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Online Hate Speech Exposes Dark Side Of Social Media In Burma – OpEd

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By Edward Barbour-Lacey

Over the past few years, as the military junta has loosened its grip on the country, Burma’s people have flocked online to sites like Facebook. But while many have used these sites to express their thoughts and feelings for the progression of the country, there has also appeared a dark underside to what is being said online. The opening of the country has released a cap on long held resentments, as a result ethnic and religious violence has flared throughout the country.

While internet penetration in the country is still low, particularly in the rural areas, this is expected to begin quickly changing in the coming years.

In this Southeast Asian nation of 53 million people, Facebook has quickly become the dominant site for online discourse. In fact, the site is also used by Burma’s government, which has announced large oil and telecommunications licenses via online posts. But, Facebook has also become a key tool for the spread of hate speech in this majority Buddhist country. The main targets of these attacks have been those in the Muslim population, particularly the Rohingya Muslims.

Around 800,000 Rohingya Muslims live in Burma, mainly in the western parts of the country. The Rohingya have been engaged in a simmering conflict with the Burma government since 1947.

In Burma, competition over land and resources tends to take place along religious and ethnic lines. Most of the anti-Muslim violence has been centered in Rakhine state.

Online, the Muslims are often referred to as “dogs”. Others speak of their desire to “clean” Burma of all Muslims and of killing anyone who dares to stay. This is not simply a few “crazies” who are inciting violence, it seems clear that this is an organized and well-planned online, and offline, campaign against the Muslim population.

In a recent incident, anti-Muslim extremists threatened to burn down cinemas that were showing a documentary that focused on the violence against Muslims in Burma. In addition, the extremists also threatened to riot again in Meiktila, the site of a violent attack on the Muslim population that left 40 people dead and thousands more displaced. Many of the threats made came via Facebook. The movie was never shown since the theatre owners did not want to be the cause of more violence.

Flower power

A number of movements have emerged that try and fight this rising tide of hate speech and anti-Muslim violence. The “flower” movement, for example, focuses on bringing order to online speech and encourages peaceful interaction. Panzagar, one of the main organizations trying to encourage more peaceful interaction online, has been in operation since 2013.

Organizations like Panzagar walk a fine line. They do not want to encourage the government to crack down on freedom of speech online; instead they want the internet to remain a free and safe place for people to express their feelings. Many of these organizations prefer to simply shine a light on the dark underbelly of Burma’s internet and call attention to those inciting violence.

International organizations such as the United Nations have taken note of the dark side of social media interaction in Burma. These organizations are in the process of developing programs to counter the hate speech and help people deal with the sweeping changes that are occurring within their country.

In the end, however, it is the people of Burma who are ultimately responsible for putting an end to the violence that is happening in their country. The government’s liberalization comes with a price – every individual must be responsible for their actions and not allow themselves to be taken in by false rumors and hate speech online.

The post Online Hate Speech Exposes Dark Side Of Social Media In Burma – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.


EU-Brazil Partnership On Development: A Lukewarm Affair – Analysis

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By Lidia Cabral

Brazil joined the club of the European Union’s (EU) strategic partners in 2007 when the two parties met for their first bilateral summit in Lisbon. The gathering was hailed as a turning point in the long-standing relations between the two partners,1 reflecting the Union’s acknowledgment of Brazil’s increasingly global stature.2

The new framing has expanded relations beyond the bilateral dimension of the European Commission’s Country Strategy Papers, highlighting the potential for collaboration in multilateral and global fora. It opened the door for jointly addressing international development issues, such as global poverty, social inclusion and development cooperation, as well as a range of related global governance issues, including multilateralism, peace and security, trade and climate change. The ambition to broaden EU-Brazil engagement was materialised in the Joint Action Plan 2012-2014, endorsed at the fifth bilateral summit in Brussels in 2011.3

This paper analyses EU-Brazil engagement in international development. It looks at their interaction in multilateral forums, as well as trilateral cooperation in third-party developing countries. The analysis suggests that multilaterally the scope for engagement is limited given that much of the debate is infused by a discourse that, by juxtaposing ‘North’ versus ‘South’ and ‘traditional’ versus ‘emerging’ players, places Brazil and the EU on opposing sides. Yet, there are opportunities to build alliances around specific thematic issues, such as the global fight against hunger. With regard to trilateral cooperation, the analysis reveals a mismatch between high-level pledges and motivations on the one hand and on-the-ground operational capacity on the other. It also shows a fading emphasis on this modality of engagement. There is still scope, nonetheless, for joint learning on trilateral cooperation. This is the case with Brazil and several EU member states. This process could inform the debate on development effectiveness among the parties and on the multilateral stage, and help move beyond the North-versus-South narrative.

The rise of Brazil In International Development: Brazil As A Bilateral Development Partner

The rise of Brazil as an international development player is a relatively recent phenomenon. It reflects both Brazil’s increasing importance in the world economy (as the seventh largest world economy in nominal GDP terms) and the result of an active diplomatic campaign, spearheaded by former President Lula da Silva. Moved by a counter-hegemonic impulse and an emphasis on South-South relations, the Lula administration was keen on matching Brazil’s influence in global governance with the country’s economic standing, as well as affirming Brasilia’s position as a regional power.4 Brazil’s development cooperation has been instrumental to the achievement of such goals, helping to forge new alliances across the Atlantic and gradually build muscle in international affairs. Although the objective of gaining a seat at the United Nations Security Council continues unfulfilled, the appointment of two Brazilians to head the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) are pay offs of the South-South offensive.

Brazilian cooperation increased swiftly during Lula’s presidency, particularly in Africa where Brazil’s diplomatic presence doubled during this period5 and its partnerships spread well beyond its traditional language affinities with Portuguese speaking countries. Today, Brazil runs technical cooperation projects in 95 countries, 42 of which are in Africa.6

Brazil’s ‘solidarity diplomacy’, a legacy of Lula’s South-South cooperation narrative, translates into guiding principles such as demand-driven action and no interference in partner country’s affairs. Brazilian cooperation also claims to have no commercial interests attached and be solely based on solidarity, although the argument is undermined by the ‘mutual benefit’ discourse that is gaining ground. In 2013, President Dilma Rousseff announced the creation of a new agency for international cooperation, trade and investment, to replace the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) that is part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The policy scope of the new agency confirms the increasingly dominant business motivations informing partnerships with developing countries, although questions remain as to how this new agency would fit into the current institutional set-up. In the meantime, cooperation modalities are gradually adapting to a more commercially-minded focus – for example, the More Food International Programme is using a new concessional lending window to export Brazil-made tractors and other agricultural machinery and equipment to Africa.7

Brazilian authorities define the country’s cooperation as comprising technical cooperation, educational cooperation (or scholarships), scientific and technological cooperation, humanitarian cooperation, refugee protection, peace operations and contributions to international and regional multilateral organisations.8 Debt relief and concessional lending are not yet considered part of development cooperation. However, these go hand in hand with bilateral technical cooperation initiatives. The same applies for growing investment lending by the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES).

Despite representing a small proportion of Brazil’s official cooperation (6 per cent of an overall amount of US$ 923 million in 2010),9 technical cooperation has gained considerable visibility in recent years. It is less about the volume of resources invested and more about Brazil’s distinctive practice of it. The fact that the latter draws on Brazil’s own public policy experiences, technology and know-how is seen as an added value of Brazilian cooperation.10 This adds to Brazil’s claim of affinity with technical support recipients, which is particularly strong in terms of cooperation in the agriculture and health sectors in tropical countries that share similar agro-ecological and epidemiological conditions.

Brazil’s Engagement In Multi-Lateral And Mini-Lateral Fora

Brazil’s sizeable contributions to multilateral development organisations, which in 2010 accounted for two thirds of the country’s total official development cooperation,11 reflect its
long-standing commitment to multilateralism.12 Yet, Brazil’s influence in international fora remains limited. Its priorities in relation to multilateralism, including reforming the governance structures of leading multilateral organisations and strengthening the role of the UN in global affairs, remain largely unmet. However, Brazil has assumed a lead role in building an alliance among developing countries to counter the perceived dominance of the United States and Europe and promote a more multipolar order, without compromising the ambition to build a stronger multilateral system. This is reflected in the establishment in 2003 of the G-20 of developing countries13 in the context of the WTO.14

Brazil also plays a central role in other counter-hegemonic ‘minilateral’ alliances established in recent years, such as IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa), BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). International development issues are relatively low in the agendas of these groupings, which in practice focus more on pursuing the individual or collective geostrategic interests of their members. However some initiatives, such as the envisaged creation of the BRICS development bank, may have an impact on the global development system and Brazil’s own engagement in international development.

There are two areas in particular where Brazil has the potential to influence the international development agenda in general and specific processes, such as the negotiation of the post-2015 UN development framework. These are the global fight against hunger and food insecurity, and environmental sustainability.

Brazil is a player in ascendency in the global fight against hunger. The election of José Graziano as FAO Director-General has placed Brazil at the centre of the international fight against hunger, with Brazilian public policies (for example, Fome Zero or the Food Acquisition Programme) and discourse (the idea of family farming,15 for instance) being increasingly portrayed as sources of inspiration for global action.16 This is complemented by high-profile actions of the Lula Institute, particularly in Africa, with former President Lula as the Brazilian ambassador for the hunger cause, and a more active Brazilian diplomacy at large.17

Regarding the environmental sustainability agenda, Brazil is pursuing a multi-pronged strategy, which includes playing a leadership role in multilateral processes (for example it hosted the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development, or Rio+20), working through South-South alliances, and strengthening relations with developed nations. Together with Southern allies, particularly within BASIC, Brazil has been pushing for a ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ perspective with regards to climate change,18 an approach that is echoing across the post-2015 debate.19 However, Brazil has also sided with the United States and the EU on issues such as renewable energy sources and biofuels.20

It is debatable whether these moves are part of an ‘environmental multilateralism’ strategy, or whether they are simply a set of uncoordinated actions in response to different Brazilian interests (including business interests).

Trilateral cooperation

While ‘South-South’ coalitions have been strengthened via bilateral and minilateral channels, alliances with member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – particularly Japan, Germany and the United States – and established international organisations (particularly UN agencies) have not been disregarded, as suggested by Brazil’s engagement with trilateral cooperation arrangements.21Trilateral cooperation entails a partnership with another bilateral ‘donor’ country or multilateral development agency in a (third-party) developing country. In addition to expanding the scale of and strengthening Brazilian cooperation, trilateral cooperation potentially helps Brazil to secure access to developed countries’ technological innovation and expertise, as well as to justify the continued presence of their development cooperation programmes in Brazil (from where trilateral cooperation with Brazil in third countries is managed), which has now become an upper middle-income country and a provider of development assistance.22

As for Brazil’s bilateral cooperation, despite its ambitions it is likely to remain limited in scope, particularly in light of current budgetary constraints. The continued rise of Brazil in the international development arena is therefore contingent on cooperation with other donors. However, even in this context, it is questionable whether a closer partnership with the EU would be either attractive – beyond high-level display – or operationally feasible for Brazil.

Brazil-EU Engagement In International Development

The EU and Brazil interact on international development issues through joint development cooperation initiatives in third countries and in the context of international multilateral institutions and processes.

EU-Brazil trilateral cooperation in third countries

Trilateral cooperation featured prominently in the Joint Action Plan 2012-2014, which, in line with the broad vision set out in 2007,23 presented it as ‘one of the major areas for the Strategic Partnership’ and ‘a modality to complement the existing bilateral initiatives, as well as leverage knowledge, coherence and additional financial resources for the benefit of developing countries’.24

EU-Brazil engagement in trilateral cooperation had been foreseen from the outset of the strategic partnership. It was then envisaged that the European Commission would explore triangular cooperation with Brazil and the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries in areas such as energy.25 The idea gained momentum in 2009, when a group of development agencies gathered in Brasilia to discuss the potential of this modality of cooperation in an event hosted by the German Cooperation Ministry, the EC Delegation and the Brazilian Cooperation Agency.26 At the fourth Brazil- EU summit in 2010 progress was achieved, with the adoption of a Joint Work Programme on triangular cooperation and an initiative focused on the sustainable development of bio-energy in ‘interested African countries’.27

A Partnership for the Sustainable Development of Bioenergy in Mozambique was also agreed between Brazilian President Lula and Commission President Barroso at the 2010 summit. It envisaged the elaboration of a feasibility study looking at sustainable bio-energy production and the mobilisation of funding to carry out bio-energy projects.28 However, the initiative attracted much criticism.

International advocacy movements warned about the social and environmental costs of biofuel investments29 and there was concern about the existence of Brazilian private interests behind the cooperation programme. On the EU’s side, there was scepticism about the gap between high-level diplomacy and country-level operational instruments.30 Ultimately, the EU delegation in Maputo played a relatively minor part in the process, responding to a request for comments on the study’s design. Since the completion of the feasibility study, no progress has been reported.

Brasilia and Brussels have continued to express interest in trilateral cooperation. In their fifth summit in 2011 and subsequent gatherings, both parties reiterated their commitment to this approach and to identifying new potential areas for such cooperation.31 However, so far no further concrete activities have been announced. Cooperation on bio-energy remains an option, after both parties expressed the intention to expand joint initiatives in energy efficiency and the sustainable production of biofuels at the sixth summit in 2013.32 It remains to be seen whether the next EU-Brazil Joint Action Plan 2015- 2017, announced in Brussels in February 2014, will shed light on the future of EU-Brazil trilateral cooperation.

The lack of progress in EU-Brazil trilateral cooperation reflects both an ambiguous commitment and tangible operational constraints, noticeable in both sides. The relative priority given to development issues within the EU-Brazil partnership at the highest diplomatic level contrasts with scepticism at operational level. On the EU’s side, there is certain scepticism of Brazil’s position as an international development player and doubts as to whether its self-proclaimed Southern alternative can in fact offer a substantial alternative to established cooperation practices. As for Brazil, it is sceptical about the level of EU interest in trilateral cooperation. Yet, Brazil too remains vague about its stance on trilateral cooperation, as this modality does not easily fit with the importance of bilateral cooperation as an instrument of Brazil’s foreign policy or its emphasis on South-South discourse and affinities.

In terms of operational constraints, ABC has limited operational capacity, particularly outside Brazil where it has no representation and operates via diplomatic channels. On the EU’s side, Brussels has not provided concrete guidance on how EU Delegations should interact with Brazil on trilateral cooperation matters, either in Brasilia or in third countries. This gap became apparent in the Mozambique case in relation to the challenge of reconciling Brazil’s seemingly commercial thrust with the EU’s development cooperation mandate.

The rigidness of the EU’s programming system is also difficult to reconcile with Brazil’s policy of demand-driven cooperation and non-interference. For example, when the two parties began to discuss potential areas of collaboration, Brazilian officials report that these had to match those already pre-defined in the Commission’s Country Strategy Paper.33 The effective involvement of third (supposedly beneficiary) countries has also been limited.

While EU-Brazil trilateral cooperation stalls, other actors are making inroads with this form of cooperation with the South America giant. Japan and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) are Brazil’s main triangular cooperation partners34 and some EU member states such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK have ongoing trilateral cooperation projects across a range of issues with Brazil.35

EU-Brazil Engagement In Global And Multilateral Development Agendas

The Joint Action Plan 2012-2014 indicated areas of convergence between the two strategic partners in the context of global and multilateral processes. These included a common commitment to reforming the multilateral system and strengthening the UN, strengthening cooperation on climate change and environmental sustainability, and coordination on the post-Busan partnership for development effectiveness.36

Yet again, implementation has fallen short of these high-level pledges. On climate change, the Action Plan subscribed to the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’, a proposition firmly supported by Brazil. The EU, however, has reportedly lobbied for the exclusion of this principle from the Rio+20 outcome document.37 The principle is absent from subsequent EU-Brazil summit statements. Meanwhile, there is heated debate on whether this principle should be included in the post-2015 agenda, with a ‘North-South’ divide beginning to surface.38 Recently, an EU representative, speaking at the UN meeting of the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals, expressed that: ‘[t]he EU recognises the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. However, it stresses that responsibilities and capabilities are differentiated but evolve over time and that the agreement should reflect those evolving realities by including a spectrum of commitments in a dynamic way’.39

On the issue of coordination around the global partnership for development effectiveness, it is unclear how the EU and Brazil could collaborate. Brazil remains, at best, a reluctant member of the post-Busan club and still emphasises South-South distinctiveness (relative to North-South) rather than convergence or coordination.40 Plus, Brazil’s choice of export-credits as a development cooperation modality will raise questions about fair competition in Brussels and among OECD members in Paris.

Looking Ahead

The EU-Brazil strategic partnership in terms of international development has been, at best, a lukewarm affair. The same applies to the economic and financial aspects of this strategic partnership.41 The praising of the achievements of Brazil-EU trilateral cooperation and the support expressed for Brazil’s South-South development cooperation model in the sixth summit’s joint statement42 contrast with modest results and scepticism on the ground. The statement’s wording on trilateral cooperation is undoubtedly more restrained than before and no reference was made to new concrete projects. Instead, it highlighted the EU-Brazil partnership on development at global level, with the post-2015 framework and the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation at the top of the agenda. However, it is debatable whether these policy spaces can offer any concrete opportunities for consolidating the EU-Brazil strategic partnership, as the two partners represent essentially different positions in the contested global development debate.

Looking ahead, the global fight against hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition seem to offer the most scope for synergies. The EU is a leading food donor and it is the largest single source of voluntary funding to FAO. Meanwhile, Brazil’s influence on food and nutrition matters is growing and the country has the potential to exercise a reformist pressure on the global food aid system. With Graziano at the top of FAO, the moment seems ripe to explore the potential for EU- Brazil dialogue on this pressing development issue.

Furthermore, at a time when the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, has made Zero Hunger a leading development priority, the question can also be used to leverage EU and Brazilian commitment to multilateralism and a UN-centred agenda.

With regard to trilateral cooperation, a recent attempt to reinvigorate joint cooperation seems to be under way. The EU’s suggestion to discuss new opportunities for triangular cooperation at the early stages of preparation of its new planning cycle (Country Strategy Papers 2014-2020), rather than after the agenda has been set, has been welcomed by Brazil. However, it is unlikely that beneficiary countries will be involved from the outset.

Even if the prospect of significant EU- Brazil cooperation on development remains unfulfilled, cooperation between Brazil and some EU member states in the area provide a basis for further engagement between Brasilia and Brussels. This would greatly contribute to the Global Partnership on Development Effectiveness process, not only to showcase the potential of working with Brazil on international development, but also with a view to overcoming the discursive divide between North-South and South-South cooperation.

About the author:
Lidia Cabral, Researcher, Institute of Development Studies

Source:
This article was published by FRIDE as part of the ESPO project on Development and EU Strategic Partnerships, which is kindly supported by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. This article was published as Policy Brief 10, June 2014, which may be accessed here (PDF).

Endnotes:
1. European Commission, ‘Towards an EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership’, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 2007.
2. G. Grevi with G. Khandekar, ‘Mapping EU Strategic Partnerships’, Madrid: FRIDE, 2011.
3. EU Council, ‘V European Union – Brazil Summit. Joint Statement’, Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2011.
4. L. Pinheiro, ‘The role of South-South Cooperation on Brazilian Regional Leadership and Global Activism’, 2012, unpublished.
5. MRE, ‘A África na Agenda Econômica do Brasil: Comércio e Investimentos’, presentation by Minister Nedilson Jorge, Director of the African Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the seminar ‘África e a Agenda Econômica do Brasil’, organised by CINDES and CEBRI, Rio de Janeiro, 22 November 2011.
6. F. de Abreu, ‘O Brasil e a Cooperação Sul-Sul’, presentation by the Head of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency at BRICS Policy Centre Seminar, Rio de Janeiro, 2 July 2013, available at: http://bricspolicycenter.org/homolog/arquivos/e.pdf
7. ‘Exportação do Mais Alimentos sai em 2014’, Canal do Exportador, 16 December 2013, available at: http://www. canaldoprodutor.com.br/comunicacao/noticias/exportacao-do-mais-alimentos-sai-em-2014.
8. IPEA, ‘Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional 2010’, Brasília: Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos da Presidência da República, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, Ministério das Relações Exteriores and Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, 2013.
9. Ibid.
10. L. Cabral, G. Russo and J. Weinstock, ‘Brazil and the Shifting Consensus on Development Co-operation: Salutary
Diversions from the ‘Aid-effectiveness’ Trail’, Development Policy Review, 32(2): 180-202, 2014.
11. IPEA 2013, op. cit.
12. C. Amorim, ‘A diplomacia multilateral do Brasil: um tributo a Rui Barbosa’, palestra do Ministro das Relações Exteriores, Embaixador Celso Amorim, por ocasião da ‘II Conferência Nacional de Política Externa e Política Internacional – O Brasil e o Mundo que vem aí’, Rio de Janeiro, 5 November 2007.
13. The G-20 of developing nations (distinct from the G-20 of major economies) was established on 20 August 2003 in the run up to the 5th Ministerial WTO conference, held in Cancún, Mexico, from 10 September to 14 September 2003. The group has had fluctuating membership.
14. P. Visentini and A. da Silva, ‘Brazil and the Economic, Political, and Environmental Multilateralism: the Lula years (2003- 2010)’, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 53: 54-77, 2010, special edition.
15. A family-labour based agricultural production system that Brazil institutionalised by law in 2006.
16. See, for example, the message from the FAO Director-General on the 2014 International Year of Family Farming, available at: http://www.fao.org/family-farming-2014/en/
17. Brazilian diplomacy, through CG Fome (the Ministry of External Affair’s General Coordination Office for International Action Against Hunger created in 2003), is becoming an active voice in international fora, supporting an heterodox ‘double- traction’ humanitarian cooperation strategy. Such approach calls for greater integration between emergency assistance (such as food aid) and development cooperation, anchored on the idea of building resilience and promoting sustainability of humanitarian interventions. See P. Brasil, ‘O Brasil e a insegurança alimentar global: forças sociais e política externa (2003- 2010)’, Masters Dissertation in International Relations, University of Brasília, 2013, available at: http://repositorio.unb.br/ bitstream/10482/13878/1/2013_PilarFigueiredoBrasil.pdf
18. MRE, ‘Declaração Conjunta: – XVI Reunião de Ministros do Brasil, África do Sul, Índia e China (BASIC) sobre Mudança do Clima’, Brasília: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2013.
19. S. Muchhala, ‘North-South debate in the UN within context of Sustainable Development Goals’, Third World Network Info Service on UN Sustainable Development, 14 March 2014, available at: http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/unsd/2014/ unsd140303.htm
20. Visentini and da Silva 2010, op. cit.
21. de Abreu 2013, op. cit.
22. L. Cabral and J. Weinstock, ‘Brazilian technical cooperation for development: drivers, mechanics and future prospects’, London: Overseas Development Institute, 2010.
23. European Commission 2007, op. cit.
24. EU Council 2011, op. cit.
25. European Commission 2007, op. cit.
26. European Commission, ‘Country Strategy Paper/National Indicative Programme 2007–2013. Mid Term Review and National Indicative Programme 2011–2013’, Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 2010.
27. Ibid.
28. InfoRel, ‘Brazil-EU-Mozambique Joint Declaration on the Partnership for the Sustainable Development of Bioenergy’, 2010, available at: http://www.inforel.org/noticias/noticia_Ingles.php?not_id=3943
29. The Oakland Institute, ‘Understanding land investment deals in Africa’, Country report: Mozambique, Oakland: The Oakland Institute, 2011; and S. Norfolk and J. Hanlon, ‘Confrontation between peasant producers and investors in northern Zambézia, Mozambique, in the context of profit pressures on European investors’, paper presented at the Annual World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty, Washington DC, 23-26 April 2012.
30. For example, the Mozambique Country Strategy Paper had not envisaged the initiative. Interview with EU official, 2014.
31. Across issues as diverse as: human rights promotion, peacekeeping operations, post-conflict stabilisation, drug control, supporting the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, monitoring of electoral processes, fighting diseases such as HIV/AIDS, supporting innovation in small-scale and family farming systems, supporting the sustainable development of the Amazon Region and the sustainable production of bio-energy.
32. EU Council, ‘VI European Union – Brazil Summit. Joint Statement’, Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2014.
33. Interview with Brazilian Cooperation Agency official, November 2013.
34. de Abreu 2013, op. cit.
35. Ibid.; B. Ayllón Pino, ‘Cooperação Triangular do Brasil: avanços e precauções’, The South-South Opportunity, 30 May 2011, available at: http://www.southsouth.info/profiles/blogs/cooperacao-triangular-do; and Cabral and Weinstock 2010, op. cit.
36. EU Council 2011, op. cit.
37. TWN, ‘“Common but differentiated responsibilities” under threat’, Third World Network Update on Sustainable Development Conference 2012, 6 June 2012, available at: http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/sdc2012/sdc2012.120606.htm
38. Developing countries, represented by the G-77 and China, have argued that the principle should guide the translation of each Sustainable Development Goal into more specific targets and respective commitments. See Muchhala 2014, op. cit.
39. I. Clark, ‘Speaking Points on “Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction” on behalf of the European Union and its Member States’, United Nations Meeting of the General Assembly Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals, New York, 6-10 January 2014, available at: http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_14456_en.htm
40. Federative Republic of Brazil, ‘Statement by Mr. Antonio de Aguiar Patriota Permanent Representative’, High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation, 18th Session, New York, 19 May 2014.
41. M. Otero-Iglesias, ‘The EU-Brazil partnership in Times of Crisis: What Crisis? What Partner? What Strategy?’, in G. Grevi and T. Renard (eds.), ‘Partners in crisis: EU strategic partnerships and the Global Economic Downturn’, ESPO Report 1, November 2012.
42. EU Council 2014, op. cit.

The post EU-Brazil Partnership On Development: A Lukewarm Affair – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Turkey: Erdogan To Run In First Direct Presidential Election – Analysis

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By William Chislett

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s prime minister for the last 11 years and an increasingly authoritarian and polarising figure, will, as expected, run in the country’s first direct election for the presidency on 10 August.

No one expects him to lose, least of all Erdogan himself. His Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) has won the last six general and local elections. He faces a term limit as prime minister next year.

Erdogan will run against Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, the former head of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, who is the joint candidate of the two biggest opposition parties, the centre-left Republican Peoples Party (CHP), established by Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, and the right-wing National Action Party (MHP), and Selahattin Demirtas, a pro-Kurdish politician. By uniting under one candidate, the CHP and the MHP, which represent the secularist elite, hope to narrow the distance with the AKP.

The current job of president (elected by parliament) is a largely ceremonial post; Erdogan would like French-style presidential powers but he does not have the required two-thirds support in parliament to change the constitution and push through reforms. A general election is due next year. The AKP has mooted the idea of changing the electoral law based on narrower constituencies, which would give the party more seats, and lowering the threshold of 10% of the vote, which would benefit pro-Kurdish parties.

Erdogan is courting the country’s Kurds, who constitute up to 20% of Turkey’s population. The government stepped up its efforts last month to end the decades-long conflict with Kurds, which has claimed some 40,000 lives, by sending to parliament legislation giving legal protection to officials negotiating with the outlawed PKK terrorist group and authorising ‘necessary measures for the members of the organization who give up arms to come home and adapt to and participate in social life’.

In an historic shift also last month –which broke a taboo– the AKP signalled its support for an independent Kurdish state in what is now northern Iraq. This move would be for strategic reasons –as a buffer against the militant group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (known as ISIS)– and would go down well with Turkey’s own Kurdish community. Turkey has a more than 300km long border with Iraq and some 900km with Syria, where ISIS also controls some territory. An independent state is now regarded as a foregone conclusion and one that Ankara would have no option but to accept.

The government has also gone some way towards mending fences with the once powerful military and arbiter of political life as a result of the release in June of 230 people, most of them officers, previously convicted for plotting a coup in 2003 after the AKP came to power. The constitutional court had ruled that the defendants’ rights had been violated in a case known as Sledgehammer. The ruling came the same day that a court in Ankara sentenced the 97-year-old Kenan Evren, Turkey’s president between 1982 and 1989, to life imprisonment for leading the 1980 coup.

But for the government’s aggressive political fight for power with the movement of Fethullah Gulen, a US-based Islamic preacher and former ally of Erdogan, whose followers had infiltrated the police and prosecution service with the government’s knowledge and initial blessing, the court’s ruling might never have happened. The Sufi-inspired Gülen fled Turkey in 1999, apparently fearing he would be arrested for plotting against the secular state.

Some of the evidence used in the trial, however, was so flimsy and in some cases fabricated that the European Court of Human Rights would probably have overturned the verdict on the 230 eventually. According to a report by a group of international scientists, the Sledgehammer court ignored the fact that documents said to be from 2002-03 used fonts ‘not available until MS Office 2007 was released’.

Corruption scandals involving the AKP and allegedly Erdogan himself and family members, the government’s flaunting of the rule of law and the prime minister’s majoritarian concept of democracy, the ban on YouTube (lifted in June more than two months after the blocking of access, following another ruling by the constitutional court), and the harsh crackdown on protests beginning with those in Gezi Park in Istanbul in May 2013 and including the rough handling of bereaved demonstrators after a fire in a coal mine killed 301 miners in May 2014,[1] have seemingly done little to dent support for Erdogan, particularly among AKP’s core pious voters in the conservative Anatolian heartlands. The AKP has a formidable electoral machine and most of the media is pro-government; the party swept the board in last March’s local elections, increasing its share of the vote from 39% in 2009 to 45%.

Erdogan’s strong point has been the economy, whose stellar growth until 2013 has raised living standards considerably. Per capita income has trebled since 2003. The economy, too reliant on hot money and cheap credit, is now coming unstuck. The country’s currency slumped early this year, forcing Turkey’s central bank into a U-turn to stave off a collapse of the lira when it hiked its benchmark interest rates. Last month, however, the bank, apparently under pressure from the government, shaved 75 basis points off the weekly repo rate to 8.75% despite inflation almost double the bank’s 5% target.

Erdogan would have liked a larger cut; he called the one in May –of 50 basis points– a ‘joke’. The latest move came shortly after Numan Kurtulmus, the AKP’s deputy chairman, suggested the central bank’s independence should be curtailed, and two weeks after leading bank officials, including the governor’s chief of staff, were moved from their posts. The size of this cut seemed to be a middle course between holding them and incurring Erdogan’s wrath or reducing interest rates to a greater extent.

Erdogan has been in power so long that some refer to him as ‘the Sultan’. The only doubt seems to be whether he will win outright in the first round or have to face a run-off round on 24 August.

About the author:
William Chislett is Associate Analyst at the Elcano Royal Institute, author of six Working Papers on Turkey | @WilliamChislet3

Source:
This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute and may be accessed here.

[1] A much publicised photo of a miner being kicked by Yusef Yerkel, a UK university-educated aide of Erdogan, while two soldiers pinioned him to the ground caused outrage on social media inside and outside of Turkey. Erdogan called the disaster an ‘ordinary’ occurence in the mining industry.

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Hong Kong Votes, Beijing Fumes – Analysis

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An unofficial referendum conducted in Hong Kong, sponsored by the ‘Occupy Central’ movement, drew a surprising 800,000 votes cast – drawing fire from China. What are the implications of the vote for Beijing?

By Dylan Loh Ming Hui

ALMOST 800,000 ballots were cast online and physically at polling stations in Hong Kong, in an unofficial referendum on Hong Kong’s electoral reform. The turnout is a sizeable proportion of the 3.5 million registered voters in the 2012 elections – representing about one in five registered voters.

The poll gave voters three options all of which would allow voters to directly nominate and elect their Chief Executive, although there is an option to abstain. The results are not tallied yet but the significance of the huge support in voter turnout is not lost on Beijing. Despite the fact that there would be no legal effect of this unofficial referendum, it will have potentially wide ranging ramifications for Beijing.

Election of Chief Executive

The key point of contention of this ‘referendum’ lies in how Hong Kong’s Chief Executive is selected. While China has promised direct elections in 2017, the candidates can only be selected by a pro-Beijing 1,200 strong, nominating committee.

Anson Chan, a former top civil servant in Hong Kong, summarised the sentiments many Hong Kongers felt: “What is the point of one man, one vote if at the end of the day we have to vote from three puppets or four puppets anointed by Beijing?”

The unexpectedly large voter turnout was precipitated by a recent white paper by Beijing on the “one country, two systems” model, emphasising its “complete jurisdiction” over Hong Kong. The vote drew swift condemnation by China. Global Times, a staunchly nationalistic paper, called it an “illegal farce” and a “joke”.

More pointedly, it stressed that pro-democracy groups should “…refrain from a gambling mentality by believing that they could create overwhelming pressure on Beijing.”

Implications for Beijing

There are four key implications from this unofficial referendum for China’s internal governance. Firstly, the large turnout is an indicator of the general unhappiness over perceived curbs on civil liberties such as universal suffrage and freedom of speech and over the increased assertiveness of Beijing as articulated in its white paper.

As the 2017 deadline looms ever closer, Beijing would have to contend with more agitation by the ‘Occupy Central’ movement and other pro-democracy groups. And as the movement gains momentum, these groups will take increasingly bold and innovative steps (such as the unofficial referendum) to put pressure on China for reforms to the Hong Kong election system.

Secondly, there remains a fear and the danger from the Chinese perspective that the upwardly mobile and educated mainlanders who work and play in Hong Kong would be increasingly socialised and attracted to the form of liberal democracy the ‘Occupy Central’ movement is pushing for. Because of the deep people and trade exchanges between mainland China and Hong Kong, there is very little to limit the slow but sure influence of ideational interactions.

Thirdly, pro-democracy activists in China, seeing the impact and global media attention of the unofficial referendum (and the larger ‘Occupy Central’ movement), can further leverage on Hong Kong as a platform to develop their own institutional capabilities, expand their protest repertoire and, potentially, import and diffuse certain aspects of the pro-democracy movement in the mainland. That is, indeed, already happening for example with the annual commemorative vigils for the Tiananmen incident.

On 4 June 2014, the largest and the only commemorative vigil marking the 25th anniversary of Tiananmen Incident drew over 150,000 people – a good number of them from mainland China. Human rights lawyer Teng Biao, from the mainland, was amongst the speakers; he used the platform to enunciate his wish for Chinese citizens to have the freedom to protest and paid homage to the many activists who have lost their lives in the fight for democratic reforms.

Finally, Beijing may find it harder to manage and deal with the Hong Kong government as it finds itself under increasing popular pressure – even if the government established by Beijing.

In a rare show of defiance, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive publicly expressed disagreement to the Global Time’s editorial stating that it was wrong to put “the people of Hong Kong and China on confronting sides” and that the citizens were only expressing their wish to elect the city’s leader by universal suffrage in 2017. The Hong Kong government also released a statement later saying that it is “the right of the people to express their views and we also understand that there are different views in society”.

Caught between a rock and hard place

The impact and significance of the annual vigil coupled with the recent ‘referendum’ must be causing some worry for the Chinese leaders. Beijing cannot foreseeably quell the movement in Hong Kong with the sort of heavy handedness that it could if it were in the mainland. Doing so would most definitely galvanize the pro-democracy movement even further and draw international criticism.

However, not taking any action or giving a ‘slap on the wrist’ response would embolden activists and campaigners even more and might inspire domestic activists to undertake similar activities. Indeed, there are early signs of a prolonged, entrenched campaign. For instance, on 2 July 2014, more than 500,000 people turned up for a pro-democracy rally in Hong Kong’s central business district – the largest turnout since the city was handed over to China in 1997.

As Beijing devotes greater resources and attention to the restive Xinjiang region in a bid to crush the violent separatist movement there, an arguably more powerful but outwardly benign ideological movement is taking place in Hong Kong. How China manages and deal with the democratic expressions and expectations of the Hong Kong people would have important implications for its domestic governance.

Dylan Loh Ming Hui is a research analyst with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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Nepal And Ethnic Federalism: The Insufficiency Of The Maoist Model – Analysis

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By Subin Nepal

The last few years have seen a great rise in the discussion surrounding state restructuring in Nepal. At its very core has been the issue of ethnic federalism. First touted by the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M) in their agenda in the 1990s and now heavily supported by several ethnic parties as well as some major political parties, ethnic federalism has become, in a way, the talk of the town. While some political parties have shown minor resistance to the UCPN-M model of federalism, the majority of them seem to agree with the need to restructure the state at the very least.

UCPN-M-introduced federalism needs critical analysis because of their close ties with ethnic groups during the civil war and the ethnic electorates they have been attracting. The recent constituent assembly (CA) election has shown that the UCPN-M’s overall public support has plummeted. However, a report that was submitted by the State Restructuring Commission in 2012 (before the second CA election) upheld the UCPN-M model which cannot be overlooked. While there is a possibility that a majority alliance between Nepali Congress and Communist Party of Nepal–Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) could be formed to overthrow previously agreed upon recommendations to the constitution, it might actually be a disastrous road to take. On top of that, singling out the unhappy faction (UCPN-M) does not seem to be the best policy to move forward with. Hence, there seems to be little to no possibility of simply overlooking the third largest party and its policies.

What are the flaws in the demanded model?

At a time when the rest of the world is trying to remove social divisions that hamper unity in society, Nepali Maoists seem to be embracing a rather strange policy. Their inclination towards an ethnic model of federalism is not only a backward model but also a way to create divisions in a society that has been functioning without any major ethnic clashes till date. The Maoist model proposes 13 provinces – a majority of them named after ethnic groups. The irony is that almost no ethnic group holds a population majority within the state that has been named after them. Though the idea of uplifting the minority and historically oppressed is a particularly positive agenda that the UCPN-M has stood with, there is no clear evidence that only 13 ethnicities are minorities and have been historically oppressed in Nepal. Or, that creating only 13 provinces would provide the much needed support to the rest of the minority groups as well. The Nepalese government officially recognises the existence of more than 100 ethnic groups in the country. And if Maoists were to embrace only 13 of them as their token minorities, it would create another gap within the minority movement, giving rise to several layers within the minorities. Several ignored minority groups have already threatened to raise weapons in case they do not receive equal rights as the top 13.

What could be the solution to this proposed model?

Nepal’s federalism has been discussed by several different non-profits and research organisations. However, on the ground, work seems still to be lacking. The political parties seem to be touting federalism to receive quick funding for “minority right campaigns” from human rights-based organisations. In addition, bulky research papers are being produced without a substantial geo-strategic vision. Carving out a nation is a difficult process and the Nepali political elites seem to have forgotten this reality. Before jumping into federalism based on ethnicity or even federalism itself, Nepal needs to devise an independent agency that consists of scholars from appropriate fields for state restructuring. Cheap slogans embraced for quick money and the possibility of a strong electorate should not decide how the country gets restructured. A political suggestion is acceptable but a political division based on one party’s agenda only will leave the country divided. Hence, Nepal needs to do a serious re-evaluation of its current inclination towards the UCPN-M model of federalism. And this re-evaluation needs to come from the Constituent Assembly and the same political parties who are leaning towards this model. The CA needs to create a new agency and make it independent unlike the previous one (State Restructuring Commission) which was just a wing of the CA. This agency needs to consist of scholars and needs to take at least a few years to devise strategic plans for state restructuring before Nepal makes those changes.

At the end, the question of convincing such a divided CA to create an independent agency that might make political parties sacrifice their agendas is what makes this task difficult to accomplish. And it is certain that UCPN-M would be the one to disagree with such an agency. Bipartisanship within the CA could lead to the creation of such an agency, which then could hold all the political parties accountable, including UCPN-M, and respond to their demands with real, hands-on research of possible state restructuring.

Subin Nepal
Research Intern, IReS, IPCS
Email: nepalsk@gmail.com

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US Midwest Gasoline Prices And Supply – Analysis

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With the Fourth of July holiday weekend starting, the national average price for retail gasoline is $3.70 per gallon (gal). This is up about 4 cents/gal over the last six weeks and 21 cents/gal higher than last year at this time, but well below the spring price peaks reached in each of the previous three years.

Most of the recent price increase is attributable to rising crude oil prices since unrest began in Iraq last month. However, there is significant regional variation in gasoline prices (Figure 1), with PADD 2 (the Midwest) having seen significant fluctuation over the past month.

While average Midwest retail prices at $3.67/gal are third highest among the U.S. Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts (PADDs), gasoline prices across the other PADDs ranged from $4.04/gal to $3.48/gal. Midwest gasoline prices can be volatile because of many factors, the most important of which are the logistics of supply and distribution to this region. PADD 2 covers a large geographic area consisting of multiple semi-connected markets. The landlocked region is also relatively isolated; it cannot directly access global markets, such as the actively traded Atlantic Basin, for additional supplies.

Instead, Midwest gasoline supply comes primarily from refineries within the region, and is supplemented with pipeline shipments from neighboring PADDs, primarily the Gulf Coast, and local inventory withdrawals. Recent market changes have led to congestion in pipelines that move supplies to PADD 2. These factors were evident in the latest period of elevated gasoline prices in the Midwest.

Beginning May 28, wholesale spot prices for conventional gasoline in Chicago rose 15 cents over five days, reaching $3.04/gal on June 3. The Chicago spot price was 7 cents/gal more than in New York Harbor on May 28 and by June 3 it was 23 cents more.twip140702fig1-lg

Despite the region’s refineries producing significant amounts of gasoline, the northern part of PADD 2, including Chicago, requires shipments from southern PADD 2 (Oklahoma and Kansas) and the Gulf Coast to meet demand. Most of this supply is delivered via the Magellan, Explorer and TEPPCO pipelines. The amount required to meet PADD 2 demand increases during peak-summer demand periods. Recent changes to pipeline infrastructure and other factors have led to congestion on pipelines that ship gasoline north.

As a result, PADD 2 has recently relied more heavily on inventories and in-region production. The recent price increases occurred even though refinery runs in the Midwest were high for this time of year. Crude runs for the week ending May 30 were 3.6 million barrels per day (bbl/d) in PADD 2, 329,000 bbl/d more than the five-year average (Figure 2). With high refinery runs insufficient and declining inventories — Midwest gasoline inventories fell 1.5 million barrels from May 23 to 30 — the next marginal barrel of supply into PADD 2 came from another PADD, and constraints in moving that supply led to higher prices in Chicago.twip140702fig2-lg

Even with refinery runs at high levels, several refinery outages unexpectedly took supplies off the market, adding upward pressure to prices. Trade press reports indicated that the extension of a planned outage at Valero’s 180,000-bbl/d Memphis refinery, a major source of supply in the region, led to tight supplies and higher prices. Normally, the Memphis market would turn to the Centennial Pipeline and the TEPPCO Pipeline for additional supplies. However, Centennial was closed in late 2013 because of low volumes, and TEPPCO underwent changes that reduced the pipeline’s capacity to deliver gasoline.

Additionally, an outage at Marathon’s 240,000-bbl/d Catlettsburg, Kentucky, refinery led to brief supply tightening in the Ohio River Valley and to pipeline allocations on the Buckeye Pipe Line system, which flows product eastward from Chicago and refineries in western Ohio. The region can also be supplied via truck from Laurel Pipe Line terminals in Pittsburgh, but with Laurel also on allocation, supplies were limited.

Northern PADD 2 pulls additional volumes of gasoline from refineries in southern PADD 2 around Tulsa, Oklahoma, a pricing point known as Group 3, and the Gulf Coast via pipelines such as the Explorer Pipeline and the Magellan Pipeline (Figure 3). However, outages at refineries that supply those pipelines affect gasoline markets in the rest of PADD 2. Trade press reports that refinery outages in Group 3 (Tulsa) and farther south in the Gulf Coast contributed to market tightness and higher prices in Chicago. Specifically, outages at Marathon’s 522,000 bbl/d Garyville, Louisiana, refinery, the nation’s third largest, tightened supplies in the Gulf Coast available for shipment to PADD 2. The large price spreads between Chicago and Group 3, and between Chicago and the Gulf Coast, created incentives to move gasoline supply northward, and led to active shipping on Explorer and Magellan.

Spot wholesale gasoline prices in Chicago began to decline compared with New York prices after high crude runs and supplies arriving from Group 3 and the Gulf Coast via pipeline built PADD 2 gasoline inventories by 1 million barrels for the week ending June 13. Crude runs in PADD 2 for that week were 3.7 million bbl/d, 364,000 bbl/d more than the five-year average and the highest level since EIA began publishing the data in 1992. Spot prices in Chicago declined more than 9 cents/gal over the weekend of June 13-16. As a result Chicago prices were 3 cents below New York prices as of July 1.twip140702fig3-lg

Gasoline prices flat, diesel fuel prices mixed

The average U.S. retail gasoline price was unchanged this week, remaining at $3.70 per gallon as of June 30, 2014, up 21 cents from the same time last year. The average West Coast price increased by three cents to $4.04 per gallon, while the Rocky Mountain price rose two cents to $3.63 per gallon. The East Coast price increased by a cent to $3.68 per gallon. The Midwest price decreased by two cents to $3.67 per gallon, and the Gulf Coast by one cent to $3.48 per gallon.

The U.S. average price for diesel fuel increased by less than a cent, remaining at $3.92 per gallon, up 10 cents from this time last year. The West Coast price increased by two cents to $4.07 per gallon. The Rocky Mountain and Gulf Coast prices both increased by less than a cent, to $3.92 and $3.82 per gallon, respectively. The Midwest price decreased by a penny to $3.87 per gallon, while the East Coast price fell less than a penny to $3.98 per gallon.

Propane inventories continue to rise

U.S. propane stocks increased by 2.6 million barrels last week to 56.2 million barrels as of June 27, 2014, 0.1 million barrels (0.2%) lower than a year ago. Gulf Coast inventories increased by 1.9 million barrels and Midwest inventories increased by 0.4 million barrels. East Coast inventories and Rocky Mountain/ West Coast inventories both increased by 0.1 million barrels. Propylene non-fuel-use inventories represented 7.3% of total propane inventories.

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How John Maynard Keynes Can Save The Arab Spring – Analysis

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By Richard Javad Heydarian

At first glance, the Arab region appears to have entered a new period of crisis—perhaps the greatest in its modern history. The Arab revolts of 2011 seem to have given way to a “Jihadi Spring,” with the civil war in Syria providing a haven for radical extremist groups from across the globe. As the crisis in Syria spills over into neighboring Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan, the world is confronting a frightening revival of the al-Qaeda franchise.

In 2011, North Africa witnessed the dramatic downfall of three dictators: Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. But in much of the region, “deep state” security apparatuses have proven more resilient than any one political leader. Cabals of military officers managed to frustrate democratic transition in Egypt and hold onto power in Algeria, with Algerian leader Abdelaziz Bouteflika and Egyptian general-turned-president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi recently claiming landslide victories in sham elections that were largely boycotted by the progressive left. The oil-rich sheikhdoms of the Middle East, meanwhile, have brutally suppressed any form of domestic opposition, while leveraging their huge cachet of petrodollars to appease their restive citizens through a combination of expanded welfare and new employment opportunities.

More worryingly, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a uniquely vicious offshoot of al-Qaeda, has upended the 20th-century map of the Middle East. The shocking brutality of ISIS—and the overweening ambition of its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi—prompted the al-Qaeda “general command” led by Ayman al-Zawahiri to disown the group. After pulling off a lightning defeat of the Iraqi armed forces across much of the country’s western and northern regions, ISIS announced the formation of an “Islamic Caliphate,” a new political entity at the heart of the Middle East that connects various Sunni-dominated regions of Iraq and Syria.

Just as the British Philosopher Edmund Burke decried the French Revolution for replacing monarchical stability with republican terror, many modern-day pundits have lamented, in varying forms, how the Arab Spring has supposedly paved the way for a renewed era of instability in an ever-combustible region. This mistaken narrative has allowed autocratic regimes across the world to use the slogan “stability” to smash and delegitimize any organized call for democratic freedom.

On closer inspection, however, German philosopher Georg W.F. Hegel may provide a better framework to understand the likely trajectory of the Arab uprisings. Although cognizant of the immediate and terrifying outcome of the French Revolution, Hegel maintained that a true break with the past inevitably requires a violent rupture with the ancien régime—part of a dialectical transition toward a new historical epoch.

After decades of centralized, autocratic leadership, the advent of popular revolutions has naturally created new power vacuums, which have been temporarily filled by well-organized reactionary groups and extremist terrorist groups. But none of the above groups is likely to provide any lasting solution to the agonies of the Arab street, from massive youth unemployment to economic stagnation and political repression. Although the Wahhabi-Salafist ideology of the al-Qaeda franchise, and particularly the extremist version embraced by ISIS, appeals only to a small minority of people, the secular autocracies in places such as Algeria and Egypt, in turn, are recycled versions of long discredited post-colonial Arab regimes.

This lack of appealing alternatives is precisely where progressive forces can build on the democratic gains of the 2011 uprisings.

Perils of Revolutionary Transition

Strongmen in Algeria and Egypt may have managed to frustrate any meaningful democratic transition in the short-to-medium term, but neither Bouteflika nor Sisi has proposed any remedy to the myriad of political and economic problems that afflict their nations.

The aging Algerian leader is struggling with health issues and has been barely visible to the public. There are serious concerns over the prospect of violent intra-regime jostling once Bouteflika passes away. In Egypt, Sisi’s popularity could melt away as soon as the majority of people realize how he and his colleagues in the military have little understanding of how to run the Arab world’s largest country. By violently crushing the Islamist opposition, the Algerian and Egyptian regimes have opened up the space for the liberal-democratic opposition to take the initiative.

As for ISIS, its emergence as a potent force for mayhem has had the unintended effect of unifying historic rivals such as Washington and Tehran, as both powers scramble to support the government in Baghdad. A warming in the relationship between the two countries could significantly strengthen the domestic position of pragmatists in both capitals, especially the Rouhani administration in Iran, which has tirelessly sought to repair Tehran’s broken ties with the West.

The rise of ISIS has also undermined the largely sectarian rule of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who has come under local and international pressure to step down in favor of an “inclusive” government in the country. Alarmed by the frightening ramifications of an extremist resurgence in their own backyard, Arab sheikhdoms in the region have also cracked down on local supporters, including top-level officials, of jihadi groups in Syria and elsewhere. In short, both the patrons of “counter-revolution” and the forces of “jihadi revolution” are by no means secure, as pragmatists and progressive actors unify against a common threat.

But what of the Arab spring? Today’s gloomy reading of the Arab spring tends to overlook a fundamental factor, which not only explains the regrettable turn of the recent revolutionary upheavals, but also holds the key to resuscitating the democratic aspirations of the Arab street. And it is here that the ideas of John Maynard Keynes, arguably history’s greatest economist, could be of greatest help.

The Keynesian State

Reflecting on the roots of the Great Depression in the early 20th century, Keynes analyzed the immanent instability of capitalism in the absence of proactive state intervention. Unlike Karl Marx, however, he didn’t call for the abolition of capitalism. Instead he proposed a set of macro-economic policies to empower the state to manage the excesses of the markets for the benefit of the greater population.

His direct participation in the establishment of the Bretton Woods system paved the way for a measure of stability and openness in international trade, which in turn facilitated the rapid industrialization and recovery of economies across the world. Many developing and industrialized economies used Keynesian theories to strike an optimal balance between capitalist expansion and sustained national development. The result was the emergence of welfare states in the West and developmental states across Asia. This marked the “golden age” of capitalism.

But as Richard Posner intelligently observed, the heirs of Keynes failed to appreciate the necessity of preventing government “from exceeding the limits of optimal intervention.” It was this particular mistake, coupled with the devastating impact of the Vietnam War and the multiple oil crises in the Middle East, which allowed neo-classical economists to eventually marginalize Keynesian thinking, advocate “pro-market” policies, and call for the retrenchment of the state in recent decades.

The 2007-08 Great Recession, however, served as a wake-up call by violently interrupting almost three decades of neoliberal economic stupor. The economic crisis heavily undermined the naïve belief in orthodox economic models, which stubbornly defended the supposed rationality and self-correcting dynamism of impersonal markets.

Consequently, a growing number of policymakers and academics have come to realize the wisdom of Keynesian thought, which elegantly articulates the inherent necessity of judicious public management of economic cycles. No wonder that recent years have seen a huge push to both re-inject more Keynesian principles into the curricula of the world’s leading economic departments and espouse robust state participation in, and regulation of, both the national and global economy.

An Arab Economic Revolution

As I argue in How Capitalism Failed the Arab World: The Economic Roots and Precarious Future of the Arab Uprisings, the 2010-11 Arab uprisings were fundamentally a reflection of the failure of the post-independence Arab states to internalize Keynesian economic thinking. There was neither a sober appreciation of the benefits of capitalism nor any effort to establish an autonomous, developmental state.

Many Arab states witnessed the emergence of quasi-socialist regimes, which were undemocratic, heavily militarized, and dependent on strategic or hydrocarbon rents. These personalistic Arab regimes failed to institute genuine land reform, blocked the emergence of a vibrant entrepreneurial class, and squandered their national resources in pursuit of autocratic consolidation—all at the expense of sustained industrialization and economic diversification. The result was an economic crisis in the 1980s, which forced much of the Arab world, especially non-oil-exporting countries, to undertake aggressive pro-market reforms over the succeeding decades.

Instead of transforming Arab economies into dynamic emerging markets, however, the economic liberalization of the 1990s allowed many autocratic regimes to outsource welfare responsibilities, transfer the ownership of state-owned companies to favored clients, and abolish support mechanisms for strategic agricultural and industrial sectors. Although the pro-market reforms allowed Arab states to establish a modicum of macro-economic stability, the result was double-digit unemployment, widespread poverty, high dependence on food and commodity imports, and heavy reliance on speculative and service-oriented economic sectors such as tourism and real estate.

It is no surprise, then, that the 2007-08 Great Recession had a devastating impact on the Arab street, precipitating massive food insecurity and a macroeconomic downturn across the Middle East. With minimal assets, fiscal resources, and policy space for intervention, many Arab regimes had limited capacity to cope with the impact of the crises. In the absence of genuine democratic mechanisms to express their economic discontent, it was arguably just a matter of time before the middle and working classes would unite against the autocratic regimes—and spark a revolution.

Today, however, the Arab Transition Countries (ATCs) have failed to adequately appreciate the structural economic roots of the Arab spring. None of the major post-revolutionary contenders for leadership has provided a coherent policy agenda to address systemic economic vulnerabilities. Instead, much of the public discussion has boiled down to questioning the democratic credentials and influence of the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots across the Arab World.

A cursory look at the ATCs reveals how post-revolutionary governments have largely pursued the macroeconomic policies of the previous regimes. And this is precisely why there has been a wobbly march toward genuine democratic transition. Unless the ATCs establish a new economic paradigm, focusing on issues of public welfare, inclusive growth, macroeconomic resilience, and industrial and agricultural revival, there will be no genuine democratic transition.

After all, beyond freedom of expression and ritualized electoral exercises, democracy is about establishing an egalitarian economic system that empowers the greater citizenry to fully participate in the shaping of the political order. Keynes’ ideas are the greatest guide to achieving an optimal balance between democracy and economic development, serving as the blueprint for the progressive-democratic forces that hold the promise of resuscitating the spirit of the 2011 revolutions.

In Tunisia, the birthplace of the Arab spring, moderate Islamists (especially the dominant Ennahda Party) and progressive liberals have managed to negotiate, albeit painstakingly, the foundations of perhaps the first truly democratic country in the Arab world. Having established a modicum of democratic political consensus, the next step for Tunisia is to embrace an egalitarian economic policy, which will translate rising discursive freedom and political openness into social justice for the majority of the people. The Arab spring is far from over.

Richard Javad Heydarian is a lecturer in international affairs and political science at Ateneo De Manila University and a policy adviser at the Philippine House of Representatives. As a specialist on Asian geopolitics and economic affairs, he has written for or been interviewed by Al Jazeera, Asia Times, BBC, Bloomberg, The New York Times, The Huffington Post, The Diplomat, Foreign Policy In Focus, and USA TODAY, among other leading international publications.  He is the author of How Capitalism Failed the Arab World: The Economic Roots and Precarious Future of the Middle East Uprisings (Zed, London), and the forthcoming book The Philippines: The U.S., China, and the Struggle for Asia’s Pivot State (Zed, 2015).

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Unchecked, But Not Unbounded: Role Of Public Opinion In Pakistan’s Military Policy – Analysis

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By Aman Shareef

On June 15, the Pakistan Army began a military operation in North Waziristan to “eliminate these terrorists regardless of hue and colour”. In the fortnight since operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’ began, numerous airstrikes have been carried out, killing 370 militants as of June 30.

At this stage of the operation, the Army is carrying out door-to-door searches in the town of Miranshah, in North Waziristan. This town has been one of the main bases of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Between airstrikes, American drone strikes and ground forces, Zarb-e-Azb is the most major operation against religious extremists the Pakistan Army has conducted in years!

Analysts have speculated about the reason behind this sudden shift in policy. Some say that the Pakistan Army believes that it is critical to carry out this operation before the US withdraws at the end of 2014. Others argue that recent attacks have proven that the peace talks are a failure, and therefore the Army is finally taking action. Some have even said that the military leadership has wanted to carry out this operation for a while, and the civilian government is no longer able to rein them in.

Although all these have some merit, the underlying reason for the shift in policy is the shift in public opinion. Since Nawaz Sharif’s government came to power last year, there have been attacks in Quetta, Peshawar and against military convoys in North Waziristan. The Taliban attacks on the Karachi International Airport on June 8 are altogether different from prior attacks because they actually succeeded in shifting public sentiment past an unknown tipping point in favor of the military taking action against these extremists.

Moving in line with public opinion is not new for the Pakistani military, but many analysts have failed to grasp the extent to which the Army’s options for any given scenario only exist within the universe created by public opinion.

The Pakistani Army does not see itself only as a tool to protect its nation, but as a governing institution that may have to step into the role of governance at any moment. Due to this understanding of its own responsibilities to the country, the Army must have the people on their side at all times. The military is aware that a successful coup, and the ability to continue ruling, is dependent on the approval of the public.

Since its founding in 1947, Pakistan has been under the rule of three different military governments. The first coup of General Ayub Khan in 1958 was met with general public approval, creating a precedent for the Pakistan military to take over whenever it felt it necessary. The later military coups of Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf were able to lean on this precedent when carrying out their own coups.

In 2007, when the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) incident took place, President Musharraf was already unpopular with his firing of the Chief Justice. Since Musharraf was unpopular, the operation to root out the heavily armed extremists in the Red Mosque was seen as being questionable. I remember being in Pakistan at the time, and being a part of conversations where people were expressing their doubts as to the validity of the military’s actions.

These extremists had practically turned a mosque in the middle of Islamabad into a fortress. The military had no other choice, and yet Musharraf’s unpopularity at the time made people question even this course action. Arguably, the Lal Masjid incident was the beginning of the end of Pervez Musharraf’s reign. The lesson Pakistan’s military took away from this incident is that military operations that are unpopular will lead to the downfall of its leaders, and hinder the Army’s ability to lead.

In 2009, the Taliban took control of the entire Swat region and hundreds of thousands of people fled to escape the harsh rule of the extremist group. Yet, the Army did nothing of note for months. Then, a video of a young girl being brutally caned went viral, and the whole of Pakistan became outraged. It was this dramatic change in public sentiment that allowed the Pakistan Army to carry out a major operation to root out the Taliban in Swat.

While military policy is not dictated by the sways of public opinion polls, the options available to them exist only in the realm of what the people of Pakistan will approve of. As a result, if the United States wants to influence the actions of the Pakistani military, they need to keep their thumb on the pulse of public sentiment in Pakistan.

Similarly, if India and the rest of the world would like to predict and understand what actions the Pakistan Army will take, keeping an eye on public opinion will be a critical component of their analyses.

(Aman Shareef is an independent analyst and freelance writer with experience working on US-Pakistan civil society engagement. He can be contacted at southasiamonitor1@gmail.com)

This article appeared at South Asia Monitor.

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ISIS And The Taliban: Writing On The Wall For Afghanistan – OpEd

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Afghans sleepwalked to the polls to replace Karzai, with a choice between a US-educated ex-World Bank official Ashraf Ghani (and his warlord VP Dostum), or the Tajik Abdullah Abdullah who threatens chaos if he loses. Iraq’s April elections, the first national elections since the US declared ‘success’ and left in 2011, provide an indication of what could be in store for Afghans. Rather than confirming the new order, they precipitated a ‘surge’ by Sunni insurgents, who quickly capture a third of the country, discrediting the whole US-imposed electoral process.

Plans for consolidating Iraq and Afghanistan as pro-US regimes appear to have collapsed with ISIS’s capture of Mosul, facing virtually no resistance. The Kurdish Peshmurga militia took control of Kirkuk, and in the south, Iraq’s Shia brace to resist ISIS. Iraqis are now living through the 1990s Afghan scenario, when the Taliban quickly took over a country in the grips of sectarian violence with the promise to disarm militias and provide security. In Iraq’s Sunni majority areas, a population exhausted by war and violence is now faced by the same prospect of accepting a harsh rule by Sunni extremists who promise security.

From AQI to ISIS

The Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham/ Syria (ISIS, ISIL) is the heir to Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), formed as a direct result of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, successor to AQI leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (d. 2006) and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (d. 2010), has suddenly emerged as a figure who is attempting to shape the future of Iraq, Syria and the wider Middle East along the lines proposed by Osama Bin Laden.

In 2006, AQI created an umbrella organization, the Mujahideen Shura Council, in an attempt to unify Sunni insurgents in Iraq, and AQI spokesman Abu Ayyub al-Masri declared the self-styled Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) as a front which included the Shura Council factions. AQI was at a low point in its fortunes in 2010, as the resistance ot the US occupation was supposedly collapsing due to the US surge of 2007–2008. But the US decision to disband the Iraqi army and ban Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party in 2003 also meant the destruction of the Iraqi state, which meant that the insurgents merely had to wait till the occupying troops departed.

AQI’s transformation into a homegrown organization covering the Levant is reflected in its name change to ISIS in April 2013. The Syrian Jabhat al-Nusra (Support Front, 2012) functioned in parallel to ISIS, and supposedly merged with it in 2013. ISIS leader Baghdadi is arguably the real heir to Bin Laden, rather that Ayman Zawahiri, who in vain told Baghdadi to leave Syria to Nusra, and has shown no real initiative since Bin Laden’s assassination in 2011.

It was Baghdadi who took the initiative to avenge Bin Laden, which included

  • 24 attacks near Baghdad immediately afterwards
  • a wave of ISI suicide attacks beginning in Mosul in August 2011 resulting in 70 deaths
  • a series of coordinated car bombings and IED attacks in Baghdad in December 2011, killing 63 just days after the US completed its troop withdrawal from the country.

How far Baghdadi is directly responsible for the military strategy and tactics of ISIS is uncertain. Former Iraqi army and intelligence officers from the Saddam era are said to play a crucial role. AQI nonetheless follows the al-Qaeda logic of terror against civilians who oppose their program, a spin-off of quietist Saudi Wahhabism, but with Wahhab’s militancy restored, the so-called neo-Wahhabis. (Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab inspired the Saud tribal leaders to rebel against the Ottomans, eventually founding the Saudi state.)

Dilemma for the US

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, there was no equivalent of the Islamist movements which offer a genuine alternative to Saudi Wahhabism—the Muslim Brotherhood or the Iranian Islamists led by Ayatollah Khomeini, which meant that the collapse of the secular regimes—Afghanistan in the 1990s and Iraq in 2003—quickly gave way to extremist neo-Wahhabi insurgencies, which initially found common cause with al-Qaeda.

This relationship soured in Afghanistan with 9/11, which the Taliban were not party to, but the US invasion of Afghanistan again gave the Taliban and al-Qaeda common cause. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the collapse of Sunni political power opened the door to al-Qaeda there.

US strategy after invading in both cases was to promote a “surge” (Iraq 2007–2008, Afghanistan 2010–2012) to defeat the insurgencies. It is clear in both cases that the surge was unsuccessful, merely providing a breathing space for the US to withdraw its troops, a la Vietnam in 1975.

Iraq’s present crisis is an indication of what is in store for Afghanistan, where a resilient Taliban aim to reassert control. The US can no longer prevail in either country, as the neo-Wahhabis gain strength. It is only a matter of time before angry Saudi citizens recreate the same dynamic in the kingdom itself.

The only realistic option to prevent this is for the US to push its Saudi ‘ally’ to work with Iran and Russia to achieve a negotiated settlement of the Syrian civil war, and with Iran in Iraq and Afghanistan to support the elected governments.

The alternative is to let Iraq disintegrate into Sunni, Shia and Kurdish states, and to allow a similar disintegration of Afghanistan into Tajik, Pushtun and Shia states—after hundreds of thousands more deaths.

Can Obama reverse the nightmare of the past decade, or is this scenario what the US intends?

A version of this appeared at Crescent International

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Ocean On Saturn Moon Could Be As Salty As The Dead Sea

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Scientists analyzing data from NASA’s Cassini mission have firm evidence the ocean inside Saturn’s largest moon, Titan, might be as salty as the Earth’s Dead Sea.

The new results come from a study of gravity and topography data collected during Cassini’s repeated flybys of Titan during the past 10 years. Using the Cassini data, researchers presented a model structure for Titan, resulting in an improved understanding of the structure of the moon’s outer ice shell. The findings are published in this week’s edition of the journal Icarus.

“Titan continues to prove itself as an endlessly fascinating world, and with our long-lived Cassini spacecraft, we’re unlocking new mysteries as fast as we solve old ones,” said Linda Spilker, Cassini project scientist at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in Pasadena, California, who was not involved in the study.

Additional findings support previous indications the moon’s icy shell is rigid and in the process of freezing solid. Researchers found that a relatively high density was required for Titan’s ocean in order to explain the gravity data. This indicates the ocean is probably an extremely salty brine of water mixed with dissolved salts likely composed of sulfur, sodium and potassium. The density indicated for this brine would give the ocean a salt content roughly equal to the saltiest bodies of water on Earth.

“This is an extremely salty ocean by Earth standards,” said the paper’s lead author, Giuseppe Mitri of the University of Nantes in France. “Knowing this may change the way we view this ocean as a possible abode for present-day life, but conditions might have been very different there in the past.”

Cassini data also indicate the thickness of Titan’s ice crust varies slightly from place to place. The researchers said this can best be explained if the moon’s outer shell is stiff, as would be the case if the ocean were slowly crystalizing, and turning to ice. Otherwise, the moon’s shape would tend to even itself out over time, like warm candle wax. This freezing process would have important implications for the habitability of Titan’s ocean, as it would limit the ability of materials to exchange between the surface and the ocean.

A further consequence of a rigid ice shell, according to the study, is any outgassing of methane into Titan’s atmosphere must happen at scattered “hot spots” — like the hot spot on Earth that gave rise to the Hawaiian Island chain. Titan’s methane does not appear to result from convection or plate tectonics recycling its ice shell.

How methane gets into the moon’s atmosphere has long been of great interest to researchers, as molecules of this gas are broken apart by sunlight on short geological timescales. Titan’s present atmosphere contains about five percent methane. This means some process, thought to be geological in nature, must be replenishing the gas. The study indicates that whatever process is responsible, the restoration of Titan’s methane is localized and intermittent.

“Our work suggests looking for signs of methane outgassing will be difficult with Cassini, and may require a future mission that can find localized methane sources,” said Jonathan Lunine, a scientist on the Cassini mission at Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, and one of the paper’s co-authors. “As on Mars, this is a challenging task.”

The Cassini-Huygens mission is a cooperative project of NASA, the European Space Agency and the Italian Space Agency. JPL manages the mission for NASA’s Science Mission Directorate in Washington.

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New Software Brings The Right Wind Farm To The Right Spot

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(CORDIS) — Wind farms are springing up all across Europe, covering some 8 % of the EU’s electricity needs in 2013 according to the European Wind Energy Association (EWEA). But several drawbacks have so far prevented this share from growing as much as it could: most notably, citizens have complained about the noise, disturbances in telecommunications or the impact on ecosystems. But what if a single piece of software could solve all these problems?

The SOPCAWIND project has developed new software to optimize wind farm placement in Europe, taking into account criteria as varied as wind power, local environment characteristics, potential interference with communication systems, noise, nearby housing exposure to the sun, visual impact or even the existence of archaeological artifacts on site.

The software -the first ever to integrate such a complex and multidisciplinary database – was presented recently at the EWEA 2014 Annual Event. It aims to facilitate the design of wind farms by ensuring that all the above-mentioned aspects are taken into consideration in the wind farm design process, thus avoiding post-construction trouble and reducing cost. Multiple stakeholders from both the public and private sectors provided precious data to feed the system.

‘Thanks to this tool, firstly the design process of the wind farm is much more fluid, and secondly, the developer knows in advance if there is any trouble and can include modifications in the wind farm in order to avoid it, which is a key aspect,’ explained Daniel de la Vega from Tecnalia’s Signal Processing and Radiocommunications Group (TSR). Screening development opportunities and optimising wind farm design indeed require extensive knowledge of the local legislation, development constraints and an extensive knowledge of the trade-off between capital cost and production yield. SOPCAWIND accelerates the process and makes it less costly by performing tasks which previously required the combination of expensive software tools.

Tecnalia led the project, while TSR particularly helped create the algorithms that enable a thorough evaluation of possible impact on radars, air navigation system aids and other telecommunications. ‘Although interference is not common, a wind farm can alter a radar signal that is 10-20 kilometres away,’ De la Vega stressed. ‘Because these impact studies are conducted before the wind farm is built, they allow potential interference to be detected if it does in fact exist, and so the wind farm developer will be able to include modifications in the design of the wind farm in order to prevent such trouble.’

In addition to optimising the design of wind farms and reducing the time necessary to undertake viability studies, the project is expected to impact future legislation in the field of telecommunication interference. The characterization of the signal emitted by wind turbines over the UHF waveband and its influence on the quality of the television signal could be used for drafting future international regulation, Tecnalia noted.

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Serbia Hoping New Police Leadership Will Reduce Corruption

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By Igor Jovanovic

Senior government officials said they hope a dramatic change in the Serbian police leadership will improve efforts to eliminate corruption and ultimately lead to the arrest of top reputed crime bosses.

The government decided to fire five of the seven police chiefs after a dramatic meeting earlier last month.

Indications of changes emerged last month as Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic said high-level police tried to blackmail him by saying his 16-year-old son participated in an incident.

After it was learned that no incident took place, Vucic called for an investigation.

At the same time, suspected cocaine trafficker Darko Saric stated before a Belgrade court that the case against him was staged by the chief of the criminal police administration, Rodoljub Milovic.

Saric also testified that Milovic took a bribe of several million euros from a rival crime gang to protect them from being charged.

Subsequently, President Tomislav Nikolic and Vucic met with Interior Minister Nebojsa Stefanovic on June 20th.

After the meeting, Nikolic addressed citizens on state television and called for dismissals in the police leadership.

“I am not satisfied with the fight against crime within the police and with the rooting out of evil from the streets — drug dealers and drug cartels. In the struggle against such evil that is destroying our society, no results were achieved in the past period, obviously because those criminal groups have aides, accomplices and informants within the interior ministry,” Nikolic said.

Vucic said the government had no choice but to dismiss the five police chiefs in order to “reset the system” and enable police to serve the citizenry.

“That was the only way,” he said.

The changes were necessary and all suspected illegal activities should be investigated, Zlatko Nikolic, of the Institute of Criminological and Sociological Research in Belgrade, said.

“The government made a good move. The image of the police has been shaken up. This reaction had to happen,” Nikolic told SETimes.

However, some experts objected, saying the chiefs were dismissed without tangible evidence.

“There have always been dismissals in the police. It is normal for everyone to choose a team to work with. But it is dangerous to do it this way, when the top of the police is criminalised without hard evidence,” Mile Novakovic, former head of the criminal police administration, told SETimes.

The government has a right to dismiss officials, but the move was preceded by spin and fabricated affairs, sociologist Vesna Pesic said.

“The government is constantly fabricating some affairs in a bid to cover up the fact that there are actually no results or reforms,” Pesic said.

However, officials from Vucic’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNP) waved off the criticism.

There will be no political party-appointed personnel in the police, and police reform is one of the state’s priorities, Jadranka Joksimovic, a member of the SNP presidency, said.

“The government did its job on the grounds of clear arguments [provided] by the state institutions,” she said.

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Burgeoning Regulations Threaten Our Humanity – OpEd

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Insofar as mainstream economics may be said to make moral-philosophical assumptions, it rests overwhelmingly on a consequentialist-utilitarian foundation. When mainstream economists say that an action is worthwhile, they mean that it is expected to give rise to benefits whose total value exceeds its total cost (that is, the most valued benefit necessarily forgone by virtue of this particular action’s being taken). But nearly always the economists make no attempt to evaluate as part of their benefit-cost calculus any costs that might be incurred as a result of how and by whom the action is taken.

Often they verge on the assumption that benefits and costs exist apart from those who take the action, even though this assumption clashes with the foundational principles of their science. Thus, in benefit-cost calculations, economists often attach a value to certain expected benefits (e.g., the dollar value of lives saved as a result of a safety regulation) and compare this value to the dollar outlays by the government that imposes and enforces the regulation and by the private parties who are compelled to comply with it, often at great private expense.

I cannot recall, however, ever seeing a benefit-cost computation that attaches any cost valuation to the loss of freedom by the regulated parties. It is as if it matters not at all that an action is mandated, as opposed to freely chosen. Freedom itself is, in effect, considered worthless, and hence its loss entails no sacrifice regarded as worthy of receiving weight in the calculation.

On the basis of such procedures, at least in a pro forma sense, countless regulations and laws have been imposed on the public willy-nilly. Apart from the many questions that might be raised even in the context of the usual benefit-cost study, one who values freedom cannot help but be struck by how entire societies have been overwhelmed by suffocating regulations and by how drastically people’s freedoms have been curtailed, all under the presumption that each drop of this deluge constituted a net improvement in social well-being. Insofar as the trampled freedom is concerned, the motto seems to have been: nothing valued, nothing lost.

In a more fundamental sense, the essence of such mainstream benefit-cost calculations boils down to a glorification of the material and the measurable and a complete denial of the spiritual. With such a mentality, rulers justify making each of us a puppet at the end of the strings they pull and jerk. That we value above all the capacity to make our own decisions, to shape—insofar as the laws of nature and economics permit—the contours of our own lives matters not a whit to our rulers and their apparatchiki. They know what is best for us to do and to refrain from doing—indeed, they have the numerical studies to prove that they know best!

Freedom, however, needs no benefit-cost justification. To deprive us of it is to deprive us of a priceless part of what makes us human beings, rather than programmed robots or puppets on strings. For too long people have deferred to the imagined expertise and superior judgment of those who presume to rule them even in the tiniest details of their daily lives. Little by little, as mentalities adjust to such continuously growing controls, people are losing not only latitude for self-direction, but a core part of their very humanity.

In the most economically developed parts of the world, this process has already proceeded so far that one wonders whether the Communists’ vision of creating a New Man was so far-fetched after all. For the sake of our humanity, for the sake of our very souls, we must challenge the continuation of this onslaught. No doubt you and I may sometimes decide badly in one way or another, but unless we have the freedom to make decisions for ourselves—and, as the necessary correlate, the obligation to bear full responsibility for any harm we cause in the process—we shall ultimately find ourselves in that horrifying dystopia where everything that is not required is forbidden and where we are no longer truly human at all.

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Ralph Nader’s Unstoppable – OpEd

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Ralph Nader’s new book, Unstoppable, describes a convergence of ideas on the political left and political right against the corporate state. The book says there is a broad consensus, from socialists to libertarians, who oppose government policies that provide corporate welfare and bailouts for the economic elite and impose the costs on everyone else. This widespread opposition to corporatism manifests itself in political groups ranging from the Occupy Wall Street movement to the Tea Party.

I’ve noticed the same thing, and a few months ago commented in The Beacon about the similar conclusions Joseph Stiglitz, on the left, and David Stockman, on the right, drew about how government policies favored the cronies — the 1 percent — over everyone else. And shortly before that, I noted my nearly complete agreement with self-described Progressive Cynthia Tucker’s column critical of government policies that favor the well-connected elite over the general public.

Like Nader, I am encouraged when I am able to agree with people whose political views differ substantially from mine.

It’s true that people from one end of the political spectrum to the other oppose corporatism, at least in the abstract. When we get to specific cases, that opposition is not so clear. Corporate bailouts were supported by Presidents Bush and Obama, and by a compliant Congress. Green energy subsidies are popular with certain groups, and business investment and job creation incentives are popular with other groups.

So, Nader’s idea that this movement, with broad-based political support, is unstoppable, is not so clear. People oppose the corporate state in the abstract, but we don’t vote up or down on whether we want a corporate state. We vote for individual policies, and there, the corporate state seems to get lots of support across the political spectrum, from left to right. Some people favor subsidies to green energy. Some people favor investment incentives. The interests that favor those corporatist policies seem to have the political clout to win out.

Nader’s idea that a vague “coalition” of people from throughout the political spectrum can somehow unite to overcome powerful and entrenched political interests seems like wishful thinking.

Nader lists 25 policy goals, and without reciting the list, I will just say that I agree with some of them, but not with others. Therein lies the real problem with any proposal to reform the status quo. Lots of people don’t like the current state of affairs. That’s why Nader can perceive widespread convergence on the opposition to the corporate state. But those people who oppose the status quo all have different ideas on what should be done to change it. So, there is always more agreement on the problem than on how it should be solved.

Nader’s book does have a point, which is that if we can get past political labels, there is a substantial agreement across the political spectrum on many problems with public policy. But, there is less agreement on the solutions.

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Oklahoma Civic Center Planning Black Mass

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Just a few months after a black mass reenactment was planned – and then canceled – at Harvard University, another has been scheduled to take place at the Oklahoma City Civic Center on September 21, prompting calls for organizers to reconsider.

Archbishop Paul Coakley of Oklahoma City said in a statement that the archdiocese is “astonished and grieved that the Civic Center would promote as entertainment and sell tickets for an event that is very transparently a blasphemous mockery of the Mass.”

“For more than 1 billion Catholics worldwide and more than 200,000 Catholics in Oklahoma, the Mass is the most sacred of religious rituals,” the archbishop said.

“It is the center of Catholic worship and celebrates Jesus Christ’s redemption of the world by his death and resurrection. In particular, the Eucharist – which we believe to be the body, blood, soul and divinity of Jesus Christ – is the source and summit of our faith.”

Connected to witchcraft and demonic worship, a black mass is a sacrilegious ceremony structured as a parody of the Catholic Mass. Invoking Satan, the ritual is centered around the desecration of the Eucharist, which is generally done by stealing a consecrated host from a Catholic church and using it in a profane sexual ritual, or defecating and urinating on it.

The black mass is offensive to more than just Catholics, Archbishop Coakley noted. “(It) is a satanic inversion and distortion of the most sacred beliefs not only of Catholics, but of all Christians.”

He called on community leaders and Civic Center event planners in “a spirit of hope,” asking them to “reconsider whether this is an appropriate use of public space.”

“We trust that community leaders – and, in particular, the board members of the Oklahoma City Civic Center – do not actually wish to enable or encourage such a flagrantly inflammatory event and can surely remedy this situation,” he said.

In May, a student group at Harvard attempted to host a black mass re-enactment, to be carried out by the Satanic Temple of New York. However, the event was canceled at the last minute amid a huge outcry from the Archdiocese of Boston and the Harvard community. A petition against the black mass drew 60,000 signatures, and some 2,000 people attended a Eucharistic procession and holy hour on the night that the event had been scheduled.

Notably, the Satanic Temple of New York has submitted plans to Oklahoma City for a public monument of an enthroned Satan surrounded by two children to counter a monument of the Ten Commandments on the statehouse lawn.

The local archdiocese plans to respond in peaceful, prayerful and respectful protest to the black mass scheduled in September should plans continue to move forward, Archbishop Coakley said.

“In the meantime, I call on all Catholics in central and western Oklahoma – as well as all men and women of good will – to pray for a renewed sense of the sacred and, in particular, to pray that the Lord might change the hearts and minds of the organizers of this event.”

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Saudi Arabia: Space For 625,000 More Created At Grand Mosque

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Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah has instructed Grand Mosque authorities to open the newly expanded annex buildings of the Grand Mosque for the use of worshippers during Ramadan.

A source at the Presidency of the Two Holy Mosques said the king’s directive would provide extra prayer space for more than 625,000 worshippers inside the mosque and its courtyards. The royal gesture would help reduce congestion among worshippers inside and outside the mosque, he added.

The king has also ordered that pilgrims be allowed to make use of the expanded “mataf” (circumambulation area around the House of God) on the ground floor, as well as on the first floor, to accommodate 40,000 pilgrims per hour.

Nearly two million worshippers, including foreign pilgrims, attend taraweeh prayers at the mosque and a large number of them stand on roads leading to the mosque. School vacation in the Arab world has increased crowding in the holy city.

Maj. Gen. Abdul Rahman Al-Qahtani, director of communications, said that more than 1,250 cameras have been set up inside and outside the mosque to monitor the movement of pilgrims and worshippers and ensure their safety. “We monitor pilgrims through 270 TV screens and if we find anything wrong, we inform field officers to take corrective action.”

Yousuf Al-Wabil, vice chairman of the committee of religious consultants, said the presidency would not allow people to hoard space at the Grand Mosque for other people.

“This is a wrongful practice and we want to change this system by spreading awareness and preventing people from practicing it.”

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World Cup: And Then There Were Eight – OpEd

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By Fernando Duarte

Don’t let the simplicity of the draw fool you. The 2014 World Cup has been a unique tournament in which the more established football nations are still reigning, just like we predicted a couple of weeks ago. But boy didn’t they have to fight for it. Out of the eight matches in the round of 16, only two were resolved over 90 minutes — and that is more than blatant evidence that those matches were very balanced. That suggests we are in for a batch of mouth-watering quarterfinals come Friday and predicting the outcomes might be hard even for the most daring fortunetellers.

But let’s start with a quick review. The round of 16 was opened with a battle between Brazil and Chile that the hosts were lucky to win on penalties. The Seleção looked out of ideas against one of the most surprising teams in the competition and they must be still shaking by Mauricio’s Pinilla’s thunder of a shot in the dying minutes of extra-time. The crossbar spared the Seleção a shocking exit in the round of 16 that would have thrown Brazilian football in disarray.

On Friday, Brazil will lock horns with exciting Colombia, whose 2-0 win over Uruguay was one of the two games that didn’t require extra time or extra sweat. Despite the obvious caveat that is the absence of Luizito Suarez, the Colombians ruled the game and must be fancying their chances of making even more history in Brazil. They had never gone so far in a World Cup and now they can smell a place in the semifinals. However, the likelihood of Brazil playing another match as poorly as they did in Belo Horizonte last Saturday is very little. And Colombia have yet to face one of the big boys so far.

France and Germany will make the other duel on this side of the draw. Both must have put their feet up in the last few days after two grueling matches against African opposition. France struggled with Nigeria’s pace but it was never really in doubt they had more quality to settle the tie. Once again we need to remember that Didier Deschamps’ squad arrived in Brazil with many pundits already writing them off thanks to Franck Ribery’s injury. Le Bleus, however, cruised in their group and one has to think they might be relishing another World Cup meeting with their Germans foes, who had the better of them in the 1982 and 1986 semifinals.

As for Germany, they are breathing with relief after Algeria gave them a proper game. Once again Manuel Neuer had to play as an extra defender to make it up for a shaky back four. Touted by many to be a dominating team here in Brazil they are finding life much harder but there is enough quality in this side for them to feel confident against France. We are talking here about a game between two European giants, where nobody will play without responsibility.

My hunch? Germany squeezing through.

Costa Rica have been another great side story in this tournament so far and their penalty victory over Greece has been cheered worldwide thanks to the fact they do not play the ugly brand of football proposed by the Greeks. One cannot stop thinking that the battle against Greece in Recife must have been tough on the Central Americans, who now have to find spirit and heart to beat Holland in the quarterfinals. Once again it will be a game in a hot and sunny place (Salvador), which the Dutch have to be dreading after their ordeal in Fortaleza against Mexico.

It was heartbreaking to see Miguel Herrera’s men capitulating after drawing first blood, but in all fairness the Dutch comeback punished their decision to sit back instead of going for the kill. They were undone by Louis Van Gaal’s decision to revert to a 4-3-3 that pushed his own players to the limit. But it paid back not only with the result; Wesley Sneijder seems to have got his confidence back and his strike to equalize the game was as sweet as it can get.

Argentina have also been living dangerously and things against Switzerland could have gone really sour. Lionel Messi once again saved them, this time by hitting a precious pass to Angel Di Maria’s winner. So far Messi has made the difference for Argentina in all their four games and that has some omen-like memories related to another short and skillful player so crucial in their last World Cup win — Diego Maradona in 1986. It remains to be seen if lightning can strike twice.

Belgium survived the spirited Americans and the vision of Marc Wilmots celebrating Eden Hazard’s winner almost on the halfway line shows how much the result meant to them. They have survived the weight of expectations and now stand with a chance to inflict damage to Argentina. They will be aware of Messi’s threat and in my opinion Belgium look the perfect match for Argentina because they will not respect Argentina as other teams would. Expect Eden Hazard to fancy giving Argentina’s back-four a scare.

If the quarterfinals are anything as good as the last eight matches have been, this World Cup will be unforgettable. As much as supporters’ nerves and hearts must be battered now…

(Fernando Duarte is a Brazilian football writer and author of “Shocking Brazil: Six Games That Shook the World Cup” Birlinn Books.)

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Iraqi PM Extends Amnesty To Sunni Tribes

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Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki extended amnesty on Wednesday to Iraqi tribes that fought Iraqi security forces during recent unrest.

In his televised address, the prime minister said that amnesty would be granted only to those who were not involved in killing Iraqi forces.

The prime minister also urged Parliament to move forward with government formation at next week’s session.

The newly elected Iraqi Parliament failed to muster a quorum at its first session on Tuesday, delaying a crucial opportunity for the country to form an inclusive new government.

Iraqi leaders, along with U.S. President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry, have championed a two-track approach in response to the crisis, militarily and politically: fight ISIS and form an inclusive new government in line with Iraq’s constitutional mandates.

According to Iraq’s constitution, Parliament must select a prime minister within 75 days of its first session.

Original article

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Deputy Secretary: Iftar Serves As Reminder Of DoD Diversity

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By Amaani Lyle

In addition to honoring the Muslim faith during Ramadan, the Pentagon’s 16th annual iftar demonstrated the importance of diversity and equality within the Defense Department, Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work said.

Iftar is the post-sunset breaking of the fast during the Islamic holy month.

Work, who spoke at an iftar held at the Pentagon yesterday, drew attention to the 4,500 Muslim Americans in uniform and the additional 1,000 civilians and contractors who work for the department.

“Ramadan reminds us of our shared responsibility to treat others as we wish to be treated ourselves and the basic principles that bind people of different faiths together by yearning for peace, justice and equality,” Work said, citing the words of President Barack Obama.

“Tonight is an opportunity for people of different faiths to come together in the spirit of respect and tolerance to share the richness of our beliefs and to enjoy the traditions of hospitality that are such an important part of the Muslim community,” the deputy secretary said.

He also recognized Gold Star Mother Shibra Khan and guest speaker Georgetown University chaplain Imam Yahya Hendi at the event.

Work reminded attendees that they gathered not only as people of faith, but also as those who have taken the mantle of responsibility in service to the nation and fellow citizens.

“Our country’s founders understood in a visceral way [that] the best way to honor the place of faith in the lives of all Americans was to fight for justice and equality as well as liberty and freedom,” he said. “That is exactly what the men and women both in and out of uniform who serve in the Department of Defense do every single day. They are safeguarding the very ideals deemed so precious by our founding fathers.”

Work noted that religious freedom encompasses soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen and civilian contractors. “The United States’ all-volunteer force is stronger because of the diversity and because of the culture of inclusion that we try to instill in every single person inside the Department of Defense,” he said.

The deputy secretary also said the U.S. military is among the finest not because of its equipment and technology, but because of its people.

“Our nation and our entire military family remain stronger because of the service and sacrifice of people of all faiths, including the thousands of patriotic Muslim Americans who have served and still serve in this long period of war,” Work said. “They continue a long and noble tradition of generations of Muslim Americans who have defended this country.”

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Kazakhstan: Fine Wine Flows As Viniculture Revives

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By Joanna Lillis

When Zeinulla Kakimzhanov took over a dilapidated vineyard in the foothills of the Tian Shan Mountains in south-eastern Kazakhstan in 2006, he had ample reason to wonder whether the property would ever be productive again.

Abandoned vines lay forlornly on the soil, the victims of neglect and wanton destruction. The vineyard had been a casualty of a Communist Party-conceived, anti-alcohol crusade in the mid-1980s; in an effort to curb consumption, state planners ordered the destruction of wineries across the Soviet Union. Kazakhstan lost about 70 percent of its vineyards.

Eight years after Kakimzhanov’s arrival, however, the vineyard is thriving, as emerald vines seem to disappear into the purple haze of the mountains. It’s a scene straight out of Tuscany – apart from the snow crowning the peaks in the shimmering heat of a Central Asian summer.

The idea of brash, petrodollar-fuelled Kazakhstan bottling vintages to tickle the connoisseur’s palate may raise eyebrows among Western wine aficionados – but Kakimzhanov, a former government minister turned viniculturalist, is confident he can help put his country on a wine lover’s map.

The founder of Arba Wine, which owns the vineyard in the Assa Valley east of Kazakhstan’s commercial capital Almaty along the highway to China, waxes lyrical about the “exceptional” wine-growing conditions: a continental climate; rich soil; a similar latitude to France’s Rhone Valley, but at a higher altitude.

Even Kazakhstan’s freezing winters are a boon: the cold kills off disease, noted Kakimzhanov, who has infectious confidence and boundless energy. He sometimes travels to the vineyard by cycling from Almaty, some 80 kilometers away. There is a trick to tending the vines through the tough winters: “We bury them.”

Advised by Italian consultants, the vineyard has planted grapes including Chardonnay, Gewurztraminer, Riesling, Merlot, and Malbec. They are thriving – but it has been a long, hard slog. It took seven years to produce the first bottling for commercial sale last year, and it will be many more yet before the vineyard breaks even – let alone makes a profit.

Kazakhstan may not be a famous wine hotspot, but viniculture has a long history here: an amphora containing wine traces has even been unearthed from an ancient Scythian burial mound situated on Arba Wine’s property. These days most drinkers in Kazakhstan prefer beer or vodka: only 3 percent of alcohol consumed in the country is wine, according to World Health Organization data.

Yet wine drinking is gaining ground among the country’s aspirational middle classes – and the president himself, Nursultan Nazarbayev, is reputed to appreciate fine reds. “Wine is considered a luxury, but slowly this habit is changing,” said Timur Tulebayev, a wine lover who led a recent wine-tasting evening at a fashionable Almaty restaurant. “You can see more middle class people starting to explore wine.”

Locally-made vintages are a tough sell, however. “People don’t trust local wines and like to drink imported wines,” Kakimzhanov laments – not surprisingly, since many wineries in Kazakhstan produce a chemical-rich brew made from concentrates, not grapes.

While some of the young professionals at the wine-tasting evening turned their noses up at the idea of sipping local wine, others embraced it. “It’s good with meat,” said economist Galiya Akilzhan – appropriately for a country whose signature dish is horsemeat piled on a noodle base.

People are “shocked” when they taste Arba’s wines made in the former Kirov collective farm in the village of Karakemer, which is now a state-of-the-art winery, said Kakimzhanov. “Nobody can believe it is local wine.”

Marketing the wine – which sells for $14-$30 per bottle in the company’s smart retail outlet in downtown Almaty – is tricky in a country where alcohol advertising is banned. The company currently relies on social networks to gain brand recognition.

When the new owners took over the old collective farm, they were amazed to find some abandoned vines still alive. They replanted them, and the hardy plants are flourishing anew with grapes imported in Soviet times from Georgia such as Saperavi and Rkatsiteli.

This story encapsulates the fledgling recovery of Kazakhstan’s wine industry: it now employs 15,000 people, Artush Karapetyan, president of the Union of Viniculturalists, told Forbes Kazakhstan magazine in April. Vineyard plantations have crept back up to about 15,000 hectares. Before the anti-alcohol campaign during the late Soviet era, Kazakhstan had about 27,000 hectares of vineyards.

After winning over the local market, Kakimzhanov wants to see if he can “build a new brand, a Kazakh brand, which can be recognized at the world level.”

Tulebayev, the wine aficionado, added that one day he hopes to go abroad and “hear someone say ‘I tried that Kazakhstani wine and it was really good’ … I’ll be proud.”

Joanna Lillis is a freelance writer who specializes in Central Asia.

The post Kazakhstan: Fine Wine Flows As Viniculture Revives appeared first on Eurasia Review.

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