By Terri Moon Cronk

Military commission proceedings for five suspects charged with the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States are progressing despite what the chief prosecutor called a “shortened week of pretrial sessions.”

Army Brig. Gen. Mark Martins made his remarks in a written statement issued June 15 before this week’s two-day session in the ongoing war crimes case at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The hearing’s arguments centered this week on whether FBI investigations of some defense team members pose a conflict of interest in the case.

In what he described as a departure from recent sessions, the chief prosecutor said his appointment of a special review team for this week’s conflict-of-interest hearing was meant to “ensure that the prosecution team … remains walled off from learning about any privileged communications between defense counsel and the accused that might arise.”

“Such an approach of detailing separate counsel is common in situations such as this,” he said.

A sixth suspect, Abd al Hadi al-Iraqi, is expected to be arraigned tomorrow before the commission on noncapital charges, the chief prosecutor said. Charges state that as a senior member of al-Qaida, al-Iraqi conspired with and led others in a series of deadly attacks and related offenses in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere from 2001 to 2006. “While facing trial he, like the others, will remain in lawful, humane and secure detention at Guantanamo Bay,” Martins said.

The general emphasized that Congress established the Office of Military Commissions as a U.S. justice and counterterror institution. “They have been and will continue to be successful in incapacitating and punishing terrorists who employ the means and methods of armed hostilities,” he said.

On a broader note, Martins said that while it is natural to focus on in-court proceedings, “it is also worth remembering the significant work the defense and prosecution teams continue to accomplish” between sessions.

The government has provided more than 293,000 pages of unclassified discovery to the defense for each of the five suspects “so the accused may meaningfully confront the charges against them,” he said. The defense and prosecution teams have briefed in writing 154 “substantive” motions and have orally argued about 36 substantive motions in previous pretrial sessions, he added.

Of those motions briefed, he said, eight have been mooted, dismissed or withdrawn; 77 have been ruled on by the judge; and another 30 have been submitted and are pending decision.

The military commission has received testimony from 22 witnesses in more than 65 hours of testimony in the case, Martins said, with “all witnesses subject to cross-examination, to assist it in deciding pretrial motions.” The defense and prosecution teams have filed 190 exhibits and 76 declarations alleging facts and have provided references for the commission’s consideration of the issues, he said.

“These data reflect methodical and deliberate movement toward trial, however unsatisfying the pace may be to a range of observers,” Martins said.

“Much remains to be done,” Martins noted. “As we continue to move toward trial, the passage of time will not diminish our resolve. And these trials, equipped with strong procedural safeguards and court sessions that are as public and open as possible, will ensure that justice is done consistent with our values and in accordance with the rule of law.”

The post US Chief Prosecutor Says Commissions Incapacitate, Punish Terrorists appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The global financial crisis has triggered a wave of regulatory reform to stabilize the banking sector.

Most of the policies proposed under the framework of Basel III are concerned with individual bank solvency rather than with the possible spillovers and risk transfer between banks. As a result, systemic risk may be exacerbated.

In their article “Good for One, Bad for All: Determinants of Individual Versus Systemic Risk,” published in Journal of Financial Stability, co-authors Germán López-Espinosa of University of Navarra, Antonio Rubia of the University of Alicante, Laura Valderrama of the IMF and Miguel Antón of IESE aim to fill the gap between “micro-prudential” policies (to mitigate the risk of individual banks) and “macro-prudential” policies (to mitigate systemic risk) by identifying how they overlap and interact.

Basel III Categories

Following the global financial crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) introduced new regulatory initiatives, known as Basel III, that seek to enhance individual banks’ resilience by strengthening their capital buffer and their capacity to absorb liquidity shocks.

The BCBS adopted supplementary measures in December 2011 to address systemic risk, including the proposal of a methodology to identify “Global Systemically Important Banks” and the calibration of the additional loss-absorbency capacity they should have.

The methodology is based on five categories that measure size, interconnectedness, substitutability, cross-border activity, and complexity of the bank. The same relative importance is given to these factors and they are implicitly treated as if they were independent. That is an oversight and a strong assumption, in the authors’ view.

Filling the Gap

The authors believe that a bank should be regulated as a function of both its joint risk with other banks and its individual risk. Also, the potential conflict between the variables that mitigate each type of risk should be formally addressed.

Taking a step toward filling this gap between “micro-prudential” and “macro-prudential” policies, the authors analyzed a sample of 47 large international banks in major advanced economies from 2001 to 2010.

They examined how the main systemic factors outlined by the BCBS contribute to individual risk and the spread of systemic risk in the global banking industry.

Measuring Risk

While individual risk can objectively be measured by looking at credit default swap spreads (tracked by Bloomberg) or the probability of default (estimated by Moody’s), for example, there is no straightforward way to define systemic risk.

They use a regression model based on the so-called CoVaR methodology to capture a bank’s contribution to the downside risk of the banking system portfolio.

Determinants of Systemic Risk

The authors identify the determinants of systemic risk focusing on bank-specific variables, such as funding model, trading activities, cross-border exposure and approach to liquidity management.

They find that a bank’s contribution to systemic risk can successfully be predicted by firm-specific variables related to the BCBS categories.

Two liability-related variables — funding risk (measured by short-term wholesale funding) and the loan-to-deposit ratio — are strong determinants of systemic risk.

Two asset-related variables — business model (measured as trading profits over net revenue) and cross-border exposure (measured as foreign assets over total assets) — seem to be crucial factors in destabilizing the financial system. Investment banking (for trading profits) or international diversification alone does not seem sufficient to trigger systemic risk; it is their interaction that exacerbates instability.

The remaining BCBS categories do not seem to play an incremental role in generating systemic risk. Size, for example, does not seem to pose significant systemic risk on its own because bigger banks may be more diversified in segmented markets, offsetting the impact of larger defaults.

Policy Implications

The article reveals potential trade-offs between the determinants of systemic risk and of individual resilience. The only factor that emerges as a generator of both systemic and individual risk is the loan-to-deposit ratio. This suggests that a micro-prudential policy based on the loan-to-deposit ratio of constraining banks may complement a macro-prudential approach to financial regulation.

By contrast, a bank’s business model and its liquidity management appear to have conflicting effects on individual and systemic risk. Specifically, higher investment banking activity lowers the probability of an individual default, while decentralized liquidity management works the same way. However, both activities appear to build up risk for the system. Looking at trading profits (business model), the effect seen here is relatively more pronounced for European banks.

The results call for a cautious approach to the design of regulatory standards that aim to increase the resilience of the overall financial system.

Macro-prudential regulation should focus not only on scaling up micro-prudential measures but also on enabling the efficient transfer of risk between financial institutions, the authors find.

The post Good For One, Bad For All: Watching Out For Systemic Risk appeared first on Eurasia Review.

China’s top diplomat traveled to Vietnam Tuesday for talks aimed at resolving a dispute over Beijing’s deployment of an oil rig in disputed waters in the South China Sea, with experts predicting the two sides to hash out several key issues.

The arrival in Hanoi of Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi, who outranks the foreign minister, represents the highest level bilateral contact since a Chinese state-run oil company deployed the rig to Vietnam’s coast on May 2, sparking tensions.

Yang will attend the annual meeting of the China-Vietnam Steering Committee for Bilateral Cooperation with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh on Wednesday, according to a statement by China’s Foreign Ministry.

He is also expected to meet with Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and Nguyen Phu Trong, the general secretary of the ruling Communist Party in Hanoi.

“We hope that Vietnam can bear in mind the big picture, work with China towards the same goal and properly deal with the current situation,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chinying told a regular press briefing Tuesday.

Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry has said that the two sides will specifically discuss the oil rig.

Vietnam and China blame one another for repeated collisions in the oil rig area between ships from both countries, with Vietnam earlier this month releasing dramatic video footage showing a large Chinese ship chasing and ramming one of its fishing boats and causing it to sink.

Dinh Hoang Thang, Vietnam’s former ambassador to the Netherlands, told RFA’s Vietnamese Service that the high level meeting was sure to address a number of key issues surrounding the sea dispute.

“We all know that Yang Jiechi and Pham Binh Minh have held very tense talks over the phone before,” he said.

“If each side tries to defend their own opinions, the situation can only get worse … [Yang] holds a higher position than the [Chinese] foreign minister, so this time the dialogue is likely to address many important issues.”

Meeting goals

Dinh Kim Phuc, a Vietnamese expert on the South China Sea, said the meeting of the Steering Committee for Bilateral Cooperation is simply “an excuse” to bring the two sides together to “solve the problem of the oil rig.”

“This is once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for Vietnam to fight China,” he said.

“But if this visit … [sees] Vietnam continue to compromise with China, then I think the oil rig will not be removed, or it will simply be replaced and we will never solve the problem—meaning that Vietnam will lose the South China Sea.”

Phuc said that if Hanoi lets the issue drag on, China would be given “the green light to undermine Vietnamese sovereignty” which would possibly lead to Vietnam’s loss of its claim on the disputed and resource-rich Spratly island chain.

Yun Sun, an expert with the Washington-based Stimson Center, told RFA that China likely aims to discuss ways of decreasing tensions in the region and how the two sides might avoid confrontations in the future.

“China does try to at least present an image of a China willing to talk and a China willing to negotiate, but I doubt that actually indicates any willingness for China to make a concession or compromise on the issues of the territorial dispute,” she said.

“Yang’s visit is aimed at having some dialogue and trying to find ways to dilute and to reduce the tension, and see if there is any possibility of having a meaningful dialogue about how to move forward.”

Open letter

Ahead of Wednesday’s meeting, Vietnam’s former ambassador to China, General Nguyen Trong Vinh, published an open letter addressed to General Secretary Trong calling on the Communist Party to stand up for the country’s sovereignty.

“Vietnam truly believes that the two communist parties ‘have the same ideology’, so it feels very close to China and would not want to do anything to disappoint the country,” he said.

“I do not oppose maintaining friendly relations between the citizens of both nations. However, I do oppose the leadership in power of China constantly nurturing a state of obtaining what it wants through the subjugation of Vietnam.”

Vinh said that public opinion in Vietnam “has it that the [party] will not resist China’s invasion.”

He decried what he called China’s aggression towards Vietnam’s ships in the South China Sea and called on the party to join the Vietnamese people to “drastically fight” Beijing’s territorial claims politically, diplomatically and legally.

“Vietnam absolutely cannot miss this chance. If Vietnam wavers and shies away from confrontation, then the day our country becomes a part of China will not be far off,” he said.

Increased tensions

The controversial oil rig is deployed between the Paracel islands—which are occupied by China and claimed by Hanoi—and the Vietnamese coast.

The rig’s deployment set off violent anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam last month, leaving at least four people dead and resulting in the destruction of factories believed to be operated by Chinese companies, though many were Taiwanese-owned.

Prime Minister Dung last month threatened to take legal action against China for the rig deployment.

China claims almost the entire South China Sea, rejecting rival claims from Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei.

Reported by An Nguyen and Serena Doan for RFA’s Vietnamese Service. Written in English by Joshua Lipes.

The post China Sends Top Diplomat To Vietnam Amid Oil Rig Spat appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Re-elected President with 51% of votes, Juan Manuel Santos today declared that his second term in office will be “an open platform to all political forces interested in working more intensely for a peace process with the various guerrillas”.

Supported by 7 million Colombians who voted him, Santos said he will put in his “soul, life and hat” for an open dialogue with the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and ELN (National Liberation Army).

The President stressed that his second term will also bring reforms, including banning re-lection, which is paradoxically what he is benefiting from. He aims to increase the presidential term from four to five or six years. Santos had already mentioned the Constitutional amendment in his first term, when he said he preferred to govern for another two years rather than be re-elected. Though with the peace negotiations situation he decided to seek confirmation.

The legislative elections that were held last March gave the ruling National Unity party the majority with 47 senators and 91 legislators, in respect to 20 senators and 12 legislators of the main opposition Democratic Centre. This will allow Santos and his government to introduce reforms.

The post Colombia: Santos Pledges Peace And Reforms In Second Term appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Michael Lelyveld

In a curious commentary, China’s official press has urged citizens to heed the concerns of U.S. President Barack Obama as it promotes the environmental benefits of a new frugality campaign.

The unusual admonition from the official Xinhua news service followed the launch of a frugality drive by the publicity arm of the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s top planning agency, on May 27.

“Thrift is a traditional Chinese virtue as well as a core socialist value,” said an official statement, calling it “vital to improving society and the environment, and … a healthy lifestyle among the public.”

Since taking office last year, China’s government under President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang has cracked down on extravagance and corruption among officials and party members, but the statement is part of a wider effort to spread the values of austerity to the public at large.

The commentary cited President Obama’s environmental concerns with excessive energy consumption, voiced in a 2010 interview with Australian television, saying that “if over a billion Chinese citizens have the same living patterns as Australians and Americans do right now, then all of us are in for a very miserable time.”

“The planet just can’t sustain it,” Obama said.

China’s new campaign could mark a turnaround from its long-standing position that its rapid economic growth should not be restrained or blamed for climate change and pollution, since industrialized Western countries had already fouled the global nest.

“Developed countries shall take responsibility for their historical cumulative emissions and current high per capita emissions to change their unsustainable way of life,” the NDRC said in a policy paper before the failed Copenhagen climate conference in 2009.

But during the U.N.-sponsored negotiations, China argued that it should not be asked to set similar limits on its own development for the sake of carbon cuts.

“Developing countries will, in pursuing economic development and poverty eradication, take proactive measures to adapt to and mitigate climate change,” the NDRC said, sticking to its formula of “common but differentiated responsibilities” that put China’s economic growth first.

Years of environmental damage may have softened China’s position and persuaded it that all countries will have to curb carbon emissions if reductions are to be achieved.

“High consumption patterns and extravagance are simply not … a suitable path for China. Instead, they will impose an unbearable weight on this most populous of countries,” said the Xinhua commentary, crediting Obama with “an element of truth in what he said.”

Even so, the appeal for frugality stands in contrast to the pro-growth fervor of the past three decades since the former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping is rumored to have said, “To get rich is glorious.”

Sustainable growth

The suggestion of a new direction comes as the government continues to struggle with the challenges of slower economic expansion and attempts to put China on a more sustainable growth course.

Xi and Li have been trying, so far with little success, to clean up pollution, control energy consumption and trim industrial overcapacity.

It is unclear whether the frugality campaign will be a trial balloon or a turning point, but the rationale is an effort to connect several of the government’s key themes, said Daniel Gardner, a China scholar and history professor at Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts.

“Here, the editorial is tying together, however inelegantly, what the leadership knows to be the three major sources of public dissatisfaction and the three major threats to the party’s legitimacy—official corruption, the wealth gap and environmental degradation,” Gardner said.

Since the start of the crackdown, the government’s anti-graft drive has netted scores of officials, some for outright bribe-taking and others for vague violations of “party discipline” and “moral corruption.”

Lavish banquets in private clubs, misuse of public funds, spending on official cars and hoarding of hidden wealth in multiple residences have all been targeted.

In the first quarter of the year, investigators pursued 8,222 cases of bribery or corruption, and 2,245 cases of dereliction of duty, Xinhua reported, citing China’s Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP).

In a widening of the net in January, the Communist Party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection said it had banned promotions of “luoguan,” or “naked officials,” a term used to describe office-holders whose families have emigrated overseas.

Such officials are seen as a high risk for absconding with illicit wealth, whether they have actually committed crimes or not.

After the Communist Party found over 1,000 “naked officials” in southern Guangdong province, 866 were disciplined with demotions or “position adjustments,” state media reported this month.

Under the broad umbrella of his “mass line” campaign, Xi has also called for reforms of official “work styles” to eliminate “formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism and extravagance.”

While the scope of the official doctrine keeps expanding, the frugality initiative may represent the first attempt to create a philosophical construct that will cover both officials and citizens, encompassing social, political, economic and environmental goals.

“Instead of being a mere advocator of frugality, it is more effective to turn everyone into a practitioner of it,” said the official commentary. “Young people must be taught to stay frugal,” it said.

Wealth gap

But after decades of boosting economic growth and wealth formation, the government is likely to find frugality indoctrination a formidable task.

“Assumed here is the long-held belief, since the time of Confucius at least, that it’s the responsibility of officials and the elite to set an example for the people, to model behavior that will promote widespread social and political harmony,” Gardner said.

Openly corrupt officials have set a poor example with their imported cars, blatant lifestyles and ill-gotten gains, but the campaign has now moved on to deal with public resentment of wealth among those who have benefited more than others from China’s growth and development policies.

Gardner said the government is trying “to persuade the rich to stop flaunting their privileged status and enormous wealth.”

“Why? Because such display highlights the enormous wealth gap in Chinese society today and serves as a constant reminder of the great chasm between those who have profited under economic liberalization and those who haven’t,” he said.

“The government fears, rightly, [that the wealth gap] has the potential to become the source of widespread social unrest,” Gardner said.

On its face, the frugality campaign appears to conflict with the government’s announced goal of creating a consumption-led economy rather than one driven primarily by investment.

But Gardner said he suspects that the point of the editorial is that “the consumption-led economy promoted by Li Keqiang should be built on consumption of Chinese-manufactured products,” not foreign cars, French wines and Swiss watches.

As an example, Gardner cited an announcement in May by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that it has removed foreign auto brands from its procurement list and has taken delivery of over 1,000 Chinese-made Hongqi (Red Flag) sedans from the state-owned FAW Car Co. instead.

“Choosing self-developed automobiles is a strict but basic standard in military vehicle reform,” said a PLA procurement official, commenting on the decision to replace Audis with the recently-revived Chinese nameplate, according to the official English-language China Daily.

It is unclear whether the switch is strictly economical, however.

The Hongqi H7 models chosen by the PLA cost from 299,800 to 479,800 yuan (U.S. $47,973 to $76,776), the paper said.

At the high end, the H7s can be equipped with rear seat massagers, said Gardner.

“Frugal? Hardly. But at least not foreign,” he said.

The post China Pursues Frugality Campaign – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

A suicide bomber has detonated explosives at a northeastern Nigeria viewing center where soccer fans had gathered to watch the World Cup.

Witnesses say Tuesday’s blast in the town of Damaturu killed several people.

Medical workers say scores of wounded people have been arriving at the main hospital in Damaturu, the capital of Yobe state.

Witnesses say the bomber rode into the outdoor viewing center on a tricycle taxi and detonated explosives as people watched the match between Brazil and Mexico.

There were no initial claims of responsibility for the blast. However, the northeastern states of Yobe, Borno and Adamawa have been under a state of emergency following a string of deadly attacks linked to the Boko Haram Islamist militant group.

Last week, authorities in Adamawa and Plateau states ordered viewing centers closed because of a fear of possible attacks.

Boko Haram militants have killed thousands of people during their five-year insurgency to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria’s northeast, with attacks on schools, churches, mosques, bus stations and other public places.

The post Nigeria: Suicide Blast At World Cup Viewing Area appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Bournemouth University research exposes the “scandal” of excess deaths in children aged 0-14 in the UK linked to the UK having the third worst income inequality *  and the joint lowest funded health care provision by percentage of GDP in the Western world

UK Child-Mortality-Rates (CMR) for children aged 0-14 were compared with 20 other Western countries between 1979-2010

Countries such as Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain had child death rates higher in 1979 than the UK’s. They now all have substantially lower rates.

If the UK had the same average rate of the 17 countries with lower CMR, then there would have been 1,827 fewer child deaths in 2010.

UK child deaths fell by 62% over the period whereas the average for all the countries in the survey was 66%.

Professor Colin Pritchard who led the research said: “The poverty aspect is a matter of shame, as the five countries with the highest CMR also have the worst income inequality, including the UK, whilst the four countries with the lowest child deaths have the least poverty.

“Scandal is not usually a term used by academics but this study should be a wake-up call for society as the excess in British child mortality is an indictment of one of the richest but most unequal countries in the world.”

Over this period Britain’s NHS was the third joint lowest funded health service in terms of percentage of GDP spent. Greece, Italy, Portugal spend proportionately more of their wealth on health and have lower deaths than the UK.

Professor Pritchard added: “In terms of cost-effectiveness in reducing deaths, the NHS was the 8th best so you cannot blame the NHS, who achieve more with relatively less.”

* Income inequality measured by the gap between top and bottom 20% of incomes

The post UK: Scandal Of Excess Deaths Of Children appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By David Kerans

In mid-2004 or mid-2005 The Economist magazine ran a special report declaring housing prices globally to be the biggest bubble in the history of all bubbles. The crash in housing prices was responsible for the global financial crisis that broke in 2008, of course, and the governments around the developed world took a close look at how to correct the damage and prevent a recurrence.

They did not manage to correct all the damage, of course. Governments have piled up a lot more debt on themselves, but economic growth has been elusive in Europe and North America for the last few years. And now it seems we may have another global housing bubble. Min Zhu, the IMF’s deputy managing director, said in a speech to the Bundesbank that accelerating global house prices are a significant threat to economic stability, and require government action.

How high are the prices? The IMF’s Global Housing Index shows prices up 3.1% over the last year, and the Index now rests 23% above the level of year 2000, which of course was a good year already, what with the dot.com stock bubble fueling extraordinary optimism until late in that year.

In Canada, to give the starkest example, sales prices for homes are “33% above their long-run average in relation to incomes (and 87% above the historical norm relative to rents).

We should point out immediately that the US, Germany, and Japan are not among the obviously overpriced markets. In the US, in fact, home prices are 13% below the historical norm versus incomes, and a modest 2.6% above historical rental prices.

Why are prices rising so fast? Surely because central bankers have kept interest rates so low for so long. And interest rates are going lower: the ECB just cut its deposit rate to -0.15%.

So, what is to be done? In his speech to the Bundesbank Mr. Zhu recommended immediate imposition of tighter lending requirements to homebuyers, higher capital requirements on mortgage lenders, and measures to keep foreign investors out of inflated markets.

For discussion of the meaning of the global housing bubble to the US, Radio VR’s David Kerans spoke with Ken Fears, Director of Housing, Finance, and Regional Economics for the National Association of Realtors (NAR).

Fears said that recent rises in home prices in the US would force prospective homebuyers to temper their expectations, and that prices stand to keep rising in most categories, especially for entry-level homebuyers, for whom the inventory of available properties continues to be tight, on account of slack construction of new housing units since 2008.

As regards the structural distortion of home prices in the US connected to the weak school system? Fears agreed that the quality of school districts is a primary determinant of home prices, as is the convenience of commuting to major centers of employment. Those two factor while continue to buoy housing prices.

As far as the GSEs (Government Sponsored Entities) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are concerned, Fears did not offer an official NAR position in response to pressure in Congress to disband them, confining himself to the NAR’s preference for predictable, steady flows of credit into the mortgage sector. He did, however, rebut the thesis of GSE opponents to the effect that the so-called “jumbo” mortgage market, in which Fannie and Freddie do not operate, functions just fine. Fears pointed out that the jumbo market has not been functioning well, that credit availability has been poor there.

The post IMF Warns Of Global Housing Bubble 2.0 – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

I met Casey Kasem in 1984.  I was then working in my first job, as a fundraiser and regional director for New Jewish Agenda in Los Angeles.  One of my main goals was to host a gala fundraiser for the grassroots group, which was always living financially from hand to mouth. NJA was the most radical Jewish organization on the national scene.  It supported gay rights when almost no one outside the gay community did.  It supported a two-state solution when no Jews, let alone Jewish organizations did.  It supported the Central American Sanctuary movement when it was targeted by Ronald Reagan’s Justice Department.

NJA was so controversial that when local JDL killers murdered the Arab American Anti Discrimination Committee’s regional director, Alex Odeh, we put an ad in the Jewish Journal mourning his loss.  The result was a threatening phone message from one of the killers saying we’d end up “like that dead sand Nigger.”  That was the first time I’ve ever willingly invited the FBI to speak to me.  I did so because the call came to my office and I didn’t know how much danger I faced by being there.  Other members of the organization disagreed with my cooperation; and I’d probably have a lawyer present if I had to do it again.  But when one’s life is in danger, and one doesn’t have much experience with such things, one does as I did.

It was in this context that I set about organizing NJA’s first major fundraising event.  I can’t even remember how we got to talking about Casey Kasem.  But someone suggested asking him and we did.  And he was extraordinarily gracious and kind.  He invited us to his sumptuous Beverly Hills palace of a home where we briefed him about the event.  That’s where I first heard his personal story: the child of Lebanese immigrants, he grew up near Detroit in its large Arab-American community.  I don’t recall whether he told me how he came from the Midwest to Los Angeles.  But in 1970 he got his big break and his show, America’s Top 40, went national.

In 1984, Casey was at the height of his popularity.  All the more reason to acknowledge that his embrace of this fledgling Jewish group of ‘rabble-rousers’ was an extraordinary thing.  In Hollywood, celebrities dish out their popularity in teaspoons on behalf of charities.  If you have even a whiff of controversy, you’re generally avoided.  Casey didn’t care about any of that.  He did what he thought was right and he liked what we were doing.

Growing up a poor Arab-American kid, he hated what happened to his country and the hatred between Israelis and Jews.  Today, perhaps he might be seen as a liberal dreamer.  He certainly was no radical.  But he was reasonable and decent and saw no reason why Arabs and Jews shouldn’t try to find what they had in common instead of what drove them apart.  In those days, that made Casey a totally out-of-the-box personality.

Another amazing figure in the Los Angeles of that time was Rabbi Marshall Meyer.  He was the dean of the Conservative Jewish rabbinical seminary in Argentina during the military junta, which he detested.  After the overthrow of the junta, he came to Los Angeles to be vice president at what was then the University of Judaism.  I don’t think Marshall was terribly happy.  The UJ wasn’t exactly a hotbed of activism.  It was more a sleepy rabbinical outpost.

He later left to become the founding rabbi of Bnai Jeshurun.  The amazing hotbed of Westside Jewish life would never have become what it is today without Marshall’s passion, charisma and towering moral stature.  Unfortunately, Marshall died way to early.  But he left a huge legacy of rabbinical moral activism.

We approached Marshall about joining Casey as our honorees.  They both agreed.  The president of the Beverly Hills Design Center agreed to host our event at his lovely home.  We went from being an “out there” group to being on the cutting edge of Jewish cool.  Perhaps we were on the far cutting edge, but we were a force to be reckoned with.  On the strength of Marshall and Casey’s reputations we broke into some liberal Hollywood celebrities consciousnesses like Richard Dreyfuss, Ed Asner, and others.  It was a fabulous event and put us on the map.

Now Casey is gone.  But like Marshall, Casey leaves a tremendous legacy of kindness and sympathy for the downtrodden.  He is a true representative of the American Dream.  I know he’d be tickled by the NY Times obituary headline which called him “an American voice.”  For this child of immigrants to become America’s voice was truly a dream and a privilege.

Our country was blessed to have two such amazing figures as Casey Kasem and Marshall Meyer.  My life too was blessed to have known them.

This article appeared at Tikun Olam.

The post Casey Kasem, Arab-American Child Of American Dream – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Casey Hynes

Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has moved to bring a Thai woman back from England on lese majeste charges. According to MCOT, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reached out to other agencies, including the Royal Thai Police, to bring Chatwadee “Rose” Amornpat to trial under the country’s lese majeste law.

Rose was born in Thailand but moved to England, where she started a family. She took to social media to post messages critical of Thailand’s monarchy. Rose often posts videos to Facebook and those who support her have called her an “angel of democracy.” However, earlier this spring, her parents reported her to authorities, submitting several of her videos as proof of her critical attitude. Prachatai reports that her parents were “heavily bullied” before they reported their daughter, and that Rose herself is “subjected to hatred and bullying online and offline.” Violating the lese majeste law is a serious offense in the country, and can mean three to 15 years in prison. According to the International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH), six people are currently imprisoned in Thailand for violating the lese majeste law.

MCOT reported that Sek Wannamethee, Director-General of the Department of Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told journalists this week “that the foreign ministry, the Royal Thai Police and the Office of the Attorney General are currently working on legal provisions” to bring Rose back from London to face lese majeste charges. Thailand does have an extradition treaty with the United Kingdom, but because Rose has British citizenship, it is unclear if that will complicate the process. MCOT also noted that while the extradition process is looked into, the Royal Thai Embassy in London will begin verifying Rose’s address, and the addresses of other reported lese majeste offenders currently living in the UK.

According to the UK government website, extradition requests must pass a dual criminality test, which “means that for someone to be extradited, their alleged conduct has to be a criminal offence in both the surrendering and the requesting state.” The site also states that there are 32 categories of offenses for which the dual criminality test does not apply, but anything outside those 32 must be considered a criminal offense in the state requesting extradition and in the UK in order to qualify.

Thai PBS reported that Pol Gen Somyos Pumpanmuang, the deputy police chief, told reporters that police were being instructed to follow up on all lese majeste cases that “are still pending with the police or which are yet to be lodged with the police.”

Rose was in the news earlier this week after a Thai man posted a video of himself going to her former home and painting the Thai flag on her door and flashing a gun (now believed to have been an air gun). Prior to that, a woman posted a video, also of her visit to Rose’s home, saying she planned to slap Rose and throw eggs at her, according to Prachatai. However, the news site reported Rose had said she moved out of that home after separating from her husband so the visits were to no avail.

In other lese majeste news, a lecturer known to be critical of the law and the coup was released on Thursday after one night in detention, according to the Phuket Gazette. Worachet Pakeerut, a legal expert and lecturer, was questioned about his political stances and released on 20,000 baht bail, on the condition that he would not join any political movements or leave the country.

The post Thailand May Attempt To Extradite UK Citizen For Insulting Monarchy – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Lara Lázaro-Touza and Elena López-Gunn

In the light of Spain’s future foreign policy, it is necessary to develop a more pro-active climate diplomacy. This paper analyses Spain’s climate diplomacy in line with the Elcano report titled ‘Towards a Strategic Updating of Spain’s Foreign Policy’ and the State Foreign Action and Service Law (Ley de la Acción y del Servicio Exterior del Estado, LAESE). The paper seeks to provide policymakers with an analysis to support a more pro-active stance on climate policy, aligning Spain’s interests and values. This should help Spain become a more influential global actor as regards climate change, both within the EU and internationally.

(1) Introduction

Climate change is a global externality with local consequences that requires concerted action by sovereign nations. Climate policy is an area in which national and international dimensions are completely blurred. It is also an area in which the concept of global public goods –the provision of a stable climate that is non-rival in nature and non excludable– crystallises. Actions to provide such goods arguably require that countries engaging in international climate agreements have normative values such as solidarity and responsibility. In practice, however, a bird’s eye view of global climate policy shows that developed countries have sought to persuade developing countries to limit their emissions while shying away from significant emission cuts at home. Developing countries have repeatedly demanded aid to address climate change both through funds and technology transfers (Harris, 2009) in order to meets these demands. The EU has traditionally pushed for deep greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions, and Spain has accompanied EU climate policy, with greater or lesser enthusiasm and independence.

For countries like the UK, France and Germany, climate change became a foreign-policy priority, especially in the run-up to Copenhagen and before the economic crisis of 2008 was in full swing. Spain is a climate-vulnerable country, located in a climate-change hotspot, with key economic sectors that can be significantly affected by a changing climate. It has strong ties with Latin America, one of the most active areas in terms of renewable energy development (Bloomberg News Energy Finance, 2013), and it has expertise and technology that can effectively contribute to the expansion of renewable energy markets. Despite Spain’s (self)-interest in successful globally-orchestrated mitigation, it has traditionally been considered a passive laggard as regards its climate-related foreign policy. This has been the case until at least 2004, when Spain took a more active role (Costa, 2006).

This paper analyses Spain’s climate diplomacy[2] in line with the Elcano Royal Institute’s report ‘Towards a Strategic Updating of Spain’s Foreign Policy’ and the LAESE. It seeks to provide policymakers with analysis that supports a more pro-active stance towards climate-related foreign policy, aligning Spain’s interests and values. This should help Spain become a more influential global actor as regards climate change, both within the EU and internationally.

The paper’s structure is as follows: the second section reflects on global changes in the climate system and their consequences for Spain, a key issue for science-based policy making. Section three briefly presents some of the critical actions taken within Spain’s climate diplomacy and then outlines the rationale and objectives for a more pro-active climate-related foreign policy. Section four analyses Spain’s geographical focus in terms of climate diplomacy. Section five presents some conclusions.

(2) Climate change as a threat?: latest findings and the consequences for Spain

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report (henceforth 5AR) states that climate change is unequivocal and that human beings have undoubtedly influenced the climate system. The key impacts that will affect southern Europe include rising sea levels and coastal erosion, water scarcity and more frequent wildfires and heat waves. Economic activity will also be affected, especially in sectors like tourism, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, infrastructure, energy and health (IPCC, 2014). Table 1 below briefly summarises the main impacts of climate change in terms of temperature increases and rising sea levels, as well as effects on water, ecosystems, health and security.

Table 1. Expected key physical and socioeconomic climate change impacts and effects
Sources: Araújo et al., (2011), Bates et al. (2008), CEDEX, (2011), DoD (2010), EEA (2014), Fischer et al. (2007), Garrido et al. (2012), IPCC (2014), IPCC (2013), IPCC (2007), Lorenzo-LaCruz et al. (2012), Met Office (2011), NIC (2009), Postdam Institute (2012).

The consequences of climate change, depicted in Table 1 above, provide Spain with strong reasons to pursue decisive action to mitigate GHG emissions and to adapt to the unavoidable effects of a changing climate.

(3) A vision: actions, goals, values, and interests in Spain´s climate diplomacy

Vision and actions: revisiting the European hot-house
The EU has historically pursued a leadership role in climate policy. The decision on a new policy framework for energy and climate will be made no later than October 2014 (European Council, 2014). Should the Commission’s proposal for a 2030 framework for climate and energy policies be endorsed by the European Parliament and the Council, this would mean a 40% GHG emission reduction for the EU by 2030, a 27% target for renewable energy consumption[6] and the structural reform of the European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The reform would imply the establishment of a market stability reserve post 2021 and provisions aimed at smoothing the process between trading phases, building on the experience gained in the transition from phase 2 to phase 3 of the EU ETS.[7]

According to the Spanish Climate Change Office (OECC in its Spanish acronym), Spain is currently wholeheartedly aligned with the EU’s climate policy, especially as regards the revised post 2020 framework. At the international level, this implies trying to ensure that the 2ºC goal is met, supporting multilateralism, striving for full participation in future climate agreements and ensuring that commitments made by the various parties involved are transparent, quantifiable, comparable, verifiable and ambitious. The EU (and Spain) will also push for a strengthening of the multilateral rules-based regime (a robust set of rules on MRV, accounting and compliance) and will support adaptation and implementation as a key part of the 2015 agreement. Additionally, Spain argues that we should build on existing institutions and processes, strengthen linkages and avoid inefficient duplication of efforts at the international level. In this regard, Spain welcomes the establishment of the Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage associated with climate-change impacts, aimed at enhancing knowledge, coordination and support on this issue.

But achieving the 2ºC target is becoming increasingly difficult, if not impossible, given the current GHG reduction efforts. The task, in terms of mitigation, will require globally, at least, three distinct and interconnected energy-related strategies. First, increased energy efficiency; a potentially low-cost option that can take us over a third of the way to the carbon reductions needed by 2025 and less than a quarter of the way to the GHG reductions needed by 2050. Secondly, reduced energy demand. Third, and particularly important for Spain, ensuring renewable energy sources make a significant contribution to the energy mix. Graph 1 below illustrates how different technologies can contribute to mitigating CO2 emissions for given amounts of energy demand, using Anderson’s bottom-up analysis undertaken for the Stern Review (2007).

Graph 1. Distribution of emission savings by technology
Source: Stern (2007), p. 230.

In Spain, the OECC has been entrusted, by way of article 3.1 of Royal Decree 401/2012, with representing the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and the Environment in international forums, especially at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the IPCC. The rationale for the OECC’s policies is that climate change is a global public bad that can threaten key sectors in Spain.

A key economic sector as regards climate-related foreign policy is the energy sector. In addition to the contribution that renewable energy sources (RES) can make to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, issues of energy dependence and energy security –which affect industrial production costs across the economy– are cited as reasons to promote renewables. Spain is already well positioned in terms of renewable targets. As Escribano (2014) outlines, Spain already surpassed the interim target set by the EU, reaching 15% in 2011. The most important strategy for Spain in terms of climate diplomacy arguably lies in ensuring energy security, an adequate level of interconnection with the EU and the establishment of a European energy market, which would increase competition, lower energy prices and allow consumers to enjoy greener energy. Pro-active policies in this area mean Spain could become an energy hub due to its geographical position, capitalising on its gas and renewable capacities (Ibid.).

In terms of Spain’s geographical focus regarding climate diplomacy, Latin America should be a prime area of interest through the Ibero-American Network of Climate Change Offices (RIOCC[8] in its Spanish acronym). The RIOCC network was created in 2004 by the Ibero-American Ministries of Environment Forum. The RIOCC’s main goals include exchanging experiences and information, and identifying priorities, challenges and opportunities. It also fosters the implementation of the UNFCCC decisions, especially as regards mitigation and adaptation and promotes the inclusion of climate action within Official Development Aid (ODA) strategies.

Climate change is increasingly considered a transversal goal for development projects in Spain (Corrales, 2008). In fact, the current plan (Plan Director 2013-2016)[9] includes climate change as one of its transversal goals. This inclusion of climate considerations in ODA projects in Spain is aligned with the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda (OECD, 2008) and the EU goal of policy coherence for development, which also sees climate change as a key global challenge (EC, 2007). In terms of funding climate-change initiatives within ODA, Spain contributed over €125 million in 2011 and €60 million in 2012 (MAGRAMA, 2013). As regards potential business opportunities, Spain’s National Climate Change Adaptation Plan (PNACC) has meant the development of important transferable knowledge and know-how for cooperation. [10] In fact, many Spanish institutions and businesses have considerable expertise in the evaluation of impacts, vulnerability and adaptation, particularly in areas such as coastal and water resources management, among others.

The opportunity to strengthen the integration of climate change and poverty is also emerging internationally. At the global level, and for the first time in 15 years, the Millennium Development Goals are being revised. These are now going to be renamed Sustainable Development Goals. It is currently being debated how and to what extent climate change will be included in these goals. The confluence of agreements to be reached at the end of 2014 in the SDGs and at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC COP21) a year later, could provide a unique opportunity to reinforce global governance in poverty reduction and climate change.

Goals

The recently approved Law for Spain’s Foreign Action and Service[11] (LAESE) recognises climate change as one of its objectives in Article 2. Additionally, Article 29 states that Spain’s foreign policy as regards climate change will foster international climate agreements, strive for sustainable production and a sustainable energy model and protect ecosystems. It will also engage in capacity-building activities and render technical assistance to develop regulatory instruments and non-economic instruments such as awareness raising.

Interests and values

This subsection reflects on some of Spain’s main environmental concerns, economic interests, key stakeholder values and demands as regards climate-related foreign policy.

While Spain’s climate diplomacy is largely embedded in the EU position, Spain’s key interests and values regarding the environment sometimes differ from those of other EU countries. The northern EU countries have traditionally been concerned primarily with pollution issues. The focus of environmental concerns in southern countries such as Spain has been on water scarcity, wildfire soil erosion (Costa, 2006) and maritime pollution (Lázaro-Touza & Atkinson, 2013).

As regards climate-related foreign policy, according to Fride (2012), countries such as the UK, France and Germany, have a much greater involvement of their Ministries of Foreign Affairs in climate-change issues than Spain. Spain’s leading role in renewable energies in a carbon-constrained world, along with the impacts of climate change on the tourist sector,[12] the wine and the milk industries, among others, are examples that serve to illustrate the powerful reasons for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAEC in its Spanish acronym), in its commercial diplomacy capacity, to increase its interest and actions regarding climate change.

Concerning the values held by Spanish citizens interviewed by the European Commission, they are (self-reportedly) among the most concerned in the EU with climate change (EC, 2011),[13] although concern has significantly decreased as a result of the economic crisis (EC, 2014). However, the actual behaviour of citizens (or lack thereof) in Spain towards climate change is still seen as a barrier to success in the climate-change arena. There is thus a gap between the concerns and actions of Spanish citizens as regards climate change. Pilot projects that demonstrate the co-benefits of climate-conscious behaviour (eg, money saved in energy efficiency) could help bridge the gap between stated concern regarding climate change and behaviour.

The business sector, through its main association in Spain (Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales, CEOE), is highly organised and cohesive in terms of voicing its demands as regards national and international climate policy. These demands include: first, to ensure there is a balanced agreement that includes both developed and developing countries. The business association hence opposes the current EU 2030 framework for climate and energy and will continue to do so until an inclusive, balanced and legally-binding international climate agreement is negotiated. The reason for this opposition according to the CEOE is that the industry’s competitiveness may be severely damaged. Recent literature on the existence of competitiveness losses and industrial flight provides some support for the intense lobbying on behalf of the CEOE as it has found a statistically significant effect on relocation partially derived from environmental regulations (Levinson, 2008). The pollution-haven hypothesis exists primarily for carbon-intensive industries like coal, oil, gas, cement, iron and steel, among others, which are heavily exposed to international trade. However, other variables such as labour costs, investment climate, regulatory stability and distance to markets, arguably have more weight in relocation decisions (Cole, 2004). Secondly, Spanish industries should be treated fairly. Third, subsidies to immature technologies should be limited. Fourth, greater attention should be paid to adaptation. And fifth, it should be ensured that there is regulatory stability that is conducive to long-term investments.

On the renewable energy front, the APPA (the renewable energy association for Spain) has demanded, at the EU level, ambitious renewable energy targets (30% by 2030), expressing regret that the Spanish government did not support, and that the EU Commission did not adopt, this target, proposed by the European Parliament. Initiatives that facilitate decentralised energy production according to EU Directives are also demanded. Domestically, the APPA is eager to work alongside the government in the development of a long-term strategy for the power sector that can transcend political terms (ie, an Energy State pact). This strategy would have RESs play an increasingly important role subject to environmental, social and economic sustainability criteria. Further demands from the renewable sector include ensuring regulatory stability and avoiding retroactive measures which reduce investor confidence, and thus increase the risk of lower investments in renewables globally (Schoenberg, 2014) at a key point in the transition to low-carbon economies. For the transition to materialise the APPA demands a coherent energy policy that promotes RESs not only internationally, but also nationally.

There are a wide variety of environmental organisations in Spain. There is, to our knowledge, no common position that provides the Spanish government with Environmental Non-governmental Organisations’ (ENGOs) demands on Spain’s climate-related foreign policy. The requests, however, are fairly consistent. ENGOs’ demands from the Spanish government (both nationally and abroad) include: further emission reductions, increases in forest protection initiatives and a climate-sensible energy policy (promoting decentralised renewable energy generation, saving energy and backing energy efficiency policies). The ultimate goal of these demands is that the international climate negotiation process abides by the 2ºC average temperature increase in accordance with the scientific consensus. The above demands by ENGOs should be met taking into account the different responsibilities and capabilities of developed versus developing countries. A just transition[14] towards a low-carbon energy model both nationally and internationally is also seen as paramount. The transition implies not only moving away from fossil fuels but also embracing renewable alternatives. National policies should be integrated across government levels and stakeholders. Private firms should be part of the GHG abatement solution and should be transparently monitored. Citizens, in turn, should change their consumption patterns to reduce GHG emissions nudged by the ‘choice editing’[15] role of governments (Assadourian, 2010). Equity is another key concern for ENGOs. This implies a fair burden-sharing agreement, making adaptation a priority and ensuring additional and adequate funding is disbursed to less developed countries by the international community. Additionally, technology transfers should be fostered to ensure the ‘climate Kuznets Curve’ can be tunnelled by rapidly developing countries. Table 2 below summarises some of the specific demands from the business sector and from civil society.

Table 2. Some key demands from Spanish stakeholders regarding climate policy and diplomacy
Source: Amigos de la Tierra, (2014), CEOE (2010), CEOE (2013a), CEOE (2013b), CEOE (2013c), Coalición Clima[17], Ecologistas en Acción, (2013), Ecologistas en Acción (2014a), Ecologistas en Acción (2014b), NRDC, (2014), ODI, (2013) and Jaume Margarit (pers. Comm.).

(4) Spain’s strategic climate alliances

Considering the goals of the recently-approved law (LAESE), as well as the interests and values described above, this section provides a brief analysis of the key geographical areas where Spain could focus its climate diplomacy efforts.

Strengthening the Latin climate connection

Spain can further contribute to the EU objective of cooperating with Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) partners to integrate climate change into development processes and strategies. The EU has adopted a relatively proactive stance under its EUROCLIMA project.[18] Spain can continue to build on these initiatives, reinforcing the synergies and complementarities with the RIOCC network and other regional initiatives promoted by Spanish Development Cooperation.

In addition to the RIOCC initiative, that has strong political support at the highest level, Spain can continue to build on a range of rich and well-established relationships across the Atlantic. Civil society, the private sector, NGOs, academics and think tanks can enhance traditional Spanish climate diplomacy. These institutions diffuse the power from the state, bringing civil societies on both sides of the Atlantic closer together. In fact, climate change can provide a ready-made lab to test the concept of an integral system.[19] Latin America would be a good testing ground because of the many shared values around fundamental rights and freedoms, all of which would enhance existing links between political parties, trade unions, regional climate expertise, the media and NGOs; a true mesh of rich experience from diverse actors.

Our southern Mediterranean neighbours: in the same climate boat?

Security, migration, shared environmental problems and business opportunities are the key axis along which Spain’s climate-related foreign policy could further develop in the Southern Mediterranean region.

While climate change has not been a significant factor directly driving migration in the recent past, it is however anticipated to be a relevant factor in the future (IPCC, 2014). This is particularly important considering the Mediterranean is a climate hotspot already affected by scarce water resources, dependency on food imports, a political winter after the Arab spring and significant income differences between its northern and southern shores. Spain’s aid and adaptation strategy abroad could help limit the adverse threat multiplier effect of climate change, which is expected to result in further resource scarcity, social unrest, possibly an upsurge in extremism and an increased demand for military support to respond to humanitarian crises (NIC, 2009). As Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary General, said: We will not enjoy development without security, and we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without human rights. Unless all causes are advanced, none will succeed’.

A further aspect that is inextricably linked to climate change in the Mediterranean region is food security (Luomi, 2012). This is so due to the fact that in these arid and semi-arid countries agriculture represents 80% to 90% of water consumption. Climate change implies a threat to the livelihoods of a population living in areas that are already some of the world’s most water-scarce. Thus water, food and environmental security in the Mediterranean context are inextricably linked to climate change.

Concerning business opportunities, the Mediterranean region, in addition to being a hydrocarbon-rich area, also has significant renewable potential. This bodes well for Spanish expertise on renewables. Should energy markets be integrated across the Western Mediterranean, this could also help reduce Europe’s energy dependence while also helping to decarbonise its energy footprint. Initiatives like the DESERTEC project and the Mediterranean Solar Plan were, geopolitical and cost issues notwithstanding, potentially innovative solutions to improve conditions on the southern shores, ensuring security through shared development. Renewed political commitments on these projects would indicate Spain can develop a strategic vision for a key sector. This strategic vision seems particularly significant after the Ukrainian crisis and the energy opportunities opening up in Spain due to its geographical position in the Mediterranean. Spain is already actively engaged with Morocco and Algeria in bilateral relations (Elcano, 2014) and with the 5 + 5 initiative in the Western Mediterranean, where the 10 countries involved have put climate change as a thematic priority.[20]

It can therefore be argued that Spain’s climate diplomacy with its southern neighbours should further focus on the food-water-energy-aid nexus, perhaps through a regional network of climate change offices à la RIOCC as well as through innovative initiatives in the renewable energy arena.

Looking East

The world axis of economic power continued shifting East in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis. Sixty per cent of the world population, three of the five biggest world economies and the second and third largest global investors are in Asia (Elcano, 2014). Asia will also be severely impacted by climate change, mainly because of its large population (much of it located in vulnerable areas such as deltas or cities in coastal regions) as well as by the economic consequences of climate change (Piao et al. 2010). Spanish foreign policy interests in this region remain mainly economic (Elcano, 2014) and this also applies to climate diplomacy. As for mitigation, for example, the Chinese market provides an opportunity for Spain’s renewable energy technology, and as regards adaptation, through water resource management (López-Gunn & Stucker, 2014), Spain has considerable relevant experience and know-how.

(5) Conclusions and recommendations

Spain’s future climate policy is likely to continue working towards an inclusive, ambitious and legally-binding international climate agreement that would aim to limit maximum global average temperature increases to 2ºC compared with pre-industrial levels. Spain will also back the use of flexibility mechanisms and will promote efficiency in the use of existing institutions at the international level. The above are all in line with the EU’s climate policy. Independently of the EU, Spain will continue to nourish the Ibero-American Network of Climate Change Offices (RIOCC), building on our historical ties while contributing to the advancement of international climate negotiations.

As discussed throughout this paper, if the climate challenge is to be tackled decisively, the deployment of renewable energy en masse will be of paramount importance. The reasons for supporting the renewable energy sector in Spain include: its renewable endowment, past investments and leadership in renewables, the increase in energy independence brought about by a high penetration of renewable energy sources in the energy mix, the reduction in GHG emissions, the contribution of the renewable energy sector to Spain’s GDP and its potential future contribution to economic growth.[21] In sum, Spain’s past efforts in renewable energy development should not be wasted, a climate (and commercial) diplomacy strategy that would align Spain’s values and interests.

The pending challenges for Spain’s climate-related foreign policy as regards its geographical outreach include further coordinating national institutions such as the Spanish Climate Change Office with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, and developing new networks à la RIOCC with its North African neighbours, to minimise threats such as climate change-related migrations and conflict. These new networks could support existing efforts in terms of Spain’s security policy and humanitarian response. Additionally, regions where Spain has traditionally had less ties, such as countries across Asia, are likely to be looking for potential solutions, technologies and lessons learnt on the management of extreme events, coastal areas, water resources management, migration, etc. Spain can provide significant experience, technology and know-how to these regions, a strategy that could bring much needed business opportunities.

Table 3 below concludes by providing a set of suggestions for Spain’s climate-related foreign policy.

Table 3. Suggestions for Spain’s future on climate related foreign policy

About the authors:
Lara Lázaro-Touza
Profesora de Teoría Económica del CES Cardenal Cisneros.

Elena López-Gunn
Directora ICATALIST e investigadora UCM.

Source:
This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute and may be accessed here.

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[1] The authors are indebted to Ángel Gómez de Ágreda, Lieutenant Colonel of the Spanish Air Force, Laura Gallego Garnacho, Responsible for Climate Change and Industry at CEOE, Jaume Margarit, Director of APPA, Gonzalo Escribano Francés, Director of the Energy Program at Elcano, Iliana Olivié Senior Analyst in International Cooperation and Development at Elcano and Michel Zoghby, independent consultant, for their comments and insights.

[2] Climate diplomacy can be defined as ‘the interface between national interest debates and international cooperation… the practice and process of creating the international climate change regime and ensuring its effective operation’ (Mabey, Gallagher & Born, 2013, p. 6).

[3] See IPCC (2000) for a description of the scenarios.

[4] Climate change and health. Fact sheet N°266. Reviewed November 2013.

[5] Other variables include: cultural tensions, resource scarcity, disease and rapid urbanisation of coastal regions.

[6] For the whole of the EU (but freedom for member states to set their own targets) and with a wait stance on efficiency targets until the Commission Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency is reviewed.

[7]According to the EU Commission proposal for the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve, the reserve ‘represents potentially a significant change to the design and operation of the EU ETS. Early lessons from operating the reserve rules may prove valuable and allow for improvements in the design of the reserve rules. At the same time predictability and stability are important for a successful carbon market. In order to strike the right balance the proposal foresees a review with particular focus on certain reserve parameters by 2026. The proposal also contains provisions aimed at smoothening auctioning supply in the years around transitions between trading phases in cases where the default would otherwise have resulted in sharp changes.

[8] Red Iberoamericana de Oficinas de Cambio Climático (RIOCC).

[9] Ministerio de Agricultura, Alimentación y Medio Ambiente, La Integración del Cambio Climático en la Cooperación Española al Desarrollo.

[10] Ministerio de Agricultura, Alimentación y Medio Ambiente, Proyectos de cooperación.

[11] Congreso de los Diputados, Proyecto de Ley de la Acción y del Servicio Exterior del Estado.

[12] Tourism significantly contributes to Spain’s GDP (10.9% in 2012) and employment (11.9% in 2012), see INE (2013).

[13] Note that the Eurobarometer on climate change also affirms that 57% of Spanish interviewees saw the national government as the institution responsible for addressing climate change (EC, 2011). Additionally, Spanish citizens also recognise their knowledge regarding climate change is low (Arto et al., 2013).

[14] Just Transition refers to ‘the notion that the transition process to a greener economy has to be inclusive of all stakeholders, and that the unavoidable employment and social costs of the transition have to be shared by all’ (Cunniah, 2010, p. 122).

[15] ‘Choice editing’ refers to ways in which government shapes behaviour by using different policy instruments, from removing ‘perverse subsidies and taxing unsustainable behaviours to outright bans of unsustainable technologies like the incandescent light bulb’ (Assadourian, 2010, p. 6).

[16] Flexibility mechanisms currently include three market-based mechanisms (Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism) that conform the carbon market, and joint fulfilment. These mechanisms help countries meet Kyoto Commitments in an efficient way.

[17] Coalición Clima. Principios y propuestas.

[18] EUROCLIMA ‘is a regional cooperation programme between the European Union and Latin America, focused on climate change. The Programme’s objective is to facilitate the integration of climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies and measures into Latin American public development policies and plans’.

[19] See Elcano Report (2014) for a definition and discussion of the integral system.

[20] See REMOC for more information on the first meeting held on 26 February 2014.

[21] According to APPA (2012), the renewable energy sector in Spain amounted to 1% of Spain’s GDP in 2012, it employed 113,899 people, avoided fossil fuel imports of 13.5 million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe) (saving €2,429 million), avoided the emission of 215,5 tons of CO2 from 2005 to 2012 (saving €3,000 million). In the same period, 2005-2012, the renewables sector avoided the emission of 171,752 tons of NOx and 322,974 tons of SO2.

[22] The World Academy of Science for the Advancement os Science in developing countries, Science Diplomacy.

[23] A triple win of ending poverty, shifting to low/zero carbon development and enabling adaptation, disaster risk management and resilience to environmental shocks and stresses.

The post Climate Change In Spain’s Future Foreign Policy – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

A group of independent United Nations human rights experts today called on the Government of Myanmar to do away with a draft bill imposing restrictions on religious conversion, stressing the right of every individual to freely choose or to change their faith.

The experts – on freedom of religion, minority issues and human rights in Myanmar – warned that the draft bill, made public on 27 May inviting comments from monks and the public, sets out a cumbersome application and approval process for conversion while purporting to make it easier for individuals to freely convert.

It also provides for disproportionate criminal sanctions on offenders, according to a news release issued by the three experts. In addition, some provisions are “vague and subject to interpretation that may lead to discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities or the poor.”

The experts noted that seeking comments from the public on draft legislation is commendable in promoting political participation of the people. “But in this instance,” they added, “this process appears partial to the interest of one particular group and simply propagates the spread of incitement of racial and religious hatred, which the Government must do more to address.”

The Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, noted that State interferences into the right to change one’s religion or belief are “illegitimate and incompatible with international human rights standards.”

“Freedom of religion or belief is a human right, irrespective of State approval, and respect for freedom of religion or belief does not depend on administrative registration procedures,” he stressed. “I am very disturbed by the attempt to regulate religious conversion.”

Rita Izsák, the Special Rapporteur on minority issues, highlighted the potential for the bill to impact negatively on religious freedoms and the rights of religious and ethnic minorities.

“I urge Myanmar to strengthen its protections in line with international standards not to create obstacles to the enjoyment of religious identity, minority rights, and the right of every individual to freely choose or to change their faith,” she said.

The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Yanghee Lee, noted some “worrying backtracking” on Myanmar’s progress towards a more democratic nation in the last six months, including through the arbitrary arrest and the prosecution of activists and journalists deemed anti-establishment.

Ms. Lee warned the draft bill – one of four composing a legislative package on the protection of race and religion – “signals the risk of Myanmar going off-track on its path to being a responsible member of the international community that respects and protects human rights.”

Independent experts or special rapporteurs are appointed by the UN Human Rights Council to examine and report back on a country situation or a specific human rights theme. The positions are honorary and the experts are not UN staff, nor are they paid for their work.

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The rat, among mammals, is one of the most successful animals on the planet. Cunning, ruthless, competitive and above all adaptable — it is able to change its habits quickly as needed to accommodate the situation it finds itself in.

When it comes to foreign policy, the US government is swarming with rats.

Just look at the situation in Iraq. The US invaded the country in 2003, claiming it was a rogue nation that had, or was trying to develop, “weapons of mass destruction.” When it became clear that this was a lie, or at best, simply not true, the stated motive for the invasion was changed to “regime change,” and the goal became “bringing democracy to Iraq.”

The US and the key US corporate news organizations loved Maliki when his party won the largest block of seats in the first parliamentary election in 2006 and he became prime minister. As the Washington Post’s David Ignatius crowed at the time, after the votes were in, “The most important fact about Maliki’s election is that it’s a modest declaration of independence from Iran.” Ignatius quickly went to the US ambassador at the time, Zalmay Khalilzad, for a comment, and Khalilzad, a neoconservative linked to the National Endowment for Democracy, obligingly told him, “His reputation is as someone who is independent of Iran.”

Khalilzad had worked assiduously (almost rat-like, one might say) behind the scenes to build a coalition of Kurds, Sunnis and Shia politicians opposed to the incumbent prime minister Ibrahim al-Jafari (who was seen as Iran’s man), in order to back Maliki’s ascendancy.

In 2010, the US again backed Maliki, supporting him for a second term even though the initial results of the voting gave a plurality to his challenger Ayad Allawi. Using heavy-handed tactics and his control of the judiciary, Maliki essentially stole that election,. He did this with the approval of the US Embassy which, in 2010, was still, if not controlling the country, a major player.

The post Washington’s Rats Are Abandoning Maliki – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The fifth round of nuclear negotiations between Iran and the world powers ended on Friday June 20 with plans to meet again on July 2.

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was quoted as saying that that there are still many differences regarding the content and form of the the comprehensive agreement that the parties are trying to draft.

According to IRNA, Zarif maintained that in view of the length of the dispute, it’s natural that there would be difficulty when moving toward the draft of a final agreement.

He said: “The other side is still asking for too much…. We have remained logical from the start and spoken according to international rights. We have come here to reach a resolution and have no need to waste time.”

This round of talks began on Monday June 16, and the parties are aiming to draft the final agreement by July 20, the deadline set out in the interim deal reached last November.

The post Iran Nuclear Talks Adjourn As Differences Remain appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Lisa Schlein

The U.N. refugee agency reports more than 6,000 refugees have fled into Afghanistan to escape fighting between Pakistan government forces and Taliban militants in the North Waziristan region.

The agency says it is bracing for a larger exodus if fighting continues to escalate.

The U.N. refugee agency reports 6,452 Pakistanis have fled into the eastern parts of Afghanistan from North Waziristan.

UNHCR spokesman Adrian Edwards says his agency is helping authorities in the eastern province of Khost to register and assist those arriving.

“The newly arrived women, men and children trekked across the mountains from Pakistan to seek safety,” said Edwards. “They are being accommodated with local Afghan communities for now. However, clearly these communities have limited resources and absorption capacity to help.”

Edwards says shelter, clean drinking water and sanitation are urgently needed. He says UNHCR is concerned that families close to where the fighting is raging will be exposed to further violence. And this, he says, could make it difficult for aid agencies to reach them with humanitarian aid.

Pakistan’s military mounted an offensive to oust al-Qaida-linked Taliban insurgents from North Waziristan June 12, a week after the militant group attacked Pakistan’s biggest airport in Karachi. That dramatic attack left 36 people dead, including 10 Taliban gunmen.

It also caused cease-fire talks with so-called moderate Taliban to collapse. This prompted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to launch an all-out assault on North Waziristan to remove the Taliban from their tribal base.

But the fighting is causing a flood of people to flee their homes in search of safety. The Pakistani government confirms more than 100,000 people have been displaced internally from North Waziristan into several areas of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province.

UNHCR spokesman Edwards tells VOA the Pakistani government has not yet asked for assistance, but if it does his agency and others will do what they can to help. In the meantime, he says his agency will work to assist the thousands of refugees who have fled into Afghanistan.

“We are always concerned when people are displaced,” said Edwards. “The difficulty in this area, as you know, is that it is an insecure area. It is very difficult to access. It is mountainous. Getting help to people there is challenging to say the least.”

Pakistan has been hosting hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees for years. But in a worrying turnabout, Edwards notes this is the first time refugees from Pakistan have fled into Afghanistan. He says there are no refugee camps in that part of Afghanistan. He adds the work ahead is daunting.

The post 6,000 Flee Pakistan Anti-Taliban Offensive appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(Civil.Ge) — Despite some improvements, Georgia’s anti-trafficking law enforcement “efforts remained low” in 2013, according to the U.S. State Department’s annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report released on June 20.

The new report says that the Georgian government “does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so.”

As a result Georgia remains in tier 2, where it was relegated for the previous, 2012 reporting period after six straight years in tier 1 – the highest ranking, which although does not mean that a country has no human trafficking problem, but indicates that its government undertakes efforts to address this problem and meets minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. Tier 3 is the lowest ranking assigned to countries whose governments do not fully comply with minimum standards to eliminate trafficking and are not making significant efforts to do so.

“Georgia is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to trafficking in persons, specifically the forced prostitution of women and the forced labor of men, women, and children,” reads the report. “Women and girls from Georgia are subjected to sex trafficking within the country, as well as in Turkey, and, to a lesser extent, the United Arab Emirates and Russia. Women from Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and other countries are subjected to forced prostitution in Georgia’s commercial sex trade in the tourist areas of Batumi and Gonio in Adjara province.”

According to the report the government sustained efforts to identify and protect trafficking victims, “but there were deficiencies in the protection of children subjected to forced begging, and women and girls subjected to sex trafficking.”

The post Georgia In US Human Trafficking Report appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Tehran said Friday that U.S. President Barack Obama lacks “serious will [to combat terrorism]” in Iraq and is sparking greater sectarianism in the country instead, according to Agence France Presse.

Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian told state media Friday that “Delaying the fight against terrorism and ISIL and putting conditions on it have fueled suspicions and doubts about the United States’ objectives in Iraq…Obama’s comments show the White House lacks serious will in fighting terrorism in Iraq and the region.”

The Deputy FM’s commentary comes in response to Obama’s address Thursday at the White House in which the U.S. leader pledged to only send military advisors from Washington at this time to combat the growing violence in Iraq. Shiite-dominant Tehran has largely been calling for stronger action in Iraq due to the fact that the Sunni militant jihadist group, ISIL, is largely taking over the Shiite-dominant areas within Iraq.

ISIL considers Shiites, and thus Iran, to be apostates, according to the AFP report.

The Deputy FM subsequently added that Obama’s commentary shows that Washington is more committed to sparking greater sectarianism in Iraq and the MENA region, rather than fighting terrorism.

“Instead of focusing on fighting terrorism and national unity and strengthening of government institutions, the U.S. is spreading sectarianism,” Abdollahian added.

Original article

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By Siham Ali

Two years after new employment programmes were announced in Morocco, they are finally ready for launch.

The “Taatir” scheme for jobless graduates has entered its trial phase, Moroccan Employment Minister Abdeslam Seddiki told Magharebia last Friday (June 13th).

Some 10,000 unemployed people are set to benefit from the programme by 2016, the minister said.

More than 2,000 young people with degrees have already been trained as “academic managers”, so that they can get work in private schools, Seddike noted.

Another project, “Moubadara”, focuses on providing youth employment within civil society organisations. The government is expected to make the necessary legislative changes in order for associations to recruit young people, political analyst Jamal Farhani said.

Work at these associations represents a significant prospect of recruitment for young graduates into the workforce, provided the government provides the necessary training, he said.

“The government now only has two and a half years before it reaches the end of its mandate. It must take action to fulfil its commitments, particularly the introduction of the new employment programmes and the reduction of unemployment to 8%,” Farhani added.

The government is also working to adapt existing projects, such as Moukalawati, to the present labour market.

Another measure under consideration is redundancy pay, which would assist young unemployed people suffering financial hardship and living in remote areas.

Young people say they are eager to see the government fulfil its promises.

“It’s time for all the talk and promises to be turned into concrete action,” 28-year-old economics graduate Karim Dahibi said.

“I’ve been unemployed for four years now, and I hope to see a favourable outcome soon,” he told Magharebia.

For his part, business management graduate Ismail Chaoui, 24, hopes to become involved in civil society.

“I do voluntary work for various associations. I’d love to be able to work in that field as part of the forthcoming ‘Moudabara’ programme. But so far, nothing concrete has come out of it,” he said.

The post Morocco Re-Launches Employment Schemes appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Given the headlines these days, one could be forgiven for imagining that ISIS is now a regional superpower — even though its ranks probably include fewer than 10,000 men. A map published by the Institute for the Study of War on June 10 puts the headlines in perspective.

The small black patches are the areas under ISIS control:

ISIS control

(Click on the image to see a larger version.)

A June 20 update shows no expansion in the size of ISIS territory.

The post How Much Territory Does ISIS Control? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Right after Camp Casey the huge media circus/protest in front of George Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas in August of 2005, I was invited to the home of Producer/Director/Actor Rob Reiner to meet and have a chat. Also at that meeting was a major philanthropist (although I didn’t know it at the time) to all causes Clinton, wealthy Stephen Bing.

I naïvely believed that I was there because Rob Reiner and Steve Bing were against war. HAH! I was there because Rob and Steve were above all things (even peace and justice) pro-Democrat.

At this meeting, the suggestion was made to me that I should support the potential candidacy of then NY Senator Hillary Clinton for president in 2008. Bing looked me right in the eyes and said, “Senator Clinton is our only hope.”

“Our only hope for what? Perpetual war,” I asked. I also reminded Steve and Rob that she not only voted for the war my son and hundreds of thousands of others were needlessly and tragically murdered in, but she proudly did grunt work for the Bush administration in being a chief-Democratic Cheerleader for it. After which, Bing looked me right in the eyes again and said, “Mrs. Clinton is against the war, and she will come out against it when it is political advantageous to do so.”

Well, even though I am not a multi-multi-millionaire with fancy homes and a private jet, I would not sell my soul to the Reiners or Bing to support a person who was/is so thoroughly opposed to everything I believed in.

My suspicions about Hillary Clinton were confirmed in a meeting I had with her on Capitol Hill about a month later where she said that the US had to remain in Iraq to “honor” the sacrifices of those that had died after I told her that I didn’t want my son’s death honored with more murder and mayhem.

I suppose since Hillary is potentially running for POTUS in 2016, it has become “politically advantageous” for her to come out with “regret” for her vote, saying in her new book about her pro-war vote: “I wasn’t alone in getting it wrong. But I got it wrong. Plain and simple.”

Well, also “plain and simple,” millions of people are dead, wounded, displaced, lives ruined. That sh can be so glib about being a dumb shit while my son, and too many others, are dead forever really pisses me off.

With the Empire beating the drums for more war against Iraq, don’t believe a word this shill for Wall Street and the War Machine says about her Iraq vote or anything else—ALL WAR IS WRONG and anyone who votes for it is a murderer, period!

As Secretary of State, Hillary cackled hysterically when after a US bombardment of Libya, killing tens of thousands, Moammar Qadafi was slaughtered in the streets: “We came; we saw; he died.” (She’s as psychopathic as the male warmongers).

I not only don’t believe her “politically advantageous” admission, I don’t believe she was fooled into voting the way she did. A lot of us never bought what the Bush administration was selling (SEE, White House Iraq Group) and we weren’t in the Cat Bird’s Seat in DC like was she. All of these people (Hillary included) should be in prison for life, not out raking in the big dough and running for public office.

Please do not mistake that this exposé of Hillary Clinton, Two-Thousand and NEVER is an endorsement of whatever shill will be nominated by the Republicans that year, it’s not.

I am desperately disappointed that out of the ashes of Obama’s havoc wreaking on the world, a new and principled antiwar movement has not arisen and that people like Bing and Reiner did not one day say, “Hey, I do care about the world more than I care about Democrats.”

Sadly, what the hell will it take?

The post Cindy Sheehan: Say Yes To Hillary, Two-Thousand And Never – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.