By Kai Fürstenberg

The recently-concluded general election in India was the largest democratic election in history. However, it isn’t the size of the electorate that makes this election interesting. Instead, it is Narendra Modi, the controversial lead candidate of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and potential prime minister of India

The German perspective on Modi is strongly divided: On one hand he is the politician-cum-businessman, and on the other, he is the far-right leader with ties to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).

Modi’s alleged business acumen, his success in attracting large enterprises and his industrialisation policies have earned him a reputation concerning the economic growth of India. Many Indians, especially the urban middle classes, hope that his leadership style will bring an end to the wide-spread corruption and produce economic development; and with it jobs. After a steep decline of German investments into India over the past two years, the German business community views Modi as someone who could make investing into India lucrative again.

The BJP’s election manifesto which promises tax-reforms and especially simplification of the tax-code is a good sign for German enterprises. Additionally, the BJP’s promise to reform the labour laws may be in favour of foreign businesses to hire and fire as needed. Although Modi rejected the influx of foreign investments in retail, it is just a minor concern for German enterprises that are heavily centred on automobiles, services, machines and chemicals.

The German economy is also dependent on exports, especially of cars, consumer goods and machines. These are products usually aimed at a middle class that is wealthy enough to afford them. A Modi-led government will favour the middle class – it is his electoral stronghold after all – and that may give some incentives to Germans entering Indian markets. The BJP manifesto also promises banking reforms probably focused more on investment activities and less on regulation. This could be interesting for German banks that will probably face increasing regulation in the European Union.

However, one should be careful with too much enthusiasm. While it is true that Gujarat is an economic and industrial powerhouse, it is not all Modi’s ‘genius’ and it is not all well in the state. The industrialisation of Gujarat is the product of policies which were set in motion well before 2001. And in terms of the Human Development Index, Gujarat stands 11th and 14th in people below poverty line – which are, at best, mediocre results. Even the glorified GDP per capita growth of Gujarat has decreased.

When in the Prime Minister’s Office, Narendra Modi would face a challenge much larger than he currently does in Gujarat. Besides, he might not be able lead and decide at the Centre like he did in his home State. To expect investor’s paradise under a Modi regime is foolish, also for German enterprises.

The other narrative in Germany is that Modi is the Hindu-nationalist, RSS member and alleged accessory to the 2002 Gujarat communal riots. In Germany, there lingers a fear of a religious-fascist dictatorship in India under ‘Führer Modi’. This narrative, to a large extent, is also a result of the coverage by the mainstream German media; and less part due to a relative ignorance towards India’s political system. The term Hindu-nationalist has a different connotation in Germany and has a much more negative sound to it for German ears. Without much knowledge of the Indian system of government, Germans who follow the Indian elections causally may get the impression that Modi would have much more influence on politics as head of government than he would actually have as a prime minister with a strong opposition party and a phalanx of states ruled by the Congress or other regional parties. The biggest factor of concern evoked by Narendra Modi is probably his membership in the RSS.

Viewed as a fascist organisation not only in India or Germany, it evokes old fears in Germans of uniformed and militaristic hordes terrorising minorities; and media reports strengthen that picture. Modi is of course not a tolerant and liberal man and he is certainly not innocent of enticing anti-Muslim sentiments, especially in connection to the 2002 riots, but he will not let loose the hordes of the RSS to bring terror upon minorities. He already mellowed in his speeches and he has mellowed even more as the candidate for the prime minister of India, when he had to appease the party establishment of the BJP, their allies; of chief ministers in the States and of course of foreign politicians and investors.

The much needed ‘manager of India Inc.’ and the ‘evil Hindu-nationalist’, these are the two personae of Modi in Germany. Both sides of the Modi medal are prevalent, but Germans will deal with a completely different Modi when he assumes office.

Kai Fürstenberg
South Asia Institute, Heidelberg University
Email: Fuerstenberg@uni-heidelberg.de

The post Modi: Perspectives From Europe – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Large-capacity sporting venues have been attractive targets for terrorists keen on carrying out spectacular attacks. How best to overcome the security conundrum that, while hardening targets might reduce vulnerabilities, overt security presence could paradoxically attract attackers?

By Sulastri Osman and Joseph Franco

SINGAPORE’S ASPIRATION to be a key centre for international sporting events reaches new heights with the scheduled opening of the S$1.3 billion Sports Hub in June 2014. Billed as a premier sports, entertainment and lifestyle destination located at the Kallang waterfront, the Sports Hub is a 33-hectare complex comprising venues such as the new 55,000-seat National Stadium, the 13,000-seat Singapore Indoor Stadium, and the 6,000-seat Aquatic Centre.

Major sports meets such as the SEA Swimming Championships and the Rugby World Club 10s are set for kick off, and with community sporting facilities also onsite, the Hub will see activities all year round.

“Inspired” targeting of sporting events

Such a collection of sports venues also attracts the attention of non-sporting groups. The 12th issue of Inspire, a publication of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), carried instructions on how to construct a car bomb that will cause maximum damage in “places flooded with individuals”.

The magazine has gained notoriety for encouraging the use of violence and disseminating the know-hows of planning attacks and assembling improvised explosives – in essence, providing the capability to complement the violent motivations it espouses. Listed specifically as targets for attacks are upcoming sporting events such as the US Open tennis tournament, the FA Cup and Premier League football matches in the United Kingdom, and the League Cup in France.

While it is untenable to make a claim that Inspire articles translate into attacks, dismissing the magazine as irrelevant, however, is also imprudent. It was revealed during the trial of Dzokhar Tsarnaev, the lone surviving suspect of the Boston Marathon bombings that the Tsarnaev brothers had learned to construct their improvised explosive devices from the first issue of Inspire. Their pressure cooker bombs were similar to the device described in the how-to article titled: “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom”.

Terrorism as spectacle

The targeting of sporting events is not new. The attack on the Boston Marathon was preceded by the 1996 Atlanta Olympics bombing and the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre. In South Asia, the Sri Lankan cricket team was attacked near a stadium in Pakistan in 2009, and in 2008 a suicide bomb went off at the starting point of an annual marathon in Sri Lanka. Closer to Singapore, bombs exploded outside a stadium in Aceh during a football game in 2001.

Sporting events are essentially “soft targets”; they are intrinsically hard to secure given the large number of spectators and participants at a venue. For those with ill intentions, such a dense crowd will yield more casualties with relatively simple weapons. Moreover, there is lesser risk of pre-attack detection and greater chances of post-attack evasion amidst a panicking crowd.

That said, operational considerations are often secondary to a more potent reason behind choosing to target sporting events. Such events provide terrorists with a captive audience for their violent spectacle. Terrorism is, after all, an act of political signalling – of affecting social behaviour and government policies through the deliberate targeting of civilians. Attackers may claim that the attacks are an end in themselves to wear down the capabilities of security forces. Such tactical goals though, serve the strategy of projecting an image of strength and undermining confidence in the authorities.

Security paradox: Hardened targets, attractive targets?

The traditional response of governments and security authorities is to “harden” potential targets: installing physical barriers and surveillance equipment, limiting access to sporting sites, and deploying security forces. This was evident in the run-up to the highly tensed 2014 Winter Olympics at Sochi with the Russian authorities repeatedly pledging to boost security, only to be met with repeated threats from Chechen militant groups to disrupt the Games. Six weeks to the opening ceremony, two successive suicide bombings in the Russian city of Volgograd – adjacent to the restive North Caucasus region – demonstrated the resolve and capability of militants to strike close to the Games.

Sochi 2014, fortunately, passed without incident, but also not without a costly “ring of steel” security clampdown. Overt security measures appeared to validate the traditional approach to hardening targets. Yet the Russian case is hardly the best example. For one, ongoing military engagement in neighbouring restive regions where rebel forces were concentrated needed to be sustained.

Following the Russian context, one would still need to deploy thousands of special operations, intelligence and local law enforcement units. Such measures could not be more disruptive and are hardly sustainable for extended periods of time. Constraining the movement of people and a heightened state of anxiety are also inimical to the spirit of the Olympics.

Accordingly, a key lesson is this: as much as terrorism is a form of signalling, so is counterterrorism.

A growing body of research, as exemplified by a study from the University of Sydney, has revealed how in some cases hardening public venues can paradoxically lead to more insecurity. On one hand, defending conspicuous targets can result in potential attackers seeking more accessible and possibly numerous other targets. On the other hand, a hardened target can also prompt attackers to seek deadlier attack methods.

A separate research has shed light on a correlation between increased hardness of targets and the likelihood of suicide bomb attacks. Simply put, signalling that a target is worth defending makes it more attractive to attackers.

Time for strong but subtle security

In aspiring to be a world-class sporting destination, Singapore can balance security with preparedness. Risk mitigation, for instance, can come in the form of physical infrastructure security. Blast-resistant glass and shrapnel-preventing structures are becoming construction staples incorporated early in the design process of new venues and facilities. There is policymaking and industry consensus that embedding security right into the physical infrastructure is less costly than when security is introduced as an afterthought.

Secure buildings and smart security designs reduce the need for overt displays of security presence at sporting events. This in turn reduces the perceived attractiveness of a target to potential attackers.

Sound infrastructure alone cannot offer security. This is why existing programmes like the Security Watch Group (SWG) Scheme, which is a collaborative effort between the police and the commercial sector to tactically harden their premises against potential attacks, must continue to be enhanced.

In addition, robust but lower-profile initiatives such as the Singapore Maritime Crisis Centre encourage information-sharing among relevant stakeholders in the maritime community with various agencies responsible for national security. These provide the foundation for early disruption of terrorist plots. Joint public exercises such as Northstar VIII (2011), Heartbeat (2013), and High Crest (2013) on the other hand help stress-test existing protocols in responding to terrorist incidents.

The opening of the Sports Hub and the ever-increasing attractions of Singapore as a popular sporting venue necessitates the balancing of appropriate measures to prepare for and respond to potential threats. Examples from overseas affirm the quiet effectiveness of strong but subtle security.

Sulastri Osman is Research Fellow, and Joseph Franco, Associate Research Fellow with the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. This commentary is a research collaboration between CENS and the National Maritime Sense-Making Group (NMSG), a component of the Singapore Maritime Crisis Centre (SMCC).

The post Security Of Sports Venues: Protecting Events From Terrorism – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Interview by Peter Tase with the Ambassador of Nicaragua to the United States Francisco Campbell

Peter Tase: How do you see the current bilateral relations between the United States and Nicaragua?

Francisco Campbell: An effort is underway to build for the first time a mature, constructive relationship between the United States and Nicaragua, based on mutual respect. We are mindful that this is not an easy task. The history of interventions, impositions and aggression has shaped perceptions as well as suspicions about intentions on both sides. This is why Nicaragua – U.S. relations are often described as “difficult”; more recently “complicated” has become the definition of choice. Intransigent voices that want to dictate rather than listen have inhibited understanding and the nurturing of empathy for the aspirations, hopes and dreams of the other. This is why we believe that to build a mutually beneficial relationship the smoky lens of ideological prejudice must be removed, so as to squarely focus our attention on issues of fundamental importance to the safety and well-being of our two countries and peoples.

In this context, it is worth recalling that during the Fifth Summit of the Americas held in Trinidad and Tobago in April of 2009, president Obama spoke of his desire for a new era in the relations between the United States and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, adding that this new approach had to be based on mutual respect. That moment was significant in that it highlighted the possibility of re-imagining a mature relationship between Nicaragua and the United States, for it is a vision that coincides with, and is central to, a major foreign policy principle of the Nicaragua government under president Daniel Ortega, namely respect of sovereignty and right to self-determination of all countries regardless of geographic size, wealth, or stage of development. The challenge then is how to translate this shared vision into concrete reality.

For Nicaragua the building of a constructive, mature relationship with the United States has to go beyond words. The bilateral agenda must have content that is both realistic and practical, covering cooperation in areas of fundamental importance to both nations.

PT: What are the three most important items of the bilateral agenda?

FC: My government considers security, trade and investment, and development of renewable energy as the three major pillars.

Security is an issue of vital importance not only to Nicaragua and the United States, but to the Hemisphere as a whole. The greatest threat our Hemisphere currently faces stems from drug trafficking and organized crime. Demand for drugs in the United States is the primary force that drives drug trafficking from South America through Central America and Mexico, fueling levels of violence that undermine institutions, as well as peace and stability in the region. The northern triangle in Central America consisting of El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala is considered to be the most violent region in the world outside of a war zone.

Because this threat is hemispheric, a regional response based on the principle of shared responsibility is necessary. Consuming countries must do more to reduce demand for drugs, become more effective in controlling drug trafficking within their borders, deal more effectively with money laundering and additionally, in the case of the United States, exercise greater control over the sale of firearms that crosses illegally into Mexico.

Producing countries for their part must find ways to reduce production as well as trafficking in their territories. The Central American Countries, primarily transit countries, have the responsibility to intercept and disrupt drug trafficking operations.

Nicaragua has fully assumed its responsibility in this effort and is widely recognized as one of the most effective partners of the United States in the region. Working closely with U.S. antidrug agencies, the Southern Command and our Central American neighbors, Nicaragua has been able to intercept record amounts of drugs, so much so, that intelligence reports indicate that traffickers are modifying routes away from Nicaragua to avoid capture.

While we are rightfully proud of the work and accomplishments of our army and police in dealing with this hemispheric threat, we are also the first to acknowledge our limitations. We do not have the capability to completely seal off our borders from drug traffickers. In spite of our best efforts, some of the drugs will enter into our territory, either by air or by sea, infiltrating highly vulnerable impoverished isolated communities on the Nicaragua Caribbean Coast, in part due to the limited presence of the Nicaragua state.

Here is where there is a convergence between the Nicaragua strategy to deal with the hemispheric threat on the one hand and on the other, the historic threat to peace and stability in our country posed by poverty, which is a direct result of the inequality, exclusion and marginalization inherited from our colonial and neo-colonial past. The Nicaragua comprehensive strategy against drug trafficking has incorporated efforts to eliminate vulnerabilities in these communities through implementation of development programs, jobs creation, as well as to provide health care, education and healthy recreational opportunities for young people.

This holistic approach is key to greater effectiveness in the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime and by eliminating vulnerabilities, we simultaneously address the historic threat to peace and stability posed by poverty.

The number one priority of the Nicaragua Government of National Unity and Reconciliation is precisely the fight against poverty. This is why the government has implemented a comprehensive mix of social programs to alleviate the urgent needs of the majority poor, combined with a sound growth oriented economic policy developed jointly by a tripartite consultative body that includes representatives of the private sector, labor and government. This approach is of strategic importance and is based on a clear understanding that sustainable economic growth requires the participation of all sectors, which is vital to success in the fight against poverty.

This growth oriented policy is bolstered by a sound macroeconomic foundation within a stable environment, with high levels of security in its various manifestations. This is why Nicaragua has become an attractive destination for foreign investments, having registered a yearly average of U.S. one billion dollars over the last three years, including a record 1.5 billion in 2013. The Nicaragua Investment Promotion Agency (Pro-Nicaragua) has played an important role in this effort and was recently recognized as the best agency of its kind in Central America and second in all of Latin America behind its Colombia counterpart.

Diversification of trade and cooperation is also of great importance to the Nicaragua development strategy and to this end, Nicaragua has entered into a seriesof trade and cooperation agreements including the Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA); the Association Agreement between Central America and the European Union; the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico; Free Trade Agreement with Taiwan; and the agreement last year with Chile. Likewise, there are strong bilateral agreements with Canada, Japan, South Korea, Russia and other emerging economies.

The US- Central America Free Trade Agreement known as DR-CAFTA was signed in 2005 during the previous administration and was the first of its kind subscribed by Nicaragua. When the present Nicaragua government took office in 2007, there were those who speculated that interest in DR-CAFTA would diminish or that Nicaragua might withdraw from this Agreement with the United States. However, the opposite has been the case. The Ortega government has sought to creatively administer these various trade agreements, including DR-CAFTA, in ways that are complementary and favorable to Nicaragua producers and exporters.

The most recent DR-CAFTA evaluation found that Nicaragua was the member country that had performed the best during the last five years. This positive assessment was made possible because of decisions by the government to create favorable conditions and to encourage Nicaragua producers and exporters to become more creative and dynamic, taking advantage of opportunities available to them under DR-CAFTA.

The United States continues to be the largest source of foreign direct investments to Nicaragua, and also remains the main market for Nicaragua exports. While the U.S. has increased exports to Nicaragua by about 25%, Nicaragua has nearly doubled its exports to the United States since joining DR-CAFTA. In 2007, Nicaragua exported 1.6 billion dollars to the United States and by 2013 this figure rose to 2.8 billion. Imports from the U.S. were US$890 million in 2007, growing to US$1.1 billion in 2013.

United States investments and bilateral trade with Nicaragua have been major contributors to the robust 4.8% GDP growth in the Nicaragua economy over the past three years. Just as important is the fact that this economic performance was achieved alongside impressive gains in levels of social inclusion. Formal employment based on the number of new affiliates to the Nicaragua Institute of Social Security grew by 8%, representing fifty thousand new workers entering the formal economy. Likewise, Nicaragua has succeeded in meeting most of the Millennium Goals ahead of time: mal nutrition was reduced by 50%; infant mortality by 2/3; maternal mortality declined greatly; foreign direct investment grew and women participation in the social, economic and political arenas was widely recognized. It is worth noting that last year the World Economic Forum reported that Nicaragua was the number one country in the Western Hemisphere with respect to women participation in politics.

PT: What are some of the renewable energy projects?

FC: The third pillar in this constructive engagement agenda with the United States is related to renewable energy. Clean energy development is of interest to our two countries and the rest of the world because of its implications for climate change mitigation. This is an area in which our two countries can work together for mutual benefit.

In 2005 the Nicaragua National Assembly approved the Renewable Energy Generation Law (law 253), but it was not until 2007 that steps were taken to put the law into effect. Major efforts have been made to attract investments to develop renewable energy sources such as hydroelectric power, wind, geothermal, solar and biomass. Much progress has been made in the transformation of the national energy matrix from fossil fuel to renewables. Last year, renewable energy generation climbed to 52% from a base of 19% in 2007, and this past April 13the National Energy Dispatch Center announced that 60.3% of energy generated came from renewables. The projection is to reach 90% in 2017 and by 2025, the renewable energy share is projected to reach 98%.

The capstone project towards these goals is “TUMARIN”, a Brazilian investment of US$1.1 billion in a hydroelectric plant being built in the Southern Caribbean Autonomous Region, that will generate 253 megawatts when it becomes operational in 2017. Beyond hydro power, the Ministry of Energy and Mines has authorized preparation of a feasibility study for a 100 megawatts solar energy project in Chinandega department and the geothermal energy potential of the country is estimated to be 2,000 megawatts. At present, just 10% of this geothermal potential is being exploited, partly with investment from the US. A total of six sites are under contract for further exploration and development.

Nicaragua is interested in more U.S. investment in this sector. Our minister of energy and mines visited Washington, D.C. in April to attend the “2014 Geothermal Showcase”, organized by the Geothermal Energy Association as an “occasion for investors to know the current landscape of opportunities in the geothermal energy world”. During this visit, the Nicaraguan delegation also participated in a geothermal best practices workshop hosted by the State Department and the Geothermal Energy Association.

Full development of the Nicaragua renewable energy potential will have a profound impact on the country. In fact, it is already being felt as our oil bill has begun to decline with the change towards renewables, freeing resources that are now being invested in social programs and infrastructure projects.

Just as significant is the fact that within the next three to five years Nicaragua is likely to become a net exporter of energy, able to sell surplus energy to other Central American countries and beyond, using the soon to be completed Central American Electrical Interconnection System, known as SIEPAC.

The image of Nicaragua as the safest country in Central America, with responsible and efficient management of the economy and increasing availability of low cost energy, are elements that have made the country an attractive tourism destination and a good place to do business.

This is why we are confident that Nicaragua is firmly on the road to development, guided by a shared national vision of what a just and prosperous society should be. But we know that to accomplish our objectives we need and indeed welcome the support of all countries that are willing to work with us, particularly the United States, a country with which we have important bilateral interests.

The post Ambassador Francisco Campbell: US And Nicaragua Have Important Bilateral Interests – Interview appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Shabbir Kazmi: What is your opinion about Pakistan’s economic potential?

Saifuddin N. Zoomkawala: To begin with I will say Pakistan enjoys enormous potential. It is a market comprising of a population of 200 million people belonging to different income groups, some enjoying substantial income and others not being equally blessed. Agriculture is Pakistan’s forte and industrial infrastructure is also reasonably robust. Textiles and clothing contribute nearly 60 percent to the total export of the country. Pakistan is a natural corridor for trade and energy supply. It is the gateway to Central Asia and three of its deep sea ports, two in Karachi and one at Gwadar are capable of handling all sorts of cargo. Pakistan has been offering the transit trade facility to Afghanistan for nearly six and a half decades.

Over the years, a mid-country refinery has been established near Multan and two pipelines have been constructed to handle black and white oil products. The TAPI gas pipeline will also pass through Pakistan and allow the country to draw agreed quantity of gas that on one hand will increase overall availability of gas in the country and on the other hand enable Pakistan to earn millions of dollars as transit fee.

Overseas investors have shown keen interest in establishing crude oil refineries in Pakistan, mainly for exporting POL products to the neighboring countries. Lately, Chinese investors have shown keen interest in acquiring textiles and clothing units operating in the country. Enhanced gas availability will meet the full demand of fertilizer plants and make the country self-sufficient in urea production and also help in earning extra dollars by exporting 1.2 million ton exportable surplus. There also exist facilities to produce and export substantial quantity of ethanol.

SK: How do you review the performance of incumbent government headed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif?

SZ: Last year an elected government completed its full term and the incumbent government headed by PML-N Chief, Nawaz Sharif came into power. During the term of the previous government, the entire world experienced financial crisis and Pakistan was not an exception. Due to economic recession, especially in the United State and the European Union, being major buyers of ‘Made in Pakistan’ products, country’s exports remained subdued. Situation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) remained highly volatile and crude oil price touched a record high level of US$147 per barrel.

Since Pakistan’s energy mix is highly skewed toward fossil oil, the country also witnessed accumulation of huge inter-corporate debt because economic managers were reluctant in passing on the full increase in the cost of electricity generation to consumers.

Accumulated payables of the energy sector touched nearly half a trillion rupees or US$5 billion. With power plants running on lower capacity utilization electricity outages (planned load shedding) not only economic activities in the country were subdued, but Pakistani exporters were also not able to compete in the global markets.

Granting GSP Plus status to Pakistan by the European Union is likely to have a positive impact on the country and people are thankful to the Union for this goodwill gesture. The Prime Minister’s economic team soon after coming into power introduced policies aimed at accelerating GDP growth rate and also to overcome those structural weaknesses that had developed due to ‘War on Terror’ being fought in Afghanistan. This war had not only serious impact on Pakistan’s economy, but also upset the social fabric of the society.

SK: Will the efforts of incumbent government for accelerating GDP growth rate yield the desired results?

SZ: As I stated earlier, the biggest challenge for the incumbent government remains overcoming ‘looming energy crisis and resolving the circular debt issue’. Soon coming into power the government released over half a trillion rupees to clean up the circular debt. The inter-corporate debt had reduced electricity generation to around 15,000MW as against an installed capacity of over 28,000MW in the country. Out of this bulk of electricity generation is being contributed by independent power plants (IPPs) operating in the private sector. The Government of Pakistan (GoP) has guaranteed minimum purchase of electricity and also fuel supply. Therefore, honoring the commitment was of prime importance to pass on the message of comfort to the existing as well as the prospective investors.

Over the last few years follow of foreign direct investment (FDI) remained low in the aftermath of global financial crisis as well as because of geopolitical conditions prevailing in the region. Lately, Chin has shown keen interest in the construction of nuclear power plants in Pakistan as well exploitation of Thar coal. The work is going on at a fast pace and once the country is able to overcome energy issue, fresh investment will flow to Pakistan. It is necessary to mention that Nawaz government is trying to create a conducive working environment. The business community has reposed its confidence in the policies.

SK: What key initiatives have been taken by the present government?

SZ: In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis Pakistan faced a precarious balance of payment situation. Entry into a standby arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has provided some breathing space. When Nawaz Sharif became Prime Minister of Pakistan for the third time, country’s foreign exchange reserves were depleting fast due to high oil and fertilizer import bill. Therefore, it was considered prudent to once again approach the lender of last resort and Pakistan’s request was honored. Disbursement of funds by the IMF helped in containing further erosion of paltry reserves and depreciation of Pak rupee value against the leading currencies.

The recent extension of US$1.5 billion loan by the Saudi Arabia has also helped in building foreign exchange reserves to a level required by the IMF. Finance Minister, Senator Ishaq has fulfilled his promise to bring down the exchange rate to Rs96 to a dollar. The changed scenario has reversed rupee depreciation and it is expected that in the days to come POL prices as well as electricity tariff will be brought down. These measures will facilitate in bringing down inflation rate in the country and making local exporters competitive in the global markets. It is expected that once Pakistan succeeds in overcoming the energy crisis and ensuring uninterrupted supply of electricity and gas at affordable cost, investors will be able to focus more on productive activities and make new investment. Containing budget deficit and resolving overcoming current account problem will help in further reduction in interest rates.

SK: What are the key threats and opportunities for insurance sector in Pakistan?

SZ: Over the years insurance penetration has remained low, but changing weather conditions resulting in torrential rains and deluge cause huge economic losses every year. This risk has been partly covered through credit insurance of more than Rs350 billion (US$3.5 billion) extended to farmers annually. With increased participation of the private sector and extension of credit by financial institutions to other segments of the economy all sorts of risks likely to be faced by the country will have to be mitigated. It is encouraging that with the growth of Islamic banking in Pakistan Takaful business, Shariah compliant risk mitigation is also growing in the country, but conventional insurance companies continue to enjoy the lion’s share in total premium collected in the country.

SK: What role do the insurance companies play in boosting GDP growth rate in Pakistan?

SZ: In Pakistan insurance companies play two key roles: 1) risk mitigation and 2) capital formation. Every year insurance companies mobilize billions of rupees premiums. EFU group comprising of three companies, EFU General, EFU Life Assurance and EFU Allianz collectively enjoy the largest share in total premium collected in the country. Insurance companies also invest a substantial portion of premiums collected in the shares of listed companies. Thus, on one hand, provides liquidity to the market and on the other hand helps in price discovery. At present the benchmark of Pakistan’s stock market KSE-100 index is inching towards 30,000 levels. As the government intends to divest shares of state owned enterprises, size of free float will further increase. It is believed that KSE-100 index may breach 30,000 level over the next few months if the right impetus are offered.

SK: Tell us more about the history of the EFU spread over more than 85 years.

SZ: The EFU Insurance Company was established in 1932 by some Muslims in India that included Abdul Rehman Siddiqui, a politician from Bengal and the late Agha Khan, the present Agha Khan’s Grandfather and the Nawab of Bhopal. These men along with others created an insurance company because at that time there was no such entity owned by the Muslims in this part of the world. The sponsors felt they had to reach out to the Muslims in India to help them get jobs as well. After partition when the Muslims got their own country, it was natural for EFU to shift its head office to Pakistan. In 1989 EFU General generated premium of about Rs340 million that reached Rs14 billion for the year 2013. It announced to pay a percent dividend for the year ended 31st December 2013. EFU Life Assurance also collected Rs14 billion gross premiums and paid 65 percent dividend.

SK: Tell us more about the EFU saga.

SZ: EFU’s history is spread over 85 years and the Saga explains the dedication of late Roshan Ali Bhimjee and his associates. After the death of Bhimjee two of his sons Rafique and Muneer have continued the legacy. Honorable Roshan Ali, the biggest insurer of Pakistan, is not only my mentor, but many of the key personalities of insurance industry in Pakistan have been groomed by him. He was a man of vision and a very patriotic Pakistani. EFU had its head office in Mumbai but it was moved to Karachi immediately after Pakistan got independence.

The history of EFU can be divided into two distinct eras: 1) from commencement of life insurance business to the nationalization of life insurance by the GoP in the seventies and 2) formation of EFU Life Assurance, once the government allowed the private sector to also establish life insurance companies. At present EFU Life Assurance could be termed the largest life insurance company operating in the private sector. EFU Allianz is also the only specialized health insurance company operating in Pakistan. These years can be termed most eventful because of persistent and quantum growth in premium collected and also huge investment made in the shares of companies listed at the local stock exchanges that is also evident from enormous growth in balance sheet size of the three companies.

SK: Please unfold the story from birth of EFU to nationalization of life insurance business in Pakistan.

SZ: EFU’s long history needs to be read by every budding entrepreneur and business executive. It has been compiled by Wolfram W. Karnowski and its title is ‘The EFU Saga’. Karnowski remained on the EFU Board of Directors for a long time. This book spread over about five hundred pages explains the making of an institution within the context of the creation of Pakistan. After making a humble beginning in undivided India, EFU became the largest insurance company of AfroAsia, excluding Japan. As I stated earlier, it was the vision, dedication and hard work of Bhimjee, his associates and of course the employees of EFU companies that have created the history, which may not be easy to replicate. Bhimjee was not disappointed at the nationalization of his business and often used to say “The government can nationalize our business, but it can’t nationalize my entrepreneurship and brains of my associates”. He proved this true once again when the GoP allowed the private sector to establish life insurance companies.

SK: How would you describe the journey from nationalization to becoming the largest risk insurer in Pakistan?

SZ: After nationalization of insurance business in Pakistan Bhimjee established insurance business in the UK, Saudi Arabia and UAE. He managed the business prudently and successfully in highly competitive markets, but ultimately came back to Pakistan, his homeland when the conditions changed. Being the largest believer in Bhimjee legacy, I with the help of the EFU Board of Directors and employees, whom I prefer to call ‘EFU Family’, have taken the beacon of light forward. I joined EFU General after graduating from Institute of Business Administration (IBA), one of Pakistan’s most prestigious business schools. Bhimjee reposed confidence in me and my more than four decades association with EFU has taught one lesson. “We don’t sell insurance cover, but claims”. The prompt payment of claims, whenever these are submitted, help our clients continue their business as usual.

SK: What is the outlook for insurance companies in Pakistan?

SZ: Keeping in view low insurance penetration in the country, I am confident the sector enjoys an enormous growth potential. While it may be true that players will have to redefine their business model, but they also need support of the government. With the changing business environment and emerging risks the country needs stringent regulatory framework. However, the objective cannot be achieved without the creation of supporting environment. The GoP has recently announced Roadmap for Insurance industry and players are getting ready to meet the confidence reposed in them.

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On May 16, head of Russia’s Federal Drug Control Service Viktor Ivanov, issued a statement to the effect that participants in the Maidan riot were under the influence of drugs, which resulted in ‘an absolutely abnormal psychoactive condition’. Viktor Ivanov reported that both the Russian service and their Ukrainian colleagues are aware that many Maidan participants had been ripped off. He added, though, that there is no information about whether the drugs had originated in the US.

The Internet and some media had already reported that sackfuls of US army combat psychostimulants had been delivered to Kiev’s Maidan during the revolutionary events at the end of 2013 and early 2014.

Early in March, one of the Russian activists who took part in the Maidan events told journalists that ‘people were very spiteful and steamed up there’.

More recently, Slaviansk rebels said, during combat operations in the Donetsk Region, that their enemies were evidently given some drugs. Self-defense fighters said that Ukrainian soldiers were overstimulated. Defenders of Slavyansk noticed from their check-points several times that Ukrainian soldiers were alternately seized with onsets of inexplicable aggression and unrestrained hilarity.

Earlier, Ukrainian bloggers also warned against eating or drinking anything in Maidan, as it was unsafe. Thus, early in February a Kharkov Internet resource posted a story about a young couple who went to Kiev to take part in the revolutionary events and to make some money at the same time. They spent about a week there and brought home a little over 10,000 hryvnas (under 30,000 roubles) between the two of them. When they called their friends from Kiev they enthusiastically described the extraordinary atmosphere, wonderful people and general euphoria in the air. Later, the girl had a headache, nausea and rheumatic pain, she also had high blood pressure. Her boy-friend later also felt ill. When they went to hospital the doctor told them that they were suffering from symptoms typical of withdrawal after taking certain synthetic drugs.

Similar information was posted by Ukrainians in other social networks.

As early as March 17, the Anti-Maidan portal stated figures that were overlooked by Ukrainian media. The article pointed out that it was clear why people sought medical attention on February 20 (the day certain events took place that are still being investigated by the Ukrainian authorities but with very little success) but what can be said about the other cases?

Maidan participants’ ailments in a times of peace are quite incomprehensible. If we put aside cases of common cold and flu that the Health Ministry registers separately, these are the figures for the period starting on February 20 with reference to the Health Ministry.

February 20

132 people sought medical assistance from ambulance teams. 82 were taken to hospital, the others were provided with on-site medical assistance. During each the following 24 hour periods;

February 21

26 people sought assistance from ambulance teams, 21 hospitalized.

February 22

42 people sought assistance from ambulance teams, 33 hospitalized.

February 23

31 people sought assistance from ambulance teams, 24 hospitalized.

February 24

49 people sought assistance from ambulance teams, all hospitalized.

This list continued daily.

The author of the article on the Anti-Maidan portal reminds readers that doctors who worked in Maidan during February’s events posted an online appeal on 24 February asking ‘revolutionary leaders’ to urgently help Maidan participants who were falling into psychotic states and losing their memory. The doctors warned that otherwise they may lose their patients.

It has been established, that soon after that, on February 27, the Ukrainian Health Ministry held an emergency conference with experts in psychiatry and narcology. However, the article goes on to say, the current Ukrainian government is terribly reluctant to admit that Ukraine received its freedom from the ‘bandit regime’ aided by dope peddlars.

The post Intoxicated Riot: Even Ukrainian Side Admits Use Of Drugs In Kiev Maidan – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(CORDIS) — Biomass covers around half of our total renewable energy consumption and is expected to also contribute to half of the EU 2020 renewable energy target. As the political discussion on energy security is ‘heats up’, biomass is being considered a primary fuel for replacing natural gas and district heating. But how sustainable is it? Scientific experts, policymakers and NGO and industry representatives addressed this question at the recent European Biomass Association (AEBIOM) conference in Brussels.

The difference between biomass and fossil fuels is one of time scale. According to the Biomass Energy Centre, if it is managed on a sustainable basis, biomass is harvested as part of a constantly replenished crop. This maintains a closed carbon cycle with no net increase in atmospheric CO2 levels.

However, the closed carbon cycle vision for biomass may not always achieved. Additionally, the question of sustainability goes beyond CO2 emissions alone – it includes other concerns such as biodiversity and food security.

At the AEBIOM conference, European Commission representatives reiterated the Commission’s conclusion that it is not necessary introduce binding sustainability criteria for solid and gas biomass in order to achieve the 2020 targets.

Giulio Volpi, of DG Energy, noted, ‘The risks of unintended environmental impacts [from biomass] can be addressed and minimised through existing or new EU measures in other fields, not specifically the energy field …There is a lot of potential with biomass that needs to be exploited and we need to make sure that the policy framework is supportive of biomass.’

However sustainability remains a distinct challenge for the sector. Peter Wilson of the Sustainable Biomass Partnership (SBP), an industry initiative, pointed to the insufficient uptake of existing sustainability schemes (FSC and PEFC) in key forest source areas. He presented the SBP’s upcoming Biomass Assurance Framework as a ‘bridging solution’ offering a set of standards and processes which will allow sector companies to demonstrate compliance with legal, regulatory and sustainability requirements using existing mechanisms.

Uwe Fritsche, of the International Institute for Sustainability Analysis and Strategy (IINAS), offered the scientific perspective, listing the range of issues will face us as we attempt to transform into a bioeconomy with biomass as an important component. These include: greenhouse gas emissions from land use change and carbon stock change; biodiversity problems in terms of converting grasslands, wet lands and peat lands; food security and the land tenure issues and acidification.

Mr Fritsche also pointed to the ‘fuel issue’. He noted, ‘The more we trade bioenergy and the more we valorise forest products there is also a risk that we might misplace some of the fuel that is needed for the livelihood for a lot of people on this earth’.

IINAS is currently working with the EU’s Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Environment Agency (EEA) and others to consider the latest science behind these issues. Mr Fritsche noted that talks are ongoing on potentially developing a matrix which identifies risks of greenhouse gas implications of using forest products.

The IINAS is also involved in one of the many EU-funded projects exploring the potential and sustainability of biomass. S2BIOM aims to improve the sustainability of the biomass delivery chain. Launched in September 2013, the S2BIOM team is working to design and evaluate optimal biomass delivery chains and strategies to support the sustainable delivery biomass feedstock at local, regional and pan European level.

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Ciudad del Este, Paraguay’s largest and wealthiest city is living its worst moments since its founding in 1957. The city is also the capital of Alto Parana which is one of the three wealthiest departments of Paraguay.

Ciudad del Este is considered to be the first city in the nation for the amount of taxes that are collected every year from its residents but unfortunately as the amount of money collected by Mayor Sandra McLeod de Zacarías grows every year, with that amount are also growing the acts of corruption, lack of transparency and an overwhelming tendency of abuse with the public money and public office.

Additionally, the Municipality of McLeod has had recently some critical problems with its former employees for not respecting the national labor laws, and is found to be in animosity with the local Association of Taxi Cab Drivers as well as with the public in general, due to her abuse of power, traffic of influence and poor administration of public works and infrastructure in the whole city.

For more than thirteen years, local government of Ciudad del Este has been monopolized by the dynasty of Zacarias Irun family, causing an increase of poverty levels while the amounts of taxes that are collected goes up every year; spending money on infrastructure while the public works and the road system is deteriorating every day and is currently found to be at its worst conditions ever, even though high taxes are paid by grain producers who operate in this region and export throughout the world over 100 thousand tons of grain every month. Historically Zacarias Irun and his wife have proved to be arrogant and corrupt civil servants who have abused power every day they spent in public office.

On May 13, 2014, at least eight hundred taxi drivers participated in a peaceful protest in front of the court house of Ciudad del Este to show support to five taxi drivers who were accused by Sandra McLeod’s Municipality with charges of civil disobedience and for violating public order on April 24th. The suspected individuals were the leaders of the Federation of Taxi Drivers of Ciudad del Este (FETACE) and the United Taxi Drivers of the East (TAUDE), their names are: Herminio Corvalán, Enrique Rolón, Roberto Fletes and Valerio Martinez.

According to Elias Fox, the attorney of the above mentioned suspects. The accused are prohibited to approach the municipality on a two hundred meters radius or less. On the other hand Mayor Mcleod and her wealthy family are allowed by the Paraguayan court system to circulate freely even though large sums of money have been abused under both her and Zacarías Irun (her husband) administrations.

According to Mr. Rolando Segovia Paez, a distinguished Colorado Party leader in Alto Parana, “the Mayor of Ciudad del Este and her husband, a corrupt politician, initiated an evil persecution against the taxi drivers of Ciudad del Este, who struggle to earn their daily living by doing an honest and decent work and driving on roads that are perhaps the worst inner city streets in Latin America.”

Mr. Segovia adds that “there are a large number of young intellectuals in Alto Parana who are capable to contribute for a better life in Ciudad del Este and should say No to Sandra McLeod’s candidacy, instead they should support the other candidate of Colorado Party which will be determined in the next weeks, for the municipal elections of late 2015.”

In addition to the aforementioned frustrated taxi drivers, Mayor McLeod is running into a very costly settlement with 23 public service workers and another group of 300 public employees who were fired from their job without any justifiable cause in 2001, during the administration of Javier Zacarias Irun. This compensation reaches over 300 thousand US Dollars and should have been allocated in the Municipality’s budget of 2012 and that amount goes up every year due to the accrued interest.

Unfortunately McLeod’s municipality has not proceeded with the payments yet. The 323 public servants are waiting for more than 13 years such a compensation to be awarded by Sandra McLeod as the regional court judge has taken a decision in favor of the 323 former employees in Zacaria Irun’s administration. According to Mr. Hernan Romero “it seems that the judges have taken a staunch decision in favor of the 23 employees, but on the other hand the Zacarias Irun dynasty considers themselves to be above the law and have ignored the Paraguayan justice system for over 13 years by not paying the right amount of compensation to these former employees who have won the court case against such a corrupt political clan in Alto Parana.”

Sources and References

http://www.vanguardia.com.py/v1/index.php/edicion-impresa/policiales/item/16964-taxistas-se-manifiestan-frente-al-tribunal-penal#sthash.B51dQZvZ.dpuf

http://www.vanguardia.com.py/v1/index.php/edicion-impresa/politica/item/16977-comuna-esteña-debe-pagar-g-2860-millones-a-funcionarios-despedidos#sthash.TPNBW7Hv.dpuf

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By Jamal Kanj

Outgoing Israeli president Shimon Peres talked in a recent interview about a peace agreement he reached with Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas in 2011.

According to Peres, the Israeli prime minister rejected the draft understanding telling him “to wait a few days Tony Blair could get a better offer.” The President continued, “The days passed and there was no better offer,” and there was no peace agreement.

Peres interview reveals three important issues regarding the peace process and the botched role of the so called peace mediators.

The first, Benjamin Netanyahu is more interested in maintaining his anti-peace government coalition than a peace accord.

Second, the peace mediators are undermining the prospects of peace.

Third, Palestinian leaders need to go back to the drawing board and take a crash course in the art of negotiation 101.

On the first point, Israel must be pleased with the status quo, building illegal colonies with impunity under the guise of peace negotiations with no urgent need to reach a peace agreement. Not that Israel doesn’t want it, but not until it realises its demographic programme.

This is not an opinion. It is well established fact that the parties forming the current Israeli government are ideologically opposed to the peace process and to halting the expansions of the “Jewish only” colonies on occupied land.

According to the official Israel’s central bureau of statistics report for 2013, the Netanyahu government increased by 123.7 per cent number of building permits for “Jewish only” housing in the West Bank. The largest majority were during the “peace negotiation” in the last six months of the year.

This is consistent with the bonafide position of the various Israeli governments which saw the number of illegal Jewish settlers grow three-fold since the start of the deeply flawed Oslo process over 20 years ago.

Responding to ICB report, Israeli Peace Now organisation concluded that Netanyahu’s government is “committed to only one thing: building settlements,” not peace.

A fact that wasn’t absent from the mind of American officials who – politically and financially – empowered Israel’s violations of the peace process. Interviewed by former Israeli soldier-turned American journalist Jeffrey Goldberg, president Barack Obama lamented, “We have seen more aggressive settlement construction over the last couple years than we’ve seen in a very long time.”

The second revealing point is when an Israeli premier counts on the mediator of the Mideast peace quartet, Tony Blair, to bring him a “better offer” than his own Zionist president. Netanyahu must have known this since his former adviser and ex-Israeli army officer Lianne Pollak was Blair’s consultant.

Another mediator, US secretary of state, keeps reminding us of his “commitment to Israel,” with his lead team negotiator Martin Indyk, a former policy director from the strongest US foreign lobby, America Israel public affairs committee.

Last point, one can’t comprehend the Palestinian leaders’ wisdom in negotiating agreements that couldn’t be carried out. They did it in the 2001 Taba agreement with outgoing Israeli premier Ehud Barak. It was rejected by Ariel Sharon when he came to office.

Abbas negotiated an understanding at the end of Ehud Olmert’s reign which was trashed by succeeding Israeli prime minister Netanyahu.

And now, Abbas was hoodwinked “again” by the “king of deception,” the ceremonial Israeli president. Side negotiations are Machiavellian Israeli tactics. For each time and with every meaningless agreement, “deceptive” unofficial Israeli negotiators chip on a piece of the Palestinian pie, with nothing reciprocated from the “official” Israeli government.

Before the pie disappears, the upcoming Palestinian unity government should be tasked not just with elections, but in parallel it must join “real” UN organisations taking the process away from phony peace mediators.

It would be impossible to reach a just agreement when “peace” intermediaries are “ideologically committed” to one side and when an Israeli premier expects better results from them than his own president.

- Jamal Kanj (www.jamalkanj.com) writes weekly newspaper column and publishes on several websites on Arab world issues. He is the author of “Children of Catastrophe,” Journey from a Palestinian Refugee Camp to America. He contributed this article to PalestineChronicle.com. (A version of this article was first published by the Gulf Daily News newspaper.)

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By Gary K. Busch

The kidnapping of hundreds of schoolgirls by Boko Haram has outraged the world; particularly after their captors promised to sell the girls as slaves. They are portrayed as Muslim fundamentalists seeking to impose a harsh Sharia Law over the whole of Nigeria. They have murdered over a thousand Nigerians in the past few years and are acting with utter impunity against the pathetic forces arrayed against them by the Nigerian State.

The last sentence highlights the reality of the problem – it is not the rise of Boko Haram which is the problem but the willing inability of the State to confront them and the concomitant complicity of several major political forces in the country in the formation and sustenance of Boko Haram for their own domestic political aims. The complicity of ‘legitimate’ Nigerian political forces in the activities of Boko Haram is a guide as to why the president, Goodluck Johnathan, is afraid to move against Boko Haram in anything more than a token resistance.

Boko Haram emerged around 2002 in Maiduguri led by Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf. In 2004 it moved to Kanamma, Yobe State, where it set up a base called ‘Afghanistan’, and used to attack nearby police outposts, killing mainly police officers. It t started as a cell of the Muslim sect called ‘Jama’atul Ahlus Sunna Lid Da’awatis Jihad’ but advertised itself as ‘Boko Haram’ from the Hausa word ‘boko’ meaning “animist, western or otherwise non-Islamic education” and the Arabic word ‘haram’ figuratively meaning “sin” (literally, “forbidden“).

From its earliest days it received support from the Northern Nigerian Muslim political elites. The elites’ power was waning and the Nigerian army, which had always been the backbone for Northern political influence, had been changing into an army dominated by the Middle Belt officers (mainly Tiv). The Northern Fulani military caste was ageing, retiring and withdrawing from military activities. The army was becoming less Muslim and more Christian or Animist, particularly the junior officers. The traditional Northern (mainly Fulani-Hausa and Kanuri) elites were Muslims and represented mainly herders, operating under a system of feudal Emirs or Sardaunas.

A substantial part of the Nigerian North is not Muslim. In areas like Plateau State Christians are in the majority. Christians in the North are primarily agriculturalists while Muslims are herders. For centuries there has been a war between herders and farmers. This is a traditional conflict across Africa as each group seeks to use the rapidly disappearing arable land south of the Sahara. Moreover the Northern Muslim herders have been beset by cattle-raiders from their own side. In the last few years there have been incessant deadly attacks on Fulani (Muslim) settlements and villages in northern Nigeria by armed bandits – largely made up of disgruntled Fulani who themselves have lost cattle. Gangs of heavily armed bandits prowl the vast Dajin Rugu forest which spans several hundred square kilometres across Zamfara, Katsina and Kaduna states and Niger State. This is not only a Nigerian problem. In February 2012 alone over 23,000 Fulani herders poured into Cameroon from Nigeria’s north-eastern state of Taraba, following deadly clashes with farming communities. Many of the armed bandits are Fulanis who have joined gangs involved in cross-border armed robbery and cattle-rustling in Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Senegal and Mali.

Thousands of herders in northern Nigeria’s Kaduna State have fled their homes in 2013 and 2014 following raids by cattle rustlers that killed at least dozens of people. This ugly trend is compounding the dilemma of the Fulani herders who are caught in a vicious cycle of conflict with farmers over-grazing the farmed land of the Christians. It is a situation ripe for manipulation.

There is also a long historical trail to these conflicts. These ethnic conflict groups extend far beyond Nigeria’s borders. The Fulani (Peul) are the remnants of the old Fulani Empire which dominated much of West Africa, and can be found in Guinea, Nigeria, Cameroon, Senegal, Mali, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, Benin, Niger, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Chad, Mauritania, Sudan, Egypt, Ghana, Togo and Cote d’Ivoire. They are a minority tribe in all but Guinea. The Kanuri (of Bornu State) are the descendants of the Bornu Empire (1380-1893) which was a continuation of the great Kanem Empire founded centuries earlier by the Sayfawa Dynasty. In time it would become even larger than Kanem, incorporating areas that are today parts of Chad, Niger and Cameroon. These two Muslim ethnic groups make up the large majority of the members of Boko Haram.

The sense of diminishing power and the concomitant rise to power of the South-South (a term used to refer to the Nigerian states of the South east where the oil is found and has been dominated in the new politics of the region by the Ijaws) was threatening to the Northern elites. The Muslims had been fighting running battles in Plateau State and elsewhere in the North with the largely Christian pastoralists, and they felt their interests would only be maintained in Nigeria through the formula of ‘zoning’, in which state power is divided among the various ethnicities and regions; theoretically sustaining balance.

This was incorporated in the rules which governed the dominant political party PDP, the Peoples Democratic Party. The PDP agreed to ‘rotate’ the presidency, vice-presidency and other key jobs between the North and the South on a regular basis to ensure “fairness” of representation. The fact that Nigeria is composed of more than just North and South was not reflected in the zoning rules. There are many Northern Christians but they don’t count as Northerners in zoning. There are massive competitions for primacy among the large Yoruba and Igbo ethnic groups on a national scale and the oil industry in the Delta is a hotbed of competition among the Efiks, Ibibio, Igbo and Ijaws of the Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa states; those who were getting very rich on the production of oil.

The Northern elites decided that they would have to insist that there be no third term for Obasanjo, the erstwhile president. They decided that they would put a Northerner (Yar’Adua) in power as the president and head of the PDP party. Goodluck Jonathan was installed as vice-president to ‘balance’ the ticket with a Southerner. But Yar’Adua was very ill and went off to a clinic in Saudi Arabia where he died, leaving Jonathan as President. The North felt that it did not get its full entitlement of power with the death of Yar’Adua. They demanded that a Northerner succeed Goodluck, but Goodluck decided to run again for President. The North took no chances and, while building up a powerful political force inside the PDP and the governorships, they also decided that they would send many Fulani and Kanuri children from the Northern madrassas to Libya and the Middle East for training. Under the pretext of sponsoring youngsters to study in the Middle East, they sent them to terrorist training camps.

Although Boko Haram officially started in 2002 there had been several terrorist activities which preceded it. These young ‘jihadists’ proved their worth to their sponsors and the best of them got overseas scholarships to terrorist schools. In the early months of May 1986, thirty-six Jihadist hardliners went on a rampage, attacking Christian students of the University of Sokoto. According to a participant in that raid in that same week, the Federal Government of Nigeria under the leadership of General Babangida mobilised the jihadists and provided them with some military vans and army uniforms which they used to start killing innocent and defenceless Christians all over the Northern states. The following year, March 5 1987 to be precise, General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida secretly armed the jihadists through one of his close aides by the name of Captain Hassan Abubakar. They attacked Christians and foreigners across Kano and Borno. Their ‘success’ led to them being chosen for training outside Nigeria.

The jihadists claim to have been trained in eight different countries namely Sudan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, Egypt and the Niger Republic. They travelled as a group and received basic and advanced training. As proof of the success of their training they sport a mark (tattoo) showing proficiency. The mark is in the form of a sword held in a hand. Those who went through the training regard it as the ‘license to kill for Allah’. They included Ali Baba Nur, Asari Dokubo, Jasper Akinbo, Mohammed Yusuf, Salisu Maigari, Danlami Abubakar, Cletus Okar, Ali Qaqa, Maigari Haliru and Asabe Dantala.

The raids on Christians increased. The militancy exhibited by the leaders brought out a lot of support from Northern youth. This was not entirely because they had become hard-line jihadists but mainly because the substantial financial support from the Northern Emirs, General Babangida, the Northern governors and the Northern PDP political and business elite made jihadism a career choice. As the Christians fought back, it became easier to recruit jihadists.

One of the key demands of Boko Haram is the creation of a Muslim state in Nigeria which would be governed by the Sharia Law. The question of the legal co-existence of a Sharia law system in parallel with Nigerian civil law was raised in 1999 when the civil government of the former General Obasanjo had begun under a new constitution. Islamic law was allowed to exist under the British but elected Nigerian governments after independence did not recognise Islamic law as equal to civil law or binding on citizens unless they wanted to be so bound.

Despite many misgivings, in 2000, several states were given the option to use Sharia law. Since 1999 Sharia has been instituted as a main body of civil and criminal law in the Muslim-majority and in some parts of three Muslim-plurality states for Muslim citizens. In 2002, in defiance of the authorities in Oyo State, the Supreme Council of Sharia carried out a ceremony in Ibadan’s central mosque to inaugurate a panel to rule on civil matters in the region; to be empowered to decide on matters such as marriage, divorce and land disputes. The extension of Sharia law to a southern Christian state (actually the West) was a bold move by the Muslims. It was strongly rejected by Christians. What they objected to mostly was the cruel punishments of stoning to death and cutting of hands of the convicted as part of Sharia.

The Muslims of the North, despite their religious preference for Sharia were also appalled by the primitive punishments being applied. They were attracted to Sharia for different reasons. The Nigerian civil administration has always been riddled with corruption and injustice. Justice is a commodity not a birth right. They viewed the Sharia law as practised by their neighbours and religious co-believers as more likely to be fair and timely than a disinterested civil administration which was not inherently fair or just. The predilection for Sharia law was a powerful boost to the jihadists.

The militancy of Boko Haram was muted under the short presidency of Yar’Adua, a scion of one of the most powerful Northern families. He kept Northern political hegemony in power and most of his close associates were from the Northern elites. They kept Boko Haram in check. However, Yar’Adua was far more ill than anyone knew and died during his first term after a protracted stay in a Saudi hospital. His Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan became the accidental president; much as he had become the accidental Governor of Bayelsa when his mentor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, the Governor was forced from office in 2005.
In 2007 Jonathan was vice-president and in 2010, at the death of Yar’Adua, he became president. In the meteoric rise to the top he had very little chance to pick up the skills and abilities needed for the job, especially in dealing with political sophisticates like Babangida, Obasanjo, Aliyu Gusau and David Mark; all of whom had years of plotting, coup-making and intrigue behind them. Those who could have helped him, like General T.Y. Danjuma, were ignored and isolated. Jonathan has bungled his way in the presidency ever since. His cardinal sin, in the eyes of the North, was to run for president on his own instead of allowing a Northerner in to finish the ‘Northern turn’ cut short by the death of Yar’Adua. On 18 May 2010, the National Assembly approved Jonathan’s nomination of former Kaduna State governor Namadi Sambo, an architect, for the position of vice- president.

With Jonathan’s election as president in his own right Northerners turned up the heat on the government by activating Boko Haram. There have been bombs, church-burnings, communal violence and a campaign to cause havoc in the country. The stated vow of Boko Haram has been to make Nigeria ungovernable. This is an amusing thought as there are very few Nigerians who have ever operated under the delusion that Nigeria has ever been governable. In 1965 there was widespread violence in the West as the Action Party turned on itself and killed large numbers of Yoruba. The Biafran War followed with the Igbo being driven from the North and calamitous battles fought between the two forces which left the East in famine and disease. Years of military rule followed, where kleptocracy and corruption thrived, even during a brief interlude of civilian rule. The roads have deteriorated and become largely impassable. There is no good drinking water in rural areas and in most cities. Boreholes which were paid for have never been drilled. Rural electricity has suffered from widespread theft of copper wire; blackouts of electricity are frequent and generators the rule. The creeks are polluted with oil spills. The rail system has largely disappeared, universities are frequently in a state of strike; hospitals are without medicines and refineries barely function. What is it that Boko Haram can do to make Nigeria ungovernable?

What Boko Haram has found, much to the displeasure of the self-appointed Northern elites, is that there are a very large number of Christians in the North. Other than in three states there is a large Christian presence; a presence which is being activated by the open support of the Northern elites; a Christian presence which is gathering its forces together to repel the excesses of Boko Haram and Sharia. The Igbo are sending buses to the north to bring back Igbo and Muslims of the South are starting a trek northwards, but these are trivial movements. There is nothing in the Northern economy which even hints at an ability to survive without the South and its oil revenues. The North needs the South but the South doesn’t need the North.

The whole edifice of what passes for governance in Nigeria is grounded upon the production of oil and the theft of its revenues. There is very little productive industry or agriculture in the North which will sustain its populace in food and jobs without a regular and hefty payment of money to the Northern states by the Federal Government from revenues derived from the oil industry.

The fundamental issue of this revenue sharing is the implementation of the ‘derivation principle’. After the ravages of the Biafran War the country was reunited. The vast oil wealth of the Delta was distributed by the Federal Government using a formula which divided the national revenue derived from the oil industry equally among the states. Each state in the Federation receives a notionally equal share of the oil revenue (since 1995 set at 13% for each state) from the Federal Government. So, in theory, each state of the North gets 13% of the revenue even though the oil is actually produced in the states of the South-South who see the oil as ‘theirs’.

Unfortunately their territory is effectively the same area as the defeated Biafran State so they had little choice. Under military governments the derivation formula was set at 10%. It is crucial to the Northern states that they receive the money from the derivation principle and the presidency of a South-South politician is a risk which seems threatening to them; hence the reliance on zoning.

The South-South states have their own ‘terrorist’ problems with the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and those who terrorise the oil industry in the Delta. The terrorists of the Delta were similar to those in the North without the religious baggage, as MEND and the Delta militants were created and funded by the political elites of the South-South for their own ends. In many cases the actual leadership of these two groups, Boko Haram and MEND, were trained together in Libya at the same terrorist school in Benghazi.

The earliest groups to form were MEND and the Delta militants. They were funded by the South-South governors of Rivers, Delta and Bayelsa states and their political allies to make it difficult for the forces of law and order (the ‘Kill and Go’ police and the Task Force) to interfere with the stealing of oil in the region; known in Nigeria as ‘bunkering’. Every day the Nigerian economy loses between 150,000 and 320,000 barrels of oil. These are stolen by ‘bunkerers’, who have small tanker vessels which load the oil in the Delta and tranship this stolen oil to offshore tankers which deliver this stolen oil to other West African states. In addition to the theft of crude oil, other inland illegal tanker trucks load the imported refined products and drive these into neighbouring countries for black market sale. At $100 a barrel that amounts to around US$30 million a day for crude oil and around US$8 million per day for gasoline (PMS) and diesel. In short the bunkering of oil and refined products in the South-South brings in an illegal $42 million a day or over US$12 billion a year.

This illegal trade was pioneered under President Abacha when Rear Admiral Mike Akhigbe and his naval colleagues Victor Ombu and Ibrahim Ogohi established the smuggling of petroleum products from Port Harcourt and Warri to neighbouring West African countries. This naval assistance was important as over fifty vessels were engaged in the bunkering.

Soon the conflict between the military and the ‘terrorists’ took over the news and public attention. The issues of losing USD$12 billion a year to theft receded in public (and international) consciousness as the battles with MEND and the others took their attention. The international oil companies in the Delta, other than for the periodic inconvenience of the occasional kidnapping and ransom of staffs, were not terribly concerned, largely because most of the terrorist activities were concentrated on-shore and in the creeks. The international oil companies have production-sharing agreements with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) which delivers the major part of the oil revenues for onshore production to the NNPC. For oil garnered from deep water production the oil companies receive around 60% of the revenue. They are financially better off delivering crude from their deep water wells so were not terribly concerned by the shutdowns of onshore production by MEND or anyone else.

Within a relatively short period of time and lots of publicity these terrorist groups of the South-South were ‘settled’ – a Nigerian term which signifies the transfer of cash for a designated behaviour. In several states the South-South governors continued to fund the militants, who also acted as their election agents, ‘Area Boys’. The militant leader of MEND, Asari Dokubo, was a graduate of the Benghazi school and was imprisoned for a while in Abuja. He is free and many of the MEND arms suppliers (primarily in South Africa and Angola) are back in business but at a lower level of activity. Their common nom de guerre, Jomo Gbomo, makes their public pronouncements. Henry Okah of MEND was arrested in Angola and brought to trial in a sealed courtroom (under Yar’Adua), and released. ‘General’ Boyloaf, who had taken over was also settled and they both resumed a less adventurous life.

Goodluck Johnathan was the Governor of Bayelsa State before becoming President and was not unfamiliar with the workings of MEND and the Delta ‘terrorists’. It is a cash cow for the South-South leadership and a ready-made political force. It is justified by alluding to the fact that this is ‘their’ oil so they have found a way to make more for themselves than under the derivation principle. Boko Haram was seen as the Northern equivalent of MEND.

The problem arose when the Al Qaida groups operating along the Sahel made contact with Boko Haram and introduced foreign fighters into their midst with little respect for the wishes of the Northern elites which continued to fund and arm them. Their ideology was a bit extreme for the more practical Northern elites but Boko Haram soon grew bigger than they could control. It operated on international jihadi principles. The Northern leaders still deal with Boko Haram as a buffer for their political adventures. Boko Haram is still useful to them. After the abduction of the girls, the Northern elders used the president’s inability to catch them to issue a declaration saying that Goodluck Jonathan had lost his bearings and had failed in his most solemn responsibility of protecting the lives and property of Nigerians. Therefore, power must return to the North in 2015. The position of the Northern elders is clear – Johnathan must not run in 2015 and a Northerner must become president.

There is no shortage of self-appointed Northern saviours. Former Vice-President Atiku is convinced he was short changed by Obasanjo in his effort to succeed him. David Mark wants to use his key role as president of the Senate for the job and sees the presidency as his next logical step in his collection of titles. Perhaps the most worrying is Aliyu Gusau, the former National Security Director and now Minister of Defence. He has always stated that one day he will be president and he hasn’t given up on his ambition. There was a fury in the country over Jonathan’s appointment of Gusau as Defence Minister. Although he was a General, the army despises him and tried to get him fired as soon as he was appointed. It wasn’t an ideological call. Gusau was one of the key people arranging arms for Boko Haram and, at the same time, keeping the Nigerian army very short of bullets and supplies. The army refused to meet with him when he was appointed, but eventually Jonathan forced them to meet. Gusau continues to play a much compromised role in this business and has been one of the key impediments to allowing foreign assistance to the Boko Haram incursions.

Jonathan is afraid of him and, at the same time, hopes Aliyu Gusau will act as a bridge for him to his Northern friends and sponsors. This is not a government with any principles, direction or conscience. There is nothing the Nigerian Government is going to do to resolve the Boko Haram problem. They have too much at stake financially to make a real effort and the military is too weak.

However there is a solution which is being considered. Over a third of the Nigerian army is serving outside of Nigeria as peacekeepers in other parts of Africa (Mali, Sudan CAR, Niger, etc.). They are fully armed and they are very hostile to Boko Haram and what they stand for. They are led primarily by Middle Belt officers and are now engaged in meetings to decide how to proceed. The problem isn’t lack of will but in overcoming the pressure for a ’Colonel’s Coup’ as opposed to a ‘General’s Coup’. This is being worked on now. There is a high likelihood that the civilian government in Nigeria will change soon as a response to the failures of politicians to agree on even the most basic policies. It will be no surprise when the green in Nigeria’s flag is once again khaki green.

Dr. Gary K. Busch is an international trade unionist, an academic, a businessman and a political affairs and business consultant for 40 years.

* THE VIEWS OF THE ABOVE ARTICLE ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR/S AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE PAMBAZUKA NEWS EDITORIAL TEAM

The post What Is Boko Haram And Whence Did It Arise? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(CORDIS) — The problem with visionary research is that it often does not see the light of day. Facilities are often simply not available, or the experts needed to put scientific theories to the test cannot be found. This is true for a number of research fields, including cutting edge thinking on the future of the internet.

The two-year EU-funded SMARTFIRE project was established to address these points. Launched in November 2013, it aims to establish large-scale experimental facilities capable of accommodating cutting edge research on the future of the internet, and encourage international collaboration between the EU and South Korea. Through doing so, it aims to ensure that Europe remains at the forefront of this field.

It is vital that Europe does not get left behind when it comes to internet research. After all, the internet is increasingly called upon to perform many tasks, from online banking to tsunami monitoring. Future networks will be faster, more flexible and ever-more responsive to the demands of both citizens and machines. In the near future, smart appliances may be able to talk to each other, our clothes may be able to monitor our health and cars may be crash-proof. Staying at the cutting edge is crucial.

The project, which received nearly EUR 0.5m in EU funding, brings together ten partners from the EU, South Korea and an international collaborator from Australia. The first step has been to assess the expectations that are currently being placed on the internet, in order to identify future potential for this technology and where new research should be focused.

A shared experimental facility located in Europe and South Korea is currently being built, which will promote joint experimentation among the project partners. The idea is to give leading experts in this field the opportunity to conceive and implement innovative ideas, and to take advantage of the most advanced facilities available. Indeed, SMARTFIRE aims to create a common and unified way of experimenting with such a large-scale experimental facility. The sharing of resources and expertise also reflects the global reach and unifying potential of the internet.

The SMARTFIRE project’s overall research infrastructure will be validated through two real life scenarios, designed to demonstrate the full potential of the interconnection of European and South Korean research. These scenarios have been selected on the basis of current trends in research experimentation.

The first scenario is distributed Internet of Things measurement aggregation and processing. ‘Internet of Things’ is used to describe the advanced connectivity of devices, systems and services, whereby objects are equipped with identifiers and can be managed by computers. The key aspect of this scenario is to demonstrate how distributed measurements gathered from distant locations will be stored and processed in a cloud computing system that the end user will access transparently, without any knowledge of its location.

The second scenario is video streaming over different technologies. In this scenario, the project team will examine how different technologies and bottlenecks of distant intercontinental links can impair video streaming applications, and how this problem can be alleviated.

The post Enabling Cutting Edge Future Internet Research appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Shujaat Bukhari

The decades old distances that exist between New Delhi and Srinagar have again been reflected in the just concluded elections for the Lok Sabha. While the battle in rest of India was about managing more seats to come to power apart from the insignificant campaign (in terms of issues), in Kashmir people were wrestling on the polling days on the issue of boycott and vote. This again showed how Jammu and Kashmir state (except for Jammu and Ladakh regions) was differently placed when it comes to the critical issue of democracy and strengthening the democratic institutions.

The election to three Lok Sabha constituencies in Kashmir has thrown up many issues worth a debate. The three phases have also come up with some lessons in case the concerned parties have a desire to learn something. In the past over 15 years, the elections have entered into the discourse on Kashmir in a different way. The process has been projected as something which has nothing to do with the larger question of resolving the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. This has been the policy adopted by the pro-India political parties whose main objective has been to be in power.

However, negating their own argument the same parties have also chipped into the political discourse and carved out a space for being the stakeholders in the final resolution. For example, both National Conference and Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) have come up with their solutions to address the Kashmir issue. Though they know that the political empowerment is something which New Delhi will not allow a regional party to enjoy, the noise continues unabated. Not only are the NC and PDP in a race to prove that they are the only ones to care for Kashmiris, new faces like Engineer Rashid also have joined the bandwagon. Now he does not surprise anyone when he talks about “Azadi” in the Assembly or asks India to leave Kashmir, though coming subtly through Afzal Guru’s hanging. Sajjad Lone’s People’s Conference is also in the race to tell Kashmiris that all others have failed and fleeced them and “now we are the saviours”.

However, the bottom line for all the discourses these pro-India parties are shaping is to attract the attention of people. And this is being done through a collage of “restoring dignity and honour” and “a quality life” by way of good governance.

Similarly the separatists have not brought any change in their strategy. They continue to call for the boycott but fail to give any pragmatic roadmap for taking the process of resolution forward. Notwithstanding the fact majority of people in Kashmir boycotted the elections, but that was not purely because of their boycott call. They did thank people in wholesale for “paying heed” to their call, but that was not the case when it comes to real situation on the ground. They failed to explain as to who should own those who chose to vote in these elections.

WHAT NEW DELHI GAINED?

For those who are at the helm in Delhi, it hardly matters how many people would come to vote. For them conducting the process is more important. In past six decades they have not learnt any lesson so they would refuse to do so in this round as well. When the UPA government sent Afzal Guru to the gallows, it was a clear message to people in Kashmir that they don’t care about what they thought about the “illegitimate” rule of Delhi. They are confident about the power to overcome any challenge in Kashmir. And at the global level too there are more takers for India’s version than that of Kashmir or Pakistan. However, what they cannot ignore for long time is the fact that Kashmir’s new generation has empathically declared that it was at far distance from them both politically and emotionally.

MAINSTREAM FAILURE

Those who have been in power in Kashmir for last over 17 years have also lost the battle. Leaving the results aside, the way people, especially youth, behaved in these elections, it puts the entire pro-India political set up in a bad picture. Even if they jumped into the fray in 1996 and then in successive elections, all have failed to cover any ground for politics aimed at strengthening the Indian discourse in Kashmir. If in 2009, the parties were free to campaign and garner support, this time they faced the wrath of people and had to retreat at many places. Leaders of both NC and PDP came under attacks from youth and it was the demonstration of growing influence of those who don’t support the electoral process. The pro-election parties must see the writing on the wall that they have failed to fulfill the promise of governance and people are wiser enough to understand that to play any significant role in resolution of Kashmir issue was not their cup of tea.

Fear may be an important factor in keeping many voters away but the majority of people did not allow to legitimize this process out of their own will. The incident of beating those in Sopore and Baramulla, who voted in frontier district of Kupwara, is another example of how people of an ideology perceived it. However, it is important that we as a society become tolerant and respect each other’s viewpoint and choice. Coercion in both the cases is undemocratic.

SEPARATISTS ILLUSIONS

On the other hand, the separatists also need to introspect. Like in 2010, this time also the people took the control of enforcing the boycott. Stone pelting on polling days, locking of polling booths and attacking those who wanted to vote or encouraged others to vote was the telltale story on polling days. Except for the routine statements they did not lead the people. They did thank them for the boycott but so did the mainstream parties for voting (to those who did). They also claim to represent the people of Jammu and Kashmir but then in Jammu and Ladakh there was record turnout. Why the people at these places did not listen to them?

There are lessons for all but will they ever think of taking them seriously. People also need to think on shedding this stigma of “40 lakh” being with all the parties. If one goes by the election meetings held in past two months, it is difficult to understand as to why there was low turnout. However, the urban centers such as Srinagar, Baramulla, Sopore, Tral, Anantnag and Pulwama have shown that they are steadfast in their ideology of not taking part in the elections. This election was no different in the context of Kashmir politics – competing narratives and crossing ideologies.

By arrangement with Rising Kashmir

Shujaat Bukhari
Editor, Rising Kashmir

The post J&K: Competing Poll Narratives – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Sean Goforth

Rare is the occasion when the words of a cabinet minister unalterably shift the direction of national policy. When it does happen, miscommunication is likely the cause. Recall the East German foreign minister’s announcement, on 30 September 1989, that refugees were allowed to emigrate to West Germany. The unauthorized declaration marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War. Or, on such odd occasions, it could be that a minister is simply carrying out an order that his boss refused to be associated with. This was probably the case on February 13, when Argentine Economy Minister Axel Kicillof introduced a new consumer price index.

It marked a dramatic shift for the government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, which seemed bent on politicizing the nation’s statistics agency, Indec, in recent years. Beginning in 2007, Kirchner pushed out Indec’s career economists and replaced them with political allies. Official figures began to trail private estimates for inflation. In 2013, with Indec regularly reporting inflation figures roughly one quarter the actual rate, the IMF adopted the private estimate as its gauge for inflation in Argentina. In so doing, the IMF not only dealt Argentina’s national statistics agency an unprecedented rebuke, it opened the way for sanctions against the country.

So, in unveiling the new consumer price index in February, Kicillof made official what everyone has known but the government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner refused to acknowledge: Argentina has one of the world’s highest rates of inflation. The new index showed that inflation was 3.7% in January, putting Argentina on track for 44% inflation in 2014. And still the official numbers remained below estimates of inflation by private economists.

Yet, Argentine bonds have rallied on the news. So far this year, the peso bonds have risen almost 30% in value, much of that owing to investor purchases of inflation-linked Argentina bonds between mid-February and mid-April. “They [inflation-linked bonds] gained so much after the government started reporting more reasonable numbers”, noted Fausto Spotorno, chief economist at Orlando J. Ferreres & Asociados in Buenos Aires, “there’s probably not much room for additional increases for now”.1

But even if the short-term rally peters out, as seems likely, the new inflation index appears likely to restore confidence for two reasons. First, Argentina is “best in class” – if one can use that term – when it comes to inflation-addled countries. Back in January headlines of the economic situation read “Argentina and Venezuela – Which Will Survive?” and “Argentina and Venezuela: Brothers in Crisis”.2 Now the comparison with Venezuela no longer seems warranted.

Inaccurate though the new inflation index is, it nonetheless provides a welcome contrast with Venezuela, where the Maduro government appears to be in denial, and the economic malaise has fueled bloody clashes between protestors and the police. Second, Brazil provides an interesting parallel. In the early 1990s, Brazil stopped hyperinflation by introducing a virtual currency, the Unit of Real Value (URV), which only gradually moved toward fair value. Brazil’s economic policymakers did not pretend that the URV was an immediate solution to hyperinflation; Brazilians would not have believed this. Rather, they posted prices on store shelves that showed the URV was steady compared to the existing currency, the cruzeiro.

Point is, while the new inflation index still is not accurate it can be effective if, over a period of months, it shows that it is converging with the peso’s real rate of inflation. Recent data suggests this is just what’s happening. In March, the government reported consumer prices rose 2.6%, below the 2.9% forecast by nine economists polled by Bloomberg.3 Inflation not only appears to be decreasing in Argentina – which, if true, is attributable to higher lending rates and a devalued currency rather than re- porting consumer prices accurately – but the data has not incited a chorus of recriminations by economists and journalists, as was the case in the past. Instead, even many skeptics are no longer dismissive. “The credibility of the new index isn’t conclusive”, Luciano Cohan, chief economist at the business consulting firm Elypsis, told the Wall Street Journal: “The data is on the border of being believable or not”.4 In sum, the measure may be credible enough to soothe the nerves of foreign investors and disgruntled Argentines alike.

For sure, Argentina’s decade-long economic “boom” is at an end. It was a pell-mell era of growth where the successive Kirchner governments blithely ignored much needed economic reforms in favor of carefree reliance on Chinese demand for foodstuffs. The government’s new inflation index should not be interpreted as an earnest turn toward reform. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner is a political opportunist, not a pragmatist, and as The Economist recently concluded, “It is not in her nature to execute a bold U-turn”.5 But, taken in league with other piecemeal attempts to right the Argentine economy, including the devaluation of the peso in January and higher benchmark lending rates, the consumer price index stands a good chance of encouraging enough foreign investment to keep the government from default, industry afloat, and inflation in check. It may sound like scant consolation, but at least the Kirchner era probably will not end as it began – in the ashes of economic implosion.

About the author:
Sean Goforth, Affiliated Researcher, Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS)

Source:
This article was published by IPRIS as IPRIS Viewpoints 146

Notes:
1. Daniel Cancel, “Argentine Inflation Accelerated Less than Forecast in March” (Bloomberg News, 15 April 2014).
2. Kathleen Caulderwood, “Argentina and Venezuela – Which Will Survive?” (International Business Times, 30 January 2014); Kevin Lees, “Argentina and Venezuela: Brothers in Crisis” (The National Interest, 31 January 2014).
3. Daniel Cancel, “Argentine Inflation Accelerated Less than Forecast in March” (Bloomberg News, 15 April 2014).
4. Ken Parks, “Argentine Inflation Eases in March” (The Wall Street Journal, 15 April 2014).
5. “The CFK Psychodrama” (The Economist, 12 April 2014).

The post Argentina’s New Inflation Index Looks Credible Enough – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Vikram Sood

Every change of government in New Delhi rekindles hope in the hearts of many that peace between India and Pakistan is about to break out. It is necessary to have a reality check on this. Successive Indian prime ministers have walked down this road, offering concessions to Pakistan, only to be disappointed.

Today Pakistan may play the injured innocent and claim that it is a victim of terrorism but the reality is that Pakistan is a victim of the policies of its leadership. Having invested so much in this policy of violent interference in its neighbourhood, having raised the rhetoric so high and despite having boxed above its weight all these years, the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment is unable to change the way it thinks much less make a U-turn in its policies towards India.

It is time we accept that Pakistan will not change its policies towards India and may even become worse as it Islamises and radicalises showing signs of becoming a Sharia state.

Since Pakistan will not change its attitude it is time we also thought of different approaches. So far, gestures have been interpreted to mean appeasement by the Pakistan deep state and a vindication of their confrontationist policy. Pakistan’s DNA will not allow a change of policy, only a change of tactics. It will retain its terror option under a nuclear umbrella that today consists of 200 nuclear weapons all aimed at India and based on a close military and nuclear relationship with China.

Our policy towards Pakistan has been based on three misconceptions. One, the assumption that the civilian politicians favour a normal relationship with India but it is the army alone that is the impediment. Facts speak otherwise. It was then prime minister Zulfiqar Bhutto who said that Pakistan would make the Islamic bomb even if Pakistanis had to eat grass. It was Zulfiqar who dabbled with assisting the Islamic Afghans who had taken shelter in Pakistan having been pushed out by the Mohammad Daud Khan regime from Afghanistan.

It was his daughter, Benazir, who launched the Kashmir jihad and later propped up the Taliban. It was Nawaz Sharif who supported both the Taliban and anti-India groups, most of them fostered in Punjab, his stronghold.

Mumbai 1993 and later Kargil happened during Sharif’s terms in office. Likewise, the Mumbai attacks of November 2008 happened during Asif Ali Zardari’s presidency. There would be no significant change in the threats faced by us from Pakistan regardless of whether there was a dictator in command or an ostensibly civilian rule.

Two, if we engage Pakistan in a sustained dialogue and grant some concessions, this will strengthen the hands of Pakistan’s politicians and weaken the military’s stranglehold which is disliked by the people of Pakistan. Not quite so. Pakistanis may not be too fond of their generals as presidents but the military is seen as the only institution which is keeping the country together. Its political, economic and military’s role in Pakistan cannot be undermined or contained by any civilian dispensation.

The third flaw in this argument is the misplaced belief that we can bring about changes in the manner in which Pakistanis want to be governed. We do not have the ability to bring about political changes in Pakistan. It would be dangerous to tread into pastures where others have ventured and failed. Pakistan’s political process is an internal matter between its people and leadership.

The time has come for India to move away from its Pakistan-centric policy orientation. India and Pakistan hardly trade with each other, Pakistan will not give India transit to Afghanistan even though it stands to earn money, there are few tourists to each others’ countries, Pakistan’s hate India machinery is vocal and active, we never get to see each others’ media except for those who surf on the Internet and they no longer tolerate Indian journalists on their soil. It will not surrender its terror option as a force equaliser and India has no cure for Pakistan’s paranoia.

A foreign policy that uses hope as an instrument of policy overlooking essential national interests is bound to fail. The most important requirement for India in the next decade or at any other time, is rapid economic progress in the widest definition of the term. This will be the best guarantor for our security in the long run.

Since we cannot progress in isolation we need to engage other countries. Notable among them would be China for multiple reasons, Japan and South Korea for economic interests and Russia and Israel for both security and economic interests. Maybe early high-profile exchange of visits would set the trend.

Our relationship with China and Pakistan means we are a landlocked country to our north and west. We need to take the maritime route to Iran and through Iran to Afghanistan and to Southeast Asia.

Above all, the government needs to engage all our other immediate neighbours — Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Nepal and the Maldives in a sustained meaningful dialogue and provide economic assistance to these countries, in our own national interest and regain space that we might have lost in recent years.

Meanwhile, given our relationship with Pakistan, we need to keep our security apparatus in a state of alert with state-of-the-art equipment. All bilateral issues with Pakistan — political, military, economic — will simply have to go on the back-burner till Pakistan decides it wants to live as a good neighbour.

In our ordinary lives too it is not compulsory to have cordial relations with our neighbours; a nodding acquaintance and staying out each other’s way is perfectly normal. So with nations.

(Vikram Sood is an Advisor to Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and a former head of RAW)

Courtesy: Rediff.com, May 15, 2014

The post Why India Must Put Any Overtures To Pakistan On Hold – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Shruti Pandalai

Ethnic clashes between Bodos (Assam’s biggest tribal group) and Muslims in lower Assam in early May, forced media attention once again to the myriad conflicts stemming from contested identities in the North East. Election rhetoric around issues of illegal migration into north eastern states, targeted at specific vote banks seems to have further fuelled the reportage. A fortnight on, perhaps understandably, the region has faded from the media’s radar, since action has now shifted to New Delhi with the country ushering in political change.

Typically, issues from the North East despite making headlines, are often lost in translation. The gravity and historic context of the conflict is often lost en masse in the national public consciousness. Mass media’s access to the lowest common denominator makes it a crucial player in building national narratives and breaking stereotypes. These narratives can come handy for the state to make sure the message is clear in areas prone to conflict, where citizens are often victims of misinformation and agenda driven campaigns.

This is not to say that bridging perception gaps will resolve the conflicts in the North East, but the case has to be made to at least inform and build common frames of reference and initiate larger public interest in the region. If attempts have been made already, then we need to investigate their limited presence in influencing opinions and debates in the larger national consciousness. It’s paradoxical that despite the rise in rich academic research on the various problems plaguing the North East, their play in mass public discourse is negligible and incident oriented.

Insurgencies have been raging on is the North East for decades, yet unlike Kashmir – which has become ingrained in public consciousness and the national discourse – one could argue that the North East has not received the same attention. Apart from spot reports on violence, which is definitely a step forward from the early days of complete ignorance; there is little effort to understand the contested narratives of the various conflicts. Images of the Manipuri women protest against the rape of Manorama Devi in 2004, anti-AFSPA activist Irom Sharmila, and shots of training camps of the ULFA are regurgitated time and again in the mass media. While these are powerful and symbolic, they have stereotyped a complex region with a flattened idea of homogeneity.

Such perceptions fail to inform that each of these states has its own distinctive culture, many competing identities and internal conflicts. In popular imagination, the North East is a monolith, and there has been very little effort to challenge this representation. Every time a student from the North East gets harassed in Delhi, opinion columns are flooded with words like ‘alienation’, ‘prejudice’ and ‘integration of the North East’. But is there an interest beyond the superficial?

In a survey which got a lot of attention two years ago, it was revealed that stereotypes that haunt the North East were still very basic.1 In their results 87% Indians outside the North East, could not name all seven states.52% had a negative perception of the region and their reflections were limited to ” insurgency”, “most underdeveloped states” and “people with mongoloid features and weird food habits”. 76% were unaware of peace talks underway in the region and 30% said they would never seek employment in the NE even if suited career interests.2 While you may choose to argue with the findings, it does reflect the extent to which the frames of reference are skewed. If this is still the starting point, then there is a lot of work which needs to be done.

Blaming the media singularly for the abysmal state of misinformation is nothing but shooting the messenger. It’s a chicken and egg situation, if you ask the national media why the bias in coverage, they argue a lack of audience interest. Sadly the regional media too hasn’t been able to perform its role independently. Reporters from the region have told me that they are under constant pressure from insurgent groups to carry their press releases verbatim, they do it for survival. They also say that if local media are overtly critical of the state their advertisements are cut down. Often the “state’s paranoia of misuse of media platforms by miscreants” becomes the biggest obstacle in challenging narratives of armed groups.3

If you look at the propaganda of many of these armed groups against the Indian state – the grievances espoused focus on neglect, lack of governance and resource and economic exploitation. Till development in the North East is achieved these discourses will only get amplified and appropriated along ethno-centric lines. What is surprising though is the lack of investment from the Centre and state governments to fight back the propaganda and challenge narratives.

The very fact that the term ‘racism’ is gaining currency to describe prejudices and biases in cases of assaults against people of the North East – should worry the Indian state. This framing of debate as ‘the mainland vs periphery’ with the vision of a homogenous North East, which is contrary to the reality on the ground, is the very essence of the problem.

The ‘othering’ of identities and perceptions, however, goes both ways and is not often reflected in the media discourse. In an eye-opener of a piece in The Hindu, Patricia Mukhim, the Editor of The Shillong Times questions eloquently that while the people from India’s North East face severe discrimination in Delhi and elsewhere, has anyone asked how the northeast treat the ‘outsiders’?4 She makes a case for the unreported incidents of attacks and discrimination faced by non-tribals struggling to survive in the North East. It is a dismal picture, starkly different from the flattened construction of a homogenous North East that is repeatedly manufactured in our public consciousness.

If the larger goal is to understand the challenges of the North East, it requires a strong national narrative which reconciles its many identities and adds to the peace process. Contested histories, tribal vs. non-tribal ethnicities, failure of states to provide for basics and security in the region, legitimate grievances and the profitable economics of war, have layered and formed the identities of people from this region. These need to find more representation. Till we arrive at an informed understanding of the region beyond the stereotypes which gain traction in our national public consciousness and debate, the North East will continue to suffer from both prejudice and indifference and the media will continue to wait for the next incident.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

1. “People have negative perception about North-East, reveals study”, May 7, 2012, The Hindu, accessed on URL: http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-newdelhi/people-have… on Oct 25, 2013.
2. Ibid.
3. Interviews conducted by the author with a group of Guwahati correspondents covering the north east on May 1, 2014.
4. Politics of Identity and Location, Patricia Mukhim, April 24, 2014, The Hindu, accessed on URL : http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/politics-of-identity-and… on May 8,2014.

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/nationaldiscourseontheNorthEast_spandalai_160514

The post Challenging Stereotypes: Reinventing National Discourse In India’s North East – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

YEARS AGO I was invited to a UN conference on the Palestinian refugees in Paris.

I was to open the debate as an Israeli, after the Palestinian representative, Salman Abu Sitta, a refugee from a Bedouin tribe in the Negev, had opened as a Palestinian.

Before the debate I was warned that Abu Sitta was the most extreme of the refugees, a notorious hater of Israel. When my turn came, I said that I had to choose between answering him or reading my prepared text. I decided to read my text and promised to invite him to a private dinner and discuss his points.

When I finished, Abu Sitta reminded me of that promise. We had dinner in a quiet Paris restaurant and I found Abu Sitta a very engaging person. Rachel, my wife, was deeply moved by his account of his flight as a boy during the Naqba, and so was I.

Abu Sitta, by now a very wealthy international contractor, has devoted his life to the plight of the Palestinian refugees and is, perhaps, the world’s foremost expert on the Naqba.

This week I received from him a letter, which I feel the need to copy here verbatim:

DEAR URI,

I read with great interest your interview in Haaretz about your rich and eventful life. You stuck to your principles since the early fifties when you found that the old doctrine was neither workable or moral.

I remember vividly our chat over dinner in Paris with your kind wife Rachel, bless her soul.

You described your early days as a young German by the name of Helmut, when you joined the terrorist organization, the Irgun, and when you, carrying a machine gun on a hilltop at Hulayqat (where now there is a war memorial to “honor” those soldiers) watched the sea of humanity of expelled refugees march towards Gaza by the sea shore.

I also told you my story; how I became a refugee without ever seeing a Jew in my life and how I spent years to find out who did it by name, face and battalion.

I remember asking you “would you agree to my return to my house if it is next to you?” You said emphatically NO.

I wrote all this in my memoirs to be published this year in Europe and USA.

I am reminded of a similar story but with a different ending. I refer to Reflections of a Daughter of the ‘48 Generation by Dr. Tikva Honig-Parnass. It is a moving account of how truth and reality faced her, as a Palmach soldier, with the grave injustice done to Palestinians. Since then she spends her energy to defend their rights, including the Right of Return.

I saw no trace or hint of retraction in your interview or what I have hoped, namely your recognition of the Right of Return, or the atonement and remedy of the greatest sin: the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians. Would it not be a fitting last station of a long life (and I wish you more of it) for you to stand at hilltops (again) and shout for all to hear, summing up all your life experiences, saying: the refugees must return, we must repent the sin of ethnic cleansing?

Is this too much to ask for a principled man like you to do this? I am not asking this on behalf of the Palestinians, because no doubt they WILL return. I am hoping that it would be a crown to your life achievements in the Israeli milieu.

As I wrote repeatedly: The history of the Jews will not be marked any more by the alleged killing of Christ nor by the Nazi atrocities in WWII, but will be indelibly marked by what they have done to Palestinians, deliberately and constantly, without remorse, regret or remedy, thus reflecting that side of the human spirit which does not learn from history and that which empties itself of its own moral posture.

Best regards, Salman Abu Sitta.

DEAR SALMAN,

I was profoundly moved by this letter. It took me days to find the courage to answer. I try to do so as sincerely as possible.

I also vividly remember our conversation in Paris, and wrote about it in the second part of my memoirs, which will appear in the course of this year. It may be interesting for the readers to compare our two descriptions of the same conversation. About the scene near Hulayqat I have written in the first part, which has already appeared in Hebrew.

When I was wounded in the 1948 war, I decided that it would be my life’s mission to work for peace between our two peoples. I hope that I have been true to that promise.

Making peace after such a long and bitter conflict is both a moral and a political endeavor. There is often a contradiction between the two aspects.

I respect the few people in Israel who, like Tikva, completely devote themselves to the moral side of the refugees’ tragedy, whatever the consequence for the chances of peace. My own moral outlook tells me that peace must be the first aim, before and above everything else.

The war of 1948 was a terrible human tragedy. Both sides believed that it was an existential battle, that their very life was hanging in the balance. It is often forgotten that ethnic cleansing (not a familiar expression in those days) was practiced by both sides. Our side occupied large territories, creating a huge refugee problem, while the Palestinian side succeeded in occupying only small Jewish areas, like the Old City of Jerusalem and the Etzion settlement bloc south of Bethlehem. But not a single Jew remained there.

The war, like the later Bosnian war, was an ethnic war, in which both sides tried to conquer as large a part of the country as possible – EMPTY of the other population.

As an eyewitness and participant, I can testify to the fact that the origins of the refugee problem are extremely complex. During the first seven months of the war, the attacks on the Arab villages were an absolute military necessity. At that time, we were the weaker side. After a number of very cruel battles, the wheel turned and I believe that a deliberate policy of expulsion was adopted by the Zionist leadership.

But the real question is: Why were the 750,000 refugees not allowed home after the end of the hostilities?

ONE HAS to remember the situation. It was three years after the smokestacks of Auschwitz and the other camps had gone cold. Hundreds of thousands of wretched survivors crowded the refugee camps in Europe and had nowhere to go but to the new Israel. They were brought here and hastily put into the homes of the Palestinian refugees.

All this did not obliterate our moral obligation to put an end to the terrible tragedy of the Palestinian refugees. In 1953 I published in my magazine, “Haolam Hazeh”, a detailed plan for the solution of the refugee problem. It included (a) an apology to the refugees and the acknowledgment in principle of the right to return, (b) the return and resettlement of a substantial number, (c) generous compensation to all the rest. Since the Israeli government refused to consider the possibility of the return of a single individual, the plan was not even discussed.

WHY DO I not stand on a hilltop and cry out for the return of all the refugees?

Peace is made between consenting parties. There is absolutely no chance that the vast majority of Israelis would freely agree to the return of all the refugees and their descendents, who amount to six or seven million people – the same number as Israel’s Jewish citizens. This would be the end of the “Jewish state” and the beginning of a “bi-national state”, to which 99% of Israelis strenuously object. It can be imposed only by a crushing military defeat, which is currently impossible because of Israel’s infinite military superiority, including nuclear arms.

I can stand on the hilltops and shout – but it would not bring peace (and a solution) one step closer.

To my mind, waiting for a solution in a hundred years, while the conflict and the misery continue, is not really moral.

DEAR SALMAN, I have listened attentively to your presentation.

You say that Israel could easily absorb all the refugees by putting them into the Negev, which is almost empty. That is quite true.

The vast majority of Israelis would reject that, because they are fiercely resolved to have a large Jewish majority in Israel. But I also ask myself: What is the logic of that?

When I met with Yasser Arafat in Beirut during the war of 1982, I also visited several Palestinian refugee camps. I asked many refugees whether they wanted to return to Israel. Most said that they wanted to return to their villages (which were eradicated long ago) but not anywhere else in Israel.

What is the sense of putting them into the harsh conditions of the desert in a Zionist dominated and Hebrew speaking country, far from their original homes? Would they want that?

Arafat and his successors limit their aim to a “just and AGREED solution”, giving the Israeli government a veto right. That means, in practice, at most the return of a symbolic number.

My latest proposal is for the Israeli president to apologize and express the profound regret of the Israeli people for its part in the creation and prolongation of the tragedy.

The Israeli government must recognize the moral right of the refugees to return.

Israel should organize the return of 50,000 refugees every year for ten years. (I am almost alone in Israel in demanding this number. Most peace groups would reduce that to 100,000 altogether.)

All the other refugees should receive compensation on the lines of the compensation paid by Germany to the Jewish victims. (No comparison, of course.)

With the foundation of the State of Palestine, they would receive Palestinian passports and be able to settle there, in their country.

In the not too distant future, when the two states, Israel and Palestine, shall be are finally living side by side, with open borders and with their capitals in Jerusalem, perhaps within a region-wide framework, the problem will lose its sting.

IT HURTS me to write this letter. For me, the refugees are no abstract “problem”, but human beings with human faces. But I will not lie to you.

I would be honored to live next to you (even in the Negev desert)

Salamaat,

uri.

The post Dear Salman – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Leonard Wong

In 1970, the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force delivered its report to the President of the United States, Richard Nixon. In the report, better known as the Gates Commission due to the leadership of former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, the members of the Commission stated, “We unanimously believe that the nation’s interests will be better served by an all-volunteer force, supported by an effective stand-by draft.” They added, “We have satisfied ourselves that a volunteer force will not jeopardize national security, and we believe it will have a beneficial effect on the military as well as the rest of our society.”[1] In June of 1973, after years of debate, the statutory authority for the draft expired and the all-volunteer force became a reality.

An effective way to survey the evolution of the all-volunteer force is to examine the different eras of the all-volunteer Army. General Maxwell R. Thurman, widely viewed as the principal architect of the all-volunteer force, liked to point out that instead of examining the all-volunteer Army as a monolithic, static entity, it was important to analyze the different eras of the all-volunteer force.[2] The following paragraphs distill the evolution of the U.S. all-volunteer Army into five eras. Examining the all-volunteer Army in five distinct phases highlights the many factors that have impacted the force over time, yet is parsimonious enough to allow larger trends to emerge.

1ST ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY: 1973 – 1980

The first all-volunteer Army began with what, on the surface, appeared to be solid footing. Shortly before the draft ended, Congress gave first term soldiers an unprecedented 61.2 percent pay raise.[3] The increase in pay combined with rising unemployment appeared to give the fledgling all-volunteer Army a favorable start. Unfortunately, the pay increase also had unanticipated second and third order effects. The large pay increase achieved pay parity for young soldiers, but subsequent military pay raises were consistently capped below wage increases in the private sector by a Congress and society who believed they had already done enough for the military. The reduced pay comparability, combined with the pay compression caused by newly recruited privates earning almost as much as their sergeants, eventually led to a gradual despondency in the mid-grade non-commissioned officer (NCO) ranks.

Compounding the problems were inadequate funding to ensure the ability to recruit quality soldiers and the loss of the Vietnam era GI Bill that attracted high quality recruits in search of federal aid for higher education. With morale still low because of the lingering effects of the Vietnam War, disillusionment gradually overcame the force and drove many NCOs and officers out of the Army as they encountered low quality soldiers and deteriorating conditions. In 1973, the Army Chief of Staff Creighton W. Abrams turned to the faculty and staff at the Army War College and asked them to answer the simple question, “Why an Army?” In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the profession was struggling to define its raison d’être.

Declining enlistment rates, low quality recruits, high attrition, and plummeting morale were indicators that the fledgling force manned with volunteers was becoming dangerously fragile. Despite the mounting problems, a 1978 Department of Defense report on the status of the all-volunteer force reported that:

The quality of those serving on active duty, as measured by the education levels of active duty personnel and the average test scores of new recruits, has not declined as popularly believed but has markedly and steadily improved since the end of the draft.[4]

Unfortunately, the new recruit test scores mentioned in the report were derived from the new Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) and subsequently the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). Unbeknownst to the Department of Defense and unconfirmed for several years was the fact that the tests were misnormed. Although Army recruiters were told that their total recruiting target could only be five to six percent of mental aptitude Category IV—the lowest mental category acceptable for military service—per the AFQT, the misnorming of the test allowed many more into the force. In 1979, the Army reported that 9 percent of the new recruits were Category IV. In reality, 42 percent of all new soldiers were Category IV due to the misnorming.[5] Although Army readiness levels were acceptable on paper, it was during this era of the all-volunteer force that the Army’s Chief of Staff, General Edward C. Meyer, informed Congress that the Army was actually “a hollow Army.”[6]

In the spring of 1976, the U.S. Military Academy at West Point was rocked by scandal as over 150 cadets were expelled for cheating on an out-of-class electrical engineering exam. With West Point graduates supposedly providing the professional foundation for the officer corps, the profession was shaken. Adding to the introspection caused by the scandal, 119 women arrived in July as part of the first West Point class with women (62 graduated four years later). The debate and controversy that initially resulted with the introduction of women into West Point has largely subsided, but the overall issues involving the role of women in an all-volunteer Army remain.

The first era of the all-volunteer Army began with a time of high expectations and ended with the nadir of the professional Army. It was a time of low quality soldiers, disillusioned officers, and a tarnished societal perception of the Army. The taking of sixty-six hostages after the storming of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, Iran compounded the malaise creeping into the Army. The failure of Operation Eagle Claw to rescue the hostages concluded a very disheartening phase for the all-volunteer force. Because of the state of the all-volunteer force during this time period, President Richard Nixon—who introduced the all-volunteer Army during his campaign for the presidency—suggested that it might be prudent to turn back to the draft because “the volunteer army has failed to provide enough personnel of the caliber we need for our highly sophisticated armaments.”[7]

2ND ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY: 1980 – 1991

In contrast to the first era, the second era of the all-volunteer Army was characterized by progress and success. One of the early signs of life being breathed back into the demoralized force was an 11.1 percent pay raise for all ranks in 1981 and a 14.3 percent raise in 1982. The pay increases were invaluable in lifting the morale of enlisted soldiers and officers who had endured the hardships of the 1970s.

The rebound of the all-volunteer Army after the near failure in the 1970s was exemplified by the extraordinary success of the advertising campaign slogan of “Be All You Can Be.” The slogan eventually pushed the Army into one of the most recognizable brands in America, but more importantly, the slogan was attractive to both potential recruits and serving soldiers. “Be All You Can Be” represented the nascent professional Army of the 1980s—a far cry from the “Today’s Army Wants to Join You” slogan of the early 1970s.

The quality of incoming soldiers increased as the Army focused on a “dual market” approach. Studies showed that young people potentially interested in joining the Army were generally work-oriented or college-oriented. Higher pay and training appealed to those in the former group who viewed the Army as a means to learn a skill. The latter group, however, was attracted to deferred incentives, especially money to attend college. The college-oriented group was critical in that soldiers in this group generally were easier to train, had less discipline problems, and retained better. The image of the Army in the eyes of society rose and soon the Army was recruiting levels of quality as indicated by nearly all recruits being high school diploma graduates (compared with 58 percent in 1973) and only 4 percent in the lowest acceptable mental category.

Pay raises, renewed attention on the families, and the emphasis on raising the overall quality of life for soldiers were part of a gradual departure from a conscription based belief that soldiers were a “free good.” The draft had created an organizational culture that valued the service of soldiers, yet acted as if soldiers were replaceable at zero cost. From senior leaders to drill sergeants, a gradual realization was emerging that if soldiers did not feel valued or respected—especially the high quality troops—they would leave.

It was during this era that the Army began its “training revolution” with a focus on more deliberate planning, measurable outcomes, and continual evaluation. The renewed emphasis on training culminated in the establishment of the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. In addition to the transformed emphasis on training, the Army introduced much needed improvements to key acquisition programs. The “Big Five” weapons system programs were initiated in the 1970s, but arrived in the 1980s to a force desperate for modernization. The Abrams main battle tank, Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, Patriot missile system, Blackhawk helicopter, and Apache attack helicopter gave the Army a much improved combat capability that helped fuel the increasing professionalism of the force

One of the key concerns of the Gates Commission report was the issue of civilian control of the military. Critics of the all-volunteer force claimed that the uniformed military would be tempted to intervene in political matters. Despite the confidence reflected in the Gates Commission report that the senior military leadership would not have undue influence on policy making, the second era of the all-volunteer force was marked by a growing concern about senior military leaders circumventing civilian authorities. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, commonly referred to as Goldwater-Nichols because of its sponsors Senator Barry Goldwater and Representative William Nichols, was passed partly to reestablish a clear chain of command between the civilian overseers and uniformed military.

The second era of the all-volunteer Army was marked by a renaissance across the ranks. The successes of this era culminated in two key events. First, the fall of the Berlin Wall showed that the all-volunteer force had succeeded in deterring Warsaw Pact aggression. Second, the Persian Gulf War displayed in one hundred hours the amazing effectiveness of highly trained, high quality soldiers operating with high tech equipment under highly competent leadership.

3RD ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY: 1991 – 2001

The direction of the third era of the all-volunteer Army in the late 1990s was largely set into motion by budgetary restrictions planned in the mid-1980s as well as the end of the Cold War. With the United States emerging as the world’s only superpower, American society was eager to shrink the Army and reap the economic “peace dividend” from the defense budget. Between 1990 and 1997, the active duty Army was downsized from eighteen divisions and 781,000 soldiers to ten divisions and 480,000 soldiers. With many Army senior leaders having experienced the impersonal and painful downsizing after the end of the Vietnam War, deliberate policies were put in place to minimize the detrimental effects of downsizing.

With the Soviet Union gone as the prime antagonist for national security, the Army shifted to the more fundamental role of “serving the American people[8]” by providing disciplined, trained, manpower capable of deploying to a possibly dangerous environment. Soldiers found themselves once again patrolling the borders—this time in counterdrug operations. The Army once again deployed to the American west—this time to fight forest fires. Soldiers once again took postings to faraway lands – this time under the mil-to-mil engagement policy.[9] The Army was deployed to Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Constabulary forces were left behind in Bosnia and Kosovo with no end date in sight.

In October of 2000, General Eric Shinseki, the Army’s Chief of Staff, delivered a speech announcing some very significant changes for the Army—a new readiness reporting system, improvements to the beleaguered military medical system, and a proposed increase in the size of the Army to alleviate the peacekeeping deployment strain on soldiers. Somehow, however, these initiatives were overshadowed by a seemingly innocent policy change announced almost as an afterthought—issuing every soldier a black beret.

Howls of protest followed the announcement almost immediately. Members of elite units—the Rangers, Special Forces, and paratroopers—were the first to decry their loss of distinctiveness through the egalitarian issue of the beret. Former Rangers marched from Fort Benning to the White House to deliver a beret in protest. Because some of the berets would be purchased from, of all countries, China, Congress became involved. Finally, after congressional pressure and a nudge from the White House, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld put the plan on hold until further review. Meanwhile the media and public watched in puzzlement over what seemed to be an inordinate amount of discussion and dissent over a hat.

But the hullabaloo over the beret was not about fashion. It was about the arduous process of changing an Army that had for half a century equipped, trained, and prepared itself to fight World War III—and did it very well. And yet that very success posed an obstacle for change in the future. The need for change became obvious in 1990 when the only forces that could be deployed quickly against the armored columns of Saddam Hussein were the outgunned paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne Division. A decade later, the difficulties in deploying Task Force Hawk to Kosovo reinforced the growing concern that the Army was still working with a Cold War mindset in a post-Cold War world.

The black beret was intended to be a symbol of unity to pull the Army together as it confronted the challenges in the process of change. Instead, an Army survey during that period showed that despite the Chief of Staff’s efforts to change the thinking of the leadership of the Army, 50 percent of battalion and brigade commanders reported that they were uncomfortable with the pending changes of transforming the Army. In hindsight, it is almost incredulous that— a year before the terrorist attacks of September of 2001—half of the soon-to-be strategic leaders of the Army were skeptical of shifting from a Cold War force to a more agile Army.

Thus, the third era of the all-volunteer Army was marked by uncertainty—uncertainty about the magnitude and duration of the downsizing as well as uncertainty about the role of the Army in the world. The uncertainty of the third era of the all-volunteer Army, however, came to an abrupt halt on the morning of September 11, 2001.

4TH ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY: 2001 – 2014

With the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, a focused sense of purpose and urgency descended upon the Army. Less than a month after the attacks, combat operations were initiated against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The swift successes of special operations forces working with indigenous allies combined with the employment of precision weapons garnered the attention of policy makers. It seemed to many policy makers that the requirement for a large, and often cumbersome, Army had dissipated with this new way of war.

In the weeks that followed the invasion of Iraq in early March of 2003, it appeared that the Army was performing magnificently. By May 1, 2003, the president declared that major combat operations had concluded. Once again, the quality of the American soldier had been a major factor in the battlefield success. The all-volunteer Army concept was once again validated. As the jubilation over the liberation of Iraq began to wane, however, the Army began to confront the reality of simultaneously rebuilding post-war Iraq and fighting a counterinsurgency.

In the chaotic years after the invasion, junior leaders were tasked to conduct missions for which they never trained, executed operations that had outpaced Army doctrine, shifted constantly from adrenaline-pumping counterinsurgency operations to patience-demanding nation building, and received very little detailed guidance or supervision in the process. While this development alarmed some, it also had the unanticipated effect that a large cohort of the Army began developing adaptability—a competency that the Army had long recognized as vital to future warfare, yet had also discovered was very difficult to develop in a non-deployed Army. By being confronted with complexity, unpredictability, and ambiguity, junior leaders were learning to adapt, to innovate, and to operate with minimal guidance.[10]

Despite the initial surge of enthusiasm in society for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, opposition to the wars steadily increased. According to a Gallup Poll, 23 percent of Americans in March of 2003 believed the U.S. made a mistake in sending troops to Iraq. By 2008, that number had increased to 63 percent.[11] In 2001, less than 10 percent of Americans thought that military action in Afghanistan was a mistake. By 2014, 49 percent believed it was a mistake and 48 percent did not.[12]

The most significant impact of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, was the strain on its personnel. A single twelve or fifteen month deployment could be taxing yet feasible for a young soldier with a growing family. Multiple deployments with only a year respite before deploying again, on the other hand, took their toll on the quality of life. Years of the unpopular wars also turned recruiting for the Army into a continuous struggle. Lowered enlistment standards, raised age limitations, and seemingly endless cash enlistment bonuses barely kept the Army’s head above water. When the Gates Commission delivered its report forty years ago, it assumed that the all-volunteer force would be supported by an effective standby draft and it did not anticipate that long wars would be measured in decades, not years. The end of the fourth era of the all-volunteer Army resulted in the world’s most competent Army, but also an Army stretched beyond its limits.

5TH ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY: 2014 –

The Army is once again facing an uncertain future environment. The national military strategy emphasizing a pivot towards Asia is a not-so-subtle signal that the nation has no appetite for land wars or troops occupying foreign countries. Congress’s inaction in stopping sequestration revealed that the days of the military receiving a blank check are over. The downsizing is in progress while tensions in Ukraine, Syria, Africa, and South Korea simmer. Cyberwarfare, the treatment of veterans, PTSD and TBI, and the growing gap between the military and the society it serves will be some of the many issues facing the all-volunteer force in this new era marked by uncertainty and ambiguity.

The all-volunteer military continues to be the institution that holds the most societal confidence. American society is appreciative of an institution that does it job well and subordinates its own interests to those of society. Yet vulnerabilities in that confidence can emerge from the military fighting for its piece of the shrinking fiscal pie, the perceived neglect of veterans, or the growing political activity of retired general officers.

In 1983, the remarkable success of the all-volunteer force led Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to exclaim, “To all the American people, I would say that the experiment is over. We know that an all-volunteer force can succeed, and we know what it takes to make it succeed.” And yet, perhaps we really cannot know all it takes to make the all-volunteer Army succeed. Considering the circumstances, it appears that this experiment called the all-volunteer Army is not over.

About the author:
Leonard Wong is a research professor in the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. A retired Army officer, his career included teaching leadership at West Point, serving as the director of the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis (OEMA), and serving as an analyst for the Chief of Staff of the Army. His research has led him to locations such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Vietnam. He has testified before Congress and his work has been highlighted in numerous newspapers and new programs. He is a Professional Engineer and holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.S. and Ph.D. in Business Administration from Texas Tech University.

This essay is based on a lecture for FPRI’s Butcher History Institute conference on “America and Modern War: The American Military Post-Vietnam,” a weekend-long program for high school teachers on American military history hosted and cosponsored by the First Division Museum at Cantigny in Wheaton, Illinois (a division of the McCormick Foundation), and cosponsored by Carthage College, April 26-27, 2014.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI, and may be accessed here.

[1] Gates, Thomas S. Jr., The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, Washington, D.C., February 1970, p. iii.

[2] See Maxwell R. Thurman, “Sustaining the All-Volunteer Force: 1983-1992: The Second Decade,” in The All-Volunteer Force After a Decade, eds. William Bowman, Roger little, and G. Thomas Sicilia (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1986), p. 266-285 and Maxwell R. Thurman, “On Being All You Can Be: A Recruiting Perspective,” in Professional on the Front Line: Two Decades of the All-Volunteer Force, eds. J. Eric Fredland, Curtis Gilroy, Roger D. Little, and W. S. Sellman (Washington: Brassey’s, 1996) p. 55-65.

[3] Thurman (1986, p. 268).

[4] Department of Defense, America’s Volunteers: A Report on the All-Volunteer Armed Forces, December 31, 1978, Washington, DC, p. 3.

[5] Janice H. Laurence, and Peter F. Ramsberger, Low-aptitude Men in the Military: Who Profits, Who Pays? (New York: Praeger, 1991), p. 68.

[6] See Chapter 5 “Era of the Hollow Army” in Who Will Lead? Senior Leadership in the United States Army, Edward C. Meyer, R. Manning Ancell, and Jane Mahaffey, (Westport Connecticut: Praeger 1995) p. 145-187.

[7] Richard M. Nixon, The Real War (New York: Warner Books, 1980), p. 201.

[8] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 1, The Army, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001, p. 1.

[9] See for example the series by Dana Priest, “The Proconsuls: America’s Soldier-Diplomats,” The Washington Post, September 28 – 30, 2000 that discusses the role of the military in diplomacy.

[10] See Leonard Wong, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College) 2004.

[11] Andrew Dugan, On 10th Anniversary, 53% in U.S. See Iraq War as Mistake, Gallup Poll, March 18, 2013. http://www.gallup.com/poll/161399/10th-anniversary-iraq-war-mistake.aspx

[12] Frank Newport, More Americans Now View Afghanistan War as a Mistake, Gallup Poll, February 19, 2014. http://www.gallup.com/poll/167471/americans-view-afghanistan-war-mistake…

The post From Black Boots To Desert Boots: The All-Volunteer Army Experiment Continues – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Hamza Salahuddin

Last month Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was re-elected for a fourth term after legislation allowing him to run again for president was passed. This unprecedented action led many critics to suspect that the elections would only serve as a façade to preserve the balance of power in the country. Criticism intensified in the run-up to elections, with many people pointing out that that a 77 year-old who recently suffered from a stroke could not possibly be in good enough health to lead the country.

Unlike typical dictatorships, Algeria’s political power is not concentrated in a single institution, family, or individual, but rather in an extended group consisting of members of the military, technocrats, and politicians, known in Algeria as “le pouvoir” (the power). Instead of the presidency and other institutions in the country, it is this group keeps a tight grip over the country’s wealth and political affairs. Yet why would this secretive group of individuals appoint an ailing man to run for president again? If Bouteflika is not an integral part of running the country, then he could easily be replaced by anyone, as long as they serve the interests of le pouvoir.

The answer to this partially lies in the country’s historical narrative. Given the Algeria’s bloody history, politicians in power have always relied on key events in the country’s history to provide justification for their rule, and le pouvoir has used Bouteflika’s civil war legacy to the same effect.

We can divide the country`s historical narrative into three periods: the pre-civil war era (before 1991), the civil war, and the post-civil war era. In the first period, the country`s major political force was the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) which fought for Algeria`s independence against French rule. Almost all of the country`s major political figures, including Bouteflika, were at one point affiliated with the FLN, often using the anti-colonial narrative to legitimize their rule. However, by the 1980s the country’s colonial narrative became irrelevant and was overshadowed by social disparity burdening the country’s population.

The second period is a particularly volatile one. It came during a time when the FLN began to lose favor among the people. Rising prices of basic goods, high unemployment, and a lack of political reform led to riots in October 1988. As a last ditch effort to satisfy the people, the FLN revised the constitution to remove the one-party system, thus paving the way for multiple parties to contest the 1991 elections. The most influential party to emerge from these events was the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), which went on to comfortably win the first round of the election. This outcome, however, was not palatable for the military which staged a coup and nullified the results. This escalated tensions between the FIS and the military, resulting in the decay of law and order and the country quickly descended into a civil war.

The civil war ended in 2002 and Bouteflika was labelled as the man who helped return peace to Algeria. He became president in 1999 when his predecessor unexpectedly stepped down. Though his role in the civil war is not entirely clear, many of his supporters believe that his reconciliation efforts led to peace in the country by encouraging the military and various Islamist groups to put down their arms.

Similar to the way that the FLN propagated their anti-colonial legacy well into the 1980s, the country’s current ruling forces have used Bouteflika’s civil war legacy as a way of legitimizing his leadership. But as was the case with the FLN, Bouteflika’s legacy also became irrelevant. The civil war ended more than 10 years ago and the current generation of youth believe that Bouteflika’s achievements are not helping with the country’s current situation. Algeria now finds itself in a similar predicament as it did prior to the civil war in 1991.

If there is one thing that the civil war can tell us about the affairs of Algerian politics, it is that the balance of power is in a fragile state. With people increasingly becoming dissatisfied with the government, it is difficult for those who run the country to find a viable replacement for Bouteflika without triggering the type of protests seen during the Arab Spring. Among the candidates that le pouvoir could put forth, Bouteflika is the only one who can gain sufficient popular support yet the tide against him and his backers has been on the rise for the last two years.

Though some people might still see Bouteflika as a daring visionary who united Algeria during the civil war, there are a growing number of people who are dissatisfied with the lack of progress being made to improve their living conditions. During the election campaign, a youth oriented non-partisan group named “Barakat!” (Enough!) led protests against the current political system demanding political reform. Unlike what many politicians have speculated, the masses no longer fear the type of instability that existed throughout the 1990s. People now have better means to vent their frustration towards the government. Rather than trying to pick up arms against the country’s leadership, people are frequently using social media to express their concerns and mobilize protests against the government.

While le pouvoir has postponed the inevitable, it will find it extremely difficult to maintain this fragile balance of power when Bouteflika’s health further deteriorates. Once that does occur, the cartel controlling the country will be forced to select a president that does not have the type of legacy that Bouteflika enjoys. With 30% of the country’s population below the age of 15, we can only expect the national unemployment situation to worsen in the near future. Once this generation comes of age and finds it extremely difficult to find a job, fingers will once again be pointed at the government. This perhaps may become a tipping point in the country’s history and the government may once again buckle under pressure from the masses.

Hamza Salahuddin is a contributor to Geopoliticalmonitor.com, where this article was first published.

The post A Coming Power Shift In Algerian Politics? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Dr Kumar David

It is natural that many reasons are ascribed for the defeat of the LTTE; none is exclusively true, they are interconnected, some more significant than others. After five years it is timely to sift the wheat from the chaff and reflect upon their relative importance and gain some perspective.

Most oft proclaimed in Sinhalese society is that a determination of leadership (funding, unflagging political support, military strategy, and resisting foreign pressure to compromise) decided the issue; yes this is partly true. A second argument, popular with Tamil liberals, is that the LTTE lost the moral high ground by espousing terrorism against Sinhalese civilians and Tamil leaders, and that internally it sank to the pits of internecine cannibalism; again partly true.

A third theory loved by armchair historians is that the war was intrinsically unwinnable; 13% Tamils versus 75% Sinhalese; a non-state actor versus state power. Yes, but the world has also seen some counter examples. A fourth explanation advanced by Tamils with empathy for the LTTE is that it was let down by India and the international community (IC). The US and India even provided Colombo with military intelligence they moan. This is an aspect of a bigger international story that I will discuss. Finally a fifth proposition, which I place the most weight on, is that the LTTE was politically misbegotten; all the other negatives flowed from this congenital malfunction. None of this is new, but what about ranking these factors, bearing in mind their interconnectedness?

There are trivial ‘explanations’ too; Mahinda Rajapakse’s astrological conjunctions, Karunanidhi’s double dealing, diaspora infighting, treachery of the old-left, and the implacable resolve of Sinhala chauvinism. All this can be put to one side as ‘also’ factors – soothsaying of course is hilarious hogwash. This essay makes no further reference to these secondary factors.

Downgrading the first factor

Determination of leadership: Yes credit has to be given to President Mahinda, Defence Secretary Gotabaya and Army Commander Sarath Fonseka whether one is a supporter or foe of the trio (one can dislike Attila the Hun without denying his skills). That they were determined to finish off the LTTE is undeniable. After the Mawilaru incident, sensing the LTTE’s international isolation, they knew the wind was blowing their way and poured money into the endeavour, expanded the military, employed extensive air power, resisted international pressure, and ignored civilian casualties once they smelt victory. The fact is that the Sinhala State did not intentionally kill Tamil civilians, rather it was callous; what Hannah Arndt called the ‘banality of evil’. It did not hesitate to decimate civilians if one Tiger was shielded among them. This is unsurprising since the military had been weaned in 1989-90 on the blood of southern Sinhala youth. To make an aside comment: For this reason the UNHRC investigations should pursue crimes against humanity and war crimes; genocide won’t stick since the intention to destroy a race or group must be proved to establish genocide.

The factor I named first, determination of leadership, was important but not the decisive or the second most important factor in defeating the LTTE. Previously there were two determined politico-military efforts that came to nought. The JR-Lalith, Vadamarachchi offensive in 1987 came close to victory when it had to be aborted. The Chandrika–Anurudha effort in late 1990s and early 2000s to regain the initiative after setbacks to Aghni Kheela and the devastating defeat at Elephant Pass in April 2000 was also resolute. Janaka Perera succeeded in repulsing a do-or–die effort by the LTTE to retake Jaffna. No one can say Chandrika, incensed by endless LTTE perfidy in negotiations in the mid-1990s, did not subsequently provide the military with ample support.

JR in 1987, and Chandrika in the late 1990s, were unsuccessful not for lack of determination, but because other factors went against them. Indian intervention and the failure to split the LTTE, respectively, went against them. True, JR was a dolt to provoke Indira Gandhi, the power next door, into arming and training Tamil militants, but eventually in 1987 he had no choice but to capitulate. He had to call off the operation in Vadamarachchi or have his military bombed into oblivion and his ports blockaded. He had no choice.

The Chandrika of the late 1990s and early 2000s was not lacking in resolve, having tasted LTTE treachery. Her problem was that her army, despite its best efforts, lost. The LTTE stayed unified and retained indulgence in the international community and support among Tamils at home and abroad. Though there was no question of gaining Thamil Eelam, and never any prospect of the LTTE occupying Colombo and taking state power, the armed forces nevertheless were incapable of defeating it prior to the LTTE’s self-inflicted split in the Eastern Province. It was not lack of leadership in government; it was other factors that aborted victory. Ten years later, the short-sightedness of the LTTE leadership in failing to avert an internal split, sealed its fate.

Disposing of theories two and three

Second in my list was the theory that the LTTE was defeated because it degenerated into terrorism and lost the moral high ground. The third thesis was that Thamil Eelam was an illusion that could never be achieved. There is some truth in both. It is true that at first Tamil militants (not only the LTTE) were exemplary while the state resorted to retributive massacre of civilians, rape, arson and racial hatred. But somewhere along the line, after the LTTE cannibalised other Tamil militants, things changed. Terrorism surfaced on a big scale in 1987 in the Habarana and Pettah bus-stand bombing in each of which over a 100 civilians died, followed by the coldblooded murder of 600 captured policemen in 1990. Something flipped; the LTTE knitted liberation war with terror against civilians. A dastardly act of different genre was the expulsion of Muslims from Jaffna in 1991.

These atrocities were compounded by political murders; Amirthalingam-1989, Athulathmudali- 1993, Premadasa-1993, Gamini Dissanayake-1994, and Neelan Thiruchelvam-1999. The NSSP’s Annamali was also killed by the LTTE. Proof of loss of rationality is that after 9-11 it persisted in terrorism, unaware that the world had changed. It was digging its own grave. In each of 2006, 2007 and 2008, there were about 15 attacks against civilians none of which can be passed off as war against a military foe. It is a measure of megalomania, divorced from reality that even after 9-11 Prabaharan persisted in individual terrorism; Lakshman Kadirgama in 2005, Janaka Perera in 2008, Jeyaraj Fernandopullai in 2008 and dozens others depending on who you believe. All this contributed to its eventual international isolation whose crucial importance I will discuss later.

The LTTE used terror but no doubt the Lankan military was a worse agent of state terror, including rape which was not in the LTTE’s repertoire. People in all lands know the state to be an obnoxious violator of rights and an oppressor of the people; but liberators are expected to be different. Another factor that cost the LTTE the moral high ground was that Tamils in the north and east came to dread it as an abductor of youth. Thousands of young Tamils living abroad today, many of them vociferous LTTE supporters, paradoxically, are refugees from this conscription.

All this is true and flow from the quintessential militarism of the LTTE; but terrorism and loss of the moral high ground was not the direct reason for defeat. Ruthless organisations have been victors if people’s faith in the cause and international support remained steadfast. A clear case that comes to mind is the creation of Israel. In real world politics the good do not always win, sometimes movements that use terrorism do. Therefore the second factor in my list, the LTTE’s propensity to terrorism to match the state terrorism of the armed forces, has to be given reduced priority in the list of reasons contributing directly to the LTTE’s defeat.

The third item in my list was that Thamil Eelam was intrinsically delusory. The Ceylon Tamils were say, 13% of the population while the Sinhalese 75%. Tamils were alienated from state power and the LTTE was an actor in the jungle. Lanka is an island and partition would entail a long and fractious border – they are still fighting on the Indo-Pakistan border 65 years after partition. Therefore a good case can be made that the LTTE dream of a separate state was never doable. There is merit in this thesis, but problematic and contentious states do come into existence if other factors are right. Examples include the de facto and much contested partition of the small island of Cyprus, the small territory of Kosovo, tiny Moldova, and possibly future East Ukraine. Therefore I do not believe that the third item on my list was an insuperable obstacle to the LTTE project.

Theory four

I now turn to the last part of my essay to commemorate the fifth year after the end of the war. I am seeking to prioritise the reasons why the LTTE was vanquished and I am well aware that ranking will be controversial – but the truth must prevail! So far I have dealt with three factors (government determination, LTTE terrorism, impossibility of Eelam) which I rank as lower in importance than the two factors that I turn to. In runner-up position I place the hostility of the International Community, especially Delhi, US and UK, and award first place to a birth defect in the LTTE’s DNA, the flawed ideological substances on which it was conceived and suckled.

In my mind the international factor, especially the near abroad, is crucial for a small island remote from everywhere else. Events in the Ukraine again prove this thesis; the great power next door will call the shots. Crimea is gone forever; Russia will decide the fate of eastern Ukraine; Obama, Angel Merkel and NATO can gasp but no matter they are extras sitting on the bench; in cricket such guys are called twelfth-man. Either the poltroons in Kiev will negotiate with the rebel provinces and allow them considerable autonomy, say federalism, or that part of Ukraine will secede as a separate state, or secede and integrate with Russia. That’s the bottom line. It’s not so simple in Lanka, but in the long run it is devolution or death for this island state.

In the Twenty-First Century international factors are crucial; the near-abroad if it is a great or a regional power is decisive. The Rajapakse clan is too dumb to see this; so this maxim will have to be engraved on its gravestone as an epitaph. Thamil Eelam died with Rajiv Gandhi because the LTTE morons failed to comprehend the importance of India. Three entities died that day; Rajiv, Prabharan and Thamil Eelam. Did a stout, squat, ogre, hiding in a cave in a remote island, fancy that he could murder a past and future prime minister of India and get away with it? Crazy!

Had the LTTE swum with the tide and formed a North-Eastern provincial administration, after the Thirteenth Amendment, as a stable autonomous unit with international guarantees, the history of Lanka would have been happier and the Tamils spared much suffering. This is another colossal Prabaharan blunder on par with his murder of Rajiv Gandhi

Without Indian support and ostracised and banned all over the Western world, the LTTE was isolated and destined to defeat. Oh yes KP could raise millions in the diaspora, the LTTE had shipping lines and access to drug money, but can this match international state power? No, the LTTE was doomed the day it lost international empathy. Its international pariah status sealed its fate. The Rajapakse regime is now staring into the same abyss.

In modern times, from the late Twentieth Century, new sates are formed, or regions secede, only exceptionally because they are ethnically, linguistically or culturally homogeneous. The Leninist Right of Homogeneous Nations to Self-Determination thesis is declining in significance and being replaced by the Right of Plural Communities of People to determine their fate. Seceding or not seceding in modern times has more to do with modern realities; global economics, technology and trade, great-power impact and internal democracy – in addition to homogeneity. The fifteen states that emerged out of the USSR, the seven ex-Yugoslav states, most new African ones, and now eastern Ukraine are non-homogeneous. They are not examples of the right of homogeneous Nations to self-determination, as if still living in a bygone era; on the contrary, they exemplify the right of People in plural societies to self-determination in the modern context.

Hence, expulsion of the Muslims from Jaffna in 1991, seeking to create Tamil homogeneity, apart from being a crime in itself, was also an anachronism that showed that the LTTE failed to grasp the plural character of modern states.

The final answer

The most important reason why the LTTE perished was its fallacious prioritisation of the military aspect over the political aspect. Its petty-bourgeois, non-Marxist DNA was military not political. I am not repudiating the armed struggle in so far as it is ancillary, but I am rejecting the strategy of giving it priority over politics. As a result the LTTE became an army, a military entity, not a political entity; this was its core DNA. It is true that in those dark and desperate days of brutal oppression by the state, the LTTE stood up and fought for the Tamil people. This is why most Tamils had a soft corner for the ‘boys’, even if they suspected that it would all end in tears. Be that as it may, Prabhakaran was not a Lenin, a Mao or a Mandela; he was a Shining Path guerrilla.

The LTTE, the advocate of a military solution rather than a political strategy with a strictly limited military component, perished in a blind alley. To be literal, it perished in a remote lagoon. The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, bad faith and deceit in negotiations, and irresponsible terrorism are the hallmarks of a leader unable to digest the ‘overdetermining’ importance of the political aspect. It is the insignia of an army, intent on victory in the field, not a cachet of statesmanship. The LTTE lived and died in this surreal world. I have held this view for thirty-five years from my Vama Samasamaja (LSSP left tendency) days of the 1970s and 1980s, in my 1989 book coedited with Silan Kadirgamar (Ethnicity; Arena Publications), and in all my subsequent interventions.

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By Dr. S. Chandrasekharan

On 8th of April, the Maldives Bar Association renewed its call for the suspension of Supreme Court Judge Ali Hameed pending investigations into allegations of the judge’s appearance in a series of sex tapes. The Bar contended that Hameed’s presence in the Supreme Court Bench contravenes the Islamic Shariah and the norms of justice. The result is that the Bar Council is itself being de recognised!

The Judicial Service Commission of Maldives had set in motion cases against Judge Hameed in May and again in December 2013. The recommendation of December 2013 is still pending. This delay of over 4 months is reported to have undermined the public trust in the judiciary. The sex tapes are not the only ones under investigation.

Maldives media has reported various other cases of corruption of the Judge which were also to be investigated. These include

a. Illegal transfer of credit from the state funded mobile account to his personal account in 2010.

b. Tapes showing Judge Hameed discussing with a local businessman of the political influence on the judiciary and there is a hint that the present power holders can manipulate the judiciary.

c. A 2010 audit reported an expenditure of MVR 13,200 to repair a state-owned car when there was evidence to show that there was no damage to the car. On the other hand some repairs were done in 2011.

d. A Sum of MV 50,000 from the state funds was spent for personal purposes during the judge’s visit to China.

e. Since 2012, the judge has been illegally occupying the State owned apartments in Male.

To cap this all, now comes the news, that the documents relating to the corruption cases against Judge Hameed were destroyed due to a “Coffee spill” at the Supreme Court Premises. The destruction of the documents could not have been accidental and could not have been done without the connivance of people now in power. It is no surprise that the opposition MDP has expressed its surprise and concern over the developments.

In one of the blogs I came across some details of the state of judiciary in Maldives. It says that Maldives has no criminal procedure act, witness protection act or Evidence Act. According to the Global Corruption barometer, 69 percent of the judiciary is “extremely” corrupt. 50 percent of the judges are said to have only 7th grade education and the only qualification they have is a 6 months or a two-year course certificate!

The Supreme Court in Maldives is said to have suddenly woken up on the need for reforms though it looks that it is being undertaken to ward off international criticism. The Court has formed a “Law Reform Committee” that would consist of

a. All judges of the Supreme Court Bench ( Note- this would include Judge Hameed too)

b. The State Attorney General, Mohamed Anil.

c. The Home Minister, Umar Naseer.

d. Minister of Finance and Treasury Abdulla Jihad

e. Prosecutor General ( position now vacant)

f. The Commissioner of Police Ali Waheed.

The purpose of the Committee is said to be to examine the basic direction of judiciary reform in Maldives with a view to setting out a reform package to be implemented. The Supreme Court has also noted that Committee’s reform work will focus on strengthening the criminal justice system, civil justice system, family justice system and the juvenile justice system.

What is needed in Maldives is not just reforms but a thorough cleanup of the judicial system in all aspects. A large committee of the type with the kind of members in it would only perpetuate, what one has described as the “tyranny” of the judiciary. Till this is rectified, there is no hope of democracy taking firm roots in Maldives.

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Swiss workers could soon be making the highest minimum wage in the world if a national vote Sunday goes their way.

Labor unions have been campaigning for months to win public backing for a minimum hourly wage of 22 Swiss francs, or nearly $25.

The Swiss government and business leaders have warned that the initiative would destroy jobs, hurt lower skilled employees and make it harder for young people and others to enter the workforce.

“The proposed statutory minimum wage would be the highest in the world, by some margin,” the Swiss economics ministry said in a statement. “Consequently, those who would suffer most from the initiative are those it is supposed to benefit.”

Switzerland is a wealthy country, enjoying above average rates of growth and employment and relatively short working hours. The average household has net disposable income of about $30,000, compared with the average of $23,000 in the OECD, a group of 34 of the world’s strongest economies.

But OECD figures also show a considerable gap between rich and poor — the top 20% of the population earn nearly five times as much as the bottom 20% — and anger at growing inequality has been increasing.

Unlike many advanced economies, Switzerland does not have a statutory national minimum wage. Pay is set in negotiations between companies and individuals, or with employee representatives — sometimes across industrial sectors.

Among the developed countries, the USA is at the bottom with a minimum wage of $7.25/hr, Canada and England are at $7.90, France is at $10.60/hr whereas Germany’s minimum wage is at $15/hr.

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