South Sudan’s National Security Service (NSS) should stop seizing and shutting down newspapers as well as harassing, intimidating, and unlawfully detaining journalists, two leading human rights organizations said today in a joint report.

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch said that against the backdrop of an internal armed conflict that has raged for seven months across much of the country, the moves are restricting freedom of expression and curtailing public debate about how to end the conflict. The groups called for an end to these abuses and for South Sudan’s parliament to ensure proper oversight of the NSS, in line with international human rights law and standards.

“The government clampdown takes place at a time when South Sudan most needs independent voices to contribute to discussions about how to end the political crisis and internal armed conflict,” said Elizabeth Ashamu Deng, South Sudan researcher at Amnesty International. “Abuses by the National Security Service – an institution that still has no law governing it – have especially contributed to a growing atmosphere of fear among journalists and human rights defenders.”

The groups documented unlawful restrictions on expression and the media since the conflict began in December 2013. Over the past seven months, senior government officials have banned journalists from interviewing opposition leaders. Those who have done so or who have reported on human rights violations by government forces have faced intimidation. Authorities have also restricted reporting on the conflict, human rights violations, and debates surrounding federalism in South Sudan.

The NSS has harassed and detained journalists, summoned them for questioning, and told some to leave the country. One newspaper, the Almajhar Alsayasy, was given explicit instructions to cease publication. The government has held issues of another weekly newspaper, Juba Monitor, eight times in the past seven months. In June, an entire run of the Citizen, a weekly newspaper, was seized.

“Right now, journalists and commentators cannot do their work and report freely on the ongoing conflict without fear of retribution by state security forces,” said Daniel Bekele, Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “We’ve seen the NSS and other authorities erode freedom of expression since South Sudan’s independence through abusive practices: these should end now.”

The war has had a direct impact on South Sudan’s media. Many journalists have been displaced due to the fighting or forced to leave the country, including because they are afraid they will be targeted based on their ethnicity. Media infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed, including radio stations in Leer and Malakal in Upper Nile State and in Bor, Jonglei State.

“Any hope for justice for crimes committed during the new conflict and the success of any future truth-telling process will require a safe environment in which South Sudanese can speak openly,” Ashamu Deng said. “If South Sudan hopes for a peaceful future, covering up crimes must not be allowed and freedom of expression must be protected, not attacked.”

South Sudan’s conflict began in the capital, Juba, in December, but quickly spread. The fighting has been characterized by unlawful attacks on civilians – often targeted and killed because of their ethnicity – and on civilian property. The violence has killed thousands of people, largely destroyed key towns, and forced an estimated 1.5 million people to flee their homes, often to places where they face severe hunger.

The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have documented abuses that constitute war crimes and potential crimes against humanity by both government and opposition forces.

An African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan was initiated soon after the conflict erupted but has been slow to begin investigating human rights violations. The Commission of Inquiry should ensure that violations of freedom of expression are addressed in its research and should make recommendations on how this basic right could be better protected in South Sudan, including through institutional reform of the NSS.

A bill to define and limit NSS powers was drafted by the Justice Ministry and introduced in the National Legislative Assembly in May 2014. The draft bill gives NSS officers the same powers to arrest and detain as the police, but does not specify permissible detention sites, or guarantee basic due process rights, such as the right to counsel or to be brought before a tribunal within a fixed time period. The draft grants broad criminal immunity to NSS officers, as well as powers of surveillance and to search and seize property without clear judicial oversight.

The bill should be revised immediately to limit the sweeping powers for the NSS to arrest and detain people, and to ensure that any communications surveillance is subject to judicial oversight. The members of parliament should ensure that the law complies with international human rights law and standards.

The post Call For South Sudan To End Media Restrictions appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Credit where credit is due. BBC newscasts over recent weeks have differed distinctly in tone, content and balance from how the Gaza conflicts of 2008-9 and 2012 were covered. Not that dedicated subscribers to the monitoring website bbcwatch.org are likely to have noticed the change, for that website remains as assiduous as ever in reporting every deviation from its interpretation of what is “accurate and impartial” – the standard by which it measures BBC news reports. It is, of course, no bad thing that the BBC’s output is subject to intense scrutiny, though BBCwatch does, perhaps, tend towards overkill.

The BBC is one of the largest and most influential broadcasting organizations in the world. As well as serving the whole of the United Kingdom, it enjoys a massive global reach, transmitting news and current events via TV and radio in over 30 languages to audiences measured in hundreds of millions.

Established in 1922 as the British Broadcasting Company, the nascent organization was stamped from the start by the high moral tone set by its first Director General, John Reith. From its earliest days Reith successfully established and maintained the independence of the BBC from political interference, and by 1939, when the UK went to war with Germany, the BBC’s reputation for accuracy, objectivity and impartiality was firmly established.

Throughout World War II the BBC broadcast to Nazi-occupied Europe, and people all over the continent literally risked their lives to listen. The wartime reputation that the BBC acquired of honesty, objectivity, and lack of bias is the foundation on which today’s BBC stands, however much the structure may have wobbled on its footings in the recent past. In defining the principles which underlie its editorial guidelines, the BBC says:

“Trust is the foundation of the BBC: we are independent, impartial and honest.  We are committed to achieving the highest standards of due accuracy and impartiality …”

There’s an old English saying: “Fine words butter no parsnips”. In other words, it’s not what you say that counts, but what you do. And there is no doubt that, at some point during the 1960s-1970s, something began to go very wrong within the BBC. Perhaps reflecting a general shift to the left among the opinion-forming élite in the UK, and perhaps not at all a deliberate policy, the BBC’s editorial standards came to be dominated by what became known as “political correctness” – an unspoken consensus of ultra left-leaning views. Mark Thompson, then-Director General of the BBC, admitted in 2010, “In the BBC I joined 30 years ago there was, in much of current affairs, in terms of people’s personal politics, which were quite vocal, a massive bias to the left. The organisation did struggle then with impartiality.”

As regards the BBC’s coverage of the Middle East in general, and Israel in particular, the Six-Day War in 1967 marked a turning point. Until then, Israel had been seen as the brave little nation fighting off enemies that were intent on its destruction. With Israel conclusively victorious, UK public opinion shifted in favour of the Palestinians – the party now perceived as the “underdogs”. Reflecting this, the BBC’s editorial stance also shifted significantly, to the point where Trevor Asserson, a British lawyer, asserting: “The BBC’s coverage of the Middle East is infected by an apparent widespread antipathy toward Israel,” undertook six well-documented studies between 2001 and 2006 detailing the BBC’s systematic bias against Israel.

Criticism of the BBC’s Middle East coverage from supporters of both Israel and Palestine led the BBC to commission an investigation and report from a senior broadcast journalist Malcolm Balen.

Completed in 2004, the Balen Report has never been published, despite repeated requests to the BBC under the UK Freedom of Information Act. The House of Lords, the UK’s supreme court, and the Information Commissioner have both held that the report falls outside the Freedom of Information Act. The suspicion by many right-wing critics is that the conclusions of editorial bias against Israel are too damaging to be made public.

Throughout the three weeks of Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009, the broadcast media, with the BBC in the vanguard, was out in force, capturing the horrors of war for the world’s television sets. Soon charges were being levelled against the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) by political and media figures of “disproportionate” military activity. It was not long before they turned into accusations of war crimes. Israel’s case, as far as BBC news reports and comments were concerned, largely went by default.

During the following years a series of incidents appeared to highlight how far the BBC had fallen below its own editorial standards. During one BBC programme in October 2004, a BBC journalist , Barbara Plett, described herself crying when she saw a frail Yasser Arafat being evacuated to France for medical treatment.

A complaint of bias against Plett was rejected by the BBC, but a year later the programme complaints committee of the BBC governors ruled that Plett’s comments “breached the requirements of due impartiality”, and the then BBC director of news apologised for what she described as “an editorial misjudgment”.

In April 2009 the Editorial Standards Committee of the BBC Trust published a report about complaints brought against Jeremy Bowen, the BBC’s Middle East Editor, including 24 allegations of inaccuracy or impartiality. Three were fully or partially upheld, though the report did not accuse Bowen of bias.

During Israel’s Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012 the BBC seemed to make an effort to present a more balanced view of the conflict. Their reports provided something of Israel’s perspective, although the general impression left on the TV and radio audience was of a triumphant Hamas bestriding the world’s stage as the upholder of the “armed struggle” against Israel and, as a principal partner in negotiating Egypt’s peace plan, winning valuable concessions in the cease-fire.

BBC newscasts during Operation Protective Edge have undoubtedly shown a change of direction – small, perhaps, but significant. For the first time in some thirty years the BBC is clearly trying to ensure that an Israeli point of view is included in reports of the conflict. Its newscasters have adopted a sharper edge in their questioning of Palestinian spokesmen, often intervening during interviews to bring the speaker back to the point (“If you stop interrupting me,” said Marwan Barghouti during a BBC interview on July 30, “I may be able to answer you”). They have ensured that an experienced journalist – in this case Bethany Bell – is located within Israel to balance the narrative provided by Palestinian spokesmen. On a recent domestic radio program the former Commander of British Forces in Afghanistan, Colonel Richard Kemp, drew a clear distinction between the legitimacy of IDF actions and the illegitimacy of Hamas.

Other examples abound.

Perhaps, after all this time, the BBC is returning to the core values that once made it the most trusted broadcasting organization in the world.

The post The BBC: A Touch On The Tiller – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

In this week’s address, the President discussed the new monthly jobs report and the fact that our economy created over 200,000 new jobs in July for the sixth straight month – the longest streak since 1997. To ensure this momentum can be sustained, the President is pressing Congress to act to create jobs and expand opportunity from raising the minimum wage, to helping people pay back their student loans, to fair pay and paid leave. These are steps that would continue to make things better for the middle class, which has always been his priority. But Republicans in Congress have repeatedly blocked these important measures. As Congress is about to go on vacation, the President encouraged Americans to reach out to their elected officials and let them know that they must pass these measures when Congress returns to session. And in their absence, the President will continue to do everything he can, working with all stakeholders who are willing, to create jobs, strengthen our economy and expand opportunity for all Americans.

Remarks of President Barack Obama
Weekly Address
The White House
August 2, 2014

Hi, everybody. My top priority as President is doing everything I can to create more jobs and more opportunities for hardworking families to get ahead.

On Friday, we learned that our economy created over 200,000 new jobs in July. That’s on top of about 300,000 new jobs in June. We’re now in a six-month streak with at least 200,000 new jobs each month. That hasn’t happened since 1997. All told, our businesses have created 9.9 million jobs over the past 53 months. That’s the longest streak of private-sector job creation in our history.

Because of you – because of your hard work and determination – America has recovered faster and come farther than almost any other advanced country on Earth. The economy is clearly getting stronger. Things are clearly getting better. And the decisions we make now can keep things moving in that direction.

That’s what’s at stake right now. Making sure our economy works for every working American. Making sure that people who work hard can get ahead. That’s why I’ve been pushing for common-sense ideas like rebuilding our infrastructure in a way that supports millions of good jobs and helps our businesses compete. Raising the minimum wage. Making it easier for working folks to pay off their student loans. That’s why I’ve been pushing for fair pay and paid leave.

These policies have two things in common. All of them would help working families feel more stable and secure. And all of them have been blocked or ignored by Republicans in Congress.

That’s why my administration keeps taking what actions we can on our own to help working families – because Congress is doing so little for working families. House Republicans actually got together this week and voted to sue me for taking actions on my own. And then they left town for the month without settling a bunch of unfinished business that matters to working families across America.

The bottom line is this – we’ve come a long way these past five and a half years. Our challenges are nowhere near as daunting as they were back then. But imagine how much farther along our economy would be – how much stronger our country would be – if Congress would do its job.

I’ll never stop trying to work with both parties to get things moving faster for the middle class. And I could use your help. If you see your Member of Congress around home this month, tell him or her what’s on your mind. Ask them why they haven’t passed bills to raise the minimum wage or help with student loans or enact fair pay for women.

And when they return from vacation next month, instead of trying to pass partisan bills on party lines, hopefully we can come together with the sense of common purpose that you expect. And in the meantime, I will never stop doing whatever I can, whenever I can, not only to make sure that our economy succeeds, but that people like you succeed.

Thanks, and have a great weekend.

The post Obama: It’s Time For Congress To Help The Middle Class – Transcript appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Israel said Saturday it would not send its negotiators to Cairo for planned talks with the Palestinians, a day after accusing Hamas of violating what was supposed to be a 72-hour cease-fire.

Yet while fighting continued Saturday, Israel’s military pulled back some ground forces from the Gaza Strip, saying it had nearly completed its mission to destroy cross-border tunnels Hamas used to infiltrate the Jewish state.

Also Saturday, Israel told Palestinians who’d evacuated the northern Gaza town of Beit Lahiya that it was safe to return.

Israeli cabinet minister Yuval Steinitz said his country would not send a delegation to this weekend’s proposed truce talks in Cairo. He accused Hamas of violating Friday’s and previous cease-fire agreements, which “leads us to the conclusion that with this organization there is no point speaking,” the Associated Press quoted him from an Israeli news broadcast.

The planned cease-fire fell apart Friday, with Israel accusing Hamas of killing two of its soldiers and capturing one in a morning ambush near Gaza’s southern town of Rafah. Second Lieutenant Hadar Goldin was among Israeli soldiers dismantling a tunnel. Barely 90 minutes after the cease-fire took effect, Israel’s military said, a suicide bomber attacked and gunfight broke out. The two soldiers were killed and Goldin went missing.

The Hamas military wing said it has no knowledge of his whereabouts. It said he likely was killed in an Israeli strike, along with the Hamas fighters who took part in the ambush. In a statement, Hamas said it had lost contact with its fighters.

In a televised address Saturday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the Jewish state “will continue doing everything” to bring the missing soldier home.

He promised Israeli ctizens the military would “bring back calm and order … no matter how much time” and effort it would take. He thanked them for “resiliance and unity.”

Netanyahu thanked United States and European leaders for their support, which he said “strengthens our demand to link the restoration and rebuilding of Gaza Strip with disarmament.” He specifically praised U.S. President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry for defending Israel’s “right to destroy missiles and tunnels,” perhaps aiming to defuse some of the criticism leveled at the secretary over rocky peace efforts.

And the prime minister apologized to Gaza’s Palestinian civilians.

Saying “we have nothing against the citizens of Gaza,” Netanyahu encouraged the international community “to help and support the rebuilding of Gaza.”

Earlier Saturday, Israel bombarded Rafah as its troops continued to search for the missing officer.

Palestinian health officials said at least 35 people were killed in the shelling in and around Rafah, while fresh airstrikes across Gaza destroyed dozens of houses. Gaza Islamic University was also hit hard by Israeli attacks.

Tunnel mission nears completion

Israel Defense Forces pulled back some ground troops Saturday and planned to scale back its military operation, media sources said.

The military has nearly reached its goal of demolishing tunnels used by Hamas fighters to enter and infiltrate Israel, Reuters said. Israeli military spokesman, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Lerner, said 31 tunnels have been blown up.

“Our understanding is that our objectives, most importantly the destruction of the tunnels, are close to completion,” Reuters quoted Lerner.

Israel said it was safe for evacuees of Beit Lahia, a town of 70,000, to return to their homes. But the military advised residents “to beware of explosive devices Hamas has spread across the area,” Reuters reported.

An unnamed Israeli official told the Associated Press that the military’s message that Beit Lahia residents could return was “a signal that things are pretty much being wrapped up.”

But armored vehicles still on the town’s periphery made residents more wary of returning, Reuters said.

“No one has told us to go back,” it quoted Taleb Manna, 30, who’d taken his family to a United Nations-run school doubling as a shelter. “We can’t risk going back and being bombed by the Israeli forces.”

After nearly a month of bombardment by the Israeli military, Gaza has become unrecognizable to Palestinians returning home after years in Israeli jails. Talking to the French news agency AFP, one man from the town of Deir al-Balah described the destruction as “a real shock.”

Peace talks to continue

The Israeli cabinet had an exceptionally long and rare Friday night session to discuss the missing soldier.

While it decided against sending envoys to Cairo, diplomatic efforts were to continue this weekend there with representatives of some of the conflict’s other various factions.

Reuters said representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization, along with exiled officials of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad militant group, were expected to participate in the talks.

“We are still continuing these [diplomatic] efforts with everyone, with all sides,” Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi told journalists Saturday.

His country’s proposed cease-fire represented the best way forward, Sissi said, adding it would aid negotiations to end “the violence and the killing and the bloodshed in Gaza.”

Israel demands that Gaza be demilitarized and that Hamas rocket attacks on Israeli territory stop, while the Palestinians insist Israel and Egypt end their blockades of Gaza, which have strangled the Gazan economy and keep Palestinians from traveling.

Escalating death toll

The fighting has been costly to Palestinians and Israelis alike. Since Israel began its offensive July 8 to halt rockets fired by Hamas and other militants, more than than 1,650 Palestinians, mostly civilians, have been killed, Gaza health officials said. Israel has lost 63 soldiers and three civilians – a greater toll than in its 2006 war with Lebanon, the Associated Press reported.

The death toll includes at least 296 Palestinian youngsters, the United Nations said Saturday.

U.N. children’s agency UNICEF has counted 187 boys and 109 girls killed, with at least 203 under age 12. The agency expects the count to rise, AFP said, because these were only the deaths verified to date.

Hospitals in Gaza were overwhelmed with wounded after 26 days of fighting, said the head of a network of Palestinian civic groups, Amjad Shawa.

“All Gaza is under attack. The humanitarian conditions are catastrophic due to the continuous Israeli air strikes [and] artillery bombardment in different areas of Gaza Strip,” Shawa said. “Most of the targets are civil premises.”

He said humanitarian groups are unable to feed or provide health care to the estimated 400,000 Palestinians displaced by the conflict.

American support for Israel

Obama has called on Hamas to immediately and unconditionally free the soldier to show that Hamas is serious about trying to resolve the situation in Gaza.

At a news conference Friday, Obama repeated that Israel has a right to defend itself from Hamas rockets and attacks. But he called the deaths of Palestinian civilians heartbreaking and said everything must be done to protect them.

Late Friday, U.S. Congress approved $225 million in emergency funding to help resupply Israel’s Iron Dome missile defense system, sending the measure to Obama to be signed into law. The House vote was 395 to 8.

An Israeli website said Saturday the Iron Dome system intercepted several rockets not long after Hamas said it had fired three rockets at Tel Aviv.

VOA’s Scott Bobb contributed to this report from the Gaza Strip

The post Netanyahu: Gaza Mission To Last As Long As Necessary appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Brig Anil Gupta

On July 26, Vijay Diwas was celebrated at Dras as a two-day annual event. The outgoing Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) Gen Bikram Singh, who was the Army’s spokesperson during the Kargil conflict, laid the wreath at the Kargil War Memorial, Dras on July 25.

In his own words it was the greatest honour that could have been bestowed on him before he sheds the uniform and remits the chair on July 31. For a soldier nothing can be more satisfying and sacrosanct than honouring the martyrs. But is it true of the nation?

Our leaders are more worried about what is happening in Gaza or politicising trivial issues to flare communal passions. They have no time to honour and remember those due to whose supreme sacrifices they are able to hold high public offices and move around freely. Except for panel discussions, featured shows on electronic media and articles in print media what has been done at the national level to commemorate this unparalleled saga of bravery, determination, valour, grit and patriotism?

Coming closer home is it not ironical that the State celebrates July 13 as a Black Day and has no time and intent to celebrate the victory in Kargil. Is Kargil not part of Jammu and Kashmir? If nothing else a Remembrance Day to honour the supreme sacrifice made by 527 valiant young officers and soldiers of the Indian Army (not to forget 8 porters of Tanda Tiger Force ) and pay homage to them is the least we can do.

A decade and half has passed since the Kargil War. The nation wants to know from its political bosses that are we any better and safer than we were at that time? Are our Armed Forces better prepared and equipped? Has our intelligence apparatus been revamped to avoid recurrence of Kargil like incidents? Has border management been improved to prevent loss of territory, infiltration and illegal migration? Are our police forces better equipped, trained and motivated to ensure internal security of the country? Is our higher defence management capable of meeting the challenges of 21st century?

These were the issues flagged by the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) appointed after the war to recommend comprehensive reforms to revamp our antiquated security structure. Consequent to the recommendations of KRC, a Group of Ministers (GOM) was appointed on April 17, 2000. The GOM in turn set up four Task Forces (TFs) for detailed analysis of the report of KRC. A task force each was set up to look into Intelligence Apparatus, Internal Security, Border Management and Higher Defence Management. The TFs submitted their reports by Sep 30, 2000. GOM submitted its report on Feb 26, 2011 and it was placed by the government before Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) on May 11, 2011.

The CCS accepted all recommendations of the GOM except the appointment of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) which has been lost in the political quagmire since then. The readers would note that everything moved post haste and deadlines were met. It happened because the entire nation was shell shocked with the Kargil incident and was determined to prevent any such like recurrence. But the problem started hereafter. Our memory is very short lived.

The implementation was faced with the usual bureaucratic hurdles, ‘couldn’t care’ attitude, lobbying, vested interests, political interference, turf battles between the home and defence ministries, charges of scams, ego clashes between the babudom and armed forces and electoral politics. The final nail in the coffin was stuck with the change of governments in 2004. The new government that ruled in two tenures for 10 years was characterised by lack of vision, compulsion of coalition politics, policy paralysis, scams and dwindling economy. This had a cascading effect on the national security apparatus,

In any sovereign nation, national interests are always paramount. National interests define the nation’s foreign and defence policies. It is therefore essential that these two vital aspects of national strategy are always kept above political considerations or political rivalries. Our political leadership must understand that National Interests do not change and only the government changes. While the script remains the same, the actors change. Alas, it does not happen this way. There are numerous instances in the past where political considerations overrode the national interest.

The glaring example of the above is the higher defence management and integration of the service headquarters with the government. Both have been victims of resistance, political and bureaucratic. Chief of Defence Staff is the need of hour. The warfare has become complex and multidisciplinary and involves nuclear dimension as well. There is pressing need for “joint ness.” No service can single-handedly win the next war. Presently, the Chiefs have a dual role of Operational Commanders and National Security Planners.

The headquarters have developed ‘command’ culture than ‘staff’ culture – their prime responsibility. The joint ness is achieved through the office of Chief of Staff Committee (COSC), a rotational appointment held by the senior most chief. At times COSC has been headed by a particular chief for 30 days only. I would leave it to the judgment of readers the efficacy of such adhoc arrangement for the nation’s top most security related appointment. In 2011, then United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government appointed Naresh Chandra Committee to have a fresh look on the issue of higher defence management.

He also vehemently supported the appointment of CDS. As per him, if the government was not willing to appoint CDS, due to lack of political consensus, it should at least give permanency to the COSC by appointing a four star general as COSC for a fixed tenure of two years. The UPA government kept the report in cold storage and summarily rejected it just before demitting office this year. The highest executive authority in the nation remains deprived of a single point integrated advice even today when the nation is faced with multifarious security challenges.

India perhaps is the only nuclear power where Armed Forces are outside the apex governmental structure. Earlier they were attached offices of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and a cosmetic change was done to designate them as Integrated Headquarters of the MOD, with enhanced financial purpose. Service officers are not posted to MOD which continues to be dominated by general service bureaucrats.

Overhaul of intelligence (INT) apparatus was another major focus area. It was decided to create a single point agency for collation, synthesis and dissemination of intelligence received from multifarious agencies. TECHINT and surveillance capabilities were to be modernised and enhanced. No doubt the National Security Council is functional but our INT gathering capability continues to be our biggest weakness. 26/11 Mumbai mayhem and recent incidents on the Line of Control are adequate enough to justify my assessment. Technical Support Division (TSD) raised during the tenure of Gen V.K. Singh was a potent asset. It has been disbanded by the previous government purely on political considerations and needs to be re-raised post haste. We must develop capability of gathering intelligence in hostile countries deep inside their territory using both TECHINT and HUMINT resources.

“Hollowness” of the Armed Forces is a major cause of worry. Leave alone modernisation, the Forces suffer from critical deficiencies of ammunition, manpower and equipment. Most of the weaponry and equipment is either obsolescent or obsolete. There are numerous reasons for this lapse and cannot be enumerated due to obvious reasons. The need for modernisation to counter the Chinese threat and maintain our conventional edge over Pakistan has drawn the attention of the Narendra Modi government that has flagged it as a priority issue.

Like God, the soldier is also remembered in the hour of need. At the time of Kargil war, Indian Armed Forces were held at a very high pedestal. The nation expressed its solidarity with the Armed Forces. The families of the martyrs were made numerous promises by the state governments. But slowly and steadily they were being forgotten. Some of the families are running from pillar to post even today to get what was promised to them. Some of them were in with a rude shock that the promises made in that euphoria were mere political gimmicks.

There cannot be bigger shame than playing politics with martyrdom of the brave sons of Mother India. The dignity of the soldier has reached its nadir. From that zenith of glory after Kargil, the soldier today is being forced to plead for restoration of his dignity. The soldiers of Kargil are the veterans of today. They have been cheated by the respective governments in power. A soldier cherishes his medals the most. But you can imagine the agony that would compel him to return his medal!

Integrated manpower policy for Armed Forces, para military forces and Central Police Forces was recommended to utilise the highly skilled, trained and motivated manpower from the Armed Forces that retires early. It would also save on the huge pension budget of the services that is growing rapidly. The government has not been able to implement it because of the reluctance of the police forces and the home ministry. Today’s soldier (serving and retired) is confused and disillusioned? The authorities must address this on war footing before it snowballs into a major confrontation.

One force for one border was recommended for better management. All coastal states were to have maritime police posts. If implemented with sincerity, 26/11 would have not happened. Only some borders have seen a single para-military force take charge. Our borders still remain porous. The issue of command and control with local military formations also remains unresolved.

I may sound pessimistic to the readers. That’s not true. The things have happened but not at the desired pace and with requisite sincerity. The progress has been at snail’s pace for the reasons mentioned by me earlier. With a new government firmly in saddle in New Delhi, a ray of new hope is being seen. Some of the actions taken by the government are very positive and indicates government’s sincerity to ensure that India is never surprised again and our enemy does not dare to repeat Kargil.

The government also needs to fulfil its promise of ONE RANK ONE PENSION (OROP); it affects the dignity of every soldier. Let the nation decide whether the money spent on maintaining the morale of the soldiers will be more paying than spending Rs.45,000 crore on a sinking Air India.

(Brig Anil Gupta served in the Indian Army for 37 years. He is presently a political commentator, security and strategic analyst. He can be contacted at southasiamonitor1@gmail.com.)

This article appeared at South Asia Monitor.

The post 15 Years After Kargil: Playing Politics With Martyrdom – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopala

There were expectations that the new Modi Government will set out new policies on many fronts, including foreign policy and security arena. But starting from his swearing-in ceremony to the recently released budget, we have only had glimpses of the priorities of this new government. We are yet to see significant pronouncements on India’s relations with major powers. One such opportunity was at the BRICS Summit in Brazil, where Modi had meetings with Russian and Chinese leaders on the sidelines. About relations with the US, Modi has already accepted President Obama’s invitation to visit Washington DC — an indication that the Prime Minister is willing to put behind him the visa ban issue and take India-US relations forward. Most recently, during US Deputy Secretary of State William Burns’ visit, Modi is reported to have said, “Reenergising the partnership between India and the US would send an important message to the region and beyond.” The upcoming US-India strategic dialogue presents another opportunity for the new government to set out its strategic vision.

While there have been a number of suggestions in how bilateral relations between India and the US can be re-energized, both countries need to place these relations in the larger context of the Asian strategic framework. China’s rise as an economic and military power house has created its own dynamics, undermining the US influence in Asia, particularly given Beijing’s economic engagement in the region. Though China’s engagement with Asia has an economic angle, this engagement has been pursued with another more important but unstated objective of reducing US role and influence in the region. It is a fact that trade is a compelling factor for India, the US and much of the rest of the world. This does not mean that the political and strategic difficulties have vanished or that these can be put on the back burner in the drive to boost trade.

India should engage China in the trade and commercial spheres, which may go to create prosperity on both sides. But neither side should be under the misplaced hope that these will diminish the salience of other tricky and more difficult issues including the border and territorial issues. While India and China are plagued with any number of issues, these are only symptoms of the larger problem that exists between the two: is China willing to see India emerging as a major power in Asia and beyond? The competition for the same strategic sphere is at the root of the problem between India and China. If India is interested in creating an Asian strategic framework that is not hijacked by one single power, it needs to strengthen several of its other bilateral relationships in Asia, especially India-US relations, to a point where it will become difficult for China to impose its hegemonistic tendencies.

China’s muscular foreign and security policy evidenced over the last few years has also changed the situation. The US, which was uncertain about its commitment to Asia after a decade-long engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq, is back in Asia to stay. The US rebalancing strategy is a direct consequence of China’s aggressive posturing in East China and South China Seas in the last five years. The wariness and uncertainty around the Chinese power and how this may play out in the territorial disputes with Japan and the ASEAN countries gave the US a fresh incentive to remain in Asia.

India too is uncertain of China. While there have been repeated rhetoric from the Chinese side on how important this bilateral relationship is, its actions raise questions, be it the Chinese map displaying the whole of Arunachal Pradesh as Chinese territory or the stapled visa issue. However, unlike other Asian countries that have supported the US rebalancing, India is still shy of openly embracing the US. Thus, New Delhi is finding its own ways of sending the message that US-India relations are important, particularly in the context of Asian stability. India’s new formulations and platforms such as acceptance of the US-Japan-India trilateral is a case in point. Expansion of this network to include Australia or Singapore and emergence of a new quadrilateral cannot be ruled out. Similarly, the track II engagements among the US, Australia and India could gain traction and become a more formal initiative in the coming years.

India’s engagement with Southeast Asia is also likely to get more substantive in the coming years. Two decades after launching the Look East Policy, India’s interactions with the region are slowly beginning to gain some strategic traction, mainly in the context of China’s behaviour and Asian stability. However, ASEAN has not remained a cohesive unit in the face of an increasingly muscular China. On the other hand, a more fractured ASEAN is on display now after being a model for other regional groupings for a couple of decades. The dilemma facing ASEAN countries – economic benefits vs strategic balancing as they engage China – is nothing unique.

This provides the context for India and the US to channel their efforts in establishing a firm partnership for enabling a stable Asian order. India and the US share a common perception of an Asia that is not dominated by one single power. India, the US and Japan to a great extent have an inclusive approach towards the Asian strategic framework, willing to take along other rising powers in shaping the new order. On the other hand, China has adopted an exclusive approach to the emerging Asian order thus leading to repeated conflict of interests among the major Asian powers. India and the US are also concerned about China’s growing military might and how that might create new dynamics in Asia. Both New Delhi and Washington should also encourage greater respect for international law and norms, especially freedom of the seas and open navigation.

If the leadership in both India and the US can get this larger strategic scene right, the rest will follow. One needs to obviously build meat into this strategic idea eventually. India also has to get realistic about playing power politics to its advantage. Despite the perception of a relative decline of and uncertainty about the US power, Washington will continue to be the dominant power centre for the foreseeable future. If India has to be able to rise and sit at the high-table, it has to recognise that the US can do a great deal in getting New Delhi there. The India-US nuclear deal and the NSG waiver for India are cases in point. India must acknowledge here that despite the desire on the part of France and Russia to engage in nuclear commerce with India, they did not have the political capital or influence to alter the global rules of the game to accommodate India. China for all the rhetoric of Chindia, among other formulations, has used every opportunity to pull India down in the last decade.

Against such a backdrop, India has to be able to appreciate who its friends and partners are in ensuring a conducive environment for it to rise. India has to learn the art of managing multiple great power relationships. So whether India looks east or west, its aim has to be to consolidate and maximise its power quotient.

(Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. She served at the National Security Council Secretariat, Government of India from 2003 to 2007.)

The post India-US Strategic Dialogue: Focus On The Big Picture – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Evan A. Feigenbaum

John Kerry visited India Wednesday as a raft of crises consume American diplomacy. By contrast, US-India relations are at a moment of opportunity, but the US Secretary of State faces challenges in New Delhi that are significant in their own way.

For one thing, after a decade of disengagement with Narendra Modi, Washington is eager to make a fresh start. The US is sending three cabinet secretaries to India in quick succession – Kerry (State), Penny Pritzker (Commerce), and Chuck Hagel (Defence) – and Washington is preparing to host Modi himself in September. From the US perspective, Modi’s government offers a welcome respite from years of perceived strategic and economic drift under UPA-2.

But Kerry’s visit is also very well timed:

First, the NDA government has been in office for nearly two months. Modi has met Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, among others, so it is high time for cabinet-level US engagement.

Second, as Kerry himself argued in a speech this week, relations with strategically important countries cannot be shunted to the sidelines by crises. For over a decade, India has been among the small group of countries vital to American strategy. And the US has a strong stake in continued Indian reform and success-especially as they contribute to global growth, promote market-based economic policies, help secure the global commons, and maintain a mutually favourable balance of power in Asia.

Third, Kerry and others, including Treasury Secretary Jack Lew and Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen, just attended the US-China strategic and economic dialogue in Beijing. Continued absence from New Delhi at the cabinet level would invite unflattering comparisons between US approaches to China and India.

The two sides’ first challenge is to find new ways of working effectively. Modi, unlike UPA-2, has designed an administration with a strengthened executive and an activist Office of the Prime Minister. In such a set-up, there are inherent limits to reliance on ritualized Strategic Dialogue between foreign ministries.

The two sides should relook existing structures, reinvigorating trade, defence, and CEO forums. But they also need new lines of coordination that reflect the emerging institutional and political set-up in New Delhi.

Kerry is attending a Strategic Dialogue (capitalized “S” and “D”) that has been a calendar-driven exercise. What the two countries need is a “real” strategic dialogue (lower case “s” and “d”), built upon a less ritualized but more powerful set of first principles: strengthened coordination, no surprises on core security equities, sensitivity to each other’s domestic constraints, and frequent not ritualized contact at the highest levels.

The most immediate need is to strengthen trust after a rough patch.

From India’s perspective, the causes of these frictions include US trade cases, the Khobragade debacle, and inadequate US attention to India’s security concerns, especially in India’s neighborhood.

From the US perspective such concerns have centered on the scope and pace of Indian economic reforms. These have badly tainted market sentiment and soured US firms on India. Retroactive taxes and the nuclear liability bill have compounded these negative sentiments.

Viewed through this prism, the current US-India standoff at the WTO is badly timed.

The US side will listen closely to India’s economic priorities. Hopefully, it will bring a few ideas-for example, technology releases, defence licenses, and co-production. Washington needs to avoid hectoring about India’s investment climate. Instead, it should inject something tangible into the mix, especially since Beijing and Tokyo, among others, offer India project finance vehicles the US lacks.

But the biggest challenges are structural, and long-term in nature.

First, economic constraints have hindered strategic coordination, especially in East Asia.

The US and India share a powerful interest in assuring a favourable balance of power. Much binds them, not least shared regional maritime and energy interests. But lofty strategic ambitions require strengthened economic, not just security, content in relations with regional states, and with one another in the East Asian context.

So it is hardly ideal that Washington and New Delhi are pursuing separate, and competitive, regional trade agreements: Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

Meanwhile, US economic weight in Asia is increasing absolutely but declining in relative terms. From 2000 to 2009, China’s share of ASEAN trade increased threefold, surpassing the US share, which declined by a third in the same period. The US wants to leverage TPP to restore its leadership but there is zero prospect of a TPP this year and the Administration has no stomach to pursue needed Trade Promotion Authority with Congress.

India’s challenge is greater. Trade plays a growing role in its economy but scale remains a handicap. In 2012, 11.7 percent of ASEAN trade was with China, just 2.9 percent with India. And that is no coincidence: the backbone of East Asian economies remains integrated supply and production chains from which India is largely absent. With rising labour costs in China, the geography of Asian manufacturing will shift, so India has an opportunity to align its national manufacturing policies with strategic imperatives to the east.

At the same time, the US and India need new bilateral economic vehicles. Vice President Biden has called for an increase in trade from $100 to $500 billion-a number analogous to US-China trade. But that is hard to fathom: India lacks China’s manufacturing base, its integration into regional and global supply chains, its comparative openness to foreign investment at a comparable stage of development, and its hard infrastructure.

Instead of pithy slogans, the two sides need better aligned agendas, especially on opportunities for cross-border investment, manufacturing, infrastructure, and gasification and energy opportunities.

For Americans, the most pressing need is for growth-conducive reforms and investor friendly tax and sectoral policies in India. The Arun Jaitley budget offered hope but less than many in the US had wished for.

One step would be a bilateral investment treaty. Indian firms would benefit from investor protections in the US. US firms would welcome relevant legal changes and safeguards in India. Both countries would benefit from the treaty’s independent arbitration process.

In fact, investment is, at this point, more important than trade. It is a vote of confidence in the other country’s economy, and meshes well with current needs on each side.

Above all, the two sides need to continue their difficult quest for strategic consensus. Enhanced intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation offer one opportunity. So do defence co-production and weapons sales because they increase the potential for interoperability.

But a positive security agenda is needed, especially in Asia, through new initiatives across a series of baskets: energy, seaborne trade, finance, the global commons, and regional architecture.

The two sides will need to manage differences of tone and substance on strategic issues of concern, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and China.

Take China: The fact is, India views Beijing’s role in South Asia with far greater alarm than does Washington, and this is unlikely to change soon. The US will lean toward India, but seek to avoid becoming caught between New Delhi and Beijing.

Many in India continue to fear a US-China condominium on issues of importance to New Delhi. This fear has receded as US-China relations have deteriorated since 2010, yet India remains sensitive about perceived inattention to its equities. And this concern is even more pronounced in Afghanistan and Pakistan, amid US withdrawal and policy turbulence.

The US and India can do (much) better. Kerry’s visit is a start. Modi’s September visit will be pivotal.

(Evan A. Feigenbaum is vice chairman of the Paulson Institute at the University of Chicago and Nonresident Senior Associate for Asia at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He served twice as deputy assistant secretary of state in the George W. Bush Administration, including for South Asia, where he was responsible for US-India relations. He can be contacted at efeigenbaum@ceip.org)

This article appeared at South Asia Monitor.

The post Kerry’s Visit To India: Preparing For Modi’s Pivotal Visit – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Fifteen Palestinians, including six members of one family, were killed Saturday afternoon in a series of Israeli airstrikes on homes in Gaza as Israeli officials said a new ceasefire agreement was off the table.

“We’re not talking about ceasefires anymore,” a senior official told the Israeli newspaper Haaretz.

“Israel will act in its own interest. We will take action against attacks from Gaza, and will finish dealing with the tunnels.”

The official said Israel would not negotiate with Hamas, even through a mediator.

“The issue of the Rafah Crossing is Egyptian-Palestinian Authority matter, and the issue of the rest of the crossings is between us and the PA and the international community.”

He said the goal was now to end the offensive unilaterally.

“If we feel deterrence has not yet been achieved, we will continue the operation inside the Gaza Strip or exit and continue with the aerial bombardment.”

Despite the Israeli delegation’s refusal to participate, a Palestinian delegation left the West Bank en route to the Cairo talks around noon.

Meanwhile, Gaza medical authorities said Saturday’s death toll had risen to 84, as Israeli forces continued their bombardment of the besieged coastal enclave by air, land, and sea.

Ministry of Health spokesman Ashraf al-Qidra said on Saturday that an airstrike on a house in al-Nuseirat refugee camp killed Yousef Madi and three of his children — Hassan, Amin, and Abd al-Rahman.

Soon afterwards, another airstrike targeted a home in Rafah, killing four members of the Abu Taha family, identified as Saadiyeh Abu Taha, 40, Mahmoud Abu Taha, 27, Youssef Abu Taha, and Rizq Abu Taha.

A third airstrike on the Salim family home in al-Qarara northern Khan Younis left another Palestinian dead and several injured.

Six family members were killed in another Israeli airstrike that targeted their home in Rafah, and four of the victims were identified as Suhaib, Jumaa, Ahmad, and Fawwaz al-Bahabsa.

The 84 Palestinians killed in strikes on Saturday brought the death toll in Israel’s offensive on Gaza past 1,670, with nearly 9,000 injured.

The post Airstrikes Level Gaza Homes, Israel Rejects New Ceasefire Talks appeared first on Eurasia Review.

A U.S. Air Force spy plane evaded an encounter with the Russian military in recent days by flying into nearby Swedish airspace without that country’s permission, a U.S. military official told CNN.

The RC-135 Rivet Joint plane was flying in international airspace, conducting an electronic eavesdropping mission on the Russian military, when the Russians took the unusual action of beginning to track it with one of its land-based radar.

The Russians then sent at least one fighter jet into the sky to intercept the American aircraft, the U.S. official said Saturday.

The July 18 incident was first reported by the Swedish media group DN.se. There was no immediate reaction on the encounter from Russian officials.

The spy plane crew felt concerned enough about the radar tracking that they wanted to get out of the area as quickly as possible, the official said. The quickest route away from the Russians took them into Swedish airspace. The U.S. official acknowledged that was done without Swedish military approval.

As a result of this incident, the United States is discussing the matter with Sweden and letting them know there may be further occurrences where American jets may have to divert so quickly they may not be able to wait for permission.

Russian and U.S. aircraft often encounter each other, both in Northern Europe as well as the area between the Russian Far East and Alaska. But the official said the land radar activity by the Russians in this instance was unusual.

The post US Spy Plane Flies Into Sweden To Evade Russian Radars appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Terri Moon Cronk and Cheryl Pellerin

US Defense Department personnel are on the ground in West Africa and in U.S. laboratories fighting to control the worst outbreak in the African history of the Ebola virus, which a senior Army infectious disease doctor called a “scourge of mankind.”

Army Col. (Dr.) James Cummings, director of the Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System, or GEIS, a division of the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, said the battle against the virus since the outbreak began in West Africa in March focuses on trying to stop disease transmission.

At the Centers for Disease Prevention and Control, or CDC, in Atlanta, Director Dr. Tom Frieden has announced that the health agency has raised the travel advisory to Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone where he said the Ebola outbreak is worsening, to Level 3 — a warning to avoid unnecessary travel to those countries.

CDC already has disease detectives and other staff in those countries to track the epidemic, advise embassies, coordinate with the World Health Organization, or WHO, strengthen ministries of health, and improve case finding, contact tracing, infection control and health communication.

Over the next 30 days, in what Frieden described as a surge, CDC will send another 50 disease-control specialists into the three countries to help establish emergency operations centers and develop structured ways to address the outbreak.

“They will also help strengthen laboratory networks so testing for the disease can be done rapidly,” the director said.

For travelers in and out of the three West African countries, CDC experts will strengthen country capacity to monitor those who may have been exposed to Ebola, and each country in the region has committed to doing this, Frieden said.

“It’s not easy to do,” he added, “but we will have experts from our division that do airport screening and try to ensure that people who shouldn’t be traveling aren’t traveling.”

Frieden said CDC has spoken with air carriers that service the West African region.

“We understand they will continue to fly, which is very important to continue to support the response and maintain essential functions in the country,” he explained.

CDC gives information to travelers to the region and health care providers in the United States who might care for people returning from the infected area. Frieden said that includes medical consultation and testing for patients who may have Ebola.

Frieden said that in the United States, “we are confident that we will not have significant spread of Ebola, even if we were to have a patient with Ebola here. We work actively to educate American health care workers on how to isolate patients and how to protect themselves against infection.”

In fact, he added, “any advanced hospital in the U.S., any hospital with an intensive care unit has the capacity to isolate patients. There is nothing particularly special about the isolation of an Ebola patient, other than it’s really important to do it right. So ensuring that there is meticulous care of patients with suspected or … confirmed Ebola is what’s critically important.”

The Ebola virus has no known cure and up to a 90 percent fatality rate and only supportive care can be offered to patients diagnosed with the disease while researchers work to find a vaccine.

DoD researchers think the viral disease originated in rural populations that prepare and eat meat from Ebola-carrying gorillas and monkeys.

The virus is passed among animals or people through body fluids. Only a person who is infected and is showing signs of illness can pass the disease to others.

Health care workers and home caretakers who have direct patient contact and those who prepare bodies for burial also are at risk, the infectious disease doctor said.

“We had a large footprint in Africa,” Cummings said of DoD’s response to the first Ebola cases reported in 1976 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly Zaire. Since that time, DoD has answered numerous calls for assistance from WHO, nongovernmental organizations and ministries of heath and defense, he explained.

DoD personnel provide a wide array of support to the Ebola-stricken African nations, from logistical help to guides for clinical management of the virus, Cummings said.

“DoD personnel bring a level of excellence second to none, working in response to host nations and WHO in the most-affected countries of Sierra Leone and Liberia,” he said.

The post US Military Responders Help Battle Ebola Outbreak appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Parameswaran Ponnudurai

Doubts are emerging over whether Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen will live up to his promise of implementing electoral and other reforms under an agreement he clinched with the country’s opposition aimed at ending a year-long political deadlock following disputed elections.

While political pundits and experts doubt the sincerity of Hun Sen, who has outfoxed all opponents since he came to power three decades ago, questions are also being asked whether opposition leader Sam Rainsy has been so gullible as to have fallen into a potential trap set by the strongman.

“I think the opposition has now put its signature to a corrupt system and that ‘s the first time this opposition [under Sam Rainsy] has done that, and they have sold out the Cambodian people,” U.S.-based Human Rights Watch’s Asia Director Brad Adams charged.

Human rights and judicial reforms—some of the key issues championed by Sam Rainsy’s Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP)—were absent from the agreement reached last week after months of negotiations, Adams noted.

He said that as Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) machinery is in complete control of parliament, it will now be nearly impossible for CNRP to bring about any reforms even though the opposition party has been given an equal sharing of responsibilities under the agreement with CPP in terms of chairing panels in the legislature.

Under the pact, elected lawmakers from CNRP have agreed to end their nearly one-year boycott of parliament after Hun Sen accepted the party’s proposal to revamp the government-appointed National Election Committee (NEC), which conducts polls in the country.

The NEC had declared Hun Sen’s CPP the victor in the July 2013 general elections despite criticism that the polls had been rigged.

Manipulate

Some groups believe Hun Sen would manipulate the composition of the new nine-member NEC to his advantage.

It has already been agreed that the election body will comprise four members selected by the CPP and four by the CNRP, with the appointment of the ninth and final member to be made by consensus between the rival parties.

But Adams, citing past actions by Hun Sen, said the CPP could refuse to agree to any ninth candidate proposed by the CNRP.

The agreement says that if the two parties cannot come to a consensus, the existing tainted NEC membership will remain in place, allowing Hun Sen to control the election machinery accused of removing one million voters from the polls list last year.

Sam Rainsy, who has seen Hun Sen renege on his pledges before, has defended the agreement but also acknowledged that any lack of “good faith” from the parties in implementing the pact could cause it to collapse.

“If you consider the worst, then the worst scenario, the worst situation could happen,” he told the Phnom Penh Post in an interview. “In order to move forward, you must have confidence. If there is no good faith, then the whole agreement will collapse.”

Government use of courts

Human rights campaigners have also questioned several other details of the CNRP-CPP deal, including the release of seven CNRP lawmakers and another opposition politician from jail on the same day the agreement was signed.

The eight politicians were arrested on July 15 when they were present as party supporters clashed with security guards during a bloody protest demanding the reopening of Freedom Park, the only venue for holding mass demonstrations in the capital Phnom Penh.

The case shows that the courts are under the control of the government and is a glaring example of how Hun Sen uses the judiciary at his whim and fancy to victimize his opponents, some experts suggested.

“Instead of being a check, the judiciary appears to be acting as a tool of the executive,” Surya Subedi, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia, said in a statement after the agreement was announced.

Though the eight politicians were later freed, the charges leveled against them of waging an “insurrection,” which could see them being imprisoned for up to 30 years if convicted, have not been dropped.

Subedi said the eight “still face serious charges that can be used against them at any time.”

Accountability

Some experts believe the CPP-CNRP agreement will promote greater accountability, although details have not been spelt out.

“The deal between the two parties opens a window of opportunity for enhancing democracy and accountability,” said Preap Kol, Executive Director of Transparency International in Cambodia.

But while the two parties said some key institutions are to be reformed, these were not identified, he said, suggesting that priority be given to the judiciary, the Anti-Corruption Unit, and the National Audit Authority, along with other “core” state institutions.

Some liken the agreement to an earlier deal between Hun Sen and the then royalist Funcinpec party which subsequently ended in the demise of Funcinpec and the loss of power by its party chief Prince Norodom Ranariddh in 1997.

Sam Rainsy may have committed the “same error as Funcinpec,” one CNRP supporter said.

Several other party supporters consider the pact as a government power-sharing arrangement, forcing Sam Rainsy to dispel any such notion.

“We are taking up our National Assembly [parliament] seats given to us by the people; we are not joining the Hun Sen government,” Sam Rainsy wrote on his Facebook page.

Tens of thousands of CNRP supporters had answered Sam Rainsy’s call last year to take to the streets to protest the outcome of the disputed elections and demand fresh polls and the ouster of Hun Sen.

Responsible opposition?

Unable to force early elections after nearly a year of protests, Sam Rainsy could have clinched the deal with Hun Sen to demonstrate to the international community that CNRP can play the role of a responsible opposition, one Western expert said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

By moving to take up positions in the legislature, the CNRP lawmakers will also begin earning their salaries after a one-year hiatus, enabling the cash-strapped party to tap a critical source of funds.

Cambodia’s donor countries have largely expressed support for the agreement.

The United States, for example, welcomed the agreement as well as the release of the eight CNRP politicians from jail.

“We are hopeful that these developments enable both parties to work together for the promotion of reform and the advancement of democracy in Cambodia,” a U.S. State Department spokesperson said.

Sam Rainsy said that election reforms are a “fundamental” demand by the CNRP and that their implementation could trigger other changes.

Still, he is keeping his options open, including the possibility of bringing his supporters to the streets again if he is unable to push the electoral reforms through the legislature.

“Suppose through the National Assembly we don’t obtain any appropriate response from the government, suppose the people are unhappy and suffer from different types of injustices, suppose they have grounds to demonstrate in the street because there are no other avenues for them to see injustices being redressed, then we would join them in demonstrations in the streets,” he told the Phnom Penh Post.

“But we hope that with the new possibilities that are given to us to push the government to correct any bad decisions or actions, we could combine both actions—one at the National Assembly and at the same time in the streets again.”

The post Are Cambodian Leaders Serious About Implementing Reforms? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Sanjana Joshi

A significant political re-adjustment in Asia in recent years has been the upgrading of low-key relations between Japan and India to a global and strategic partnership.

Particularly in the last decade, India-Japan relations have gathered significant momentum. The foundation for this was laid when Yoshiro Mori, the then prime minister of Japan visited India in August 2000 to establish the ‘Global Partnership in the 21st Century’, a term which had previously been used by Japan only to describe its relations with the United States.

A few months later Japan lifted all nuclear-related economic sanctions imposed after India’s nuclear explosions in May 1998, and in 2006 the two countries elevated their relationship to a Strategic and Global Partnership. Since then, a multitude of joint statements and dialogues have added substantive layers to this relationship.

India and Japan affirm that they are partners with a mutual stake in each other’s progress and prosperity and that their relations are rooted in their similar perceptions of the evolving environment in the region and the world at large.

From an annual summit between the political leaders to several strategic dialogues, including between the foreign ministers, the foreign secretary of India and the vice-minister for foreign affairs of Japan, the defence ministers, the defence secretary of India and the vice-minister of defense of Japan, the National Security Advisor of India and the Japanese counterpart, as well as coast guard and navy staff talks have been institutionalized.

Both countries are conducting bilateral naval exercises since 2012, and soon India hopes to become the first country to purchase defence equipment from Japan since 1967 with the purchase of the Shin Maywa US-2 amphibious aircraft from Japan.

The bilateral economic relations too have been on an upward trajectory. The institutional framework to further accelerate and consolidate business activities between India and Japan has been put in place with the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) that came into effect in August 2011.

With trade between India and Japan at US$ 18.51 billion in 2012-13, the target of achieving $25 billion by 2014 appears well within reach. Currently, Japan is the fourth largest investor in India, with foreign direct investment of $16.26 billion between April 2000 and April 2014.

A total of 2,542 Japanese business are operating in India, which is an increase of 738 establishments (41 percent) compared to last year. Japan is also India’s largest bilateral developmental assistance donor and India has been the top recipient of yen loans from Japan since 2003 surpassing China, which had been holding that position for many years.

Undoubtedly, the geo-political context in which Japanese perspectives on India have undergone a transformation in recent years is China’s growing regional assertiveness. From Tokyo’s perspective, expanding Sino-Japanese trade and investment – China replaced the United States as Japan’s biggest investment destination in 2007 and in 2010 surpassed Japan to become the second largest global economy – has not mitigated the security tensions between the two.

Rather, Japan has watched with grave concern the increase in frequency as well as level of Chinese aggression in the recurring cycles of tensions over historical animosity and territorial disputes. And with China’s use of economic instruments of pressure at these times the traditional Japanese policy of separation of economics and politics, wherein Sino-Japanese relations were ‘economically hot and politically cold’ is under severe strain.

As Japan has hedged India has moved up substantially in its strategic priorities. And Japan has not been reticent in expressing this, both ideationally and tangibly. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe not only included India in his formulation of Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond, the National Security Strategy unveiled in December 2013 lists India as a partner with which it shares strategic interests and with which Japan will strengthen cooperative relations.

Likewise, Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso frankly stated that it was necessary for his country to re-think the self-imposed ban on the export of defence equipment and technologies for Japan and India to become net providers of regional security as Asia’s two largest maritime democracies.

Similarly, support for ambitious Indian projects such as the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC) is part of Japan’s economic diversification strategy to reduce dependence on China. Indeed, the Indian policy establishment, irked by the delay in the signing of the civil nuclear cooperation agreement, would do well to keep in mind that Japan’s decision to start the negotiations on such a domestically sensitive issue was itself momentous.

Much has been written about the convergence in Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s and Prime Minister Abe’s nationalist orientations as well as an apparent personal chemistry. However, these can only be augmenting factors. What is more crucial is a strategic visualization of Japan’s importance to India’s comprehensive national security and correspondingly pursuing appropriate strategies to strengthen this partnership.

That India in its quest for rapid economic development has much to gain from a strong relationship with Japan is widely accepted in the Indian policy establishment. The development focus of the new government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi leads one to be optimistic that long-awaited measures to improve the business environment and revitalize the Indian economy will be taken up on priority and in turn give a boost to India-Japan economic engagement.

It is time Indian strategic thinking also incorporated India-Japan relations as an important component of the country’s security policy and articulated a clear vision to guide this partnership. Japan is an essential pillar of a multi-polar Asia that India seeks wherein it is in India’s interest to provide India-Japan security cooperation greater traction. A stable and peaceful Asian security architecture can emerge only with proactive India-Japan collaboration.

The abrupt postponement of Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Japan has made the Japanese side uneasy. Viewing of India-Japan relations through the prism of national security will enable India to shed its hesitancy about greater security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and restore Japan’s confidence in India’s commitment to the global and strategic partnership between the two countries.

(Sanjana Joshi is a Senior Consultant with ICRIER, New Delhi. She can be contacted atsouthasiamonitor1@gmail.com)

This article was published by South Asia Monitor.

The post Japan Must Become An Integral Part Of India’s Strategic Calculus – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Antonio Anup Gonsalves

Catholics in Pakistan reached out to the local Islamic community in an effort to promote peace between the religious groups in their nation and throughout the Middle East.

“The objective of this gathering is to express harmony with our Muslim brethren, to eliminate the gaps and to live peacefully with one another,” said Fr. Francis Nadeem of St. Joseph’s Parish, Lahore Cantonment, as he welcomed the guests.

“Maintaining peace will help Pakistan to create conducive conditions for economic prosperity and the well-being of a majority of people living in the region,” he emphasized.

The Council for Interfaith Dialogue Pakistan hosted an inter-religious banquet with the Islamic community during Ramadan to promote dialogue, friendship and harmony in the Archdiocese of Lahore, about 185 miles from the capital city of Islamabad.

The month of Ramadan is considered the holiest month for Muslims, who observe it rigorously with day-long fasting, offering prayers five times a day and practicing almsgiving.

Muslim leaders and scholars joined in the “iftar,” or evening meal that Muslims eat to end their day-long fast at sundown during Ramadan. The event was held with multiple faith groups as an expression of their desire for peace and harmony.

“Fasting is one of the common values prevailing in Islam and in Christianity,” explained Archbishop Sebastian Francis Shaw of Lahore at the event.

“Fasting teaches us about prayer, tolerance, alms giving and forgiveness,” he said. “Fasting is a channel that reduces the gaps prevailing between the two religions.”

Asif Nazir a local Catholic teacher and catechesis, explained that inter-religious peace efforts are particularly important at this point in the country’s history.

“Peace at this juncture is very important in Pakistan, because for the past few years this country has suffered and has worked hard to establish peace” among religious communities in the region, he told CNA.

Nazir observed that problems with terrorism have also choked the country’s economy, which has affected many people and harmed efforts at harmony.

Another initiative in the Archdiocese of Karachi featured a local parish collaborating with Caritas-Karachi to initiate a Peace Walk in solidarity with the victims of tensions in the Middle East, particularly those suffering in Gaza.

St. Philip’s Parish teamed with groups from neighboring parishes for the Peace Walk, led by Friar Bernard Bhatti OFM, Fr. Saleem Amir, and Br. Joseph Shamo.

More than 300 participants walked from the seminary on one side of the city to the parish school. Members of the Muslim community also joined in the Peace Walk and were “happy to observe and participate,” Nazir recounted.

“Peace is the urgent need of our times,” said Friar Bernand Younas OFM Cap. “The world is destroying itself with wars and conflicts. We all need to prayer for the peace of the world.”

“Without peace, we are nothing and we will destroy God’s creation,” he continued. “It is important for us to live and let others live, and love them without any sort of discriminations at all levels.”

The friar explained that the goal of the Peace Walk was to increase awareness of “how peace is important in our world…everyone has to play his or her role to promote peace and harmony around them.”

The post Pakistani Catholics Foster Dialogue, Fellowship With Muslims appeared first on Eurasia Review.

OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Didier Burkhalter and members of the Minsk Group have expressed “deep concerns” amid rising violence in Nagorno-Karabakh, at the center of a territorial dispute between Armenia and neighboring Azerbaijan.

“They appealed to the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to take immediate action to defuse tensions and to respect the ceasefire agreement. Retaliation and further violence will only make it more difficult to continue efforts to bring about a lasting peace,” the Chairperson-in-Office and the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group said.

“They also urged the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to resume as soon as possible negotiations on peaceful settlement of the conflict, being the only way to bring peace and genuine reconciliation to the peoples of the region,” the statement said.

The Burkhalter and co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, Ambassadors Igor Popov of Russia, James Warlick of the United States, and Pierre Andrieu of France, also extended their condolences to the families of the victims and “shared the anguish of their grievous losses.”

The sides said they “were deeply concerned” about reports that an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) vehicle came under fire while assisting the local population on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border on a humanitarian mission.

“They strongly condemned the deliberate targeting of civilians and shooting at representatives of international organizations and reminded the parties of their obligations under Geneva Conventions,” the statement said.

Tensions along the contact line of Nagorno-Karabakh with Azerbaijan have been running high over the past few days.

On Saturday, Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry said four people were killed overnight along the contact line in a shootout, while the Nagorno-Karabakh republic said one its soldier was killed.

On Thursday, the troops of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh republic said two soldiers were killed on the border, while Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry claimed nine Azeri soldiers were killed.

A spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry said on Saturday that the recent escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a serious violation of ceasefire agreements.

Armenia and Azerbaijan are still technically at war after a conflict over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh in the early 1990s left some 30,000 people dead. A ceasefire was agreed on in 1994, but a permanent peace deal has still not been signed.

The post OSCE Urges Immediate Settlement Of Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Thousands of Central American children are streaming in the United States in a major scandal of international child abuse, with untold numbers more to come. With stories of rampant sex trafficking, kidnapping, rape, and narco-violence, overburdened American taxpayers have good reason to view the chaos on the Mexican border as cause for concern.

It’s not just the citizens of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California who are threatened by what some news reports call a “flood of illegals.” Since local and state governments are unable to house, feed and clothe all of them in detention facilities near the Mexican border, thousands of the immigrants are being bused or flown to U.S. cities of their own choosing, with tickets bought for them by taxpayers.

While most of the immigrants are minors, some belong to drug gangs, some have been kidnapped, some carry diseases eradicated long ago in United States, and some of the girls—an unusually large number of them—have been raped and are pregnant.

Commentators on the left and the right of the political spectrum view the crisis from very different perspectives.

Many self-styled “progressives” characterize the border breach solely in humanitarian terms despite the blatant vote pandering. House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), for example, called it an “opportunity” for America to show the world that “we respect people for their dignity and worth.” It is “for the children.”

Meanwhile, President Obama appointed Craig Fugate, head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), to coordinate Washington’s response; initial reports suggested that the president would ask Congress to appropriate $2 billion to deal with the immigration crunch. At $4.3 billion, the latest price tag is more than twice that figure.

The view from the right is divided into traditional Republican “law-and-order” types, who want to mobilize the National Guard to enforce existing immigration laws and to strengthen border security, and some but not all of those on the GOP’s libertarian wing, who want to open the borders even wider to immigration, arguing that many of them share American ideals of hard work, traditional values and independence and simply are seeking better lives for themselves and their families.

But most of the immigrants are just innocent kids, who as the pawns in this chaos, know nothing of or care about the principles and market-based institutions of a free society.

What is missing on all sides of the debate is recognition that recent events expose two more fundamental problems: One is the failure to enforce private-property rights on this side of the border, coupled with even weaker property rights on the other side. The current wave of immigrants has been trespassing with impunity on land owned by farmers and ranchers in Texas and elsewhere. Governmental unwillingness or inability to prohibit trespassing undermines the rule of law and endangers both residents and immigrants.

The other problem is that the public budget is a common-pool resource and what we are witnessing is massive and bald-faced “rent seeking” into that budget by people who are over-running America’s welfare state. The budgets of government schools, housing, police, fire protection, healthcare and social welfare programs could all be swamped by the surge at the border.

Political corruption and the absence of economic freedom in the countries that the immigrants are now fleeing explain widespread poverty there. Although the United States is significantly less free than it once was, it still is a better place to live than Mexico, which has been complicit in passing through to the north immigrant children uprooted from the nations of Central America.

Coupled with government inefficiency at home and corruption that makes them vulnerable to drug gangs, sex slavers and the grabbing hands of the public sector, trying to escape to the United States is rational, especially if, as many illegals apparently think, they will be allowed to stay and be eligible for public services financed by U.S. taxpayers.

Central American governments and parents there are shirking their responsibilities in this debacle of international child abuse. And, the Obama administration is exploiting the immigration crisis to expand the welfare state and to recruit a new generation of voters who they hope will reliably support the Democratic Party and the continued growth of government.

If the United States continues to take on the social and economic problems of Central America, our neighbors to the South never will institute the human-rights and market-based reforms that will protect their children and make then want to stay home.

The United States should neither be the world’s policeman, nor should it be the world’s wet nurse.

This article appeared at The Daily Caller and is reprinted with permission.

The post Chaos And International Child Abuse On America’s Southern Border – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

With 54% of the Chinese population living in cities, China has six megacities of more than 10 million inhabitants and 103 cities of more than one million inhabitants. This presents China with a unique set of urban challenges that rapidly need to be addressed to ensure that these cities remain liveable, productive and sustainable.

As China’s urbanization rate is slated to grow to 60% by 2018, two years earlier than initially forecast, the need to address these urban challenges is all the more pressing.

The World Economic Forum has released a new report, The Future of Urban Development Initiative: Dalian and Zhangjiakou Champion City Strategy, in collaboration with the China Center for Urban Development (CCUD).

The report identifies three main urbanization themes for Chinese cities: transport planning and management, urban energy management and sustainable industry development, and proposes 19 strategic recommendations and best practices case studies to guide Dalian and Zhangjiakou.

The post Tackling The Challenges Of China’s Urban Development appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Andrew Spath

The swiftness with which the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, now the Islamic State) assaulted and overran northern Iraq brings a new level of concern to policymakers. The offensive blew a hole in Washington’s desire to maintain “a ring of Syrian containment” that favored a political solution with limited measures to support rebels against the Assad regime. As the organization expands in number and territory, and ambitiously declaring the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate, anxiety is growing among leaders and citizens in the neighborhood. Jordan, the key U.S. ally bordering territories held by the Islamic State and comprising a central part of its desired Sunni empire, is precariously situated on the frontline of the ISIL’s violent campaign.

Jordan is regularly perceived in strategic terms as a “buffer state” between Israel and its regional adversaries, between the Sunni Gulf States and the “Shi’a Crescent,” and as a receptive host to waves of refugees amid regional turmoil. But while the small kingdom is practiced in its role as regional shock absorber, the civil wars and associated state weakness in two of its immediate neighbors long dominated by strongmen (Syria and Iraq) presents a new challenge. Moreover, turmoil and tenuous status quo conditions in other proximate areas (Egypt, Lebanon, Israel and Palestine) present a geographic “ring of fire,” unsettling citizens and officials alike.

President Obama warned last month that the security vacuum from ISIL’s expansion raises the prospect that destabilization will “spill over into some of our allies like Jordan.” How vulnerable is Jordan to conflict diffusion from neighboring violence? What factors create immediate security risks for the country? What options are available to mitigate the risks facing this crucial U.S. ally?

LOOKING TO JORDAN? THE ISLAMIC STATE BEYOND SYRIA AND IRAQ

There is some debate over the threat of ISIL outside of Syria and Iraq, including whetheror not it is seriously targeting neighboring Jordan. Making enemies of nearly every political and military organization not pledging bay’ah (allegiance) to the Islamic State and its leader, self-proclaimed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the militant jihadist organization is preoccupied with taking and controlling territory in northern and eastern Syria and northern and western Iraq. Some analysts are predicting short-lived success for the group and its Caliphate before it buckles under its maximalist governing strategy and unwillingness to mediate disputes with other insurgent groups. They argue that the brutality and extremism that turned Sunni tribes against al Qaeda in Iraq during the Sahwa (Awakening) Movement circa 2007 will likewise distance local populations from the Islamic State today.

But others urge seriousness about the Islamic State’s expansionist abilities and staying power. The surprise incursion into Iraq, starting in Mosul and proceeding systematically down the Tigris, proved the Islamic State’s objectives and capabilities were not confined to Syria. In retrospect, the Islamic State’s origins in the Iraq War and the despotic governing style of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki make the Eastward move less surprising. In an attempt to consolidate its gains and defend against a multilateral response to its progress, ISIL may have limited ability to continue its march outside of Iraq and Syria.

However, the organization’s transnational aims are apparent and worrying. Local sources close to jihadist circles reported recently that al-Baghdadi discussed with senior leaders “the possibility of expansion and creating a safe haven in a third country in the event of being overpowered in Syria or Iraq,” particularly Jordan, the Sinai, or the Gaza Strip. Statements from ISIL single out Jordan as a target of their attention and aspirations. Numerous videos show militants denouncing the monarchy as a “criminal and apostate” regime. In viral videos from the spring, a boy fighter in Syria is celebrated by older militants as he rips and burns his Jordanian passport and threatens Jordan with car bombs; another fighter wearing an explosive belt threatens to slaughter King Abdullah II.

ISIL’s emphasis on Jordan as an impending target is not surprising. The organization was founded as an al Qaeda branch in Iraq (AQI) by the Jordanian Abu Musab al Zarqawi from Zarqa, a densely packed industrial city just northeast of Amman. Jordanian enmity toward Zarqawi and AQI grew as he tried numerous times to carry out attacks inside the kingdom. Zarqawi’s attempts to attack inside Jordan were ultimately successful, culminating in a coordinated bombing of three hotels in Amman in 2005. He was killed the following year in a joint US-Jordanian operation. After his death, Zarqawi’s al Qaeda in Iraq would come under new leadership as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and then, in the context of the Syrian Civil War, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

A SUPPLY AND DEMAND

To rally supporters and attract potential recruits, ISIL publicizes its broader aims using symbolic themes that resonate across borders. Shedding references to Iraq and the Levant in its rebranding as the “Islamic State,” proclaiming Sykes-Picot null and void, and directing a Ramadan message to the global Ummah all serve to establish the organization’s transnational bona fides. Savvy self-promotion through the production of high-quality videos and the shrewd use of social media extend the organization’s reach into areas away from the battlefield. ISIL is also exploiting the ongoing conflict in Gaza to trumpet the larger goal of “liberating Palestine from the Zionists” through dual fronts in Syria and Jordan, requiring destabilization of the kingdom. The mobilizational potential of this conflict is particularly strong in Jordan, where a majority of the population is of Palestinian descent and the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty resonates with all segments of society as an object of protest.

On the supply side, then, ISIL is a compelling focal point for its ideological partisans and aggrieved, conservative-minded youth. They deliver as a source of inspiration, direction, and purpose. This is the critical concern for Jordan. The success of ISIL in battle, its enforcement of laws and norms – however primitive – over its strongholds, and the reach of its self-advertising augment its own strength while also appealing to potential adherents inside the kingdom.

The size is debatable, but there is a segment of the Jordanian population that comprises this demand side. Reports last month suggested ISIL started a branch inside of Jordan. A lawyer for Islamist jihadists in Jordan “ruled out the existence of Da’ash [the Arabic acronym for ISIL] in Jordan” while acknowledging significant numbers of advocates and supporters of the organization among young people in the jihadist Salafist movement. When considering the potential for the instability to overwhelm Jordan, the Islamic State’s own capacity to wage violence is not the only, or even primary, concern. In this vein, Jordan observers tend to focus predominantly on the southern city of Ma’an. 

THE CASE OF MA’AN: THE FALLUJAH OF JORDAN?

Recent events draw attention back to a traditional hub for contention and an occasional harbinger for more widespread upheaval – the southern town of Ma’an. Ma’an is a poor, tribal town (and province) just 150 miles south of Amman that has been the repeated scene of rioting, unrest, and clashes with Jordanian security forces. Illustratively, during past tensions, residents raised the Saudi flag in defiance of the monarchy and gave refuge to jihadist Salafist leader Abu Sayyaf after a car chase with police.

In April, the security situation deteriorated rapidly as security forces sweeping the city for wanted men killed a 19 year-old under uncertain circumstances. Protests and rioting turned to clashes between residents and security forces. Demonstrators demanded the resignation of Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour and his government, and in an affront to King Abdullah, displayed a banner that read “Ma’an: We will not kneel except before God.” Within days, tribal leaders from throughout the country coordinated a gathering to mediate the situation and town notables held rallies to denounce ISIL. Ringing loudly, however, were warnings to the government not to approach Ma’an in a way that gives rise to a “new Dara’a” – referencing the southern Syrian town that erupted against heavy-handed tactics at the beginning of the Syrian revolution.

Following another raid by security forces against criminal gangs at the end of June, riots and clashes again broke out in the city. This time, and coinciding with ISIL’s gains in Iraq, larger protests voiced sectarian slogans and displayed loud shows of support for Jabhat al-Nusrah and ISIL with the black jihadist flag ubiquitous and a large banner stating “Ma’an the Fallujah of Jordan.” The reference is to the Iraqi city of Fallujah that saw revolutionary tribal militias and ISIL contingents take control of the city from the Iraqi military in January; it remains the site of continual fighting.

The proximate cause of the recent flare-ups is related to security and policing. The conflicts in neighboring countries have given rise to a small-scale war economy in high poverty and unemployment areas like Ma’an that facilitate organized crime through the trafficking of weapons, drugs, and vehicles. Security forces enter the town to round up wanted criminals and, in perception if not reality, use arbitrary methods and excessive force. Instigated by these tactics and incursions, residents respond with anger.

But more enduring factors create underlying animosity, and conditions that led to the first bouts of unrest in Ma’an persist today. Muhammad Abu Rumman, an expert on Islamist groups in Jordan, recently urged officials to review an important 2003 publication from the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan titled “Ma’an: Open Crisis.” The book examines the immediate and enduring causes of five successive crises in Ma’an (1989, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002). Three points stand out. First, persistent socio-economic disparities and the lack of opportunities produce localized grievances. Perceptions among Ma’anis that the province is deprived of government support and development contribute to an overwhelming sense of inequality. In past surveys, Ma’an residents are twice as likely as other Jordanians to characterize the country as unequal and unjust despite national economic growth and a 25-year-long “democratic march.”

Second, the state retreated from Ma’an and other provinces in a noticeable way under the first appointed governments of King Abdullah II. State retrenchment coincided with both expanded privatization plans under these new technocratic governments and, more directly, with protests supporting the second Palestinian Intifada, demanding the closure of the Israeli embassy, prisoner releases, and “liberation of al-Aqsa.” The imposition of law and order declined drastically, creating a security vacuum and a rise in criminality. Salafi groups seized the opportunity to align street interests with their own, assert influence, and increase their capability to activate the street against the central government in Amman.

Finally, the state has attempted to reassert itself haphazardly, treating Ma’an as a security problem instead of a development problem. Citizens report feeling that all Ma’anis are implicated by the government security forces in their sporadic incursions while the state shows little interest in addressing longer-term underdevelopment. Instead, the state has used public sector employment and overrepresentation in legislative positions (and the patronage this facilitates) to placate these areas.Together, each of these factors contributes to estrangement between the people of Ma’an and the state. Long-term, an environment without constructive state involvement serves as an incubator for criminality and non-state authority. Current neighboring conflicts create opportunities for illicit markets and activities that demand government intervention. Intervention is aggressive, spurning more enduring development strategies to counter subversive tendencies. Whether or not the most recent contention develops into something more, this is not the last time challenges to the state will ignite in Ma’an. Given its symbolic value as a center of state challenge and citizen grievance (as demonstrators here commemorate the 1989 protests), future unrest will have the potential to spread.

Importantly, analysts must also widen their gaze. Too narrow a focus on Ma’an as the center of instability produces tunnel vision. In reality, the southern city clarifies key risk factors in the kingdom. However, varying degrees of the same conditions that have produced unrest in Ma’an exist elsewhere in the country, as do centers of jihadist Salafist  coordination and activism including Salt, Zarqa, Irbid, and some of the Palestinian refugee camps. Unlike more remote rural towns like Ma’an, Tafileh, and Mafraq, these low-income urban areas are underrepresented politically and in public sector jobs. It is no surprise, then, that the impoverished neighborhoods in these bigger cities supply the majority of Jordanian jihadists in Syria.

ASSESSING THE MULTIPLE CHALLENGES & RESPONSES

The “magnet of militancy” created by neighboring conflicts presents a multi-level challenge and requires a multi-level response. Jordan and the U.S. will need to consider policy responses to multiple contingencies that include an ISIL offensive, an internal extremist threat, and widespread unrest.

Direct Offensive

A direct offensive from IS militants is possible but not imminent. The questions are whether ISIL will make the strategic move to carry out an offensive into Jordan, and whether Jordan could repel such an offensive if it occurred. In response to ISIL taking over the Iraqi side of the Karameh-Turaibil border crossing, Jordan significantly bolstered its border defenses. And with the risk of militants crossing the border to challenge the monarchy, the Jordanian Army launched a new recruitment drive to shore up its numbers and increased coordination with Saudi Arabia.

ISIL depended heavily on revolutionary tribes and militias in its offensive into Iraq, but it lacks this opportunity for coordination in Jordan. Tribal unease has existed for some time, but there is no reason to worry that they will defect in favor of an extremist group like ISIL. A sizable swathe of desert separates the border area in Iraq with population centers in Jordan, giving the military ample time to intercept an advance. Jordan’s military, with support from others if necessary, will not allow the kind of staging that ISIL carried out around Mosul. Moreover, the highly professionalized Jordanian military will not lay down arms and flee as happened in many Iraqi territories.

As ISIL increasingly resembles “a full-blown army,” however, Jordan knows that adequately guarding the border requires international and regional support. The U.S. should guarantee the Jordanian government unequivocal support and a “real red line” with regard to an external incursion into the kingdom. Closer to home, Jordan will need to coordinate with Iraqi tribes in the border region and Free Syrian Army units in southern Syria, both of which are familiar to the Jordanian military. Moreover, Jordan should work on its relationship with Baghdad after a conference of Iraqi opposition figures led to a flare-up in tensions.

Extremism Inside

Despite reassurances from King Abdullah II and top government and military officials to the Jordanian public, the risk of smaller-scale attacks is higher. The potential for small groups inside the country to be seriously disruptive is not lost on anyone. Jordanian jihadists returning home from the battlefield pose a direct threat while also serving as sources of radicalization for the rising number of jihadist Salafists in the country. There is fear that the internal “fire under the ashes” will be fueled by the combination of domestic discontent, regional grievances, and battlefield successes of radical militants that inspire revolutionary-minded youth. Jihadist Salafist leader Abu Sayyaf, who coordinates sending Jordanians to fight in Syria, has made clear that with greater capacity “this regime [in Jordan] will not be left alone.”

A fissure between traditional jihadists (including al Qaeda supporters) and ISIL supporters is playing out regionally. In Jordan, the dispute follows two trends defined by a fallout in prison years ago between al-Maqdisi, representing the more traditional jihadist line, and his more radical and sectarian pupil al-Zarqawi. Acting opportunistically, the Jordanian government is making use of anti-ISIL jihadist leaders who advocate jihad but, for the time at least, eschew attacks inside the country and targeting other Muslims. The Jordanian government has recently released two high-profile Salafist leaders highly critical of ISIL and its declaration of a Caliphate. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, an influential jihadist leader, followed up previous anti-ISIL statements from prison with a statement deriding ISIL and invalidating the Caliphate proclamation. Prominent al Qaeda figure Abu Qatada was also released and, like other prominent Salafist leaders Abu Sayyaf and Iyad Quneibi, condemned ISIL’s actions. In response, Jordanian ISIL supporters under the name “Sons of the Call of Monotheism and Jihad” (Ibnaa’ Da’wa al-Tawheed wa al-Jihad) disseminated a repudiation of al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada and swore allegiance to ISIL.

In light of the emergent jihadist Salafist dispute, the regime in Jordan is wise to follow a divide-and-endure strategy. This internal row undermines coordination and capacity of radical groups inside the kingdom and deprives neo-Zarqawists of traditional jihadist lines of support. Moreover, the government should be careful in its application of a new and expansive anti-terrorism law. Excessive or arbitrary enforcement will antagonize Islamist opposition activists at a time when the government should utilize avenues of engagement with a wide range of Islamists, including the traditional jihadist leaders who reject militant action inside of Jordan. In a positive sign, a seven-person committee representing the movement in Jordan was created last week to “open direct communication with the government” and make demands, particularly related to pardoning select Salafist leaders.

Widespread Contention

Jordan’s long-term threats to stability are no less challenging than its immediate security problem, and even add to it. Organizations like ISIL are hoping that feelings of detachment from the state among even small numbers of radicals will breed new branches and ease recruiting within the country. As in the case of Ma’an, government retrenchment is a problem years in the making and requires long-term developmental strategies to mitigate the associated risks. The more that the Jordanian government embraces the idea that security problems are governance problems, the better it will be at reducing the distance between the state and antagonistic parts of society.

Even before the uprisings, civil strife, and wars-next-door, assertions of Jordan’s vulnerability to instability persisted. Experts have deemed the kingdom to be “forever on the brink.” Particularly during the wave of uprisings in the region, many observers speculated over whether the Jordanian monarchy would be “the next domino to fall.” These concerns largely emphasize the potential for domestic discontent, occasionally stoked by political crises-of-the-moment, to be manifest in an eruption of a regime-threatening popular movement.

The civil war in Syria exacerbated this apprehension as hundreds of thousands of refugees presented new security challenges to the kingdom. Managing the humanitarian crisis, smuggling networks, camp riots, and other immediate refugee-related issues are onerous even prior to considering the structural impacts on the Jordanian economy and society. As the flow of refugees continues unabated, now at over 600,000 with over 80 percent living in Jordanian communities outside of the camps, communal tensions are beginning to emerge. Worsening conditions in Iraq increase the prospect of a new wave of refugees and brings further angst to the resource-strapped country. Economic disruptions have always been a trigger for strife in the country, so the government will have to enact policies that mitigate the economic impact of the “quiet emergency” felt by its own citizens, especially as unemployment is on the rise. As the primary patron to the kingdom, the U.S. can help by continuing direct grants and urging states who committed funds to Jordan’s refugee relief effort to make their payments.

The current iteration of the Israeli-Palestinian crisis is also dangerous for Jordan’s domestic stability. Jordan witnessed significant upheaval coinciding with the Second Palestinian Intifada, including rioting and clashes inside its many refugee camps. Officials are rightly concerned about the Gaza incursion serving as a tool for mobilization and radicalization. King Abdullah will continue to speak out strongly against Israel’s Operation Protective Edge and show support for Mahmoud Abbas both out of sincerity and the need to appear actively engaged. As long as this round of the conflict continues, the government in Jordan will face increasingly vocal, and perhaps forceful, domestic pressure.

Should domestic unrest reach a critical point – whether from bedlam in Ma’an or demonstrations against Israel or political and economic protests – King Abdullah will find it expedient to use an oft-played card in the kingdom – dismissing the prime minister and his government. Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour, like prime ministers before him, can be an internal shock absorber, temporarily mitigating domestic tensions. But this tactic requires careful use to avoid it backfiring in this especially tense situation. It will not mollify extremists, but it can appease their societal support bases, traditional opposition, and some fence-sitters. As such, it can work in the face of social unrest but not a militant insurrection.

CONCLUSION

Radical and sadistic in its methods, ISIL is making rational moves according to organizational opportunities and constraints; its military exploits have been reactions to voids in state power and authority. The civil war in Syria was a prime occasion for the organization’s revival after being weakened in the 2006-2008 counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq. Sectarian and autocratic politics in Iraq delegitimized the government in predominantly Sunni areas and facilitated ISIL’s return to its erstwhile eastern base. No matter the organization’s rhetoric, a direct incursion into Jordan would defy its current territorial logic, especially as it presently focuses on consolidating gains. But ISIL has surprised before, it has ample resources, and territorial logic can give way to other offensive strategies including, for example, symbolic attacks for recruitment purposes. The U.S. recognizes Jordan’s geostrategic value and longstanding cooperation on diplomatic and security matters; as such, it should guarantee unqualified and immediate support in the event of such a hostile contingency.

An inward-looking strategy is more pressing for Jordan and can yield short- and long-term security benefits. The kingdom has strong institutions, but they are also exclusionary and underlie domestic grievances. Progress on fundamental issues of representation and opportunity – long-debated but with little tangible progress – will do as much for the kingdom’s stability as military and policing. Officials and analysts know that this starts with the implementation of the 2005 National Agenda, but parochial interests and reluctance to share power continue to stand in the way. Continual failure to bring to fruition more inclusive development and reform initiatives undercuts confidence in government and strengthens subversive elements of society. Laws and practices that repress political activity and expression create hostility exactly when the government should be conciliatory to legitimate voices of dissent. Without this progress, the government will risk marginalizing itself more than the radical factions it needs to marginalize.

About the author:
Andrew Spath is a Fellow in FPRI’s Program on the Middle East. He is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Rutgers University where he teaches courses on authoritarianism, Middle East politics and society, and Model United Nations. He is writing his dissertation on political activism during periods of leadership change in authoritarian regimes focusing on Jordan and Syria. From 2012-2014, as a David L. Boren Fellow and two-time Fulbright Fellow, he lived and conducted research in Jordan as an associate researcher at the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan and the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies. He has professional fluency in Modern Standard Arabic and Levantine dialect.

Source:
This article was published at FPRI, and may be accessed here.

The post Jordan: Between Stability And Spillover – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Kapil Narula

The Indian Navy (IN) announced a slew of ‘green initiatives’ on the eve of World Environment Day, which was celebrated on June 5, 2014. The project is being steered under the guidance of Admiral R.K. Dhowan, Chief of the Naval Staff, who has stressed on the need to implement various measures for protecting the environment in various functional domains of the IN.

The four domains across which these initiatives will be implemented are operations, administration, maintenance and infrastructure & community living. Exhaustive guidelines in the form of an ‘Energy Conservation Roadmap’ have been drawn up to implement the initiatives and various units and formations of the IN have been directed by the Naval Head Quarters (NHQ) to closely monitor the progress.

Following directives have been issued under the green initiatives:

(a) Measuring energy consumption level.

(b) Incorporating energy efficiency from ab-initio stages in all future acquisition and infrastructure projects.

(c) Identifying Key Result Areas (KRAs) for infrastructure and community living projects such as green buildings, waste recycling, water conservation and harnessing of renewable energy.

(d) Conducting awareness drives and programmes on energy conservation and environment protection.

While IN’s bid to adopt green initiatives is extremely laudable and deserves all appreciation, the issue deserves a closer analysis.

IN’s Energy Challenges

The IN extensively uses petroleum products for operation of its platforms such as ships, submarines and aircrafts. This has resulted in an ever-increasing energy bill for the IN. Extensive use of energy, directly, by combustion of fuel in ships, and indirectly, by use of electricity in maintenance and repair of sea-going vessels also leads to Green House Gas (GHG) emissions, causing irreversible environmental damage. Diminishing global fossil fuel reserves, sustained increase in the real price of oil along with its accompanying volatility, and India’s increased oil import dependency over the last couple of years are other concerns for the IN.

Thus there are three major emerging energy and environmental challenges for the IN:

(a) The ever increasing energy bill

(b) The environmental aspects of unrestricted energy usage and

(c) The growing risk associated with fossil fuel dependence

While the initiatives were adopted under the umbrella term of ‘green initiatives’, the intention is clearly to address environmental as well as energy challenges. Hence IN has rightly linked environmental concerns with the root cause of the problem, which is excessive and sub-optimal energy usage and proposes to tackle both issues together. This is also evident in the press release which stated that “there is a compelling need to optimally utilize energy resources while ensuring that each rupee is stretched to the maximum”.

Response strategies

Energy Conservation, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (RE) are the three triads, which can support the transition to a green IN. While Energy Conservation can be implemented by behavioural and managerial changes, Energy Efficiency is the cheapest, fastest and the surest way to address energy and environmental concerns. Increasing generation of RE at various distributed locations and integrating it with the electricity grid in the regions endowed with alternative energy resources is also a viable solution.

This idea has also gained traction due to the falling costs of solar power, which has led to an exponential increase in the installed capacity of solar Photovoltaic (PV) plants in the last couple of years. The above three aspects can, therefore, be applied in various domains in the IN, according to the degree of ease of implementation and availability of technical expertise after carrying out a cost-benefit analysis.

‘We cannot reduce what we cannot measure’. Hence, the first step towards reducing energy use is to measure energy consumption. This aspect has received specific attention in the present proposal, and a framework to measure energy consumption levels has been initiated, based on which future energy reduction goals would be identified. Although measuring energy use in various facets of operations in the IN is a time-consuming task, which is cost intensive, recording energy usage over time is essential to benchmark energy consumption. This is more so as most of the operations in the IN are tailor made and do not have one to one correspondence in the commercial industry. Notwithstanding the initial hurdles, once the right technology is in place to monitor energy consumption, the task of recording energy use becomes automatic and yields a large amount of data, which can be analysed both online and offline for implementing an energy management programme effectively.

Energy efficiency, which is driven by advances in technology, is also called as the fifth fuel after coal, oil, natural gas and renewable energy. Energy efficiency is therefore the cornerstone of any energy reduction programme. Energy efficiency can be achieved onboard ships by hydrodynamic ship design, incorporating energy efficiency in the design of main propulsion system, selecting optimal sized engines/generators and efficient auxiliary systems such as air conditioning/refrigeration systems onboard ships.

In fact, energy efficiency standards are now mandatory in commercial shipping, which includes adoption of Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) (which is applicable to new ships) and the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) (applicable to all ships). Both these measures have been enforced from Jan 1, 2013.

There will also be the ‘low hanging fruits’, such as use of energy efficient lighting, installation of automatic power factor correctors, managing peak loads in industrial establishments etc. which can be implemented at low cost without much effort. These fruits need to be harvested first, as they have short payback time and will reap rich dividends over their entire lifetime. Success in these programmes will also help in streamlining the administrative processes and will impart momentum to implement the remainder of the programme.

Lessons from US Navy

The US Department of the Navy (DON) has realised that energy is critical for its success and they have taken a lead in energy reforms by adopting a well-defined energy strategy. The DON in its ‘Operational Energy Strategy’ has set aggressive goals to reduce the amount of energy needed for military operations, expand the portfolio of available energy options (from fossil fuels to RE) and ensure their timely delivery via a reliable electricity grid.

In line with this strategy, the US navy has set a goal to deploy the 21st-century ‘Great Green Fleet’ by 2016. The US Navy has also set a target of generating 25 percent of all electricity used by US military installations from RE by 2025. To meet these goals, an organisational structure with clear responsibilities and earmarked funding has been put in place. Apart from this, the DON has an energy programme which ensures energy-efficient acquisition, energy management (governance, planning, programming, budgeting) and technology development, implements behavioural changes (training, awards and incentives) and forges strategic partnerships with industry and research organisations. The multifaceted approach adopted by the US Navy is noteworthy and is a right example for all growing navies of the world.

Way Ahead

Cost savings, increasing the strategic reach of sea-going platforms (as opposed to mid-sea refuelling), increased operational efficiency, demonstrating environmental stewardship, and developing a robust and resilient energy architecture are few benefits that will accrue to the IN by adopting the ‘Green Initiatives’. While the framework is in place, a lot depends on how effectively these steps will be implemented in the near term. Although energy accounting and accurate monitoring is the key to the success of the programme, capacity building and allocation of financial resources from the existing budget of the IN remains a key challenge, which needs to be addressed for demonstrating long-term commitment to the programme.

Though a beginning has been made, the next logical step for the IN is to adopt an integrated energy policy. As defined by the Government of India, the policy “covers all sources of energy and addresses various aspects of energy supply and usage including security of supply, …energy pricing, as well as energy efficiency and environmental concerns”. Such an approach will provide an overarching framework under which, various interrelated energy and environmental issues can be addressed in the future.

Conclusion

Energy is a precious commodity and a key enabler of military combat power, which should, therefore, be considered a strategic resource by the IN. Hence, it is crucial that the risks associated with energy supply disruption should be mitigated by effectively managing supply and demand of energy. IN’s bid to adopt green initiatives is laudable and deserves appreciation. All measures implemented as ‘green initiatives’ will go a long way in reducing the carbon footprint of the IN.

This landmark step clearly signifies that the IN is preparing to tackle energy and environmental challenges head on, and is on the right path to transition into a navy that is energy conscious and environmentally responsible.

Commander Kapil Narula is a Research Fellow at the National Maritime Foundation (NMF). He can be reached at southasiamonitor1@gmail.com)

This article appeared at South Asia Monitor.

The post Greening The Blue: Indian Navy Meets Energy Challenge – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Natalia Shapovalova

The Russian and Western press has long portrayed Ukraine as a deeply divided country with a pro-European ‘West’ and a Russia-oriented ‘East’. Although this neat division along the Dnieper river ignores the country’s far more nuanced regional mosaic, both sociological data and electoral geography show that the East-West divide has been an enduring feature of Ukrainian politics since the early 1990s. Historical, cultural, linguistic and socioeconomic differences between Ukrainian regions explain much of why Ukraine is pulled in two opposing directions by Russia and the European
Union (EU).

Decentralisation is now espoused as an important means of smoothing regional divisions in the country. It has come to be high on the public and political agenda over the last eight months. Ending the centralisation of state power, a legacy of the Soviet era, and strengthening accountability of local and regional authorities to citizens are two important intertwined goals of the Euromaidan protesters. The current government holds that transferring more power from the centre to the periphery will be an essential ingredient to settling down anti-Kyiv sentiments in Donbas and dovetail future calls for regional autonomy and secession.

Meanwhile the tragedy of MH17 has put Ukraine and its Russian-supported separatist revolt in Donbas in the limelight. With the world watching, Ukraine’s new government should lead by example by not only seeking a solution to the conflict but also by initiating long-term reform through decentralisation.

This policy brief examines the politics of regionalism and centre-periphery relations in Ukraine. It argues that, notwithstanding the regional differences in the country, regionalism has been exploited by local elites to gain control over state power and resources. Management of centre-periphery relations has been rather a political strategy to maintain power than a policy for effective territorial governance and economic development. While the explosion of violent separatism in Ukraine has been largely instigated and sustained by Russia, the comprehensive decentralisation planned by the Ukrainian government should help to address some of the grievances in Donbas and to build a stronger and more democratic state.

REGIONALISM, AUTONOMY AND SEPARATISM IN UKRAINE

The Russian factor in Ukraine’s identity, including attitudes towards history, language, culture and foreign policy preferences has divided the country. Over the last decade, this division has had a significant influence on Ukrainian politics. The overwhelming majority of Ukrainian citizens living in the Western and Central regions have preferred Ukraine to align with the EU, while the population in the East and the South have been largely in favour of Russian-led integration projects.

This dividing line has also been evident in all national elections since the early 1990s: political parties and candidates representing the pro- European Western and Central regions competed with those whose main electoral base was in the Russian-oriented East and South. Slight shifts in popular support usually ensured a slim victory for one of the camps. However, the presidential elections in May 2014 were a major exception to this trend. Lacking any serious candidates representing the Eastern regions – and without Crimea and parts of Donbas voting – Petro Poroshenko won in all regions of Ukraine.

Since Russia occupied Crimea and became involved in the war in Donbas, the Russian factor in Ukraine’s politics is in decline.

According to opinion polls carried out by the Razumov Centre, Ukrainian society as a whole has become increasingly united around the idea of European integration (rising from 46 per cent in December 2013 to 60 per cent in June 2014); as well as favouring a unitary state (up from 69 per cent in March 2014 to 78 per cent in June 2014) with one state language (up from 56 per cent in March 2014 to 68 per cent in June 2014). Meanwhile public support for joining the Moscow-sponsored Eurasian Customs Union decreased significantly from 35 per cent in December 2013 to 22 per cent in June 2014. In other words, the East-West divide has moved eastwards closer to the Russia border. Moreover, when sociologists unpack the Eastern regions, only Donbas appears to have large numbers taking the opposite stance to the majority of Ukrainians on the main identity-related and governance issues.

Despite these regional differences, even before Russian military involvement and support, Ukrainians have been consistent in their preference for a strong unitary state. A drive for regional autonomy or federalisation of the country has never enjoyed any significant public support, neither in the East or West. Moreover, Ukrainian sociologists have shown that the rise of pro-autonomy tendencies is transitory, and mainly a defensive reaction to how Kyiv deals with identity-related issues. In general, if the central government is dominated by members from eastern Ukraine, then pro-autonomy tendencies come to the fore in western Ukraine and the opposite also holds.

For example, research by the Institute of Sociology at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine over the last decade shows that during the presidency of the Orange revolution leader Victor Yushchenko (2005-2010), public support for regional autonomy was highest in the Southern and, particularly, Eastern regions. It was supposedly linked to Yushchenko’s policy of ‘Ukrainianisation’ of education, media and culture, and a foreign policy prioritising ties with the West.

When Victor Yanukovych came to power in 2010, polls showed a rise in pro-autonomy attitudes in the Western regions: the share of those in favour of autonomy grew in these areas from 5.4 per cent in 2009 to 16.8 per cent in 2013. Meanwhile, in the Eastern regions support for regional autonomy fell from 33.9 per cent to 21.8 per cent. In the South (minus Crimea which already had autonomy) and centre of Ukraine no statistically significant changes were observed (about 11 percent and 5 percent opted for regional autonomy respectively). Meanwhile, the share of citizens supporting the unitary state of Ukraine went up in the East and South of the country in 2013. This illustrates that citizens in Eastern and Southern regions were content with power resting largely in Kyiv once politicians from their region were in government.

Support for separatism or pro-Russian irredentism in Ukraine has been even more limited than that for regional autonomy. A poll conducted by the Razumkov Centre in December 2013 showed that a mere 13 percent of the population in the South of Ukraine, including Crimea, and 8 percent in the East wanted their region to secede from Ukraine and join another country. According to a poll conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in April-May 2014, support for separatism was still modest even after the installation a pro-Western government at the end of February 2014. The only exception to this was Donbas while Crimea was not included in the survey. A mere 2.7 percent of population in the South and 5.3 percent in the East (without Donbas) supported secession of their region from Ukraine. In Donbas, 29 percent supported secession, 23 percent were in favour of greater autonomy in a federal Ukraine and 35 percent preferred to remain in the current unitary system.

Unlike in other European countries with distinct regions (such as Catalonia in Spain or Scotland in the United Kingdom), a cry for autonomy has been less an expression of popular self-determination for Ukraine’s regions, and more a way for regional elites to gain power and influence in the centralised state. A notorious example of such power games was a threat to establish the South-East Ukrainian Republic expressed by some members of the Party of Regions from the Eastern and Southern regions after Victor Yanukovych’s electoral defeat in 2004. After the fall of the Yanukovych administration in February 2014, some politicians from his party also tried to use the revolts in the East to improve their position vis-a-vis the new government until violence erupted and they lost control over events.

THE POLITICS OF STATE-PERIPHERY RELATIONS IN UKRAINE

The current system of state-periphery relations was established in Ukraine’s 1996 Constitution. The institutional structure at regional (oblast) and sub-regional (rayon) level include directly elected assemblies. But this structure foremost includes regional and sub-regional state administrations which serve as both the executive committees of the locally-elected assemblies and as representatives of the central government in Kyiv. The heads of the oblast and rayon state administrations are appointed and dismissed by the president upon a proposal of the cabinet of ministers. About 80 per cent of all national revenue goes to the state budget, and the state administrations even distribute resources within the oblasts and rayons. Local authorities lack adequate resources to be able to provide basic services and are inherently weak as a result. This system encourages regional elites to compete fiercely for control over the central government and the position of the president.

The heads of oblast state administrations (known as governors) have often performed the function of electoral campaign chiefs in their regions to ensure victory for ‘the ruling party’ in the national elections through the exploitation of administrative resources. In return, the president would often promote regional elites to the central government to ensure their continued support. The constitutional reform of 2004, which curbed the power of the president while boosting that of the parliament and the government, had little impact on state-periphery relations. The regional and sub-regional state administrations became accountable to both the president and the cabinet of ministers. Although local government reform was a stated aim during Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency, it was never carried out.

Over the last decade, all the key parties competing for power in Ukraine espoused decentralisation. Yulia Tymoshenko’s Fatherland Party consistently pledged to reform local government structures and in 2006 it even vowed to establish elections for regional governors. When in opposition 2005-2006, Yanukovych’s Party of Regions campaigned for a federal Ukraine. It largely abandoned this aim once in office and during the 2007 and 2012 parliamentary election campaigns, promising merely to enhance local government power and minor budget decentralisation reforms.

Prior to 2010, both President Yushchenko and the then opposition leader Yanukovych proposed constitutional amendments to introduce decentralisation. Nothing came of this however as Yushchenko lost the elections, while Yanukovych’s reform plans, when in power, were short-lived. With the reversal of the 2004 constitutional amendments in October 2010, Yanukovich centralised power in the presidency. This made for the dominance of one party and representatives from one region (Donetsk) in Ukraine’s system of government. Centralisation was also brazenly exploited by the Yanukovych administration for personal enrichment.

In all but two oblast, governors were members of the Party of Regions. This was even the case in regions where the assemblies were dominated by opposition parties. Representatives of Yanukovych’s home region of Donetsk not only occupied ministries in Kyiv, but also state administrations in other Ukrainian regions. This included the Prime Minister of Crimea, the only region to enjoy constitutional autonomy: he had come from the Donetsk oblast.

Centralised control over the state budget allowed generous financing for Yanukovych’s home region and businesses owned by members of his party. In 2013, Donetsk received UAH13 billion (Ukrainian Hryvnia), which is equivalent to approximately €1.2 billion, from the state budget – three times its contribution to state finances. However, the ordinary residents of Donetsk scarcely benefitted from this generous fiscal transfer as the bulk of the money was pocketed by Yanukovych and his entourage.

Political decentralisation was one of the key demands of Euromaidan. It was not motivated by an ambition for regional autonomy, but by a desire for democracy and better governance. Throughout most regions in Ukraine, protesters occupied or picketed regional government buildings, demanding the resignation of governors appointed by Yanukovich and greater accountability on the part of the police. The protesters established people’s councils – a technique that would subsequently also be employed by separatists in the East.

With the rise of separatism in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, decentralisation has become a crucial issue in Ukrainian politics. For its part, Russia has demanded that the Ukrainian authorities federalise the state, in the hope of making it weak and unmanageable, thereby boosting Moscow’s scope for influence.

Meanwhile all the main presidential candidates in the May 2014 election promised decentralisation while preserving a unitary state. The only candidate to promote federalisation was Mykhailo Dobkin from the Party of Regions. He won a mere 5 percent of the vote.

Public opinion favours decentralisation within the existing unitary state. According to a June poll conducted by the Razumkov Centre, 78 percent of Ukrainians support a unitary state with decentralised power and increased competences for local authorities, while only 12 percent favour federalisation. Even in the East a large majority of Ukrainians are support the concept of a decentralised unitary state (63 percent).

DECENTRALISATION PLANS

The new Ukrainian government has set out decentralisation and reform of local government as a top priority. The Arseniy Yatseniuk’s government had approved of local government reform on 1 April 2014, but most of the legislative changes were not adopted before the presidential elections on 25 May. The incoming President Petro Poroshenko spoke about decentralisation in his inaugural speech, in particular addressing the residents of the turbulent Donetsk and Lugansk regions. He promised to respect regional diversity in Ukraine, so that the rights of local communities to ‘distinct historical memory, pantheon of heroes and religious traditions’ and the use of regional languages are ensured. Decentralisation, along with early local elections and special status for the Russian language, are part of Poroshenko’s peace plan for Donbas. On 3 July, he presented a proposal on constitutional change to Parliament. It included a component designed to reform centre-periphery relations.

Government plans view decentralisation as a means of strengthening the power and institutional capacity of local communities, putting an end to the dominance of state administrations. A basic level of self-government would be concentrated at community level – cities, towns and groups of villages – which would be empowered with their own resources. Local government reform will probably go hand-in-hand with territorial reorganisation. The number of existing local councils and rayons is to be reduced by merging them into bigger units. By increasing the size of local communities and the share of revenue that goes to local administrations, the reform seeks to allocate more resources to the community level to improve local authority provision of services.

According to the presidential proposal, instead of the existing regional and sub-regional state administrations, the oblast and rayon directly elected assemblies would establish their own executive committees. The President would only appoint his representatives in the regions and rayons. The presidential representatives would only be responsible for ensuring that local authorities adhere to the Constitution and laws of Ukraine; that public order, human rights and civic freedoms are respected; and that the activities of territorial branches of the central authorities are coordinated. While the constitutional amendments should empower the elected local, sub-regional and regional assemblies, the introduction of presidential representatives would strengthen presidential influence in the regions at the expense of the government (of which the President is not the head). Unsurprisingly, this has been strongly criticised by Parliament.

In general, decentralisation will transfer a degree of power to local communities and authorities. This should bolster local democracy and improve prospects for local and regional development, provided that adequate mechanisms are established to ensure accountability and transparency. The reform also requires fiscal and budget decentralisation which can be achieved through amendments to the Tax and Budget codes so that local authorities have their own revenues and budget autonomy to better serve local communities.

Whereas the government aims to gain legislative approval for the reform as soon as possible, it is unlikely to make it possible for citizens to elect their new representatives in the local elections scheduled for 2015. The proposed changes of centre-periphery relations are part of a package of amendments to the constitution that also include heavily contested issues such as the balance of power between the president, cabinet of ministers and parliament.

Ukraine is heading towards parliamentary elections in October, and only if a new parliament is convened quickly and meets the necessary majorities for a constitutional change on the full package in two necessary readings, will the changes come into effect next year.

CONCLUSION

Public demand for better local governance expressed during the Euromaidan protests has increased the drive towards decentralisation. The momentum for decentralisation should be maintained and not derailed by upcoming elections and changing political interests as has happened so often in the past. Preparations for implementation – that can also help keep momentum – need to be effective to be able to hit the ground running after approval by a new parliament, hopefully early next year.

Decentralisation reform is however not the short-term answer to resolving the current armed insurgency and pro-Russian separatism in Donbas.

Indeed implementation of decentralisation in Donbas will only be possible if and when the security situation in that region has normalised. But when this is the case, decentralisation will be an essential ingredient of winning trust of Donbas residents. A difficult task as Russia is likely to continue pushing for Ukraine’s federalisation. This makes a realistic and nationally agreed decentralisation plan all the more imperative for Ukraine.

About the author:
Natalia Shapovalova is associate fellow at FRIDE.

Source:
This article was published by FRIDE as Policy Brief No 183 – JULY 2014, which may be accessed here. (PDF)

The post The Politics Of Regionalism And Decentralisation In Ukraine – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(Civil.Ge) — Tbilisi City Court accepted prosecution’s motion and ordered pre-trial detention of Georgia’s former President Mikheil Saakashvili in absentia.

Preliminary court hearing – the stage when a presiding judge, among other issues, decides on the admissibility of evidence submitted by the parties – has been set for September 22.

Prosecutor’s office has charged Saakashvili with exceeding official powers in connection to break up of the anti-government protest rallies on November 7, 2007, and raid on and “seizure” of Imedi TV station.

“Ahead of the August war [six-year] anniversary Putin could not have imagined more desirable present than Georgian authorities ordering my arrest,” Saakashvili said in a video address from the U.S., released on August 1 before the court’s ruling was announced after midnight on Saturday.

“This will be one of the most shameful pages of Georgia’s history,” he said.

“I am not going to turn up upon summoning of prosecutor’s office, controlled by Gazprom shareholder [referring to Georgia’s ex-PM Bidzina Ivanishvili] – I will be very far whenever they summon me, but I will be very close when the Georgian people call me,” Saakashvili said.

Judge Spartak Pavliashvili, who was transferred to the Tbilisi City Court from Tetritskaro court month ago, also accepted prosecution’s motion for pre-trial detention in absentia of Zurab Adeishvili, who was chief prosecutor in 2007 and Davit Kezerasvhili, then defense minister, who are co-accused in the same case.

Kezerashvili is already wanted in Georgia for other, unrelated criminal charges, but court in France declined Georgia’s request to extradite him. Adeishvili, who reportedly received asylum in Hungary, is also wanted by Georgia for number of other criminal charges.

Others who have also been charged in the same case are Vano Merabishvili, who was interior minister in 2007 and Gigi Ugulava, who at the time was Tbilisi mayor. Merabishvili, who is now jailed, was sentenced by the court to prison terms in two separate trials, one of them related to exceeding official powers in case involving break up of protest rally in Tbilisi in May, 2011. Ugulava is now in pre-trial detention pending trial in money laundering charges; he is already standing trial in number of other criminal charges, one of them related to Imedi TV.

Defense lawyers said that they would take the ruling to the Court of Appeals.

During the hearing, which started on Friday evening in a half-empty courtroom, one of the prosecutors Irakli Nadareishvili said that Mikheil Saakashvili has been repeatedly avoiding to cooperate in investigation and the prosecution was left with no other option than to ask for his pre-trial detention in absentia. Saakashvili was first summoned by prosecutor’s office for questioning in March and also offered interrogation via video link; he was then again summoned for questioning less than two days before criminal charges were filed against him on July 28.

Prosecutor argued that Saakashvili possesses both financial means and influence to exert pressure on witnesses. He also claimed that Saakashvili and other co-accused former high-ranking officials who remain at large, Adeishvili and Kezerashvili, “acted in concert” in committing the crime incriminated against them and there is a risk that they will continue coordination with each other to exert influence on or conspire with witnesses with the purpose of obstructing investigation.

Saakashvili’s defense lawyer, Otar Kakhidze, who also acts as Adeishvili’s lawyer, argued that charges against his clients are purely politically motivated and represent part of, what he called, ex-PM Bidzina Ivanishvili’s declared goal to destroy the opposition United National Movement party. He was also citing statements of Georgia’s Western partners expressing concerns over bringing criminal charges against Saakashvili.

Defense lawyers also claimed that the case is mainly built on a witness testimony of Nino Burjanadze, who was parliamentary chairperson in 2007. But prosecutors said that there were several direct witnesses other than Burjanadze in the case, among them Zaza Gogava, who was army chief of staff in 2007. Among the allegations leveled against Saakashvili is unlawful deployment of army troops in Tbilisi center on November 7, 2007 while riot police was breaking up protesters.

In his video address on August 1, Saakashvili said that those behind his prosecution would share Ukraine ex-president Viktor Yanukovych’s fate. H also said that wants a team of legal experts to be established, which would “document actions of not only of those who issued orders, but also of all the judges and prosecutors.”

“We should not need it for revenge, but we should recall that certain legal actions were taken against those in Ukraine who illegally arrested [Ukraine’s former interior minister Yuriy] Lutsenko and [former PM Yulia] Tymoshenko. Georgia will need these materials in the future,” Saakashvili said.

The post Georgia Court Orders Pre-Trial Detention For Saakashvili In Absentia appeared first on Eurasia Review.