agreement between Iran and six world powers, reached during talks in Geneva, calls for the suspension of parts of Iran’s nuclear program.

In exchange, Iran will receive some relief from economic sanctions that have crippled the Iranian economy, impacting millions of ordinary Iranians, and forced the reduction of Iranian oil exports, a key revenue source.

The deal has been given a timeframe of six months, so that Iran and the world powers – the United States, Russia, France, Germany, China and Britain – will have time to negotiate what’s envisioned as a permanent settlement.

In his remarks November 25, Obama praised the pact as halting Iran’s nuclear “progress,” saying “key parts of the program will be rolled back.”

He hailed the deal as a victory for diplomacy, saying the agreement will give Washington and Tehran an opportunity to “chip away at the mistrust” that has existed for many years between the two countries.

“If Iran seizes this opportunity and chooses to join the global community, then we can begin to chip away at the mistrust that’s existed for many, many years between our two nations,” Obama said.

“None of that’s going to be easy, huge challenges remain. But we cannot close the door on diplomacy.”

Obama said he intends to push forward with negotiations in the coming months to find a lasting resolution to the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program, which is suspected by Washington and its allies of being used to develop an atomic weapon.

Iran denies pursuing an atomic weapons program, saying its nuclear development is for energy production and medical uses.

“International inspectors will have unprecedented access to Iran’s nuclear-related facilities, so this will help Iran from building a nuclear weapon,” Obama said.

“Over the coming months, we’re going to continue our diplomacy with the goal of achieving a comprehensive solution that deals with the threat of Iran’s nuclear program once and for all.”

Earlier, officials in the European Union said the bloc was likely to lift some sanctions on Iran by the end of the year or in January.

Western officials have emphasized, however, that sanctions can be reapplied if Iran fails to fulfill its obligations.

Under the deal, Iran has agreed not to enrich uranium beyond 5 percent, and also to “neutralize” stockpiles of uranium that have been enriched to 20 percent purity, or close to weapons-grade.

Iran also agreed not to install more enrichment centrifuges, nor to commission the Arak heavy-water reactor, which could produce plutonium.

The deal also gives United Nations inspectors improved access to the Natanz and Fordow nuclear sites.

In return, Iran is to receive sanctions relief estimated to be worth about $7 billion in sectors including petrochemicals and precious metals. The United States and its allies have also pledged not to impose fresh sanctions for six months.

The article Obama Defends Iran Nuclear Deal appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By IDSA

By Pushpita Das

It’s been five years since 10 terrorists from Pakistan landed on the shores of Mumbai on the night of November 26, 2008 and carried out multiple attacks in the city exposing serious shortcomings in the country’s coastal security apparatus. So shocked were the mandarins in New Delhi that a day after the carnage ended, they hurriedly decided that the Indian coast guard should be responsible for guarding the entire coastline of the country. However, two months later they revised the decision and on February 9th, 2009, they roped in the Indian navy and entrusted it with the responsibility for the overall maritime security including coastal security. The Indian coast guard was given the additional responsibility of guarding the territorial waters right till the shoreline. A decision was also taken to augment the strength and presence of marine police along the coast. Thus a three tier security arrangement for coastal security was formally put in place with the Indian navy guarding the outer tier, the Indian coast guard patrolling the intermediate layer and the marine police patrolling the shallow and inland waters.

This arrangement looks perfect on paper, but it has not translated itself satisfactorily on the ground and therefore the coastal security mechanism remains weak. One of the reasons for the failure is that the three-tier structure has made it difficult to hold any organisation solely responsible in case any untoward incident takes place as every organisation has arguments in its defence. For instance, the Indian navy argues that while it has been entrusted with the overall responsibility for coastal security, it does not have the power to task all the concerned organisations or command their resources for everyday coastal security duties and therefore should not be held responsible. Similarly, the Indian coast guard argues that it has been given the responsibility only for coordinating with the concerned central and state agencies for coastal security but not made in charge of coastal security. The marine police’s argument is that since the Indian navy and the Indian coast guard are guarding the outer and intermediate waters, it is their responsibility to prevent any intrusions into the coastal waters from outside and therefore should not be held accountable in case of any incident.

Furthermore, the involvement of a number of organisations in coastal security duties has proven to be counterproductive. Presently, in addition to the roles of the three organisations highlighted above, others such as the Customs Department (marine-preventive) and the Central Industrial Security Force (marine wing) have also been made part of the coastal security architecture. Since these tasks require the conduct of sea patrols in their respective areas of jurisdiction, these organisations have started procuring marine assets such as interceptor boats. The problem with such a step is while the Indian navy and the Indian coast guard possess the technical knowledge and manpower as well as infrastructure to handle these boats, the marine police, CISF and Customs department have barely any. As a result these expensive assets are either not being used for want of technical manpower or sent away for repairs because of mishandling. Thus, national resources are getting frittered away on assets which are not giving any substantive returns.

The involvement of several organisations in coastal security has also led to coordination problems among them. The tendency of each of the concerned organisations to zealously guard its own turf, reluctance to work under or along with other organisations citing differing organisational culture and goals, and propensity to hold on to intelligence, have all prevented the coastal security arrangement from working effectively. Even though a number of measures such as the formulation of standard operating procedures, conduct of joint coastal security exercises, establishment of joint operation centres and setting up of coordination committees have been undertaken, these have not proven adequate for overcoming the strong forces of dissonance among these organisations.

Most importantly, the organisations involved in coastal security suffer from inadequate capabilities in terms of manpower, assets, presence, and mind-set. For example, the Indian navy’s objectives have been to defend the coasts during war time and force projection. And over the years it has developed its force structure accordingly. As a result, today it has neither the assets nor the mind-set to undertake coastal security duties. Similarly, the marine police continue to grapple with manpower and asset shortage and their growth remains contingent upon the interest of the coastal states. Those coastal states which do not see any threat emanating from the sea have not given adequate attention to the development of the marine police, but even in those where sea-borne threat perception is high, the performance of the marine police is extremely poor. This is evident from the recent Comptroller and Auditor General’s (CAG) reports, which revealed that in Gujarat, the shortfall in sea patrolling conducted by the marine police is 78 to 91 per cent, while in Kerala it is 95 per cent. Also the mind-set that the police are a land based organisation has not helped.

Given all these, it is only prudent to designate a single organisation for coastal security. The Indian coast guard is well suited for shouldering the responsibility as it has the training, tradition and the mind-set. The Indian coast guard has been functioning as the national authority for Offshore Security Coordination Committee (OSCC), national authority for maritime search and rescue, lead intelligence agency for coastal borders and the coordinating agency for coastal security. Also unlike the Indian navy, it has a strong presence along the entire coastline of the country and has established good working relationships with concerned organisations as well as with fishermen. Therefore, the Government of India should designate the Indian coast guard as the single authority responsible for coastal security. Accordingly, the charter of the ICG should be duly amended, and the force should be strengthened and trained. The Indian navy should be eased out from coastal security responsibilities, and allowed to concentrate on developing its blue water capabilities and defending the country during times of war. It appears that the kneejerk reaction of the Government following the ‘Mumbai 26 attacks’ to entrust coastal security responsibilities to the Indian coast guard, after all, had some merit to it.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiaCoastalSecurity_pdas_261113

The article India’s Coastal Security: Time For Course Correction – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Eurasia Review

How is the bond between people in love maintained? Scientists at the Bonn University Medical Center have discovered a biological mechanism that could explain the attraction between loving couples: If oxytocin is administered to men and if they are shown pictures of their partner, the bonding hormone stimulates the reward center in the brain, increasing the attractiveness of the partner, and strengthening monogamy.

The results are published in the “Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences” (PNAS).

Monogamy is not very widespread among mammals; human beings represent an exception. Comparatively many couples of the species Homo sapiens have no other partners in a love relationship.

For a long time, science has therefore been trying to discover the unknown forces that cause loving couples to be faithful.

“An important role in partner bonding is played by the hormone oxytocin, which is secreted in the brain”, says Prof. Dr. René Hurlemann, Executive Senior Physician at the Inpatient and Outpatient Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy of the Bonn University Medical Center. A team of scientists at the University of Bonn under the direction of Prof. Hurlemann and with participation by researchers at the Ruhr University of Bochum and the University of Chengdu (China) examined the effect of the “bonding hormone” more precisely.

Oxytocin makes the partner more attractive

The researchers showed pictures of their female partners to a total of 40 heterosexual men who were in a permanent relationship – and pictures of other women for comparison. First a dose of oxytocin was administered to the subjects in a nasal spray; and then a placebo at a later date. Furthermore, the scientists also studied the brain activity of the subjects with the help of functional magnetic resonance tomography.

“When the men received oxytocin instead of the placebo, their reward system in the brain when viewing the partner was very active, and they perceived them as more attractive than the other women”, says lead author Dirk Scheele.

In another series of tests, the researchers tested whether oxytocin enhances the activation of the reward system only when seeing the partner or whether there is a similar effect with pictures of acquaintances and female work colleagues of many years.

“The activation of the reward system with the aid of oxytocin had a very selective effect with the pictures of the partners”, says psychologist Dirk Scheele. “We did not detect this effect with pictures of longstanding acquaintances”.

Based on these results, therefore, simple familiarity is not enough to stimulate the bonding effect. They have to be loving couples; of that the scientists are convinced.

Biological mechanism of couple relationships acts like a drug

Overall the data showed that oxytocin activates the reward system, thus maintaining the bond between the lovers and promoting monogamy.

“This biological mechanism in a couple relationship is very similar to a drug”, says Prof. Hurlemann. Both in love and in taking drugs, people are striving to stimulate the reward system in the brain.

“This could also explain why people fall into depression or deep mourning after a separation from their partner: Due to the lack of oxytocin secretion, the reward system is understimulated, and is more or less in a withdrawal state”, says Prof. Hurlemann.

However, therapy with the bonding hormone could possibly be counterproductive: Administration of oxytocin could possibly even increase the suffering, because it would only make the longing for the beloved partner even greater.

At first glance, monogamy does not make much sense. In the classical view of evolutionary biology, men have an advantage when they disseminate their genes as greatly as possible through many different partners.

But another aspect also plays a big role: “When oxytocin strengthens the partner bond, it increases the stability of the persons providing nutrition and thus the chances of survival for the progeny”, explains Prof. Hurlemann. And a person’s genes are in turn further disseminated through the children.

The article Oxytocin Leads To Monogamy appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By SATP

By Ajai Sahni

India’s capacity for self-deception is extreme, and this constitutes the gravest threat to national security. The state’s counterterrorism (CT) ‘policies’ have been based principally on political posturing, and not on objective and urgent considerations of strategy and response. — An Enveloping Blindness

Five years have now passed since the devastating terrorist attacks in Mumbai on November 26, 2008 (26/11), and the protracted counter-terrorist (CT) debacles that ensued. There were resounding declarations of determination to fight terrorism, promises that such an incident would “never again” be allowed to happen, policy commitments to a “zero tolerance of terrorism”, and an immediate suspension of the dialogue with Pakistan ‘until the infrastructure of terrorism’ in that country had been completely dismantled and the architects and planners of the 26/11 attacks had been punished.

Within months, however, India was importunately approaching Pakistan for a restoration of the ‘dialogue’ between the two countries, despite the fact that Pakistan had done nothing whatsoever to comply with even the most minimal of India’s terms, and was, indeed, visibly protecting the principal conspirators in this case, including Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, the Amir of the banned (and hence, legally invisible) Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jamaat-ud-Dawa, as well as identified officers within the country’s military intelligence agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).

Worse, the many promises about CT reform and ‘strengthening internal security’ translated into little more than high profile political gambits that sought to manipulate public perceptions, rather than to address the core issues of capacity and capability. Unsurprisingly, after three-and-a-half years of heading India’s Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA), P. Chidambaram, towards the end of his tenure, reiterated the assessment he had given a year after 26/11 – that India remained as vulnerable to terrorist attack as it was on that fateful day. There has been no evidence to suggest that this assessment requires any amendment in the past year under Chidambaram’s lusterless successor, Sushil Kumar Shinde.

Indeed, if the language and content of the latest addresses by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Union Home Minister Shinde, at the Conference of Directors General of Police, on November 22 and 23 are anything to go by, the entire impetus of CT and internal security reform has been lost. The Prime Minister, it appears, has also lost the speech-writer who drafted his dramatic statement at the Conference of Chief Ministers on April 5, 2005, where he declared, “There can be no political compromise with terror. No inch conceded. No compassion shown… There are no good terrorists and bad terrorists. There is no cause, root or branch, that can ever justify the killing of innocent people. No democratic Government can tolerate the use of violence against innocent people and against the functionaries of a duly established democratic Government.” Now, however, a dispirited, Prime Minister heading a Government crippled by scandal and a mounting financial and political crises, merely waiting out his term till the General Elections due before May 2014, told the “important conference” of Police leaders, “I don’t know if I have anything new to say on this occasion,” and proceeded to read out a tired and tedious bureaucratic assessment of the various internal security challenges facing the country. Beyond exhortations to find ‘creative solutions’, to ‘minimize vulnerabilities’, and to ‘tackle all these issues with collective resolve and firm determination’ there is not a single phrase that inspires confidence or indicates clearly that the Government has, or is evolving, a coherent CT strategy.

The visible manifestation of terrorist and armed extremist violence have, of course, declined dramatically over the past years for a wide range of extraneous reasons. Total fatalities related to terrorism and insurgency across the country have dropped from 2,619 in 2008, to 803 in 2012, and presently stand at 791 in 2013 (all data till November 24, 2013). More specifically, Pakistan-backed Islamist terrorism has registered a sharp drop, both in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) and across India. 541 fatalities were recorded in J&K in 2008, and just 117 in 2012, though there has been a spike in the current year, with 172 already killed. 366 fatalities related to Pakistan-backed terrorism outside J&K had been recorded in 2008 – including the 195 killed in the 26/11 attacks (according to South Asia Terrorism Portal data); the number collapsed to just three in 2009; rose again to 20 in 2010, and 42 in 2011; just one fatality was recorded in 2012; but the toll registered another small surge in 2013, with the total standing at 24, as on November 24.

Worryingly, however, the pattern of attacks, arrests and seizures have exposed a network that is evidently spreading into areas that had earlier remained outside the ambit of Islamist extremist mobilization. Patna, the capital of Bihar, thus recorded its first serial bomb blasts on October 27, 2013, killing eight persons, including one of the bombers, and injuring at least 100. On July 7, 2013, Bihar also recorded the first ever attack on a Buddhist target in India, when 10 low intensity blasts shook the Mabodhi Temple complex at Bodh Gaya, one of the most sacred sites of the Faith. The Gaya blasts were also the first Islamist terrorist attacks in Bihar. Investigations into the Patna blasts also discovered a strong IM module in the neighbouring Jharkhand State.

Islamist terrorism also inflicted its major attack (resulting in three or more fatalities) in Madhya Pradesh, when motorcycle-borne Indian Mujahiddeen (IM) terrorists shot three persons dead, including a Madhya Pradesh Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) trooper, in the Teen Pulia area of Khandwa on November 28, 2009.

Unsurprisingly, Syed Asif Ibrahim, the Director of India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB), speaking on November 21, 2013, at the Conference of Directors General of Police, warned, “The LeT and IM have enlarged their network and developed capabilities to carry out acts of terror at short notice in various parts of the country… Evidence gathered from various cases indicates Pakistan continues to nurture terrorist groups…”

The declining trends in terrorist violence and the exposure and neutralization of significant Islamist terrorist networks can, at least in part, be attributed to the extraordinary efforts exerted by the existing intelligence and enforcement agencies, despite the paralyzing deficits that continue to afflict them. Crucially, partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal indicates that at least 929 persons involved in Islamist terrorism and extremism – including LeT and IM cadres, as well as ISI agents, and Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Nepali nationals – have been arrested outside J&K since the 26/11 attacks; 141 of these persons have, thus far, been arrested in 2013 alone.

A significant aspect of several recent arrests has been the degree to which foreign intelligence and enforcement agencies – including many that tended to look the other way at Pakistani and Islamist terrorist mobilisation and mischief in the past – have increasingly cooperated with India. Some significant actions that involved support from foreign agencies include the arrest of IM operative Fasih Mohammad (deported from Saudi Arabia and subsequently arrested at Delhi’s Indira Gandhi International Airport on October 22, 2012) – Fasih Mohammad was a suspect in the April 17, 2010, Chinnaswamy Stadium (Bangalore, Karnataka) blast case, and the September 19, 2010, Jama Masjid (Delhi) shooting case; the arrest of LeT operative Abu Hamza alias Sayeed Zabi ud Deen alias Zabi Ansari alias Riyasat Ali alias Abu Jundal, the 26/11 attacks handler, arrested on June 21, 2012, after being extradited from Saudi Arabia; and LeT terrorist A. Rayees, deported from Saudi Arabia and arrested on October 6, 2012, named as the third accused in the case of the seizure of explosives at Malayalamkunnu under Chakkarakkal in the Kannur District of Kerala, in 2009.

Indian security agencies arrested three top terrorists – Yasin Bhatkal aka Mohammad Ahmed Siddibappa Zarrar aka Imran aka Asif aka Shahrukh; Asadullah Akhtar aka Haddi; and Abdul Karim Tunda – from the Indian State of Bihar along the Indo-Nepal Border in the month of August, 2013. These arrests reconfirmed the fact that the Indo-Nepal Border has long provided safe passage to terror groups operating on Indian soil under the direct patronage of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).

These successes, however, do not reflect any dramatic improvements in CT capabilities over the past five years. Despite massive increases in the expenditure on internal security, capacity augmentation has been no more than marginal, and most state agencies continue to struggle with manpower, technology and resource deficits that are little different from the situation in 2008.

Significantly, for instance, the annual budgetary allocation for the UMHA has escalated dramatically since 26/1, more than doubling, from INR 254.39 billion in 2008-09, to 592.41 billion in 2013-14. A detailed breakdown of this expenditure is not available, nor is any detailed assessment of its components possible here. It is useful, however, to take an overview of some of the most pressing heads and commitments made post-26/11, to see the sheer magnitude of implementation failure.

One of the proudest ‘achievements’ of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government was the creation of the National Investigation Agency (NIA) within a month of the 26/11 attacks. The legislation to establish the agency had been bulldozed through Parliament in an atmosphere of hysteria, with the promise that the NIA would be “like the FBI”, America’s Federal Bureau of Investigation, and would play a crucial role in ‘fighting terrorism’. The commitments were manifestly dishonest, even as the legislation to establish NIA pushed beyond the limits of India’s Constitution. Nearly five years after its establishment, the NIA has little to show in terms of quantifiable CT impact. The NIA has a sanctioned strength of 650 officers – yielding an investigative caseload that can only be the envy of most investigative agencies in the States. Just 72 “important” cases of terrorism have been cherry-picked for investigation by the NIA, and chargesheets have been filed in just 32 of these. Three persons have been convicted in two of these cases. Many of the investigations ‘taken over’ by the NIA had already been at least partially completed by State agencies. The cumulative CT impact of the NIA – if at all measurable – would at best be negligible. It is useful to note that the total strength of all Crime Investigation Departments (CID) in the State Police across the country stood at 11,729 personnel in 2011; they were intended to handle as many as 6,252,729 offences registered that year, yielding a ratio of 533.09 cases per officer (it is no surprise that most of these cases go uninvestigated).

The promise to set up a national database for terrorism and crime has made little headway. The task of creating such a database was handed over to the Multi Agency Centre (MAC) in the Intelligence Bureau, but the critical element of implementation – the creation of networks linking up all the Police Stations in the country – lay within the jurisdiction of the States. The project was expectedly beset with many difficulties relating to software and hardware architecture (as, indeed, has been the case with such databases globally), but the core of the project, a database linking all IB units in the country, was eventually established towards mid-2012. However, the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS) project, which was intended to link up all Police Stations, and which received sanction on June 19, 2009, is yet to take off, with several States failing even to initiate first steps. Crucially, the CCTNS project is a reinvention of the PolNet (Police Network) project, which was sanctioned as far back as 1996, with the same objective of linking the Police Stations across the country. INR 2.76 billion has been allocated for the CCTNS project in 2013-14, but most observers believe it will take years before the network is ready.

The NATGRID project, which was intended to integrate 21 existing databases – including banking, finance, and transportation databases – and which the Government claimed would help ‘fight terrorism’, has also failed to take off. NATGRID’s potential impact on terrorism is, moreover, debatable, and its efficacy has been questioned even by the IB. Crucially, sources indicate that the project is “several months to several years” away from providing real-time access to existing Government databases, or to identifying suspicious transactions.

The Government has, of course, implemented the decision to establish ‘hubs’ of the elite National Security Guard (NSG) in four major metropolitan centres but the utility of this move has always been in question. Further, the hubs are functioning under acute limitations for training and readiness of Forces, and the NSG has a critical leadership shortfall, with a deficit of over 22 per cent in its sanctioned strength of officers.

Both the Prime Minister and successive Home Ministers have spoken a great deal about ‘bringing the beat constable into the vortex of our CT strategy’, and have repeatedly emphasised the necessity of enormously strengthening general policing capabilities. Bringing the Police-population ratio in line with international norms has been a crucial element in this context. And yet, this ratio has risen from 128 per 100,000 in 2008, to no more than 138 per 100,000 in 2012, as against a general norm of 220 per 100,000 for ‘peacetime policing’, with some Western countries maintaining ratios above 500 per 100,000. There is no evidence whatsoever of any significant change in the very poor manpower profile of the Police Forces, or in their training and capabilities. Mumbai, today, has the same Police that so dramatically failed to protect the city against the 26/11 attacks; the State Police across much of the country, moreover, is measurably worse in terms of resources, capacities and capabilities.

While some augmentation in strength of the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) has occurred, there is increasing evidence of rising neglect. Thus, the total sanctioned strength of the CAPFs rose from 838,893 in 2008, to just 906,504 in 2012. Worse, the CAPFs are suffering from sweeping resource cuts, even though they play a critical role in CT and counter-insurgency (CI) across the country. Shortly after 26/11, a ‘modernization plan’ for the CAPFs was announced, with a total allocation of INR 41.85 billion, to acquire the latest weapons, surveillance and communication equipment, vehicles, body protection gear, etc. But only a fraction of these financial commitments have actually been met. Thus, the CAPFs sought INR 23.60 billion for 2013 for their CT-CI and border control acquisitions; the MHA released just INR 900 million. The Central Reserve Police Force had raised a demand of INR 8.73 billion, but was sanctioned just INR 200 million. The Border Security Force (BSF) sought INR 6.94 billion, but received just INR 200 million.

The IB, the Centre’s principal CT bulwark, continued to function at a total strength of 18,795 in March 2012, at a 30 per cent deficit against its meagre sanctioned strength of 26,876 personnel. Any augmentation since, would, at best, be insignificant.

With the breach in Mumbai 26/11 coming from the sea, there was enormous rhetorical focus on strengthening coastal security, and much has been claimed by Governments thereafter of measures taken to secure this objective. Five years later, however, it would be necessary to concede that, fitful efforts notwithstanding, we remain as vulnerable to terrorist attacks along our coastline as we were in 2008.

The latest and dramatic evidence of this vulnerability came with the discovery of the 390 tonne Seaman Guard Ohio, owned by a private US firm, AdvanFort, which its commander admitted had been functioning undetected as an illegal ‘floating armoury’ for merchant vessels in Indian territorial waters for 45 days prior to its detention 10 nautical miles off Tuticorin along the Tamil Nadu coastline, on October 12, 2013. 35 weapons, including 34 rifles, one pistol and ammunition were recovered from the vessel. The vessel was supposedly checked and found clean when it had berthed on August 23, 2013, at Kochi in Kerala, suggesting, either, that the inspection was far from thorough, or that the arms had been acquired in Indian waters before the vessel reached the point of its interception.

Clearly, a terrorist attempt to pass through Indian waters to a target port would take considerably less than 45 days of undetected movement.

There have been a number of such breaches over the past years, the most dramatic of these being three incidents in 2011, when three massive vessels simply drifted into Mumbai, completely unnoticed by the purportedly enhanced vigilance exercised by Naval, Coast Guard and Marine Police patrols, as well as by the numerous Coastal Police Stations, check-posts, outposts and land patrols that had been established after 26/11. On June 12, 2011, thus, a Singapore-flagged cargo ship, MV Wisdom, en route to Alang in Gujarat, drifted towards the Mumbai Coast after breaking its tug, and eventually ran aground on the very busy Juhu Beach in the heart of Mumbai, at which stage it was noticed by citizens, long before any security agency took cognizance of it. Again, on July 30, 2011, a Panama flagged ship, MV Pavit, which had been abandoned by its crew a month earlier near Oman, drifted onto the same Juhu Beach in Mumbai. Very quickly thereafter, on August 4, 2011, an oil tanker, MV Rak, again from Panama, with 60,000 metric tonnes of coal and 340 tonnes of fuel oil on board, entered Indian waters unchallenged, and sank just 20 nautical miles off the Mumbai coast, causing a major oil spill.

If Mumbai itself, the target of the 26/11 attacks, remains so open to the undetected movement, not of little fishing vessel or dhows, but of massive commercial sea transports, it must be abundantly clear that India’s 7,516 kilometre long coastline and over two million square kilometre Exclusive Economic Zone, across nine states, dotted with 13 major and 185 minor ports, remains entirely susceptible to terrorist attack even today.

Official sources insist that there has been “significant increase in the coastal surveillance patrols by Naval and Coast guard ships and aircraft”, and that four Joint Operations Centres have been established by the Navy at Mumbai, Vishakhapatnam, Kochi and Port Blair, to ensure coordination between the Navy, Coast Guard and State Marine Police. Numerous coastal police stations and posts have been established, and many high speed vessels have been purchased and deployed.

While substantial expenditures have certainly been incurred on these various initiatives, the systems are far from functional and effective. A CAG report released in July 2013 further compounded a critique of failing systems that the same organisation had submitted to Parliament in 2011. The 2013 was scathing in its observations on procurement, ageing vessels and manpower shortages, noting “72 per cent of the fast patrol vessels (FPVs)/inshore patrol vessels (IPVs), 47 per cent of the advanced offshore patrol vessels (AOPVs) and 37 interceptor boats (IBs) were either on extended life or their extended life had expired…” Many of the coastal Police Stations and Posts sanctioned had not been established. Sea patrolling was a fraction of the prescribed frequency, and there had been no night flying. “Out of the 50 CCPs [Coastal check-posts] and COPs [Costal outposts] completed, 36 remained non-operational as police personnel were not deployed…”

Worse, even if all these measures had been fully implemented and operational efficiencies ensured, we would remain as vulnerable. The very core of any effective system of coastal defence is not the number of patrols, but the capacity to detect and interdict the entry and illegal movement of ships and boats in Indian waters. In the immediate aftermath of 26/11, the necessity of fitting GPS devices on all boats and fishing vessels plying in the high seas, a protocol for registration of routes of each vessel, and a surveillance and radar system to identify any illegal entrants and deviant vessel, had been repeatedly emphasised. No such system is yet in place, and even the “satellite-based vessels tracking and warning device system, sanctioned at a cost of Rs 46.16 crore in May 2008, to caution fishermen before approaching international boundary, was not established.”

India’s coastline is vast; there are tens of thousands of vessels, large and small, at sea in Indian waters each day; unless there is a GPS tagging system to identify those whose presence is legitimate, it is impossible, irrespective of the intensity of patrolling, to identify the interloper or deviant. The process of securing India’s coastline, consequently, is yet to begin.

It is impossible, here, to make any detailed evaluation of CT-CI capabilities and responses in the States, but recent terrorist attacks in Patna (October 27, 2013); Bodh Gaya (July 7, 2013); Bangalore (April 17, 2013); and Hyderabad (February 21, 2013), have again and again provided evidence of unpreparedness and inadequacy of response. While limited, and often purely symbolic, augmentations have fitfully occurred in some of the States, their cumulative impact remains inconsequential.

The cumulative deficits of capacity and capability that have been built into India’s intelligence and security apparatus are so great that they would require a massive and sustained commitment of resources and purpose, before they reach the critical mass necessary to have a measurable impact on the country’s vulnerabilities to terrorism. The present Government has demonstrated neither the vision nor the will for such a commitment. The country has been fortunate that the attention of its adversaries has, for some time, been turned elsewhere. But India cannot think itself secure if her only defence remains a reliance on the inattention of her enemies.

Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, ICM & SATP

The article India: CT Programmed To Fail – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By SATP

By Fakir Mohan Pradhan

People generally believed that the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M) would be weakened electorally due to the split in the party in June 2012, but no one predicted a rout. After the announcement of results of most of the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system seats, UCPN-M is all set to be the sore loser in the just concluded elections for the second Constituent Assembly (CA) in Nepal. The final results are, of course, yet to be announced, but the trends are already clear, and the available results put UCPN-M in a distant third position, behind the Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML).

Results have already been announced for all 240 FPTP seats, with NC bagging 105 seats, followed by CPN-UML with 91 seats. UCPN-M stood at a poor third, with just 26 seats. The polls witnessed an unexpectedly high voter turnout with nearly 70 per cent of more than 12 million registered voters casting their votes.

The Madhesi parties also did rather badly, with Madhesi Janadhikar Forum-Democratic (MJF-D) securing just four seats; Terai Madhes Loktantrik Party (TMLP) another four; and Madhesi Janadhikar Forum-Nepal (MJF-N), two. Counting for the Proportional Representation (PR) system seats is currently underway, with more than half the total votes yet to be counted, but it is unlikely that UCPN-M will make a particularly strong show here, though an authoritative projection is difficult at the present stage. Significantly, UCPN-M Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda, himself lost the Kathmandu-10 seat, which he had won with a high margin in the previous CA election. Prachanda did, however, manage a barely face-saving victory from the Siraha-5 constituency, with a slender margin of just 900 votes over his nearest CPN-UML rival. In 2008, Prachanda had taken the Kathmandu-10 seat with nearly twice the number of votes of his nearest NC rival.

Significantly, the UCPN was the largest single party in the previous (2008) CA, with 120 FPTP, 100 PR and nine nominated seats, a total of 229 in a 601 strong CA; its nearest rival, NC, had just 115 seats, and the UCPN, 108.

The current CA elections could be organised only after many hiccups and delays, on November 19, after the first CA had failed to draft a new Constitution for Nepal. The second CA is also to have 601 members, out of which 240 members are to be decided by the FPTP system, 335 by the PR system, and the remaining 26 are to be nominated.

Earlier, the Mohan Baiday-led Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-Maoist), which had threatened to disrupt the polls, announced a 10-day transport strike and general shutdown across the country, beginning November 11. The party did manage to disrupt transport services for a majority of the strike days in many parts of the country, but there was little violence, particularly in view of the far greater apprehensions, with just one fatality – a truck driver in Kathmandu in a petrol bomb attack. Another boy lost his hand when he unknowingly opened a bag containing explosives. On polling day, however, people came out to vote in large numbers. Significantly, the Army was deployed for the first time to ensure security during the polls. At the end of the strike, Baidya had nothing to show, other than the claim that the election had been held by “misusing all state powers”, and would not deliver a new constitution. He insisted that only dialogue among political forces and a national political consensus could bail the country out of its current problems.

There was little disruption or violence, other than sporadic and minor incidents, during the voting process, but the political problem started as soon as Prachanda’s results and the broad trend demonstrating the UCPN-M’s rout came to be known. While no such claims had been made during the course or immediate aftermath of polling, the UCPN-M began to question the integrity of the process after its defeat was apparent. The party alleged that ballot boxes were ‘changed midway’ while being transported from the polling booths to the counting centres. On November 21, Prachanda threatened, “We will not accept any irregularities and conspiracy to subvert the will of the people. We will start a people’s movement against this subversion… If the counting is not stopped immediately, we will not associate ourselves with the electoral process and will stay away from the new Constituent Assembly. Let the Election Commission (EC) and the political parties take this seriously.”

Unfortunately for the UCPN-M, however, the EC as well as international observers – including Jimmy Carter – have vouched that the polls were both free and fair poll. The EC naturally rejected the demand for suspending counting, and advised that any ‘aggrieved party’ could approach the Supreme Court if there were any irregularities in the polls. On November 24, a meeting held between UCPN-M Chairman Prachanda and leaders of other losing parties, including the Madhesi People´s Rights Forum-Nepal (MPRF-N) Chairman Upendra Yadav and Federal Socialist Party (FSP) Chairman Ashok Rai, decided to hold talks with EC officials over the “irregularities.”

The election result is, of course, a stinging rejection by the people of the disruptive, intimidatory and violent politics of the Maoist formations in Nepal. The humiliating electoral loss, however, has revived the spectre of an intractable impasse, and a possible revival of violence, that the elections had been intended to resolve. Raising acute apprehensions, Prachanda held an informal meeting with CPN-Maoist leader Mohan Baidya on November 24, along with other leaders including UCPN-M’s Baburam Bhattarai, and General Secretary Ram Bahadur Thapa and leader Dev Gurung of the CPN-Maoist. Baidya is reported to have advised Prachanda to stay away from the CA.

Utterly marginalized by the electoral outcome, UCPN-M leaders are now of the opinion that the party must stay away from the Government and CA, and should unconditionally reject the poll verdict, demanding a thorough investigation of alleged irregularities. Encouragingly, however, the Party’s ideologue and former Prime Minister, Baburam Bhattarai, on November 23, hinted at continuing the commitment to peaceful resolution of issues, despite the poor showing in the election, declaring: “We will continue to use such legitimate body (CA), as the agendas raised by our Party are still at the centre of national politics.”

As for the Mohan Baidya-led CPN-Maoist, the road ahead looks bleak as the party lost whatever limited sympathy it had by attempting to disrupt the polls. Worse, the elections exposed the party’s bluff , in seeking to defer polls indefinitely, in an effort to bring the group to the centre-stage of Nepal’s political structure, just as the undivided CPN-Maoist had done under Prachanda’s leadership in the run-up to the first CA election. This strategy has, of course, now gone haywire, and the group can only hope to salvage a modicum of relevance by uniting with the UCPN-M.

The outlook is rather bleak for the Madhesi parties as well. These groups had emerged as a potent political force after the First CA election, but lost the plot after split into nearly 30 disparate and quarrelsome parties. Unsurprisingly, many of them have failed to win even a single seat, and even the strongest among them has failed to secure more than five seats in the FPTP system.

While the election results are a resounding popular endorsement of democracy in Nepal, it appears that the outcome will do little to end the crisis that had preceded the polling process. NC and CPN-UML, of course, have a history of uncomfortable cooperation, and Government formation will not face any insurmountable problems. However, if the UCPN-M and CPN-Maoist and even the minor Madhesi groupings – choose to stay away from the drafting of the Constitution, this process would lack the legitimacy and consensual basis that it needs for a stable and sustainable outcome. Further, a substratum of radical elements, committed to the restoration of the Maoist ‘revolution’ continues to exist within the Maoist formations. Any protracted crisis or confrontational politics by the electoral victors will encourage at least some among these to return to the violence that they are far more familiar with and adept at.

The second CA elections were underpinned by the hope and expectations that the uncertainties of the first CA would be brought to an end with a clearer mandate. Unfortunately, the very clarity of the current mandate has exacerbated uncertainties even further.

Fakir Mohan Pradhan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

The article Nepal: A Clear Mandate For Uncertainty – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By World Security Network

By Hubertus Hoffmann

When a retired Lieutenant General of the Bundeswehr writes a dissertation entitled, “Die Bundeswehr als Instrument deutscher Außenpolitik” (“The Federal Armed Forces as an Instrument of German Foreign Policy” – published in German only; Order here on Amazon: Die Bundeswehr als Instrument deutscher Außenpolitik (German Edition), people take notice and become curious about his new findings and the links between theory and practice. From general to academic. From obedience to the political leadership to an analysis of errors. The instruments of political science, mixed with the background knowledge of leadership positions in the Bundeswehr and NATO.

Dr Ulf von Krause has written an excellent analysis, which was published this year by Springer VS Verlag. It is also a history of the Bundeswehr, from its tentative early years in the 1950′s, through rearmament, to its deployment in Kosovo and Afghanistan and the reform of the armed forces.

The General complains about the “political consideration of the prevailing mood in society, which limits combat strength and puts the soldiers in a difficult legal position”. After two lost world wars, the bombing of German cities, the expulsion of 12 million Germans from the East, the excessive militarism and lust for war of the Nazis and later the militarisation of East German society by the communists combined with a direct confrontation in the Cold War, understandibly many Germans hold extreme reservations about the application of military force and are marked by a strong pacifist tendency. German-born Pentagon strategist Dr Fritz Kraemer called it the German “exclude me out” – mentality.

Von Krause highlights one example: after nine years of engagement, some necessary military equipment  for the German Forces in Afghanistan arrived only in 2010, because of the political restraint of the Federal Government. Furthermore, the rules of engagement were adjusted relatively late given the realities on the ground in the north of Afghanistan. The legal position of the German soldiers remained uncertain, because German criminal law, rather than the international laws of war, was applied to them.

September 4, 2009 was a watershed. The Bundeswehr lost its innocence and politicians and the public were shocked by the consequences of combat operations. In this incident, the commanding Bundeswehr Colonel Georg Klein ordered the bombing of two tanker trucks that had been hijacked by the Taliban, only seven kilometers away from the German camp that night by the Kunduz River. More than 100 civilians who had been helping to empty the tanks were killed. From the air, they were not identifiable to the Colonel as civilians. Was the operation necessary for preventing a devastating attack against the camp? Could the civilians – and the Taliban – have been warned by a “show of force” low-level flight? Investigations by prosecutors led to the German officer being relieved. He lacked the necessary reconnaissance capabilities and long-range weapons. Only then were howitzers moved to Kunduz for such operations. The government now talked openly of a combat operation and war – words which they had till then avoided.

Von Krause is right to criticize: “Politics is to blame for not having communicated to society their position, which has changed since 1999, on the use of military force as an instrument of policy.” The political culture in Germany would need to change.

Germany has been contributing more and more soldiers to missions overseas. The politicians gave them duties in Afghanistan (ca. 5000), Kosovo (3200), to guard the coast of Lebanon, and to defend against pirates at the Horn of Africa. Bundeswehr soldiers have also been deployed in Sudan, the Congo, Somalia and Mali.

However, a broad discussion on the role of the armed forces and the strategic use of military assets is still lacking in Germany. The Bundeswehr is not situated in the middle of society, as in Great Britain, the United States or France. This also explains the reluctance towards other military operations, as in Libya or Syria.

The main threat to the allies of NATO and the EU is not a strong and militarized Germany in the heart of Europe, but a weak and pacifistic one. Military expenditure is well below the threshold of two percent of gross domestic product. Even though a new, fresh and active NATO 3.0 peace and security polic is needed and a combination of effective defense capability and soft factors (see NATO 3.0 – Fresh new proposals by the World Security Network Foundation).

General von Krause refers to the ongoing structural reform of the Bundeswehr, which provides for a reduction of the armed forces and an adaptation to international assignments. But this is a squaring of the circle. The schedule is dictated by budgetary constraints, not increased responsibilities in an order of world peace. The suspension of conscription was already found in “Model 4″ of the Inspector General of the Bundeswehr from July 1st 2010 who suggessted 163,500 soldiers, of whom 10,000 should be deployed abroad. A reliable financial basis for the next six years would be required for this. Now the Bundeswehrreform (Federal Armed Forces Reform), which is currently being implemented, aims at 185,000 soldiers plus 55,000 civilian staff.

The author rightly criticizes a complicated and error-prone organizational structure for the missions of the Bundeswehr, the separation of administrative and military force and the “delimitation” of military operations.

His book is a laudable contribution and drills deeply into the thick braid of the military, bureaucracy and politics. It enhances understanding of German security politics and is a reminder to politicians to make the basis of armed conflict more meaningful and ultimately to also provide the Bundeswehr with sufficient funding.

Germany has learned some lessons from its long engagement in The Balkans and Afghanistan. The coalition-negotiations between CDU/CSU and SPD about the new government agreed during last days to follow a combined approach of foreign, defense, and development elements in a joint strategy. Yet the funding is key – and vague.

About the author:
Dr. Hubertus Hoffmann is a German entrepreneur and geostrategist based in London. His three main focuses as a philanthropist are: – ‘Networking a Safer World’, with the largest global elite network in foreign affairs, the independent World Security Network Foundation (www.worldsecuritynetwork.com). – The Human Codes of Tolerance and Respect – promoting understanding and concrete actions for tolerance towards other religions, races and minorities (www.codesoftolerance.com). – The promotion of a responsible elite which takes over special obligations and duties in societies around the world (www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/fritzkraemer).

The article The Germans To The Front? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By VOA

By Barbara Slavin

The ink was not dry on the historic Geneva nuclear accord with Iran before Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu denounced it as a “historic mistake” that would allow Iran to cheat and get closer to nuclear weapons.

Netanyahu may have been doing Iran a favor. By criticizing the deal so harshly, he will make it easier for Iranian officials to assert to their hardliners that the agreement, which pauses Iran’s nuclear advances and rolls back some of the program in return for modest sanctions relief, was a victory for the Islamic Republic.

In the zero-sum politics of the Middle East, what’s good for your enemy is invariably considered bad for you. Yet the deal announced early Sunday European time has much that is useful for Iran, the United States, the international community writ large and yes, Israel too.

If implemented, it will push Iran farther from the ability to “break out” quickly from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Even though low-level uranium enrichment will continue, Iran has pledged not to stockpile it and to stop refining uranium to 20 percent U-235 – very close to weapons grade. Iran will convert the 200 kilograms of 20 percent uranium it has amassed to a form that cannot be easily enriched further. The deal will also freeze most work at a heavy water reactor called Arak that if completed, could yield plutonium, another potential bomb fuel. And it will provide the International Atomic Energy Agency with unprecedented daily access to Iranian enrichment plants as well as potential answers to questions about alleged past weapons research at military sites. All of this has long been sought by the international community in vain.

In return, the Iranians will get about $7 billion in sanctions relief – most of it their own oil earnings which have been frozen abroad — the right to continue to export oil at a current reduced level to Asian clients and facilitated humanitarian transactions including imports of food and medicine and a means to support Iranian students abroad, including 8,000 in the US. The United States, European Union and UN Security Council also pledge not to pass new nuclear-related sanctions against Iran for the six-month duration of the interim deal. During this time, Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (the P5+1) are to negotiate a comprehensive agreement that will cap the Iranian nuclear program in return for recognition of Iran’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the lifting of all nuclear-related sanctions.

Iran will still remain under US sanctions for the foreseeable future for its support of groups such as Hezbollah which the US regards as terrorist and for abusing the human rights of the Iranian people. European sanctions related to those areas will also remain in place. But the nuclear agreement is an entry point into further discussions that could lead to a more constructive Iran externally and a less authoritarian regime at home.

As I wrote in August the election of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani was a bright spot in an otherwise bloody Middle East and presented President Barack Obama with the potential for a positive foreign policy legacy. Rouhani, who marks his 100th day in office on Nov. 26 – he counts from the day his cabinet was seated – desperately needed a nuclear deal to fulfill his campaign promises to ease the burden of sanctions on the Iranian people. But to sign a deal, Rouhani had to be able to say that Iran’s rights had been respected and that Iran had not given too much away too soon. For Obama, the same equation applied.

It is easy for Israeli, Arab and congressional critics to complain that the agreement does not “dismantle” Iran’s nuclear infrastructure but the maximalist deal that would have satisfied these hardliners was simply not obtainable in a first phase. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei gave Rouhani and his talented negotiating team “heroic flexibility” to reach an agreement, not carte blanche. Rouhani was not going to be able to stop all uranium enrichment because he was heavily criticized by Iranian hardliners for suspending parts of the program from 2003-2005 – when the George W. Bush administration sat on the sidelines and Europeans negotiated with Iran – and getting very little in return. (It is not true, as critics have charged, that Rouhani “cheated” so Iran could continue other nuclear work; his agreement with the Europeans suspended only the enrichment program.)

The next few months will show whether Iran – and the United States and its partners – can fulfill their promises – which will require that domestic opposition hold its fire. If the deal works, the prospect for another Middle East war and all the horror that entails will recede, the US and Iran can begin to repair a breach of 34 years and there could be benefits for tamping down the conflict in Syria as well. Indeed on Monday, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon announced via Twitter that a long-sought Geneva conference on Syria will be held Jan. 22.

Rather than try to sabotage the nuclear agreement, detractors should test Iran’s compliance. Netanyahu and other critics may find it psychologically uncomfortable to reappraise a long-time enemy, but the upside could be tremendous – and not just for the Israeli stock market which hit a record high on Sunday.

The article Nuclear Deal A Win-Win For US, Iran And Even Israel – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By RT

Thai opposition protesters have targeted several more government ministries on Tuesday in a continuation of their effort to depose Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s government. It comes a day after they took over two ministries.

“We have to leave because [the protesters] will cut the utilities,” Tourism and Sports Minister Somsak Pureesrisak told AFP. He added the Transport and Agriculture Ministries were also surrounded.

The protesting crowds also gave officials at the Interior Ministry an ultimatum to leave within one hour, the news agency reports. The ministry staffers yielded to the demand about 15 minutes later and left the building, as some 800 people surrounding it were cheering and chanting “Come out!” The protesters left the ministry’s grounds as a result, ending the siege.

This was followed by promises to take over government offices nationwide.

Meanwhile thousands of protesters tried to march on the prime minister’s offices, which are heavily guarded by police. After being blocked, they retreated to Bangkok’s historic quarter, where they have set up a main stage.

The government fought back, issuing an arrest warrant for Suthep Thaugsuban, a former MP and leader of the Democratic party, for allegedly masterminding the civil unrest, it was reported by Bangkok police on Tuesday.

He stands accused of giving the order to attack government buildings and breaking the law on public order in the capital.

On Monday, Thai opposition protesters occupied the country’s Finance and Foreign Ministries. They pledged to hold the buildings overnight and proceed to take over four more ministries on Tuesday, including the Transport Ministry and the three already targeted.

PM Yingluck in response invoked the Internal Security Act, which gives extraordinary powers to security forces, but pledged not to use force in the confrontation.

Despite the takeovers, the Finance Ministry is still functioning on Tuesday, Reuters reports.

“Key officials are still working as normal from our backup office,” Finance Minister Kittirat Na Ranong told Reuters. “So there will be no impact on the fiscal budget and important functions.”

The minister added that his office is concerned over investor confidence due to the protests. The ministry is going to file a lawsuit against protest leader Suthep Thaugsuban and investigate ministry officials who had facilitated the invasion, Kittirat said.

The ongoing turmoil follows weeks of protest in Thailand against an amnesty bill, which would allow the return of former PM Thaksin Shinawatra, the brother of the current PM Yingluck. Thaksin is currently living in exile after being ousted during the 2006 military coup.

The bill, which was blocked in the parliament, would also pardon those responsible for an army intervention during the 2010 protest, which left more than 90 people killed.

Since 2008 Thaksin has been living outside of Thailand, being accused of undermining the country’s powerful monarchy and breaching conflict-of-interest laws. He had been tried in absentia and sentenced to a two year term.

Despite being reviled by the elite of the large cities, he remains a popular figure in rural areas.

The seizures of government buildings come as Thailand enters its worst political unrest since the 2010 riots.

The article Thailand: Protesters Besiege 4 More Ministerial Buildings Seeking Govt Ouster appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Eurasia Review

he President of the Skolkovo Foundation, Viktor Vekselberg, and Eni’s CEO, Paolo Scaroni, in the presence of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, and Italian Prime Minister, Enrico Letta, today signed a Memorandum of Understanding establishing the principal terms for the cooperation between the parties in research and development of new technologies related to the energy sector.

The Skolkovo Foundation, the innovation center located nearby Moscow and dedicated to the high technology and scientific research field, will enable Eni to have access to the Russian technological innovation sector, which includes innovative enterprises, cutting-edge technology products and advanced research, development and scientific education programs.

Eni will provide its industrial experience and technological know-how and will contribute to the research and educational activities of the Foundation.

The article Eni Signs Memorandum Of Understanding With Skolkovo Foundation For Research And Development In Technology appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Eurasia Review

China’s good relations with states at odds with each other could yield results at the negotiating table soon.

By Keith K C Hui

If there is a nation (not “state”) that can successfully convince the Arabs, the Jews and the Persians to sit down simultaneously for a talk, it can only be the Chinese. With the historical cultural links and for immense economic interests, China is both eager and able to lay the table.

Having had the 11,179-kilometer (6,946-mile) iron silk road in operation going through Germany, Poland, Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan and China, Beijing is now working assiduously to push for the implementation of the United Nations 80,900-km Trans-Asian Railway (TAR) project which knits 24 countries including Iran, Armenia and Turkey together. Furthermore, the August 2013 opening of the US$500 million Chinese-built port in Colombo, Sri Lanka, represented the first step of realizing Beijing’s vision of a “maritime silk road” between Africa and East Asia, exposing the Arabian Peninsula as a key mid-way security concern. Being blocked by Japan to go eastward, China has tons of reasons to get the west bound roads through and reliable.

In June 2013, Beijing hosted a two-day United Nations meeting with attendance by Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to discuss how to revive the peace between Israel and Palestine. This rare move by Beijing is a sign that its leaders are keen on bringing safety to the new Silk Roads being constructed. While ordinary Americans may not care about peace in the remote Middle East, it is about daily life in China. Two Chinese state-owned enterprises recently made a 50-year deal with Ukraine that up to 7.4 million acres of high-quality farmland in the eastern Dnipropetrovsk region will be growing crops and raising pigs for China. It is just a tiny portion of the supplies of food, energy and all types of natural resources that Beijing has to make sure that they can be delivered to China from Europe, Africa and western Asia by rail and sea efficiently.

Total trade amount between Saudi Arabia and China jumped from US$25,367 million in 2007 to US$63,710 million in 2011, with crude export to China exceeding the same sale to the United States for the first time in 2010 (National Bureau of Statistics of China). Aside from numerous refinery and infrastructure projects, their relationship was further recognized by the granting of the privilege to the then Chinese president Hu Jin-tao as the second foreign leader in its history to give a speech to the Kingdom’s legislative council in 2006. The friendship between the two nations can be traced back to the ninth century during which the business-minded Arabian merchants walked along the silk road with fleets of camels from Mecca to Xian for, of course, silk. While there is no sign that this friendship was eroded by Beijing’s stand in the Syria crisis, the Obama-Putin wrestle showed Riyadh that the U.S. is no longer the sole bookmaker in this region. It is time to consider drawing in new players.

The Jews’ relationship with the Chinese was always sweet in history. “Seventy years ago, only Shanghai opened the door to provide a sanctuary to Jewish refugees,” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in his visit to Shanghai in May 2013. “From the early 1930s, tens of thousands of Jewish refugees who fled Europe made Shanghai their home.” In 2011, the trade amount between Israel and China was not that much at US$9,778 million, but it is no ordinary goods and services. Despite heavy pressure from the Pentagon, Israel has been selling certain weapons and military technologies to China since the formal establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992. Given China’s ties with other Islamic nations, this kind of mutual trust is incredible.

Commodity and cultural exchanges between Iran and China can also be traced back to the Tang Dynasty (618-907AD). When the Persian merchants went to China for silk and tea, they were free to preach their religion in the Middle Kingdom without interference. While they kept on fighting against the Ottoman Empire, the Persian never had trouble with the Chinese. In 2011, the trade between these two historically friendly nations amounted to US$45,103 million. China is now not just the major buyer of Iran’s crude, but also the leading supplier of all types of goods and services in the wake of the embargo worldwide. When the then Iranian president Ahmadinejad attended the Shanghai Co-operation Organization summit in Beijing in June 2012, he was told by Hu “to engage in serious dialogue with other world powers and show flexibility in resolving disputes triggered by Tehran’s nuclear programme.” Such flexibility was first seen under the new Iranian president Hassan Rowhani that Tehran would participate in the Geneva talk, prompting the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry to rush for a deal on November 8, 2013.

Israel and Iran will certainly continue to have wars of words but the Chinese helmsman rulers who purse persistently for peace in this region behind the scenes will add a strong force to the drive already pushed by the Kremlin and White House. When the three top military and economic superpowers are so ‘friendly’ and so ‘enthusiastic’ to ask you to talk instead of fight and there is no one else you can rely on, it means you do not have alternative. The Saudi, Israeli and Iranian leaders will show up around the table soon.

About the author:
Keith K C Hui is a Chinese University of Hong Kong graduate, a Fellow of The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (UK), a former Manager (Asset Management) at HK Monetary Authority and now a retired businessman; and the author of “Helmsman Ruler: China’s Pragmatic Version of Plato’s Ideal Political Succession System in The Republic”.

This article appeared at FPIF and is reprinted with the author’s permission.

The article China: What Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran, Israel, And The US Have In Common appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Patrick J Buchanan

“Iran’s Nuclear Triumph” roared the headline of the Wall Street Journal editorial. William Kristol is again quoting Churchill on Munich.

Since the news broke Saturday night that Iran had agreed to a six-month freeze on its nuclear program, we are back in the Sudetenland again.

Why? For not only was this modest deal agreed to by the United States, but also by our NATO allies Germany, Britain and France.

Russia and China are fine with it.

Iran’s rivals, Turkey and Egypt, are calling it a good deal. Saudi Arabia says it “could be a first step toward a comprehensive solution for Iran’s nuclear program.”

Qatar calls it “an important step toward safeguarding peace and stability in the region.” Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates have issued similar statements.

Israeli President Shimon Peres calls the deal satisfactory. Former Military Intelligence Chief Amos Yadlin has remarked of the hysteria in some Israeli circles, “From the reactions this morning, I might have thought Iran had gotten permission to build a bomb.”

Predictably, “Bibi” Netanyahu is leading the stampede:

“Today the world has become a much more dangerous place because the most dangerous regime in the world has taken a significant step toward attaining the most dangerous weapon in the world.”

But this is not transparent nonsense?

In return for a modest lifting of sanctions, Tehran has agreed to halt work on the heavy water reactor it is building at Arak, to halt production of 20-percent uranium, to dilute half of its existing stockpile, and to allow more inspections.

Does this really make the world “a much more dangerous place”?

Consider the worst-case scenario we hear from our politicians and pundits — that Iran is cleverly scheming to get the U.S. and U.N. sanctions lifted, and, then, she will make a “mad dash” for the bomb.

But how exactly would Tehran go about this?

If Iran suddenly moved all its low-enriched uranium, to be further enriched in a crash effort to 90 percent, i.e., bomb grade, this would take months to accomplish.

Yet, we would be altered within hours that the uranium was being moved.

Any such Iranian action would expose Barack Obama and John Kerry as dupes. They would be discredited and the howls from Tel Aviv and Capitol Hill for air and missile strikes on Natanz, Fordo and Arak would become irresistible.

Obama and Kerry would be forced to act.

War with Iran, which would mean a shattered Iran, would be a real possibility. At the least, Iran, like North Korea, would be sanctioned anew, isolated and made a pariah state.

Should Iran test a nuclear device, Saudi Arabia would acquire bombs from Pakistan. Turkey and Egypt might start their own nuclear weapons programs. Israel would put its nuclear arsenal or high alert.

If, after a year or two building a bomb, in an act of insanity, Iran found a way to deliver it to Israel or a U.S. facility in the Middle East, Iran would be inviting the fate of Imperial Japan in 1945.

So, let us assume another scenario, that the Iranians are not crazed fanatics but rational actors looking out for what is best for their country.

If Iran has no atom bomb program, as the Ayatollah attests, President Hassan Rouhani says he is willing to demonstrate, and 16 U.S. intelligence agencies concluded six years ago and again two years ago, consider the future that might open to Iran — if the Iranians are simply willing and able to prove this to the world’s satisfaction.

First, a steady lifting of sanctions. Second, an end to Iran’s isolation and a return to the global economy. Third, a wave of Western investment for Iran’s oil and gas industry, producing prosperity and easing political pressure on the regime.

Fourth, eventual emergence of Iran, the most populous nation in the Gulf with 85 million citizens, as the dominant power in the Gulf, just as China, after dispensing with the world Communist revolution, became dominant in Asia

Why would an Iran, with this prospect before it, risk the wrath of the world and a war with the United States to acquire a bomb whose use would assure the country’s annihilation?

America’s goals: We do not want a nuclear Iran, and we do not want war with Iran. And Iran’s actions seem to indicate that building an atom bomb is not the animating goal of the Ayatollah, as some Americans insist.

Though she has the ability to build a bomb, Iran has neither conducted a nuclear test, nor produced bomb-grade uranium. She has kept her supply of 20-percent uranium below what is needed to be further enriched for even a single bomb test. Now, she has agreed to dilute half of that and produce no more.

If Iran were hell-bent on a bomb, why has she not produced a bomb?

Just possibly, because Iran doesn’t want the bomb. And if that is so, why not a deal to end these decades of sterile hostility?

The article Patrick Buchanan: Is the Superpower Afraid Of Iran? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By IPCS

By Ranjit Gupta

Introduction

During the past decade, India’s relationship with the GCC countries has expanded more rapidly and more satisfyingly both in absolute terms and when compared with India’s relations with any other region in the world.

Close interaction between the peoples of India and of the Gulf region began with the dawn of history millennia ago and has continued on an uninterrupted basis since then. Few countries can match this historical connection. Factors such as bilateral trade, gas and oil interdependency, remittances and the huge Indian passport holding diaspora living and working in these countries, makes GCC countries India’s leading socio-economic partner in the world. The political and diplomatic relationship is becoming stronger by the day. Overall, it is a relationship of increasing mutual symbiotic advantage and synergy and increasingly significant strategically for both sides.

The Energy Factor

In today’s world geo-economics dictates geopolitics. For India to become a global power it must grow at 8-10 per cent annually for the next two decades at least. The assured availability of adequate energy resources will be a key factor. India is seriously energy deficient. Even allowing for increasing domestic oil and gas availability, increasing imports from other countries and regions, and the rising proportion of usage of alternative non-conventional energy, India will still need incrementally rising amounts of oil and gas each year; in fact India’s hydrocarbon import dependency has been predicted to rise from the current 70 per cent to almost 92 per cent by 2030. India’s oil imports from GCC countries as a proportion of its total oil imports has been rising steadily growing from 1190 barrels per day in 2001-02 to 1604 barrels per day in 2011-12. Also, India’s oil imports from the GCC countries as a proportion of its total hydrocarbon imports are already the highest amongst all oil importers from the GCC countries.

China provides the greatest competition. Even though Chinese oil imports from the Gulf region are larger than India’s and are likely to continue increasing, China even now and almost certainly in the future will not be as critically dependent on the GCC countries as India is, as the proportion of its imports from them to its total imports is significantly lower than India’s. China’s oil import dependence on the Gulf region in 2010 was 47 per cent and in 2030 is projected to be 74 per cent, with Iran and Iraq likely to be playing increasingly even more major roles, whereas India’s oil import dependence on the Gulf region in 2010 was 63 per cent and in 2030 is projected to be 85 per cent with GCC countries and Iraq likely to be playing the major role. Furthermore, compared to India, China has been acquiring new external production sources and diversifying import sources of oil and gas with much greater success. Both China and the US are also well ahead of India in the development of alternative new and renewable sources of energy. In fact, China is already the world’s leading producer of wind and solar energy.

In the light of such projections and the new energy geography that the renowned expert Daniel Ergin is projecting that the Americas are likely to become a larger oil producer and exporter than the Gulf region, the GCC countries’ need of a reliable, large and long term buyer of increasing quantities of its oil and gas would become an imperative for them. India fits the slot perfectly as a long term partner. The main source and a market constantly increasing in size and being geographically proximate to a very much greater degree than any other market/source combination for both the buyer and the seller, suggest a very realistic potential of the development of a truly symbiotic, mutually beneficial, long term mutually inter dependent oil and gas relationship.

The Trade Factor

In 2011-12 total trade (oil and non-oil) between India and the GCC countries amounted to US$ 145.7 billion rising in 2012-13 to US$ 181 billion. India’s trade with GCC countries greatly outstrips the financial volumes of trade ties that India has with other regions of the world such as the EU, NAFTA, ASEAN etc. The total trade between India and the EU – the second ranking regional group – was US$ 109.86 billion in 2011-12 and stood at only US$ 94.43 billion during April-February 2012-13. Just to provide perspective, Indo US trade was about US$ 65 billion. The UAE remains India’s top trading partner with total trade at US$74.7 billion and also India’s top export destination. Saudi Arabia has become India’s fourth largest trading partner. During 2012-13 total trade with it jumped to over US$43 billion and India’s exports to it increased by 27 per cent. India’s exports to Oman doubled during 2012-13.

In 2012, total India GCC trade made it the third largest trading partner of GCC countries, India having overtaken the US and staying marginally ahead of China with only the EU and Japan ahead of it. The major trade partners of the Gulf region/GCC countries have been the EU, China, Japan, South Korea and the US – these are the topmost global trading entities and therefore their high rankings are understandable. China has overtaken the US to become the world’s top trading nation. However, India is not even amongst the top 15 trading nations of the world and, therefore, this statistic of GCC trade with India underlines the enormous significance of the bilateral trade relationship for both sides.

As in the case of energy, on the trade front too, China will provide the main competition for India in the years ahead. Some extracts from a paper written by an expert on the subject, Prof Tim Niblock of the Exeter University, are rather enlightening: “The growth in China’s and India’s trade with the Gulf since 2000 has been phenomenal…. In both cases, the increases have been many-fold greater than the increases in EU, US, Japanese or South Korean trade with the Gulf…The growth in India’s Gulf trade has been even more substantial than China’s. This runs counter to the common perception, where attention is usually focused on China’s growing share of the market. .. increase in trade between China and the Gulf region between 2000-2008 was 908% and between India and the Gulf region 1600%. Over the 2005-2012 period, India’s Gulf trade rose by 771.5% while China’s rose by 379.9%. In 2010 India’s Gulf trade, for the first time since the 1990s, overtook that of China – although only by a narrow margin. China, as well as India, are now substantial exporters to the Gulf region as well as oil importers from it. The economic relationships, therefore, are not shaped solely around their need for oil but involve a more symbiotic set of exchanges.”

Over the last several years, India has been able to capitalise on its strong capabilities in the IT-enabled services sector to increase its share of services exports globally. Though overall amounts are not available, according to industry estimates India’s IT products and services exports to the GCC countries are substantial and have been increasing at a growth rate of above 30 per cent annually during the past decade.

These facts and figures provide a very clear indication of the enormous dynamism that has characterised energy and trade relations between India and the GCC countries in the first decade of the 21st century. The trends clearly indicate that the future looks particularly rosy.

The Diaspora Factor

The frenetic construction and economic development activity that exploded in the GCC countries triggered by the spectacular oil price rise in 1973 had one very major consequence of great significance for India – the movement of Indian manpower to the GCC countries, which today totals around 7 million. Their numbers have increased steadily over the decades and Indians today constitute about 38 per cent of the total expatriate population in GCC countries, making them the largest expatriate community both cumulatively in the GCC as a whole and individually in each GCC country. Given that GCC countries are highly internal-security conscious Muslim countries, these facts clearly represent an enormous vote of confidence by the governments and people of the six GCC countries in Indians and by extension in India.

Anybody who has lived in any of the GCC countries knows just how vital the Indian community is to the logistics and mechanics of the daily functioning of life in each of the 6 GCC countries. The processes which propelled such large numbers of Indians into the GCC countries took place organically responding to the laws of demand and supply with little or no governmental role in pushing this; a strong contributory factor has been the high comfort level with Indians due to the millennia old people to people interaction. Over recent decades, Bollywood is watched avidly on TV in most Gulf households being the programme of first preference.

A significant byproduct has been the huge and growing remittances sent by the Indian community back home. These have been of utterly vital importance in providing the means of livelihood to millions of family members in India on the one hand and to keeping India’s balance of payments manageable on the other. Last year, at US$ 70 billion, India was the largest recipient of remittances from its diaspora abroad of any country in the world and of that about US$38 billion came from the GCC countries.

In the context of the high employment in Saudi Arabia, which has almost nine million expatriates, constituting one-third of the total number of people living in the country, the Saudi government has understandably cracked down hard on illegal immigrants believed to be several million. Several ministerial delegations from India visited Saudi Arabia in recent months in this connection. The position is that of the 2.8 million Indians living and working in Saudi Arabia, 1.3 million needed to have their status regularised and have done so and only 1,34,000 returned voluntarily; however, even after this the overall number of Indians has increased due to new people going there. In contrast to communities of many other countries the Indian community has faced the least harassment. In fact, a new agreement relating to the domestic workers sector is due to be signed very soon.

The diaspora factor and growing economic interaction have resulted in another significant fact – flight connections between India and GCC countries are almost 50 per cent of the total flight connections between India and the rest of the world put together.

Thus, as far as the bilateral dimension is concerned, the energy, trade and diaspora factors taken together clearly substantiate the assertion that I made that the GCC countries constitute India’s largest socio-economic partner in the world. India is well set to become the largest socio-economic partner of the GCC countries in the world too if present trends continue, as is more than likely.

The Islamic Factor

India has the world’s third largest Muslim population and the world’s second largest Shia population. The Gulf region is the heartland of the Islamic world with Islam’s two holiest places being located in Saudi Arabia and of the Shia sect of Islam located in Iraq. Around 1,70,000 pilgrims from India go to the Haj annually constituting the third largest contingent in the world, apart from a couple of hundred thousand who go each year for the Umrah pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia and to the Shia holy places in Iraq.

Islam initially came to India from the Arabian Peninsula through traders within the first decade or so of the emergence of this great religion and has flourished ever since. Muslim dynasties have ruled in India for centuries before the British arrived. India has a very rich Islamic heritage, an inextricable part of Indian civilisation and of the idea of India, and of which the country and its people are justly proud. These facts make the Islamic factor another very significant bond for India’s relations with the Gulf region.

One of the very major consequences of the turmoil in the Arab world for the past two years has been the rise of political Islam.

India with its pluralist civilisation, large Muslim population and long term Islamic connections is quite comfortable with political Islam. In fact, India’s interaction with Egypt under its Muslim Brotherhood regime was already better than it had been under Mubarak. India considers political Islam to be a natural phenomenon in Islamic countries.

However, there is a dangerous dimension too. In the wake of 9/11 US policies in particular have led to a steady increase in the rise of radical and extremist elements in the region and its immediate neighbourhood. Ominously, violence perpetrated by extremists in the name of religion is now not only an increasingly integral part, but getting to be the preeminent and most dangerous element, of the tumult that is spreading across the Arab world. Most GCC countries and in particular Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have become particularly wary of radicalism. Their celebration of the recent removal of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt is an eloquent indicator of their deepening concern.

The reactions of the GCC countries to the terror attacks in Mumbai in November 2007 were particularly satisfying; since then cooperation in counter-terrorism between India and the GCC countries in general and with Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular has been developing very well. In this context, the extradition of two high profile terrorists to India by Saudi Arabia last year despite exceptionally strenuous efforts made by Pakistan to prevent it, is a watershed development and is a very significant indicator of just how far bilateral relations between India and Saudi Arabia have come. The UAE has been similarly helpful for some years now. It may be mentioned that this cooperation has been more satisfying than the cooperation that India has received from the US.

The Political Factor

The political arena, too, has witnessed a remarkable upswing. During the first decade of this 21st century, rulers of all GCC countries – the Qatari Emir twice – have paid state visits to India and the Prime Minister of India has paid state visits to Oman (twice), Qatar and Saudi Arabia. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia chose India as the second country to visit after ascending the throne, and was the chief guest at India’s Republic Day celebrations in January 2006. This was the first visit of a Saudi monarch to India after nearly 50 years. The Saudi king does not personally sign documents with foreign leaders but he signed the Delhi Declaration in 2006 and later when the Indian Prime Minister visited Saudi Arabia in 2010, the Riyadh Declaration. These unprecedented, landmark, path-breaking documents spell out the parameters of a wide-ranging strategic partnership covering security and defence cooperation also. Pakistan has long had a very special relationship with the GCC countries in general and with Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular. These two countries have now consciously de-hyphenated their relations with India and Pakistan and the perceived veto that the latter had enjoyed over the GCC countries’ relationships with India has now been cast aside. Mention needs to be made of the fact that visits by India’s Presidents, Vice Presidents and a flurry of Ministers holding different portfolios including the first ever visit by an Indian Defense Minister to Saudi Arabia and an equal flurry of visits of crown princes, Prime Ministers and senior Ministers from the GCC side also have now become a regular feature of India GCC interaction. Special Envoys, National Security Advisers, Intelligence Chiefs, Armed Forces Chiefs, etc, from both sides have been making frequent visits too.

As would be evident from the foregoing account, India has now become so intrinsically interlinked with the GCC countries that India’s destiny in the years ahead will be greatly influenced by what happens in the GCC region and how India-GCC relations evolve further.

Originally presented at IPCS workshop on India’s Foreign policy and Regional Security for students of Davidson College, US in November 2013

Ranjit Gupta
Distinguished Fellow, IPCS

The article India And The Gulf: Looking Beyond Energy, Islam And The Diaspora – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By IPCS

By Ruhee Neog

The interim nuclear deal signed between Iran and the P5+1 on 24 November 2013 was a definite breakthrough. It is the only nuclear deal to have been successfully concluded since the one reached with Rouhani at the negotiating table in the early 2000s, and detractors notwithstanding, it can be hailed as movement in the right diplomatic direction. It must also be remembered that this is an interim deal of six months – a sort of first step to cautiously gauge the opposition’s intentions while addressing concerns for a more conclusive resolution – without immediately tying either party to long-term commitments without proof of the other’s sincerity. This makes it a concrete starting point for further negotiations – of a kind that was previously missing.

Certain preliminary questions/concerns can be raised about the contents of the deal, which have been widely covered in the media, their merits and demerits, and what they require of the parties involved.

Is the Rapprochement Genuine?

Can the possibility of Iran using the deal to buy itself time and further develop its nuclear weapons programme be completely done away with? Saudi Arabia and Israel, who, understandably, are none too happy with the way the meeting concluded in Geneva, have been vocal about the foolhardiness of the P5+1. Indeed, after the last successful nuclear deal with Iran, Rouhani himself admitted that the easing of diplomacy was concomitant with the growth of Iran’s nuclear programme. Would this then be a case of ‘fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me’?

Can Sanctions Relief have Negative Implications?

Saudi Arabia and Israel have also commented on the possible negative implications of relief by lifting sanctions. Their contention is that lightening Iran’s economic burden will only create the space for the furtherance of Iranian weaponisation. One of the critical reasons for what could be seen as an artificially induced rapprochement between the West and Iran is the crippling effect of sanctions on the latter. In fact, reports state that Senator Kerry may have cited the peril of imminent sanctions passed by the US Congress – much like the sword of Damocles – to perhaps hasten the process. The message being, sign now or regret later. It was certainly a very effective approach. The point to be made here is this: if sanctions are finally fulfilling their objective of bringing about ‘acceptable’ behaviour, is this the right time to be easing them, especially without any guarantee that the gesture would be reciprocated?

That being said, the sanctions relief that has been promised under the aegis of this deal is limited, and is therefore going to have a limited effect on reversing the Iranian economy. Additionally, and crucially, these sanctions are reversible, which means that any sign of a less than stellar commitment to the clauses of the deal will result in the reinstatement of sanctions. This partial reprieve is really just a taste of what could be in store if Iran ‘behaves’. The above argument, therefore, can be just as easily invalidated as it is established.

Will the US Congress Pose a Challenge?

While sanctions relief may have been promised to Iran, how is the Obama administration going to overcome opposition posed by the Congress? The Congress is famously at odds with the White House over what an ideal nuclear deal with Iran should look like, and while the latter can lift sanctions that were imposed by a presidential order, any attempt to lift those imposed by Congress will be riddled with challenges. This interim deal has promised limited sanctions relief – oil and trade sanctions remain intact – which is doable, for now. But if there is to be a way forward – one which assures the other party of additional respite – how is the Obama administration planning to navigate it? Additionally, there is already talk of fresh sanctions against Iran as an expression of disappointment with the deal. Some members have warned that this may happen when Congress reconvenes in December this year. If this were to happen, it is difficult to envisage how rapprochement between the West and Iran will be reconciled with further penalties imposed by the US Congress.

The negotiations conducted in Geneva cannot be cast as a failure. An ideal deal was not on the cards because even the most initial steps had yet to be agreed upon. This deal lays the foundation to both test the commitment of the parties involved as well as build towards a genuine, long-term resolution. It is precisely the length of this deal that allows both parties to assess each other, and make a swift exit if the results don’t match expectations.

Ruhee Neog
Senior Research Officer, NSP, IPCS
Email: ruhee.neog@ipcs.org

The article Iran Nuclear Deal: A Definite Breakthrough – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Umm-e-Habiba

Balochistan, the western province of Pakistan, has substantial untapped potential of energy (oil and gas) and other strategic minerals. Unfortunately it is also the poorest province of the country, due to failure of the development policies of many of the previous governments – thereby causing the consequent socio-economic hardships becoming a source of discontentment of the people of the province. The socio-economic uplift of the people of the province is therefore the top priority of the newly elected government of Pakistan; and this time the stated strategy of the elected provincial government appears likely to successfully commence the remedial measures.

However, what is more alarming is the growing insurgency in the province, which is surely a threat of destabilization not only for Pakistan but also for the region – and also that there are sure signs, albeit not given much coverage in the foreign media, of the direct involvement of certain regional and extra-regional powers which are accentuating the public discontentment for initiating and fueling this insurgency.

This particular aspect is factually related to the geographical location of the province. In that context, it is noteworthy that Balochistan is geographically located at the possible maritime outlet in the Indian Ocean of the Eastern, Central, and Western segments of Asia; and that, the Indian Ocean has already attained marked significance in global powers’ heightened rivalry for securing and dominating its sea lanes which are now almost vital for the massive world trade and energy shipment.

The development of Gwadar Port in Balochistan and further plans to develop the necessary infrastructure including road/rail communication to connect the port with the aforementioned segments of Asia, definitely provides the potential to Balochistan of providing China, Central Asia, and Afghanistan their much needed connection to the Indian Ocean, besides serving as an international trade route, and an energy transit corridor. It is this significance of Balochistan, of having become the ‘Geo-strategic fulcrum’ of this arena of the heightened geopolitical tussle of the regional and extra-regional powers, which is the ‘casus belli’ of the foreign involvement in igniting and further stoking insurgency in Balochistan. This very dangerous foreign-instigated emerging threat to peace and stability in the region, with global implications, therefore, deserves priority attention.

Balochistan is located amid the Central, Western Southern and South-western Asia, so it can hardly escape the effects of global geo-politics. Moreover, its maritime significance especially after the development of port Gwadar; its potential to connect the landlocked Afghanistan and the Central Asian states to the Indian Ocean; its capacity to serve as an international trade route and an energy transit corridor, and its untapped mineral resources, add to its geopolitical importance. In the context of current heightened geo-political competition among global powers, in the Eurasian region Balochistan provides an ideal lucrative target for global powers.

By dominating world energy resources, trade routes and maritime choke points, a state can secure not only its national interest but can outweigh its contesters also. This win-win situation motivates the global powers to initiate their regional play. Moreover, it is also obvious that the world is gradually moving towards multi-polarity, economic and military powers are rising in the Asia. These would come to share the ‘burdens of power’, which USA has been enjoying solely since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The goal of rising Asian states like China and India is to attain global hegemony, which requires not only military, but also economic power. Because of emerging economies, disturbance in energy supply and demand equation is likely to happen in the near future; for, major shifts are occurring in energy markets.

Rapidly increasing collective demand for energy supply in the newly emerging economies such as China, India, and Asian tigers etc. is likely to outweigh first world economies’ demand for energyi by 2025. Therefore, a quest to grab world energy resources, energy transit corridors, major land and maritime trade links/routes has become the focus of global geo-political maneuvering in this region. The desired resettlement of boundaries in the name of Greater Balochistan would wobble the development of four states, i.e. China, Iran, India and Pakistan. For this reason, several US policy makers have highlighted the geo-strategic and geo-political significance of Balochistan; and, from time to time they have presented the idea of free Balochistan that could serve best to secure US’ geopolitical and geostrategic interests.

For instance, a US expert on South Asian affairs, Selig Harrison, urged the White House in 2011 to create an independent Balochistan. He also recommended a plan of action that the US should follow to make it happen.ii Because, the regional repercussions of an independent Balochistan would exacerbate the situation of law and order, it would lead to further anarchy and regional instability. Thus, the region would turn out to be ‘safe playground’ for extra-regional powers’ covert and overt activities. The chaotic situation would give global powers enough excuse to stay in the region in one way or another. Thus, the globalists will have to tackle a weak Asia instead of rising Asia. Asia’s Sea trade, energy pipelines and natural resources (especially oil and gas of CARs) all would be under considerable domination of the West. This situation would enable US to further maintain its dominant position in the international system. This would be especially significant as far as balance of power is concerned; for, the international system already seems to be gradually moving towards multi-polarity. When a multi-polar world would eventually emerge dominant hold over the region would give a potential leverage to the globalists. All major energy supply and trade routes under western influence will create a dependent Asia. Whose economic autonomy can be threatened or crippled any time if it would be contradictory to the western interests.

To pursue its multifaceted regional interest, the US is exploiting socio-economically deprived masses of Balochistan in the name of Greater Balochistan,. As such the complex situation in the province is because of the extra-regional powers’ interest, and by all possible means they are trying to sabotage the region. Besides highlighting the deprived state of locals, the foreign forces entice the Balochi youth with attractive slogans such as Poor Balochs are suffering at the hands of the Punjab dominant federation; a Free/Greater Balochistan state is the inborn right of Balochs; US’ policy is to oppose aggression and violation of human rights anywhere in the world and etc. Thus, in case of Balochistan, it is not for the first time that the external powers have introduced appealing notions to wrap up their agendas in an attractive covering. US Congress’ bill on Baloch’s “right of separation/self determination”, tabled in 2012, is one of the promos of this pre-planned US’ global agenda.

That bill was not only an extreme violation of non-intervention principle but also window dressing of USA’s and its Western allies’ global agendas. It was nothing else but a cover to pursue power and energy politics agendas. So, it is neither terrorism nor sympathy with the locals, but, the geo-political and energy demands which spur global powers to penetrate and dominate the region. Jane’s information groupiii reported in 2001, that the RAW and Mossad have created five new agencies to penetrate Pakistan to target important religious figures, civil and military personnel, journalists, judges etc.iv the current situation and credible information of our security agencies is available which strengthens the fact that the foreign agencies are involved in Balochistan. The major role in supporting the insurgency is that of CIA and RAW; whereas the clandestine operations of these two have full cooperation of Mossad and MI–6. Besides these some other states like Afghanistan is also responsible for providing its territory for training the insurgents.

The current and intense wave of insurgency in Balochistan emerged in 2005 when tension escalated between the Bugti tribe and the federal government. This resulted in an armed conflict between them and the killing of Navab Bugti which further increased the regional tensions. Before this conflict, the problem was confined to limited tribes and areas but after that disgruntled, socially deprived and unemployed Baloch youth also joined such movements. Consequently, the situation became quite ripe for regional and extra regional powers to carry out their ‘play’ successfully by abetting insurgents. The evidence of which can also be found in the US military analyst Lt. Col. Ralph Peter’s article “Blood Borders” the author presented the idea of revision of boundaries between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan as per ‘demand of locals’, as he marked these states as unnatural and emphasized the importance of the Middle Eastern Region and its oil supplies for US’ interests.v Ironically, not only foes but ‘friends’ of Pakistan are also involved in igniting this insurgency with ample foreign funding, supply of arms, sophisticated technology and military training etc. Also, the operating pattern of Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) has a ‘coincidental’ resemblance with Kosovo’s KLA, which was financed by the drug trade and supported by the CIA and Germany’s Bundes Nachrichten Dienst (BND) in the 1990s.vi

On one hand, US is exploiting Pakistan and its resources, in the Global War against Terror, and on the other hand, US itself, is promoting the terrorism in Pakistan especially in Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) and Balochistan. Therefore, it is trying to rupture the social, political and territorial integrity of the state. The ongoing US drone attacks under the banner of the “Global War on Terror” are also part of that destabilization process.

By destabilizing Pakistan specifically, its largest province Balochistan, US is also trying to influence the nature of Pakistan’s relations with its immediate neighbors, for instance, Sino-Pak and Pak-Tehran relations. Thus, it is trying to isolate Pakistan in the region. Let’s, consider Sino-Pak relationship first, any change in the boundaries can be a bad omen for Chinese economic and strategic sphere. Chinese interest in the Balochistan region is linked with port Gwadar, which Pakistan has constructed with the Chinese support and later on, it has also handed over operational rights of the port to China. The port under China’s hold will likely reduce Chinese dependency upon Malacca Strait. But, status-quo powers count this pure administrative move of Pakistan, which is also a total internal affair of the state, as a direct threat to their regional interests. Therefore, the meddling of foreign agencies in Balochistan seems to be a ‘justified’ step in the eyes of Pakistan’s foreign friends. While responding to the Chinese involvement in maritime infrastructure developmental programs in Balochistan, a US expert on South Asian affairs Selig Harrison stated, “to counter what China is doing in Pakistan, the United States should play hardball by supporting the movement for an independent Baluchistan along the Arabian Sea and working with Baloch insurgents to oust the Chinese from their budding naval base at Gwadar”vii.

If the global powers succeed in redrawing the regional boundaries, this would provide them a strong foothold in the region, hence containment of China’s maritime and mineral exploiting ventures in the region. US’ presence can significantly affect China’s elbow room in the Indian and the Pacific Ocean. A Greater/Free Balochistan can further tilt the regional Balance of power in favor of India, whose role is very important in the application of US grand strategic design in the region. Indian involvement in destabilizing Balochistan is also obvious; the strong links of the insurgents’ leadership with Afghanistan and India is an open secret. Indian consulates on Pak-Afghan border are responsible for training militants and transporting them to Pakistani territory.viii

During a briefing to the upper house of the parliament (March 2012) former interior Minister Rahman Malik showed several official letters written by the Afghan government to provide funds, visas, weapons and ammunition to Brahamdagh Bugti’s followers inside Balochistan. Only in Kandhar there are 24 training camps which train Pakistani insurgents for carrying out militant missions. Moreover, in 2009 on an international forum, for the first time Indian PM Manmohan Singh accepted Pakistan’s stance on Balochistan that India is directly involved in attempts to destabilize Balochistan region. (However, later on, he denied his words but his joint statement with his Pakistani counterpart at Sharm-El-Sheikh 2009, is still on the record) The increasing Indian involvement in Balochistan can probably lead to a threat of Indo-Pak war also; for, this would implement a huge territorial loss to Pakistan and cross one of the nuclear thresholds of Pakistanix. Moreover, a weak Pakistan would enable India to pay full attention to the China front, hence the new phase of India-China rivalry. Thus, the regional stability will be threatened by the rivalry of two military-economic regional giants.

Now, considering the case of Islamabad-Tehran relationship, Washington favors the creation of a “Greater Balochistan” thereby it would lead not only to the process of territorial but also political fracturing of both Iran and Pakistan. The US plan of action consists upon fomenting social, ethnic and factional divisions and political fragmentation, in the two states, ultimately, resulting in the breakup of positive bilateral relationship between the two. Additionally, an independent Balochistan, under the influence of the US and its allies would significantly enable them to counterbalance Iranian domination of the Persian Gulf. The US’ policy makers consider that their presence in the backyard of Iran would enable them to ensure continuous energy supply to the West via the Persian Gulf, and help monitoring the coastal areas of Iran. Moreover, if they can successfully achieve their free Balochistan objectives, port Gwadar will give them a strategic edge over Iran, and prevent the latter from manipulating the Strait of Hormuz to its advantages.

Policy Options for Pakistan

It is essential for Pakistan, to obliterate this insurgency lest it should spread to other areas of the state, as also in the bordering regions of Iran and Afghanistan. Not only Pakistani Balochistan but Iranian Sistan and Baluchestan Province and Afghanistan province of Balochistan would also fall into anarchy. Because, historical and ethnic links among these politically fragmented areas which are now part of Pakistan (Balochistan Province), Iran (Sistan and Baluchestan Province) and Afghanistan (Afghan Balochistan) cannot be denied. Disturbance in any of these areas directly or indirectly impacts the bordering regions.

During the past five years of democratic rule, the political turmoil in the region passed through many twists. Incompetent government was found neglectful of its responsibilities. This led to serious repercussions for the masses. Massacre and large scale bloodshed in the region during the so-called democratic rule left the government almost dysfunctional, hence socio-political disruption. Federation repeated past mistakes and used short term solutions like Haqooq-e-Balochistan package etc. to address public grievances. Now, tough challenges are waiting ahead for the current political government. The political leadership will have to list maintenance of law and order in the region in its top priorities. To root out insurgency, those factors should be addressed which are its root cause. Baloch youth- which can be a puppet in the hands of foreign meddlers should be enticed with solid and long term incentives. After taking solid domestic measures large scale and multi-dimensional efforts are required to soothe the ‘brewing lava’; for, Baloch problem is both an insurgency and a multi-facet conspiracy against Pakistan.

It is essential for regional peace and stability that Pakistan should make optimum use of all diplomatic and political channels. By utilizing its print and electronic media sources, Pakistan can propagate its rational stance on Balochistan. For the awareness of the world community, foreign office needs to present tangible proofs of foreign insurgency on all regional and international forums like UNO, SAARC, and OIC etc. On all forums, Pakistan should unravel the involvement of global and regional powers which is being covered under the name of “Human rights” activities. Instead of relying on the so-called friends Pakistan should look for other reliable options. Some of its neighbors’ interests coincide with those of its own. Because of their geographical location they face many common geo-political and geo-strategic realities. There is a dire need to discuss this boiling issue at the domestic and international level. Strengthening ties with Tehran and Beijing and somehow with Moscow in all spheres of common interests would possibly help Pakistan to counter this insurgency. Multilateral cooperation among regional states would lessen the intensity of extra-regional threats. This will not only enhance the confidence among regional states but the efficacy of regional organizations would possibly progress also.

The state’s foreign office needs to solve the enigma that how Pakistan can secure its national interest and its position in the world system best whilst countering its internal challenges. The masses can only hope that the federation will learn from its past mistakes because not much time is left for the rectification of errors. In the international system, where uni-polarity is gradually fading, it is likely that Pakistan would formulate a “made-in Pakistan” “Look East Policy” based upon ground realities. Only a thought-out policy based upon greater regional integration would benefit the entire region.

Notes:
i. China has already begun to compete with the US and Europe for dominating oil markets. See, Ronald F. Farina “Geopolitical Factors and Increasingly Turbulent Supply and Demand” Journal of Global Business and Technology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2006 http://gbata.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/JGBAT_Vol2-1-p2.pdf (Accessed April 20, 2013)
ii. Maitra, Ramtanu “Balochistan: Is US backing London’s plan to dismember Pakistan?”
http://www.vijayvaani.com/ArticleDisplay.aspx?aid=2144 ( Accessed April 20, 2013
iii. the world’s leading source on intelligence information
iv. Brigadier (Retd) Khan, Dr. Ahsan ur Rahman. (2012)The Balochistan Issue: Land People
v. Military scholar Lieutenant Colonel Peter, Ralph “Blood borders How a better Middle East would look” Armed Forces Journal 2006 http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/06/1833899 (Accessed April 20, 2013)
vi. Chossudovsky, Prof Michel “The destabilization of Pakistan” http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-destabilization-of-pakistan/7705 (accessed November 25, 2013)
vii. S.Harrison, Selig “The Chinese Cozy Up to the Pakistanis” THE NATIONAL INTEREST march 2011 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/chinese-cozy-up-pakistanis-5027 (Accessed May 5, 2013)
viii. ibid
ix. In 2001 during an interview, the then Director General of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, Lt. General Khalid Kidwai, declared Pakistan’s nuclear threshold is premised on four benchmarks. The territorial threshold (the use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan would only be contemplated if India attacks and occupies a large part of Pakistan), the military threshold (if India manages to destroy a large part of Pakistan’s armed forces),the economic threshold (if India economically strangulates Pakistan) and the political threshold(if India foments any political and internal unrest in Pakistan through subversive measures)

The article Global Geopolitics Behind Turbulence In Balochistan: Regional Repercussions And Policy Options For Pakistan – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By IPCS

By Ayesha Khanyari

After months of negotiations, the P5+1 and Iran have managed to reach an understanding on Tehran’s nuclear programme that gives each side a small portion of their demands. In exchange of temporary relaxation of sanctions, the P5+1 reached an interim agreement to freeze parts of Iran’s nuclear programme.

After years of estrangement between the US and Iran, what pushed Iran to clinch a deal which dragged on due to lack of consensus? Does the deal signal the end of the Cold War between Iran and the West or just a temporary thaw? Does the deal indicate a fundamental restructuring of Iran?

The Iranian government cannot be indifferent to the harsh consequences of the most crippling sanctions in history. Such back-breaking sanctions have affected Iran’s economy with high rates of unemployment, lower levels of productivity and rising poverty. The relief from sanctions is overwhelmingly welcomed by the leaders of the Islamic Republic.

Given the state of its economy, Iran cannot afford going to war with the US. It would rather join hands with the adversary than go against it. Its economy cannot absorb the cost of going to war with a super power. It would be a nightmare scenario for both Iran and the US.

Despite the long festering stand-off between the US and Iran, some issues have found common ground. The US and Iran both face a common threat – the Salafi Sunni extremist al Qaeda, which abhors Shiite Iran as much as the US. However the hostility between Iran and the US has prevented them from coming together against this threat. With the revised relations between the two, this common enemy can be dealt with.

Hence the situation at home was such that it didn’t leave Iran with much choice than to comply with the great powers and agree to give up a little in return of greater benefits.

The Other Side of Iran

Iranian intentions might not be all that benign. The Obama administration believes that Iran can play a positive role in addressing the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in Syria. For the US, it is important to engage Iran for finding a political solution to the Syrian conflict. However there is no indication that Iran will back off from its support to President Bashir al Assad and not ensure his survival. On the contrary, all indicators suggest Iran’s support for the inhuman attacks by Assad on his own people will continue to flow unabated.

The Israelis are quite vocal about their scepticism of US-Iran rapprochement. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu argues that the slowdown is occurring simply because Iran already has all the capacity needed to produce a bomb. The Israelis fear a strategic realignment that will help Iran rise as a regional hegemon in the near future with US at its side. To claim its position in the region, it needs the US to keep the hardliners at a distance.

Iran’s vested interest in the deal is apparent. Once the threat of sanctions is over, Iran can flex its muscles in the region without the US pointing its gun at it. An unrestrained Iran is what the West Asian countries fear.

Is Iran Truly Changing?

The primary concern for the Iranians was to survive the economic malaise and thwart war. Political freedom and human rights became lesser priorities for them. Once a full blown deal is in place, possibly within a few months, will Iran’s focus shift towards issues of democracy, human rights and freedom? The United Nations’ special rapporteur on human rights in Iran Ahmed Shaheedi’s report read “….ethnic, linguistic and other minorities continue to see their rights violated in law and in practice.” He also adds, ‘prisoners of conscience’; hundreds more remain in detention, many of them with ‘inadequate provision of food, water and medical treatment’. His report highlights the fact that a moderate Rouhani is not looking forward to paint Iran along democratic lines as the different sections of minority groups are still targeted repression and violation of their rights.

Iran has hence realised that to reconstruct its economy and get it back on track it needs US support. However, when it comes to reorienting its society; it is still a long tale of unfulfilled promises.

Claims about a restructured Iran can only be testified when both its economy and society experience change and openly welcome ideas of democracy and freedom. How far beyond the nuclear deal the US-Iran friendship will last is questionable. It comes across as a temporary fix than a long-term restructuring strategy to end the Cold War between the two. However, the interim deal opens the path for addressing other issues between Washington and Tehran and a way to go about for further cooperation.

Ayesha Khanyari
Research Intern, IReS, IPCS
Email: ayesha.khanyari@gmail.com

The article Iran Nuclear Deal: End Of Cold War Against The West? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By RSIS

Lebanon is on the brink of an abyss again. Who were behind the recent twin suicide attacks outside the Iranian embassy in Beirut? Why were the Iranians targeted? What are the potential implications for Lebanon?

By Ahmed Salah Hashim

THE TWIN suicide attacks outside the Iranian embassy in Beirut on 19 November 2013 by a Sunni militant group known as the Abdullah Azzam Brigades (AAB) killed two dozen people and wounded more than 140 others. The origins of AAB are shrouded in mystery while the group’s activities seem to span several countries in the Middle East.

The use of the name “Abdullah Azzam Brigades” goes back to 2004, when a group adopting this name claimed responsibility for a series of bombings against tourist facilities on Egyptian resorts in the Sinai Peninsula. Egyptian security eventually dismantled the network that carried out the attacks and the Egyptian AAB quickly disappeared from sight.

Who are the Abdullah Azzam Brigades?

In 2005 three rockets were launched at targets in Jordan’s Red Sea port of Aqaba. The attacks were claimed by the AAB and other groups, including Al Qaeda in Iraq. Jordanian security traced the attack back to a cell operating under the command of Abu Musab Zarqawi in Iraq who was allegedly seeking to establish a group to facilitate the flow of jihadist fighters into Iraq from Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. The AAB which launched the attack on the Iranian Embassy this month originated from this group which is focused on the Levant, namely Lebanon and Syria.

AAB in the Levant is an amorphous Sunni militant group named after the famous Palestinian Islamist thinker and activist, Abdullah Azzam, who played a prominent role in promoting Muslim involvement in the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan and was Osama Bin Laden’s mentor. The founding leader of the AAB in the Levant was curiously a Saudi national named Salih al-Qar’awi who is now in Saudi custody.

AAB’s geopolitical narrative

As leader of AAB, Qar’awi showed himself to be immensely hostile to Iran which supported the Lebanese Shia movement Hezbollah. One of the group’s first media releases was a September 2010 documentary titled “The Oppressed Sect,” a simplistic and conspiratorial look at the region’s contemporary politics, in which the oppression of Lebanon’s Sunni minority becomes the principal narrative. Syria’s government and Hezbollah are seen as ruthless players engaged in a conspiracy directed from Iran to keep the Sunnis in Lebanon down.

This is tied to what it sees as a regional conspiracy by the Shias and Iran to oppress the Sunnis and to help Israel maintain the integrity of its borders and proceed with its territorial despoliation of the Palestinians. This is then further woven into a broader narrative of the improbable global repression of the Sunnis at the hands of the Shia in Lebanon, Syria, the Jews/Israel and the West, and Iran.

Until the attack on the Iranian Embassy in Lebanon, the AAB in the Levant had remained out of the spotlight. Although this may be the result of a deliberate strategy which had primarily focused on establishing media credentials, its initial organisational weakness and rivalries with other Sunni militant groups in Lebanon played a role in the fact that it was a latecomer to violent action in Lebanon. In early 2011 the group urged Syrians to protest peacefully against the Damascus regime saying violence would undermine the uprising. This stance did not last; and its leadership began exhorting the Syrian people to violently oppose the regime. It sent cadres to participate in the war against Assad in Syria where they gained combat experience.

Since June 2012 it has been led by another Saudi national, Majid Bin-Muhammad al-Majid. Under al-Majid it continued to promote itself as a protector of Sunni Muslims and has repeatedly alleged Shia domination of Lebanon, blaming the militant group Hezbollah for Lebanon’s instability. Under al-Majid it began to prepare itself for violent political action.

Implications of attack on Iranian Embassy

Given AAB’s ideological hatred for Shias and Iran, it is not surprising that the Iranians became a target. Although well-protected, the Iranian Embassy was a much softer target than taking on the formidable Hezbollah on its own turf. The dual suicide attacks were undertaken by the Ziad al-Jarrah Battalion – named after one of the al Qaeda members (a Lebanese) who piloted one of the hijacked planes on 9/11. The AAB provided two justifications for the deadly attack on the Iranian Embassy. First, it was designed to force Hezbollah to withdraw from Syria. Second, it was to pressure the Lebanese government to release incarcerated Sunni militants.

Timing seems to have played an important role. In June 2013, AAB put out a statement railing against Iranian involvement in Lebanese politics. The statement also attacked Iran for its support of the Syrian regime. Indeed, around the same time, the tide of the war seemed to be turning in favour of Damascus as a result of support from Iran and Hezbollah. In fact, Hezbollah units played an important role in trouncing the Sunni militants in the battle of Qusair earlier this year. Currently, the Assad regime is moving to consolidate its successes by cutting off the Sunni militants from their supply lines in Lebanon.

The attack on the Iranian Embassy was both retaliation and a message. Al Qaeda’s affiliates in Syria and Iran are on opposite sides of the Syrian civil war which, itself, is part of a larger conflict between Sunnis and Shias. Al Qaeda’s two affiliates inside Syria, the Al Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and Bilad al-Sham, or Levant (ISIS), are fighting Assad’s forces, which are backed by Iran and Hezbollah which have provided troops and advisers to Damascus. Iran is unlikely to allow this assault on its embassy to go unpunished. However, it is equally unlikely that it will lash out blindly in revenge.

Tehran does not wish to seek full-blown sectarian violence in Lebanon. Nonetheless, Tehran is likely to retaliate in a covert manner either against AAB itself, against Sunni militants in Syria, or possibly against third parties which it sees as direct supporters of militant Sunni groups.

Ahmed S. Hashim is an Associate Professor with the Military Studies Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

The article Attack On Iran’s Embassy: Who Are The Abdullah Azzam Brigades? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Dr. Habib Siddiqui

An OIC (Organization of Islamic Countries) delegation, which included foreign ministers and senior officials from its member states Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Djibouti, and Bangladesh recently visited Myanmar. It was led by the OIC Secretary General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu. The OIC delegation pressed for unhindered access of humanitarian aid to all affected people and communities, including Rakhine (Arakan) State, without any discrimination. They also stressed the need for clarifying misconceptions and misunderstandings on both sides and for building mutual trust and interfaith community harmony.

As has become the norm in this mostly Buddhist country that has come to signify the den of intolerance and hatred of our time, the OIC delegation was, however, met by angry demonstrators, esp. in the Rakhine state, which has seen more than its share of ethnic cleansing of the Muslim minorities. Some 3,000 protesters, led by Buddhist monks, staged their demonstrations in Rakhine’s capital Sittwe (formerly called Akyab) as they toured camps housing mostly displaced Rohingya refugees as well as some ethnic Rakhines and met local officials. The delegation’s visit to Myanmar’s commercial capital Yangon on Friday also saw nearly 1,000 people, carrying “No OIC” placards.

The protests of this kind – organized by the members of the central government and local administration, Buddhist politicians and monks – are nothing new. These are a show of defiance against everything noble and humane. These dark, hideous and savage forces of Theravada Buddhism want to hide their monumental crimes against humanity and want to starve to death the remnants of the Muslim minority who mostly now live in abject poverty as Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) in squalid camps.

Last year, the Buddhist government similarly did not allow the fact finding missions from international agencies, including the OIC, to tour the ethnically cleansed territories. It also did not allow opening up an OIC office in the Rakhine state. In the midst of government-sponsored protest demonstrations, the OIC had to pack up and leave, which only emboldened the savage regime and its supporters within the apartheid state to repeat their crimes against the Rohingya – who, according to the UN, are the most persecuted people on earth – and other Muslim minorities.

So the plight of the Rohingya and other Muslim minorities continues unabated inside apartheid Myanmar. In ethnic cleansing drives in this country, the victims are usually the Rohingyas and yet they end up in the prisons (and not the Buddhist marauders) overwhelmingly. A peaceful demonstration may cost them their lives in this Mogher Mulluk. The same security forces which did nothing to stop lynching of Muslim victims have no moral qualms in killing them unprovoked for staging a peaceful demonstration.

As has been noted by the Associated Press on November 24, 600 Rohingya Muslim men were recently thrown in jail in this remote corner of Myanmar during a ruthless security crackdown that followed sectarian violence, and among one in 10 who didn’t make it out alive.

An eyewitness described that when she visited the jail, the cells were crammed with men, hands chained behind their backs, several stripped naked. Many showed signs of torture. Her husband, Mohammad Yasim, was doubled over, vomiting blood, his hip bone shattered. “We were all crying so loudly the walls of the prison could have collapsed,” the 40-year-old widow said. “They killed him soon after that,” she said of her husband. Her account was corroborated by her father, her 10-year-old son and a neighbor. “Other prisoners told us soldiers took his corpse and threw it in the forest.” “We didn’t even have a chance to see his body,” she said.

In early November, three Rohingyas were killed. One Rohingya man was murdered by Rakhine villagers when collecting firewood in the forest. Another two were killed and four wounded after riot police opened fire during clashes. In Pauktaw Township the situation remained tense with many of the remaining Rohingya villagers being forced into an IDP camp allegedly for their own security by army and police. Many are afraid because the camp, funded by an international aid group, is very close to a village with only Buddhist Rakhines.

Buddhist security forces have been allowed to operate with impunity. As a result of such brutality, unfathomed discrimination by state authorities and their obvious collusion with the Rakhine (Magh) extremists towards never-ending pogroms life has only gotten worse for Rohingya. They see no way out but to board rickety boats for Bangladesh, or make the perilous journey to Malaysia. Many have already drowned trying when their boats capsized.

In spite of Myanmar’s Government’s zealous efforts to hide its complicity and crimes against humanity, truth has been leaking out. Consider, for instance, the testimony of Mr. Thomas H. Andrews, President and CEO of United to End Genocide on September 19, 2013 in front of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. In that, he provided his first-hand account of visits made in Burma. He travelled to Rakhine State in the west where he visited eight IDP camps and spoke with dozens of desperate IDPs. He also travelled to the central and northern area of Mandalay and the city of Meiktila where he visited neighborhoods and met with many people and families who continue to live in fear and desperation. He also came across Muslims in Rangoon whose fear and intimidation was on the rise in Myanmar.

During his trip, Mr. Andrews was blocked by security forces at roadside checkpoints from visiting IDP camps. The reason was clear. They did not want him to hear what had happened to the Muslim community inside Myanmar. Nevertheless, the signs of destruction were everywhere and he was able to see burnt out buildings and destroyed Mosques, meet with those who had to literally run for their lives after watching their homes and everything that they had worked for destroyed. They were living in abject poverty in makeshift camps wanting desperately to return and rebuild their village but also utterly terrified by the Buddhist mobs, Myanmar security forces and police even more.

Throughout his travels, Mr. Andrews heard stories of systematic discrimination, isolation and blanket oppression where every aspect of life of members of the Muslim minority was controlled. People described living in constant fear of violence within their communities and intimidation by authorities. The right to move from one village – or even one street – to another, the right to earn a living, to get married, to have more than two children and even the right to live with one’s own family was often dependent on the permission of authorities and most often only after the payment of bribes.

He found that hate speech – a precursor of genocide – was prevalent in Burma. Fueling it was a systematic, well organized and well funded campaign of hatred and bigotry known as “969”. It followed a well established pattern:

1) Campaign organizers arrive in a village, distributing DVDs, pamphlets and stickers that warn Buddhists that their religion and their country were in peril as Muslims seek to eliminate both and establish a Muslim caliphate;

2) Villages are invited to a special community event to hear a message from venerable Buddhist monks about how they can protect their families, nation and religion;

3) Radical nationalist monks arrive at the designated time and deliver fiery hate-filled speeches warning that Muslims are plotting to destroy Buddhism and take control of the nation. Villages are encouraged to support the movement by signing petitions, and displaying “969” stickers on their homes and businesses. They are encouraged to only patronize those who displayed the stickers and boycott any Muslim owned or operated business.

As I have documented earlier, the hateful rhetoric of these radical Rakhine monks and the “969” campaign is ominously reminiscent of the hateful propaganda directed at the Tutsi population and their sympathizers in the lead up and during the Rwandan genocide, let alone the Nazi-led Holocaust more than half a century earlier. Demanding the expulsion of all Rohingya from Burma, these monks urge the local population to sever all relations with not only the Rohingya, but also with what are described as their “sympathizers”. Labeled as national traitors, those Buddhists who associate with Rohingya Muslims also face intimidation and the threat of violence.

Gregory Stenton, President of Genocide Watch, documented eight stages of genocide – Classification, Symbolization, Dehumanization, Organization, Polarization, Preparation, Extermination and Denial. Human rights watchers have long concluded that the Rohingyas are facing genocide in Myanmar, and this crime must be stopped.

Last week (Tuesday, November 19) the U.N. General Assembly’s human rights committee passed a resolution urging Myanmar to give the stateless Rohingya minority equal access to citizenship and to crack down on Buddhist violence against them and other Muslims. In its response, an official of the Myanmar government said that it will not allow itself to be pressured by a U.N. resolution.

Presidential spokesman Ye Htut insisted in a posting on his Facebook page that the government does not recognize that there is a group called Rohingya, referring to them instead as Bengalis.

As I have noted above, such defiance by the rogue Myanmar regime is not new and unless checked vehemently it will continue to defy the world community. The elimination of Muslims there has become a national project enjoying widespread support from Nobel disgrace Suu Kyi to president Thein Sein. Thus, the UN has to go beyond passing soft resolutions that don’t bite the rogue regime.

A reading of history shows that genocide succeeds when state sovereignty blocks international responsibility to protect its persecuted group. It continues due to lack of authoritative international institutions to predict it and call it as such. It happens due to lack of ready rapid response forces to stop it and lack of political will to peacefully prevent it and to forcefully intervene to stop it.

Since founding of the UN, at least 45 genocides and politicides have taken place in our world resulting in deaths of some 70 million people. It is a shameful record that needs to be improved.
The time for soft talk with Myanmar is over. It is high time for the UN Security Council to authorize armed intervention in Myanmar by a UN force under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter. The Mandate must include protection of Rohingya civilians and humanitarian workers and a No Fly Zone over the Rakhine state. The Rules of Engagement must be robust and include aggressive prevention of killing.

The major military powers (e.g., the USA, Russia and the UK) must provide leadership, logistics, airlift, communications, and financing. If Myanmar will not permit entry, its UN membership should be suspended. Myanmar’s leaders should be tried in an international criminal court for committing and aiding crimes against humanity. Nothing short of these will be able to stop these savage criminals. Sooner the better.

The article Time For Soft Talk With Myanmar Is Over – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.