By SATP
By Giriraj Bhattacharjee
On December 3, 2013, an angry mob lynched a militant-extortionist, identified as Raban Basumatary, belonging to the Ranjan Daimary faction of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-RD), at Sengimari area under Krishnai Police Station in Goalpara District. Another militant, Kamal Khakhlari, was also reported to have been critically injured. “The duo had threatened a businessman in the area and demanded money from him. But, when they came to fetch the money, angry people gheraoed them and started beating them up,” a Police officer explained.
This incident comes just days after the signing of a six months long tripartite Suspension of Operations (SoO) with NDFB-RD, the Central and the Assam Government on November 29, 2013, at the Headquarters of the Special Branch (SB) of Assam Police at Kahilipara. The agreement was signed in the presence of Shambhu Singh, Joint Secretary (Northeast) in the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA), State Home Secretary, G.D. Tripathi, Additional Director-General of Police, Special Branch (ADGP-SB), Pallab Bhattacharyya, ADGP-Law and Order A.P. Raut, and a six-member delegation of NDFB–RD leaders. The NDFB-RD delegation was led by Ranjan Daimary alias D R Nabla. The group now joins another 12 militant groups who have reached accommodation with the Government: the Pro-Talks Faction of NDFB (NDFB-PTF) with whom an SoO was signed on May 24, 2005; the Pro-Talks faction of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA-PTF), with whom an SoO was signed on September 3, 2011; the Karbi Longri North Cachar Hills Liberation Front (KLNLF), which surrendered arms on February 11,2010; as well as the Adivasi Cobra Military of Assam (ACMA), the Birsa Commando Force (BCF), the Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA), the United Kukigam Defence Army (UKDA), the Kuki Liberation Army (KLA), the Hmar Peoples Convention-Democratic (HPC-D), the Adivasi People’s Army (APA), the All Adivasi National Liberation Army (AANLA) and Santhal Tiger Force (STF), all of whom laid down arms on January 24,2012.
According to the latest SoO, two designated camps will be set up in Lalgudam in Udalguri District and at Panbari in Dhubri District for 579 cadres of the NDFB-RD. According to a November 30, 2013, report, the faction had earlier deposited 40 weapons with the Police, but was told at the meeting to deposit the remaining weapons within six months. Daimary, who signed the agreement, submitted a list of 602 cadres, but after the verification process, the actual strength was found to be 579. NDFB-RD leaders are reported to have been told in clear terms that all their cadres would have to stay at the designated camps, and could not leave the camps without obtaining prior permission from the Superintendents of Police (SP) of the respective Districts. The designated camps will be guarded by Police personnel, and Close Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras will also be installed. The NDFB-RD had, earlier, declared a unilateral ceasefire in April 2011, after several setbacks over the preceding three years. The NDFB-RD’s shift to a negotiated settlement commenced after the ‘handing over’ to India of its ‘chairman’ Ranjan Daimary, by Bangladesh, in May 2010. This was quickly followed by the ‘handing over’ of ‘vice-chairman’ NDFB-RD, Rajen Goyari alias G. Rifikhang and ‘finance secretary’, Dorsang Narzary, on April 20, 2011.
Joint–Secretary (Northeast) Shambhu Singh, who represented UMHA at the signing of SoO, disclosed that the ground rules were more stringent in the present case, and “The process of depositing of arms should be over on or before the next date of review and the weapons will be kept in Police armoury.”
On November 23, 2013, during the annual conference of Directors General of Police, Union Home Minister (UHM) Sushilkumar Shinde had highlighted the adverse affect of such agreements, noting, “Many of these (ceasefire) agreements are being flouted by the militants, who are indulging in extortion affecting the lives of common people. Recently, there have been public protests in certain areas against such extortion activities. The State Police Forces need to enforce the ceasefire agreements so that relief could be provided to the people.”
Sources indicate that the signing of the ceasefire agreement with the NDFB-RD is likely to improve the effectiveness of counter-insurgency (CI) operations against the I.K. Songbijit faction of the NDFB (NDFB-IKS). Sources pointed out that the Security Forces (SFs) were having trouble in differentiating between the two groups. However, after the signing of the ceasefire agreement with the NDFB-RD, members of this outfit would be restricted to their designated camps and would all be given photo identity cards. This will help the SFs to separate the cadres of the two formations and focus operations against the NDFB-IKS.
Unfortunately, SoO agreements in the past have mostly led to splits and violence within SoO groups, including the earlier undivided NDFB.
The undivided NDFB’s tryst with peace started when the original group, then led by Ranjan Daimary, declared a ceasefire on October 8, 2004, following the State Government’s offer of negotiations. This was followed by the signing of a tripartite SoO. Little was achieved between 2005 and late 2008. However, following the naming of Ranjan Daimary as the prime accused in the October 2008 serial blasts, which left more than 90 people dead and 300 injured, the first split occurred in the group, with two faction emerging, one led by Ranjan Daimary and the other led by the then ‘vice president’ B. Sungthagra alias Dhiren Boro. On December 15, 2008, an ‘NDFB General Assembly’ replaced Ranjan Daimary with Dhiren Boro as a new ‘President’, on the grounds that Daimary was involved in the serial blasts. The Government continued the SoO with NDFB-PTF led by Dhiren Boro and started peace talks after the faction dropped the issue of ‘sovereignty’.
NDFB-RD is now also trying to ‘reach out’ to other factions – NDFB-IKS and NDFB-PTF – to join it in the peace talks. According to a December 1, 2013, report, Daimary admitted that he had recently got in touch with Songbijit, and tried to persuade him to join the peace process. Replying to a question regarding Songbijit’s decision to split from the NDFB-RD at a time when he was the outfit’s ‘commander-in-chief’, Daimary stated, “I was in jail when the division took place. Songbijit might have been frustrated with the delay on the part of the Government in responding to our unilateral ceasefire. As Songbijit is in Myanmar, the possibility of him coming under pressure from Paresh Baruah, ‘commander-in-chief’ of the Independent faction of United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA-I) and SS Khaplang, of the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) also cannot be ruled out.” NDFB-IKS has so far not commented on the issue.
The NDFB-IKS’ split was announced on November 20, 2012, by the then NDFB-RD’s Myanmar based, ‘army chief’ I.K. Songbijit, who, vowed to “work and fight together with vigour and determination to liberate Boroland” and “Western South East Asia (North-East India)”. The split was announced following a November 13-14, 2012, meeting, leading to the formation of the I.K Songbijit faction [NDFB-IKS]. Worryingly, since its formation, NDFB-IKS has been found to have been involved in killing, abduction and extortion incidents across the Bodo Territorial Autonomous District (BTAD). In the latest incident, six persons, including three children, were injured in a grenade blast by suspected NDFB-IKS cadres at Bongaigaon town in Bongaigaon District on November 25, 2013. One of the minors, two-and-a-half-year-old Sumit Barman, succumbed to his injuries on November 27.
Meanwhile, NDFB-PTF’s continued engagement with the Government has not resulted in any breakthrough apart from the extension of the SoO periodically. SoO with NDFB-PTF was last extended on September 12, 2013, and will expire on 31st December 2013. NDFB-RD’s ‘Chairman’ Daimary had expressed the hope of a meeting with NDFB-PTF in the near future, noting, “NDFB-PTF is already in peace dialogues with the Government and now we too have come forward. I hope someday we will meet at some point.” NDFB-PTF had on the other hand said that any dialogue is not possible till Ranjan Daimary places its demand before the Government.
NDFB-PTF has also been found to be involved in cases of abduction and extortion during the period of the SoO. According to a February 11, 2012, report, SFs arrested 46 NDFB-PTF cadres on charges of abduction and extortion and recovered 37 weapons from them, between 2005 and 2011. More worryingly, a February 8, 2012, report stated that a total of 108 NDFB-PTF militants fled their designated camps between 2010 and 2012.
While peace overtures between the various NDFB factions move tentatively forward, NDFB-RD has shown no such desire for reconciliation with its bitter rival, the now-disbanded Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT). NDFB-RD described the 2003 Bodo Accord signed with the BLT as a failure. The Bodo insurrection has led to two accords till date, both without the involvement of the NDFB. The first of these was with the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) and its political wing, the Bodo People’s Action Committee (BPAC), in 1993. This was followed by the 2003 Accord, which was signed with the Hagrama Mohilary led BLT, and led to the formation of the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC).
Besides the Bodo outfits, the non-Bodo formations like the Adivasi and Kamtapur militant groups are also active in Bodoland Territorial Area Districts (BTAD) areas and engage in criminal activities including extortion and intimidation. Recently, a Bengali militant outfit named National Liberation Front of Bengalis (NLFB) led by Abhijit Das, its “commander-in-chief”, announced its formation on November 20, 2013. NLFB took responsibility for planting bombs in the Alipurduar-Kamakhya Inter-city Express and also in Chirang and Kokrajhar Districts, in protest against the Government’s alleged failure to check extortion and abduction of Bengalis living in BTAD. All the bombs had, however, been safely recovered by November 21.
The presence of multiple militant formations in BTAD areas adds to the tense ethnic relations between different groups, variously due to competing ethnic assertions, compounded by land alienation and the problem of illegal immigration, which led to the ethno-religious clashes between Bodos and Muslims in 2012. UHM Sushil Kumar Shinde, expressing his concern about prevailing situation in the area on November 23, 2013, stated, “Special efforts are required to check the growing mistrust, particularly between Bodos and non-Bodos in the BTAD and its adjoining areas.”
Unfortunately, the situation has been further destabilized by the declaration supporting the formation of a separate Telangana State, to be carved out of Andhra Pradesh, by the Congress Working Committee (CWC) on July 30, 2013, and its subsequent endorsement by the Union Cabinet on October 3, 2013. This has resulted in the renewal of the demand for various separate Tribal States to be carved out of Assam, including Bodoland and Kamatapur, demands that had been diluted earlier on the grounds that non new States could in principle be established unless a new State Reorganisation Commission had defined the fundamental criteria for such divisions. Worryingly, the territories of both the proposed Kamtapur and Bodoland State overlap. Further, the demand of the proposed Bodoland is strongly opposed by non-Bodos in these areas. Moreover, the State Government has ruled out any division of Assam.
The SoO with NDFB-RD will be one more addition to the long list of agreements signed between the Government and rebel formations, but any enduring solution to the ethnic polarization in Assam, and to the ‘Bodo issue’, will remain elusive, unless the polarization of communities in the region, and the desire to ‘resolve problems’ by creating majoritarian enclaves, each with its own alienated minorities, is abandoned.
Giriraj Bhattacharjee
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management
The article India: Piling Up On Non-Solutions In Assam – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.