Reuters reported Wednesday that at least 35,000 people have been displaced from their homes in Yemen’s northern province of Amran from ongoing clashes between government forces and Houthi rebels, according to a local government refugee agency.

“Based on the monitoring and follow-up that we have been doing, there are more than 35,000 people that have left for other areas in Omran or to the greater Sanaa area, Hajja and Mahaweet,” wrote the head of Yemen’s government refugee agency, Mutahhar Yahya Abu Sheeha in an appeal to relief organizations nationwide Wednesday.

According to Abu Sheeha, most of the families who have been displaced do not have shelter and are in “desperate need” of humanitarian aid, and others do not have the financial means to leave the areas of fighting at all.

“We direct this urgent appeal to help these families and to provide emergency help to ensure basic needs of shelter and food and medical aid, and to help get these trapped families,” he added in his statement.

More than 200 people have been killed in fighting between Sanaa’s government forces and Shiite Houthi rebels in Amran province since Saturday.

Rebels claimed control of Amran the city earlier this week in a move that is challenging the stability of the already fragile state.

Houthi rebels have been engaged in violent clashes with Sanaa’s government forces since February. Leadership in the capital fear that the rebel group will try to take over Sanaa, but the rebels have dismissed the idea, saying their fight is targeting rivals who are loyal to the Islah party, which consists of Yemen’s version of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Original article

The post Yemen: At Least 35,000 Displaced From Violence In North appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Ghazanfar Ali Khan

The US Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor has been slammed by GCC Secretary-General Abdullatif Al-Zayani, for his interference in Bahrain’s internal affairs.

Al-Zayani voiced his “dismay” over the attitude of Tom Malinowski, who met with only one segment of political society during his official tour of duty to Bahrain this week.

“This kind of interference in the GCC’s domestic affairs is a violation of diplomatic norms and the principles of good neighborliness,” said Al-Zayani in a statement.

GCC officials said that safeguarding Bahrainis’ rights is the responsibility of its leaders, who have promoted “security and stability” across Bahrain.

Referring to this political episode that has caught the attention of local and international media, Al-Zayani said: “The US diplomat’s holding meetings with representatives of a certain political segment, excluding other major components of Bahraini community … is deemed a form of interference in Bahrain’s internal affairs.”

Al-Zayani added: “This attitude will not help build confidence among Bahrainis on the US stance toward Bahrain’s crisis nor will it support its positive reform process.”

The US official was ordered to leave Bahrain on Monday after meeting with members of the leading Shiite opposition group.

Malinowski, who arrived in Bahrain on Sunday for a three-day trip, did not meet political and social workers currently supporting the Bahraini leadership.

US State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said that the Bahraini government “is well aware that US government officials routinely meet with officially recognized political societies.”

Psaki said “Malinowski is on a visit to reaffirm and strengthen our bilateral ties and to support King Hamad’s reforms and reconciliation efforts at an important time, particularly given events elsewhere in the region.”

The visit of the US official was coordinated far in advance and warmly welcomed and encouraged by the government of Bahrain, said Psaki.

Despite the diplomatic tiff, Bahrain provided assurances that ties with the US remain sound. “The government of Bahrain asserts that this should not in any way affect the two countries’ relationship of mutual interest,” according to a statement.

The post US Meddling In Gulf Issues Slammed By GCC appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Samah Sabawi

As Israeli air strikes rain death and destruction on Gaza, and as protests rage in Palestinians cities and camps throughout the West Bank as well as inside Israel’s 1948 borders, an op-ed appearing in Haaretz written by the president of the Palestinian Authority clearly reveals that the chasm between the Palestinian people and their leadership could not be wider.

Mahmoud Abbas, begins the op-ed by reminding Israel that 26 years have passed since Palestinians endorsed the two-state solution, and in effect conceded 78% of their historic homeland, agreeing to have a Palestinian state on what remains of Palestine inside Israel’s 1967 borders. Abbas ends his oped by assuring Israel he remains “totally committed to the vision of a two-state solution, normalization and peace with our neighbor – Israel”.

Abbas knows that for Palestinians and Israelis to be neighbours there must be two independent states, Palestine and Israel, both with clearly defined borders. This is no longer feasible given the facts on the ground that Israel has created. Israel does not plan to live next door, it plans to continue existing on top of all of Palestine, crushing it, inhaling its oxygen, removing its indigenous population while stealing its natural resources.

Palestinians are not as Abbas would like to imagine, neighbours of Israel, Palestinians are Israel’s captive occupied population and they have had enough. They are calling for an uprising and are building their resistance with or without the PA.

The brutal murder of Palestinian teen Mohammed Abu Khdeir, who was burned alive inside and out by three Israelis after being forced to drink gasoline, is the trigger for much of the uprising we see today. Thousands of people came to Abu Khdeir’s mourning tent while tens of thousands marched in his funeral.

His fate captured the imagination of Palestinians and brought home the brutality and vengeful nature of Israel. Abu Khdeir’s murder came amidst various other kidnapping attempts of Palestinian children by Israeli settlers, as well as Israeli attacks on Palestinians on buses and in the streets.

While Israel apologists tried to justify these attacks claiming they are a direct response to the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teens on 12 June, the reality is Palestinians have faced death and destruction at the hands of Israel on a daily basis for decades and most of it often goes unreported. According to statistics by the Ministry of Information in Ramallah, 1,518 Palestinian children were killed by Israel’s occupation forces between September 2000 and April 2013. This means that for the past 13 years, one Palestinian child has been killed by Israeli forces every three days.

Reeling in Gaza

Even though Hamas – often not shy of claiming responsibility – denied its involvement in the kidnapping of the Israeli teens on 12 June, the Israeli government has insisted, without any solid evidence, that Hamas is responsible. This gave Israel the opportunity to conduct hundreds of arrests. Reneging on a deal it had with Abbas to release the Palestinian prisoners, Israel rounded up prisoners recently released, including Hamas politicians, once again proving that “gains” made at the negotiating table were easily reversible by Israel. This further undermined the Palestinian Authority and their commitment to negotiations.

The move by Israel to hold Hamas responsible resulted in what we are now witnessing: a large scale Israeli military assault on the besieged and trapped people in Gaza. The situation in Gaza has become unsustainable both for the population and for the political leadership of Hamas. Hamas’s increased isolation following the seven year siege and the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has forced it to move toward reconciliation with the PA.

However, Israeli pressure on the PA and the PA’s failure to address the economic hardship of the Palestinian civil servants in Gaza, including the explosive problem of the salaries for civil servants appointed by the Hamas government, have torpedoed the potential for real reconciliation and for a unified leadership for the Palestinian people.

What Palestinians Need

Abbas writes in his op-ed in Haaretz that negotiation can be a powerful tool for bringing about peace but he makes the mistaken assumption that negotiations with Israel have failed because Israel did not have ‘a stated goal and known parameters’. While this is true, Israel has refused to define its borders and has used the negotiations to provide a cover to its aggressive settlement expansion, the reality is the main obstacle preventing Palestinians from succeeding in their negotiating efforts is first and foremost the lack of leverage they had every time they came to the table.

Abbas quotes international law constantly when speaking of Palestinian rights, but quoting international law is one thing, actively pursuing its implementation by addressing Israel’s war crimes at the intentional court of justice is another. To have justice on the Palestinian side is not enough to compel Israel to change its brutal and racist policies, what is needed are tactics that can work to bring about pressure, massive amounts of international pressure, that can force Israel to consider changing its course.

What Palestinians need today is a unified leadership that is not focused on maintaining Israel’s security, but on challenging the legitimacy of its action in the International Court of Justice. What is needed is a leadership that is able to support the Palestinian internal popular resistance and the international solidarity calls for boycotts divestments and sanctions in order to leverage diplomatic support.

As Albert Einstein once said, the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. Mahmoud Abbas cannot continue to do the same thing while expecting his people to believe that he will be delivering different results. Palestinians are out in the streets calling for active resistance.

They are standing up to the Israeli Occupation soldiers. They are challenging the submissive quiet that was imposed on the Palestinian Occupied Territory for years. They are rebelling against Israel’s “economic peace” while demanding a peace that is based on freedom, justice and equality for all. They are calling for Boycotts Divestments and Sanctions. When will the Palestinian leadership change its dead end tactics and join them?

- Samah Sabawi is a playwright, poet, political analyst and human rights advocate. She has written and produced the critically acclaimed plays Cries from the Land and Three Wishes as well as having co-authored the book Journey to Peace in Palestine. She is also Policy Adviser to Al-Shabaka, the Palestinian policy network. (This article was originally published in the Middle East Eye.)

The post When Will Palestine’s Leaders Change Their Tactics? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

“Then fight in the cause of Allah, and know that Allah Heareth and knoweth all things.” Quran 2:244

When ISIL enounced its plan earlier in June to lay waste Shia Islam and destroy everything and everyone related to it, millions across not only Iraq but the Islamic world understood that terror had just came knocking on their door. ISIL – the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – a terror group so radical in its thinking and brutal in its methods that Al Qaeda itself felt the need to distance itself from its commanders, has, with one simple statement shook the very foundations of the Islamic Ummah (community).

The Shia are a disgraced people. God forbid that they become victorious over you. How can they when they are polytheists? Don’t stop until you reach Baghdad and Karbala. Be prepared! Iraq will be transformed into a living hell for the Shia and other heretic,” declared ISIL’ spokesman Abu Mohammed Al-Adnani, as he addressed the conquered people of Mosul, thus setting the tone for a sectarian struggle which now threatens to engulf the region in a whirlwind of violence and endless bloodshed.

While radical Islamists have so far reserved their venom for western powers, often equating the United States and their allies to the devil itself in an effort to justify their actions and calls for blood, this sudden change in narrative from anti-western to anti-Shia might prove to be the undoing of the Middle East. Rather than project its hatred outwardly, ISIL is now looking inward, keen to wage a crusade against a group within the Arab people. But if the Shia are on ISIL’s to-kill list so are Christians and all other religious non-Muslim communities. Our modern day crusaders, ISIL militants have proven over the past few weeks to be as crude and gory in their love for slaughter as Reginald of Chatillon during his crusade against Saladin in the 12th century.

Fuelled by rage and a misplaced desire to exert revenge, ISIL hordes could prove to be the most immediate and potent threat to the Islamic world, even more so than Israel, as its present goal is to crumble Shia Islam to the ground. Should the Middle East be forced to redefine itself along sectarian lines, countries would fracture, society would find itself divorced, an entire people – the Arab – would once again find themselves at odds with one another over the eternal dispute of Islam – a schism which occurred more than 1,000 years ago over Imam Ali’s (Prophet Mohammed’s cousin and son-in-law) legitimate claim to the caliphate of Islam over that of all others.

Analysts have already warned that Iraq could become ground zero for the battle of the two Islam, when Shia and Sunni would come to crash against one another in a fight to the death. While of course the idea of a Sunni army opposing a Shia army is somewhat reminiscent of the infamous Iran-Iraq war, the insidious sectarian nature of this particular conflict makes it much more dangerous. While the Iran-Iraq war had more to do with national sovereignty and the safeguards of one’s territorial integrity, ISIL’s war equates to a fratricide. The repercussions on the region would be disastrous.

With no other option left but to fight, Shia Muslims across Iraq turned toward their political and religious leaders for answer, keen to find solace in their guidance. An answer was born in Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani’s fatwa.

The Fatwa

On June 13, in the wake of ISIL’s flash advances in northern and western Iraq, Ayatollah Sistani, Iraq’s most revered Shia cleric broke away from his usual detachment from political life by using his stature as religious leader to galvanize Iraqis into opposing terrorists’ onslaught.

The 84-year-old cleric called on all Iraqis – Sunnis and Shia – to rise in solidarity of each other in order to oppose the terror wave which threatens to engulf the country and beyond, the region. Ayatollah Sistani’s call for mobilization sent shockwaves across Iraq, as thousands poured in the streets of Baghdad, Samarra and Karbala, all vowing they would defend Islam until their dying breath.

If Sistani’s rallying call was meant to be universal and non-sectarian, most Sunnis failed to rise to the occasion, feeling somewhat detached from the dire-strait urgency of the situation as they did not feel as being the target of ISIL’s wrath.

A man of the people, a defender of democracy, Sistani has long been known for his moderate views and his distaste for violence and vindication. A scholar, a philanthropist, Sistani has often acted a unifying figure for Iraq, well-loved and respected by all, within both the political and religious arena. It is important to remember that after Sunni militants attacked the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra in 2006, one of Shia’s holiest sites, in an act that precipitated the country’s civil war, Sistani blamed the sectarian violence on foreign forces and urged reconciliation between Iraq’s disparate groups. Sistani has never been a warmonger, rather the epitome of restraint and religious tolerance.

But if Sistani meant his fatwa to be universal, only Shia identified with its message.

Hardin Long, a Middle East expert at the Center for American Progress, warned in June that Sistani’s fatwa would “resonate with the Shia population, while Sunni Iraqis will largely ignore it.” And indeed, although Sistani called on all able-bodied Iraqi men, regardless of religious affiliation, to join the fight against ISIL, his fatwa may actually exacerbate the sectarian tensions that have plagued the country.

The Two Jihads

As predicted by many analysts, among whom Dr. Haytham Mouzahem from the Beirut Center for Middle East Studies, Iraq is once again finding itself in a situation whereby Shia men have formed militias, similar to those established in the aftermath of the Al-Askari bombing in 2006, in an attempt to parry ISIL’s advances, thus fanning sectarian tensions at a time when radical Islamists are working to draw in Shia Muslims into a war of the two jihads.

Within days of Sistani’s fatwa In Baghdad – Shia stronghold, the Mahdi Army – a large Shia militia – marched through the streets of the capital in an unprecedented show of force, emboldened by the cleric’s words, endowed by a sense of religious duty.

As thousands lined up in perfect military formation, Baghdad residents recalled the time of the militias, wondering just how long the central government will manage to keep them in line and under its control.

Iraqis now found themselves caught in between the rage of ISIL and the thunder of Shia militias. Residents of Baquba, a city located an hour north from Baghdad; residents have said to be fearful, not knowing which force to fear the most as they fear sectarian tensions will mean they will soon become targets.

To the north of Baquba are ISIL, the Sunni militant group bent on destroying Iraq and the Shias who govern it. To the south are Shia militias who have responded with vehemence and are transforming the frontlines into a sectarian showdown that pays no heed to the state.

Abu Mustafa, a resident told the BBC in late June, “”We have Da’ash [ISIL] on one side and we have Asa’ib ahl al-Haq [Shia militia] on the other. I don’t know who to be more scared of.”

If what is happening in Iraq is anything to go by, sectarian tensions could soon flare up uncontrollably across the region, most particularly in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen where already a stage has been set opposing the two-battling religious sects.

Now that ISIL has defined its agenda against Shia Islam, how long will it take for other Islamic radical groups to emulate such narrative and set the region on fire?

The post The Battle Of The Righteous: Iraq Dissolves Into Sectarianism – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Human beings stand at the edge of extinction and yet few of us are
mobilized in defense of human existence. Why is this? And what can we do about it?

Unless someone lives in a cave secluded from all news, the evidence that human beings are in deep trouble – with violence in its many forms intruding on all aspects of our lives and threatening our very existence – is readily available. Of course, you won’t necessarily hear the news this bluntly from the mainstream media but even they must convey at least occasional and/or muted reports of military violence in many parts of the world and the threat of nuclear war over Ukraine, ongoing massive deaths by starvation in many parts of the world, vanishing ecosystems and species under our combined and unrelenting assaults on the natural environment and violence in many other forms, including in our homes and on our streets.

The information might not always be in the headlines but it is a recurring feature of 21st century news if someone takes the slightest interest in checking it. Given the threats, an aware person might ask ‘Why so little action in response?’

Of course, the usual answers include such explanations as these: people don’t necessarily ‘know’ (for one reason or another) and elites make considerable effort to manipulate people into believing one or more of these three things: it is the responsibility of governments (not ordinary people) to act, people can do nothing to make a difference and/or anything they do will be ineffective. Having people passive and dependent, rather than powerful agents of change, suits governments and corporations nicely: Social control is easiest in this circumstance.

However, explanations such as this, truthful though they may be, are
superficial and obscure the deeper, psychological reasons why most people are so powerless.

At birth, a child is genetically programmed to use their many capacities, including their senses (such as sight, hearing and touch), feelings (such as thirst, hunger, fear, anger, sadness, happiness, pain and sexual arousal), memory, ‘truth register’, intuition, conscience and intellect to explore, learn about, understand and interact with their natural and social world. Evolution intended children to become powerfully Self-aware individuals by doing this.

However, if you want obedient adult subjects who passively accept social control, then it is simpler to work on rendering individuals powerless by stifling the development of their innate capacities during childhood.

Human socialization processes, which I call ‘terrorization’, including
parental practices and school, do this superbly: see ‘Why Violence?‘
and ‘Fearless Psychology and Fearful Psychology: Principles and Practice‘.

Let me give some simple examples.

If a child is crying and you comfort them, you will (presumably
unintentionally) scare them out of feeling their sadness when, in fact, their crying is a functional response to something not working out as the child wanted and for healing from this event. The same applies to fear, anger and all other feelings. Unfortunately, if we scare a child out of feeling their natural responses to events (by ignoring, comforting, reassuring, distracting, laughing at, ridiculing, terrorizing or violently controlling them when they express their feelings), the child has no choice but to unconsciously suppress their awareness of these feelings and they will not be able to identify the appropriate way forward: this reduces their power to respond functionally and powerfully to events in their life. And helps to create the passive slaves that elites want.

Another way in which we adults make children powerless is by endlessly thwarting the child’s initiatives so that they learn that ‘nothing works’ or even that ‘Mum/Dad doesn’t want it to work’. If a child is thwarted often enough, they will unconsciously internalize the message that trying to investigate things for themself and trying to do anything in response to their own initiative is a waste of time and they will progressively suppress their awareness of the evolutionary urges to investigate and ‘keep trying’.

So have a look around you and ask yourself this: ‘Who do I perceive as being powerfully able to respond to what is happening in the world?’ If you are like me, you see a lot of scared and powerless people (even though I spend considerable time identifying powerful people and working with them). If you are one of these powerful people, then consider participating in ‘The Flame Tree Project to Save Life on Earth‘ or an equivalent sustainability initiative.

You might also consider joining the worldwide movement to end all violence by signing online ‘The People’s Charter to Create a Nonviolent World‘.

Powerful individuals must play the central role in shaping a human future that nurtures life on Earth. And while we are heavily outnumbered and under-resourced for now, as Gandhi once said ‘A small body of determined spirits fired by an unquenchable faith in their mission can alter the course of history’.

Do you feel powerfully able to help ‘alter the course of history’?

The post Why Are Most Human Beings So Powerless? – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Since April 2014, the Malaysian media has carried numerous stories of Malaysians who are directly or indirectly linked to terrorist groups operating in Syria, and to a lesser extent, Iraq. We are told that they see themselves as “jihadis” who are fighting for an Islamic cause. There are unconfirmed reports that some of them have been killed in the on-going conflict in Syria.

Police intelligence appears to have mined a lot of information about the activities of these individuals and groups. Their local training hideouts have been revealed and their regional and international links exposed. This has enabled the police to make several arrests.

Eliminating Muslim terrorist networks of this sort will not be a walk in the park. The police, and indeed, the majority of the Malaysian populace share the same faith as the individuals associated with these terrorist operations. A lot of Malaysian Muslims may also harbor some of the misconceptions and prejudices which impelled some of these jihadis to take the road to Damascus.

What would have motivated them to tread this perilous path? What would have persuaded thousands of Muslims from some 80 countries – according to a certain estimate – to join the armed rebels against the Bashar Al-Assad government in Syria? Why are they so determined to topple Bashar?

It must be remembered that this is not the first time in recent decades that Muslims from various parts of the world have come together to do battle on behalf of a common cause. The global Muslim campaign against the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in the nineteen eighties was in a sense even more extensive and sustained. Muslims from Malaysia were also involved in that campaign which they saw rightly as the foreign occupation of a Muslim land. Repelling occupation is a Quranic imperative.

But Syria today is not occupied the way Afghanistan was in the eighties. If there is any occupation in Syria, it is Israeli occupation of the strategic Golan Heights since 1967 which should concern Muslims and others who cherish justice and sovereignty. And yet the jihadis from Malaysia and the rebels who are their comrades-in-arms do not seem to be bothered about the liberation of the Golan Heights. On the contrary, it is an open secret that Israel has colluded with some of the rebels — by providing training and supplying intelligence —-in the fight against Bashar since the middle of 2011.  Israel itself has conducted a series of military strikes within Syria in the course of the last two years with the aim of sapping the strength of the Syrian army.

Mission

If the rebels are not fighting alien occupation, what is their mission? It is obvious that the Malaysian jihadis, like their counterparts from other countries, see themselves as defending the Sunnis of Syria against alleged oppression by the Shia ruling elite. There is a parallel perception of Shia suppression of Sunnis in Iraq. Both these perceptions are part of a wider view fostered by various influential groups in West Asia (including Israel) and in some parts of the West that an arc of Shia power is rising from Iran through Bahrain to Iraq and Lebanon and this is a threat to the Sunni majority in the region. Adding to this phobia of the Shias — Shiaphobia — especially in the case of Syria is the rebels’ opposition to secularism and the secular state. It is a state which in their reckoning has to be replaced by a Caliphate — a Global Sunni Caliphate — which has now become the rallying-cry of some of the rebels, specifically the terrorist group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS).

This narrative of Sunnis being suppressed; of Shia power; of the illegitimacy of the secular state; of a Sunni Caliphate, has reached a crescendo in the last few years in the midst of the Syrian conflict. Leading religious personalities in West Asia especially from the Gulf monarchies have been vitriolic in their denunciation of the Shias. In mosques and through the media, they have succeeded in fuelling hatred of this minority sect within and beyond the region while creating a sense of siege among the majority Sunni population. Consequently, the Sunni-Shia divide has become more pronounced than ever before.

Because some of these Islamic personalities are highly revered in Malaysia, their utterances command a substantial constituency. They have legitimized the already prevailing antipathy towards the Shias among the local ulama (religious scholars).As a result, the anti-Shia campaign led by the ulama has gained much prominence among the populace. Some of the ulama are part of the religious establishment; others are free-lance operators.  Academics and media practitioners have also reinforced the vile bigotry emanating from some of the ulama. So have politicians from both the government and the opposition. NGO activists have been equally vocal in conjuring an ominous Shia threat in a Sunni-Muslim majority nation where the sect is an insignificant minority.

Given how pervasive and intensive the targeting of this sect has been in recent months, propelled by the massive propaganda flowing from parts of the Arab world, it is not surprising that some impressionable youth in the country have been  lured by the slogan of Sunnis facing the danger of extermination in Syria and now Iraq.   There are perhaps two additional factors that explain this fatal attraction. For centuries, Sunni Muslims in Malaysia, as in some other parts of the Muslim world, have been somewhat uneasy about Shias— which is why any negative imaging of the sect is so readily absorbed. The videos on You Tube showing the alleged atrocities committed by the Syrian government in the course of the last three years have also had a huge impact upon Muslims here, as elsewhere. Indeed, cyber media as a whole has been a major tool in mobilizing Sunnis globally to defend themselves.

Critical Analysis

While there is no denying that the Syrian Army and its affiliates have committed gross atrocities in trying to quell the armed rebellion, Muslims in Malaysia and other countries have unfortunately failed to subject the media blitz launched by the rebels, their supporters in West Asia and in Western capitals to  critical analysis. Independent investigations into a number of horrendous massacres for which the mainstream media had immediately blamed the Syrian authorities have now revealed that the rebels were actually culpable. The Khalidiya and Karm Allouz massacres in March 2012 and the Houla massacre in May 2012 would be outstanding examples.  The most startling expose of all was the Ghouta sarin gas attack of August 2013, pinpointed upon the Bashar government, which the celebrated American investigative journalist, Seymour Hersh, showed through meticulous analysis was in fact the work of a rebel group carried out with the connivance of Turkey. Young Malaysian Muslims should realize that half-truths, outright lies and wholesale fabrication in order to demonize an adversary and to camouflage the truth are part and parcel of the arsenal of the powerful as they seek to perpetuate their interests.

Indeed, even allegations about the suppression of Sunnis who are the majority in Syria should be examined with greater objectivity. Sunnis constitute the bulk of the Syrian armed forces and are at the core of the top brass. The current defense minister is Sunni. His predecessor was a Christian assassinated by the rebels. Some of the most influential positions in the dominant public sector are held by Sunnis while major businesses in the private sector are Sunni owned. The highest religious authority in Syria, the Grand Mufti, is a Sunni from the Shafie doctrinal school, the same Mazhab as the Muslims of Malaysia.

It is because many Muslims trapped in the web of propaganda spun by certain elements in West Asia and the West refuse to come to grips with realities that they do not want to acknowledge that Syria is one of the few countries in the region that has succeeded in integrating the majority community with the minorities and has developed an inclusive Syrian citizenship that transcends religious boundaries. This is also the reason why the Syrian leadership has always been opposed to any notion of an exclusive Muslim religious identity in politics peddled by groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood.

Just as the question of an inclusive versus exclusive idea of citizenship is fundamental to Malaysia’s own quest for national identity, so is the other issue that appears to have attracted some Muslims to the Syrian rebellion, the issue of Syria’s fidelity to Islam. For most of the armed rebels and the Malaysian Muslims who have joined them, one of the reasons why they regard the Bashar government as not ‘Islamic’ is because it has not implemented the Islamic penal code, erroneously interpreted as Hudud. They may not be aware that in the Syrian Constitution Islamic jurisprudence is a main source of legislation and the President of the Syrian Republic has to be a Muslim, the faith of the vast majority of the citizenry. More than that, there are many aspects of governance — free education, universal healthcare, specific worker representation in public decision-making and so on— which would make Syria Islamic. By the same token, there are other aspects of the Bashar administration which violate Islamic norms such as the ubiquitous role of its secret police, the curtailment of dissent, and the persistence of corruption.

However, Bashar’s Syrian opponents and their Malaysian friends do not adopt a balanced, rational approach when it comes to determining the credentials of a government. They are more inclined towards labelling a government as ‘Islamic’ or ‘secular’ driven by their own shallow, superficial approach to religion and politics. In this regard, they would view an absolute monarchy that denies basic rights to the people but implements hudud as ‘Islamic’ while condemning a state that applies the rule of law to all its citizens and provides space to women and men to participate in politics but does not include hudud in its legal system, as ‘secular.’

This then is the nub of the issue. It is a shallow, superficial understanding of what is happening in Syria that has pushed some Malaysian Muslims into the arms of the Syrian conflict. Their ignorance has been exacerbated by distorted information and skewed analysis. There is hardly any appreciation among these jihadis of the underlying causes of the conflict and how they are linked to regional and global politics with long-term significance. That the Syrian conflict epitomizes the perennial US-Israeli goal of crushing resistance to their hegemony over West Asia is something that escapes our jihadis.

This is why there is an urgent need to develop a deeper, broader understanding of the conflict among religious elites, politicians, activists, youths, students, academics and the media. This is as important as intelligence gathering and effective action against the culprits based upon law. A more profound appreciation of conflicts such as Syria should be accompanied by a serious endeavor to impart an understanding of Islam that is inclusive, universal, progressive and enlightened through our educational institutions, religious bodies and the media.

The national leadership has a particularly important role to play in this. It should be clear in its total rejection of the sort of religious extremism that breeds terror and violence. In both its domestic and foreign policies it should demonstrate through deeds — not words — that it subscribes to a “justly balanced” outlook, as prescribed in the Quran. There can be no room for ambiguity or ambivalence in its approach to issues that hint of religious bigotry and dogmatism.

As a nation, we should not be under any illusion. Malaysians with a terrorist orientation, willing to exploit religion in pursuit of their agenda, are now operating in other countries. There is no reason to believe that they and their kind will not turn their guns upon local targets one day. We should not let that happen — which is why we must act now.

Dr. Chandra Muzaffar is the author of the e-book Whither WANA? Reflections on the Arab Uprisings which is accessible through the JUST website, www.just-international.org

The post The Malaysian Link to Terror in Syria – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Anton Gojçaj,
Albanian writer from Tuzi, Republic of Montenegro

Translated in English: Peter Tase

Book review on Ndue Ukaj’s “The Crate of Salvation,” poetry volume, published by Drita Publishing House, Prizren, Kosovo (2012)

1. In all his poetry, from its micro to macro structures, somewhere in a very lucid style and in other place expressed very implicitly, Ndue Ukaj expresses by himself the memories of love, with the passion and faith of a missionary. That is the “Spritus movens” of this poetry. The darkness and coldness emerging from these verses, looks like they are the birth of separating ties of the contemporary man with his own roots and of the loss of spirit and genuine spiritual values of a civilization in crisis: “In its city there is a ruined cathedral, it is standing among ruins, its choir is missing, and ‘Ave Maria’ Song (Laura’s Sunday).

Ukaj’s poetry preaches the lack of moral and ecological purity, but also the lack of (divine) music, in the world. Notwithstanding the icy environment, the lyrical speaker has not lost every hope, when, just as in a controlled fading “epiphany”, erupts in the enclosing verses of poetry, in my anthological opinion at “Laura’s Sunday”:

“She walks through the ruins of the Cathedral and lights a candle, and her pretty knees caress the robust stones.” There is an event or a meeting place as delicate as it is tectonic, where the pretty woman knees touch “harshly” the stone, on this occasion is released a transcendental energy, beyond the superficial explanation of semantics, which ignores the power of demise and promises something else, even if it is not revealing something tangible. Here we have elements that lead us to the conclusion that Ukaj connects love closely with Christianity. This conviction is emphasized even more in the verses of the fifth part of the poem “the Civilization of Love”, which simultaneously reminds us “The song of all songs” from the Old Testament, but also the adoration for love found in one of the letters of apostle Saint Paul who baptized the pagans: “Love is painful, is merciful, love is the mirror of embodied truth and even it is engulfed at unseen war with envy and quietly is at war with greed and with many thrones that are before her; and harmoniously has its feelings together with hope that is located under its arms. Love is not proud even when dark shadows are heading towards her. Its weapons are more perfected than hatred, love never dies neither sorrow is recognized by love.”

I think that “The Crate of Salvation” in this poem, with no desire to simplify it or to freeze it in single minded significance, above all is a metaphor for love. Only love can rescue civilization from the waves of a turbulent era such as ours, the same as the rescue provided to insects and civilization by Noah’s Ark in the well-known biblical genesis of flood narrative.

2. The loss of love, of spiritual, they all feel, individually and as a community. Security, self-confidence, orientation, inner peace is all lost. Unstable general behavior and lack of clear visions is over ruling, for which the people are always in need: “Sometimes it happens so that won’t understand the border between night and day neither between good and evil between right and wrong. Sometimes it happens when roads are mixed and in a great sorrow colors are not recognized at all this happens when lights are shut in the horizon. “ (When Biblical Peace is ruined)

3. The writing of Ndue Ukaj is a product of a newer era, post-communist, of ever improving relations, more self-understanding, of Albanian Literature and European Literature. There is a steep turn from the usual rhetorical course and emphasized national symbolism (“She loves poetry, but doesn’t read patriotic stories” is said in the poem entitled “her Biographer”),in search of new semantic fjords, while understanding that great art, even though not necessarily negating nationalism, is found somewhere “beyond Ithaca”. The poet’s sorrow in search of himself, in terms of differentiating the individual’s existence in relation to human society, are reflections for a certain type of identity, personal identity, as an interaction between I the reader in relation with the writings/thoughts of others

And the search of ones’ place in this amazing circus wheel, which come around and grinds these subjects and cultural models: “you would say that we struggle with our minds in order to read books, we read them to encompass others’ ideas. We digest others’ ideas just like a cow’s stomach full of dry pasture. This is the sorrow of not being you.”

(Identity) we are in a globalist era, a trend that has its supporters and enemies. Dilemmas connected with the search of identity are numerous, especially amongst the members of small nations. Every individual wants to know what his real identity is.

Ukaj’s poetry also presents a series of such questions: “Suspicion shakes her, just like a human is shaken after a dream full of fear in a dark room, with a hybrid identity. She is beautiful. Is like a mysterious portrait, is broken while searching for desired answer for daily questions: who am I, I, Is it myself?

Or is it the shadow of time that imposes in me, colors, longing, love, longevity and abyss that is nearby the heavy [weight] nations.”

(While sensing the smell of truth) there are three searches of identity in the verses of this book: the search of artists identity / innovator / thinker with a personal as well as universal character, then the search of authentic national identity and the search of a faded European uniqueness. Lyrical hero, saddened with the state of the three identity planes, looks like he has lost confidence that something will improve for better: “For our lost paradise just like in our dream we embrace the inverted tree’s identity whose fruits are tasteless”(Identity) the blame for all this chaos and confusion is the corrupt politics, which has also escaped from its first rate mission, the improvement of life in the community.

Faceless politics, which doesn’t know limits and sanctity, where there is God’s town has built a city of clouds: “Where actions of politics have thrown dirt on everything including the birds’ voices and kisses of loved ones.” (In the cloud’s city)

4. Another particularity of Ukaj’s pen, recognized, is the creation of paintings that communicate, with descriptive-allegorical-meditational sub-extensions, which create powerful metaphorical scenes: there is a crowd of people some of them dance in front of an orchestra that is fighting with the wind and in a city corner is read poetry. The hands of poets are shaking and their paper sheets are tormented by the wind, within the walls are kept unexplainable mysteries just like in old castles: documents, weapons, beds of loved ones. There is a concrete podium, is not a theater, but noise is its auditorium.” (Poem’s watch)

5. The tradition in which Ndue’s work can be related is the European Cultural Tradition. This poem deserves to be called as “European” in many levels, starting with some crucial connective points, first of all the references flowing in biblical writing, them Homer’s poems and Dante Alighieri’s “Divine Comedy” etc. … It is considered to be this way for its modern expressionism, for its free verse and its admirable rhythm full of dignity, for its invention and figurative richness, with many inter-textual tentacles with European literary heritage, with multidimensional semantics that, like a fountain, in a receptive space, plants ideas, feelings, images, requests, and many other significances.

The major energizers of this poetry are humanism, love and freedom.

The major part of the book is developed over the archetypes of classical European culture and this provides a great coherence to Ndue Ukaj.

Nonetheless, there are other poems connected with spiritual values and historical national themes, of Albanians, such as: “While feeling the aroma of truth,” “The Knight of civilization” or “To Poetry’s father.”

Ndue Ukaj with is work, but especially with his book “The Crate of Salvation” opens a new path in Albanian poetry, that I would call – a lyrical call to return into the genetical and spiritual European core, not to be engulfed in the origin, but to acquire a new inspiration, with the objective: to be followed and promoted with artistic tools, healthier, happier models of culture.

The language of poetry, besides its multi meanings, is also multi-functional. The influence of neo European style in poetry should not be understood only as a nakedness of racial skin, or negation of some over layers of national history, but as a powerful call for a conscientious return, and full conviction in its own natural family, with which Albanians are undividedly connected since its early childhood, although a cloudy nation of this ancient civilization. The primary mission of this poetry even though it is the stimulation of aesthetical delight to the reader and this is another factor, perhaps the decisive, that makes Ukaj a genuine representative of the neo-European era in our contemporary literature.
Poems such as “ the girl who read the Divine Comedy,” “Laura’s Sunday,” “Last Supper,” “The platoon of Angles,” “Mass of Easter” “turbulences” and many more, certify convincingly this thesis. The book is written in the northern Albanian dialect (Gege).

6. There are writers/ artists who are during all their life in search of their identity as writers. Even though he is in the best age to invent verses, on the other side, a writer during all his life explores new shapes of expression, Ndue Ukaj in “the Crate of salvation”, it seems that he has found his own style, which distinguishes and identifies him from poets of his generation in Kosova and also among Albanian poets.

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By Rajeev Sharma

With the presentation of its maiden rail budget on Tuesday, the barely 45-day-old government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi has given a sneak peek into its economic vision — a mix of selling dreams to 1.2 billion Indians by undertaking big-ticket, eyeball-grabbing projects with a heavy dose of Thatcherism.

Forget the fact that the budget was presented by Railway Minister Sadananda Gowda. It could have been anyone as Indian railway minister and the result would have been the same. Modi is obviously the engine driver of his government’s first rail budget.

The budget is imbued with Modi-ism from the scratch to the finish — a Modi-ism that has a strong imprint of Thatcherism.

The biggest dream that Modi is trying to sell to the Indians through his rail budget is to start work on a bullet train on the Pune-Mumbai-Ahmedabad route. The budget makes a provision of $16.7 million for this purpose. The provision of such a paltry sum for the mammoth project which is going to cost up to $11 billion at current prices raises many questions, though this amount is said to be toward conducting feasibility studies. Incidentally, the $11 billion price tag for this single project is roughly the same amount as the entire budget of Indian Railways for 2014-15.

Many preliminary studies have already been done on this subject by the previous governments. An entirely new and dedicated rail track will have to be laid for the purpose. This amount is enough to build just one kilometer of bullet train track!

Where from the Modi government is going to get this kind of money? The government says the money would be raised through the FDI route.

But haven’t we been there and done that? The previous Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) had targeted to raise $1 billion for the railways through the FDI route last year but miserably failed and could garner only a few millions. Why? That is because any potential investor needs to have a guarantee of minimum assured return, which the UPA government could not give.

True, the Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government has the luxury of being a strong government and the BJP has emerged as a party to have won absolute majority on its own steam for the first time in past three decades.

Therefore, theoretically it is possible for the Modi government to pull off this achievement, which deluded the UPA government. But then theories are far different from the ground realities and the Modi government will have to walk its talk. One will see how far it succeeds.

This brings us to another debate: Can a poor country like India, where a vast majority of its citizens don’t even have rudimentary facilities like a toilet, afford a “luxury” like bullet trains which are essentially elitist?

This is the reason why successive governments have merely toyed with the idea of having bullet trains but never taken the concept beyond drawing boards. The highly expensive concept has been viewed by previous governments as politically incorrect and economically disastrous.

But then Modi is different and has the image of being a strong leader. His idea is to make this bullet train project operational within five years, in time for the next general elections where he can parade it to the electorate as a symbol of strong and resurgent India. Modi can decidedly be not faulted for selling this expensive dream to the Indians when the neighboring China has a bullet train network of 10,000 kilometers and India has zilch.

That’s why his government’s first rail budget promises to increase speed of trains to 160 to 200 km per hour in nine select sectors and launch diamond quadrilateral of high-speed trains connecting major metros.

These are the kind of projects China has undertaken and finished in past one decade and emerged as a dominant global power. Modi wants to emulate China, a country he admires and has visited four times as chief minister of Gujarat.

To generate this kind of money and to undertake such big-ticket projects the Indian Railways will have to generate its own resources as the union finance ministry simply cannot provide this type of financial cushion. The Modi government plans to do so by seeking the union Cabinet’s approval for allowing FDI in Railways, barring in operations, and finance bulk of new projects through the PPP (Public-Private Partnership) mode.

This is where Modi shows a streak of Thatcherism. The Modi government plans to privatize everything and outsource maintenance of railway stations, catering and cleaning of trains, to name a few, the way it is done in many developed countries.

But isn’t it rather odd for a party like the BJP to go in for FDI in railways and even in defense when it has vociferously opposed FDI in multi-brand retail?

The writer is a New Delhi-based independent journalist and a political commentator who tweets @Kishkindha.

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By Sinisa Jakov Marusic and Edona Peci

An ethnic Albanian leader in Macedonia urged an internationally monitored retrial of the so-called ‘Monster’ case after six Albanians were found guilty of terrorism and jailed for life.

Ali Ahmeti, the head of the junior party in Macedonia’s ruling coalition, the Democratic Union for Integration, DUI, demanded on Tuesday a transparent retrial and a public presentation of the evidence that led to the conviction of six ethnic Albanians for terrorism – a verdict that sparked unrest on the streets of the capital last week.

The statement came a week after a court gave life sentences to six Albanian Muslims for the killing of five ethnic Macedonians in 2012 in a case that raised ethnic tensions.

Alil Demiri, Afrim Ismailovic, Agim Ismailovic, Fejzi Aziri, Haki Aziri and Sami Ljuta were found guilty of the grave offence of terrorism in connection to the killings. One defendant was acquitted.

Two of the men who were convicted, Alil Demiri and Afrim Ismailovic, are serving prison sentences in Kosovo and were tried in absentia.

Condemning the protests against the verdict in Macedonia over the past few days, Ahmeti said in a statement that there was “a joint responsibility to identify and overcome the efforts at selective justice”.

He said there was a also need to examine the role of “judges and prosecutors who carry out their duties with prejudice” and whose work devaluates faith in justice.

Ahmeti said that any new trial should be closely monitored by Western representatives.

The verdict angered ethnic Albanians, several thousand of whom who took to the streets of Skopje last week, throwing stones and bricks at the Criminal Court building and at riot police, who responded with tear gas, water cannon and stun grenades.

More protests have been announced in Macedonia, while more than 200 protesters took to the streets of Pristina in neighbouring Kosovo on Tuesday in support of the convicted men.

Holding posters with slogans like “Skopje is not alone” and singing nationalist songs, protesters headed towards the Macedonian embassy where they burned the Macedonian flag.

The War Veterans Association in Kosovo echoed Ahmeti’s request for a retrial, accusing the authorities in Macedonia of handing out an unjust sentence.

The veterans’ organisation said the verdict proved that “the repression of Albanians continues even in the 21st century and has culminated with the ‘Monster’ trial in which Albanians were given life sentences without any proof [of guilt]”.

“As war veterans we express our readiness to help our brothers in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia… with whatever they need in order to bring an end once and for all to Slavic repression,” it said in a statement.

The association also urged the Kosovo government to not extradite the two Albanians convicted of terrorism in absentia to Macedonia.

Meanwhile, the situation in Macedonia itself on Tuesday remained calm, despite renewed calls for protests.

The Macedonian embassy in Tirana, Albania, also said that no protests took place in Tirana, although some groups had called for people to take to the streets.

In 2001, armed conflict between ethnic Albanian insurgents and the security forces erupted in Macedonia. It ended the same year with the signing of a peace deal that increased Albanian rights. Ethnic Albanians make up a quarter of Macedonia’s 2.1 million population.

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By Taryar

Mandalay Division’s parliament convened an emergency session on Tuesday to discuss how individuals who have tattooed the map of Burma on the lower part of the body should be punished, as such an inking is a disgrace to the country’s image.

Thein Lwin, a parliamentarian of the divisional body, requested the government to pursue legal action against individuals who have the map of Burma inked on “inappropriate parts” of the body.

“Nowadays, we are seeing this trend of Burma map tattoos. The map of Burma, while an inanimate object, is a symbol of dignity and some individuals have it tattooed on inappropriate parts of the body, which is disgraceful,” Thein Lwin said during the session.

“I would like to know the government’s plan to prohibit disgracing the map of Burma by having it tattooed on inappropriate parts of the body, and I urge the government to enact laws if it is necessary,” he continued.

Thein Lwin did not specify the exact parts of the body that such a tattoo should be prohibited from appearing on.

Ye Aung Myint, Mandalay Division’s chief justice, threw his support behind Thein Lwin, and singled out the leg as a particularly offensive site for a Burma tattoo.

“Tattooing the map of Burma on the lower body, such as on the leg, can be deemed as defacing a part of the whole of a national symbol,” Ye Aung Myint said. “According to the State Seal Law, this offence can be punishable with up to three years in prison or offenders can face a fine of up to 300,000 kyat – or both.”

This emergency session of the divisional parliament comes a week after Mandalay Division’s Chan Aye Tharzan Township was rocked with communal violence for about two nights after hundreds began rioting based on a rumour that two Muslim teashop owners had raped a Buddhist woman. The riots left at least two dead and several others injured.

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Vasectomy was associated with a small increased risk of prostate cancer, and a stronger risk for advanced or lethal prostate cancer according to a new study from Harvard School of Public Health (HSPH).

The researchers found that the association remained even among men who received regular PSA screening, suggesting the increased risk of lethal cancer cannot be explained by diagnostic bias. It is the largest and most comprehensive study to date to look at the link between vasectomy and prostate cancer.

The study appears online July 7, 2014 in Journal of Clinical Oncology.

“This study follows our initial publication on vasectomy and prostate cancer in 1993, with 19 additional years of follow-up and tenfold greater number of cases. The results support the hypothesis that vasectomy is associated with an increased risk of advanced or lethal prostate cancer,” said co-author Lorelei Mucci, associate professor of epidemiology at HSPH.

Vasectomy is a common form of contraception in the U.S., with about 15% of men having the procedure. Prostate cancer is the second-leading cause of cancer death among U.S. men, so identifying risk factors for lethal prostate cancer is important for public health.

The researchers analyzed data from 49,405 U.S. men in the Health Professionals Follow-up Study, who were followed for up to 24 years from 1986 to 2010. During that time, 6,023 cases of prostate cancer were diagnosed, including 811 lethal cases. One in four of the men in this study reported having a vasectomy.

The results showed a 10% increased risk of prostate cancer overall in men who had a vasectomy. Vasectomy was not significantly associated with risk of low-grade cancer. However, vasectomy was associated with a stronger risk of advanced and lethal prostate cancer, with an increased risk of 20% and 19% respectively. Among men who received regular PSA screening, the relative increase in risk of lethal prostate cancer was 56%. The effect appeared to be stronger among men who had a vasectomy at a younger age.

Prior work on this topic raised concerns that the positive associations could be linked to bias. However, in the present study, the researchers had access to diverse information and could rule out potential biases, including that men who have vasectomies may seek more medical care in general, that they may have a higher rates of PSA screening, or that the association was due possible confounding by sexually transmitted infections.

In this study, 16 in 1,000 men developed lethal prostate cancer during 24 years of follow-up. Although the relative increase in the risk associated with vasectomy was significant, this translates to a relatively small increase in absolute difference in the risk of lethal prostate cancer, say the researchers. “The decision to opt for a vasectomy as a form of birth control is a highly personal one and a man should discuss the risks and benefits with his physician,” said co-author Kathryn Wilson, research associate in the Department of Epidemiology at HSPH.

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By Chris Dalby

Nigeria

As much as 400,000 barrels of oil a day are stolen in Nigeria. This equates to losses of $1.7 billion a month for Africa’s new largest economy. This represents 7.7 percent of its GDP vanishing, or more than the country spends on education and healthcare.

These numbers paint a harsh picture about the inability of the Nigerian government, and the multinational oil companies in the Niger Delta, to do anything about this rampant theft.

Shell executives have railed against the futility of trying to remove illegal taps from the hundreds of miles of pipelines they have in Nigeria. Philip Mshelbila, Shell’s head of communications in Nigeria, pointed to a sophisticated organization of people that have been working for years to steal oil from official pipelines. The company is now divesting its portfolio of assets in Nigeria. (Given this striking
news, it seems odd that Nigerian oil producer Seplat says it sees no theft in its operations whatsoever.)

With oil theft hitting record levels in 2013, the G8 has been reminded of its 2000 pledge to help Nigeria solve this crippling problem. However, as the Global Financial Initiative points out, “stolen Nigerian crude oil is transported on internationally registered vessels, sold to international buyers, processed by
international oil refineries and paid for using international bank accounts.” With one group of thieves admitting to profits of nearly $7,000 a day from their illicit activities, it will take some doing to stop them.

Mexico

In the notoriously secretive government of President Enrique Peña Nieto, it is rare to see a senior official publicly admit that a particular crime is up. Last summer, Carlos Morales, the then head of Pemex’s Exploration and Production subsidiary admitted that fuel theft was growing 30 percent annually in Mexico, for a total theft of 5,000 to 10,000 barrels per day. Given that authorities found 2,614 illegal
taps in 2013, including close to 600 in November and December alone – compared to around 1,500 in 2012 — Morales might have underestimated the situation.

The staggering 1,548 percent jump in these illicit siphons from 2000 to 2013 has been attributed to powerful drug cartels like the Zetas realizing the potential of the black gold being pumped through territory they control. Fleets of tankers are now being stolen as they rumble across states like Tamaulipas, where Mexican press report the Zetas and the Gulf Cartel have distribution operations that rival those of Pemex itself

Iraq

Even if we set aside the attractive claim that the U.S. invasion of Iraq was the biggest oil heist of all time, Baghdad has a problem on its hands. Oil smuggling was institutionalized in the days of Saddam Hussein; one U.S. Senate estimate is that the Baath regime pocketed $21.3 billion from the UN Food For Oil program.

Today, it is difficult to estimate just how much oil is being smuggled out of Iraq, as the country’s metering system is behind by a number of years.

However, there have been substantiated reports of complex networks taking thousands of barrels right from the refineries and selling them illegally to Iran and Syria.

In the chaos left over by the Iraq War, smugglers and terrorist elements have swooped in.

Russia

Vladimir Putin is an ambitious man. He is seeking to secure Russia’s energy future through landmark deals with China and Central Asia.

To meet the export requirements of those deals, he has ordered Russia’s oil producers to reach an annual production of 535 million tons of oil by 2020. For that to happen, he will have to better secure Transneft’s pipeline network of over 50,000 kilometers.

This past April, Transneft threatened to shut down the oil supply to Ukraine, saying that oil worth $63 million dollars had been stolen from its PrikarpatZapadtrans pipeline system heading to the beleaguered country. However, Transneft has been facing more serious threats from organized crime in fractious regions like Dagestan where 27,000 tons of oil was stolen in 2009.

Indonesia

The state of oil smuggling in Indonesia might seem insignificant when compared to Nigeria, at just 2,000-3,000 barrels per day. However, the government seems to have only awoken to the issue after a South Sumatra pipeline explosion in October 2012 killed at least eight people, and injured dozens. The explosion was caused by one of the hundreds of taps that proliferate in the district of Bayung Lencir alone.

Since then, Jakarta says it has cracked down but oil firms remain unimpressed.

National oil giant PT Pertamina shut down one of its main pipelines, Tempino-Plaju, in July 2013. It reported losses of 17,500 barrels of oil within the first week of the pipeline’s exploration.

Chevron has also had to take matters into its own hands, running off teams of thieves in Jambi Province. The South Sumatra chief for Indonesia’s Special Task Force for Upstream Oil and Gas Business Activities has lambasted the government, saying that its inaction has allowed oil thieves to act with more confidence.

Source:
http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/These-Are-The-5-Countries-Most-Plagued-by-Oil-Theft.html

The post The Five Countries Most Plagued By Oil Theft – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Google is apparently adding music playback controls to its Google Now service, Digital Spy reported.

Android Police claims that some devices now enable users to control their music via vocal commands following a new update for the Siri rival.

Google Now is said to understand commands such as ‘next song/track’, ‘play next song’, ‘stop music’ and ‘pause music’ for some users.

The new feature is intended for use in situations where hands-free controls are necessary, such as behind the wheel of a vehicle.

Google rolled out a new version of its Search app last month, bringing ‘OK Google’ voice functionality to all Android tablets and smartphones.

It is yet to be confirmed whether the media playback controls will be released on a wide scale.

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On the first day of the month of Ramadan (June 29, 2014), the re-establishment of the Islamic caliphate (state) was declared in Iraq by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (greater Syria) militants, and a caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was anointed to head it.

With its origins going as far back as 2004, the ISIS, after its recent spectacular successes in Iraq and Syria, has its Islamic caliphate presently straddling parts of Syria and Iraq. The envisioned caliphate though includes areas of the Middle East, Central and South Asia. The June 29 declaration of the caliphate also “clarified” that it is incumbent upon all Muslims to pledge allegiance to the caliph and support him.

This new Sunni Muslim religious entity seeks to override the prevailing regional political order. Vijay Prasad in his recent article in The Hindu commented, Al-Baghdadi has announced that “he wants to command a religion, not just a region. Of such delusions are great societies and cultures destroyed.”

The discourse in India on the ISIS crisis has largely focussed on the fate of the approximately 10,000 Indian workers in Iraq (besides the 46 nurses) and hundreds of thousands more in other Arab countries. The rise in oil prices to a nine-month high after the ISIS seized Mosul also grabbed attention as it raised the prospect of a disruption in supply from the world’s sixth-largest oil producer. India imports 25 million tonnes of oil from Iraq every year, and is appreciably concerned regarding energy security and the impact of rising cost of oil on its economic growth. However, the rise of the ISIS holds more serious implications for India in its subtext.

ISIS

The ISIS has a characteristic manner of consolidating its authority in the territories it captures. After seizing the Iraqi city of Mosul and surrounding area, the ISIS gave an indication of how it would govern its dawla (state) by releasing a wathiqat al-madina (charter of the city) to Moslawis, as Mosul residents are known. The ISIS also has a governing strategy that includes social services, basic utilities (electricity and water), religious lectures, health and welfare programmes, da’wa (proselytizing) to local populations and a functioning bureaucracy, which includes an Islamic court system and a local police force.

Yet, al-Baghdadi in keeping with his caliph image, had imposed the dhimmi (second class, “tolerated” non-Muslim inhabitants) status on Christians in the ISIS–held town of Raqqa (Syria) in March this year. Dhimmi status, in traditional theology, is to be imposed by a caliph.

The ISIS declaration, including a more recent first video speech by al-Baghdadi, is unambiguous on the global nature of the ISIS’s struggle. Baghdadi touched on issues regarding the persecution of Muslims in Myanmar and the Philippines as well as the French restriction on the wearing of the veil, and responded to accusations that the ISIS engages in irhab (terrorism).

The military capability of the ISIS in Iraq to expand the territories under its rule is limited. Therefore, its leaders are directly appealing to Muslims all over the world to support the caliphate and to rebel against existing governments. They also draw this subtle distinction between their success and that of Al-Qaeda. The declaration also has the potential to escalate the conflict between Sunnis and Shiites and is likely to impact the Muslim communities in the West as well.

Having declared its objective of creating a caliphate and succeeding in some measure in doing so, ISIS is likely to gain in strength, at least in the short term. It is likely to get support from marginalised fringe radical groups which have been upstaged in their respective countries by larger “mainstream” Islamist groups, including the Al-Qaeda. This includes the extremely violent terror groups which are in an uneasy relationship with Al-Qaeda. Even Al-Qaeda itself may step up its activities to regain its leadership status. Yet the ISIS will face resistance within the Muslim world, including from Sunnis in Iraq and Syria.

Why South Asia?

One question that begs attention is what attraction does South Asia hold for the ISIS, other than the fact that parts of the region feature in the map of the caliphate. The ISIS’ earlier avatar the Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) had it fighters initially drawn from Abu Musab al Zarqawi’s networks in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and later merged with recruits from Syria, Iraq, and its neighbours. In addition, sectarianism in Pakistan and the Iran-Saudi power play in Afghanistan are likely to make the two countries quite receptive to the ISIS philosophy and its call to arms.

However, demographics is the key factor. Islam is the second largest religion in India, making up 14.6% of the country’s population with about 177 million adherents; 10 percent of these are estimated to be Shias. According to some sources, the Indian Shia population is the world’s third-largest after Iran and Pakistan, and equal to Iraq.

As per the Pew Research Center, in 2010 there were 49 Muslim-majority countries, with around 62% of the world’s Muslims living in South and Southeast Asia. Almost one in three Muslims lives in South Asia: Pakistan (11.0%), India (10.9%), and Bangladesh (9.2%). On the other hand, while about 20% of Muslims live in Arab countries, Iraq and Syria together constitute just around 3 percent (Iraq – 1.9%, Syria – 1.3%).

Given the ISIS’ motivation and its sectarian tendencies, it will be viewing South Asia as the largest pool of potential recruits (Sunnis), staying in close proximity of the largest concentration of potential targets (Shias and non-Muslims).

Foreign Fighters in ISIS

Besides the fact that ISIS’ initial recruits came from the Af-Pak region, the ISIS caliphate will draw more foreign fighters from Central and South Asia and possibly from as far as Myanmar and Thailand. Its call has already drawn foreign fighters with various groups in Syria to its fold. At present ISIS is estimated to have upwards of 11,000 fighters spread between Iraq and Syria. Around 3,000 of who are estimated to be foreign fighters, with an estimated 500 coming from Western Europe.

Australia has become the largest per capita contributor of foreign fighters to the ISIS. An estimated 150 to 300 Australian citizens and residents have left the country to join radical militant groups in the Middle East. In India police and intelligence services have begun a transnational investigation into revelations that at least two Chennai college students are now training with jihadist groups in Syria, highly placed intelligence sources have told The Hindu. The All India Shia Husaini Fund (AISHF) said around 4,000 people had volunteered to travel to Iraq and fight against the ISIS militants.

Returnees

A related issue is that of volunteers who proceed to conflict zones for humanitarian and other non-combat related reasons. A relevant driver in the case of India is the protection of Shia holy shrines in Syria and Iraq. There were unconfirmed reports as late as last year of some Indians having gone to Syria to aid in the protection of Shia shrines. Some 30,000 Indian Shia Muslims have submitted their passports and are ready to travel to Iraq to defend Shiite holy shrines from the advancing Sunni Islamist insurgents by any means available. According to recruiters, a further 100,000 have pledged support.

The point here is that whatever their nature of motivation, the “returnees” coming back home would be radicalised and polarised to a degree, even if they themselves did not engage in sectarian violence.

Mosques in India have been reported to be denouncing the ISIS in their Friday sermons too. Many maulvis have been telling devotees at prayer meetings that the ISIS is not an outfit to look up to; their actions go against what Islam preaches. Indian agencies have requested Muslim leaders to sensitise the people on the impact of sectarianism.

The track record of India’s Muslims in eschewing sectarianism and violence has been outstanding compared to the neighbourhood and elsewhere in the world. However, their most severe test, courtesy the ISIS, maybe around the corner.

(Monish Gulati is a Senior Research Fellow with the Society for Policy Studies. He can be contacted atm_gulati_2001@yahoo.com)

This article appeared at South Asia Monitor.

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By Jai Kumar Verma

The Pakistan armed forces have launched a joint military offensive in North Waziristan from June 15, 2014 to wipe out Pakistani and foreign terrorists.

The prominent terrorist groups include Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), several Afghan terrorist groups and their factions, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) supported infamous Haqqani group, Hafiz Gul Bahadur group, East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Al-Qaeda, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) etc.

The powerful Pakistani army was insisting on a full-fledged military operation against terrorists as the army had begun to realise that slowly and steadily the writ, power and influence of the army was diminishing and the terrorists have inculcated the courage of even targeting the army.

Nonetheless the civilian government under the leadership of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced to hold peace negotiations with the Taliban. The negotiation commenced on March 16, 2014 at Islamabad, but failed soon as the Pakistan government insisted on the cessation of hostilities as well as holding of talks under the constitution. Several factions of the Taliban refused to accept these conditions and insisted on the promulgation of Shariat Law (Islamic law) first in the area of their control and then in the whole of Pakistan.

An important faction of the Taliban which was against the peace negotiations killed 23 Frontier Corps soldiers who were in their captivity since 2010 with the sole objective of derailing the talks. But the last nail in the coffin of the peace negotiations came on June 8 when terrorists attacked Jinnah International Airport, Karachi, in which 36 people, including 10 terrorists, were killed. Besides these assaults, terrorists also attacked army installations, which was very humiliating for a professional army.

Once the peace talks failed the army made several aerial raids on the hiding places of terrorists in North Waziristan in which more than 400 Pakistani and foreign terrorists, including Abu Abdur Rehman Almani, an Uzbek commander, the mastermind of the Karachi airport attack, were killed and more than 60 hiding places smashed.

Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has stated that the administration had to take action against the terror groups as the strategy of negotiations failed. Now the operation will continue till it completes the assigned task.

Air Force, ground troops, artillery guns, tanks, heavy weapons are used under Operation Zarb-e-Azb. After breaking the backbone of terrorists through aerial raids and migration of the civil population, the army started ground operations from June 30. Afghan security forces were also requested to seal the border from their side so that the terrorists could not run away to Afghanistan or get any assistance from that side of the border. Infantry troops and personnel of the Special Services Group made house-to-house searches in which more than 25 terrorists were killed, several surrendered and troops recovered large cache of lethal weapons, unearthed factories manufacturing improvised explosive devices (IEDs), tunnels etc.

More than 450,000 people were displaced from their homes and registered themselves as internally displaced persons (IDPs). However, instead of residing in camps they are living with their relations in Bannu, tDera Ismail Khan, Lakki Marwat etc. Some IDPs have also gone to Afghanistan. The IDPs are not residing in camps partly because of tribal traditions and partially because of fear of backlash from terrorists.

Pakistanis who were also fed up with the inhuman activities of terrorists welcomed Operation Zarb-e-Azb. Analysts agree that North Waziristan has become the epicentre of terrorism and the much-delayed military operation against terrorists was the need of the hour.

Several tribal leaders of Miran Shah, Mir Ali and Datta Khal fully endorsed the military offensive and assured that in future they will not allow the terrorists again to re-establish themselves in the area. The influential people of the area were fed up with the activities of terrorists as their authority was clipped. Now as the army is poised to eliminate the terrorists, elders would like to establish themselves again in the region.

Most of the political parties except Jamat-e-Islami (JI) supported the army offensive against terrorists. Sunni Ulema Board and large number of Islamic clerics issued fatwa in support of the army offensive; they declared that the Pakistan army is doing jihad (holy war) by eliminating terrorists. Several countries like Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Afghanistan, United Nations, United States etc also supported the army offensive.

Many Uzbeks, Chinese, Chechens and Afghan terrorists also took refuge in this area. These terrorists are involved in terrorist activities not only in Pakistan but in other countries, including Afghanistan, China, Russia and India.

Some analysts opined that it would have been better if the government could have solved the problem of terrorism through negotiations, but a large number of Pakistanis feel that terrorists will not adhere to peaceful negotiations and they simply want to buy time so that they can make more preparations. The critics also said that the terrorist organizations would increase terror attacks, killing large number of civilians, just to show their strength. Few pessimists have also alleged that most of the terrorists have already left North Waziristan and the army is killing innocent civilians.

The terrorists attacked a Pakistan International Airlines plane at Peshawar, and in reaction Emirates Airlines and Etihad Airways, both of United Arab Emirates, suspended operations from Peshawar airport.

The hard core Pakistanis allege that these terrorists are getting support from abroad, especially from India and Afghanistan, to create trouble in Pakistan.

It is heartening to see that the Pakistani army has initiated an offensive against terrorists, but it will not bring the desired result if the offensive does not include all radical Islamist groups, including ISI-sponsored terrorist groups. The situation will become very complicated if Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which is a hard-line Sunni group and ideologically very near to Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), opts for an alliance with it.

Besides the military action in North Waziristan, there is a need to curb the rising trend of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan. At present the military action against TTP and other terrorist groups is because they were targeting Pakistani establishments, especially the armed forces. There was no action against these terrorists till they were killing minorities, Shias, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and making terror attacks in India or Indian establishments outside India. Action should also be taken against the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), including its founder Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, who is roaming freely in Pakistan and the ISI-sponsored Haqqani faction.

In the past, the Pakistani army took action against terrorists in the Swat valley, South Waziristan etc. but the terrorism instead of ending continued to grow. It clearly shows mistakes in the operation.

The basic problem in the military offensive is that it is not against all terrorists, but only against those terror groups which are not toeing the line of ISI. Secondly, madrassas which are the breeding ground of terrorism are increasing in the country. In this 21st century when people are becoming more liberal, fundamentalism is increasing in Pakistan. This trend needs to be curbed.

(Jai Kumar Verma is a Delhi-based strategic analyst. He can be contacted atsouthasiamonitor1@gmail.com)

This article appeared at South Asia Monitor.

The post Pakistan’s Military Offensive: A Selective Campaign? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By James A. Baer

The current economic and political morass in Argentina stems from a confluence of two issues that have intersected several times over the last seventy years. The first is the concept of Peronism and its misinterpretation by President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-present), who has striven to follow the policies of her late husband and previous president Néstor Kirchner, with decreasing success. The second is the cyclical nature of Argentina’s economy. Periods of sustained economic growth eventually stall leading to stagnation and decline. The current result is a political stalemate, where the president frantically searches for policies that will stem the loss of support by the people of Argentina and stabilize the economy. However, she has yet to comprehend that as the leader of the Peronist Party she will not be allowed automatically to inherit the success of her predecessor simply by relying on the ideology of Peronism.

Néstor Kirchner assumed the presidency in May 2003, a time when Argentina was convulsed by a maelstrom of debt and chaos. The economic implosion of late 2001 had devastated the country, with factories abandoned, banks closed and creditors demanding repayment of the nation’s debt. In quick succession four heads of state resigned, leaving the country effectively leaderless and in deep crisis. The election of Néstor Kirchner brought, in time, political stability even though he received less than a quarter of the votes and gained the presidency only after his Peronist rival and former president, Carlos Menem, withdrew. Kirchner’s policies began to restore economic growth. Rejecting the neo-liberal economic ideas of previous Peronist and Unión Cívica Radical administrations, Kirchner’s program of income redistribution and refusal to pay back creditors fully, dollar for dollar, made him very popular with Argentines, but made Argentina a pariah on world financial markets.

Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was elected to her first term as president in 2007, promising continuity with her husband’s successful administration. Despite the sudden death of Néstor in 2010, Fernández de Kirchner managed to be reelected in 2011, campaigning on the notion that Peronism would provide a continuing social and political model for her administration. This was a mistake. Over many years Peronism has been identified with Juan D. Perón for whom the concept is named, defined as a political ideology, and most recently as an element of Argentine culture.[1] Peronism has morphed over time, depending on which issues most capture the hearts of Argentines. But most of all, Peronism is not a coherent political philosophy that can be traced from inception through a period of maturation. Peronism is a shadow, an ethereal set of ideas that takes whatever is popular at a given moment and is used to enhance the power of the political leader. Peronism is more of a political tactic than an ideology.

In 1943 Perón may have employed the structure of a corporatist military government, but these notions were not the totality of Peronism. The mid-1940s populist program of higher wages and better working conditions developed by Public Works Minister Juan Pistarini might become the classical core of Peronism, but then only for a season. Peronism in 1944 may have taken the rebuilding of San Juan as it central message for creating a New Argentina,[2] but Peronism in the late 1940s was more concerned with the women’s vote and the export market. Indeed, the bewildering mix of fascism, liberalism, populism, democratic, labor-centric, state capitalism, socialism of Juan Perón had ultimately only one meaning: to give Perón power and make him the central figure in the government.

Perón became the champion of the common Argentine, the “shirtless ones,” or descamisados as he called them. As an outsider to the political power center of Buenos Aires, Perón claimed the totality of opposition. After his overthrow in 1955, Peronism of the exile years appealed to the dispossessed: labor, youth and the poor. Peronism after Perón then became Menemism and Kirchnerism. Like Juan Perón, who grew up in Argentina’s southern Patagonia, Carlos Menem came from the northern province of La Rioja, and Néstor Kirchner was from Rio Gallegos, in the southern province of Santa Cruz. All three were outsiders who brought hope in the name of Peronism.

Cristina Fernández de Kirchner identifies herself as a Peronist. “Peronism is so much like Argentines,” she announced. “We Peronists, just like all Argentines, are capable of spawning the most generous actions and the most sublime individuals, as well as the most despicable actions.”[3] She has tried to identify problems that can unite Argentines. She has attacked Vulture Funds which refuse to compromise on debt repayment and threaten Argentina’s financial markets. Fernández de Kirchner continues to press Great Britain over the sovereignty of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, and she has identified her administration with those of Cuba and Venezuela. These issues brought her some support. But her insistence on misrepresenting inflation statistics, controlling access to U.S. dollars by Argentines and making her administration the victim weakens her politically.[4] She has held onto the Peronism of her husband rather than affirming her rapport with the people of Argentina searching for answers to current crises.

The second issue creating the malaise that made the country so vulnerable is the economic uncertainty in Argentina, especially after the June 17 ruling by the United States Supreme Court denying Argentina’s request to stop Vulture Fund NML Capital from going after the country’s assets in order to obtain repayment of Argentina’s debt. Yet this present dilemma is only the latest in a long line of troubles that have grown naturally out of boom and bust cycles dominating the Argentine economy. Juan Perón initiated a policy of controlling export markets as a way to take profits from agricultural commodity exports and redirect them to industry and social programs. The policy was successful in the immediate post-war era when Europe needed to import food. But by the 1950s conditions changed as Argentine export prices slumped, and the resulting economic strains led Perón to become more authoritarian in order to maintain his system of benefits to those he favored. In 1955 the military coup that overthrew Perón tossed aside his economic policies. In their place came an era of free market economic development. Some growth returned, but Argentina became increasingly dependent on foreign capital.

Perón returned to Argentina briefly in the 1970s, but his presence quickly demonstrated that no one could agree on what Peronism meant, not even Juan Perón. He tried desperately to hold together the various groups supporting him, promising all things to everyone, but the coalition crumbled when he died in 1974. His third wife, Vice President and his successor, María Estela (Isabel) Martínez de Perón, could not maintain control over the economy or the government and was removed in a coup. The infamously brutal military regime that followed borrowed outrageously, encumbering generations to come with massive foreign debts.[5] A period of hyperinflation created chaos after the fall of the military regime in 1983 and led to the introduction of a new currency, the austral. One austral was equal to 1,000 pesos. In 1989 the Peronist Party’s Carlos Menem took office (1989-1999) and began to redefine the policy program of Peronism. In 1991 Menem changed Argentina’s currency once again, with one peso equal to 10,000 australes and pegged Argentina’s peso to the U.S. dollar. Inflation came down, but the new Argentine currency became over-valued resulting in reduced exports and a weakening economy. President Menem also oversaw a wave of privatizations, with the government airlines, telecommunications, the national petroleum company and other assets sold to private companies, mostly foreign. The economy boomed for the wealthy and the well-connected, although unemployment and poverty increased dramatically. The Argentine economy finally collapsed in late 2001, creating an economic catastrophe and a political vacuum that Néstor Kirchner addressed. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner now flounders in the doldrums of declining popularity and economic confusion, unable to adapt Peronism to the current crisis.

Peronism may emerge anew with presidential elections in October 2015. Fernández de Kirchner is constitutionally barred from running for a third consecutive term, but Buenos Aires governor, Daniel Scioli is emerging as the Peronist heir-apparent. Scioli is the candidate for the Front for Victory/Peronist Party. Another Peronist, Sergio Massa created his own party the Renewal Front and plans to oppose Scioli in 2015. Whichever candidate best reads the mood of the population and wins the election will have the opportunity to redefine Peronism in the twenty-first century.

James A. Baer, Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

References

[1]James P. Brennan, ed. Peronism and Argentina, Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1998. In the introduction, Brennan writes, “Peronism has always been profoundly rooted in national conditions.”(xi) The chapter by Christian Buchrucker, “Interpretations of Peronism: Old Frameworks and New Perspectives,” looked at the typologies of Peronism that focused on political ideologies from fascism to socialism and populism and finds that none of them are adequate. Instead of an ideology, “Peronism has seen itself as representing the contemporary values of the people,” concludes Buchrucker (12). The latest iteration of Peronism can be found in Matthew B. Karush and Oscar Chamosa, eds. The NewCultural History of Peronism: Power and Identity in Mid-Twentieth-Century Argentina , Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010.

[2] See Mark Healey, The Ruins of the New Argentina. Peronism and the Remaking of San Juan after the 1944 Earthquake, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011. Healey attempts to define the meaning of Peronism through its response to the earthquake from 1944 through the early 1950s.

[3] Quoted in the Buenos Aires newspaper Clarin 06/05/2006. Accessed on June 25, 2014 at https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Cristina_Fern%C3%A1ndez_de_Kirchner

[4] “She also said Argentina was the victim of ‘extortion’ by holdouts who refused to join debt restructuring deals since the catastrophic 2001-02 default on $100 billion of sovereign debt.” Quote from Business Insider, accessed on June 27, 2014 at : http://www.businessinsider.com/r-argentina-vows-to-service-debt-despite-new-legal-blow-2014-16

[5] Under the military Argentina’s borrowing increased from $8.3 billion in March, 1976 to $43.6 billion in December, 1983. Andrew Thompson, “Alfonsin Walks on a Knife Edge,” South 43 (1984): 88-89. Cited in The Freeman accessed on June 27 2014 at http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/the-international-debt-problem-the-case-of-argentina/

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By Mahendra Ved

Posterity may record this as the best and the worst of times for the Pakistan Army. Not wielding absolute power like it has done several times before, the army has under orders from the civilian leadership launched one its fiercest operations – not against a neighbour – but its own people in the restive North Waziristan Agency (NWA).

This is also the time when one of its chiefs and a former president of the country, Pervez Musharraf, is imprisoned and being tried for serious charges, including treason. This is unprecedented.

The army’s widely perceived efforts to get Musharraf out of jail and out of the country on some pretext have failed so far.

And this is also the time when another former chief, Ashfaque Pervez Kayani, is being attacked by a fellow senior retired military man for failing to launch a drive in these areas, for allowing the situation to go out of hand and causing serious security damage to the country. This too is unprecedented.

Taking Musharraf first; He has been in and out of jail since he returned home from a four-year self-imposed exile in March last year to participate in the general election, hoping to ‘save’ Pakistan. He was disqualified from contesting, his farmhouse declared a sub-jail (placed under house arrest) and he has been made to appear in trial courts despite explosions taking place more than once on the route between his home/jail and the court.

Deals brokered to get Musharraf out, purportedly by the Saudi royal family – that had earlier done the same to get Nawaz Sharif out of Pakistan after Musharraf had deposed him – have not worked. Some reports say that he has refused to leave to be with his ill mother in Dubai, while others have at different times said that the Sharif government has refused to take him off the “Exit List” that prevents select people from leaving the country.

The military has not liked this one bit. Questions have been asked why his hand-picked successor Kayani did not exert pressure either on then president Asif Ali Zardari’s regime or the Nawaz Sharif government to save Musharraf from the prospect of prolonged imprisonment, trial and a possible death sentence. There is no conclusive word on this.

The military, speaking vocally through ex-servicemen’s bodies, has been so outraged at the thought of an ex-chief being tried for treason by the civilians that it has acted to thwart the proceedings every step of the way, especially since the Special Court summoned Musharraf to face indictment.

There is a view that the issue has been complicated by Musharraf’s aggressive defence by his lawyers who have sought to bring in a large number of officers, both military and civilian, as ‘abettors’ of the acts like dismissal and jailing of judges and declaration of Emergency that have been termed as violation of the constitution and hence treason.

A swift indictment could have paved the way for bail and freedom. But the drama at the trial court, combined with concocted medical and security reports and Musharraf’s hospitalization have rebounded on the military. Musharraf’s defence team has done its best to drum up media headlines in the likely hope that it would build further pressure on the government. That has not happened.

It is not clear if, and how, the Nawaz Sharif government wants to push ahead with Musharraf’s trial. This has affected the civil-military relationship that has never been clear and comfortable. The government-military-judiciary stalemate has not changed even with the military operations underway in NWA.

Kayani was a powerful army chief for six years. He was given a three year extension by the Zardari regime. The military under him did not attempt to take power, something speculated on numerous occasions. This was despite grave circumstances and political attacks on the military, like when Al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden was found to have been located and killed by the United States in the garrison town where he was sheltered.

Kayani did not take power even after the “Memo Gate” incident when Zardari was accused of approaching the Americans to save his seat in the event of the army chief staging a coup.

All through this period, the militants were getting stronger across Pakistan, especially in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) under the umbrella of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Foreign militants, among them Arabs of various nationalities and Uzbeks from Central Asia, had taken shelter (right from the Musharraf era). There were clear signs that under the US pressure and for its own domestic compulsions, the Pakistan military would launch an offensive. Everyone, including the militants, was expecting a military operation in North Waziristan in 2010-11. But that did not happen.

Now, retired Major General Athar Abbas, a former spokesperson for the Pakistan Army, says that as army chief Kayani baulked at launching a military operation in 2010 for fear of a backlash from the religious right. The indecision, he told BBC in a recent interview, has caused untold losses.

This assessment has turned out to be correct. Pakistan has suffered more than 50,000 civilian causalities owing to this. Although not everything happened in, and because of rising militancy, in North Waziristan, but it was the main source. Over 5,000 soldiers were killed and 10,000 more lost their limbs.

Abbas has opened up a new chapter, a new controversy that was simmering for long, but was overtaken by events. None of this is good news for the military that has finally, after the June 8 terror attack on Jinnah International Airport at Karachi, launched Zarb-e-Azb, the military offensive.

According to Abbas, Kayani did not act despite the formation commanders under him generally agreeing upon the necessity of urgent action in order to control the spread of militancy and terrorism. In interviews to BBC and then to Dawn, he has listed the reasons that led Kayani to stay his hand.

First, Kayani feared that such an operation would propel the militant groups and tribes allied to the military for long (ostensibly funded and armed) to turn against the army and join the militants. Second, he worried about how to target the foreign militant-assets belonging to the Haqqani network which the Pakistan Army has all along considered “strategic assets” to be used against India in Jammu and Kashmir and against Afghanistan.

As could be foreseen, and has happened, he feared a huge number of people being displaced from the battle zone. He had doubts about the reliability and efficacy of the civilian intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Coping with the expected terrorist backlash in the rest of the country was another factor that held him back.

There was a clear lack of a national consensus on a military response to militancy – which eludes Pakistan even today. Kayani was afraid about a militant reaction from the religious right wing.

Finally, according to Abbas, Kayani could not ignore the probability of being personally targeted by the militants, like Musharaf before him.

In his editorial in The Friday Times, Najam Sethi claims: “There is absolutely no doubt that General Abbas is speaking the truth.” Among the many indications, he points out that “Admiral Mike Mullen, the US Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, who boasted of his friendship with Gen Kayani, confirmed that an operation was on the cards. Later, on the eve of his retirement, Admiral Mullen spoke bitterly of being misled by General Kayani and breaching his “trust” by going back on his word to launch the operation.”

“For six years General Kayani kept vacillating over the issue and in six months, this leader (General Raheel Sharif) decided this is the crux of the problem. It’s a matter of how decisive you are, how much you have the ability to sift essentials from non-essentials.”

He contends that “Gen Abbas has obtained “clearance” for his interview from the “top”, meaning General Raheel Sharif, the current Army Chief, who ostensibly wants to go public on the role of various stake holders as he storms the tribal areas.

“It is important to send a strong signal abroad to the international community that this time the army leadership is not playing a “double game” and can be trusted to keep its word,” says Sethi.

This explains why the army authorities have repeatedly announced that they are targeting everyone, “including the Haqqani network”, high on the US target and one that has relentlessly targeted Indian establishments and personnel in Afghanistan.

Like the US, India should take note of this positive turn of events whose outcome, of course, remains uncertain.

(Mahendra Ved is a New Delhi-based writer and columnist. He can be reached at southasiamonitor1@gmail.com)

This article appeared at South Asia Monitor.

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The growing number of Indonesian fighters involved in Syria’s civil war has security implications for their country when they return. Will the fighters there now have an impact on local dynamics and revitalise the militant Islamist movement?

By Navhat Nuraniyah and Sulastri Osman

The recent suicide bomb attack in Syria by a Malaysian militant has highlighted the presence of Southeast Asian fighters in Syria’s civil war. Another 15 Malaysians have also been reportedly killed in clashes while Indonesian militants have also featured among the dead in Syria and Iraq. Many of them were said to have fought for the extremist Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) which has metamorphosed into the Islamic State, declared to be a transnational “caliphate” by its leader Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi.

The continued traction of Syria

Among the Indonesians killed are alumni of different Jemaah Islamiyah-linked schools in Indonesia. Security analysts believe the number of Indonesian fighters in Syria is greater than the government estimate of 56.

Part of the continued traction of Syria for Indonesia’s militant Islamists is the narrative that the land is to be the epicentre of the Last Caliphate and where the Final Battle, or Armageddon, against Dajjal the Anti-Christ will ensue. Based on jihadist interpretation of selected hadith, it is argued that the current conflict against Assad may not be the Final Battle, but it certainly is a divinely sanctioned mechanism to get rid of infidels from the holy land and attract pious Muslims from everywhere to migrate there.

Subscribing to the narrative, Indonesian jihadists who have travelled, or have intentions to travel to Syria to fight could well regard their trip as a one-way ticket, either staying or dying there to be a part of the Final Victory. The government anticipates that if some do return, they will come home with new skills and capabilities and renewed ideological commitment to conduct armed jihad. Indonesia is legitimately concerned about Syria veterans, noting that some of the most egregious terrorist attacks in the country in the past decade were masterminded by Islamist militants who had once fought in Afghanistan or Mindanao. However, a more immediate concern is arguably the swelling numbers of local supporters of Syrian jihadist groups, especially ISIS.

Implications of the new “caliphate”

Locally, ISIS’s self-proclaimed “caliphate” has had two results: firstly, it has injected new breath into the notion of qital tamkin, i.e., armed warfare that is aimed at gaining territorial control as opposed to merely attacking the enemy (qital nikayah). Secondly, it has contributed to the growth of Indonesian ISIS supporters, both offline and online, beyond those who populate the militant Islamist circles.

On the first point, ISIS takeover of parts of Syria and Iraq could further reinforce the viability of ISIS-styled qital tamkin in Indonesia. Small-scale qital nikayah has been the favoured tactic hitherto largely because it is easier to conduct, but proponents of the approach – which included the Bali bombers and Noordin Top – have been much criticised for being too destructive and not yielding much political or territorial gains. Consequently, those championing qital tamkin, including influential jihadi ideologue Aman Abdurrahman, have been using ISIS’s victory to demonstrate how Indonesian jihadists need to focus on establishing a secure base wherein sharia laws could be implemented and governing capability developed.

Growth of ISIS supporters in Indonesia

The leader of Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) Abu Bakar Ba’asyir has also recently endorsed ISIS precisely because it has established territorial control and a semblance of a governing authority. These serve to reenergise attempts to create jihadi safe havens in the country, a strategy that, while contested, underlay various violent campaigns over the years. In the most recent recollection was the attempt to set up a militant base in Aceh in late 2009, but which was disrupted; another, led by Santoso’s Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), is still being actively fought in Poso today.

With regard to the second point, ISIS supporters in Indonesia have noticeably grown, and they include existing jihadist groups and their supporters as well as non-violent radicals. MIT and JAT are among those that have sworn allegiance or endorsed ISIS. New groups, too, have been formed in direct support of ISIS such as Anshorullah, whose members have publicly declared their intention to fight in Syria, and Anshar Al-Daulah, whose members are more inclined to promote ISIS through community-based events such as charity work. ISIS sympathisers also come from pro-sharia advocacy groups and religious vigilantes known for their anti-vice activism.

The number of ISIS cheerleaders online is also rising. New pro-ISIS websites, Facebook groups and Twitter accounts continue to emerge with thousands of followers. To be sure, although many ISIS online cheerleaders share the romanticism of an Islamic caliphate, not all of them necessarily support the group’s methods of violence. However, given that terrorists like Abu Roban had reportedly recruited new operatives by identifying cheerleaders of armed jihad supporters on Facebook, ISIS online cheerleaders could become targets for recruitment too.

What’s next?

In sum, developments in Syria and Iraq could determine new directions for the militant Islamist movement in Indonesia. The newly declared “caliphate” has attracted local supporters and revived the idea of qital tamkin. These developments can have implications for the rest of the region whether in terms of spill-over effects of domestic politics or the clandestine movements of violent elements across porous Southeast Asian borders.

There is need to closely monitor the development of ISIS supporters to discern credible security threats from the brash cheerleaders. Without necessarily being alarmist, particularly considering how the majority of the global Muslim community consider ISIS neither relevant nor legitimate to demand allegiance, countering the legitimacy of the new “caliphate” as well as any attempt to emulate it in the Indonesian context remains important.

Navhat Nuraniyah is Associate Research Fellow and Sulastri Osman is Research Fellow with the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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A video of a purported member of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) pledging support to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) surfaced recently. With an apparent spike in ASG-related activities, this is interpreted as evidence of convergence between the groups. However, the localised factors that motivate ASG factions should not be ignored.

By Joseph Franco

An audio recording of a purported Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) member pledging support to the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) was uploaded to YouTube on 24 June 2014. The pledge was made in Arabic and played over jihadist-inspired graphics. The objective of the clip remains unclear.

The month of June also saw major incidents involving the ASG. A top ASG leader, Khair Mundos, who had a US$500,000 bounty on his head, was captured by the police in Manila. Further arrests followed of ASG operatives associated with Mundos involved in plots to kidnap local businessmen in Zamboanga City, a Christian enclave in Mindanao. Thrusting the ASG further into the limelight was a fierce skirmish that resulted in several deaths, including of a junior officer.

The non-ideological heritage of the ASG

Some pundits claim that recent events indicated new links between the ASG and ISIS. Particularly after ISIS declared itself the new “caliphate”, henceforth the Islamic State (IS); security stakeholders in Southeast Asia (SEA) especially in countries where militant Islamist groups operate were expectedly concerned. This stems from the popular narrative of how terrorist organisations in the Philippines maintain alliances with groups outside SEA.

While Al Qaeda elements provided seed funding in the early years of the ASG, radicalization based on ideology does not factor heavily for the new ASG recruit. The demise of ASG founder Abdurajak Janjalani in 1998, arguably the only ideologue in its history, stunted the group’s ideological development. No other ASG faction leader has produced something to complement or rival Janjalani’s one written tract, the Jumaah Abu Sayyaf. The few dozen pages of the Jumaah pale in comparison to the voluminous body of literature produced by other extremist Islamist groups such as Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiyah.

In the milieu of Mindanao, recruits join the ranks of ASG factions for more practical motivations – to earn ransom money. The ASG, specifically its Sulu-based faction, gained international notoriety when it kidnapped 21 Western tourists in Sipadan Island in 2000. During the protracted captivity of the victims, the average individual, even entire clans, swelled the ranks of the ASG, expecting to benefit from the potential windfall. Once the estimated US$20 million ransom was paid out, another cycle of financially motivated but transitory involvement in the ASG occurred.

For such opportunistic individuals, joining the ASG is a way to monetise their possession of illicit firearms. Mindanao is a region beset with small arms proliferation, where firearm possession is part of a wider gun culture. Decades of conflict allowed the flourishing of an arms black market from captured or diverted government stockpiles. In Sulu alone, international NGOs peg the number of illicit firearms at 100,000. Mindanao’s illicit arms surplus had in fact been a major source for Islamist and Christian militias operating in Indonesia’s Sulawesi and Ambon. The relationship between small arms smugglers on both sides of Philippine-Indonesia border had been largely transactional, across sectarian lines.

The recent ASG kidnappings in Eastern Malaysia between late 2013 and early 2014, viewed with this more practical perspective, reveals the group’s weakness as an ideological movement. ASG had not even attempted to posture the kidnappings as political acts; their profit-making preoccupation overshadowing their ideological moorings.

An Offline ASG in an Online world

The local roots of ASG’s continuity go hand-in-hand with its lack of online presence, further disputing assertions of its link to extra-regional groups like ISIS. To date, the ASG has remained an offline organisation. A 2014 Australian study of “neojihadism” in the Philippines followed the activities of three Facebook pages, claiming them as evidence of the online presence of Islamist groups in the Philippines. However, the study itself admits that the pages are mostly passive repositories of links to other jihadist websites.

A simple digital ethnography reveals that the audience of all the pages combined amounted to only 15,000 Facebook “likes” – including fake and duplicate accounts – originating from only a single urban centre in Mindanao. The number is dismal considering the Philippines’ stature as the “Social Media Capital of the World” with nearly a third of its 100 million-strong population active on Facebook. Moreover, the pages were arguably run by “jihobbyists” — an Internet subculture of young men interested in Islamist content but having neither capabilities nor intent to engage in violence.

The tepid presence of Philippine-based militants is in stark contrast to the more active online jihadists found in the Western context where notorious online “disseminators” propagate global jihadist ideology despite not being officially part of groups like ISIS such as Australian Musa Cerantonio. Curiously, Cerantonio is currently reported to be seeking refuge in “the mountains of Sulu”. The claim remains unconfirmed. Even if it were true, the appeal of the likes of Cerantonio owes much to their take on armed jihad as an individualistic duty, which does not align with the more communitarian social structures of Mindanao. Neither would theological arguments gain traction in communities involved with the ASG because of the primacy of financial motivations.

The importance of context

The ASG remains a localised movement. Its subscription to the jihadist narrative is passive and superficial. It has yet to make its mark in the online world and would unlikely do so in the near future. Thus, state responses should always be aware of and be cautious of quickly ascribing ideological motivations to what essentially are socio-economic issues. The Philippines’s social and economic milieu creates distinct dynamics that may be wholly different even from close neighbours like Indonesia or Malaysia.

Joseph Franco is an Associate Research Fellow with the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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The UK government has stated that it cannot provide the full information regarding the country’s role in unauthorized US military operations because the data were “incomplete due to water damage.” This was said by the Foreign Ministry spokesman Mark Simmonds concerning the demand of lawmakers to publish data about British participation in unsanctioned US operations, according to The Guardian.

The information concerns a clandestine prison for foreign citizens suspected of involvement in terrorist organizations, located on the British island of Diego Garcia, as well as the US military airbase. This data, as US media had earlier reported, were mentioned in the report of the Senate, which would be officially released later. It says about “full cooperation” of the British government with the US authorities on the functioning of the secret prison, reports Russia Today.

UK Parliament from time to time tries to put pressure on the government, demanding to publish data on the participation of this country in various anti-terrorist operations of United States, which US have implemented after the attacks of September 11, 2001.

Thus, in February 2008 the British Foreign Office representative was forced to admit that at least two flights from the base on the island of Diego Garcia were connected with the transportation of informally arrested people suspected of terrorism.

The chairman of the Treasury Committee of the UK House Parliament Andrew Thiry performs investigation the involvement of the government in the secret US operations. Responding to his request, Mark Simmonds explained that since 2003 departures and arrivals on the island of Diego Garcia were recorded on a daily basis. “However, some of the entries 2002 are limited. As far as I know, they are incomplete due to water damage, ” he stressed.

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