By IPCS

By Mariam Safi

If the rise in violence this month is any mark of the year that is to be, then we can conclude that 2014 will turn out be an ominous year for Afghans. The winter season in Afghanistan, which tends to witness a reduction in fighting, has in fact faced a sharp rise in violence, shocking many in Afghanistan. In Kabul alone there have been several attacks, in and around the fortified diplomatic enclave, targeting both local and foreign security personnel, government and military installations. Many believe this to be a glimpse of what is yet to come, as Afghanistan gets ready to hold its third Presidential elections in April 2014.

US Lt General Mark Milley has predicted that this trend is likely to continue into 2014 with insurgents targeting. For many locals, this scenario has reinforced their anxieties concerning the prospects for 2014 being a pivotal year, marking the end of the security transition process, withdrawal of international troops, and handover of all political, security and development responsibilities to the Afghan leadership. While the challenges to peace and security are many, the solutions however are extremely limited and difficult to reach in the time-lines that have been set. One such mechanism has been the Afghan peace and reconciliation programme (or peace process) which was launched in 2010. This process envisioned political means to facilitate military measures for reconciliation and reintegration of insurgents through talks and negotiations. This process was to assist the security transition process and set the stage for the handover of all responsibilities from international to Afghan ownership by the end of 2014. However, the lack of achievements coupled with consistent setbacks and growing obstacles have done little to set the foundation needed to ensuring peace and stability post-2014. With the prospects for reaching a peace deal with the insurgency almost next to none, many are left wondering what to expect from it in the post-2014 period.

The Afghan peace process is a two-tiered initiative with a reintegration and a reconciliation pillar, both of which have been implemented simultaneously. The reintegration pillar has been implemented at the sub-national level where foot soldiers are enticed to reintegrate and take advantages of the financial incentives provided by the ‘Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme’. The reconciliation pillar on the other hand has been implemented at the national and regional levels where the Taliban leadership has been approached to participate in official channels of communication with the Afghan government in the hopes of starting a negotiation process that could lead to a peace deal. Thus far the Afghan government has been able to reintegrate 7,375 foot soldiers and local commanders, making reintegration a relatively successful programme, whereas reconciliation efforts have consistently hit roadblocks with no major achievements to date.

The Afghan government and its international partners have tried to win over the top tier of the insurgency by employing several trust-building mechanisms. These include the release of Taliban prisoners by the Afghan government, removal of UN sanctions and blacklist against former Taliban members, the creation of a political address for senior-level Taliban commanders for their participation in mainstream politics, allowing representatives of the insurgency to participate in track II meetings abroad, offering Taliban and other armed groups non-elected positions and opportunities to be included into the power structure of the state. In response, the Taliban have increased their attacks across Afghanistan, continued to engage in indiscriminate killings of civilians as reflected in the spike in civilian casualties observed in 2013 which marked the second highest recorded year since 2001, targeted killings of Afghan government officials including the High Peace Council members, parliamentarians, and Afghan National Security Forces, continued implementation of their draconian laws in areas under their influence, refusal to enter peace talks with the Afghan government whom they still refer to as a puppet regime which has sustained their inflexibility in accepting the ‘red-lines’ for entering negotiations (which include accepting the Afghan Constitution and breaking ties with international terrorists groups including al Qaeda). While many experts will argue that the Taliban have shown a steady willingness to negotiate over the years, their actions however continue to denote another tone.

It remains highly doubtful that the Afghan government and its international backers will strike a peace deal with the Taliban before 2014 or even in the immediate post-2014 environment for that matter. This is not surprising considering that in the past five years the Afghan government and the international community have been largely unsuccessful, and that such efforts have become ever more daunting as the security transition process enters its last tranche and the international community is set to withdraw by the end of 2014 irrespective of the scenario that emerges between the Afghan government and the insurgency by the end of this year. At the current juncture, ground realities continue to display the Taliban to be in a position of strength, a trend that has been strengthened, instead of weakened, by the peace process.

Mariam Safi
Afghan Institute of Strategic Studies, Kabul

The article Afghanistan, US And The Peace Process: A Deal With The Taliban In 2014? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By SATP

A five-day anti-Naxal (Left Wing Extremism), multi-State offensive, led by Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), was executed between December 27-31. During the operation, CRPF and Jharkhand Police troops neutralized a Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) arms manufacturing unit in the Simdega District of Jharkhand. The factory had reportedly been set up two months earlier, and had lathe machines, which were procured from Kolkata [West Bengal]. The Forces also discovered that the factory was being run on electricity from generator sets looted from BSNL towers in the vicinity. Further, Security Forces (SFs) were alarmed to find a “unique dual switch mechanism” that could be activated by remote control and also serve as a timer device to detonate explosions.

In a separate incident, a Maoists cadre, Ramesh Munda, was killed and another, Lalmohan Munda, was arrested in an encounter with SFs in Lobed village in the Adki Block of Khunti District on January 14, 2014.

SF efforts notwithstanding, Jharkhand has maintained the dubious distinction of recording highest number of total fatalities, as well as of civilian fatalities, among Left Wing Extremism (LWE)-affected States for the second consecutive year in 2013, even as the CPI-Maoist appeared to be losing some momentum in the State. According to data released by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA), Jharkhand witnessed a total of 162 fatalities – 120 civilians, 30 SFs and 12 Naxals – in LWE-related incidents in Jharkhand in 2013, while Chhattisgarh recorded a total of 148 fatalities – 66 civilians, 44 SFs and 38 Naxals – in the year.

Though Maoist fatalities in direct encounters with SFs were low in Jharkhand in 2013, the total number of Left Wing Extremists killed, if fratricidal gunfights are taken into account, was much higher. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) data base, at least 57 Maoists were killed in Jharkhand through 2013.

SF losses remained at roughly the same level over the past four years, with 30 killed in 2013, despite an overall decline in Maoist violence since 2011, suggesting that the Maoists have retained their capabilities in Jharkhand.

The Maoists sent shockwaves across the country at the very beginning of 2013, when they killed nine Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel and one Jharkhand Jaguars trooper in an ambush near Amawatikar village in Latehar District, Jharkhand, on January 7, 2013, and then surgically inserted Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) inside the abdomen of two dead CRPF troopers. They kept the momentum going till the middle of the year with another four major attacks (each involving three or more fatalities) — two against SFs, one against civilians and one against the People’s Liberation Front of India (PLFI), a splinter group of the CPI-Maoist. However, Maoists suffered heavily in at least two major reverses – one at the hand of Tritiya Prstuti Committee (TPC) and another at the hands of the SFs. In a third incident, the Police claimed that eight Maoists were killed, but not a single body was recovered.

Two points of significance emerge: one, the Maoists were not involved in any major incident in Jharkhand after July 2013; and two their fratricidal war against TPC and PLFI has intensified further.

A range of other parameters suggest that, though the Maoists could not sustain their early pace through 2013, they have been able to retain their overall capacities in the State.

While the number of LWE incidents remained comparable between 2011 and 2012, there was a 20 per cent decline in 2013. Similarly, the number of attacks on the SFs (including landmines) had remained comparable in 2011 and 2012, but the decline was sharp, from 21 to 14, between 2012 and 2013. The number of arms snatched also declined from 30 to just 8. The number of training camps organised fell from 12 in 2012 to nine in 2013. Significantly, the number of Jan Adalats (‘people’s courts, Kangaroo courts organised by the Maoists) almost doubled, from 23 in 2012 to 41 in 2013. The number of encounters with the Police also increased from 43 to 55, though the number of arrests declined marginally, from 377 to 332. Maoist attacks on economic targets also remained low:

According to partial data compiled by SATP, incidents of killing (civilian, SF and Naxal) were reported from 16 Districts in 2013 – Latehar (33), Gumla (26), Khunti (18), Simdega (9), West Singhbhum (9) Chatra (12), Dumka (6), Garhwa (3), Hazaribagh (3), Seraikela-Kharswan (3), Giridih (2), Ranchi (2), Bokaro (1), East Singhbhum (1), Palamu (1) and Ramgarh (1). In 2012 incidents of killing were recorded in 14 Districts.

Among other patterns of violence recorded by SATP, the Maoists engaged in at least 12 incidents of arson in six Districts – Latehar (3), Palamu (3), Hazaribagh (3), Bokaro (1) Jamtara (1) and Lohardaga (1). LWE groups were also involved in eight incidents of abduction through 2013, and triggered at least eight landmine blasts in the State. Jharkhand recorded at eight major incidents in 2013, as against six such incidents in 2012.

An analysis of Maoist violence, as well as of overground and underground activities, through 2013, indicates that a total of 16 Districts, including Bokaro, Chatra, Dumka, East Singhbhum, Garhwa, Giridih, Gumla, Hazaribagh, Khunti, Palamu, Ranchi, Seraikela-Kharswan, Latehar, Ramgarh, Simdega, and West Singhbhum, remain highly affected; Dhanbad and Lohardaga are moderately affected; and Koderma, Deoghar and Godda are marginally affected by LWE.

A peculiar feature of LWE violence in Jharkhand is that various splinter groups (which have broken away from the CPI-Maoist) continue to operate, in addition to the CPI-Maoist. The most prominent among these groups include the PLFI, TPC, and Jharkhand Prastuti Committee (JPC). These splinter groups are strongly antagonist to the CPI-Maoist, though they are also engaged in fratricidal struggles among themselves. The most significant clashes have occurred between TPC and the Maoists and the Maoists and PLFI. In the first five months of 2013, the Maoist share in LWE violence stood at 51 per cent, PLFI at 29 per cent, and TPC at 15 per cent. This was a continuation of earlier trends in this regard, and while disaggregated data is not currently available, there is no evidence to suggest that the trend changed significantly in the latter half of 2013.

SFs have planned and carried out large operations especially intended to corner CPI-Maoist Central Committee member Deo Kumar Singh alias Arvindji, who is leading the Maoist operations in Jharkhand, but without success. However, as a by product, the relentless pursuit, in one instance, probably led to a Maoist group taking shelter in a TPC dominated area, resulting in a gunfight between the two in which 10 Maoists, including some senior cadres, were killed. Other than that, there are some significant catches – 11 according to SATP data – in terms of arrests of ‘commanders’ or senior level cadres of the CPI-Maoist, and nine others from PLFI.

Meanwhile, the Saranda Development Plan, a project that was intended to showcase the ‘clear, hold and develop’ policy, implementing major projects to benefit local populations after the Saranda Forest area had been freed from Maoist dominance in August 2011, continues to be implemented at snail’s pace. This is despite the fact that Union Rural Development Minister Jairam Ramesh is personally monitoring the progress of the Plan. The first Integrated Development Centre (IDC) was inaugurated at Digha on April 26, 2013, by Ramesh, after several deadlines had been missed. People vented their ire at Ramesh at the inauguration function, complaining about several issues, including poor road construction quality, illegal felling of trees, unemployment, lack of livelihood and problems in getting promised old age pensions. Ramesh did get a feeling of the seriousness of the problem, but could only say, “I know, I know. Your complaints are genuine. Please don’t lose hope. I will ensure roads come up by the year-end.”

Even as the implementation of development plans move at snail’s pace, a key environment ministry panel, Forest Advisory Committee, the statutory forest clearance panel, has been extraordinarily ‘proactive’ in recommending that mining be allowed in the Saranda Forests, lending some credence to the allegations that the motive behind the preceding security operations was to give secure access to mining companies to the iron ore rich area. Significantly, when Ramesh was Environment Minister, he had argued that only the Government owned Steel Authority of India Ltd. (SAIL) would be allowed to mine the area. However, private companies, like JSW Steel, and Jindal Power and Steel and Rungta Mines, have now been given clearances for mining in the Saranda area.

The Jharkhand Police Population ratio has improved from 167 Policemen per 100,000 population on December 31, 2011, to 178 as on December 31, 2012, well above the national average of 138, though it remains substantially below the level needed to deal with the State’s complex problems of law and order administration, and of security. At least 22 battalions of CRPF are also currently deployed in the State.

Maoists in Jharkhand seem to be hanging on, despite some pressure from the SFs. The marginal decline in violence as well as in the visible strength of Maoists in 2013 cannot provide extraordinary solace to the state, particularly in view of the fact that the Maoists appear to have been avoiding any direct confrontation with the SFs during the second half of the year. There are also apprehensions that the state may slow down operations against the Maoists, especially after Hemant Soren of the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) formed his Government in July 2013. Soren has expressed the hope that Jharkhand’s LWE problem would end within five year, though he appears to have placed his principal reliance on ‘dialogue’ with the rebels. The JMM has a past history of deep ambivalence towards the Maoists under the Chief Ministership of Hemant Soren’s father, Shibu Soren, and this significantly enabled the consolidation of the Maoists in the State, even as it hobbled SF operations. It remains to be seen whether Hemant Soren will follow in his father’s footsteps in this regard; preliminary statements and indications suggest that this may well be so.

The article India: Jharkhand Assessment 2014 – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By SATP

On January 2, 2014, two cadres of the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) were killed in an encounter with Assam Rifles (AR) personnel at Holam village in the Khonsa area of Arunachal’s Tirap District. Two civilians were also killed in the cross-fire. Security Force (SF) personnel later recovered two AK-47s, a sniper rifle and an M-16 rifle from the incident site. The operation had been launched following information that some militants were hiding in the village.

This latest incident was the continuance of an established trend of periodic intrusions and violence in largely peaceful Arunachal Pradesh. On November 17, 2013, for instance, AR personnel shot dead an NSCN-IM militant at Kharsang village in Changlang District. The deceased was identified as ‘lance corporal’ Aron Gonmei from Tamenglong District [Manipur]. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least four militants [three from NSCN and one from United Liberation Front of Asom-Independent (ULFA-I)] were killed in the State in three encounters through 2013. One encounter with SFs in 2012 had resulted in the death of one ULFA militant. Another three militants [two from NSCN-Khaplang (NSCN-K) and one from NSCN-IM] were killed in 2012 in factional clashes between NSCN-IM and NSCN-K.

2013 also saw the arrest of 22 militants, including 11 from NSCN-K, six from NSCN-IM, three from ULFA-I, two from the IK Songbijit faction of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-IKS). There were 31 arrests during 2012, including 21 United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) cadres, three ULFA-I cadres, three Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres, two NSCN-IM cadres, and a cadre each of NSCN-K and the Naga National Council (NNC). In one incident, SFs arrested NSCN-K ‘revenue secretary’ and ‘intelligence head of Lohit District’ Hongloan Lowakhao alias Paul, along with four of his accomplices, on December 22, 2013.

Significantly, there were no civilian or SF fatalities during 2013. The last civilian killing in a terrorism-related incident in Arunachal Pradesh had taken place over six years ago, on November 28, 2007, when one civilian was killed and another 14 were injured in a bomb attack by ULFA militants at Bordumsa in the Changlang District. Similarly, the last incident in which an SF trooper was killed was also recorded in 2007, on October 25, when three AR personnel and a civilian were killed and eight persons were injured in an ambush by NSCN-IM militants in a remote jungle in the Tirap District.

Arunachal had recorded a total of 63 fatalities, including 40 civilians, 12 SFs and 11 militants, in 2001, the peak year of militancy in the State.

Clearly, the peace established in Arunachal was further consolidated through 2013. Nevertheless, a considerable militant presence in the State is also evident. Apart from the groups already mentioned, other outfits present included the National Liberation Council of Tani Land (NLCT), United Liberation Council of Arunachal (UCLA), Arunachal Dragon Force (ADF), Arunachal Naga Liberation Front (ANLF) and Tai-Khamti Liberation Front (TKLF).

Though the various militant groups in Arunachal have not attacked civilians or SFs over the past years, factional fights among the two most prominent outfits, NSCN-IM and NSCN-K, to secure dominance in certain areas – particularly the Districts of Tirap, Changlang and Longding, which border Nagaland and have provided them safe sanctuaries – have the potential of endangering future peace. These groups are also engaged in significant acts of extortion which largely go unreported. The All Arunachal Pradesh Student’s Union (AAPSU) President, Kamta Lapung, in a statement issued on April 3, 2013, thus alleged that the NSCN factions were thriving on ‘extortion’ and soc-called ‘donation’ money’. Confirming this, outgoing Arunachal Pradesh Governor, General (Retd.) J. J. Singh, on May 23, 2013, thus observed:

The people of three eastern Arunachal Districts – Tirap, Changlang and Longding – are living in fear due to the presence of cadres of the two NSCN factions [NSCN-K, NSCN-IM] in the area, who resort to kidnapping, extortion and factional feuds. The problem of Arunachal is directly linked with that of Nagaland. The Centre should immediately resolve the Naga issue to bring peace and normalcy to these districts.

Significantly, these three Districts are part of NSCN-IM’s projected State of Nagalim (Greater Nagaland). Since the signing of the 1997 Ceasefire Agreement between the Centre and the NSCN-IM, both parties have held over 80 rounds of talks, without any solution. The latest round of talks took place on November 21, 2013, where it was decided that contentious issues need further and extensive discussion.

Apart from these two Naga outfits, ULFA-I has strong presence in the region. The Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) in a statement issued on November 4, 2013, noted, “In Arunachal Pradesh, ULFA-I cadres use the Lohit, Changlang and Tirap Districts for infiltration and exfiltration to Myanmar, where the base camps of the outfit are located. The outfit uses these areas extensively for temporary transit camps while on the move as well as to escape counter insurgency operations in Assam.”

Meanwhile, another emerging concern is the presence of CPI-Maoist cadres in the State. The Union Minister of State for Home Affairs, R. P. N. Singh, on March 20, 2013, disclosed that movements of CPI-Maoist cadres had been reported from the Lohit and Lower Dibang Valley Districts of Arunachal Pradesh. According to the SATP database, at least five Maoists have been arrested from the State – three in 2012 (all from Lohit) and two in 2011 (all from Lohit). However, no Maoist was arrested in the State in 2013.

The presence of the 53,000 strong Chakma and Hajong refugees in Arunachal Pradesh as well as the influx of other foreigners, have also raised concerns among locals from time to time. Indeed, an AAPSU memorandum on November 30, 2013, urged President Pranab Mukherjee to deport Chakma-Hajong refugees and all other foreign nationals from Arunachal Pradesh. The memorandum read:

The illegal settlement of Chakma and Hajong refugees has resulted in marginalization of indigenous tribes like Noctes, Wangchow, Khamtis, Singphos and Tsangas in the eastern-most part of Arunachal, while in the western part of the state, the Tibetans, Bhutanese and Nepalese are exerting their dominance over the indigenous Monpas, Sherdukpens, Akas and Mijis. In central part of the State, there is a floating population of Bangladeshis which has created tension among Nyishi, Adi, Galo, Apatani and Tagin tribes.

Realising the challenges posed by these residual concerns, the Union Government extended the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act-1958 (AFSPA) in the State on November 4, 2013, for another six months. AFSPA is being enforced in Districts of Tirap, Changlang and Longding (carved out of the undivided Tirap District) since September 17, 1991.

The State has a thin Police presence, with 9,627 State Policeman in total though the very low population of the State raises the Police-population ratio to an extraordinary 764 Policemen per 100,000 populations, compared to the national average of 138. However, as compared to a national average of 52.9 Policemen per 100 square kilometres, Arunachal has just 11.5 Policemen per 100 square kilometres. The problem is further compounded by the very poor physical infrastructure of the State. With an area of over 83,743 square kilometres, the State has a road density of just 14.96 kilometres per 100 kilometre area, as against a national average of 42 kilometres/100 square kilometres. The State also lacks a civil airport and a rail network, though a skeletal helicopter service to some of its major towns has now been established. Union Minister for Road Transport and Highways C.P. Joshi, on February 5, 2013, disclosed that only 100 kilometres of the 2,400-kilometres long Trans-Arunachal Highway announced under the Prime Minister’s package for Arunachal Pradesh had been completed so far. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had announced the project in the capital Itanagar on January 31, 2008.

Meanwhile, the State Government is pressing for the creation of two new Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) in the bordering Districts of the State. The State Assembly had passed two resolutions in 2004 and 2007 for the creation of the Patkai ADC covering Tirap and Changlang Districts (including the subsequently created Longding District); and the Mon ADC, covering Tawang and West Kameng Districts. This move has raised some concerns among security experts. An unnamed senior Army Officer, on December 23, 2013, warned that “more money could mean more extortion, besides development”. ADCs directly receive funds earmarked for them by the Centre. This step, moreover, may be a prelude to demands for formation of more such ADCs and the rise of militant groups around this issue. Notably, the UPDF, led by its ‘commander-in-chief’ Sumona Munglang, had emerged in the State in 2011, with the objective of creating an ADC out of nine administrative circles in Lohit and Changlang Districts. The group, however, suffered a setback when several of its cadres, along with Sumona Munglang, were arrested in 2012.

The political classes have often failed to initiate pragmatic steps, taking long term repercussions into account. Arunachal Pradesh is not only afflicted by the overflow of insurgencies from its neighbourhood, it is also under significant threat from China, which has laid claims to much of its territory. Accelerated development of the State’s infrastructure and economic profile is necessary, not only to provide a better life to the people of Arunachal Pradesh, but also to secure a durable peace and the national interest.

The article India: Arunachal Pradesh Assessment 2014 – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By SAAG

By R. Upadhyay

When the Lok Sabha elections are only a few months away, the union Minority Affairs Minister K. Rahman Khan while inaugurating an Urdu festival on January 3 in Maharashtra flagged off a huge column of about 50,000 school students carrying banners and raising slogans demanding promotion of Urdu language.

Expressing anguish he said, “the Muslims have never held a protest or campaign for the protection and promotion of Urdu language despite the “Constitutional right to demand protection of our mother tongue”.

The Minister knew very well that except for a limited group of Muslims in UP, Bihar and some other urban centres in north and central India, Urdu is not the mother tongue of Muslims all over the country. Yet he is propagating a lie that the Urdu language is the mother tongue of the entire Muslim community in India and what is worse- he is desperately linking the language as part of Muslim identity.

The Minister who is part of the present government deliberately ignored the fact that the communal legacy of Urdu was the first issue taken up for dividing the Indian society during British rule. What should be our concern is that these demands are being given prominence just on the eve of elections. We saw this in the State elections in Uttar Pradesh in 2012 when the Union Minister Salman Khurshid took up the issue of reservation for Muslims which was the legacy of All India Muslim League and not that of the Congress. Historically, Urdu was born out of the socio-administrative requirement of the Muslim conquerors who preferred to settle down in the regions around Delhi. In this, they broke from the traditions of the past invaders like the Huns or Kushans in Arabising and Persianising the local dialects and used it as the lingua franca for communication between the alien soldiers and the native dwellers.

This linguistic separatism played a major role in creating a communal divide from which India is still to recover.

Sir Sayed Ahmad (1817-1898), a first British loyal Muslim leader turned the Urdu-Hindi controversy into a political one at the cost of Hindu-Muslim unity against the British. Sayed’s snobbish observation before the Education Commission (appointed by the British) that Urdu was “the language of gentry and Hindi that of the vulgar”, was repudiated by his contemporary Hindi protagonist Babu Harish Chandar. He retorted that “Urdu was the language of dancing girls and prostitutes” (Yusuf Abbasi- Muslim Politics and Leadership in the South Asian Sub-continent, p.90). Since then Urdu has been mired in one controversy or other and used as a political tool to continue the communal divide during British India and after.

Replacement of Persian with Devnagari from the language of the courts on 18 April 1900 by McDonnell, the Chief Commissioner of Oudh gave fresh ammunition to Muslim leaders to demand the restoration of Urdu in place of local language. The then Mohammedan Anglo Oriental Defence Association (an outfit of the Aligarh movement) was renamed as the “Urdu Defence Association” and an aggressive campaign thus began. This movement soon converted itself into one in search of a “muslim identity” which they believed is cannot be done without promoting an aggressive agitation in favour of Urdu language.

‘Jinnah, who could not write his own name in Urdu, included the question of Urdu as one his famous fourteen points and cynically used it as a tool to forge a Muslim identity.’ (S.K.Ghosh, Muslim Politics in India, 1968, p.15.) He exploited Urdu to widen the gap of cultural divide between Hindus and Muslims though ‘he could not speak a word of Urdu’.( Rafiq Zakaria, The Widening Divide, p.105.) At the height of the partition demand by the Muslim League, the Muslims repudiated the slogan that was ‘Urdu-Muslim-Pakistan’.

Urdu does not have any religious or Islamic cultural identity. Had it been so, there would not have been any conflict between the Urdu speaking Muslims of West Pakistan and Bengali speaking Muslims of East Pakistan, which is now Bangladesh. Had Urdu been the cultural legacy of Islam, Muslims all over the world would have adopted it. In the present day, Urdu has just become another issue for our minister in the government in his self-seeking political interest and vote bank politics.

Pressure for “vote bank politics” was noticed when Urdu was made the second official language in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh. One may ask- Has it helped Urdu in spreading to other places or more popular? The answer is a definite “No”.

Since 1947 till today the sole agenda of the community leaders has been to frighten the innocent masses of the danger of their identity being lost. Besides Mosque and Madrasa, recognition of Urdu for Muslim identity has been added.

Unfortunately, the patron saints of political parties encourage such communal demands more to get their “vote bank support” and these issues start surfacing only at the time of elections and then left unattended until the next elections. Muslim identity is still secure without the Urdu language but such calls during election time do create confusion amongst the people.

It is not clear why the Muslim leaders in the political parties have not taken any initiative to launch any newspaper for the community that could be read all over. This could also help the community to understand the problems and challenges faced by the country from their perspective in an overall Indian context.

Note: The views expressed are author’s own.

The article Urdu And Muslim Identity In India – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Central Asia Online

The first decade of the 21st century was a decade of “real-transition” in social, political and public spheres of Afghanistan, analysts and political observers say.

“Afghanistan has changed a lot during the last decade,” Pakistani political analyst and social activist Aimal Khattak told Central Asia Online. “I just got back from a month-long stay in Kabul. I am really impressed by the socio-economic development.”

And under such an atmosphere, observers contend, there is no place for the Taliban, led by Mullah Mohammad Omar, a leader who has stayed out of the limelight in recent years.

“I do not see any support base for the Taliban order,” he said. “If Taliban wants to create a space in Afghan society; they have to change their ways.”

Zubair Shafiqi, a leading Afghan intellectual, writer and author, agreed.

“Afghans still remember atrocities under the Taliban, who ruled by sheer force,” Shafiqi told Central Asia Online. “The return of the Taliban is impossible in the prevailing circumstances. […] There is no attraction to Taliban style of governance for Afghans.”

Taliban movement is a rudderless ship

Besides the Taliban’s reputation for being ruthless leaders, another contributing factor to the loss of support for the militant group is that Omar seems to have faded from view. So silent has he been that some wonder whether he is still alive and about how effective his leadership is.

Aqil Yousafzai, author of several books on the militancy, questions Omar’s status.

Despite Omar’s tendency toward reclusiveness, it seems unlikely that a leader of his stature can stay in hiding for such a long time, he said.

“I am not sure [whether he is alive], but if he is, at the very least he is not leading the movement,” Yousafzai said.

Shafiqi and Khattak also expressed scepticism about the Taliban leader’s capacity and control over the movement.

Nobody has heard or seen any report about the reclusive leader’s whereabouts recently, they said.

It has been about 10 years since anyone has heard anything of substance from Omar, said Akhunzada Chattan, a former parliamentarian from Pakistani tribal areas.

“He would have been found out with the help of electronic intelligence if he was alive or commanding his men from the front,” Chattan added.

As democratic principles grow, space for militancy shrinks

There is likely a smattering of support in the rural areas of Afghanistan for the Taliban, but that is not substantive, mainly because it is not deeply rooted, Shafiqi said.

“This support is due to fear of Taliban, not love or liking of the insurgents,” he said.

Khattak, meanwhile, said the major hurdles against the Taliban’s return to power are: more political activism and the media transformation in the country.

Democratic ideals are taking root in Afghanistan, making the citizenry more aware of their rights and duties in a participatory government, observers said.

“[Afghans] are going to elect president for the third time,” Alhaj Ghazi Nawaz Tanai, head of the Afghanistan Tribal Solidarity Shura, said of the political progress, “[and they] have elected their parliament — both on the national and provincial levels — twice during the last 10 years.”

With freer elections, Afghans are now taking pride in electing their rulers, Tanai said. “To reverse this process is not possible.”

“Afghans will never let anyone reverse the [democratic] process and socio-political development,” Yousafzai agreed.

Progress in communications is also unprecedented in Afghanistan, Khattak said.

“[Mobile phones, internet, television and radio] are the true agents of change in Afghan society and are strengthening democracy,” he said.

The availability of information technology has politically revolutionised Afghanistan and the Pakistani tribal areas, Chattan told Central Asia Online.

“People of the tribal areas are politically more aware today than they were years before,” he said. “Insurgents might have the capacity to kill and run, but not to rule the people or control the land.”

“If the Taliban believe they are so popular, they should contest presidential and parliamentary elections and become rulers of Kabul instead of fighting,” Tanai said.

The article Mullah Omar Has No Place In Democratic Afghanistan – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Al-Shorfa

By Faisal Darem

Yemen’s economy posted positive indicators at the end of 2013, recording a growth rate in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of about 5.4%, according to a government report.

The Ministry of Finance report pointed to a number of positive economic developments over the year, including a rise in the rate of growth, a decline in the inflation rate and stability in the national currency exchange rate in relation to hard currencies.

The growth rate of real GDP rose to 5.4% in 2013, compared with around 2% in 2012 and a negative growth rate of 12.8% in 2011, the report said.

There has been a steady decline in the inflation rate, which has dropped from 19.3% in 2011 to 9% in 2013, and the local currency exchange rate has been stable, which positively impacts the productive sectors, experts told Al-Shorfa.

Improved revenues

“These positive developments were the result of the adopted economic policies and improved efficiency in the collection of oil and non-oil revenues,” said the finance ministry’s budget sector assistant undersecretary Ali al-Shamahi.

“The steady decline in the inflation rate to 9%, which is likely to continue to drop in 2014 down to 8%, can be attributed to the stabilisation of the exchange rate of the riyal against foreign currencies,” he told Al-Shorfa.

This encouraged the Central Bank to cut interest rates to help revive the national economy and facilitate lending to small and medium enterprises, which helped create new jobs, fight poverty and achieve an increase in production and the rate of growth, he added.

The preservation of the banking system’s foreign reserves at safe levels, sufficient to cover the import bill for a six-month period, contributed positively to stabilising the national currency exchange rate and thus limited inflation, al-Shamahi said.

The growth in non-oil revenues in the first 11 months of last year also led to an increase in customs and tax revenues compared to the corresponding period in 2012, with each growing by about 33%, he said.

“The relative political and economic stability stemming from the political settlement reached in the country encouraged entrepreneurs to resume their various activities,” Central Bureau of Statistics head Hassan Thabet Farhan told Al-Shorfa.

This, in turn, “reflected well on the economic indicators, especially the GDP growth rate, which would have risen even higher had oil production not been interrupted by the sabotage to the oil pipelines”, he said.

The Central Bank has had success implementing financial and economic policies to stabilise the price of the Yemeni riyal against foreign currencies, Farhan said, and this produced economic stability and led to a decline in the inflation rate.

The Central Bank follows a “managed float” policy, meaning it manages the currency exchange policy and controls prices by virtue of the autonomy it is granted in its founding law, he said.

Additionally, the Yemeni government in 2013 did not present an additional funding allocation to parliament for approval as a supplementary budget, in contrast to past practices, Farhan said.

Sanaa University economics professor Hamoud Aqlan attributed the positive economic indicators to the increase in the volume of production, especially industrial and oil and gas production, in comparison to the years prior to 2013.

The official aid Yemen received also contributed to the increase in the general growth rate, he said.

At the same time, Aqlan pointed to the clear decline in the volume of both local and foreign investments in the private sector, which he said has an adverse effect on development.

Aqlan called on the government to address this issue in the days ahead, pointing out that preliminary data show the volume of local investment averages no more than 8.5% of GDP, and 36% of the volume of private sector deposits with local banks.

The article Yemeni Economy Posts Positive Results In 2013 appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Central Asia Online

By Zia Ur Rehman

The Taliban’s recent attacks on Sufi shrines are giving people who oppose the militancy more fuel for their cause.

Police are investigating the January 7 killing of six men who were at the Ayub Shah Bukhari shrine in the Gulshan-e-Maymar area of Karachi.

Three of the men were custodians at the shrine, popularly known as Pahari Walay Baba, while the others were visitors.

“It seems that all of them were slaughtered with a sharp-edged dagger that was recovered at the crime scene,” Samad Khan, in charge of the local police station, told Central Asia Online.

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants left a note claiming responsibility for the massacre and warned the public against visiting Sufi shrines, he said, adding that the militants damaged the shrine’s walls and religious banner.

In another such attack this month, unidentified gunmen January 10 fatally shot two Ghazi Shah Baba shrine faith-healers in Mardan District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Taliban history of targeting Sufi shrines

Taliban militants have frequently targeted Sufi shrines in Pakistan, especially in the Pashtun region, and now are stepping up such attacks in Sindh and Punjab, according to Sufi leaders.

This does not come as a surprise given the TTP’s history of violence toward religious followers and their sacred sites.

Militants attacked at least 28 worship places (including four Sufi shrines) in 2013, killing 136 worshippers and injuring 453 others, according to an annual security report released by the Islamabad-based think tank Pak Institute of Peace Studies. The TTP and its affiliated groups claimed responsibility for the attacks.

One of the most lethal bombings of a Sufi shrine in recent years occurred in July 2010 when two suicide bombers targeted the shrine of Sufi saint Data Ganj Baksh Hajveri in Lahore, killing about 45 devotees and injuring dozens of others.

The attacks on shrines are thought to be linked to the arrival of Arab militants in Afghanistan, Asmat Khan Wazir, director of the Islamabad-based think tank Research Advocacy and Development (RAD), said. Such militants reject Sufi Islam and visits to Sufi shrines, viewing them as incompatible with the Wahhabi Islamic fundamentalism the TTP espouses, Wazir told Central Asia Online.

Killings widely condemned

Protest rallies to denounce the killings took place in Karachi January 8 and in Lahore January 10.

Religious scholars in Karachi organised a protest under the banner of the Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC) outside the Karachi Press Club. More than 50 of Pakistan’s top religious scholars associated with the SIC in July issued a fatwa against suicide bombings and other forms of terrorism.

“We condemn the gruesome killing of shrine visitors in Karachi and Mardan and denounce the Taliban’s violence,” SIC Secretary General Tariq Mehboob said, adding that Taliban militants have no legitimacy in Islam or in Sharia.

“Followers of Sufism have always condemned the Taliban’s un-Islamic acts, like beheading the innocent and bombing shrines and worship places,” Mehboob told Central Asia Online, surmising that the militants see Sufism as a threat.

The Taliban are trying to frighten the followers of Sufism, Allama Maqbool Aleemi, a Hyderabad-based religious scholar, said.

“First they attacked the shrines and killed Sufi leaders, but now they are slaughtering shrine visitors and faith healers,” Aleemi said, adding that Sufis spread a message of love, peace and inter-faith harmony that the Taliban are trying to discredit.

Sufi shrine security beefed up

The Sindh government, after attacks on Sufi spiritual leaders last February, devised a strategy to protect shrines and spiritual leaders across the province.

“The Sindh government installed cell phone jammers, walk-through gates and security barriers in all shrines in the province and directed district police officers to increase patrols around the shrines,” Muhammad Kaleem, an official in the provincial Awqaf (Islamic endowment) department, said.

Authorities are also protecting key Sufi shrines, including those honouring Shah Abdul Latif Bhittai (in Bhit Shah), Abdullah Shah Ghazi (Karachi) and Lal Shahbaz Qalandar (Sehwan), he said, noting that intelligence agencies declared them sensitive.

The article Pakistan: Religious Leaders Protest Taliban Attacks On Shrines appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By SAAG

By Dr. S. Chandrasekharan

After a delay of over two months, the interim Parliament convened on Jan 22 with the veteran 86 year old Surya Bahadur Thapa in the chair.

In all, 565 out of 601 members took the oath of office in 11 different languages, proving once again that Nepal being a multi ethnic, multi lingual country, multi cultural country, the decision to have a federal constitution appears to be the right choice of the people.

Though all parties vowed to bring in a new constitution within one year, it looks that from the way the parties took their own time to produce their list of candidates for proportional representation, that delayed the convening the parliament, it is very doubtful whether they could arrive at a new draft within the stipulated period. Even the dead line for submitting the list had to be postponed twice by the Election Commission to accommodate the parties!

There were many internal problems in the parties in choosing the candidates for the PR list. There was an acrimonious discussion in the UCPN (M) – (Dahal’s) central committee meeting that accused Dahal of having included his own candidates for the list without consulting other senior colleagues like Baburam Bhattatarai and Narayan Kaji Shrestha. Seats were supposed to have been sold to the highest bidders in some of the other parties. There appears to be a need to review the entire mode of proportional election system. One way could be for the parties to give a prioritised list even before the elections to avoid “horse trading” that is alleged to have occurred.

The Parties do not seem to understand the urgency of the situation and the mandate given by the people to get on with the constitution making has already been ignored!

Then there was the controversy over who would call for the assembly- the President or the interim Chairman of the council who conducted the elections. This controversy unfortunately was raised by the President’s office itself. It was finally discovered that the prerogative is not with the President.

The second issue was whether the President and Vice President could continue in their posts when fresh elections for another interim assembly had taken place. The Supreme Court on a PIL petition filed, declared that the present incumbents President and Vice President could continue till a fresh constitution is in place. Yet the UML and UCPN (M) are bent upon having a fresh election for the post of President and Vice President. The President, Ram Baran Yadav, having served over five years could gracefully leave in view of the controversy surrounding his continuation. Yet he is still digging his heels and this is another controversy that has unnecessarily arisen.

All the parties are having problems in electing their parliamentary leaders and for the Nepali Congress this is crucial as their leader would be the Prime minister being the party with the largest number of candidates.

The top three leaders of the Nepali Congress Sushil Koirala, Sher Bahadur Deuba and Ramachandra Paudel have ambitions of their own to be the next prime minister. Sushil has nothing else to recommend except in carrying the Koirala name, while Deuba had been a prime minister thrice and in one instance was openly declared to be incompetent. Paudel unlike Robert Bruce tried many times to be the Prime minister in the last assembly but failed. The talks amongst the three continued till late night of 25th and no consensus could be arrived at. An election had to be held. With Paudel and thirty of his followers throwing in their lot with Koirala, the latter won with 105 votes as against 89 votes for Deuba.

This election showed that there had been no real merger of the Deuba group with the main Nepali Congress groups and that the patched up merger has shown cracks once again.

With this kind of a split in the ranks of the Nepali Congress one wonders how they are going to carry on the government and produce a constitution within one year as promised. With their house in disorder how do they expect other parties to support them to produce the constitution which is still the main task of the present assembly? It looks that they are out to destroy the immense faith the people have placed on them to provide stability and move on!

It would have been much better and in keeping with the voters’ expectations if all the three top leaders had stepped aside and nominated a younger group to run the government. As I had said many times earlier, there is no dearth of young and capable leaders within the Nepali Congress.

The other parties appear to be in no better position and they are also riven by factions.

In the UML which made a surprisingly good showing, there are four leaders vying for the two posts of chairman and leader of the parliamentary party. The four leaders are Madhav Nepal, Jhalanath Khanal, K.P.Oli and Bom Dev Gautam. The last one Gautam who is the least influential is demanding that if he is not allowed the post of party chairman, he should at least be given the post of the parliamentary party leadership. Madhav Nepal has a natural claim as he was unseated by his own colleague Jhalanath Khanal by unfair means in making a deal with the Maoists! It is said that KP Oli has a limited following but will be the most acceptable to the other major party Nepali Congress! Yet, it looks that Madhav Nepal is leading.

The UCPN (M) led by Dahal is also having internal problems. In the central committee meeting held on January 18, Dahal was severely criticised by the party members for the election debacle. Many including Baburam Bhattarai sought a change in the leadership. There was also a demand for decentralization of power within the party. The meeting was held in a bid to reform the party and discuss the political strategy. The political paper presented by Dahal gave 10 external and 10 internal causes for the humiliating defeat. The point that emerged was that Dahal was no longer the “unquestioned chief” of the party” and the possibility of a further split in the party after Baidya’s exit cannot be ruled out.

It is the Madhesi parties that have realised that fragmentation of the Madhesi groups had resulted in their poor showing. Mahanta Thakur admitted that the defeat in the elections has weakened “the Madhesi strength” in the Parliament, but added bravely that they would not stop their struggle for equal rights! Three of the parties- the TMDP, Madhesi Janadhikar Forum-Nepal and Sadhbhavana party are on the verge of uniting and others may join.

One cannot but remember the efforts of late Gajendra Narain Singh who fought for the rights of Madhesis. In the 12th death anniversary meeting held on 24 January, members of all the major parties attended the function and praised the contributions made by G.N.Singh for the Terain cause. Daman Nath Dungana ex speaker in expressing his anguish over the fragmentation of the Madhesi groups said that another Madhesi movement may be necessary to safeguard the Madhesi interests. The Nepali Congress leader Amresh Kumar Singh said that G.N.Singh’s contribution was unparalleled as he raised the issue of Madhesi identity, citizenship and federalism at a time when talking on such issues was tantamount to challenging the state!

The focus of all the parties should have been in getting the new constitution on time within one year as promised and as expected by the electorate. Instead the parties are indulging in petty squabbling and in pursuit of power, thus forgetting their main task.

The article Nepal Post Elections: The State Of The Parties – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By CNA

By Kevin Jones

The upcoming beatification of Opus Dei lead prelate Bishop Alvaro del Portillo brings to prominence a man of deep faith and love of God, according to his biographer.

“He was someone who reached out to all kinds of people. He would befriend the doormen in the Vatican. They’d come over and say hello to him. He was interested in everybody,” Seton Hall University professor John Coverdale told CNA Jan. 24.

“There can’t be too many people who take up interest in the doorman.”

Bishop del Portillo, a native of Madrid, Spain, headed the personal prelature of Opus Dei from 1975 until his death in 1994. He will be beatified in Madrid on Sept. 27, with Cardinal Angelo Amato of the Congregation for the Causes of Saints presiding.

“He had confidence in God, confidence that Opus Dei was part of God’s plan for the Church, and that he was called to put his whole life at the service of seeing that actually happen,” Coverdale continued.

“That’s exactly what he did. He worked very hard, even in the final days of his life as an old man and much exhausted.”

Bishop del Portillo studied to be an engineer and received doctorates in philosophy, liberal arts and canon law.

He joined Opus Dei in 1935 and soon became a close collaborator of St. Josemaria Escriva, who founded the organization dedicated to spiritual growth and discipleship among the Catholic laity. The organization teaches its members to use their work and their ordinary activities as a way to encounter God.

Coverdale, a tax law professor and member of Opus Dei since 1957, is the author of a history of the prelature. He is now working on a biography of Bishop del Portillo.

The professor said Bishop del Portillo’s personality was “very different” from that of the “ebullient” and “high energy” St. Josemaria.

“Don Alvaro was a much quieter sort of person,” he explained.

However, his life showed his “complete availability” to the Church. He served in various Vatican congregations and commissions. During the Second Vatican Council, he served as a secretary and a “peritus,” or theological expert.

“He told one of his collaborators, who had been asked to take on a very onerous appointment in the Vatican, ‘just always say yes’,” Coverdale said.

The professor worked and studied in the Opus Dei headquarters for five to six years in the 1960s, alongside St. Josemaria Escriva and

At the time, the bishop was “very much a man in the background.”

“He made no effort to stand out or have people pay attention. He was there to second whatever the founder was doing, and help him in that.”

Coverdale was impressed that a man “of his enormous talent” would simply stand by to be there “in case he was needed.”

He described the bishop’s importance in Opus Dei as “extraordinary.” In addition to being a long-time aide and the “closest collaborator” of the prelature’s founder, Bishop del Portillo had a “very strong sense” of the spirit of the organization.

Upon St. Josemaria’s death, he helped maintain the continuity of Opus Dei’s spirit and practice, securing the organization’s status as a prelature – a special structure under church law – and helping secure the beatification of St. Josemaria.

Coverdale suggested that the death of St. Josemaria was the bishop’s “most dramatic” moment, due to his close friendship with the saint, with whom he lived and ate “every day for 30 years.”

“He had enormous affection for him, and was probably the person most saddened and upset by St. Josemaria’s death.”

But rather than simply grieving, Bishop del Portillo “immediately took up the reins” and wrote Opus Dei members a 30-40 page letter recounting the founder’s death.

“It must have been very hard to do, when, I am sure, he was in tears,” Coverdale noted. “He knew he had to take care of the other people.”

The biographer said he was also struck by “just how much” the man prayed.

“Not only did he celebrate Mass everyday and say the breviary and say the rosary and do an hour a day at least of mental prayer,” the biographer recalled. “Many times if he was traveling by car, he said multiple decades of the rosary.”

“There are all kinds of occasions when you see him simply returning to prayer as a way of solving issues and opening God’s grace for Opus Dei and for the Church as a whole,” Coverdale said.

Since the bishop’s death in 1994, many people have turned to him in prayer.

In July 2013, Pope Francis recognized a miracle attributed to the intercession of Bishop del Portillo. It involved the August 2003 healing of a Chilean newborn boy who suffered a 30-minute period of cardiac arrest and a major hemorrhage.

Although the newborn’s medical team thought he had already died, his parents prayed for healing through the bishop’s intercession. The baby’s heart began to beat again and he went on to live a normal life.

Monsignor Flavio Capucci, the postulator in charge of Bishop del Portillo’s cause for canonization, has said that he has received almost 12,000 signed reports from Catholics who believe they have received favors through his intercession.

The recognition of a second miracle is typically necessary for a blessed to become a saint.

Beatification events will include visits to Madrid’s Almuenda Cathedral and other places related to the bishop’s life and the beginnings of Opus Dei. Related events will also be held in Rome.

The current Prelate of Opus Dei, Bishop Javier Echevarría, said the Vatican’s Jan. 21 announcement of the beatification ceremony was a “moment of profound joy.” He said Bishop del Portillo “loved and served the Church so much.”

The article Opus Dei Bishop Showed ‘Enormous Faith,’ Biographer Says appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Eurasia Review

Reporters Without Borders said Tuesday it deplores the four-year jail sentence that Beijing Intermediate Court No. 1 imposed on the cyber-dissident Xu Zhiyong on 26 January on a charge of “gathering a crowd to disturb public order.” He got just one year less than the maximum of five years.

“We condemn both the harshness of the sentence and the way the trial was conducted,” said Benjamin Ismail, the head of the Reporters Without Borders Asia-Pacific desk.

“The judicial authorities flouted many procedural regulations, including those governing the right of defence. This legal farce was deplorable and confirms that the government has no time for international conventions. We call for Xu’s immediate release.”

Xu and his lawyer, Zhang Qingfang, chose to remain silent throughout most of the trial. At the end, Xu began to read a final statement entitled “In the name of freedom, justice and love,” but the judge cut him short after five minutes. Zhang had planned to call 68 defence witnesses but the court did not allow any of them to testify.

Foreign diplomats were not allowed to attend the trial, while police prevented TV reporters from filming outside the court, manhandling them and pushing them away. One plainclothes policeman forced an Agence France-Presse journalist to leave in a taxi.

The trials of other members of the New Citizens Movement that Xu founded – Ding Jiaxi, Li Wei, Zhang Baocheng and Yuan Dong – have begun since end of Xu’s trial.

As part of the current crackdown and wave of censorship, the well-known blogger and dissident Hu Jia was arrested at his Beijing home on 26 January and was held for several hours on suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.”

“The New Citizens Movement is not going to disappear because of the crackdown,” Hu told Reporters Without Borders. “We are going to continue demonstrating to get Communist Party officials to declare their assets and to obtain the release of our members who have been arrested.”

Hu added: “The arrests of members of the New Citizens Movement by the party’s political police constitute violations of civil liberties. Xu Zhiyong and the others are innocent. It is the members of the Communist Party’s judicial apparatus who are guilty.”

China is ranked 173rd out of 179 countries in the Reporters Without Borders press freedom index.

The article China: Four Years In Prison For Cyber-Dissident Xu Zhiyong appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By JTW

By Hasan Selim Ozertem

On December 17th, Kiev obtained important concessions from Moscow through an agreement between Ukraine and Russia. Accordingly, the parties have reached a consensus on certain economic issues. One of these compromises is that Ukrainian companies experiencing difficulties in exporting to Russia will create collaborative working areas with Russian companies for high-tech products, and thus develop trade. Apart from this there were two further fundamental matters of importance for Ukraine.

The Russian oil fund and the discount on natural gas

The first is related to the state of the Ukrainian economy. Ukraine’s economy has not achieved a status that gives positive signals since the 2008 financial crisis. After reaching a 2010 agreement with the IMF for a $15 billion package in return for reform, Kiev was not able to get its economy back on track. In fact, in order to face its structural problems and finance its situation, a $27 billion package was requested from Brussels in exchange for a partnership agreement with the EU. When the Yanukovych government could not receive what it expected from the EU, it agreed on a rather serious package with Moscow—though it did not reach the figures discussed with the EU. Accordingly, Russia decided to invest approximately $15 billion from its oil fund in Ukrainian bonds. Vladimir Putin stated that the agreement was made within the framework of the British legal system and a profit of 5% is projected for Russia. [1] The first bond sale with a $3 billion tender was made in December. A second tender around $2 billion was made in the last week of January 2014. Thus, $5 billion of the $15 billion package will thus be completed.

The second important issue is Ukraine’s price discount in the natural gas it gets from Russia. The parties agreed on a gas price of $268.5 per 1000m3 and will continue negotiating in the three-month periods. This is not to be taken lightly by Ukraine, which has paid around $400 for the same amount of gas in the past. Considering that Ukraine is 60% dependent on Russian gas, this concession will provide some economic comfort for in its finances. On the other hand, experts think that Moscow is politically strengthening Yanukovych’s hand with this deal. By decreasing the expenditures of the country’s very strong iron-steel lobby through this agreement, it’s expected that these lobbies will support Yanukovych in a more powerful way before the 2015 elections—if an early election is not held.

The IMF on the other hand thinks that the agreements with Russia will slow down the economic reforms and would retard the austerity measures in Ukraine. In particular, falling natural gas prices may cause a slowdown in the recent trend of declining natural gas consumption. Thus, IMF experts argue that natural gas prices should be raised. In addition to that, it should not be ignored that the IMF’s ability to pressure Ukraine on structural reforms through its $15 billion fund has been weakened by Russia’s fund of the same amount.

The ongoing protests in Ukraine

Russia is trying to attain a determinative role in Ukrainian politics by providing economic concessions. However, the gradual increase in the severity of the ongoing protests since the end of November 2013 is one of the most important issues concerning Moscow. Sergei Lavrov stated that the process in Ukraine has an increasingly high likelihood of getting out of control, and declared that Moscow aims to meet with the EU about Ukraine this week. On the other hand, the protesters seized the governor’s office in the Western cities of Lviv and Rivne last week and this week the occupied number of governorates reached to twelve with Kiev, Vinnytsia, Khmelnitsky, Volyn, Ternopil, Chernivtsi, Poltava, Ivano-Frankivsk, Zhytomyr, Chernihiv. The chaotic atmosphere extended to the other districts of Ukraine supports Lavrov’s statements about the process becoming more and more worrying.

Russia has already been trying to keep its finger on the pulse of the street as much as possible. Putin’s December meeting with Yanukovych about Ukraine’s accession to the Customs Union was expected to be an important meeting. However, the fact that no such decision was taken—if there is such a goal—can be read as an effort by Russia to spread the process across as much time as possible. Ukraine signed two 50-year agreements on shale gas research, one with Chevron in Lviv and the other with Shell in Kharkiv and Donestsk. If the research turns up positive results, there will be some certain risks for Moscow when it comes to using natural gas as an instrument for a long time, considering the potential of this gas reaching Ukraine’s 8-10 billion m3 production capacity and the plans Ukraine has made regarding LNG. In this respect, the Putin administration’s move to preserve its sphere of influence in its backyard by strengthening its position with new instruments should be considered as a rational but also risky political opening.

Although Russia has succeeded in convincing some Ukrainian elites through compromises, it has had problems in creating enough gravitational pull over Ukrainian society as a whole. In particular, judging by the ongoing demonstrations in the west of the country and the capital, the society sees the EU as more attractive, despite being rather costlier. According to some, it’s impossible for the protestors to endure behind their barricades for more than two months without some foreign help. This argument might have some basis, but considering the harsh weather conditions in the country, and the geographic-social divide the dynamics motivating these protestors need to be better analyzed.

Although the protests in the country started as pro-EU protests, they have evolved to a situation in which guns have begun talking and news of deaths has come. This shows the limits of elite based economically driven policies of Russia in Ukraine. The atmosphere on the streets shows that the situation in Ukraine has turned into a socially-driven political phenomenon. Yanukovich’s moves to negotiate with the opposition seem to be constructive, but have limitations. His efforts should be supported by Russia and the EU as well. The EU-Russian summit is a chance, but EU experts argue that the curtailed meeting to one day from the conventional summit of two days shows the EU’s concerns regarding Russian policies that undermine European efforts with economic instruments particularly in Armenia and Ukraine. [3] Yet, standing between EU and Russia and trying to find an exit from this political crisis, Ukraine continues to be special test case for both parties to develop a problem solving capacity.

[1] http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/20/business/international/imf-releases-rebuke-of-ukraines-financial-strategy.html.
[2] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25833391.
[3] http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/eu-and-russia-to-swap-recriminations-over-ukraine/493346.html.

Translated by Yağmur Erşan.

The article Russian Economic Power And The Ongoing Protests In Ukraine Amid EU-Russia Summit appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Eurasia Review

Jordanian lawmakers should undertake critical reforms in 2014 to remove or amend laws that place impermissible limits on free expression, Human Rights Watch said today in its World Report 2014.

Jordanian officials prosecuted people during 2013 on such vaguely worded charges as “insulting an official body,” “undermining the political regime,” and “disturbing relations with a foreign state,” to stifle peaceful expression. Authorities failed to bring the 1960 penal code into compliance with constitutional free speech guarantees strengthened by 2011 constitutional amendments.

“It’s shameful that Jordanian prosecutors can still imprison people who simply chant a slogan at a protest or voice an opinion about a leader,” said Nadim Houry, deputy Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. “Constitutional guarantees are just ink on paper if the authorities don’t get rid of penal code articles that undermine them.”

In the 667-page world report, its 24th edition, Human Rights Watch reviews human rights practices in more than 90 countries. Syria’s widespread killings of civilians elicited horror but few steps by world leaders to stop it, Human Rights Watch said. A reinvigorated doctrine of “responsibility to protect” seems to have prevented some mass atrocities in Africa. Majorities in power in Egypt and other countries have suppressed dissent and minority rights. And Edward Snowden’s revelations about US surveillance programs reverberated around the globe.

In September, prosecutors charged the publisher and the editor of the Jafra News website with “disturbing relations with a foreign state” after the site posted a third-party YouTube video that authorities deemed insulting to the brother of Qatar’s ruler. Authorities held them until December 31, when an appeals court ordered their release on bail and transferred their case from the State Security Court to the Amman Court of First Instance.

The State Security Court in May exonerated five students at Al al-Bayt University in the northern city of Mafraq of “inciting sectarian or racist strife,” but on January 20 a regular court convicted four of them for “insulting a religious symbol” and sentenced them to one month in prison. Prosecutors alleged that their style of dress and musical tastes indicated that they were “devil worshippers.”

The director of the Press and Publications Department on June 2 ordered the blocking of more than 260 news websites that had refused to register, as required under a 2012 amendment to the press law. Some registered in November after losing a lawsuit to overturn the order.

Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour announced in September that the government planned to amend the State Security Court law to end trials of civilians before the court except on charges of terrorism, espionage, treason, money counterfeiting, and drugs. Yet the penal code’s overbroad definition of terrorism includes such vaguely worded offenses as “undermining the political regime.” Dozens of protesters face terrorism-related charges before the State Security Court merely for chanting slogans or carrying signs at protests critical of the king and other officials.

In breach of international law, officials denied entry to certain groups of people fleeing Syria’s conflict, including Palestinian and Iraqi refugees residing in Syria, single males of fighting age, and people without documents.

The article Jordan Must Deliver On Promises To Respect Free Expression, Says HRW appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Eurasia Review

(CORDIS) — Our seas and oceans are a major priority for the EU, be from a political, environmental or scientific perspective. Preserving the resources of the sea, bringing prosperity to the fisheries sector, improving aquaculture technologies and practices, as well as raising citizen awareness are some of the key objectives the EU has set for the years to come.

The latest and most important move in this regard is certainly the reform of the Common fisheries policy, which aims to bring fish stocks back to sustainable levels. The Commission stresses that European citizens can only benefit from such sustainable use of resources over the long term, and is now backing the reform with a communication campaign designed specifically for the broader public.

European Commissioner for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Maria Damanaki is launching an EU-wide campaign to raise awareness on the reform. The campaign, named INSEPARABLE, puts emphasis on the strong ties between Europe and its seas. ‘For centuries, we Europeans have been inseparable from the sea and its fish. Fish are an important part of our diets, keeping us healthy. Fishing provides us with jobs. Fish help us prosper. This is why the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, agreed on in 2013, boosts the European fisheries and aquaculture sectors to make them more environmentally, economically and socially sustainable,’ Commissioner Damanaki explains.

INSEPARABLE urges Europeans to eat, buy and sell sustainable fish. Citizens will be given information on how they can make the small changes in their everyday lives to ensure we can keep fishing tomorrow.

In addition to this political and citizen-oriented approach, Commissioner Damanaki also regularly stressed the need to enhance the EU support to marine and maritime research through Horizon 2020. The EU has already approved 11 new projects to promote innovative solutions for water-related challenges for a total budget of EUR 50 million. These projects involve a total of 179 partners from research organisations and private companies (including more than 70 SMEs) across 19 European countries.

The article Seeking Land-Sea Harmony In Europe appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Al-Shorfa

By Waleed Abu al-Khair

Recent media reports have revealed instances of foreign fighters traveling to Syria with their families in tow for the purpose of engaging in “jihad,” experts told Al-Shorfa.

Reports and videos have emerged of the migration of said families to Syria and the emergence of so-called “family jihad,” they said, adding that the phenomenon constitutes a “serious threat” to the country’s future.

“The recruitment of fighters under the banner of ‘jihad’ to fight in the ranks of al-Qaeda in hot spots in the Middle East has become a systematic method employed by this terrorist organisation to give its sympathisers the illusion it is capable of recruiting fighters from all around the world,” said retired Maj. Gen. Wael Abdul Muttalib, a researcher with the Cairo-based Regional Centre for Strategic Studies who specialises in the affairs of terrorist organisations in Asia.

“This presence most often is for purely media and political purposes and does not have any actual military weight on the ground due to the small number of these fighters,” he told Al-Shorfa.

Fighters have been making their way to Syria from Muslim-majority countries and regions in Central and Southeast Asia such as Chechnya and former Soviet states such as Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan as well as Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and to a lesser extent China, Abdul Muttalib said.

These prospective fighters do not cross the border individually, “but rather the process is pre-arranged and carried out in full co-ordination with jihadist groups in Syria,” he said.

‘Family jihad’

In recent months, the families of jihadists have arrived in areas under the control of al-Qaeda affiliates such as the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) and Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN), including some from Chechnya and Tajikistan, said Mahmoud Rafih, a Syrian activist with the Manbij Local Co-ordination Committee in northern Syria.

Many migrant families live in a cluster of homes on the outskirts of Idlib, he told Al-Shorfa.

“They were housed in utmost secrecy,” he said. “However, their identities were soon discovered because their spouses visited them repeatedly, and it became known then that some of the Chechen mujahideen had brought in their families.”

“The matter became public after battles broke out between ISIL and other armed factions, and JAN issued a statement announcing its intention to protect migrant families and arrange their departure from the country if they so desired,” Rafih said.

The emergence of “family jihad” previously came to light in Chechnya and Afghanistan, said Mazen Zaki, director of the new media division at Ibn al-Waleed Studies and Field Research Centre in Egypt.

“It is a means used by extremist fighters such as al-Qaeda to recruit more young men who would otherwise hesitate to engage in ‘jihad’ because of familial and social ties, which explains the movement of large groups of families from Kazakhstan,” he said.

Recently, a video clip circulated about an extended family of 150 who migrated from Kazakhstan to Syria for “jihad,” Zaki said. The video, which ISIL posted online in October, showed men, women and children of all ages.

International concern

This type of migration could pose a serious threat in the future, Zaki said.

“The danger lies in these families, which are imbued with the ideology of terrorism, staying in Syria and affecting its social fabric in the future, which may be a calculated move by terrorist organisations to ensure the existence of fertile ground for its ideas and presence in general in Syria,” he said.

“Furthermore, the continued existence of these families will produce a new generation that is saturated with al-Qaeda’s terrorist ideas and sees Syria as a land of ‘holy jihad,’ in addition to the danger of that generation moving to other areas in the world ” for jihad, Zaki said.

Many governments are concerned about the spread of this phenomenon and about the proliferation of extremist ideology in their own countries when these families return, Abdul Muttalib said, and some governments are taking measures to address this.

In January, for example, Kyrgyz authorities announced they arrested a “senior terrorist ringleader” suspected of recruiting militants to engage in “jihad” in Syria, according to Al-Bawaba.

And President of the Russian Republic of Dagestan Ramazan Abdulatipov announced that passports would not be issued for external travel until the applicant is “fully scrutinised” and “the family to which the applicant belongs to is ascertained.”

The article ‘Family Jihad’ Erodes Syria’s Social Fabric – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Central Asia Online

By Zahir Shah

Pakistani citizens are outraged over the January 26 deaths of six children in the Babar Mela area of Hangu District who were killed by a bomb rigged to resemble a toy.

The children, siblings and cousins from the same family, discovered a ball-shaped hand grenade in a nearby field and played with it, thinking it was a toy. A seventh child was injured.

The children, ages 4-12, came to Hangu as refugees from the militancy-ravaged Orakzai Agency, District Police Officer Iftikhar Ahmed told Central Asia Online. They were buried January 27.
Officials condemn violence against children

KP officials are promising to punish the culprits.

“Those who are involved in the killing of innocent children in such a gruesome manner deserve no mercy,” KP Information Minister Shah Farman said.

The KP government is striving to restore peace and terrorists will not succeed in their designs to derail democracy and cripple Pakistan’s future generations, he said, adding that the country’s various political forces must join hands to curb a militancy that refuses to spare even children.

KP Chief Minister Pervez Khattak ordered an inquiry and issued a statement saying, “Measures have been put in place to avoid such incidents in the future.”

Aftereffects of the attack

The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) government announced a special package of Rs. 2m (US $19,000) for the family on top of the usual martyr compensation package.

Civil society, besides denouncing the crime, is calling for more awareness of the dangers of bombs disguised as toys. The militants have used toy bomb tactics before and even have put bombs in candy boxes, making it appear they are targeting children.

Children who fall victim to such bombs are intolerable collateral damage of militancy, Farhat Khan of the Female Human Rights Organisation said.

It’s essential, she said, to educate parents and their children about unexploded munitions and toy bombs.

The article Pakistan: Outrage Over ‘Toy Bombs’ appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By TransConflict

Both internal and regional stability, peace, and development will likely be affected by Myanmar’s commitment towards the integration of Rohingyas and other Muslim minorities in the peace process.

By Margherita Belgioioso

Myanmar’s (also known as Burma) Rohingya population is one of the most vulnerable ethnic groups in the world today. They have been stripped of their nationality and subjected to extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrest, and other abuses. Desperately seeking refuge and security many have fled their homes, moving to other parts of Myanmar, or leaving the country. Bangladesh, Thailand, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and China have been preferred destinations of this community in flight, but for the vast majority, their suffering has not ended upon leaving Myanmar.

The widespread persecution in their native Myanmar stems primarily from the 1982 Citizenship Law. This law defined a concept of Burmese nationhood based on being Burmese and Buddhist, and in turn justified the discrimination and persecution of the Rohingyas base.

The ‘legality’ of anti-Rohingya violence

Burma has a rich ethnic minority population which account for roughly 30% of the total Burmese population. The Rohingya Muslims are predominantly concentrated Rakhine State, in western Myanmar. There are no official figures, but it is estimated there are around 1.4 million Rohingya in Rakhine – approximately half the state’s total population - of which 800,000 reside in the three townships, making up 80% of the cities’ total population.

The Rohyngas in Rakhine define themselves as an indigenous Burmese ethnic group descended from Arab merchants which settled from the 8th century in Southern Eastern Asian Colonies. Until 1784 Rakhine (formerly known as Arakan) was part of an independent kingdom whose boundary included a southern portion of today’s Bangladesh. Arakan territory divided Islamic and Buddhist Asia. This is reflected by Rohingya language which is a mixture of Bengali, Persian, Arabic and Arakanese.

In 1962, a Coup established a military government in Myanmar. Since then, ethnic cleansing and human deportation against Rohingya has taken place. In 1982, the Citizenship Law made impossible for Rohingyas to be recognized as Burmese citizens. Decreeing stateless status for the Rohingya ethnic group, the Citizens Law forms the legal basis for the continuing arbitrary violence against the Rohingya community. From 1990 Rakhine was militarised and oppressive tactics against Rohingya intensified. Since then the state of affairs did not improved.

In June 2012, an outbreak large-scale violence against the Rohingya caused thousands of deaths and forced displacement of over 100,000 people throughout Rakhine State. Rohingya have been largely segregated in order to create ‘Muslim-free’ areas. At the end of 2012 UN estimates a further 13,000 displaced Rohingya. During the time of the violence, the website of the Burmese President carried a message stating that the only way to end communal violence in Rakhine State was to send Rohingyas to either UNHCR refugee camps or to a third country.

The credibility of Myanmar

Despite the ongoing democracy reforms, the meetings to promote dialogues with ethnic armed groups and the nationwide ceasefire, Myanmar’s for peaceful transition is, at best, incomplete. I believe that a genuine resolution for decades of armed and ethnic struggle can only come if the neglected minorities, such as Rohingyas, are fully integrated in the process of dialogue.

Unless steps are taken in this direction violence against Rohingya will be still be seen as justified in the years to come, with consequences for the stability and development of the whole region. In this sense, a lack of substantial measures appears evident. With the Citizenship Law still in place, for example, the first national census after thirty years, expected in 2014, will further marginalize Rohingya population with respect to the 2015 election.

The UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, Tomás Ojea Quintana, complains that the government is failing to address the causes of the violence in Rakhine and, most notably, to hold the security forces accountable for systematic human rights violations.

According to a recent brief by ALTSEAN research team, one year on from the renewed sectarian violence against Rohingya, the government has not taken any substantial steps towards a resolution. Government authorities continue to detain Rohingya activists and call for the enforcement of discriminating policies against Rohingya. Rafendi Djamin, Indonesian human rights activist and representative to the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), warns that the failure to control deadly sectarian violence by the Myanmar government could see violence escalate, leaded to likely genocide against the Rohingya minority

From January 2014, Myanmar will be the regional leader of ASEAN and chairman of the AICHR: the ASEAN Intergovernmental consultative body on Human Rights. The Arakan Project outlined in 2012 that the amendment of the Citizenship law, birth certificates and documentation to Rohingya children, abolishment of local policies of restricting marriages and births, the guarantee of quality health care, education services, access to food and the ban on forced labour, are all essential measures to ensure the protection of Rohingyas’ basic human rights.

Yet policies and restrictions institutionalizing racial discrimination remain in place for national security reasons and there is no plan to amend the 1982 Citizenship Law. Both internal and regional stability, peace, and development will likely be affected by Myanmar’s commitment towards the integration of Rohingyas and other Muslim minorities in the peace process.

Margherita Belgioioso recently finished her Master degree in Conflict Resolution and Peace at the University of Essex obtaining the distinction. She currently works as research and analyst intern on conflict and terrorism trends in Africa.

This article was originally published by Insight on Conflict and is available by clicking here.

The article The Rohingya In Myanmar: A Genuine Effort Toward Peace? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Al-Shorfa

By Ali al-Rawashdah

The Jordanian sports community is welcoming a new initiative to improve medical care provided to athletes and to treat emergencies that may arise during training sessions and matches.

Jordanian Crown Prince Hussein bin Abdullah II launched the Qusai Initiative in January in response to the November death of footballer Qusai al-Khawaldeh on the playing field.

Al-Khawaldeh, 19, who played for the junior team of al-Faisaly Football Club, lost consciousness during an official match and died of asphyxiation when his tongue blocked his airway.

The initiative aims to serve Jordan’s 28 sports federations, 340 sports clubs and more than 1,000 athletic training centres, in addition to public training centres.

Jordanian national basketball team doctor Louay al-Meriat said the move would improve safety for all the country’s athletes.

“Jordan has qualified people that could work in the [sports] medical sector, and this initiative will enable them to keep advancing that profession and enhancing it on an on-going basis, with all that is new,” he told Al-Shorfa.

The initiative “will raise the sector to new levels where all stadiums will be equipped to treat athletes.”

The Qusai initiative will also focus on prevention and awareness among caretakers and athletes and will seek to raise readiness levels, reduce injuries, offer advanced training to sports therapy cadres and offer a bachelor’s degree in sports medicine.

“This initiative came to fill a void in Jordanian sports, which lacks the necessary requirements for medical treatment as the clubs do not give it adequate attention,” said sports analyst Yousef Sawarkeh, a retired international referee.

Stadiums are not safe for competing teams and referees, he said: “The first priority must be to protect the players from recurrent injuries such as ‘tongue swallowing’, blood clots, heart attacks and even fractures.”

Nations have a duty to provide basic medical supplies for both major and minor league sports, including a paramedic, an ambulance and sometimes even a doctor on the pitch, he said.

An integrated system for the protection of players

“The initiative will create an integrated system for the protection and safety of players, and will train paramedics in all the clubs and federations to provide fast care, in addition to requiring sports federations to have an ambulance ready before every game,” Sawarkeh said.

It also authorises referees to postpone or cancel any match in the event a paramedic and an ambulance are not available, he said.

The initiative addresses a clear flaw in the sports sector, said sports analyst Awni Freij.

“Sometimes we see masseurs working under the guise of a sports medic, but they do not know the basics of first aid,” he said.

“Sports therapy has become an important field in medical science, and Jordanian sports must evolve along with developments in medical treatment and emergency care for athletes,” he added.

The initiative is receiving strong official and public attention, which will contribute significantly to its success and help to improve medical safety for athletes, said Al-Dustour newspaper sports writer Mohammed al-Rahahleh.

It is important to both train medical staff to deal with sports injuries and to raise awareness among players about prevention, he said.

The initiative is supported by the ministries of health and education, the Prince Hussein Academy of Civil Protection, the Royal Medical Services, Jordan’s Civil Defence, the Jordanian Olympic Committee, The Supreme Council for Youth, the Military Sports Federation and the Hashemite University.

The article Jordan To Enhance Medical Care For Athletes appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Iran Review

By Mahmoud Reza Golshanpazhooh

1. In her beautifully written book, The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam, Barbara W. Tuchman has explored the history of international relations from thousands of years ago up to the 1970s. In her extensive effort, she has presented several prominent examples of unwise and illogical measures taken by human beings as a result of which opportunities have been lost and peace has given way to war and destruction. The insanity and arrogance of the protectors of the ancient city of Troy, the foolhardiness of the Germans in attacking the British Navy during the World War I, the outlandish and irrational arguments given by the Japanese army commanders to justify their attack on the Pearl Harbor, and many other cases are among the prominent instances cited in this book, which make the reader feel great regret at the end of every chapter. Also, in his valuable book, When Things Go Wrong: Foreign Policy Decision Making under Adverse Feedback, Charles F. Hermann enumerates cases in which despite receiving negative feedback about their erroneous decisions in foreign policy, the politicians stubbornly insist on their viewpoints. At times, even some of them directly see the horrendous and destructive consequences of their decisions which have led to loss of good opportunities, but still stick to their viewpoints and decisions, make no revision to them and, therefore, inflict heavy losses on their countries. His book is full of good examples in relation to special situations that the American politicians face when making a decision and elaborates on how they react to such situations. When reading this book, one feels that politicians are sometimes possessed by evil spirits and lose any ability to see the future events or even pay attention to the threats that are posed to their countries at the present time.

2. During about two months that have passed since the signing of a nuclear deal [between Iran and the P5+1 group of world powers] in the Swiss city of Geneva, a weird atmosphere has been created and presented to the public opinion of the world, especially in Iran, by the executive and judicial officials of the United States, which is reminiscent of what you read in various chapters of the aforesaid books. Although the White House is apparently doing its utmost to prevent adoption of a new sanctions resolution by the Congress [against Iran], it should not be forgotten that the interpretation that the US Executive offered of the Geneva agreement immediately after its signing, was the main factor which led to more distrust between Iran and the United States. There is no doubt that nobody, whether in Iran or among the member states of the P5+1 group, expected nuclear negotiations and the conclusion of an agreement to be simple and easy. However, for any negotiations to bear fruit, both sides need to settle for a minimum degree of goodwill while taking care not to treat the opposite party with a condescending approach. At present, the true meaning of a number of concepts has been blurred in the negotiations. They include goodwill, mutual trust and commitment which are considered as the main pillars of any important negotiation. There is no doubt that in any negotiation both negotiating parties are aware that the negotiating table is no less than a real battlefield. Therefore, they should do all in their power in order to achieve their goals and protect their national interests, and should not be satisfied with apparent smiles and promises given by the opposite party. Despite the above facts, there is a subtle difference between negotiations and conflicts in that a minimum degree of commitment, trust and goodwill is needed for any negotiation to begin and continue. The question is do the American statesmen really imagine that if they continued with such dual behavior, they would be able to convince the public opinion that Iran has been the main reason behind a possible deadlock in nuclear negotiations? Here, the value of the active and purposive public diplomacy pursued by Iranian foreign policy team, especially the president and his Foreign Minister [Mohammad Javad Zarif], whose main goal is to shatter the false and unreal wall of Iranophobia, becomes more evident.

3. During his various speeches in the past few months, from his address to the United Nations General Assembly meeting to his recent remarks at the World Economic Forum meeting in the Swiss city of Davos, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has persistently asked for the resolution of the existing problems with the United States and Europe. He has also specified that any improvement in relations should be carried out in association with due respect for both sides’ sovereign rights and international standing. Now, the ball is in the court of the American statesmen and members of the Congress and it is for them to give an appropriate response to this offer. Otherwise, they are sure to once again lose the precious opportunity that has been presented to them. It seems the fact that the only opposite voice against any form of propinquity between Iran and the West or regional countries is Israel, attests to clear realities that do not need further elaboration. Let’s not forget that Israel is the same regime which has scored the highest number of resolutions in its condemnation from international human rights bodies and has also accounted for the highest number of times that the United States has used its veto right at the United Nations Security Council as a result of its irrational support for Israel.

4. Perhaps this viewpoint has proponents inside the United States that it was the pressure of sanctions which forced Iran to sit at the negotiating table. However, the proposition that comes forth from it, that is, “sanctions and intensification of sanctions will keep Iran at the negotiating table,” has certainly nothing to do with the reality. At present, although the Iranian people are suffering from the sanctions, few Iranian people can be found who really believe that Iran should still continue with its diplomatic efforts if it is faced with the awkward behavior of a number of radical US senators and lawmakers, and if new sanctions are adopted against the Islamic Republic. If opinion polls conducted by the American institutes and research centers in Iran are considered creditable, then attention should be paid to the findings of the latest of such polls, which was conducted by Zogby Research Services. The poll, whose results were released on December 6, 2013, revealed that 96 percent of Iranian respondents were relatively or completely in agreement with the proposition that safeguarding the country’s right to develop its nuclear energy program was worth the costs of economic sanctions and international isolation resulting from pursuit of that program. Interestingly enough, the findings of the same poll made it clear that those Iranians who believed Iran should possess nuclear weapons were more frequent among the supporters of Mr. Rouhani (76 percent) compared to those who had not voted for him (61 percent).

5. As Mr. Rouhani said in his latest remarks while addressing the World Economic Forum in the Swiss city of Davos, “the world has totally changed.” Therefore, it is no more possible to imagine that a country like the United States will be able through its carrot and stick approach to continue implementing its policies in a volatile region such as the Middle East, which is best known for its complexity and high capacity for tension. As a result, continued emphasis on such allegations that “we will bring Iran to its knees,” will only create an unpleasant feeling on the Iranian side and “provide us with the final reason which we needed in the country in order to create unwavering unity.” If a government with a moderate and pacifist approach as that of Dr. Rouhani’s administration would not be able to engage in mutually satisfactory negotiations with the United States, this would eliminate any chances for the improvement of relations between the two countries. In view of what has happened in the nuclear talks as well as all that is going on in the Geneva II conference on Syria, if American statesmen still feel that the situation in the Middle East before signing the nuclear agreement and conducting negotiations with Iran was more suitable for the management of and presence in the region, then they can continue with their policies on the basis of this understanding. However, one thing is certain. If the conservative politicians, who only think about promoting the international standing of Israel and claim that Iran’s geopolitical and geostrategic capacities have been depleted, are allowed to have their way, the authors of the two books mentioned at the beginning of this article will have to add a new chapter to their books in the near future and in the new edition of those books. That chapter will be probably entitled, “United States Recurrent Insanity vis-à-vis Iran.”

Mahmoud Reza Golshanpazhooh
Executive Editor of Iran Review

The article Rouhani’s Calculated Focus On Shattering Iranophobia Project – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Iran Review

Maintaining Iran’s peaceful nuclear program tops the country’s agenda in the negotiations with world powers, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman says.

“The path that has been taken is that of maintaining the nuclear know-how, which we have achieved through our indigenous capabilities, that is irreversible,” Marziyeh Afkham said.

Referring to the recent statements by US officials about the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear facilities, the Iranian official said that one-sided interpretations and readings of the Joint Action Plan – the interim agreement between Iran and six world powers – are legally unacceptable.

Afkham stressed, however, that, “The Joint Action Plan is our yardstick,” which we are moving toward turning it into a final agreement.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif has also slammed Washington’s efforts to distort Tehran’s commitments in the Geneva deal, saying Iran “did not agree to dismantle anything” as part of the agreement.

“We are not dismantling any centrifuges; we’re not dismantling any equipment; we’re simply not producing, not enriching over five percent,” Zarif said on January 22.

“For a decade, there was only one concept in the West’s mind, that there existed a ‘zero enrichment’ option only, and that Iran’s capability in uranium enrichment had to be stopped,” said Iran’s Foreign Minister.

“Now, the United States, though belatedly, has come to the conclusion that it would not achieve such a goal,” Zarif said, adding that US President Barack Obama had declared that although zero enrichment in Iran had been his dream, he has not been able to attain the objective.

The top Iranian diplomat said Iranian President Hassan Rouhani had also noted that the Americans had to accept uranium enrichment in Iran as a fact.

Iran Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif also said Tehran will not allow Israel to deceitfully divert world public attention away from the crimes it has committed against Palestinians.

Zarif said the Palestinian issue is a fundamental cause for Iranian officials and nation.

“For the Iranian government and people, all walks of the Palestinian nation are dear. The Palestinian nation, given its brilliant record of resistance against the Zionists’ aggressions, deserves all-out support from all Muslim and world countries,” the top Iranian diplomat stated.

Zarif also described Israel’s occupation of Palestinian lands as the violation of the most basic right of Palestinians, saying, “Over the past years, Zionists have used the issue of Iran’s peaceful nuclear program as pretext to divert world public attention from their crimes in Palestine.”

He noted that Iran policy in negotiations with the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council – Russia, China, France, Britain, and the US – plus Germany over its nuclear energy program and a nuclear agreement with the Sextet of world powers is to divest Israel of its excuse.

“We believe the future of Palestine and its people should be decided by Palestinians themselves and through ballot boxes,” Zarif pointed out.

In another development the Iranian Foreign Minister said ties between Iran and Russia will serve the two countries’ interests and will be beneficial to regional and international peace and stability.

Zarif expressed hope that Tehran and Moscow would tap into their capacities for cooperation in various fields and further strengthen their relations.

He expressed hope that Russian President Vladimir Putin would visit Tehran in the near future and said Iran Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani is also scheduled to travel to Moscow to discuss ways to bolster parliamentary relations.

The top Iranian diplomat emphasized that such exchange of visits between the two countries’ officials would be an important and effective step toward improving mutual relations.

Zarif expressed Iran’s readiness to prepare the ground for strategic cooperation with Russia, especially in academic and research fields.

The article Iran Says Indigenous Nuclear Capabilities Irreversible appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By IDSA

By V K Ahluwalia

A media report of 17 January this year, said a large number of armed guerrillas of the Communist Party of India (Maoist), or Maoists in short, have infiltrated into Balaghat district of Madhya Pradesh comes as no surprise. Of course, it is difficult to hazard a guess at the number of rebels that have moved across the porous border between Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh and from the adjoining areas of Gondia (Maharashtra).

The enclosed map shows a few safe sanctuaries in the Maoist-affected areas indicating that in case of sustained operations and hot pursuit by the security forces (SF) against the Maoists, they could move into some of the prominent forested areas – also characterised by their remoteness and vulnerable population. These include general areas in and around Malkangiri, Abhujmarh, Gadchiroli, Balaghat, Balrampur and Sarguja, and Saranda. Interestingly, all these lie along inter-state boundaries. The bi-junctions and tri-junctions are known to be the most vulnerable areas.

On 29 May last year, the Maoists – in one of the deadliest pre-planned attacks – had successfully ambushed a convoy of Congress leaders in Chhattisgarh’s Bastar district, killing 29 people. The immediate reaction of the rebels was to cross over to southern parts of Odisha, which thereafter resulted in an increase in violence, particularly in Malkangiri and Koraput.

The SF too had further intensified their operations in southern Odisha (Malkangiri, Koraput, Rayagarh, Navrangpura etc), southern Chhattisgarh with greater focus on the Bastar region of Chhattisgarh and Gadchiroli in Maharashtra. They have met with a large measure of success, resulting in apprehension, elimination or surrender of a few rebels. Gudsa Usendi (GVK Prasad), leader and spokesperson of Dandyakarna Special Zonal Committee (DSZC) surrendered to the Andhra Pradesh police in early January 2014, after having remained with the Maoists (particularly in Chhattisgarh) for about three decades.

The rebels have also remained active in the conflict areas by resorting to killing civilians and security personnel, laying IEDs and preventing development activities by destroying plant equipment and vehicles of contractors. If we plot, on a map, the areas in which the operations were conducted by the SF and the places where the rebels have experienced the heat of such operations, the Maoists could possibly move into the adjoining areas of Balaghat (Madhya Pradesh) to the west or Andhra Pradesh in the south or forested areas in the north, to seek refuge. Considering the overall status of anti- Maoist operations, the distances involved and the success achieved by the Andhra Pradesh’s police, Balaghat forests and ghats appeared to offer a relatively safer sanctuary.

Movement of the Maoists into an otherwise relatively dormant Balaghat region was quite expected. It has been reported that one of the Local Guerrilla Squad (LGS) commanders, named Dilip, who has been on the wanted list, has led the armed Maoists into the Balaghat region. Balaghat has also been in the news in recent times due to activities of the Tanda Dalam (guerrilla squad). Coupled with this, a few suspected Maoists were arrested in early January 2014. Balaghat district – one of the poorer district – lies along the south eastern portion of the Satpura Range, and has a series of ghats, laden with dense forest cover. In addition, it is extremely rich in minerals such as manganese, bauxite, copper, marble, dolomite, limestone and clay. Balaghat has all the ingredients required to bolster Maoists activities – difficult terrain, dense forests, vulnerable population. While such forested areas and ghats provide safe sanctuaries to the Naxals, it is also easier to move across the porous border into Chhattisgarh and Maharashtra to escape the dragnet of the operations by the SF.

Maoists are known to be more innovative and dynamic to change their tactics. Following the broad principles of Mao Tse Tung and Che Guevara – the acknowledged masters of guerrilla warfare – Maoists have adopted hit and run tactics, utilised space to disperse themselves and deny a target, and have avoided direct and prolonged confrontation with the SF. In addition, it appears that movement of their armed cadres into other areas may also be part of their tactics to release pressure on their traditional strongholds. We could also expect them to shift some of their arms, rockets and IEDs manufacturing units to safer areas like Balaghat. While shifting a few elements to safe havens, the Maoists would continue to carry out violent attacks in their traditional strongholds, including firing on helicopters, to tie down the SF in different areas. Thus, SF remain dispersed and are relatively weak, having spread over a large area. However, whenever the Maoists suffer heavy losses, they would normally carry out a ‘tactical retreat’ to rest, recoup, recruit cadres, and train, so as to strike at an opportune moment. The SF, therefore need to continuously appreciate and analyse the expected movement of hard core Maoists, based on situation on the ground and by developing traditional human intelligence.

Besides, a media report of November last year noted, based on a letter of the general secretary of CPI (Maoist) to 24 international groups in September 2013, the Maoists are seeking international alliances and support to sustain and to strengthen their movement. The letter was intercepted by the security agencies. The report should, perhaps, be seen in the backdrop of the Maoists suffering many losses and the relative weakening of the movement. They have already established linkages with militant outfits in the north east like Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) (IM) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur. The CPI (Maoist) is fully aware that a movement of this magnitude cannot sustain on its own for long without any external support; be it in terms of funding, weaponry, training, refuge or ideological support. Though not entirely true of the Maoists movement in India, such an initiative is also in line with a study report by RAND Corporation which suggests, among others, that, without external support and available sanctuaries, no internal insurgency can thrive for long.

At present, we do not have any concrete evidence of direct involvement of any external powers, except a few linkages being established with certain militant organisations and ultra – outfits. The Maoists are known to have linkages with Maoists of Nepal and anti – India terror groups based in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Given India’s geopolitical location, it would come as no surprise if the CPI (Maoist), through its aggressive efforts, is able to garner substantive resources for its disposal. Therefore, we need to remain sensitive to the fact that some of the external powers are perhaps monitoring the Maoist situation in the country very closely and would most willingly provide the necessary support. For instance, in order to open another active front, we could expect our adversaries to be more aggressive by providing multi-faceted support to the Maoists to further destabilise the heartland of the country. Thus, there is a need to sensitize our diplomatic community of the impending threat, as also to streamline the intelligence apparatus to monitor such activities of internal and external powers, to pro – actively prevent ‘tangible support’ to the Maoists. However, we must not forget that solution to the conflict finally lies in improving the security environment, providing good governance, and simultaneously ensuring implementation of the planned development projects on the ground.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/MaoistsLookforSafeSanctuariesandExternalSupport_vkahluwalia_270114

The article India: Maoists Look For Safe Sanctuaries And External Support – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.