By MINA

Belarus has asked Russia to deploy up to 15 more warplanes in Belarus in response to NATO’s intensified activities close to the Belarusian border, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko said.

Belarus is requesting Russia to reinforce their joint group of troops, in particular with aviation, under bilateral agreements, Lukashenko told the Belarusian Security Council in Minsk on Wednesday.

The move intends to adequately respond to NATO’s decision to build up military presence near the Belarusian borders, stressed the president.

“If NATO redeploys about 15 airplanes from Italy to the Baltic states, I think we should contact the chief of the Russian General Staff and offer them the reinforcements they are obligated to provide us with as part of the Russian-Belarusian alliance,” Lukashenko said.

The article Belarus Asks Russia For More Planes Over NATO Activities appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By IDSA

By Gautam Sen

In a bilateral interaction at the recent BIMSTEC Summit in Myanmar, India’s prime minister is reported to have told Sri Lanka’s president, Mahinda Rajapakse on March 4, to think about demilitarizing Sri Lanka`s northern province. As a posture, demilitarization may be alright for India but in real terms this may be difficult to achieve. A nation which had to endure enormous sacrifice and destruction to overcome the secessionist threat of the LTTE over nearly two decades cannot conceivably concede substantively. Moreover, within the ambit of Sri Lanka`s Constitution, demilitarization may not be a feasible proposition, if it entails withdrawal of the defence establishment, either operational mobile elements or static garrisons from the northern province. From Sri Lanka’s standpoint, its defence secretary is said to have opined that deployment of its military and acquisition of armaments were the prerogative of the government.

However, if the case for demilitarization rests on achieving a significant reduction in force strength of the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) in the Northern Province, which is reported to be currently about 150,000, then it is welcome. There is also no apparent reason to deploy the SLA in the north when there hardly has been any covert insurgent activity or overt armed action by any Tamil group since the end of the war in 2009. Furthermore, activities like the SLA taking control of agricultural land and denying the livelihood of the traditional Tamil owners from tilling as also usurping private civic lands for use by the SLA for their comfort like golf courses and residential buildings, etc have to stop. Going by media reports, more than 6000 acres of land belonging to the Tamil people before 2009 have subsequently been taken over by the Sri Lankan defence forces.

Some of the fundamental requirements are: the SLA should be confined to their barracks; further expansion of land area in possession of the SLA and their sister services` garrisons should not take place; surrender of land usurped by the armed forces (except the police) under emergency or special powers of the State to the provincial civil administration effected while allowing them to consolidate or localise their garrisons without visibly augmenting them and, a process of withdrawal of the SLA from agricultural and commercial activities on land taken over beyond the limits of the garrisons, after 2009, initiated.

Further, Rajapakshe`s government should not delay launching of such an action plan. For effectiveness, the implementation plan should have a consensus-based monitoring mechanism with either the northern province Chief Minister or one of the Cabinet Ministers and one of the SLG Ministers. Such a measure would work towards instilling confidence in the local Tamil population, enable the provincial administration to assert its role in their provincial domain within the Constitution and also indicate to the international community that the government is serious on justice, demilitarization and resumption of livelihoods in the affected area (these are some of the cardinal points indicated in the latest Resolution introduced in the Human Rights Committee at Geneva).

De-militarisation per se is a sensitive issue for any country. Sri Lanka cannot be an exception, particularly in the backdrop of its past history and present context. However, it is of essence that the Sri Lanka armed forces` role vis-à-vis the provincial administrations or even in the larger island-nation context be re-defined. As a consequence of the Ealam wars and other developments, for example induction of ex-defence forces` officers like General Fonseka in politics, it may not be inappropriate to claim that the military`s influence in Sri Lanka`s national affairs have increased. This is quite clearly seen in the northern province.

In India, in contrast, there is the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) manned by both military and civilian personnel. It functions under India`s Army Act for disciplinary control but is fully under the civilian administrative authority of the Ministry of Defence and the Border Roads Development Board. Sri Lanka could develop a similar framework for its northern province, limited to involvement in infrastructural activities like road-building, bridge construction, etc. Such a role for the huge military establishment presently in the northern province, may be viewed positively. The idea is to engage the SLA in project activities and relocate the army throughout the country and not be exclusively entrenched in the north. Maintenance of assets created may be funded and executed through the provincial administration.

While high-level interactions between India and Sri Lanka may continue, this is perhaps not the most propitious time for India, with its national elections around the corner, to press for de-militarisation of the northern province. The de-militarisation issue invariably is an emotive one in Tamil Nadu, with electoral ramifications. India`s approach may be to achieve some outcome as stated above, through bilateral administrative and diplomatic efforts, in a manner that the entire process appears to be driven under the aegis of the Sri Lankan government.

The author is a former Additional CGDA who has served in Sri Lanka, presently working as Adviser to a State government.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheissueofdemilitarisationofNorthernProvinceofSriLanka_gsen_130314

The article The Issue Of De-Militarisation Of Northern Province Of Sri Lanka – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By IDSA

By Rajorshi Roy

President Putin’s latest decision to pull back troops from Russia’s western border and his declaration to employ armed forces in Ukraine only as a last resort is expected to temporarily reduce tensions in this rapidly evolving region. Putin’s stand comes after a week of intense diplomatic standoff between Russia and Ukraine on one hand and Russia and ‘West’ on the other – wherein a direct military intervention in Ukraine’s autonomous region of Crimea looked imminent. These developments raise some pertinent questions: How deep is the Russia vs. West fault-line? Will there be a military intervention in Ukraine? And will the American pressure tactics work against Russia?

Fault Lines

Russia views the overthrow of President Yanukovich’s democratically elected government as being masterminded by the West and led by the US. This is interpreted as an attempt to impede Russia’s geo-strategic and economic aspirations. At the heart of the issue lies a deep rooted mistrust about each others’ capabilities and intentions.

The importance of a ‘friendly’ Ukraine is a matter of national security for Russia. Apart from shared civilisational ties, Ukraine offers Russia the geographical advantage of security buffer against Europe. Russia’s Black Sea fleet is based in Sevastopol and majority of hydrocarbon pipelines to Europe pass through it. The success of President Putin’s Eurasian Economic Union, designed at strengthening Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space depends on the inclusion of 46 million Ukrainians.

However, the increasing likelihood of Kiev’s westward drift, with potential NATO membership and closer ties with EU, strikes at the core of Russia’s national defence. The fault-lines have been further exposed with Russia’s refusal to recognise the current government in Ukraine.

These developments are expected to bring about a review and transformation of Russia’s relations with the West with both sides now directly vying for the same geopolitical space. A plausible outcome may well be Russia attempting to strengthen ties with China and emergence of anti-west sentiment domestically.

In fact, there has been a growing disillusionment in Russia with the West even before the Ukrainian crisis. The prolonged slowdown in Euro-zone had started to affect the Russian economy, since half its global trade is with the Union. The discovery of shale and Europe’s energy diversification has as such reduced the leverage which Russia enjoyed earlier. Missile defence negotiations remain a contentious issue The West has refused to accept Russia as an equal partner, buoyed by the assumption that its socio-economic growth has slowed and its power will eventually decline. There also exist fundamental differences on the global stage. All these factors have contributed towards Russia’s desire to diversify and explore new synergies of partnership with countries of Asia-Pacific. This can indeed be the pivotal moment in Russia’s foreign policy orientation.

Military Intervention?

While President Putin has conveyed the message of tough military action, it is highly unlikely that he will order his troops to invade the majority ethnic Russian region of Crimea. A military intervention is likely to lead to a civil war. There are vast sections of people like Tartars and ethnic Ukrainians who are opposed to Russian interference. The peninsula’s separation from Ukraine will not only limit the prospects of Russia’s future influence in the country but also make it difficult to justify it internationally. Russia is possibly looking at gaining concessions in the form of greater autonomy for Crimea and permanent naval base at Sevastopol to maintain its influence in the region.

These manoeuvres can suit all parties for the time being. The Kiev government may accept Crimea’s increased autonomy short of independence in return for Russia’s recognition of its legitimacy and cessation of hostilities. And the West will want to avoid a military confrontation in return for Russia not violating Ukraine’s sovereignty.

Therefore, military brinkmanship can be seen as an attempt to force the West to include Russia as a partner in settlement of the crisis. It will also help reap domestic dividends for President Putin’s image of standing up to the West.

Nevertheless, the one factor which may upset all calculations is the persecution of ethnic Russians by western Ukrainian nationalists for rendering their support to the secessionist movement. This may force Putin’s hand to protect Russian ‘brothers’.

But there are limits to Russia’s military tactics. The possibility of even a short conflict spooked the markets and the stock index crashed by a whopping 11 per cent.1 Russian pipelines carrying half of European hydrocarbon supplies pass through Ukraine. Any disruption will not only have huge economic repercussions for its energy dependent economy but also force EU to look for stable long term alternatives.

Apart from the military option, Russia holds the important leverages, from an interdependent economy to trade sanctions and control over gas supply and its prices, to influence developments in Ukraine. The dire economic conditions that forced Yanukovich to seek Russian aid remain the same. The Western support will not only be constrained due to the euro-zone crisis but also conditioned on Ukraine initiating painful economic reforms. With elections due in May and people’s aspirations high after the ‘revolution’, the Ukrainian government will find it hard to sell this idea to the electorate. This can pave the way for renewed political churnings in the country.

Will Sanctions on Russia Work?

The US on its part has tried to pressurise Russia to de-escalate the crisis with threats of economic sanctions and global isolation. However, these measures are unlikely to succeed without EU’s participation and may prove counter-productive. Europe is heavily dependent on Russian energy and Russian investors hold substantial Euro assets. In an era of slowing economic growth, EU exported goods worth US$ 170 billion to Russia in 2012.2 Therefore, getting the EU on board is necessary, but difficult challenge, for sanctions to work.

Moreover, even the US needs Russia’s support when it comes to international mechanisms involving UN Security Council, Syria, Afghanistan, North Korea and Iran. It is the G20 and BRICS which hold more promise to Putin than the G8. A military conflict will push commodity and grain prices, Ukraine is one of the world’s largest producers of wheat, which the global economy can ill afford.

A military standoff in Crimea appears to have subsided for the time being with Russia holding all the important cards. But it has outlined deep divisions in its ties with the West. A renewed hostility is in the making which is likely to transform the global balance of power wherein the two sides will compete with each other on a much larger scale. However, the crisis also lays bare the limits of what they both can do vis-à-vis each other.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

1. “Ruble Dives to Historic Low, Stocks Crash on Ukraine Fears”, Rianovosti, March 3, 2014, http://en.ria.ru/world/20140303/188042051/Ruble-Dives-to-Historic-Low-St…
2. “Congress set to take 1st steps on Ukraine, Russia”, The Washington Post, March 6, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/congress/congress-rushing-to-put-…

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/CrimeaThawinTensions_rroy_070314

The article Crimea: Thaw In Tensions? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By VOA

The United States and the European Union will respond on Monday with a “serious series of steps” against Russia if a referendum on Ukraine’s Crimea region goes ahead on Sunday, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said on Thursday.

Kerry told a congressional hearing he hoped to avoid such steps, which include sanctions, through discussions with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov, in London on Friday.

“If there is no sign of any capacity to be able to move forward and resolve this issue there will be a very serious series of steps in Europe and here with respect to the options that are available to us,” Kerry said in testimony on the State Department’s 2015 budget request.

The Russian Foreign Ministry said Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry discussed proposals for resolving the crisis in Ukraine during a telephone conversation on Thursday.

Lavrov and Kerry, who are due to meet in London on Friday, discussed “the situation in Ukraine, taking into account existing Russian and U.S. proposals to normalize the atmosphere and provide for civil peace,” the ministry said.

Germany warns Russia

Earlier, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said Russia risks “massive” political and economic damage if it does not change course in the Ukraine crisis.

In a speech to the German parliament Thursday, Merkel said Ukraine’s territorial integrity is “not up for discussion.”

She also said the European Union will impose sanctions on Russia if it does not move to set up a contact group to discuss the Crimea crisis.

The West and Russia have been locked in a tense standoff over Russia’s military incursion into Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula.

Risk of war

Ukraine’s acting president said on Thursday that Russian forces were concentrated on the border “ready to invade” but he believed international efforts could end Moscow’s “aggression” and avert the risk of war.

A statement on the presidential website said Oleksandr Turchynov told a local television channel that, when Russian forces took over the southern region of Crimea last week, other units were concentrated on Ukraine’s eastern border “ready for an invasion of the territory of Ukraine at any moment.”

”We are doing all we can to avoid war, whether in Crimea or in any other region of Ukraine,” he said, adding that Ukraine’s own armed forces were in a state of full combat readiness.

However, he said: “All of civilized humanity supports our country. All the leading countries of the world are on the side of Ukraine, and I am sure that this united effort in the international arena, bringing together all democratic countries, can still allow us to halt this aggression.”

Obama cautions Moscow

President Barack Obama warned Russia again Wednesday that the West will “apply costs” to Moscow if it continues to interfere in Ukrainian affairs.

Speaking at the White House alongside interim Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Obama said Washington “completely rejects” Crimea’s planned referendum Sunday on whether to secede from Ukraine and join Russia. He said the vote, “patched together in a few weeks,” is a violation of international law.

Yatsenyuk thanked Washington for its support, and said his government is “absolutely ready and willing” for talks with Moscow, but added that Ukraine will never surrender. He also said his government is preparing to sign an association agreement with the European Union later this month.

Today, Yatsenyuk is scheduled to meet in New York with U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.

Congressional support

Meanwhile, U.S. Senator John McCain is set to lead a bipartisan delegation to Kyiv Thursday. A spokesman described the visit as a show of congressional support for the interim government, “and for the Ukrainian people’s aspirations for freedom, democracy and territorial integrity.”

Republican McCain and his Senate Democratic colleague Christopher Murphy visited Kyiv in December, at the height of anti-government protests that eventually forced pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych to flee the country.

Also, U.S. House Speaker John Boehner on Thursday urged the Senate to pass a House bill backing $1 billion in loan guarantees for Ukraine .

On Wednesday, leaders of the Group of Seven leading industrialized nations called on Russia to “cease all efforts to change the status of Crimea contrary to Ukrainian law and in violation of international law.”

The G7 – which includes Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States – also said it will not recognize the referendum’s outcome.

Russia war games

Russia announced on Thursday it had started military exercises near the border with Ukraine in what is likely to be seen as a show of force in the standoff with Kyiv and the West over Crimea.

Separately, the ministry said Russia had sent six Su-27 jet fighters and three military transport planes to ally Belarus, responding to a request prompted by joint U.S.-Polish exercises in NATO nation Poland, Interfax reported.

The Russian Defense Ministry confirmed exercises had begun in the Southern Military District near the Ukrainian border, involving 8,500 artillery men. Pictures had appeared earlier on social media showing military vehicles on the move in the area.

Drills were also being held in the Belgorod and Kursk regions, which border Ukraine, state-run news agency RIA cited the Defense Ministry as saying.

Russian stocks slump

The Russian stock market hit a four-and-a-half-year low on Thursday and is down 20 percent since mid-February. The cost of insuring Moscow’s debt against default rose to its highest level in nearly two years and is up by more than a third this month.

The crisis has already forced several Russian firms to put plans on hold for public offerings to raise cash abroad.

Yet none of that appears to have slowed down President Vladimir Putin, who told officials of the Paralympic Games he is hosting in Sochi that Russia was `’not the initiator” of the crisis.

The article Kerry: US, Europe Will Respond If Crimea Referendum Passes appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By RT

Six Russian Sukhoi-27 fighter jets and three transport planes have been deployed at Bobruisk airfield in Belarus. Earlier this week Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenko invited Russian forces to fend off potential NATO threat.

“In case of continuing build-up of military forces in countries bordering Belarus, the country will take adequate response measures,” says a statement from the country’s Defense Ministry in Minsk.

NATO is sending 12 F-16 craft in Poland, in the wake of the Crimea crisis, and Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski has asked for an even greater US presence. Baltic states have also requested military assistance from NATO.

Just like their NATO counterparts, the Russian aircraft in Belarus will participate in a joint training exercise.

“The joint air defense system [between Russia and Belarus] is intended to guarantee collective security in Eastern Europe,” the Belarusian Defense Ministry said.

According to previous military agreements, Russian and Belarusian troops can move freely throughout both countries, though it is unusual for them to be stationed abroad for any prolonged period of time.

Aleksandr Lukashenko has expressed repeated concern about NATO’s eastward expansion since his ascension to the presidency of the 9-million-strong state in 1994, and has been one of Russia’s staunchest allies.

All the same, following the emergency of a possibility of Crimea joining Russia following a referendum on March 16, the Belarus leader has spoken out in favor of “maintaining Ukraine’s territorial integrity”.

The article Russia Transfers Nine Warplanes To Belarus To ‘Counter Massing Of Forces On Border’ appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Al Bawaba News

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani says the Islamic republic pursues a policy of engagement with world countries, especially the Middle East states.

“One of the key policies of the [new] administration since it began its work more than six months ago has been constructive interaction with the world and other countries,” said President Rouhani in a meeting with Iranian and Omani merchants in the Omani capital of Muscat on Thursday.

“Iran extends a hand of friendship and brotherhood to all regional countries, particularly its neighbors in the southern part of the Persian Gulf,” the visiting president further noted.

He underlined that “this friendship and unity” will benefit the region and even the whole world.

Stating that the meeting focused on economic and commercial fields, Rouhani further underlined that a central plank of Tehran’s foreign policy is to forge closer ties with the Muslim world.

Heading a high-ranking politico-economic delegation, the Iranian president arrived in the Omani capital on Wednesday for a two-day visit at the invitation of Oman’s King Sultan Qaboos.

During the visit, the two neighboring countries also signed a contract under which the Islamic Republic will supply the Persian Gulf state with 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year.

The deal comes out of a 60-billion-dollar agreement between the two countries in August 2013, under which Iran will be delivering gas to the Persian Gulf state for 25 years.

Oman is the first country in the Persian Gulf to be visited by President Rouhani after he assumed office in August.

The Omani king paid an official visit to Iran in late August 2013 as the first head of state to visit Tehran after President Rouhani was inaugurated in a ceremony on August 4.

Original article

The article Iran’s Rohani ‘Extends Hand Of Friendship’ To Gulf States appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By IPCS

By Shujaat Bukhari

When India played against West Indies in Srinagar on October 13, 1983, I vividly remember how star batsman Sunil Gavaskar felt awkward when the spectators were carrying long posters of Imran Khan in their hands. He just waved at them and gestured by lowering his hand to tell them that he was not as tall as Imran. At that time also people in Kashmir did not cheer for India and the match was played amid chaos. Before that the pitch had been dug by a group of youth led by Shabir Shah, Showkat Bakhshi and Mushtaqul Islam, who are now in the separatist camp. In total 17 youth were charged with anti-national crime and the case was closed in the court only last year. Eventually the West Indies won the match even as it was abandoned before the required number of overs could be played.

So history of people not cheering for Indian team goes back to what generally many would prefer to call “good old days” of Kashmir, which in other words means pre-violence era. Thus whatever happened in Meerut on March 2 was nothing unexpected. Whether in Kashmir or outside, Kashmiris have made no bones about publicly exhibiting their liking for Pakistani cricket team. In lighter vein, it is often repeated that Kashmiris cannot make compromise on two things vis-a-vis Pakistan— one being cricket and other about the appearance of moon. They would only go by the Rooyat-e-Hilal Committee of Pakistan and not by any Mufti in Srinagar or Delhi.

The way the students reacted in Meerut and according to university authorities not only cheered for Pakistan and Shahid Afridi but also raised pro-Pakistan slogans, is a matter of debate and investigation. If they simply cheered, then according to Indian constitution it is not unlawful and if they resorted to sloganeering, which they strongly refute, then it is a matter of investigation. To me one thing is clear that, keeping in view the treatment Kashmiri student community has been meted out in other parts of India during past two decades, which includes denial of rented accommodation and random arrests on Republic and Independence Day, I don’t support even cheering for a team which rest of India strongly believes is of an enemy country.

However, one thing is clear that the university authorities have in first place failed to strike a chord with them. Even if they had crossed a “limit” it could have been either apprehended in advance or as a seat of learning, the university authorities should have brought them on table, counseled them and sorted out the issue. In this case the Vice Chancellor who is a retired IPS officer acted as a police officer and not as an educationist. The first blunder was to throw them out and then slapping sedition charges capped it all. It is a different matter that under tremendous public pressure those charges had to be dropped later, but it again sent a strong message to people especially the youth that tolerance is a bygone trait in India now.

Whatever happened in Meerut should not be seen in isolation. It must be understood in the larger context of deep sense of political alienation that people particularly youth have been harbouring in their minds. What happened in Srinagar in October 1983 or in 1985 when India played against Australia, also gives a lot of food for thought about the people’s likings and dislikings. But the problem with Delhi is that it has always refused to learn the lesson. What it possibly ignored in 1983 bubbled up in the form of armed rebellion in 1989. And to understand the psyche of today’s youth, even that lesson is outdated.

Today Kashmir’s youth is educated and whatever he does, like in Meerut, is with conscience and not out of any “misguidance”, as Omar Abdullah tried to make people believe. Today’s youth is born after 1989. He has seen violence, repression, depression, injustice, high handedness and discrimination. He is more alienated and at distance from Delhi than the youth who picked up gun in 1989. Social media is the best indicator for gauging mind of an angry educated Kashmiri youth.

One interesting thing has come up after the Meerut incident. Some of the students who are studying there have gone under Prime Minister’s Scholarship Scheme, which means that their study is fully funded. But even that has not helped them change their ideology. Isn’t there a bigger lesson for understanding the psyche of youth? It is ironic that Chief Minister Omar Abdullah calls them misguided when he himself said on the floor of House that Kashmir has not merged with India but acceded which means that it remains a dispute. But he continues to enjoy the power and poor young man who has the same feeling about Kashmir’s status is either slapped with sedition charges or booked under Public Safety Act. In case of Omar Abdullah and other mainstream parties who lure voters by repeating that “masla-e-Kashmir” is alive and its “hal (solution)” is necessary, the space to maneuver is free.

So the Meerut incident has again brought to the fore the larger side of mindset of the youth whether in or outside Kashmir. It is a fact that cheering for Pakistan has to be seen in the political context and it is surely different from any one who cheers for a country other than his own. Here the alienation is deep rooted and the angry youth, despite knowing that he would invite wrath for what he or she is doing has not held up his emotions or preferences. The way the Kashmiri youth, all educated and enlightened raised their banner of revolt in Delhi, when Afzal Guru was hanged in 2013, was enough to understand their political belief and the grit and determination with which they were agitating for their rights. Denial of political rights in last several decades, lack of accountability for those who have perpetuated excesses on Kashmiris and denial of justice like in the case of killing of 120 people in 2010 have compounded this anger.

Sedition charges or PSA’s have failed to break them so the lesson has again been thrown up for those who have to address the larger political question of Kashmir. Will they read that or will continue to remain “misguided” remains to be seen.

By arrangement with Rising Kashmir

Shujaat Bukhari
Editor, Rising Kashmir

The article J&K: Of Sedition And Cricket – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By JTW

By Mehmet Yegin

Russia may consider Ukraine critically important enough to go to war for. The same, however, cannot be said for the U.S. The U.S. sees Ukraine not as a country to be grasped firmly, but more as a lever to use against Russia. Besides, the Obama administration sees the approach of trying to control everywhere in the world as trying to shoulder an impossible burden. The United States’ new orientation will focus on and allocate American sources to the Asia-Pacific region. Other regions are not of first-order importance.

Furthermore, in comparison with the past, now a much higher threshold must be reached before the U.S. decides to use military force. The U.S. is suffering from battle fatigue following the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. It is manifest that the Obama administration approach is to end these wars and prioritize diplomacy. It is quite difficult to expect from peace-prone cabinet members and the American army with limited defense expenditures to initiate into a military engagement for Ukraine. Furthermore, the American public will not run the risk of losing American soldiers for Ukraine. In brief, neither the Obama administration nor the American public are leaning toward the military option. For that matter, neither are the U.S. foreign policy hawks.

Reduce the tension and reach an agreement

If none are willing to risk a military intervention, offsetting Russia’s influence does not seem possible. In a general picture where the military option is highly unlikely, the steps taken by the American administration are aimed at slowing Russia down and not losing prestige. The Obama administration’s threatening statements can be evaluated in this context. The U.S. will probably denounce Russia, cancel some diplomatic gatherings, and use sanctions if possible. The U.S. administration stated that Russia’s actions will “not go unpunished” and cancelling the G-8 Summit to be held in Sochi has been brought to the agenda. Ejecting Russia from the G-8 was also opened to discussion. Obama used an executive order to enact a few visa restrictions and freeze some assets, but other than these limited punishments his administration hasn’t made any substantial moves yet. In order to impose large, multilateral sanctions and to ostracize Russia, the U.S. will need the support of its allies. Yet this kind of an initiative is risky due to the dubious positions of the allies.

The Obama administration will probably seek to reduce the fever of tension and reach an agreement with Russia. In this regard, the goal is to shift the issue from a military perspective to a diplomatic one and propose a negotiated solution. The U.S. government, thereby, is trying to limit Russia’s gains in Ukraine. However, through its diplomacy it has acknowledged that is not realistic to expect Russia to relinquish Crimea. At the end of the day, in spite of the rising tension in the region, it seems U.S.-Russian relations will find a new modus vivendi. In the long term, the U.S. may try to break Europe’s energy dependency on Russia by selling natural gas to Europe. However, this kind of brain-storming will probably not affect the current crisis.

Awakening Cold War images

This crisis had had impacts on American public opinion as well. It has damaged the image of Russia and Obama administration that portrays Russia as a prospective ally. Promoting Russia as an ally in U.S. public opinion will be difficult for a while. Cold War suspicions seem to remain even after Obama’s reset policy and hamburger diplomacy with Medvedev. Now these suspicions have strengthened again. Obama’s ideas about cooperating with Russia have been called naïve and quotes from old presidential candidates claiming that Russia is a threat have been raised and remembered. Republican candidates that spoke out against the Russian threat and opposed Obama in 2008 and 2012 have gained ground through the recent developments.

The article Will The US Push Hard For Ukraine? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By JTW

By Mehmet Hecan

In a show of support for Saudi Arabia the Gulf States, the UAE, and Bahrain condemned Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki’s recent statements accusing Saudi Arabia of funding terrorist groups in Iraq. Yesterday, the UAE summoned Iraq’s ambassador in order to give a memorandum showing their distress at statements of Iraq’s prime minister. A similar message also came from Bahrain, another Saudi Arabian ally, saying that Maliki’s statements were “irresponsible”.

At the beginning of this week, in an interview with French TV channel France24, Maliki accused Saudi Arabia and Qatar of working to destabilize his country by supporting insurgent groups and providing financial assistance to them.

Iraq claims to have struggled against Al-Qaeda-related insurgence in Sunni-dominated regions like Fallujah and Anbar since the beginning of this year.
According to UAE state news agency WAM, after summoning the Iraqi ambassador yesterday to give the memorandum, UAE Foreign Minister Anwar Gargash said that PM Maliki’s statements were baseless, stressing that their ally, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, has struggled hard against terrorism in the region.

In addition to counterstatements from the UAE and Bahrain, former GCC Secretary-General Abdullatif Al-Zayani denied the terrorism allegations raised by Iraqi PM Maliki against Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

The administrations in Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies generally have chilly relations with the Iraqi prime minister because of his Shia-sympathetic politics and close relationship with Iran.

The article Diplomatic Tension Arises Between Maliki’s Iraq And Gulf States appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By JTW

By Alexander Müller

In the Tuesday, March 11th party summit of the Christian Democrats, German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared that the EU must remain united and maintain its resolve when facing the current crisis engulfing Ukraine.

Angela Merkel had accused Russia of annexing Crimea, contending that the Kremlin’s actions are incompatible with international law and Russia’s aggressive policies are not to be tolerated.

Mrs. Merkel urged her European partners to maintain their current course towards leveling sanctions, yet warned that one should not rule out diplomatic incentives nor ignore a window of opportunity to bring Russia back to the negotiating table.

Some EU member states have been reluctant to impose sanctions on Russia given Europe’s dependence on Russian energy imports, especially concerning Gazprom’s threats to cut oil and gas deliveries.

In light of a potential energy crisis and a shortage in supplies, Merkel reassured her European colleagues that although sanctions may invite retaliation, the EU should not deviate from its course and should remain united against Russian aggression. She also argued that EU member states had to prepare for potential reaction from Russia.

As such, the German Chancellor advocated for a more prudent European approach, one that is sensible yet tempered by a degree of toughness. German foreign policy toward Russia is therefore characterized by firm action and a commitment to dialogue.

International government officials are currently meeting in London to discuss possible sanctions in the form of freezing assets and imposing travel bans on key figures in Putin’s administration.

U.S. President Barack Obama had been advocating isolating Russia and ejecting the country from the G-8 group. Contrary to Washington’s confrontational approach, Germany is striving to keep dialogue channels open and rely on communication.

Political circles are in agreement that the key to a diplomatic solution to the Crimean crisis lay with Europe, in particular Berlin, and the determination of German Chancellor Angela Merkel.

Given Germany’s economic weight in Europe as the EU’s largest economy and its strong ties to Russia, experts are convinced that Angela Merkel may be the only person left capable of compelling Putin to cooperate.

The Ukraine and Crimean crises have evolved into a symbolic test for Angela Merkel and Germany, regarding whether the country will assume greater responsibility in global affairs.

Gone are the days when Germany could conceal itself behind France and the UK, and the country’s governing elite may soon be forced to employ its economic and political leverage to both counter and contain Putin’s geopolitical ambitions.

Only time will tell whether Angela Merkel will demonstrate leadership qualities and deliver results, and if the German Chancellor is willing to utilize her influence in Moscow to confront Putin.

The article German Chancellor Angela Merkel Key To Resolving Ukraine Crisis? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By SAAG

By Kumar David

In my considered view the US is keeping its options open; it will not get so deeply involved in the pandemonium in Geneva unless it has a game plan. Its Sri Lanka (SL) resolution at the UNHRC has taken centre stage; briefings and lobbying overshadow everything else in the corridors.

The crucial issue is not the wording though stake-holders tear each others hair out re “strengthening” or “watering down”. The true dynamics of the next stage depend entirely on whether the government (GoSL) accepts the resolution and promises to implement it faithfully, or rejects it and the UNHRC makes its next move. Events that will unfold in the next 6 to 12 months depend on this choice; an immediate crisis if GoSL rejects; a slow brewing imbroglio if it agrees to go along and wrecks it in implementation, as it obviously will.

There are two crucial clauses in the draft. Clause 2 “Calls upon the Government of Sri Lanka: to implement the recommendations made in the reports of the Office of the High Commissioner, and also calls upon the Government to conduct an independent and credible investigation into allegations of violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, as applicable; to hold accountable those responsible for such violations; to end continuing incidents of human rights violations and abuses in Sri Lanka; and to implement the recommendations made in the reports of the Office of the High Commissioner”.

Clause 8 “Welcomes the High Commissioner’s recommendations and conclusions on the need for an independent and credible international investigation in the absence of a credible national process with tangible results, and requests the Office of the High Commissioner to assess progress toward accountability and reconciliation, to monitor relevant national processes, and to investigate alleged violations and abuses of human rights and related crimes by both parties in Sri Lanka, with input from relevant special procedures mandate holders as appropriate . .”

Clearly there is ambiguity and overlap; intentional, deliberate. The overlap is in the phrase I have highlighted in Clause 8. It can be interpreted as saying the High Commissioner will “investigate”, in addition to the “independent and credible investigation” that SL is “called upon” to undertake. If GoSL accepts the resolution Clause 8 will be read as subordinate to Clause 2; the High Commissioner’s role will be assessing, monitoring and arranging assistance from special mandate holders.

If GoSL rejects the resolution and refuses to implement Clause 2, the way is open to beef up Clause 8 into an independent international investigation. This can be done by appropriate protocols if GoSL declares its refusal, now, on the floor of the UNHRC meeting or by a new resolution in September. In practices if GoSL says “no”, an international investigation will get rolling under Clause 8 straight away. Hence, however grudgingly, and with plenty of double-speak to pacify its extremist clientele, GoSL unless it is suicidally inclined, will find a way to go along with the final version and avoid head-on collision with the international community.

Does the US want regime change?

March 7 was the first consultation where the US presented the draft. The hall was packed. EU countries welcomed the resolution, some wanted to add text and surprisingly the edits strengthened it not it watered down. Uruguay and Chile spoke in support of the resolution, while Mexico was vocal but undecided. Japan spoke of the need for justice, suggesting it is moving towards supporting the draft. Two countries spoke in favour of GoSL; Thailand and Pakistan and are sure votes against the US. The Africans are watching and waiting for a lead from South Africa. The Organisation of Islamic Countries, strangely, kept away from the 7 March meeting.

The US has stirred up a buzz; what is its possible game plan? Till recently I thought the US was not seeking regime change as it had no alternative to put in place. But this degenerated into a chicken and egg scenario; don’t change as there is no alternative, without change there will be no alternative. In the State Department’s view, I believe, matters seemed to be going from bad to worse and at some point during the last 12 months it snapped.

Why may the US stance on the SL regime have flipped to a new attitude? One reason is that American public and Congressional opinion about justice and human rights has to be assuaged and the second is the influence of the Tamil diaspora in Britain and Canada. A third it is that Washington, like Delhi, is fed up with Colombo’s insolence and untruths and wants to teach the upstarts a lesson. Again this is not how great powers make foreign policy. All three count but not enough to explain.

A fourth possibility is strategic; Lanka’s location in the Indian Ocean, sea routes, proximity to India and a great and growing Chinese strategic and economic threat. But there is no Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean, nor will there be for a quarter century; China does not have a blue water fleet. Nor will the UNHRC fracas help; it is likely to push Colombo closer to Beijing. On the economic side Lanka is not a big factor in China’s great global outreach; Africa, Central Asia and South America matter more. Therefore this too is a subsidiary not a decisive reason.

The US will note all this but the crucial link concerns political stability. The Americans are putting in motion a process of regime change which will deliver results some way down the road. I think they reckon the current regime is headed for an unstable period; the link with the North is eroding and no political solution is in sight, Muslims are alienated, and the rapport with India will deteriorate after the Indian elections. Most serious, perilous fault lines have emerged in the south on economy, autocracy and democracy. There is more than a whiff of instability in the air.

Since every global crisis ends on some White House or State Department plate, for reasons to do with America’s global position, maybe Washington would like to nip this one in the bud. If GoSL does not compromise in Geneva; if it is driven to paroxysms of irrationality and if extremism shows its face on the streets; then Washington’s plan is already half done thanks to Colombo! International mechanisms will get moving. If GoSL accepts the resolution, as wiser counsel is urging it to do in self-interest, then Clause 2 takes precedence and the American game plan gets operative if and when GoSL calculatingly fouls it up in implementation.

India and 13A

13A was 25 years ago; is India still emotionally attached to the narrative, is its self-interest still connected to devolution in Lanka? The answer to the first question (emotional attachment) is, yes but not strong. The Indian army lost 1200 jawans and there is sentiment that they should not have died in vain. At the same time rational Indians concede memories alone are no reason for retaining a policy if it serves no current purpose. Does India get any economic benefit from the Indo-Lanka Accord? None as far as I can see; it is exports, investments , CIMA, SAARC and such linkages, which have nothing to do with any of this that can be pointed to as of economic interest to India.

One factor apart from sentiment and memory that concerns Delhi is the affect of the Lankan Tamil issue on Tamil Nadu. Indian Tamils do care about Ceylon Tamils and more deeply about Upcountry Tamils. Tamil Nadu politicians also keep the issue alive as a punching bag against each other. Furthermore, if a future Narendra Mody government stands accused of appeasing Sinhala chauvinism in Lanka, it is Congress more than Tamil Nadu that will have a field day slamming Mody of treachery to the memory of the jawans, betraying Tamils and insulting Rajiv Gandhi.

Devolution, power sharing, self-administration and the like are matters of life and death for Ceylon Tamils living in the North and East and because of fraternal linkages for those living in the South. With the Indian commitment waning with the passage of time, the Tamils of Lanka and the TNA are wise to broaden their support base to secure breathing space for the community. Breathing space is another way of saying autonomy and devolution of power. So they need to win the support of other countries, not instead but in addition to India, as a backup to securing a political settlement at home. The relationships now being fortified with the United States, Britain, Japan and South Africa are needed for this purpose. The Tamils are not strong enough to get a fair deal by their efforts alone and expectations about India must not be exaggerated unreasonably; a wider support base is crucial not only for human rights purposes but also as pressure points in hammering out a political settlement.

The article Sri Lanka: Does US Want Regime Change? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Arab News

Saudi Arabia announced on Wednesday that it would not stop members of the Muslim Brotherhood — listed among terrorist organizations in the Kingdom — from coming to perform Haj and Umrah.

“We have got special instructions from higher authorities on treatment of such people coming for pilgrimage,” said Lt. Col. Ahmed Al-Laheedan, director general of the Passport Department.

“Those who are banned from entering the Kingdom may be allowed to come for Haj and Umrah, if there are no specific instructions to prevent some individuals from entering the country,” he pointed out.

In such cases, the names of those individuals would be uploaded onto the computer system to prevent them from entering the Kingdom or arrest them on arrival. “We act according to the instructions we receive.”

Meanwhile, Adnan Mazroue, president of Taibah University, backed the Interior Ministry’s decision to take punitive action against those militants who go abroad to take part in civil wars and those who support terrorist organizations.

He commended the government’s efforts to promote moderation. “The measures taken by the government are aimed at reinforcing security and stability in the country.”

The article Saudi Arabia Says No Pilgrimage Ban On Members Of Brotherhood appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By IPS

By Johan Galtung

There is much in a name. Ukraine means borderland. The position of the extreme West – like U.S. neocons – is clear: get all into NATO, encircling, containing, defeating Russia.

Some in Ukraine and Georgia share that goal. The less extreme West would focus on European Union (EU) membership, both being European countries.

Some of them, in turn, might focus on loans as there is much money to be made. Thus, Bosnia-Herzegovina had nine billion dollars debt before the EU takeover as “high authority”; now 107 billion dollars. “Austerity” around the corner.

The position of Russia as expressed by president Vladimir Putin and minister Sergei Lavrov: no way. Crimea will revert to Russia after it was given to Ukraine in 1954 by Nikita Khrushchev – himself born in Kalinovka, Ukraine in 1894, the wife an Ukrainian – possibly mainly for economic reasons as his son at Brown University, U.S. argues.

However, Ukraine is not only a borderland but also two countries between Poland and Russia. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of 1569 and the Austria-Hungarian Empire once covered most of Ukraine; so did czarist Russia and Soviet Union in their heydays.

More importantly, the dividing line of the Roman Empire from 395, confirmed by the schism between Catholic and Orthodox Christianity in 1054 is reflected in Ukraine’s extremely complex history.

The result is unmistakable: moving east the Catholic attachment yield to the Orthodox and Ukrainian to Russian. When Poland became a member of EU and even NATO the handwriting for Ukraine was on the wall; bringing to mind Polish First Marshal Pilsudski’s Odessa-Black Sea ambitions after World War I.

Odessa is in the West, Donets in the East, Ukrainian in the West, more Russian in the East. And Kiev – origin of Russia, Rus – the capital, in the middle.

No doubt there is also a Ukraine uniting the two, a land, not only a border; also united in popular revolt against corruption all over. One split in two, two united in one: both true.

But watch out: one thing is the corruption-inequality pandemic all over the world hitting Ukraine; another is centuries of history leaving lasting impacts. Imagine corruption-inequality subsiding, and the fault lines will come up, even with a vengeance.

So much for diagnosis. Prognosis: Crimea reverts to Russia; Ukraine under Washington-Brussels hegemony; civil war threatening. Anti-semitism, Islamism. But not escalating to a world war: However, balance of terror is not peace, so what is the possible therapy?

But first Georgia, also deeply divided with Russian-speaking Orthodox South Ossetia and Abkhazia within 1921 borders where Joseph Stalin – a Georgian – played a key role (Zviad Gamsakhardia, independent president in 1991, re-asserted Georgian hegemony; now more disputed).

The Soviet power centre was in Moscow, but they showered the non-Russians with gifts of various kinds, even land. The two stories are similar, with Russian troops in Abkhazia-South Ossetia and military encounters. Thus, Georgia attacked South Ossetia in 2008, evidently hoping to provoke Russia to provoke NATO but the plot was revealed.

Georgia 2003 -Ukraine 2004 had rose-orange “colour revolutions”; now U.S. uses more forceful demonstrations also helped by Resistance!, the Beograd student group fighting Milosevic, to install governments.

Europe is more sensitive to conflicts between nations, making a NATO consensus unlikely.

Europe had the Cold War experience that a neutral-nonaligned belt between West and East is useful; the roles of Finland and Sweden, Austria and Switzerland, Yugoslavia.

To Washington they were half-way traitors, “equalizing” West and East, to be won over, even coerced. But, a non-aligned borderland between today’s NATO Poland-Lithuania and Russia and NATO Turkey and Russia, could also one day be useful.

The choice for Ukraine is not between one unitary state ruled from Kiev, and two states run from, say, Odessa and Donets. There are three in-betweens.

First, there is devolution, decentralisation, already working, with regional parliaments reflecting the deep differences. But they are weak relative to Kiev, let alone relative to Washington-Moscow.

Second, federation; the Federal Republic of Ukraine, with high level of autonomy for the two parts to express their character, yet sharing foreign, security (neutral!), finance and logistics policies.

Third, confederation, the Ukrainian Community, two independent countries each other’s major partners economically and politically.

Examples of the three: United Kingdom, Belgium, the Nordics; with similarities and differences. Thus, the UK is now loosening, possibly breaking up in spite of shared language and history.

How Belgium will turn out history will show. The Nordics work well with even more differences than there is inside Ukraine and are not even contiguous.

The West and Russia compete with economic offers, but identity is probably more important. Ukraine West feels West, Ukraine East feels Russian; united historically, divided culturally. Could one be in EU and the other in the Russian federation, both enjoying the carrots offered? – in a Ukrainian Community with open borders? Too divisive.

None of the three is perfect, but the federation may be the best way out. There is unity and diversity. Ukraine, a founding member of the United Nations, is still a country, yet the different identities are fully respected. Be smart, could that federation even be both an associate member of the EU and the Russian federation?

Prediction: within five years we have both federations. Crisis over.

Johan Galtung, Rector of the TRANSCEND Peace University, and author of ‘50 Years – 100 Peace and Conflict Perspectives’ analyses possible scenarios for Ukraine.

The article Ukraine-Crimea-Russia And The West – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute

By June Teufel Dreyer

Russian president Vladimir Putin’s actions with regard to the unrest in Ukraine put the Chinese leadership in an exceedingly delicate position. A cornerstone of the country’s foreign policy since 1954 has been its adherence to the Pancha Shila, or Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, with their insistence on non-aggression and non-interference in the sovereign affairs of other countries.[1] China’s “principled stance” on non-aggression and non-interference has been used, among other instances, to object to the United Nations effort to force Iraqi president Saddam Hussein to relinquish his takeover of Kuwait,[2] against the decision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to induce the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to halt the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, and in defense of regimes in the Middle East during the Arab Spring. Putin’s actions clearly violated the Five Principles and should therefore have been unequivocally condemned.

That didn’t happen. Although the Russian foreign ministry announced that the two countries had “broadly coinciding views” on the situation in Ukraine, “broadly” is a conveniently ambiguous term that can obscure inconvenient but important differences of views. Foreign Minister Wang Yi as well as official spokespersons have dispensed largely meaningless anodynes about deep concern for the crisis and on the need for dialogue even as Putin effects a fait accompli, with Russian troops fanning out in key positions in the Crimea and a date set for a referendum in which Crimeans will vote on whether they want to stay in Ukraine. The latter is at variance with the country’s constitution, which says that the entire country would have to vote on such matters. For China to accept this has uncomfortable implications for Beijing’s position on the independence of Taiwan: it has consistently held that all citizens of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—to which Taiwan has never belonged—should have the right to vote on the island’s independence.

Yet China has important reasons for supporting Putin and, indirectly, the incursion itself.  Official pronouncements typically refer to the country as China’s most reliable strategic partner. The PRC’s strategists see the Ukraine as in the midst of a tug of war between East and West, with their country’s interests solidly on the side of the East. The Russian and Chinese leaderships have similar views on such matters as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, as well as a common interest in supporting autocracy. Beijing sees a diminution of its own position if Ukraine becomes better integrated with the West. This view has an eerie resonance with Chairman Mao Zedong’s famous advice to the Soviet Union in 1957: the west wind must not be allowed to triumph over the east wind. When, this past November, Putin appeared to think this might be happening, he offered Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych $15 billion in economic assistance to become part of the Russian-sponsored Eurasian Customs Union rather than move toward a closer relationship with the European Union. Yanukovych’s acceptance infuriated pro-Western Ukrainians, resulting in charges that he had been bribed and massive demonstrations that led to Yanukovych’s resignation from power.  Chinese sources have mentioned the involvement of foreign forces in this, though carefully not specifying either the names of the putative interferers or the means the foreign forces are employing to do so.

There are also economic reasons why China does not want to incur Putin’s displeasure. Russia is an important source of energy for China. After a dispute with Ukraine in the 2005-2009 period, Russia temporarily cut off gas supplies, and could do the same to China. Doubtless mindful of this, Beijing has announced its unequivocal opposition to imposing sanctions on Russia.

On the other hand, common views on opposition to democracy and human rights do not necessary make close allies. Neither side is unmindful of the tensions that have caused periodic problems in their relations in the past, and each is wary of the implications of the rise in power of the other, as can be seen in the negotiations about how many troops each will contribute to periodic joint military exercises, and what territories they may pass through.  Although it ratified Putin’s actions in South Ossetia in 2008, Beijing was palpably uneasy with their implications for its problems with separatist-seekers in China. If, as seems likely, Russia does gain control over the Crimea and, ultimately, predominant influence over Ukraine, it will have extended its reach further into what Russian strategists call the Near Beyond—i.e., the sway of the former Soviet empire. The Baltic and Eastern European states have already expressed uneasiness that they will be next.  Georgia has reported Russian helicopter incursions of its airspace, believing that their purpose is surveillance of its border posts. With a land area a third the size of Russia itself, Ukraine has far greater significance than these. An old saying has it that Russia without the Ukraine is just a country, while Russia with the Ukraine is an empire.[3] This is an empire that Chinese leaders have unhappy memories of, and no wish to see re-created. For its part, Russia is concerned with the rise of China and worried that the large influx of Chinese immigrants into the heretofore sparsely populated Russia Far East may portend a loss of Moscow’s control over that area. Moscow’s willingness to sell advanced fighter planes to India and Vietnam, with whom Beijing has prickly relations, contributes to the Chinese leadership’s concern about being encircled.

Meanwhile, the Western states also struggle to cope with the changing geopolitical implications of an expanding Russia. Washington has few options. Sanctions, on the rare occasions they work, take a long time to do so, by which time Russia’s presence will have been consolidated. Economic arrangements are typically undertaken because they are mutually beneficial, and therefore sanctions tend to hurt not only the country sanctioned but the sanctioners as well. Britain has already indicated it is reluctant to participate in financial sanctions because of the effects on its economy; the Japanese fear that they will destroy the country’s fragile recovery from a twenty-year financial slump, and the Chinese have refused point-blank. Their financial exchanges are, respectively, the third, fourth, and seventh largest in the world.

As for energy sanctions, suggestions that America compensate European states for the loss of Russian gas with the products of its fracking are not feasible since current U.S. production is less than a sixth of what would be needed. Faced with the virtual certainty of loss of influence over the Ukraine, the Obama administration seems resigned to accepting the inevitable while assuring nervous Baltic and Eastern European states of its support.

Contrary to assessments that China has issued a “soft nyet” to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine,[4] Beijing has chosen to employ verbal acrobatics to substantiate its claim to uphold the principle of non-intervention while in fact supporting intervention. Having carefully weighed the uncomfortable alternatives, the PRC will support Russian expansion. In return, it will expect, and doubtless get, reciprocal support from Russia for its actions in the East and South China seas and Taiwan. Its obfuscatory rhetoric notwithstanding, China has chosen power politics over principled policy.

About the author:
June Teufel Dreyer is a Senior Fellow in FPRI’s Asia Program as well as a member of the Orbis Board of Editors. She is Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida. Formerly senior Far East Specialist at the Library of Congress, she has also served as Asia policy advisor to the Chief of Naval Operations and as commissioner of the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission established by the U.S. Congress. She is author of China’s Political System: Modernization and Tradition (2012, eighth edition).

Source:
This article was published by FPRI and may be accessed here.

Notes:
[1] The Five Principles are 1. mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; 2. mutual non-aggression; 3. mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; 4.equality and mutual benefit; 5. peaceful co-existence.

[2] When it was pointed out that Saddam had already violated the Five Principles by invading Kuwait, the Chinese response was that “two wrongs do not make a right.”

[3] Feng Yujun, director of the Institute of Russian Studies at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR, one of the PRC’s leading think tanks) cited this saying, though attributing it to Zbigniew Brzezinski, Renmin Ribao, February 24, 2014.

[4] Elizabeth C. Economy, “China’s Soft ‘Nyet’ to Russia’s Ukraine Intervention,’ Forbes. March 5, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/elizabetheconomy/2014/03/05/chinas-soft-nyet-to-russias-ukraine-intervention/

The article China And Ukraine: Principled Policy Or Power Politics? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By SATP

On February 27, 2014, at a meeting sponsored by the Forum for Naga Reconciliation (FNR) in Dimapur, 31 Naga organisations extended their full support to the Naga reconciliation process and urged the FNR to continue strengthening and pursing the task of Reconciliation at a time of deep crisis. The Naga bodies also implored all Naga tribe and civil society organizations to consciously work towards reconciliation in the spirit of forgiveness, towards a shared future: “Recognizing that reconciliation is a continuous process, we urge all Naga political groups to join Naga reconciliation and to unitedly pursue the Naga political and historical rights for the common good of all.” FNR was formed in May 2008.

On October 8, 2013, amidst increasing factional killings and other forms of violence in Naga areas, FNR had observed that, if the reconciliation process was to continue with credibility, the Naga militant organizations would have to immediately stop violence perpetrated in any form. The FNR had then urged the leaders of the Naga underground groups to demonstrate their statesmanship by putting aside factional politics and work for the common Naga cause of justice and peace. It is useful to recall, here, that on March 23, 2013, Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), NSCN-Khole-Kitovi (NSCN-KK) and Naga National Council/Federal Government of Nagaland (NNC/FGN) functionaries had held another round of meetings on reconciliation at Chiang Mai, Thailand.

Even as the efforts for reconciliation amongst the Nagas continued, fresh challenges have emerged, besides the well known factional clashes between Naga rebel groups. When Rengma Nagas and the Karbis clashed in Assam in December 2013, the effect was felt in Nagaland. On December 27, 2013, at least four persons, the village headman and three women, all belonging to Rengma Naga community, were shot dead by Karbi People’s Liberation Tiger (KPLT) militants in Khowanigaon, under the Borpathar Police Station in the Karbi Anglong District of Assam. Sources indicated that KPLT militants had issued an ultimatum to Rengma Nagas to leave the District by December 25. On the same day [December 27], a Naga militant outfit, Rengma Naga Hills Protection Force (RNHPF), had retaliated and launched a counter–attack on the KPLT militants, killing two of them. Further on December 29, 2013 Security Forces recovered the bullet-riddled, decomposed bodies of two aged women, suspected to have been killed by KPLT cadres, at Rengma Mouza, Bokajan in Karbi Anglong District.

There was a standoff between the NSCN-IM and the Sumi Nagas following an incident in December 2013. The tension started when four armed NSCN-IM cadres allegedly molested two Sumi women and assaulted two men travelling to Zunheboto at Aghuyito village near Zunheboto District on December 21, 2013. The incident triggered mass resentment among the Sumi community, triggering a massive rally on December 22, where it was resolved that the errant NSCN-IM cadres should be handed over to the District administration within three days, failing which a call for non-cooperation with NSCN-IM would be initiated. When the Sumi Hoho (the apex organisation of the Sumi community) asked the outfit to hand over its cadres, it refused.

On December 28, hundreds of Sumis, angered by the December 21 incident, marched towards the NSCN-IM’s designated camp at Mukalimi village under Pughoboto Subdivision in Zunheboto District, where they were fired on, allegedly by NSCN-IM cadres, leading to the death of two persons and injuries to six others. On January 2, 2014, the Sumi Hoho in Nagaland declared December 28 as “Martyrs’ Day” to honour the two Sumi volunteers who died during the three-day siege of the NSCN-IM’s camp at Mukalimi in Zunheboto District. The NSCN-IM vacated the Mukalima camp On December 30, after much persuasion by the Centre and State Government. An NSCN-IM source claimed that the cadres vacated the camp on their own, but sources disclose that they did so only after much discussion with the Government. A Sumi general public meeting held under the aegis of the Sumi Hoho at Zunheboto on January 7, 2014, further resolved that the NSCN-IM would not be permitted to establish its designated camps within Sumi-inhabited areas and thereby decided to sever all ties with NSCN-IM.

The beginning of 2014 has brought no relief. In the night of January 3, 2014, highly decomposed bodies of nine persons, blindfolded, their hands tied and shot from close range, were recovered from a gorge in the Pachaspura area, Chumekedima, in Dimapur District in Nagaland. On January 6, Nagaland Police disclosed that all the nine dead bodies were ethnic Karbis from the Karbi Anglong District of Assam, and included a missing Karbi Students Association (KSA) leader, Harlongbi Engti. The incident was purportedly in retaliation against the killing of Rengma Nagas in Assam in December 2013. The RNHPF claimed responsibility for the Dimapur killings. There were also reports that the RNHPF was floated under the patronage of the NSCN-IM for protection of the Rengma Naga people living in Karbi Anglong. On January 4, 2014, the Nagaland Government constituted a three-member High Power Enquiry Committee (HPEC) to probe the recovery of the nine bodies. The Nagaland Home Department asserted that the HPEC had been constituted alongside the Police investigation by a Special Investigation Team (SIT), which had alleged that another seven NSCN-IM cadres were behind the Dimapur killings. Cease Fire Monitoring Group (CFMG) Chairman Lt. Gen (Retd.) N.K Singh also stated that the involvement of NSCN-IM had come to light with the arrest of three alleged accused in this incident. The arrest date was unspecified.

A January 6, 2014, report indicated that over 3,000 people from the Karbi and Rengma Naga tribes had been taking shelter in relief camps in the Bokajan area of the Karbi Anglong District since December 27, 2013, due to violent clashes between the KPLT and the RNHPF. Karbi Anglong Superintendent of Police Mugdhajyoti Mahanta disclosed that, as on January 6, 2014, 3,131 people were taking shelter in nine relief camps. Of them, 1,683 were Rengma Nagas and 1,448 were Karbis. On February 1, 2013, the Rengma Naga organisations in Karbi Anglong District reiterated their demand for the creation of a Rengma Hills Autonomous District Council (RHADC) , with its headquarters at Bokajan, through the separation of the Rengma Hills from Karbi Anglong, on the basis of the original boundary of the Hills and Rengma Mouzas (an earlier nomenclature for a revenue collection unit). Later on February 4, the RNHPF declared that peace could return to Karbi Anglong District only if the Rengma Nagas were given constitutional protection or a political identity separate from the Karbis.

Despite these fresh challenges, fatalities in Nagaland dropped dramatically from 61 [six civilians and 55 militants] in 2012 to just 32 [11 civilians and 21 militants] in 2013, according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). Internecine clashes within the State also declined from 43 incidents in 2012, resulting in 53 persons killed and 23 injured, to 18 incidents in 2013, resulting in 12 killed and 11 injured. 2012 had witnessed intense factional killing between NSCN-K and NSCN-KK, which visibly slowed down in 2013. In one major factional clash during the year, three NSCN-K cadres were killed and one was injured by NSCN-KK cadres at Sikiu ‘A’, under the Shamator Sub-division, Tuensang District.

Factional killings amongst the Nagas had spiked after the formation of NSCN-KK on June 7, 2011, and the Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF), a Manipur based outfit, on February 25, 2011. Outside Nagaland, SATP recorded seven incidents of fratricidal clashes [resulting in nine killed and two injured] between Naga militant groups in 2013, as against such 13 incidents [resulting in 27 killed and 10 injured] in 2012. Fatalities in Nagaland registered an upward trend, till they peaked at 145 in 2008, but fell drastically in 2009 and 2010. The dramatic drop in fatalities in 2009 and 2010 came in the aftermath of the signing of the Covenant of Reconciliation in mid-2009. However, this emerging trend was dramatically reversed after the emergence of ZUF and NSCN-KK in 2011.

Arms smuggling remains an issue in Nagaland, with at least 25 arms dealers arrested in 11 incidents through 2013. The arrestees included at least three NNC and two NSCN-IM cadres. On November 12, 2013, seven arms smugglers, including two NSCN-IM cadres, were arrested by the Assam Rifles in Dimapur District, and a huge cache of arms was seized from them.

In a significant breakthrough, on August 30, 2013, the NSCN-IM arms supplier, identified as Wuthikorn Naruenartwanich alias Willy Narue, was arrested by Bangkok Police while arranging for the supply of Chinese arms to the NSCN-IM. Naruenartwanich has been accused of buying nearly 1,000 assault rifles and an unspecified number of rocket-propelled grenades to be sold to the outfit. Naruenartwanich, a Thai national, was reportedly picked up at India’s request. On September 22, the Thai gunrunner revealed “key information” about the supply chain for smuggling arms from China to the Northeast through Bangladesh. An official source disclosed that preliminary questioning of the accused by Thai authorities had revealed that Naruenartwanich, along with NSCN-IM , had hatched a plan to send a huge consignment of arms and ammunition from China to the Northeast. The official stated, “Willy had told Thai Police that the arms consignment was to start from Beihei port in South China Sea near Vietnam to Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh. On the high seas, the consignment was to be shifted to small fishing trawlers to reach Bangladesh, and then to the Northeast.”

Naruenartwanich was reportedly the main interlocutor of Anthony Shimray, the chief arms procurer of NSCN-IM, who was arrested from Patna (Bihar) in October 2010. He had brokered a USD 2 million deal involving supply of some 1,000 firearms, including 600 AK-47s and ammunition, with Chinese arms dealers. The deal, according to the National Investigation Agency (NIA) chargesheet, was renegotiated to USD 1 million. The Chinese arms dealer is one of the four accused charge-sheeted by the NIA following Shimray’s arrest.

Further, the SATP database recorded the arrest of 146 militants in 2013, in 69 incidents. These included 26 NSCN-IM, 23 NSCN-K, 22 NSCN-KK and 11 of the IK Songbijit faction of National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-IKS). 93 militants were arrested in 2012.

SATP also recorded 10 incidents of abduction, in which 12 persons were abducted, as against three such incidents in 2012. In the worst such incident in 2013, two bodies, suspected to be that of a driver and a cleaner, were recovered from Sakhaba village in Kohima District on February 3, 2013. Suspected NSCN-K militants had abducted drivers and cleaners of four trucks from Manipur, near Kohima, on the grounds that the truck owners had not heeded their extortion demands. A ‘tax’ of INR two million each had been demanded from the owners.

Eight incidents of explosion were recorded in 2013. Two civilians were killed in two of these incidents. 2012 recorded only two incidents of explosion, injuring two persons.

Nine incidents of extortion were reported in 2013, as against 11 such incidents in 2012 [the incidence is likely to have been much higher, as most victims comply without reporting the demands to the Police].

2013 also saw the formation of the Action Committee Against Unabated Taxation (ACAUT) in Dimapur. The ACAUT was formed by several organizations under the aegis of Naga Council in May 2013, in an effort to check the rampant imposition of ‘illegal tax‘on the people, especially the business community, by various organizations, particularly including Naga underground outfits. On October 31, 2013, several thousand persons from all sections of society showed up to express support and solidarity with the campaign spearheaded by ACAUT. After the rally, however, NSCN-declared that ACAUT had no authority to ‘dictate the people’. Earlier, on June 8, 2013, during a meeting with ACAUT, NSCN-IM leaders had asserted that, as a people-mandated revolutionary group, they had the ‘right to tax’ people.

Interestingly, a November 11, 2013, report observed that NSCN-IM had officially revealed, for the first time, that it had hundreds of members and several offices in foreign countries. Reiterating its stand on ‘taxation’, the group had asserted that it had to collect ‘tax’ from the Naga-inhabited areas of Nagaland, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Myanmar, to support its members in foreign countries. The outfit also warned ACAUT, claiming that the organization was hand-in-glove with NSCN-IM’s adversaries, and sought to undermine Naga nationalism, which would never be tolerated.

NSCN-IM continues to maintain a base in Bangladesh from where arms are supplied to the outfit’s camps in the region. According to a November 11, 2012, report, NSCN-IM had four camps out of the 51 still in existence of Northeast militant groups still present in Bangladesh. It also has offices in the United States, Germany, Netherlands, China, Thailand, Japan, the Philippines and the United Kingdom. According to intelligence sources, the outfit spends thousands of dollars to maintain its network abroad. According to intelligence sources, the outfit’s annual budget has increased manifold as a result of heavy recruitment and procurement of arms from foreign countries, to over INR 1 billion per year. There are an estimated 25,000 NSCN-IM cadres, each receiving a salary ranging between INR 2,000 and INR 15,000, according to ‘rank’.

Meanwhile, talks between the Government of India (GoI) and the NSCN-IM have been going on without any concrete progress. The negotiation process faced a further setback with the Centre’s interlocutor, R.S. Pandey resigning on December 16, 2013, after announcing that he would be contesting the 2014 Lok Sabha polls. A top official of the Union Home Ministry, on February 14, 2014, disclosed that the Government would announce the name of the new interlocutor after the Parliament session.

On January 26, 2014, Nagaland Governor Nikhil Kumar expressed his regret on the failure to settle the Naga political issue before the State Assembly elections. Addressing the Republic Day (January 26) celebration in the State capital, Kohima, Kumar appealed to all sections of the Nagas to continue working for a peaceful settlement. On October 10, 2012, Union Minister of Home Affairs, Sushil Kumar Shinde, had reportedly hinted that a ‘solution’ to the ‘Naga issue’ was likely before March 2013, when Assembly polls in Nagaland were due.

Meanwhile, the ceasefire between GoI and NSCN-K was extended for a year on April 22, 2013. On April 26, 2013, the ceasefire agreement between GoI and NSCN-KK was also reviewed and extended for a year, with effect from April 28, 2013.

2013 also saw a renewed agitation for the creation of a separate State by the “Eastern Nagaland People’s Organisation” (ENPO) following the decision of the Congress working committee to carve out the Telengana State from Andhra Pradesh. In a symbolic move to intensify the demand for separate statehood – ‘Frontier Nagaland’ – the six tribes of Eastern Nagaland, under the aegis of ENPO, observed a “Black Day” on August 15, 2013. ENPO took the decision as “a practical message” to the GoI, to demand the ‘immediate declaration’ of Statehood with a special status within the Indian Constitution, based on the distinctive and different historical and geo-political background of Eastern Nagaland – comprising the four Districts of Mon, Tuensang, Kiphire and Longleng. The demand has already been turned down by both the Centre and the State Government. The demand was first raised in the year 2010. ENPO has also rejected the State Government’s offer of an autonomous council, regional council and economic package, in lieu of ‘Frontier Nagaland’.

The promise of a ‘solution’ to the vexed ‘Naga issue’ has long been belied, and though the peace process has stemmed the force of India’s longest insurgency, it is yet to give a real peace to the people of the State. The uncertainty, the jockeying for power, the regimes of illegal ‘taxation’ and intimidation, the continuing sway of armed non-state groups, and the exacerbating inter-tribal tensions, keep the situation at a constant simmer, boiling over into violence from time to time. Unless a settlement of the issue is achieved, and one that is perceived as just by all affected parties, it is unlikely that things will change dramatically in Nagaland.

The article India: Nagaland Terror Assessment – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By SATP

We were going shopping for our sister’s wedding when my cousin suddenly stopped the car in the alley where our house was located. I saw two men standing at the entrance of the lane and a group of eight to ten people, including young men aged 17-18 years approaching us, loading their guns…. I had never seen this kind of ferocity on the streets in India… my cousin, whose place I was visiting in Karachi, pleaded to me to be quiet and not to get into any argument with them. He referred to them as Balochi gangsters and exclaimed, “These are Balochis and you should not utter a word, just surrender and give whatever you have.” They held my two sisters at gunpoint and put a sharp knife on my chest, making it bleed. Each of us gave whatever possessions we had. My cousin lamented, “This is the drudgery of our daily lives here. We live in fear…” — Interview to SATP on condition of anonymity

At least 13 Policemen were killed and 58 persons were injured in a suicide blast targeting a bus carrying 50 Police officers near the gate of the Razzakabad Police Training Centre in the Shah Latif Town of Karachi, the provincial capital of Sindh, on February 13, 2014. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) ‘spokesman’ Shahidullah Shahid claiming responsibility for the attack, declaring, “We carried out the attack against the Police because they are killing our people.”

On January 7, 2014, TTP terrorists had killed six people near the Sufi shrine of Ayub Shah Bukhari in Gulshan-e-Maymar area of Gadap Town in Karachi. Two of the victims were beheaded, while the rest had their throats slit. The Police found a bloodstained knife and note, written by the TTP, which read, “Stop visiting shrines — from the Pakistani Taliban. People visiting shrines will meet the same fate.”

On January 2, 2014, three gangsters were shot dead in an ambush by a rival group in the Ilyas Goth area of Liaquatabad Town, Karachi. The deceased were involved in murders, gang wars, abduction-for-ransom, extortion and other criminal activities in Landhi and Malir Towns of Karachi District.

These incidents are only a few of the proliferating manifestations of the violence that flourishes in Sindh, because of an intricate relationship between terrorist outfits, violent political organisations and criminal gangs. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Sindh has already recorded 273 fatalities, including 180 civilians, 46 Security Force (SF) personnel, and 47 terrorists in the first two months of year 2014, and remains the second worst terrorism affected region across Pakistan in terms of fatalities [the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) rank first, with 290 killed, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) is third, with 187 dead]. Sindh, however, continued to hold the dubious distinction of recording the highest number of civilian fatalities, at 180, over this period, followed by 120 in KP, 92 in Balochistan, 20 in Punjab and 20 in FATA.

Terrorist attacks, sectarian and political violence and gang wars were the three indices that made Sindh, which recorded 1,668 fatalities in 2013, second among the most violence-afflicted Provinces in Pakistan [after FATA, which saw 1,716 killed during the year]. Even in 2013, however, Sindh held the first position in terms of civilian fatalities, by far, with 1,285 killed, distantly followed by KP, where 603 civilian fatalities were recorded. 156 SF personnel, and 227 terrorists were killed in the Province in 2013. In 2012, these numbers stood at a total of 1,553 fatalities, including 1,318 civilians, 118 SF personnel and 117 terrorists. Fatalities among SFs and terrorists increased by 32.2 per cent and 94.01 per cent, respectively, between 2012 and 2013. The rise in fatalities in these two categories is primarily due to escalating confrontations between the two sides, as the worsening law and order situation forced the Government to launch limited operations.

Though civilians continued to face the brunt of terror through 2013, there was a marginal decline of 2.50 per cent in fatalities in this category, as compared to 2012. According to SATP data, of 1,285 civilians killed in 2013, 151 died in 91 sectarian attacks, as compared to 122 killed in 92 such attacks in 2012.

Other parameters of violence registered significant increase. Incidents of killing in 2013 increased to 1,215, from 1,105 in 2012. Major incidents (each involving three or more fatalities) and resultant fatalities increased to 56 and 282, respectively, as compared to 38 and 149, respectively, in 2012. Incidents of bomb blast and resultant fatalities in 2013 increased to 122 and 193, respectively, from 77 and 42 in 2012.

Karachi was the worst hit among all 23 Districts of the Province. Of the total of 1,668 killings in Sindh, 1,638 (98.2 per cent) took place in Karachi alone. Of 1,285 civilians killed in the Province in 2013, 1,270 civilian killings (98.83 per cent) occurred in Karachi alone, followed by six in Hyderabad District, three in Kashmore District, two each in Khairpur and Shikarpur Districts, and one each in Jacobabad and Sukkur Districts.

Karachi’s descent into anarchy has been enormously accelerated as a result of the influx of TTP cadres from the country’s tribal areas. According to a January 20, 2014, threat report by security agencies, a further influx of TTP operatives into Karachi is likely, to avenge the deployment of military troops in the Waziristan areas of the FATA. The report said that thousands of TTP operatives are already living in Karachi, adding to the numbers of local operatives of various other active and defunct organisations.

Adding to the problem are a wide range of sectarian-terrorist outfits operating in the city. These prominently include Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Sipah-e-Sahaba-Pakistan (SSP), Jandullah, Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Sunni Tehreek (ST) and Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP), among many others. Unsurprisingly, barring one fatality in Jacobabad District, all 150 killings in 90 sectarian attacks in Sindh Province occurred in Karachi alone.

Political killings have also become the order of the day. Activists of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and the Awami National Party (ANP) have been the principal targets. A total of 345 activists of these parties, including 191 of the MQM; 98 of the ANP, and 56 of the PPP, have been killed since 2011. 176 of these, including 124 MQM, 36 ANP and 16 PPP activists were killed in 2013 alone.

Turf wars between two prominent criminal gangs, the Uzair Baloch-led People’s Amn Committee (PAC, People’s Peace Committee) and the Ghaffar Zikri-led Lyari gang, and their local wings, continuously exacerbate violence. Despite being banned, these criminal formations continue to operate with the support of their political patrons. The PAC is alleged to be supported by PPP and the Zikri group thrives with the support of the MQM.

A Report by Foreign Policy in September 2013 termed Karachi “the most dangerous megacity” in the world. The Report cited a murder rate of 12.3 per 100,000 residents, “some 25 per cent higher than any other major city”.

The epidemic of violence is worsened by an endemic extortion racket, making the environment extremely volatile for the business community. Predicting 2013 as “a record year for extortion in Karachi”, the chief of the Citizen-Police Liaison Committee (CPLC), Ahmed Chinoy stated, “The extortion racket has blown out of all proportion with the previous year.” According to the figures collected by Chinoy’s committee, there were more than 630 extortion complaints registered in Karachi from January 2013 to mid-June 2013, compared to 589 in the whole of 2012. Most cases were registered by people who had refused to pay. However, the Police claim that the actual number of incidents is many times higher, since the vast majority of extortion demands go unreported, as victims usually decide to pay. Kutchi Rabta Committee (KRC) leader Haji Adam, while speaking of the menace of extortion on July 5, 2013, complained, “The situation of Lyari is worse than that of Waziristan,” and added, “miscreants were free to operate in the area.”

Fearing a spill-over into other parts of the Province, Sindh Chief Minister Syed Qaim Ali Shah, on February 24, 2014, cautioned, “Karachi-like terrorism must not hit other parts of Sindh. Terrorism should not make its way into the interior of Sindh with the intensity witnessed in Karachi.”

Significantly, the Hyderabad and Sukkur Districts had each witnessed one major incident in 2013. On November 26, 2013, in a targeted attack on the Police, unidentified terrorists shot dead four Policemen and injured another three, while the Police unit was on mobile duty in the Latifabad area of Hyderabad District. A major incident occurred in Sukkur District on July 24, 2013, when suicide bombers and armed militants mounted an attack on the local office of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in the high security zone of the Sukkur Barrage Colony in Sukkur town. Eight persons were killed, including four terrorists, three ISI officials and a civilian, and another 50 were injured. It was combined attack by the Mohmand Chapter of TTP and the Punjab Chapter of the Taliban (Punjabi Taliban). An unnamed ‘commander’ of the outfit claimed responsibility for the attack. These attacks, and a range of lesser indicators, suggest the gradual penetration of the TTP in other parts of Sindh, potentially creating a far greater challenge for a state apparatus that has, thus far, not been able to combat the ongoing groundswell of terrorist, sectarian and criminal violence in Karachi, the core area of militant activities, despite the tall claims of “successful operations.”

The crisis in Karachi – indeed, the crisis in Pakistan – is that the state, its agencies, and the political forces that control these, are unwilling to relinquish extremist Islam and terrorism as instruments of policy and of domestic political management. Whatever limited action that has been taken against particular terrorist or organised criminal gangs has been fitful, selective and, in most cases, half-hearted. In the meanwhile, armed extremist formations have consolidated their own independent bases of power, even as the regime of collusion with elements within the establishment continues. Under the circumstances, the challenge in Karachi – and potentially across wider areas in Sindh – can only become more intractable with the passage of time.

The article Pakistan: Sindh Terror Assessment – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By IPRIS

By Gustavo Placido Dos Santos

Introduction

On 12 April 2012, following the first round of Guinea- Bissau’s presidential elections, the armed forces staged a coup d’état.1

Interim President Raimundo Pereira and presidential frontrunner Carlos Gomes Júnior (won 49% of the votes in the first round), were arrested and forced into exile. A military-backed interim regime took over. The international community’s refusal to recognize the post- coup interim regime, and the sanctions imposed by the African Union (AU) and European Union (EU), has led the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to appeal for international legitimization of the transitional government and removal of sanctions in sake of the country’s security sector reform (SSR) and smooth return to full democratic rule. It can be argued that the divisions within the international community have contributed to the transition authorities’ consolidation and the indefinite postponement of elections for the last two years, which raises doubts about the effectiveness of international intervention.

Nonetheless, the ECOWAS mission is not without merit, as it has managed to avoid further instability that could have worsened the situation in the field. Elections scheduled for 13 April 2014 may mark the country’s return to constitutional order. The armed forces have historically posed a threat to constitutional order, and will probably haunt the forthcoming elections. Likely motivated by the possibility of military meddling, the PAIGC’s new secretary-general, Domingos Simões Pereira, has dismissed his support for Carlos Gomes Júnior, the former prime minister and presidential candidate on the eve of the 2012 coup.2 In sum, this situation shows how important it is to implement an effective, extended and resilient SSR.

The Ups and Downs of International Intervention

Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior implemented a program of reform and modernization of the defense and security sectors, aimed at curbing the armed forces’ influence. However, in September 2010, one of the major sponsors of the SSR, the EU, withdrew its mission following a coup attempt.3 Angola, which then chaired the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), signed a protocol with Guinea- Bissau’s government aimed at contributing for the SSR and increasing its influence in the country.

The cooperation agreement was renewed in February 2011, with approval of a US$ 600 million line of credit.4 One month later, the Angolan Military Mission to Guinea- Bissau (MISSANG) emerged. Moreover, ECOWAS agreed to support the SSR, and pledged to expand its collaboration with Angola and the CPLP with the deployment of a 600-strong ECOWAS-CPLP mission that included Brazil.5

However, soon after the coup d’état that followed the first round of the 2012 presidential elections – deemed largely free and fair by the international community – the armed forces began complaining.

According to the military, in the aftermath of the coup, Angola brought weapons to the country without the knowledge of the national authorities, which suggested that the Angolan mission had other objectives, namely to overthrow the junta.6 This led to friction between the two countries. Tensions escalated when the opposition made public a letter7 – from three days before the coup – wherein Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior asked the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to authorize the deployment of an international force with an extensive mandate under Article 24. The opposition and coup plotters claimed this constituted an attack on the country’s sovereignty.

Coupled with growing opposition in Guinea-Bissau, the unwillingness of some West African countries – such as Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria and Senegal – in having one of Africa’s regional powers in their sphere of influence, the Angolan forces withdrew in June 2012. This ruptured the bilateral agreement with Angola, and with it the financial support and on-going projects. An ECOWAS force (ECOMIB), comprised of 600 troops and police from Burkina-Faso, Nigeria and Senegal, took over MISSANG’s part of the mission, despite inexistent UNSC’s formal backing.

In February 2014, ECOWAS agreed to increase the 750-strong ECOMIB mission, although maintaining its original mandate to provide security during the elections.8 Nonetheless, it failed to gather more financial and logistical support needed to effectively reinforce the ECOMIB. France, the United Kingdom and United States made it clear that the regional bloc must use its own resources.9 It is worth noting that almost two-thirds of the financial burden for ECOWAS operations falls on the organization’s largest contributor, Nigeria (nearly two-thirds of the budget), clearly showing the dependency of the West African bloc on the West African economic powerhouse.10 ECOWAS is comprised of several troubled states, with young democratic systems and limited military capabilities. Some like Côte d’Ivoire11 and Nigeria face major social, political and military challenges within their own borders, while others just recently recovered from civil wars. The crisis in Mali, in particular, has drained ECOWAS resources. In addition, many of the countries that have shown solid progress in terms of consolidation of democratic institutions and improved governance, like Cape Verde and Ghana, are still susceptible to backsliding. Moreover, these countries comprise a minority within ECOWAS, and they lack the economic clout to influence policy-making and promote their model of governance. As a matter of fact, a few recent episodes depict the weakness of ECOMIB. Last month the vehicle UNIOGBIS head José Ramos-Horta’s vehicle was pulled over by the military in the country’s interior; and on 16 January 2014 the military and national guard surrounded UNIOGBIS office at the southern city of Buba, following information that Carlos Gomes Júnior was hiding there.12 It can therefore be argued that these episodes, the likes of which gain greater relevance for having taken place close to the elections, increase the necessity for a mission that effectively safeguards the next government’s security. The ECOWAS-brokered transition period was initially scheduled to end in April 2013, with the election of a new government, during which time the SSR would be consolidated and open the way to swift and peaceful presidential and legislative elections that would mark the return to constitutional order. However, the failure to organize elections, to improve the judicial system, and the persistent military meddling in national affairs shows that the ECOWAS and UN missions have largely failed to influence events. Nonetheless, since it is unlikely that elections will continue to be postponed indefinitely, it is urgent to analyze a post-election scenario for insight into how the international community should engage Guinea-Bissau.

Changing the Course of Events

The upcoming elections will define Guinea-Bissau’s short- term future, and in particular the return to constitutional order. In the elections’ aftermath, political and social instability need to be curbed if Guinea-Bissau is to not be a failed state.13 In order to do so, the international community should provide the conditions to guarantee that the democratically elected government will not be endangered by the armed forces. One should bear in mind that the implementation of a SSR14 program takes time to produce results, which means that in the meantime the country’s government will be not only vulnerable to a coup d’état, but also the armed forces will retain influence over national politics.

International sanctions and suspension of government- to-government aid15 following the 2012 coup contributed to the deepening of the country’s isolation and maintained or strengthened the armed force’s grip on power. Disruption of foreign aid and the suspension of vital internationally sponsored reforms, such as the EU €6.5 million deal aimed at modernizing and resizing the public administration,16 coupled with diverging post-coup engagement between the ECOWAS and the international community, have failed to restore democratic rule. In addition, they were largely counter- productive in a country with a poorly diversified economy whose economic structure and public finances rely heavily on agriculture, fisheries and foreign aid. In a post-election scenario sanctions and suspension of aid, which only serve to undermine the people’s livelihoods and the country’s economic development, need to be replaced by constructive initiatives – resumption of foreign aid and international cooperation – aimed at reforming the public administration and promoting economic growth.

The task of rebuilding the state must be supported by international organizations. Programs aimed at rebuilding the state, and the actors involved, have to be protected in order for meaningful changes to be introduced. A legitimate international intervention, ideally in the form of a UN stabilization force, would be the best option, as it would dissuade military meddling. According to Chapter VII,17 in the event that coercive measures – such as sanctions – have proven inadequate, the UN may allow the use of force. The argument in favor of the application of Chapter VII is all the more important when taking into account the country’s history of coups d’état, and the high probability of it happening again.

In order to increase the level of legitimacy, political control and decision-making over the mission would be delegated from the UN to the AU under the principle of ‘African Ownership’. In sum, the UN should delegate the mandate not to the West African regional bloc but to the AU, while not excluding it from the mission. In fact, the mission could draw on the ECOMIB’s experience in the field – and work developed so far – and team it up with other African military contingents that can offer greater availability of financial, personnel and technical resources. In addition, the AU mission would be eligible for EU financing, namely through its Africa-targeted programs, such as the African Peace Facility. Bearing this in mind, an international intervention under Chapter VII, legitimized by the UN and delegated to the AU, has the potential to end the vicious cycle of military coups. In turn, the task of garnering technical, financial and personnel support would be eased. The availability of a wider set of contributing countries, derived from the UN mandate, would reduce the financial burden on ECOWAS. In addition, some countries that have previously provided financial support to Guinea-Bissau during the period that preceded the 2012 coup, such as Angola and Brazil, continue to express their commitment to the cause. The same applies to other CPLP members and the EU,18 in particular Portugal, which is currently a major bilateral donor and also greatly experienced in the field. Although Angola’s presence in West Africa goes against ECOWAS geopolitical interests, the possibility of seeing their finances relieved, and the international legitimacy attached to the mission – versus a bilateral one, as it happened in 2010 – may work as convincing arguments for ECOWAS to allow for Angola to re-enter the region.

Conclusion

Following the 2012 coup, the CPLP appealed to the UN for an international intervention mandated by the UNSC, in articulation with the AU, ECOWAS and EU,19 showing its commitment towards stability in Guinea-Bissau. The CPLP member-states have deep historical and cultural ties that can work as powerful instruments of mutual understanding, cooperation and support.20 In particular, the CPLP member-states can provide experts to work in the country’s state ministries – drawing on Timor- Leste’s experience, as suggested by José Ramos-Horta21 – in order to help reorganize public administration, and defense and security forces. This specific type of support and collaboration poses an advantage to CPLP member-states – in relation to other international actors that may be willing to offer support – when considering that countries like Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Portugal and Timor-Leste, share similar administrative systems and legal codes. Although most of the CPLP member- countries lack conditions to have an active physical presence in Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Brazil have the financial and military capabilities to spearhead CPLP members’ participation in the stabilization force.

Until the most recent coup, Brazil was actively engaged in support of Guinea-Bissau’s political reconciliation, SSR, and economic and social development.22 It is worth noting that former Brazilian Foreign Minister António Patriota, who chairs the Guinea-Bissau Configuration of the Peace Building Commission – tasked with marshalling the available resources and propose strategies for post-conflict scenarios23 – oversaw aid to Guinea-Bissau from 2011 until the 2012 coup. Drawing on Patriota’s knowledge of the situation in the country and on his privileged position to influence policy-making in the UN General Assembly and UNSC, Brazil and the CPLP have the instruments to push more swiftly towards a stabilization force with an extended mandate under Article VII.

Furthermore, one other positive outcome of the CPLP involvement would be the participation of an EU country like Portugal. This is relevant when considering that the stabilization force will need to garner support from as many donors as possible. Portugal can influence EU policy-making in terms of going further than imposing sanctions, and ultimately push for funding. In turn, EU involvement goes in line with its own Africa strategy, namely to tackle insecurity and instability in the volatile Gulf of Guinea and Sahel – illegal criminal activities, international terrorism, among others – which endanger EU members.

About the author:
Gustavo Placido Dos Santos
Researcher, Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS)

Source:
This article was published by IPRIS as IPRIS Viewpoints 139, March 2014, which may be accessed here (PDF).

Notes:
1. See Paulo Gorjão and Pedro Seabra, “Guinea-Bissau: Can a Failed Military Coup be Successful?” (IPRIS Viewpoints, No. 95, May 2012).
2. “Líder do PAIGC exclui apoio a Carlos Gomes Júnior nas eleições presidenciais na Guiné-Bissau” (Lusa, 18 February 2014).
3. Farouk Chotia, “EU pull-out hits Guinea-Bissau reforms” (BBC News, 4 August 2010).
4. “Militares angolanos já estão em Bissau” (RFI, 17 March 2011).
5. “Angola and ECOWAS revive security sector reform” (EIU, 22 June 2011).
6. “Guinea Bissau Military Command blames Angola for last week’s coup” (A
Semana, 17 April 2012).
7. See “Letter dated 23 April 2012 from the Secretary-General addressed to the
President of the Security Council” (United Nations Security Council, 24 April
2012).
8. “West African defense chiefs to bolster troops in Guinea-Bissau” (AFP, 20
February 2014).
9. “Monthly Forecast: Guinea-Bissau” (Security Council Report, 31 January 2014).
10. “Nigeria, ECOWAS’ largest donor, continually outsmarted by smaller West- African countries” (Premium Times Nigeria, 4 February 2013).
11. Laurent Gbagbo,former President of Côted’Ivoire,was along-time ally with Angolan President, José Eduardo dos Santos, until the former Ivorian leader’s arrest in 2011. When of the recognition by the international community of Alassane Ouattara as the November 2010 presidential winner, and Gbagbo’s fierce refusal to concede defeat, Angola was one of the few countries to take part in Gbagbo’s swearing-in ceremony. See Paulo Gorjão, “Côte d’Ivoire: A test tube for Angola’s regional policy?” (IPRIS Viewpoints, No. 29, December 2010).
12. “Guiné-Bissau: Relatório semanal do UNIOGBIS confirma invasão da sua sede em Buba” (Jornal Digital, 22 January 2014).
13. Highly positioned armed forces officials – with deep connection with the transition regime – have been linked to narco-trafficking by the US. See “Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Charges Against Antonio Indjai, Chief Of The Guinea-Bissau Armed Forces, For Conspiring To Sell Surface-To-Air Missiles To A Foreign Terrorist Organization And Narco-Terrorism Conspiracy” (The US Attorney’s Office, 18 April 2013).
14. See André Monteiro and Miguel Morgado, “Last chance for security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau” (IPRIS Viewpoints, No. 1, April 2009).
15. Although the EU countries have suspended institutional support, they have maintained humanitarian aid. In fact, Portugal is still the major bilateral donor, following a restructuring of its aid to the country.
16. Eduardo Jaló, “Guiné-Bissau: uma reflexão patriótica – parte 2” (Ditadura do Consenso, 16 July 2016).
17. “Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression” (Charter of the United Nations).
18. The EU is set to start the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) aimed at economic cooperation with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, from which sub-Saharan Africa can extract major benefits.
19. “Resolução sobre a situação na Guiné-Bissau” (CPLP, 14 April 2012).
20. Luís Bernardino, “Que Política de Cooperação para a Segurança e Defesa
deve Portugal adoptar em África?” (Revista Militar, June/July 2007).
21. “Será preciso a refundação do Estado guineense” (GBissau.com, 26 November 2013).
22. “Guiné-Bissau: Golpe interrompe ajuda do Brasil” (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, 28 May 2012).
23. “Mandate of the Peacebuilding Commission” (United Nations Peacebuilding Commission).

The article Elections In Guinea-Bissau: A Roadmap For Restoration Of Constitutional Order – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Eurasia Review

Yemeni security forces apparently used excessive lethal force against peaceful demonstrators in Aden on February 20 and 21, 2014. The government should promptly, impartially, and thoroughly investigate the incident, which left one protester dead and five wounded, and hold all those responsible for abuses to account.

State security and military forces unnecessarily used teargas and live ammunition against supporters of the Southern Movement (Hirak), an umbrella group seeking independence or greater autonomy for southern Yemen, witnesses told Human Rights Watch. Reports of excessive use of force by security forces against southern protesters have declined since the change of government in February 2012, but the government’s record of investigating incidents remains poor, Human Rights Watch said.

“The Yemeni government needs to investigate why people were killed and wounded at an apparently peaceful protest,” said Joe Stork, deputy Middle East and North Africa director. “Given the failure to investigate similar past incidents, it’s crucial for the government to make its findings public and to hold accountable any security officers who used excessive force.”

A media officer for the protesters, Salah Mothana Abdullah, 37, told Human Rights Watch thatat least 5000 Hirak supporters gathered in the central al-`Orod Square in the Khur Maksar neighborhood of Aden on February 20, 2014, for two days of demonstrations. He said they were protesting the proposal by the recently concluded National Dialogue to create a federal system made up of six states in Yemen. Three protesters and a bystander told Human Rights Watch that the protesters appeared unarmed and did not resort to any violence until after the government crackdown the following afternoon. The government has not issued a statement on the incident.

Abdullah and another witness said that on the first day, state security and military forces increased their presence both on foot and in armored military and security vehicles in the streets of Khur Maksar. Abdullah said:

I was in a shop in the square on Thursday afternoon and saw three military vehicles, two [military] Special Security Force vehicles and one General Security vehicle, parked in the square.… At around 5 p.m., I noticed four snipers on the rooftop of the former Ethiopian Embassy, facing the square. Their faces were masked.The first demonstration was planned for that evening.

People started to approach the square, and got to around 15 meters from the Special Security Forces. I counted at least 60 [soldiers/personnel], most of them not visibly carrying guns, but carrying batons, teargas canisters, and canister launchers. I saw around 12 of them who were carrying guns shooting live rounds into the air, and three or four took aim directly at the protesters.

Abd al-Khaliq Mothana, 40, a local freelance journalist, told Human Rights Watch that at about 6 p.m. “at least 100 protesters were carrying out the evening prayer in the street, when soldiers suddenly started throwing teargas canisters at them.” He said that at about 10:30 p.m. he saw soldiers fire live ammunition toward a crowd of protesters gathered next to Ahl al-Bait Mosque, near the square. Visibility was difficult because it was dark, he said, and the security forces continued to fire teargas into the crowd. Two protesters standing about 7 meters from him were wounded by gunfire, one in the abdomen and the other in the right hand.

Despite the crackdown, protesters continued to gather in the square throughout the night, only dispersing at 3 a.m. Some gathered in a neighboring square but were not pursued by security forces.

On February 21, security and military forces increased their presence in the area and tried to prevent the protesters from returning to al-`Orod square. According to Mothana, the journalist, some protesters had travelled from Hadhramout, Abyan, Shabwa, Lahj, and other towns in southern Yemen. As protester numbers increased, security forces blocked the roads leading to the square with military vehicles and water cannons.

Zain al-Mahbashi, 47, a local businessman, told Human Rights Watch:

As we were finishing our midday prayer at Ahl al-Bait Mosque, about 20 meters from the square, we saw that riot police had surrounded the mosque and were firing teargas canisters at the main gate of the mosque courtyard. We took this as a sign that the security forces did not want us to gather in large groups, so we left the mosque one by one. As I was leaving the mosque, I saw at least 100 of the military’s Special Security Forces personnel and riot police, and four military armored vehicles, surrounding us.

Mothana said that he saw at least 12 wounded protesters “but because of the teargas I was not able to see how they got hurt.” Abdullah, the media officer, said that Abd al-`Alim Hussein Ahmed, 21, a protester from Abyan, was shot and killed.

An employee at the al-Naqib hospital, where the injured were brought, told Human Rights Watch that he knew of three protesters with gunshot wounds – to the head, right hand, and back – and eight with respiratory problems from the teargas.

Four witnesses to the events on February 21 said the protesters remained peaceful until about 1:30 p.m., when security forces assaulted them as they attempted to enter the square. The witnesses all said that the protesters set about seven car tires on fire and threw stones at the security forces.

Yemeni authorities should abide by the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, which provide that all security forces shall, as far as possible, apply nonviolent means before resorting to force. Whenever the lawful use of force is unavoidable, the authorities must use restraint and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offense. Law enforcement officials should not use firearms against people “except in self-defense or defense of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury.”

Human Rights Watch documented multiple incidents in Aden prior to the 2011 uprising in which security and military forces routinely used lethal force that was excessive in relation to any danger the protesters presented. In all of the cases, security forces used teargas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition from assault rifles and machine guns. Since the change in government, southern activists had expressed fewer complaints about security forces using excessive force during demonstrations.

More generally, in the past three years Human Rights Watch has documented many incidents in which armed forces used apparent excessive force and the president or government announced investigations. But no results of those investigations have been made public.

“Yemeni security forces have a well-documented history of using excessive force against demonstrators, particularly in the south,” Stork said. “This incident unfortunately harkens back to the brutal tactics of the previous government.”

The article Yemen: Lethal Force Against Southern Protesters appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By VOR

The Ukrainian crisis is of a domestic nature and Russia cannot be blamed for the situation in the county, Russian President Vladimir Putin said at a meeting with Russian Security Council members. The Russian leader also added that there is a strong need to discuss how to build relations with friends and partners in Ukraine and partners in Europe and the US.

President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday that Russia was not to blame for the crisis over Ukraine’s Crimea region. At a meeting with paralympic delegations in the Black Sea city of Sochi, Putin thanked officials for keeping politics out of the Winter Paralympics being hosted by Russia.

“I would like to express my gratitude to you for keeping the Paralympics out of politics. And the uneasy circumstances which you well know about did not affect it. And I would like to stress that Russia was not the initiator of the circumstances that have taken shape,” he said.

Crimea is to hold a referendum on Sunday on joining Russia, but Ukraine and Western leaders strongly oppose submitting the question to the people’s will and claim the planned referendum is illegal.

The article Ukraine A Domestic Crisis, Russia Not To Blame – Putin appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Ria Novosti

Russia does not rule out reciprocal action if sanctions are imposed by the US and European countries, a senior Russian economic official said Thursday.

“We hope that there will only be targeted political sanctions, and not a broad package affecting economic trade,” Deputy Economic Development Minister Alexei Likhachev said.

“Our sanctions will be, of course, symmetrical,” he added.

The threat of economic sanctions has sent Russian markets and the ruble reeling in recent weeks following Western outcries over the seizure of military bases in Ukraine’s autonomous republic of Crimea by troops lacking official insignia but widely believed to be under Russian command.

Russian President Vladimir Putin denied the troops are Russian, calling them local militia. A referendum on secession and annexation by Russia is scheduled for Sunday in the majority Russian ethnic region.

The vote is widely expected to return a positive result, with annexation following as early as by the end of the month, pending approval by Russia’s parliament and Putin.

The White House announced visa bans on unnamed officials last week and said that targeted economic sanctions have been authorized against individuals responsible for violating the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

A US bill expected to introduce broader and tougher sanctions against Russian officials passed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Thursday and will now advance to a full vote in Congress.

Russia has in the past responded to such targeted sanctions in a proportional manner. A 2012 US blacklist of Russian officials blamed for the death of whistleblowing lawyer Sergei Magnitsky in 2009 spurred the country last year to retaliate with a similar list of US officials banned from entering the country.

The article Russia Threatens Symmetrical Sanctions Against West appeared first on Eurasia Review.