By Frank R. Gunter

The recent explosion of violence in Iraq has several interrelated causes. In part, it is a spillover from the Syrian civil war and a reaction to Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s heavy-handed pro-Shi’a policies. These events have reopened the wounds of the terrible sectarian violence of 2006 and 2007. But the Syrian war may be coming to an end either through negotiations or through a bloody “victory.” And Maliki – the consummate politician – appears to be trying to modify polices perceived to be anti-Sunni both to undermine support for the ISIS and al-Qaeda insurgent groups as well as improve his standing in advance of the April 30^th election.

It will be more difficult to deal with the economic causes of this violence. High oil prices and a gradual increase in oil export volume have flooded Iraq with oil money.  However, mismanagement and massive corruption have diverted much of this oil money either into unproductive domestic investments or capital flight to foreign sanctuaries. As a result, many of Iraq’s young face a grim future.

OIL AND BIRTHRATES

Despite the small decrease in world oil prices in 2013, Iraq earned about $87 billion from its oil exports, up almost 90% in only five years. Iraq is now the most natural-resource-dependent country in the world, with exports of a single natural resource amounting to about two-thirds of the country’s gross domestic product. However, the oil industry creates relatively few jobs. Only 2-3% of Iraq’s labor force is employed in oil exploration, development, transportation, refining, or export.

But oil is not the only valuable resource that Iraq possesses in abundance. Compared to its regional neighbors, Iraq has an exceptionally young, rapidly growing population. Almost 41% of the population is less than 15 years old reflecting a fertility rate of 4.5 (children per adult female). In contrast, only 24% of Iran’s population is younger than 15 years and its fertility rate is less than replacement – 1.6. As a result of Iraq’s rapid population growth, every year an estimated 850,000 Iraqis become old enough to work. However, these young men and women face a combined unemployment and underemployment rate of over 80%! The impact of large numbers of un- and underemployed poorly educated, unskilled young men is especially destabilizing. Without a good job, a young man cannot get married and start a family; he becomes an object of pity or scorn in Iraqi society. Is it any wonder that many such men attempt to gain respect by picking up a gun in support of a religious, tribal, ethnic or criminal group?

Even after adjusting for retirements, migration, and the extremely low labor force participation rate of women, Iraq needs about 250,000 new jobs each year simply to keep the pool of unemployed and underemployed young men from growing. For six decades – before, during, and after Saddam’s regime – the Iraqi government’s primary response to rising unemployment has been to increase the number of government jobs, either directly or indirectly. This policy is based on the hope that gainfully employed young men are less likely to participate in insurgent violence. Increasing government employment is a popular policy in Iraq since working for the government provides better pay, more benefits, stronger job security, and a much reduced work intensity compared to private sector jobs. Also, since 2003, international agencies have advised the Iraqi government to rapidly expand public employment since it provides a measurable means of reducing unemployment – especially among difficult to employ uneducated/untrained young men – and puts money in circulation. But there are four problems with continuing a policy of the “government as the employer of first resort” in order to maintain political stability.

UNEMPLOYMENT CHALLENGES

First, the Iraqi government has passed any reasonable limit for increasing government employment. Government bureaus and state-owned enterprises are massively over staffed. For example, the Iraqi Republic Railroads has over 10,000 employees inefficiently running a 2300 km (1,400 mile) system that in other countries would require one-fourth to one-tenth as many employees. Some state-owned enterprises actually have zero production but continue to pay a large work force that shows up only to receive their pay.

Second, does an expansion of government employment actually reduce political instability in Iraq? It is often a misnomer to refer to the expansion of government employment as real job creation. A job implies an exchange. The worker provides something of value to his or her employer – his labor and human capital – and, in exchange, the employer provides something of value to the worker – a paycheck.  Since this exchange is valuable to both parties, they develop a commonality of interests – a limited form of loyalty – since if the firm goes out of business then both the owner and the workers are worse off.

Contrast this with government employment in Iraq. The loyalty of government workers is rarely to the Iraqi government or to the public at large but rather to the particular political, religious, tribal, militia, or family member who arranged for their government paycheck. This is especially true if the government job requires little labor or even attendance. In Iraq, it is thought that in some government Ministries, as many as 25% workers are “ghosts”. These ghost workers receive a regular paycheck without having to show up for work. The combination of a government paycheck, little or no work, and an intense loyalty to whoever arranged this bounty can be a recipe for instability. Political, religious, tribal, or militia leaders in Iraq often have loyal forces of supporters being paid by the government they may actively oppose.

Third, oil exports provide over 90% of the national budget. Since the country has only about $6.5 billion worth of fiscal reserves in the Development Fund of Iraq and a severely limited ability to borrow internationally, the government’s expenditures are determined by the world price of oil. If the government’s response to the loss of revenues in 2006 and 2009 are a guide to the future, then the government responds to a large loss in revenues by sharply reducing non-oil infrastructure investment and freezing government employment. Both of these actions will lead to a politically destabilizing rise in unemployment and underemployment especially among uneducated unskilled young men.

How likely is a fall in world oil prices? In view of the slowing growth and demand for petroleum imports of the BRIC countries combined with the sharp increase in energy production from the United States and Canada, the main prop of $100 plus oil prices is regional disruptions such as the sanctions dispute with Iran, Russia’s invasion of the Crimea, and political disruption in Egypt that threaten oil shipments via the Suez Canal. If a resolution of Iran’s sanction issues and a restoration of political stability in the other nations of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) occurs, then one could expect sharply lower oil prices. While any decline in oil prices would be challenging to the Iraqi government, an extended period of world oil prices below approximately $55 per barrel – a level experienced as recently as 2005 – will require unprecedented budget cuts including reductions in politically sensitive salaries and pensions.

Finally, like sand after the desert storm, corruption permeates every corner of Iraqi society. While Iraq is not the most corrupt country in the world – North Korea and Somalia are tied for that dubious honor – Transparency International ranks Iraq as tied with Haiti as the eighth most corrupt country. Corruption in Iraq extends from the ministries in Baghdad to police stations and food distribution centers in small towns. At the high levels of government, the corruption has led to a massive diversion of public oil export earnings into private pockets. A portion of this corrupt money has gone toward expensive cars and homes as part of a luxurious lifestyle led by high government officials.

However, a large portion appears to have been smuggled out of the country – capital flight. The lack of reliable data on Iraq’s international trade and financial transactions makes it difficult to estimate capital flight from Iraq. But a crude estimate based on unexplained balance of payments transactions points to a minimum of $6-9 billion a year of capital flight equal to about 10% of the country’s oil export earnings. The actual volume of capital flight may be twice as great.

PRIVATE SECTOR TO THE RESCUE?

Can the Iraqi private sector create enough new jobs to keep the army of unemployed young men from growing with all of the accompanying political instability? The creation of private sector employment in Iraq faces a series of policy barriers. As a reflection of Iraq’s socialist DNA that has dominated during decades of conflict, the regulatory environment of private business is best described as hostile. Even by the standards of the MENA, Iraq makes it extremely difficult to operate a private business. According the World Bank’s 2014 Ease of Doing Business Survey, Iraq ranks 169^th (out of 189 countries) in the ease of starting a business. If a potential business owner knows exactly what procedures to follow and refuses to pay bribes to shortcut the process, then it takes a month to start a new business and costs almost 40% of the annual income of the average Iraqi.

It is also difficult for a private sector business to obtain credit – Iraq ranks 180^th in the world. Not only are creditor rights weak under Iraqi law but also credit registries are almost non-existent. With respect to foreign trade, Iraq is 179^th in the world. To administratively process – not actually ship – a container for export or import takes almost 80 days with administrative costs of over $1,750. Finally, Iraq is tied for last in the world when it comes to resolving insolvency. The average MENA creditor receives about 30 cents on the dollar when a firm goes bankrupt; the average Iraqi creditor receives nothing.

In view of the regulatory hostility, it should be no surprise that the informal or underground economy accounts for an estimated two-thirds of all private sector activity. And this regulatory hostility is not simply an unloved artifact of the Saddam era. National and provincial bureaucracies carefully maintain the complexity and expense of Iraq’s regulatory rat’s nest since it facilitates the extraction of bribes. Corruption and regulatory hostility are not separate issues in Iraq but two facets of the same problem.

Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the Maliki government will be motivated to make serious efforts to curb corruption and regulatory hostility in order to increase private sector employment. Of course, Maliki has shown himself many times to be a master politician capable of surprising observers. Following the 2010 election, he outmaneuvered former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi’s Iraqiya party, which had received a plurality of the votes, and formed the government. And in 2008, his unexpected military operation, “Charge of the Knights”, returned control of Basrah City to the government. However, like most members of an elite, his initial reaction to a crisis tends to be to reward his traditional supporters while excluding newcomers and their ideas.

In the long-term, increasing the availability of productive private sector jobs should reduce political instability and violence in Iraq. The means are there – the country’s large oil wealth – to finance a restructuring of the Iraqi economy that will make better use of the country’s most valuable assets, its young people. However, Iraq’s political class, distracted by a series of short-term domestic and international crises, appears unable to take a long-term view on anything except to encourage oil production.  They are trapped in a classic conundrum. It is hard to think about draining the swamp when the alligators are attacking. But if you don’t drain the swamp, then the alligator attacks never end.

About the author:
Frank R. Gunter, Ph.D. is an Associate Professor of Economics at Lehigh University, a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and retired Marine. Based on his two years in Iraq as an economic advisor, he is the author of The Political Economy of Iraq: Restoring Balance in a Post-Conflict Society (E. Elgar, 2013). This book was selected as one of the “Outstanding Academic Titles” of 2013 by Choice Magazine.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI and may be accessed here.

The U.S. central bank has concluded that almost all of the country’s biggest banks could withstand a severe economic downturn.

The Federal Reserve said that 29 of the country’s 30 biggest banks — excluding a regional bank in the western U.S. — have enough money on hand to withstand a hypothetical deep recession. Such a downturn would include a sharp rise in unemployment, a nearly 50 percent drop in the country’s major stock indexes and a steep drop in home prices.

The central bank said the annual survey of the banks shows broad improvement in their financial standing since the country’s recession five years ago, its worst in seven decades.

Analysts say that the better outlook for the banks could allow them to again pay dividends to their shareholders for the first time in recent years. One survey of bank profits showed that the six biggest U.S. banks earned $76 billion in profits last year, close to their collective all-time high.

Meanwhile, the Fitch credit rating agency has issued a AAA rating with a stable outlook for the United States.

Fitch made the announcement Friday, saying the new action resolved the negative watch the U.S. received in October.

The agency noted that last year’s U.S. debt ceiling crises had not negatively affected U.S. bond yields or reduced foreign holdings of Treasury securities. Fitch said, “therefore Fitch does not believe the role of the U.S. dollar, sovereign financing flexibility or debt tolerance has been materially damaged.” The ratings agency said the U.S. has achieved “strong fiscal consolidation.”

The agency said the U.S. economy is one of the most “productive, dynamic and technologically advanced in the world,” underpinned by strong institutions, a favorable business climate and efficient product and labor markets.

Fitch said the U.S. has greater debt tolerance than its AAA peers, owing to the “unparalleled financing flexibility provided by being the issuer of the world’s pre-eminent reserve currency and benchmark fixed income asset.”

Fitch said the country’s capital markets are “the deepest and most liquid in the world.”

Russia has finalized the legal process of taking Crimea under its sovereignty, as President Putin signed a law amending the Russian constitution to reflect the transition.

Earlier Russian lawmakers ratified both the amendment and an international treaty with Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, which was legally required for the incorporation.

Following the signing of the law, Putin thanked lawmakers and everyone involved in the historic change of European borders for their efforts to make it happen.

“I ask lawmakers of both chambers to work actively and do everything we can, to make the transition process not only painless, but also beneficial for all Russia and the people of Crimea,” Putin said.

The treaty and the bill were submitted for the approval of Russian lawmakers on Tuesday by Putin, following last week’s referendum in Crimea, which showed the overwhelming support of the peninsula’s residents for joining Russia.

The actual transition of Crimea to existing under Russian laws and regulations may take until next year. Local rules in the new Russian region will be changed to adopt the ruble, social benefits, tax requirements and other Russian legislation.

As was promised by the Crimean authorities, the treaty includes preferences for the region’s ethnic minorities, particularly Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians. Their languages would be official in Crimea, on par with Russian.

Russia pledged to make the process as smooth as possible by offering funding and recognizing various Ukrainian documents, which were in force in Crimea before it declared its independence last week.

Moscow will retain military ranks and academic levels for Ukrainian troops who choose to serve Russia, give preference to Ukrainian officials who want to keep their positions in Crimea, and expedite the issuance of Russian citizenship to all residents of Crimea who want it. Citizenship would be given automatically to all except those who explicitly opt out of it no later than one month’s time.

The current interim authorities of Crimea will be replaced with new ones after elections, which will be held in September 2015.

Crimea’s rejoining Russia was triggered by an armed coup in Kiev, which ousted Ukrainian President Viktor Yanokovich from power. The new authorities took some alarming steps, including parliament passing a law revoking the regional status of the Russian language, which caused the predominantly Russian region to defy Kiev.

The public uprising in Crimea culminated in a referendum, in which an overwhelming majority of over 96 percent voted in favor of asking for reunification with Russia. Moscow agreed, citing the will of the people and the historic justice of the move as its motives.

Kiev and Western countries deemed Crimea’s secession and Russia’s acceptance of the peninsula illegal, a notion that Moscow denies. The US and the EU issued sanctions against some Russian officials and businessmen in a bid to put pressure on Russia over its stance on the Ukrainian crisis. Russian authorities mostly mocked the sanctions.

A recent Pew study found that the percentage of Americans who do not identify with any organized religion continues to increase to slightly over 20% at present.

But in American religious history the cyclical rise and fall of religious affiliation and self proclaimed identity has frequently occurred. America is a free country and free people can and do choose their own religious identity.

A Pew study a few years ago found that 44% of Americans no longer belong to the religious tradition they were raised in; compared to 47% who still belong to their childhood religion.

Even more typical of religious freedom in America; 9% say they had switched religious identity at some point in the past, but have now returned to their original faith.

Should these people be thought of as double switchers or as only temporarily switchers.

Many of these people are the children of mixed religious marriages and were raised feeling half and half; marginally belonging to both while not feeling deeply connected to either. Like trying to sir on the space between to chairs.

On the other hand, some people have never felt at home in their family’s religion, and do feel at home in their new religion. In Jewish tradition most of these converts are considered to be gilgulim-reincarnated Jewish souls from previous lives who were cut off from the Jewish people by dire circumstances.

Kabbalah, the Jewish mystical tradition, claims that the souls of most converts to Judaism are the reincarnated souls of Jews in previous generations that were cut off from the Jewish people by persecution or mixed marriage.

Through conversion to Judaism they are coming home.

Sometimes these souls are descendants of Jews who were part of whole communities that were cut off, like the Marranos in Spain. Other times they are descendants of individual Jews who married out and did not raise their children as faithful Jews.

An example of the later is recounted by Rabbi Barbara Borts: “One of the most touching conversions I ever did was a young girl of 11, brought to me by her mother, to discuss Judaism. The mother was a widow, living back at home with her mother and her father, who was a minister.

This girl had done some research on Hanukkah for her school class, and in the process both loved what she learned and discovered that her late father’s grandfather was a German Jew.

I asked her mother why she would support her daughter’s conversion to Judaism.

Her response – her 2 daughters were no longer going to church and she was delighted that one had found a religious home. She hoped her older daughter might also find that of interest.

When I said that I could not imagine doing what she was doing if the positions were reversed, she said, ”It’s different for Jews, after the Holocaust and all.”

So the girl started Hebrew school classes, and attending services. I moved a couple of years later, and bequeathed her to the next rabbi. Some years later, we met up again when she was in University.

She had converted, changed her name permanently, and was an active member of her Hillel. Bless the girl – she may even now be in rabbinical school.”

Other people who become Jewish do not know of a specific Jew who was an ancestor but come from a population that contains the descendants of past Jewish communities.

Millions of Spanish and Portuguese speakers are descendants of Jews who were forcibly baptized during the 15th century. In 1391 there were anti-Jewish riots in several Spanish cities. Thousands of Jews were forcibly baptized.

The Catholic Church viewed these forced baptisms as valid because the Spanish Jews had freely chosen baptism over death, unlike the Jews of France and Germany during the first and second crusades, who chose to kill themselves rather than be baptized.

Over the next three generations there were additional riots that led to more forcible baptisms.

Of course, Jews forced to become Christians didn’t stop believing in Judaism, but they had to practice Judaism and teach their children in secret.

The Church knew this but thought that all the children and grandchildren of the Marranos (as the secret Jews were called) would be indoctrinated in the true faith and become believers. This did not happen.

In 1480 the Inquisition began holding trials in Spain. Over the next two centuries thousands would be tried/tortured, and imprisoned or executed.

In 1492 all unbaptized Jews in Spain were exiled. Over 100,000 Jews left Spain, most of them going to Portugal.

In 1497, they were expelled from Portugal, but first all their children were forcibly baptized, so parents who didn’t want to lose their children had to freely choose baptism.

In later decades many of these secret Jews and their children came to the new world seeking freedom so the Inquisition was established in Lima in 1570 and in Mexico City in 1571.

Secret Jews fled to all parts of central and south America to escape. (see: A History of the Marranos by Cecil Roth) . Many of these people have Jewish souls and are now returning to the Jewish people. How would someone know if he or she could be one of them?

Signs of a Jewish soul.

1- You like to ask questions? But when you asked them as a child, you were told faith is a gift from God and you shouldn’t question it. This never satisfied you, although others didn’t seem to have a problem with this view.

2- The trinity never made any sense to you even as a young child. You prayed to God the father more easily than Jesus the son of God, even though you were told to pray to Jesus.

You couldn’t believe that people who didn’t believe in Jesus couldn’t go to Heaven.

3- You found you related well to Jewish people you met at work or at school even though they were culturally different from your own family.

4- When you first learned about the Holocaust you reacted more emotionally than did any other members of your own extended family.

5- When you started to learn about Judaism the ideas and values were reasonable and the traditions and heritage were attractive.

You felt more at home within your adopted people than you did to your birth people.

If you identify with four of the five listed signs you may indeed have a Jewish soul. If you identify with all five of the signs you definitely have a Jewish soul.

More information about reincarnation and becoming Jewish can be found in “God, Sex and Kabbalah” by Rabbi Allen S. Maller or at Rabbi Maller’s web site: rabbimaller.com Judaism is for Non-Jews.

By Vivek Mishra

The limitations of the US involvement in the Asian security construct have been manifesting themselves often recently – particularly since the 2001 EP-3 incident – and with increasing frequency with the rise in China’s maritime assertiveness in the region. Over the past six months alone, there have been a few confrontations between the US and China that reflects the limitations to Washington’s strategic hedging against Beijing in the Asia-Pacific.

There have been at least three incidents that indicate the limitations:. In 2012, the US displayed evident reluctance to go out of its way to side with the Philippines when China took the Scarborough Shoal, in spite of there being a bilateral defence understanding between the two. In 2013, when China unilaterally imposed an Air Defence Identification Zone over large parts of the East China Sea, that angered Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, the US’ response was limited to flying two unarmed, unescorted B-52 bombers over the Chinese-demarcated Zone. Washington did not make any attempt to pressurise Beijing to take back the decision. Six days later, China’s Hainan province issued new regulations on fishing in the South China Sea. These regulations came into force in January 2014.

In December 2013, USS Cowpens (CG-63), a Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser, was nudged and forced out of its way by the People’s Liberation Army Navy although it claimed to have been in ‘international waters’. Washington’s response was limited to a statement issued by the U.S. Pacific Fleet which stated, “This incident underscores the need to ensure the highest standards of professional seamanship, including communications between vessels, to mitigate the risk of an unintended incident or mishap.”

On all these geostrategic developments, Washington has exercised restraint. Both the White House and the Pentagon have thought it to be wise not to confront China. Implicit in this decision is the fact that any possibility of strategic confrontation between China and the US is undercut by their neoliberal concerns. In other words, a free execution of “Rebalancing” has thus been constrained by the US’ economic dependence on China. There are other constraints as well. A recuperating US economy finds it difficult to remain committed in military-strategic assets in the Asia-Pacific due to resource constraints. Part of the blame also lies in the failure to implement the “Rebalancing” properly. This assertion gets a justification in a US Department of Defense-commissioned assessment which pointed out that the strategy behind its force planning has not been “adequately articulated.”

Even as the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review reaffirms Washington’s commitment to the US pivot to Asia, the Pivot is failing to live up to its promise. Clearly, the chinks in the armour of the US’ capability for a military-strategic force projection in the Asia-Pacific have been made visible by Chinese assertiveness.

Early Signs

The recoil in the Obama Administration’s Pivot to Asia policy became evident within two years of the declaration of the policy. Among the first instances was the talk of the US’s pivot to the Asia-Pacific being replaced with the policy of a ’rebalancing’. For example, in the annual security conference of the US Army War College in 2012, references to an ‘Asian Pivot’ were deliberately eschewed in favour of the term, ‘rebalancing.’ Gradually, with recalibrations in its erstwhile pivot policy, rebalancing became the preferred term.

Careful observations will reveal that there has either been a further dilution in the rebalancing policy of the US or that it never really took off in the intended sense. This dilution traces itself to the first term of US President Barack Obama. In 2008, while still campaigning, Obama spoke tough on China. But he softened his stance on the country after he assumed office. His first term saw conciliatory steps towards accommodating Chinese concerns to deal with issues such as the currency dispute, climate change, North Korea, and Iran. On all these issues, China did not reciprocate as desired by the US.

In his second term, Obama’s Asia policy remains clogged with problems arising particularly out of Beijing’s maritime assertiveness. China’s further military modernisation and its show of strength have become the bane for American security policy in the Asia-Pacific. China, at least in the past six months, has reacted in a way that confirms that it is circumspect in so far as “Rebalancing” is concerned, and is keeping its powder dry. The Chinese assertive reactions stem from the understanding that rebalancing seeks to throw China off its strategic balance in the region. China’s wariness also lies in the US’ repositioning of its troops in the Philippines and Australia – apart from strengthening its security and military alliances in the region.

Chinese assertiveness has forced the ‘Rebalancing” to undergo significant changes. A conclusive assessment for American “Rebalancing” will reveal that a head on collision with China has received a thumbs down from mandarins in Washington. For now, it appears that the best way to sustain the momentum of an already waning “Rebalancing” strategy is the realisation that the US cannot take this policy forward by itself.

The US will have to work with a concert of democracies in Asia to create an effective strategic bulwark against a growing hegemon like China. But are the others ready?

Vivek Mishra
Research Intern, IPCS
viveksans@gmail.com

The President of Vietnam Truong Tan Sang visited Japan from 16 to 19 March 2014. This was the latest in Vietnam’s foreign policy activism with a view to deepen diplomatic relations with the outside world. Sang was accompanied by his spouse Madam Mai Thi Hanh.

The visit was at the invitation of the Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko of Japan. The significance of Sang’s visit at this critical time cannot be missed as Vietnam is confronting a mighty and belligerent China whose muscular demonstration of assertive stances on territorial issues have been unnerving the rest of Asia, Vietnam included. It is time to assess the outcome of Sang’s visit and what purpose it achieved.

Sang took the opportunity to highlight Vietnam’s “foreign policy of independence, self-reliance, peace, cooperation for development, multilateralism and diversification, willingness to be a friend of all nations and active international integration”. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in September 1973, many high level visits have contributed to the consolidation of bilateral ties. The establishment of strategic partnership agreements between the two countries proved to be the base for stability, cooperation and prosperity in each country.

Sang’s visit to Japan this time contributed to further consolidation of the economic and strategic ties. Sang also used the opportunity to share common view points on the regional issues.

Economic

During the visit, Sang visited Japan’s industrial centre in the Kansai region with the view to boost cooperation between two countries’ localities and businesses. He had a meeting with representatives of the Kansai Economic Federation (Kndeiren) and business leaders of the Kansai region. Vietnam is taking active part in ASEAN-Japan cooperation through ASEAN Plus+3 and free trade agreements with the European Union and the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Sang highlighted this and stressed that it is also a driving force behind ongoing negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement. While attending a Vietnam-Japan business forum in Osaka city, Sang remarked that Vietnam is deploying its 2011-2020 socio-economic development strategy towards the goal of becoming fully industrialised in 2020.

Sang exhorted business leaders to continue to contribute to Vietnam’s economic expansion and development in various fields spanning technology and agriculture. Sang observed that Japanese backing could help Vietnam to “enter a new phase of global value chain”, as the country’s economic trajectory continues to be high following a number of free trade agreements and multilateral agreements with the ASEAN member countries that are near conclusion. Indeed, the contribution of Japanese companies in Vietnam in the expansion and development of Vietnam’s economy and helping the country to enter a new era of modernisation and honing its industrial prowess is noteworthy.

What would be attractive to the potential Japanese investors about Vietnam is that inflation has hit a ten-year low and the country’s GDP grew by more than 5 per cent in 2013. Therefore, Vietnam as a potential investment destination for Japan has increased greatly. Currently, Japan is the fourth largest investor in Vietnam after China, the United States and South Korea. Sang paid a visit to Ibaraki Prefecture, northeast of Tokyo, where he inspected several farms and agricultural research facilities, machinery manufacturing and flower processing facilities. An understanding was reached to strengthen cooperation by way of bilateral technical and educational endeavours.

Vietnam and Japan have seen their relationship develop significantly in recent years. As one of the world’s leading economies, Japan was the first member of G-7 to welcome the Vietnamese Party General Secretary to Japan in 1995, establish a strategic partnership with Vietnam in 2009 and recognise Vietnam’s market economy in 2011. Japan remains the leading ODA donor to Vietnam: the East Asian country provided 2.1 trillion Yen ($21 billion) in ODA from 1992 to 2012 and $1.55 billion in 2013 alone. In 2013, Japan was Vietnam’s fourth-largest trade partner, with two-way trade hitting $25.16 billion, of which Vietnam earned $13.5 billion from selling mainly seafood, crude oil, garments and coal. In 2013, Japan was Vietnam’s leading investor, with capital totalling $5.88 billion, the largest figure for any single country. As of last December, it had 2,166 valid FDI projects in Vietnam with total registered capital of $34.7 billion. The number of new Japanese FDI projects approved by Vietnam in 2013 was 352, up from 317 in 2012. According to the Vietnamese Planning and Investment Ministry, the number of Japanese FDI reached a record high for the third consecutive year in 2013. Japanese investment overseas have slowed down due to a weaker yen, but Vietnam remains an active investment destination, reflecting Japan’s troubled relations with China and unrest in Thailand.

While welcoming new ODA from Japan totalling 120 billion Yen loans, high-ranking officials from the two countries also signed a document on five infrastructure projects to be funded using the yen loans, including building two expressway sections, an international port and a thermal electric power plant. Japan agreed to help Vietnam develop its industrial parks and implement Ninh Thuan 2 nuclear power project. The two sides also agreed to work closer in implementing high-level agreements as well as large-scale projects, with Japan helping Vietnam in its action plans for the key areas under its industrialisation strategy within the Vietnam-Japan cooperation framework.

Culture

The two countries also agreed to work together in the fields of human resource development, culture, sports, tourism, welfare, medical services, education and science and technology. The Japanese side pledged to support Vietnam in the upgrade of some key universities to meet international standards. Japan also promised to accept Vietnamese nurses, care workers and technical interns. From his side, Sang lauded Japan’s proposal on the setting up of a dialogue framework to promote cooperation in culture and people-to-people exchange between the two countries. While welcoming the increase in the number of school trips to Vietnam organised by Japanese high schools, both share the same view on the strengthening of cooperation in broadcasting, sports and tourism. Both sides also agreed to work together to simplify the visa application procedure for Vietnamese people.

Regional Security Issues

While delivering a speech in the House of Representatives, Sang said Vietnam firmly upholds the principle of resolving disputes through peaceful means. He warned against the use of force in territorial disputes as his nation and its neighbours lock horns with China over competing claims in the South China Sea. Sang observed: “”Vietnam has always maintained these principles over maritime disputes – resolution by peaceful means, compliance with international law and respect for each other’s due rights and sovereignty”. He further said: “Countries concerned should not make the situation complex, but rather exercise self-restraint. They should neither use force nor threaten to use force.” Though Sang did not refer to any particular country, he was apparently referring to China’s growing maritime assertiveness. But Vietnam and three other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations – the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei – have opposed Beijing’s attempt to claim almost all of the South China Sea. Sang was the first state guest to deliver a speech in the Diet since French President Francois Hollande in June 2013.

Sang observed expanding and deepening Japan-Vietnam, relations would be important for the Asia-Pacific region’s peace and prosperity. He hoped to strengthen ties with Japan, which is also embroiled in a separate and bitter territorial dispute with China. Tokyo has called for stronger security ties with Asean members to try to ease the growing territorial tensions. At a joint press briefing, Sang and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said they discussed regional peace, loans and grant aid to Vietnam and the possibility of Japan sending patrol boats to the country. Japan will send soon a fact-finding mission to assess Japan’s plan to provide patrol ships to beef up Vietnam’s coast guard.

Both the countries agreed to elevate their ties to a new level of Extensive Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia. The upgrade came during the March 18 talks between Sang and Prime Minister Abe.

In a joint statement issued, Sang and Abe agreed that all relevant countries should comply with international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in settling maritime security issues. Like Sang did not mention China in his address to the Diet, even the joint statement avoided mentioning any specific country/countries in mentioning maritime security issue. But it was apparent that it was designed to keep China in check, as Japan has the Senkaku dispute with China in the East China Sea and Vietnam has a similar row in the South China Sea. Abe expressed Japan’s willingness to assist Vietnam in enhancing its capacity in maritime law enforcement.

Sang also expressed support for Japan over the issue of North Korea’s abductions of Japanese nationals in the 1970s and 1980s. Since Vietnam has diplomatic relations with North Korea, Japan sought and Vietnam agreed to work with Japan to solve the abduction issue.

Abe and Sang also called for ensuring freedom of flight above the open seas, in an apparent criticism of China’s unilateral declaration in November of an air defence identification zone in the East China Sea. The US Pacific commander, Vice-Admiral Robert Thomas, who sailed to Manila on the USS Blue Ridge, stressed the Philippines’ importance as a military ally. “Our 62-year alliance with the Philippines remains key to our efforts to ensure the stability and prosperity of the Western Pacific,” he said. The US naval operations in international waters are likely to continue even if China asserts its domination over the South China Sea. Thomas is said to have remarked: “We’re going to continue to encourage freedom of access for all the maritime nations in the theatre, and as disputes come up, we’re going continue to encourage the dialogue, resolving it through the rule of law. We will continue to stand by our allies.”

Japan and China are locked in a bitter row over islands in the East China Sea administered by Japan as the Senkakus, but claimed by China as the Diaoyu Islands. Since Japan nationalised some of the archipelago in September 2012, Chinese government ships and planes have been seen off the disputed islands numerous times, sometimes within Japan’s territorial zone. Japan-China dispute has sparked air and sea confrontations, further exacerbating animosity over Japan’s military incursions across East Asia in the first half of the 20th century. Finding common grounds with Japan, Sang expressed concerns about China’s increasingly assertive stance beyond its borders, and observed territorial disputes in the region must be solved through peaceful means rather than with force. He seemed to urge restraint from China on its territorial disputes with Vietnam, Japan and other Asian countries in the South and East China seas. Echoing the position held by Japan, Sang remarked: “Vietnam keeps the principle of seeking a peaceful solution and abiding by international law,” and countries concerned “must exercise their self-control and not use force nor threaten to do so.”

Indeed, the East and South China Seas have emerged as new flashpoints in the Asian region, which continue to threaten the peace and stability of Asia. China’s foreign minister is known to have said “there is no room for compromise” with Japan and that China will “never accept unreasonable demands from smaller countries”. Vietnam’s long, bloody struggle with China over islands means Vietnam sides more with the Philippines, ASEAN nations than with its northern neighbour. Philippines seem to upgrade Ulugan Bay navy base in response to China’s disputed sea claims. While China aggressively enforces its fishing rules, apprehending boats weekly in what it calls “China’s waters”, US Commander Thomas reassured that the US would stand by its allies. The Philippines in turn agrees to let the US build facilities in areas claimed by it. A huge wealth of untapped oil is believed to be below the sea here. This makes the South China Sea the flashpoint. The chart I below shows the Air Defense Identification Zone or ADIZ declared by China over the East China Sea on 23, November 2013. The Chart II shows the area declared by China on 1 January 2014 as “an area under China’s jurisdiction.” China says “foreign fishing vessels” can only enter and work in this area with prior approval from China. Vietnam, the Philippines and others have said they will not comply with China’s law.
Chart I

China claims: Source China Defense Ministry

Chart II

China claims to South China Sea

In view of the above, Japan agreed to help improve Vietnam’s maritime policing capabilities in the face of China’s increasing activities in the South China Sea. This understanding elevates the strategic partnership between the two countries in a wide range of areas in a comprehensive manner. The positive result of Sang’s visit to Japan meant that both Japan and Vietnam will deepen cooperation and work together towards contributing constructively and proactively to peace and stability in the Asian region and the rest of the world. Indeed, maintaining order in the sea and air is extremely important for regional peace and stability. The resolve to realise this objective is the positive outcome of Sang’s visit to Japan.

Dr. Rajaram Panda is currently The Japan Foundation Fellow at Reitaku University, JAPAN. E-mail: rajaram.panda@gmail.com

Heading into the 2014 election, Indonesian society is being faced with certain political figures, ranging from businessmen and office holders, to military background figures. However, given many election surveys, two prominent figures have emerged as the most likely to be the next Indonesian president, namely Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto. Joko Widodo, affectionately known as Jokowi, is Jakarta’s current governor, whereas Prabowo is the chief patron of the Greatest Indonesian Movement Party (Gerindra) as well as a former general of the late President Suharto. Recently, Jokowi has been announced as the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) candidate. Thus, the governor Jokowi and former military general, Prabowo will likely dominate the Indonesian political landscape prior to presidential election in September 2014.

After 15 years of democratic consolidation, the big inquiry is whether Indonesia still needs the military style leadership. In the last three general elections, the military candidates have always been involved to run for office. The current president is the former Suharto general who has been in office for two terms.

In this 2014 election, at least two former generals have announced their candidacies beside Prabowo, namely former Indonesian military commander Wiranto supported by his party, the Peoples Conscience Party (Hanura) and Sutiyoso, retired army lieutenant general cum Chairman of the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI). The ruling party, Democrat, also is presenting former army chief of staff Pramono Edhie Wibowo as one of its presidential candidates. All of these generals, except Pramono Edhie, served during Suharto’s waning days. And these three generals are also widely believed to have been involved in human rights violations.
Ironically, on the one hand, Indonesian society is hoping to have clean and good leaders, such as Jokowi and Tri Rismaharini, the Surabaya Mayor.

On the other hand, as a recent survey shows, many Indonesian voters still prefer a presidential or vice presidential candidate with a military background over a civilian. Three characteristics have been advanced for this preference, namely decisiveness, discipline and firmness. This tendency exemplifies the romance of the Suharto-backed military regime among Indonesians.

The military in Indonesia has two prominent reasons why they have to meddle in daily political life. First, the Indonesian military (TNI) still criticizes the current democratic system. As attributed by Indonesia’s army strategic command head, Lieutenant General Gatot Nurmayanto, Indonesian democracy is not always right for Indonesia. Accordingly, democracy based on popular vote does not always lead to the strengthening of the nation.

For some political analysts, this is the picture of a hard-line faction within the TNI to push for more military involvement in Indonesia’s daily politics.

Second, the TNI has doubted the ability of civilian government to govern. Corruption and immorality have become chronic diseases in the civilian government. As a result, certain political regulations can risk national stabilization, such as the current dispute over the legitimacy of Law No. 42/2008 on presidential and vice presidential elections. As former army intelligence head, Soleman B. Ponto argues, the potential of national chaos is high, given that the law was dismissed by the constitutional court in January 2014. If national chaos develops, the military will launch what Ponto calls a “constitutional coup”.

In addition, during my personal interview in 2012 with former Vice Chief Staff of Army, retired Major General Kiki Syanahkri, he expressed the same concern. He thought that the quality degradation of civilian government and intended to take political steps necessary to return to the original version of the 1945 constitution. To support his idea, Kiki and his colleges in the Retired Army Association (PPAD), proposed to form a “national council”. This would allow the military to legitimately engage directly in politics. These statements raise the question about the military’s relentless tendency to take any opportunity to influence or even to take over the civilian government.

Democracy allows for every individual, regardless of their background, to run for office. However, after the downfall of authoritarian regime and the beginning of democratic consolidation, the remnants of a former authoritarian regime, including the military, should be restricted from participating in politics. The former regime was highly backed up by the military in Indonesia during the new order period for over 30 years. This history can give the military the desire to re-engage in the new political system. If it does, there is high possibility for the military to bring back an authoritarian spirit, such as in Egypt and Thailand.

According to the Indonesian constitution, military figures can run for office after resigning from active duty. However, the close relations between former officers and active officers are difficult to overlook. Former officers support the core interests of their institution. This again brings up the question of the future of the TNI reformation that has stalled during the second term of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). Three crucial areas of the TNI’s internal reform could be “blocked” by former senior officers if they get elected.

First and foremost is the uplifting of human rights values among officers. The TNI has been globally known for its human rights record toward its own people. The military internal reformation failed to deal with this issue, particularly in Papua province. The military candidates are likely to defend their former institution. For instance, the prison raid by army special forces (Kopassus) that killed four detainees in Cebongan, drew support and even praise from Prabowo and other former generals, including SBY. In addition, Pramono Edhie Wibowo recently called to forget past violations of human rights conducted by the TNI.

The second area of army reform which might be left undone is the reorganization or even liquidation of some army territorial commands across country. Many territorial commands at the regional level have been widely alleged to be used for political and economic purposes. As a leading general during the early days of TNI’s reformation, Wiranto supported and defended the existence of the commands. In present day, there are no military candidates have questioned these commands in light of charges of misuse for political purpose and human rights violations.

The third area of military reform needed is the management of its businesses, particularly the illegal ones, such as illegal logging, gambling, and the security business. It seems hard to tackle this issue if some former generals get elected in September, given the fact that the military still highly depends on these off-budget resources.

Given the uncertainty at the national level, Indonesian democracy will arguably allow the military figures to continue their role as decisive political actors as happened during the new order. In contrast, after the era of strong military regimes, certain Latin America countries have produced many strong populist leaders, such as Lula Da Silva and Dilma Rousseff in Brazil; Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentine and Evo Morales in Bolivia. These figures can restrict constitutionally military ambition in their countries. They can channel effectively people’s aspirations to support government policies, instead of paving the way to the military to get its second opportunity to govern.

Indonesian politics has never gotten out from under military influence, and certain populist leaders, such as Jokowi and Risma, also appear to rely on military support. As a result, the future of the Indonesian democratic system remains uncertain.

Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi is a visiting scholar in the Equality Development and Globalization Studies at the BCICS, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, the US.

Energy (oil and gas) is a geopolitically sensitive commodity, and the pipelines that transport them are no different. Besides the geopolitics of the countries that produce energy and those that consume this energy, the security situation in the regions that the transporting pipelines traverse can also make a project viable and attractive to investors. As the geopolitics of the Middle East is taking a churn, India is again evaluating undersea energy pipelines from the Gulf.

The new plan proposes to transport oil and natural gas sourced from countries in the Middle East and Central Asia through deep sea pipelines via Oman to the ever-growing Indian energy market. Oman is India’s most trusted partner in the Gulf, therefore comfort levels are high between New Delhi and Muscat. Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah, Oman’s foreign minister, raised the possibility with his Indian counterpart Salman Khurshid during their meeting on Feb 28. Abdullah suggested the pipeline could transport gas from Iran, even Qatar, as well as Central Asian states. Khurshid then introduced the proposal to Javad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister, who he met later in the day.

Iran has reportedly shown interest in the project. Zarif also informed that Iran was negotiating separately with Turkmenistan for an overland pipeline to carry its gas to an Iranian terminal for export. If these proposals fructify, Iran would be looking to market gas not only from its fields but from other Gulf suppliers, even Qatar, which is India’s largest supplier of LNG. Therefore, even though sources of gas remain the same, it is the mode of transportation that is the key differentiator.

The history of the India-Oman pipeline project goes back to 1985, when Oman and India signed an agreement to expand the development of energy-related enterprises between them. In mid-1992, a joint commission was set up to identify and monitor several new areas of cooperation between Muscat and New Delhi. Oman had invested $90 million in the project over a decade ago, but it did not get implemented.

What has changed?

Firstly, the technology has come of age. An undersea pipeline from Iran to India could now be completed as quickly as three-four years and costing approximately $5 billion, according to New Delhi-based South Asia Gas Enterprise Pvt Ltd (SAGE); a joint venture of Siddhomal group, and UK-based Deep Water Technology. SAGE has proposed building an under-sea energy infrastructure corridor comprising of gas (and maybe later oil) pipelines, which could be used by major gas suppliers to connect to terminals in India’s west coast. Any such pipeline could transport about 31 million cubic meters (MMSCMD) of gas a day.

Secondly, the Iranians have shown interest in deep-sea pipelines to India after the failure of the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline. Iran cancelled a $500 million loan to Pakistan in December 2013. India had pulled out of the IPI several years ago citing price and security issues. The TAPI pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan is fast losing its attractiveness due to security uncertainties and other gas pipeline projects from Turkmenistan to Iran, China etc. Thirdly, the recently concluded Iran-Oman gas deal is another driver.

Iran-Oman gas deal

In August 2013, Iran’s oil minister and his Omani counterpart signed a memorandum of understanding on energy cooperation, reportedly the largest economic agreement between the two countries so far. Under the US$ 60 billion gas supply deal, Oman would buy over the next 25 years nearly half of its total natural gas imports from Iran, which would be transported by a newly-laid undersea gas pipeline. Construction of the planned pipeline, its length and possible route will be explored, and pipe laying operations are expected to start soon after a final decision is made.

The announcement came as Oman’s Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said concluded a three-day visit to Iran as the first head of state to meet Iranian President Hassan Rouhani after his inauguration in August 2013. Oman is a close US ally and has reportedly acted as a go-between for Tehran and Washington in the dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme, according to U.S. embassy cables published by WikiLeaks dating back to 2006. Omani officials have been visiting Tehran in a bid to buy Iranian gas in the hope that someday sanctions on Iran will be lifted and Oman can finally get the supplies it desperately needs over the Strait of Hormuz.

India-Oman Gas Pipeline

Transportation cost of natural gas through deep water pipelines will be much lower than transporting in the form of LNG through tankers/carriers by sea. SAGE feels that the burgeoning future energy requirement of India can be met only through such pipelines. If the pipeline project gets the nod, SAGE plans to lay a total of three natural gas pipelines over the next 10 years. Each line will have a length of 1,300 km with a capacity to carry 31.5 MMSCMD per line. Each pipeline is estimated to cost $4.2 billion, and additional investment is required to lay onshore pipelines in the Middle East.

Assessment

Besides the more obvious cost trade-off between LNG and transportation of gas by pipelines and that between undersea pipelines and overland ones, it is the availability of diverse gas producing countries to provide gas to the India-Oman gas pipeline that makes the proposal attractive. The availability of existing (and proposed) overland gas pipelines such as the Qatar-UAE-Oman line further increases the attractiveness and viability of the project. In an environment of political uncertainty, energy buyers invariably choose the more flexible option of transporting gas as LNG rather than laying pipelines. However, in the case of India-Oman pipeline, issues of geopolitical risks and gas pricing would remain.

Geopolitically three power blocs currently appear to dominate the Middle East — the Iran-led Shia group, a rival emergent Cairo-Riyadh axis leading a group of smaller Sunni states, and a smaller, much weaker Qatar-Muslim Brotherhood alliance. Their competition is set to influence regional affairs in the period ahead. India’s relationship with these power groupings will determine the availability of oil and gas from the Middle East for India. On the issue of gas pricing, Iran is a hard (and at times a fickle) bargainer as India had experienced in the case of the IPI pipeline.

For India diversification of sources of energy and distribution of energy supply risks is imperative for its energy security. As the country stares at the prospect of almost 20,000MW of its gas-fuelled power plants going off grid due to gas shortages, an undersea gas pipeline from Oman appears to be a distant possibility despite the project making economic and strategic sense.

This article appeared at South Asia Monitor and is reprinted with permission.

By Aaranya Rajasingam

Early this week, President Hamid Karzai reiterated his decision not to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the US in his final address to the parliament. In a recent interview to Washington Post, he explained his position by stating “Afghans died in a war that’s not ours”. His strong resentment stems from the fact that though the US had fought its war on Afghan soil, it had failed to neutralise the Taliban threat emerging from neighbouring Pakistan and has continued its secret operations on Afghan soil without working in coordination with the Afghan security forces. However, this decision does not reflect the sentiment of all Afghans in general. In direct contradiction to the statement given by the Afghan president, Zahir Tanin, the ambassador of Afghanistan to the United Nations, gave firm assurances this week that the security deal will be signed by Kabul. And this seems more likely since many of the leading candidates in the next presidential elections seem favourable to this proposition.

In the rare event that the next elected president fails to sign this pact or come to a mutual agreement of some sort regarding security arrangements, the US will be forced to exercise the zero option. This entails a complete withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Such a decision will leave Afghanistan on its own to deal with national security challenges. Without a strong US presence it is unlikely that NATO forces will continue to stay, and this has serious ramifications for a country that is ill equipped to combat the Taliban insurgency alone at present. All this is taking place at a time when elections are looming ahead and security demands on Afghanistan have multiplied.

The real problem, however, is that any conversation on preserving the security and stability of Afghanistan dwells almost exclusively on hard security arrangements. While they are huge obstacles, the fact that security concerns have taken centre stage in all the debates on Afghanistan has been extremely counterproductive. Surprisingly, this emphasis on traditional security issues can be found in not only military and diplomatic circles but also in the development discourse on Afghanistan

The transition process in Afghanistan is a multi-levelled process and includes political, economic and security transitions. Any strategy towards Afghanistan needs to take into consideration a more holistic picture of the upcoming transition process rather than focus on selective tactics, which bring short term gains.

The first important issue is to ensure a peaceful political transition of power to a legitimate Afghan government. Without the continuity of a strong central state structure, Afghanistan has little hope of overcoming all its problems, including the fight against terrorism.

Alongside the political transition, the state has to also focus on enabling a smooth economic transition. One of the casualties of the current security environment has been the economic stability of the country. At present Afghanistan is unable to retain millions of dollars worth investments. The state is highly dependent on international financial support for its survival, with over 65% of its national budget covered by external funds. It can be expected that the rapidly increasing financial burdens on the government will undermine its ability to function effectively. While the international community has pledged to stand by the financial commitments made at the Chicago Summit in 2012 and subsequent Tokyo conference, this is hardly adequate to finance all the needs of the state.

As evidenced above, solving hard security issues alone will not address the parallel transitional challenges that the country faces. Prioritising the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) above other considerations or focussing on negotiations with the Taliban has constantly shifted the focus of the “transition of power” debate in Afghanistan towards traditional security challenges. This has often meant that the global anti-terrorism campaign waged by the US and its allies dictates the peace process in Afghanistan. While the challenges from insurgents in the country are significant and contribute to many insecurities, the prioritisation of it above other challenges has not been beneficial for the people of Afghanistan. Civil society reports from within Afghanistan have begun to highlight this issue with more frequency.

The people of Afghanistan themselves are now initiating this much needed change. For example the current presidential debates focus a lot on non-traditional security issues. Election candidates have stressed the importance of good governance, transparency and the fight against corruption in their manifestos. Although this may be cosmetic rhetoric at present, it signals that these issues dominate the public discourse and are issues which Afghans are voting on. Another example is the attempts taken to prevent sectarian violence. While candidates and media outlets remain polarised along ethnic lines, the people have shown zero tolerance for any attempts, by military or government representatives, to incite ethnic hatred. Public outrage during such incidences (via social media and street-level protests) has shown that the population is wary of allowing the outbreak of yet another ethnic conflict post-2014.

The social and political landscape in Afghanistan has changed dramatically over the last decade. More than a million young Afghans have graduated from school and there has been tremendous infrastructure and technological development in the country. The proliferation of mobile phones and internet facilities has brought Afghans closer together and has amplified their opinions on the international stage. It is hard to claim that the people of Afghanistan are not speaking when in fact they are voicing themselves on a myriad of issues regarding health, education, infrastructure, corruption, rule of law and women’s empowerment. This is but one example of a shift towards a more holistic security outlook, one that puts forward human security issues in Afghanistan. To deny their voice would be a disservice to them.

It is vital that the media and international community focus on these conversations as they contribute to developing a vision for Afghanistan: a vision that can act as a blueprint for positive change over the long run. Though there may be no easy solutions for Afghanistan in the near future, supporting Afghans in finding their own answers would be an important step towards paving the way for peace and stability in both the country and the region.

(Aaranya Rajasingam is a programme officer at the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (Colombo, Sri lanka). She can be contacted at aaranya@rcss.org )

This article appeared at South Asia Monitor and is reprinted with permission.

By Alexander Boehm

The ongoing geopolitical chess match between the West and Russia over Ukraine has prompted governments in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to reignite a debate over the regions need for energy diversification. Governments in the region are concerned over the implications that deteriorating Russian-European relations could have on gas prices and energy security.

Energy security has long been among the EU’s chief policy concerns. In the wake of CEE’s political and economic integration with Western Europe, reliance on Russian oil and gas imports were viewed as perilous by European policymakers. CEE made impressive strides with regards to democratization and market reforms but energy infrastructure, which remains largely unchanged to this day, provides a sobering reminder of a political –economic relationship that once held sway not that long ago. Those who decried CEE’s reliance on Russian energy imports in the early years of integration were slowly drowned out and before long, any momentum towards energy diversification was lost.

Although demand for energy in Europe has fallen in recent years, due in large part to slowing economic growth, CEE remains heavily dependent on Russian sources of energy, which include oil, gas, and nuclear technology. While almost 40 percent of the gas used in Germany comes from Russia, in CEE countries, the percentage is considerably higher. In 2010, 90 to 100 percent of imported gas in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia came from Russia. In Hungary, it was slightly lower, with 70 percent of imported gas coming from Russia. Hungary, however, recently signed an expansion deal with Rosatom, the Russian state-owned atomic energy corporation, to install two new nuclear reactors.

It is no secret that Russia has routinely exploited its position as the region’s primary energy exporter to further its own foreign policy agenda. This is perhaps best evidenced by the Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes that saw periodic cut-offs in supply, including a few occasions when Ukrainians were left without gas in the dead of winter in 2006 and 2009. The 2009 dispute had implications for EU member states as it disrupted the delivery of Russian gas via Ukraine. As a result, any disruption of supply in Ukraine puts energy security at risk for the rest of continental Europe. A bellicose Russia, embroiled in a geopolitical retaliatory tit-for-tat scenario with the West, may find easy targets in CEE. This makes the issue of energy diversification all the more pressing for governments in the region.

The ambassadors of the Visegrad four (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia) recently wrote a joint letter urging the United States to remove bureaucratic obstacles for the approval of gas export licences to non-free trade agreement countries. The US could play a pivotal role in solving CEE’s single supplier problem, as it is poised to become one of the world’s top liquefied natural gas producers, propelled by advances in drilling techniques, particularly fracking.

Alternatively, Europe’s attempt to lessen its dependence on Russian energy could result in the construction of new pipelines originating in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan that would effectively circumvent Russian territory and infrastructure. Pipeline projects like the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline, which would link gas from Azerbaijan to southern Europe via Turkey, could be instrumental in achieving energy security for Europe. Continued deterioration in relations between Russia and the West could also revitalize the recently defunct Nabucco pipeline project, which was scrapped due to soaring costs. A “west Nabucco” project that would link up with the Trans-Anatolian pipeline in southern Bulgaria may prove more cost effective.

European policymakers are cautiously optimistic that Russia will not recreate a similar situation to that of Ukraine and cut off gas supplies to the continent. Approximately 60 percent of Russia’s state income is derived from oil and gas sales, most of which come from Europe. Moscow also needs foreign cash to pay for its import of goods and services. As the Russian economy continues its lacklustre performance, those needs will undoubtedly continue to grow. Despite this, however, Russia has shown willingness in the past to use its energy resources as a political weapon. Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned gas company, recently announced that it may rescind an agreement it made last year to supply Ukraine with a cheaper gas rate unless it receives payment for $1.55 billion it is owed for fuel.

The current geopolitical discord between the West and Russia reaffirms the need for greater energy security in Europe, particularly in CEE. EU and national policy makers should seek to regain the impetus of those early integration years and devise realistic strategies that will lessen the continent’s dependence on Russian energy imports.

Alexander Boehm is a contributor to Geopoliticalmonitor.com, where this article originally was published.

By Vikram Sood

It will be quite a while before all fuzziness and wild speculations about what actually happened to the ill-fated MH370 subsides. Informed conjectures vary from pilot error, suicide, mid-air explosion, technical fault, or assault in the aircraft leading to hijacking, none of which can be established so early into the investigations. Speculation abounds and even the normally restrained Strobe Talbot was a bit over the top when he compared this to the WTC attack on September 11, 2001 saying that the aircraft might have been heading towards the Indian coast. It is true though that India has faced land-based and sea-borne terrorist attacks. An airborne attack would be high on the list of possibilities in the assessment of Indian intelligence.

It could be several months or years before any truth is established. When the EgyptAir Flight 990 from New York to Cairo went down in the Atlantic in October 1999 the conclusion of the American investigators in 2002 was that the pilot had committed suicide while the Egyptians insisted it was a mechanical failure. After the Air France Flight 447 from Rio de Janeiro to Paris crashed in the Atlantic in 2009, the black boxes were found two years later at a depth of 4,000 metres. The Malaysians searching for the jet want to to cover an area spread from Kazakhstan to southern Indian Ocean which makes it a daunting task in this age of global connectivity, surveillance and communications.

It is implausible that China would allow an unidentified aircraft to fly through Tibet to an unknown destination. The Russians had brought down a South Korean flight KAL 007 over Siberia in 1983, as it had strayed from its authorised path. It is also implausible that the Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 would have landed without night-landing facilities having flown westward from its last known location for four hours in the middle of the night as it would still be dark in Pakistan, Afghanistan and beyond. Moreover, it is just not possible that an aircraft can possibly fly overland for seven hours and not get detected.

There are many other questions too — about those persons with stolen passports, the inaction by the Malaysian Air Force to as the unscheduled flight went over three radars and the F-18s and F-5s did not take off to intercept. If there was an assault inside the aircraft then how was it carried out? There are also new theories that the pilot brought down the aircraft to fly at 1,500 metres to beat the radar but the accuracy and source of this claim is not known.

Many initially considered terrorism as the motive for this disappearance. However, there has been no credit taken up to now for this incident, if indeed it was a terrorist plot. No one or group claimed credit for this. This may not have been a terrorist act and more likely an accident of some kind.

There have been some discussions on the net, like a page out of a Tom Clancy novel, that MH370 after it turned around 40 minutes following take-off, might have been following the flight path of the Barcelona-bound SQ68, also a Boeing 777, at a distance of 30 nautical miles. This would have camouflaged MH370 on the radar screens so that it appeared as one blip en route from the Malacca Straits over the southern tip of India on its way across the Arabian Sea and the Arabian Peninsula.

It would require extremely accurate timing, maintenance of steady speed and flight path to follow another aircraft in this fashion and seems an unlikely possibility. There is even a sci-fi version that speaks of an American experiment with invisible aircraft.

This incident has occurred very close to our Tri-service Command at the Andaman and Nicobar Islands which has three radar stations. Regardless of whether or not MH370 actually flew over or close to the Command, it would doubtless be useful to learn lessons from this and that switching off radars at night is a dangerous way to economise. Secondly, if it indeed it flew over Indian territory, we have the ability to detect unknown aircraft, and if we had detected what would be the procedure for handling an unidentified aircraft. Thirdly, if all communications had indeed been turned off by MH370 would the Indian Air Force have forced the aircraft down or merely escorted it to the borders? Finally, MH370 was not the first aircraft that disappeared in mysterious circumstances and it’s not the last one.

(The writer is an Advisor to Observer Research Foundation, Delhi. He is a former chief of Research and Analysis Wing)

Courtesy: Mid-Day, March 20, 2014

Writing in The Washington Post on February 27, 2011, Rachel Bronson asked: “Could the next Mideast uprising happen in Saudi Arabia?” Her answer was: “The notion of a revolution in the Saudi kingdom seems unthinkable.”

However, On September 30 the next year, the senior foreign policy fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy Bruce Riedel concluded that the “revolution in Saudi Arabia is no longer unthinkable.”

To preempt such a possibility, the kingdom in March 2011, in a “military” move to curb the tide of the Arab popular uprisings which raged across the Arab world from sweeping to its doorsteps, the kingdom sent troops to Bahrain to quell similar popular protests.

That rapid reactive Saudi military move into Bahrain heralded a series of reactions that analysts describe as an ongoing Saudi-led counterrevolution.

Amid a continuing succession process in Saudi Arabia, while major socioeconomic and political challenges loom large regionally, the kingdom is looking for security as far away as China, but blinded to the shortest way to its stability in its immediate proximity, where regional understanding with its geopolitical Arab and Muslim neighborhood would secure the kingdom and save it a wealth of assets squandered on unguaranteed guarantees.

In his quest to contain any fallout from the “Arab Spring,” Saudi King Abdullah Ben Abdel-Aziz selectively proposed inviting the kingdoms of Jordan and Morocco to join the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, known as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), leading The Economist on May 19, 2011 to joke that the organization should be renamed the “Gulf Counter-Revolutionary Club.” For sure including Iraq and Yemen would be a much better addition if better security was the goal.

Ahead of US President Barak Obama’s official visit to the kingdom by the end of this March, Saudi Arabia was looking “forward to China as an international magnate with a great political and economic weight to play a prominent role in achieving peace and security in the region,” according to Defense Minister and Crown Prince Salman Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud who was in Beijing from March 13 to 16 “to enhance cooperation with China to protect peace, security and stability in the region.” He was quoted by a statement from the Saudi Press Agency.

Prince Salman was in Japan from 18-21 last February, hopefully to deepen bilateral cooperation “in various fields.” On February 26, India and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement to strengthen co-operation in military training, logistics supplies and exchange of defense-related information. On last January 23, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia signed a defense cooperation agreement,  the first of its kind.

While a strong Saudi-Pakistan defense partnership has existed for long, it has been upgraded recently. Princes Salman and Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal arrived in Pakistan on February 15. Pakistani army chief General Raheel Sharif was in Saudi Arabia earlier. Director of South Asia Studies Project at the Middle East Media Research Institute, Washington DC, Tufail Ahmad, wrote on this March 11 that “the upswing in the relationship marks a qualitative change,” hinting that the kingdom could be seeking Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities to “counter a nuclear-capable Iran” despite Islamabad’s denial, which “is not reliable.” The kingdom is moving “to transform itself as a regional military power,” Sharif wrote.

On this March 14, the Financial Times reported that Saudi Arabia has given $1.5 billion (Dh5.5 billion) to Pakistan. In February a senior Pakistani intelligence official told the Financial Times that Saudi Arabia was seeking “a large number of [Pakistani] troops to support its campaign along the Yemeni border and for internal security.” The official confirmed that Pakistan’s agreement, during Prince Salman’s visit, to support the establishment of a “transitional governing body” in Syria was an important aspect of the deal.

On this March 5, the kingdom led two other members of the six-member GCC, namely the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, to withdraw their ambassadors from Qatar, risking the survival of the GCC.

Hunting two French and Lebanese birds with one shot, the kingdom early last January pledged a $3 billion royal grant, estimated to be two-time the entire military budget of Lebanon, to buy French weapons for the Lebanese Army.

The Saudi multi-billion dollar support to the change of guards in Egypt early last July and the kingdom’s subscription to Egypt’s make or break campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) inside and outside the country following the ouster of the MB’s former president Mohammed Morsi reveal a much more important Saudi strategic and security unsigned accord with Egypt’s new rulers.

On the outset of the so-called “Arab Spring,” the kingdom also bailed out Bahrain and the Sultanate of Omen with more multi-billion petrodollars to buy the loyalty of their population.

More multi-billion petrodollars were squandered inside the country to bribe the population against joining the sweeping popular Arab protests.

Yet still more billions were squandered on twenty percent of all arms transfers to the region between 2009-2013 to make the kingdom the world’s fifth largest importer of arms while more Saudi orders for arms are outstanding, according to a new study released on this March 17 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

While the United States will continue to “guarantee Israel’s qualitative military edge” over all the twenty two Arab nations plus Iran, Iran is developing its own defense industries to defend itself against both the US and Israel, rendering the Saudi arms procurement efforts obsolete.

Had all of those squandered billions of petrodollars spent more wisely they could have created a revolution of development in the region.

Not Assured by US Assurances

Ahead of Obama’s visit, the Saudi message is self-evident. They are looking, on their own, for alternative security guarantees, or at least additional ones. They don’t trust their decades – long American security umbrella anymore. The US sellout of close allies like the former presidents of Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen shed doubt on any “assurances’ Washington would be trying to convey during Obama’s upcoming visit.

President Obama is scheduled to be in Riyadh by the end of this March to assure Saudi Arabia of what his Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns on last February 19 told the Center for Strategic and International Studies that the United States takes Saudi security concerns “seriously,” “US-Saudi partnership is as important today as it ever was” and that the “Security cooperation is at the heart of our agenda” with the GCC, reminding his audience that his country still keeps about 35,000 members of the US military at 12 bases in and around the Arabian Gulf.

However, “the Saudi voices I hear do not think that what they see as the current lack of American resolve is merely a short-term feature of the Obama Presidency: They spot a deeper trend of Western disengagement from their region,” Sir Tom Phillips – British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia 2010-12 and an Associate Fellow at the Chatham House Middle East and North Africa Programme – wrote on last February 12.

Obviously, the Saudis are not assured, neither internally, regionally or at the international level because as Burns said on the same occasion: “We don’t always see eye to eye” and it is natural that Gulf states would “question our reliability as partners” given US efforts to achieve energy independence and US warnings that traditional power structures, such as the gulf monarchies, are “unsustainable.”

Obama’s upcoming visit to the kingdom has been described as a “fence-mending” one. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal, at a joint press conference alongside visiting US Secretary of State John Kerry last November, hinted that fences might not be mended because “a true relationship between friends is based on sincerity, candor, and frankness rather than mere courtesy.”

What Prince Al Faisal described as “frankness” is still missing: His brother, prince Turki al-Faisal, in an interview with The Wall Street Journal last December, blasted the Obama administration for keeping his country in the dark on its secret talks with Iran: “How can you build trust when you keep secrets from what are supposed to be your closest allies?”

“The Saudis have good reason to feel besieged and fearful,” Immanuel Wallerstein, director emeritus of the Fernand Braudel Center at Binghamton University and senior researcher at Yale University and Maison des Sciences de l’Homme in Paris, was quoted as saying by AlJazeera America on this March 1.

Senior associate of Carnegie’s Middle East program Frederic Wehry on this March 10 wrote that, “There is a growing sense in Gulf capitals … led by Saudi Arabia” that “the United States is a power in retreat that is ignoring the interests of its steadfast partners, if not blithely betraying them.”

What Burns described as “tactical differences” with Saudi Arabia and its GCC co-members, the Saudis are acting on the premise that those differences are much more strategic than “tactical” and accordingly are overstretching their search for alternative security guarantees worldwide because they seem to disagree with Burns that “our Gulf partners know that no country or collection of countries can do for the Gulf states what the United States has done and continues to do.”

Pressured between Two ‘Crescents’

Three threatening developments have led to Saudi distrust in US security assurances. The first was the selling out of a US ally like the former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, the second was the Qatari, Turkish and US coordination with the Muslim Brotherhood regionally and the third was the assumption to power of the MB in Egypt. The first development set the precedent of selling out of a long regional US ally against the fervent public advice of the kingdom. Mubarak’s ouster set the red lights on in Riyadh of a possible similar scenario in Saudi Arabia.

The second development put the kingdom on alert against the emerging MB, Turkey, Qatar and the US axis that would have encircled Saudi Arabia had the kingdom allowed this axis to hand the power over to the Brotherhood in Syria in the north and in Egypt in the west. The MB is influential in Jordan, the kingdom’s northern neighbor, and in Yemen, its southern neighbor. The Hamas’ affiliation to the MB in the Palestinian Gaza Strip would complete what a Saudi analyst called the “Brotherhood crescent” in the north, west and south, to squeeze the kingdom between the rock of this “Brotherhood crescent” and the hard place of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the east.

The third development surrendered the western strategic backyard of the kingdom to the MB, which has become untrustworthy politically in view of its membership in the emerging US-led ““Brotherhood crescent” after decades of sponsoring the MB leaders who found in the kingdom a safe haven from their suppression in Syria and Egypt and using them against the pan-Arab regimes in both countries and against the pan-Arab and communist political movements.

Unmercifully pressured between the “Brotherhood crescent” and what King Abdullah II of Jordan once described as the “Shiite crescent” extending from Iran through Iraq and Syria to Hezbullah in Lebanon, let alone the al-Qaeda offshoots, which have deep roots inside the kingdom and in its immediate surroundings and have emerged as a major threat to regional as well as to internal stability, in addition to what the Saudis perceive as the withdrawal or at least the rebalancing of the US power out of the region, the kingdom seems poised to find an answer to the question which Bruce Riedel asked on September 30, 2012 about whether or not the “revolution in Saudi Arabia is no longer unthinkable.”

The Saudi answer so far has been reactive more than proactive. “It is difficult to avoid the impression that Saudi policy is more re-active than pro-active,” Sir Tom Phillips – British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia 2010-12 and an Associate Fellow at the Chatham House Middle East and North Africa Programme – wrote on last February 12.

Proactive Shorter Path Overdue

Following the lead of the United States and Europe who have come to deal with the fait accompli that Iran as a pivotal regional power is there to stay for the foreseeable future, a more Saudi proactive regional policy that would engage Iran and Syria would be a much shorter and cheaper route to internal security as well as to regional stability, instead of reacting to their alliance by engaging in a lost and costly battle for a “regime change” in both countries.

Or much better, the kingdom could follow the lead of the Sultanate of Oman, which risked to break away from the GCC should they go along with the Saudi proposal late in 2011 for transforming their “council” into an anti-Iran military “union.” Regardless of what regime rules in Tehran and since the time of the Shah, Oman has been dealing with Iran as a strategic partner and promoting an Iranian-GCC regional partnership. Qatar takes a middle ground between the Saudi and Omani positions vis-à-vis Iran. On this March 17, the Qatar-Iran joint political committee convened in Tehran.

Feeling isolated, besieged and threatened by being left in the cold as a result of what it perceives as a withdrawing US security umbrella, the kingdom’s new experience of trying to cope on its own is indulging the country in counterproductive external policies in the turmoil of the aftermath of the shock waves of  the Arab popular uprisings, which have raged across the Arab world since 2011, but its tide has stopped at the Damascus gate of the Iranian – Syrian alliance, which is backed internationally by the emerging Russian and Chinese world powers.

At the end of the day, the kingdom’s recent historical experience indicates that the Saudi dynasty lived its most safe and secure era during the Saudi-Egyptian-Syrian trilateral understanding, which was developed as a regional axis of stability, as the backbone of the Arab League regional system and was reinforced by the trilateral coordination in the 1973 Arab – Israeli war.

The revival of the Saudi coordination with Egypt in the post-Morsi presidency was a crucial first step that would lead nowhere unless it is completed by an overdue Saudi political U-turn on Syria that would revive the old trilateral axis to defend Arabs against Israel. A partnership with Iran would be a surplus; otherwise the revival of the trilateral coordination would at least serve as a better Saudi defense against Iran as well.

However such a Saudi U-turn would require of course a strategic decision that would renege on the kingdom’s US-inspired and ill-advised policy of dealing with Syria and Iran as “the enemy,” while dealing with Israel, which still occupies Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese territories, as a possible “peace partner” and a co-member of an anti-Iran and Syria “front of moderates,” which the successive US administrations have been promoting.

It would first require as well a change of foreign policy decision-makers in Riyadh, but such a change will continue to be wishful thinking until a man of an historic stature holds the wheel at the driving seat at the helm of the Saudi hierarchy. Until that happens, it might be too late. Meanwhile, it is increasingly becoming a possibility that the “revolution in Saudi Arabia is no longer unthinkable.”

In a phone conversation with Ukrainian Defense Minister Ihor Tenyukh today, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel repeated his praise for the restraint demonstrated by Ukrainian forces in Crimea and commended Tenyukh’s leadership, Pentagon Press Secretary Navy Rear Adm. John Kirby said.

“For his part, Minister Tenyukh updated Secretary Hagel on the situation in Crimea and throughout the country,” Kirby said in a statement summarizing the 35-minute call. Hagel reaffirmed U.S. support for Ukraine and stressed that officials are actively reviewing Ukraine’s request for military assistance materials, he added.

“Both leaders agreed on the need to find a diplomatic, peaceful resolution to this crisis,” Kirby said, and Hagel agreed to stay in close contact with Tenyukh going forward.

By Army Sgt. 1st Class Tyrone C. Marshall Jr.

The U.S. Navy’s USS Elrod relieved the USS Stout of its escort duties for the Morning Glory tanker ship March 19, Army Col. Steven Warren, a Defense Department spokesman, told Pentagon reporters today.

The Navy initially took control of the commercial tanker in international waters by request of the governments of Libya and Cyprus following its seizure earlier this month by three armed Libyans.

The Morning Glory, according to a DOD statement, is carrying cargo of oil owned by the Libyan government National Oil Company, and was illicitly obtained from the Libyan port of As-Sidra.

Warren said 34 sailors from the USS Elrod are aboard the Morning Glory and all USS Stout personnel have departed the ship.

“We’re going to hand over the Morning Glory to Libyan naval authorities within the next day or two in international waters just outside of the territorial water line,” he said.

Everything will be turned over to the government of Libya, Warren noted, including the three Libyans, the entire 21-member organic crew of the Morning Glory, the ship and all of its contents.

The change of escorts was for administrative reasons, Warren said. The USS Stout is assigned to the U.S. European Command area of operations, while the USS Elrod has the U.S. Africa Command area of operations.

The USS Elrod, an Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate, is homeported in Norfolk, Va., and deployed Jan. 14 to the 6th Fleet area of operations.

By Aijaz Zaka Syed

Some years ago, in response to a rather strong piece on the US shenanigans in the Middle East, an American reader wrote back: “Why do you hate America?”

As some of my perceptive readers might have already deduced, I get loads of fan mail in response to my weekly rants, especially from my own kind and most of it not very flattering.

Yet the accusation “why do you hate America?” from an all-American white reader was a little disconcerting, as I do not see myself as an America phobe.

The influence of American literature, Hollywood, culture and their collective glorification of ambition, excellence, grit and hard work left a lasting impact on an impressionable Muslim boy. Those influences are still a part of my consciousness. Just as they are a part of the people of my generation and generations after that.

For none of us, wherever we are and whoever we are, can escape the influences of McWorld. You don’t have to be a Star Wars fan, drink Coke or sport Levi’s and Nike to be a part of the empire of mind created by America. There is a little America in all of us. And we all love and admire in various degrees what America ostensibly stands for or once stood for: Democracy, freedom, civil liberties, freedom of speech and action and a celebration of individualism and doing your own thing.

If you are born with imagination, original ideas or just happen to be a plain hard working guy, then the land of the free is for you. No matter where you were born or where you come from, Uncle Sam would embrace you.

If you have guts for glory, patience and persistence, it’s not impossible for anyone to get your slice of the American pie. Life is beautiful!

This is what we once believed about America. Many of us still do. At least, I still do. I like my share of Hollywood potboilers, westerns and John Grisham’s legal thrillers where small, insignificant men are pitted against big, bad corporate leviathans and who ultimately prevail over their far more powerful opponents.

Despite the watershed transformation that America has undergone after 9/11, there’s been little change in the essential character and soul of the country discovered by Columbus.

It might have changed in the way foreigners are received at US airports. The punishing frisking, scanning and daunting questioning certainly make all visitors to the land of the free feel unwelcome.

This gets all the more unpleasant when visitors happen to be or look like, you know, who! But then that’s how it is in the rest of the world — from European airports to Asian holiday destinations.

The welcome ceremony doesn’t vary much whether you are at LaGuardia airport in New York or passing through Charles de Gaulle of Paris. That now infamous date in September 2001 has changed, perhaps forever, the way we fly and the way we look at each other. Especially the way the Americans view the rest of the world and the Muslims in particular.

Yet notwithstanding the unprecedented curbs imposed on civil liberties and basic rights of the Americans at home and the usual suspects around the world, Muslim Americans are still better off than their counterparts — say in Europe. This is borne out by several recent opinion polls.

This may come as a surprise but Muslim Americans still feel and see themselves as a part of the US mainstream. This is despite the pathological aversion of this administration for all things Islamic and its disastrous war on terror. In total contrast, the European Muslims, long paraded as a model of the continent’s fabled multiculturalism and tolerance, are dangerously angry and unhappy with the western policies in the Muslim world in general and their host countries in particular.

Unlike the Muslim Americans who are a healthy part of the mainstream, Muslims in Europe have been living on the sidelines of their societies.

And unlike their fellow believers across the Atlantic who’ve been enjoying the fruits of America’s economic progress, Europe’s Muslims live in deprivation and isolation in their ghettos and enclaves. So it’s no coincidence that the US hasn’t witnessed any major incidents involving US Muslims since 9/11. On the other hand, Europe has reported several so-called terror plots apparently involving Muslims.

Remarkably, the US Muslims responded swiftly to the challenge posed by 9/11 developments. First, they closed their ranks. Secondly, they reached out to the Americans addressing the accusations and misconceptions vis-à-vis Islam and Muslims.
Instead of withdrawing into their shells, they tried their best to present the true face of their noble faith. But I must point out that this is also a tribute to the US model of tolerance and assimilation. If the US Muslims today identify themselves with America without compromising their religious and cultural identity, the credit goes in no small measure to the US spirit of genuine tolerance and embracing newcomers.

Perhaps this can happen only in America. It’s only in the US that an Austrian immigrant, Arnold Schwarzenegger, can scale Hollywood heights to become governor of California. Or Bobby Jindal, an Indian American, can become governor of Louisiana. And who knows you might even have a Muslim governor soon! On the other hand, across the Atlantic you’re still known as a Paki or Moroccan butcher despite having being born and brought up in Europe.

As Mohsen Hamid, the author of Reluctant Fundamentalist wrote some time back: “If you speak with an American accent, you’re an American (it doesn’t matter whether you are a Muslim or Hindu). In Europe, although I’m a British citizen, they still refer to me as a Pakistani novelist. In the US, even though I’ve never had an American passport, I am called a Pakistani American.”

I love and admire this side of America. The America of Robert Frost, Mark Twain and Hemingway. This is the land of Jefferson, Lincoln, Martin Luther King Jr. and Mohammed Ali.

This America is different from the one that media punditocrasy obsesses over day after day. The America that repels and agitates you and me is like a different country altogether. Represented by neocons, Zionist lobbies and powerful corporate interests, this entity is self-centered and most often doesn’t seem to see beyond its nose. It seeks to run the whole world as its extended colony.

It doesn’t lose sleep over a couple of million innocent lives wasted here and there. It’s this leviathan that we often deal with in the Middle East and around the world.

Unfortunately, this America controls and manipulates the America that we all know and love. For like Dr. Jekyll and Mr.Hyde, Uncle Sam appears to suffer from a split personality.

You don’t quite know which side indeed represents the real America. But it is not for us — the outsiders — to determine which side of America is plastic and which truly represents its values, ideals and spirit. It’s for the Americans to decide once and for all which America really represents them and which they would like the world to see: The America of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay or the freedom-loving and humane America that comes forward to help the helpless, as it did during World War II and more recently in the Balkans? Will the real America please stand up!

In this week’s address, President Obama highlighted the importance of making sure our economy rewards the hard work of every American – including America’s women. The President reiterated his call for Congress to ensure that women earn equal pay for equal work and increase the minimum wage to $10.10, which would give nearly 28 million Americans the raise they deserve. He underscored his belief that providing opportunity for working women and families is the right thing to do for our economy, because when women succeed, America succeeds.

Remarks of President Barack Obama
Weekly Address
The White House
March 22, 2014

Hi, everybody. This week, I visited a community college in Florida, where I spoke with students about what we need to do to make sure our economy rewards the hard work of every American.

More specifically, I spoke about making sure our economy rewards the hard work of women.

Today, women make up about half of our workforce, and more than half of our college graduates. More women are now their families’ main breadwinner than ever before.

But in a lot of ways, our economy hasn’t caught up to this new reality yet. On average, a woman still earns just 77 cents for every dollar a man does. And too many women face outdated workplace policies that hold them back – which in turn holds back our families and our entire economy.

A woman deserves to earn equal pay for equal work, and paid leave that lets you take a day off to care for a sick child or parent. Congress needs to act on these priorities.

And when women hold most lower-wage jobs in America, Congress needs to raise the minimum wage. Because no woman who works full-time should ever have to raise her children in poverty.

Now, the good news is that in the year since I first called on Congress to raise the minimum wage, six states have passed laws to raise theirs. More states, counties, and cities are working to raise their minimum wages as we speak. Small businesses like St. Louis-based Pi Pizzeria, are raising their wages too – not out of charity, but because it’s good for business. And by the way, Pi makes a really good pizza. And in this year of action, I signed an executive order requiring federal contractors to pay their employees a fair wage of at least ten dollars and ten cents an hour.

But if we’re truly going to reward the hard work of every American, Congress needs to join the rest of the country and pass a bill that would lift the federal minimum wage to ten dollars and ten cents an hour. This wouldn’t just raise wages for minimum wage workers – its effects would lift wages for nearly 28 million Americans across this country. It will give businesses more customers with more money to spend, and grow the economy for everybody. So call up your Member of Congress and let them know it’s time for “ten-ten.” It’s time to give America a raise.

A true opportunity agenda is one that works for working women. Because when women succeed, America succeeds. We do better when everyone participates, and when everyone who works hard has the chance to get ahead. That’s what opportunity means – and it’s why I’ll keep fighting to restore it.

Thanks, everybody, and have a great weekend.

Protesters clashed with police in Madrid as thousands of people trekked across Spain to protest austerity which they claim is destroying their country. Under the banner “no more cuts!” the protesters called for an end to the government’s “empty promises.”

Police arrested at least 29 protesters following the clashes which took place after the march. According to emergency service, 101 people were injured – 67 of them police, El Mundo newspaper reports.

Protesters were seen throwing stones and firecrackers at police. According to witnesses, officers used tear gas to disperse the demonstrators.

Clashes broke out during a final speech at the demonstration when protesters tried to break through a police barrier. Riot police took charge by beating protesters with batons, AP reported.

“The mass rally was coming to an an end when reportedly a group of younger protesters, who had masks on their faces, started throwing rocks at the police. Police tried to push them away from the parameter that they organized around this area,” RT’s Egor Piskunov reported from the Spanish capital.

“They (police) tried to push them (protesters) away from these police fences and then we started seeing firecrackers being thrown at police and reportedly authorities started firing rubber bullets at the protesters. As a result, there are injuries on both sides and several people have been arrested as well.”

“I can confirm that there is very heavy police presence in this whole district. Since it is the center of Madrid, there are lots of luxury hotels in this part of town and security here is very tight,” he added.

Six “columns” of trains, cars and buses, as well as bands of pedestrians have travelled from Extremadura, Andalusia, Valencia, Murcia, Asturias, Galicia and Aragon, among other Spanish regions, to converge on Madrid in mass protest this Saturday. The demonstration itself has been dubbed 22-M, Marches for dignity.

Eight groups of activists are expected to move into the Spanish capital at different points throughout the course of the day. As a precautionary measure, the Madrid authorities have closed roads in the center of the city and asked people to use public transport whenever possible on Saturday. In addition, the Spanish authorities have deployed 1,650 riot police to keep the situation under control in Madrid.

The protest movement is demanding an end to the so-called Troika-style cuts in Spain, more jobs and affordable housing.

“Why am I here? I’m sick of this government. With all the promises they never fulfill. They said they were going to create more jobs and lower the taxes but it’s a lie! Instead, unemployment rose from 4 to 6 million. This is the only way we can fight back,” one of the protestors, who had been on the road since March 9, told RT correspondent Egor Piskunov.

A large proportion of the protesters who have made their way on foot to the Spanish capital are unemployed and plan to camp in Madrid until their demands are met.

“There are too many reasons: my sons have to work every day from 8 in the morning to five of the next morning only for 400 euros per month! Also I’m a teacher and I know what cuts in the public sector mean,” said another activist. “All these evictions – this is insane. I’m marching to Madrid because I can’t walk to Berlin or Brussels. We must stop them and the Troika!”

Hundreds of people are evicted from their homes every day in Spain. The General Council of the Judiciary reported that 49,984 forced evictions had been carried out across the country last year, which averages about 185 a day.

The number of evictions reached an all-time high in Spain in 2012 with over 500 a day, according to a report by the BBC. This combined with an unemployment rate of 26 percent, the second highest in Europe after Greece, has left many Spanish citizens with nowhere to turn. This is reflected in the growing number of suicides in the country, with the country’s National Institute of Statistics estimating that at least 8 people take their lives every day in the country.

Pepe Caballero, one of the organizers of the protests said the Spanish government is trying to return Spain to the Franco era.

“What the government wants is to go back to the Franco years and keep the working class from demonstrating in the streets and saying what our main problems are. We won’t allow that to happen and they know it,” Caballero told RT, adding that the protest movement will change Spain from the “bottom to the top.”

At the beginning of this month, the Spanish Minister of Employment Fatima Banez said that Spain had finally pulled itself out of the recession and registered economic growth. However, the Spanish Union of Workers dismissed Banez’s announcements as “government propaganda.”

(RFE/RL) — Two Ukrainian air bases in Crimea have been overrun by pro-Russian forces.

Pro-Russian forces appeared in control of the base in Belbek, near Sevastopol, after an armored vehicle was seen ramming into the gate of the base and an ambulance drove into the compound at high speed.

A live video feed from outside the gate showed men in civilian clothes entering the base. There were also reports of explosions and gunfire.

The events occurred after a Russian ultimatum to the personnel at Belbek to surrender the base.

The Ukrainian commander of the base, Yuliy Mamchur, said there was at least one injury.

Mamchur said he summoned his men together, sang the Ukrainian national anthem, and then stood at ease. He said they were going to turn over their weapons.

In western Crimea, some 200 unarmed demonstrators broke through to the air base in the town of Novofedorivka as Ukrainian military personnel barricaded themselves inside buildings.

Vladyslav Seleznyov, a spokesman for the Ukrainian Defense Ministry’s Crimean region, told the Ukrainian media that the attackers threw smoke bombs at the base.

Seleznyov was later quoted as saying the Ukrainian forces had left the base after singing the national anthem.

Seleznyov also said Russian troops had also seized the flagship of the Ukrainian fleet, the Slavutich, which had been prevented from leaving port at Sevastopol by Russian tug boats.

Meanwhile, Russia’s Defense Ministry said that as of March 21, the Russian state flag had been raised at 147 Ukrainian armed forces’ facilities in Crimea. Russian Navy flags were raised on 54 Ukrainian naval ships, including Ukraine’s only submarine.

In the eastern Ukrainian city of Donetsk, some 5,000 people attended a pro-Russian rally, chanting slogans in favor of a referendum on seceding from Ukraine.

Donetsk resident Galina Zakazchikova said she was against the new Ukrainian authorities.

“Look what is happening in the country, it is a coup d’etat, it is against the law, and we are against these authorities,” she said. “We are for the legitimate President [Viktor] Yanukovych, and we are waiting for him.”

Earlier on March 22, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier denounced Russia’s “attempt to splinter Europe” by backing an independence referendum in Ukraine’s Crimea region earlier this month.

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law formalizing Crimea’s annexation on March 21, despite U.S. and European sanctions.

Speaking in Kyiv on March 22 after meeting with Ukraine’s acting President Oleksandr Turchynov, Steinmeier said he hoped the first Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) monitors would arrive in Ukraine to support de-escalation efforts in the next couple of days.

Moscow has slammed the second wave of sanctions imposed by the European Union over the Crimean crisis as “divorced from reality.”

On March 21, the EU added 12 Russians and Ukrainians to a list of people targeted by asset freezes and travel bans, bringing to 33 the number of figures targeted by the European bloc.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Aleksandr Lukashevich said on March 22 that Russia reserved the right to “give a comparable answer to the actions taken.”

In a separate statement, the ministry expressed hope that the decision to send international monitors to Ukraine will help “overcome the internal Ukrainian crisis, stop rampant nationalist banditry, [and] eradicate ultra-radical tendencies.”

Russia agreed late on March 21 to join the 56 other members of the OSCE in a consensus decision to send a monitoring mission to Ukraine. It added that the “mission’s mandate reflects the new political and legal realities and does not extend to Crimea and Sevastopol, which have become part of Russia.”

The OSCE had said the observer team — numbering at least 100 — will gather information over six months on the security situation “throughout” Ukraine.

U.S. chief envoy Daniel Baer said the observers will start deploying within 24 hours of the March 21 decision.

Britons see Russia in a more positive light than the European Union, despite recent tensions with Moscow over Ukraine, according to a poll published on Saturday.

Voters in Britain are also equally divided about whether to remain in the 28-member bloc, a subject on which Prime Minister David Cameron has promised a referendum in 2017.

The results of the online poll of 20,000 people between 7 and 20 January organised by Conservative party peer Lord Michael Aschcroft were published in Rupert Murdoch’s British tabloid The Sun on Sunday.

The league table of 27 “liked” countries and institutions put the European Parliament — for which elections are being held in May — sixth from bottom, and the EU fourth from bottom.

Only Saudi Arabia, Iran and North Korea ranked below the European parliament when those polled were asked how positive or negative they felt towards them. Israel was fifth from bottom and Russia was seventh from bottom.

Canada was top.

The poll taken before relations between Russia and the West were plunged into the deep freeze because of the crisis in the Ukraine and Russia’s absorption of the Crimean peninsula.

The poll meanwhile found 41 percent thought Britain should remain in the EU, while exactly the same percentage thought it should leave, with the rest undecided.

Only 20 percent of voters were confident that Cameron could renegotiate a better deal for Britain with the EU.

He has pledged to do so and then hold a referendum on Britain’s EU membership in late 2017, provided that he is re-elected in May 2015.

“Britain is split down the middle,” Ashcroft wrote on his website.

Separately, a Survation poll for the Mail on Sunday newspaper showed that 48 percent would vote to leave the EU in a referendum, 39 would vote to stay in, and 13 percent were undecided. It polled 1,000 adults online on Thursday and Friday.

As the conflict in Ukraine refuses to precipitate, it continues to raise fears of triggering yet another confrontation between the Cold War era adversaries – the US and Russia in a geopolitical tussle for dominance in Europe. There is also the possibility that Ukraine itself could descend into civil war. Analysts ponder as to which past moment of history will the country seek to repeat: the 1968 model, when Soviet troops invaded former Czechoslovakia to put an end to the Prague Spring; or the 2008 scenario, when Russia intervened in Georgia on the issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Ukraine with its 45 million residents has deep ethnic and economic fault lines. While the economically weak regions in the west are bastions of nationalists, Ukraine’s major industries, like the steel mills, ship and turbine building are located in the east and are dependent on the Russian market. One narrative on the protests in the Independence Square of Kiev states that far-right nationalists and fascists have been at the heart of the protests and attacks on the government in Kiev. The most active of the groups has been reported to be the rightwing Svoboda or “Freedom” Party. The latest source of tension in the region is the autonomous Crimean peninsula; it was first transferred to Ukraine in 1954, and now its parliament has just voted to be reunited with Russia.

The Ukrainian crisis has turned out to be a severe test for global governance norms and institutions on the issues of democracy, public will and territorial sovereignty. India would draw several pointers for its foreign policy as the US, EU, Russia play out the geopolitical chess. India would more keenly watch the Chinese position and the dynamics of China-Russia relationship as the situation unfolds and derive implications for its bilateral standoffs.

India’s Position

For months into the Ukraine crisis India had remained noncommittal and no statements were forthcoming from the government. The only indication of India’s position came from a ‘tweet’ by the External Affairs Ministry (MEA) spokesperson, which read “We are closely watching fast evolving situation and hope for a peaceful resolution.” The silence was broken on March 6 after statements from both the MEA and the National Security Advisor (NSA).

The statement by MEA expressed India is concerned at the escalation of tension in Ukraine and called “for a legitimate democratic process to find full expression through free and fair elections that provide for an inclusive society.” It added that India stood for sincere and sustained diplomatic efforts to ensure that issues between Ukraine and its neighbouring countries are resolved through constructive dialogue. However, the response of the NSA, who said, “There are legitimate Russian and other interests involved and we hope they are discussed and resolved,” was more indicative of India’s tightrope walk between deep historic ties with Russia and the Indian commitment to the inviolability of national sovereignty.

Chinese Reaction

The Chinese position on Ukraine and Russian intervention in Crimea has been gleaned by China watchers from two telephone calls, a newspaper editorial, and two foreign ministry briefings. It however left the analysts divided on the nature of Chinese position, which was then declared by some as being of “studied ambiguity”.

Chinese President Xi Jinping was quoted on March 4 by the official Chinese media as telling Putin during a telephone call that the present situation in Ukraine was highly complicated and sensitive and that China supports proposals and mediation efforts of the international community that are conducive to reduction of tension. Russia should work towards a political settlement of the issue so as to safeguard regional and world peace and stability.  Earlier Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had discussed Ukraine by telephone with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, on March 3, and claimed they had “broadly coinciding points of view” on the situation in Ukraine.

Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Qin Gang said on March 3 that “China upholds its own diplomatic principles and the basic codes for international relations, which have also been implied on the Ukraine issue,” Qin said China has taken the historical and contemporary factors of the Ukraine issue into consideration and that there were reasons for the situation in Ukraine.

China’s trapeze act has been justified on the grounds that denouncing Putin’s decision to send troops to Crimea would impact the partnership between Beijing and Moscow. Worse, standing against Moscow would mean China was standing with the West —which could be taken as implicit support for the Ukrainian protestors. China is distrustful of “colour revolutions”, including Ukraine’s own “Orange Revolution” of 2004 as it considers the “colour revolutions/springs” as instigated by Western nations to oust unfriendly regimes.

Assessment

Alyssa Ayres at the CFR has drawn out some lessons from the Ukraine crisis. First, she highlights the importance of establishing strong “rules of the road” which are effected through functional regional institutions to resolve differences between countries. Referring to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), she says Russia’s approach on similar issues/ differences with NATO member countries in the region has been more appropriate and balanced unlike in the case of Ukraine, as it is not a member of the NATO. Yet the concept has its limitation as the thought of the likely NATO reaction did not deter Russia from moving into Crimea. Nor did fear of possible alienation from the G8, or condemnation from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) appear to have any effect.

Second, the Ukrainian events accentuate the shortcomings of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and its vulnerability to use of veto power by the permanent members. Consequently, EU and US have been compelled to explore other persuasive and punitive responses centered on national visa policies, economic and trade sanctions etc.

China over the last few months has increasingly pushed to test established global norms with regards to resolving territorial disputes as well as demonstrated an inclination to challenge the regional order. US  in its pivot to Asia finds  itself  balancing  stable US-China relations on the one hand, and the imperative to uphold  the credibility of US deterrence in the face of rising concern amongst its allies  on China’s ‘creeping expansionism’, on the other. Analysts warn that US will struggle to maintain this precarious balance and Chinese interests may dominate Asia in the future.

China would be mindful of the fact that it too at some point in future could be the target of Western sanctions. Therefore it would watch closely the drama over Ukraine and Crimea and the West-Russia confrontation to expand its portfolio of strategic options. China in this regard would also value its strategic collaboration with Russia to jointly counter Western interference.

On March 8 on the sidelines of the National People’s Congress (NPC) session, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told media persons in his annual press conference on the issue of territorial disputes that ”We will not take anything that is not ours, but we will defend every inch of territory that belongs to us”. Referring to the strained Sino-Japanese relations over the islands in the East China Sea, Wang said, “On the two issues of principle, history and territory, there is no room for compromise.”

This was the second time within few days (the other being in case of Ukraine) that China had used “history and territory” together to justify aggressive measures to resolve long standing territorial disputes. It is this kind of posturing that would give strategic analysts in India goose bumps.

While the Indian approach on China has been to engage, compete and cooperate in the shared periphery and in the world, India would take certain pointers from the Ukraine crisis with respect to its prospective interactions with China. India would be conscious of the degree of consensus and cooperation Russia and China have shared on ticklish issues concerning Syria, Libya, Iran and now Ukraine.

Also the fact that this understanding has included deliberations at the UNSC and that Russia may feel obliged to reciprocate Chinese support in the future. This may compromise Russian support to India during a Sino-Indian standoff. India would also watch the effectiveness of non-military coercive measures being deployed by EU and the US against Russia and at the same time being aware that similar measure if ever used against China would be appreciably less effective, given China’s economic staying power.

The crisis in Ukraine is not likely to go away in a hurry. Its impact on global security structures, the dynamics of US, EU, Russia and China relations and the growing Russia-China strategic partnership are the issues that India would be keenly watching.

This article was published by South Asia Monitor and reprinted with permission.