By Kaveh L. Afrasiabi

Can Iran replicate the experience of last-minute US-India nuclear deal in November 2006? This is an interesting question as the November 24th deadline for an Iran deal looms closer.

Chances of a major breakthrough in the Vienna talks currently underway are subject to a great deal of speculation given the confidential nature of the intense negotiations, described by some Western diplomats as “positive and serious.”

Some pundits have written about a “general framework” agreement that would leave some critical details for further negotiations.

Others, like John Limbert, have prayed for a “miracle.” Still others are in favor of an extension, with some experts regarding it as inevitable given the complexity of issues and the remaining differences, while others point at the window of opportunity now that would be closed once the new Republican-dominated Congress convenes in January, 2015. Historical comparisons may be helpful here.

The US-India “nuclear sharing” agreement was reached after several years of tumultuous negotiations, and was signed by President George Bush when the ‘lame duck’ Congress was in session after an election that had resulted in the Republicans’ loss. Bush took advantage of the small window of time to get the deal done before the Democrat-dominated Congress could act.

According to the US negotiator at the time, Nicholas Burns, both sides showed a remarkable degree of flexibility “at the last minute” otherwise the deal would not have gone through. Interestingly, several weeks prior to that, the differences between the two sides had “sharpened” and had become more “focused.”

Yet, confronted with the reality of a deadline and a potentially hostile US Congress, the US and Indian negotiators stepped back from their hardened positions and showed new flexibility that led to the deal. Can this be the fate of the Iran nuclear deal? The answer will be clear in a precious few days, but at the moment of this writing the answer was clouded under a thick air of suspense.

Yet, it is rather abundantly clear that the parties have come too far and made too much progress — Russian envoy has been quoted as saying up to 95 percent of issues have been resolved — to allow a complete collapse. That would not bode well for either side and is therefore highly unlikely, though by no means impossible.

The more likely scenarios are (a) a comprehensive deal, (b) a general agreement with a short-term extension to work out the remaining differences, (c) an extension of interim agreement, i.e., Interim II. Of course, the best case scenario is a final-status agreement that would end the Iranian nuclear standoff and result in immediate, and concrete, benefits to all sides. It is estimated that such a deal would yield hundreds of billions of dollars of new trade and investment with Iran.

The various trade and financial ramifications of such a deal represent a major incentive for some of the negotiating parties such as France and Germany to show genuine interest in this scenario. Even the US companies have lined up for a major re-entry into the Iranian market and, therefore, it is not in US’s own interest to play spoiler by making proposals that would be unacceptable in Tehran. Clearly, any nuclear deal that does not respect Iran’s rights and would be considered a lop-sided deal cannot be politically feasible in Iran.

On the other hand, the domestic hurdles in both Tehran and Washington can be handled if the required flexibility is adopted by both sides, in light of the rhetoric of some Western diplomats conveying the false perception that only Iran is required to do so. What these diplomats ignore is that for the deal to materialize, the US and other Western powers need to stop playing hard-ball with the two principal issues of Iran’s centrifuges and the removal of sanctions. Otherwise, the internal critics of a deal would be exonerated in their skepticism that the West wants to take most of the benefits from the deal while giving up very little.

In conclusion, as the clock winds down to the deadline, the US negotiators would be well-advised to take another look at the process of negotiations with India and their predecessors’ last minute flexibility, otherwise they must deal with the unwanted consequence of failure and a nuclear crisis that is up for grabs for a mutually-satisfactory win-win resolution.

*Kaveh Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of several books on Iran’s foreign policy. His writings have appeared on several online and print publications, including UN Chronicle, New York Times, Der Tagesspiegel, Middle East Journal, Harvard International Review, and Brown’s Journal of World Affairs, Guardian, Russia Today, Washington Post, San Francisco Chronicle, Boston Globe, Mediterranean Affairs, Nation, Telos, Der Tageszeit, Hamdard Islamicus, Iranian Journal of International Affairs, Global Dialogue.

The post Iran Nuclear Talks And US – India Deal: A Comparison appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Sony Pictures has pulled out of the Steve Jobs biopic.

The movie – which had Danny Boyle attached as director and Aaron Sorkin managing the script – has been put into turnaround, Digital Spy reports citing Deadline.

Christian Bale was due to play the late tech pioneer but withdrew after deciding that he wasn’t the right man to portray Jobs.

Michael Fassbender was hotly-tipped to replace Bale, while Seth Rogen was said to be playing Apple co-founder Steve Wozniak alongside Interstellar’s Jessica Chastain in an unspecified role.

Leonardo DiCaprio was also previously linked to the project, which would have seen him reunite with his Beach director Boyle.

It is understood that Universal Pictures may now make a bid for the movie.

Sorkin has used Jobs’s authorised biography by Walter Isaacson for the film, which focuses on three stressful, high-profile Apple product launches including the first Macintosh in 1984 and the iPod in 2001.

The post Sony Pictures Drops Steve Jobs Biopic appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The number of foreign citizens registered with the Spanish Social Security System stood at 1,566,953 in October, a decline of 0.97% on the previous month.

The highest figures for foreign workers correspond to Romania, Morocco, China and Ecuador, with 270,985, 183,058, 91,554 and 73,280, respectively.

La Rioja, Andalusia, Castile-Leon and the Region of Valencia are the autonomous regions posting the highest month-on-month increases (14.17%, 5.71%, 5.56% and 4.09% respectively). In contrast, Castile-La Mancha (-18.52%), the Balearic Islands (-15.17%), and Aragon (-7.16%) posted the largest declines.

The figures recorded for October show that 928,886 of the total foreign citizens registered with the Spanish Social Security system are from countries outside of the European Union, with the remaining 639,068 from EU countries.

The majority of foreign citizens are registered under the General Regime: 1,321,230, a figure that includes the Special System for Agricultural Workers (185,244) and the Special System for Domestic Workers (209,161). This is followed by the Special Regime for Self-Employed Workers (241,140), the Special Regime for Seamen (4,323) and the Special Regime for Coal Workers (260).

Catalonia is the autonomous region with the highest average number of foreign citizens registered with the system; 354,091 (22.60%). This is followed by the Region of Madrid, with 326,971 (20.87%); Andalusia, with 188,419 (12.02%); and the Region of Valencia, with 169,888 (10.84%).

By gender, of the total foreign citizens in the system, 841,563 are men and 725,388 are women.

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The financial crisis has taken its toll on household consumption. It’s not news that the unemployed are spending less. But new research from Spain suggests that they’re not the only ones who are cutting back. Consumption is down even among those who have kept their jobs and salaries.

A rising unemployment rate casts a long shadow, according to a 2014 working paper by IESE’s Rolf Campos and co-author Iliana Reggio. Present income is important, but expectations of future income also have significant effects on household spending in unstable economic times.

While many studies have examined the changes in consumption habits of the unemployed, Campos and Reggio focus on households that are not experiencing unemployment themselves, but perceive the threat of it hanging over their heads.

Pain in Spain

The research homes in on Spain, where the unemployment rate soared by 13 percentage points — from 8.5 percent to 21.6 percent — between 2006 and 2011. The spending habits of millions of Spaniards were directly affected by unemployment, naturally enough. Yet the drop in consumption during this period was significant enough to suspect that something further was going on.

Indeed it was. The study concludes that Spanish households that did not themselves experience unemployment significantly reduced their consumption in response to a rise in the unemployment rate. Specifically, a one percentage point increase in the average unemployment rate implied a drop of more than 0.7 percent in household consumption per equivalent adult.

What’s more, the study showed that people weren’t just cutting down on quality or buying the cheaper option, they were also cutting down on quantity.

Age, Education and Unemployment

The authors considered a final sample of 17,182 households, sub-grouped according to age and education level. In these households, the primary earners were continuously employed for the two year period covered by the two annual interviews for this study.

The sample was further narrowed to focus results on consistent earners. Households in which the primary earner was self-employed were discarded, along with households in which the primary earner changed from year to year.

Sub-grouping by age and education allowed the authors to define trends within the general reduction in consumption. The two youngest age groups, containing workers aged 25 to 44, cut back more than older households that contained workers approaching retirement. For the 25- to 44-year-old age bracket, a one percentage point increase in the average unemployment rate implied a drop of close to 0.8 percent in consumption. For 45- to 54-year-olds and 55- to 64-year-olds, that drop was 0.6 percent and 0.2 percent, respectively.

Results were also filtered by job type. Public sector jobs are generally considered to be more stable than private sector jobs in Spain, and they have, in fact, proved more resilient to the crisis. This perception was reflected in the consumption statistics. Households employed by the public sector cut back less (0.5 percent per percentage point) in the face of the soaring unemployment than those employed in the private sector (0.8 percent).

Results for both age and sector tallied with the hypothesis that it is fear for the future, rather than present circumstances, putting a damper on consumption.

Food for Thought

Not only do employed households living in a situation of growing unemployment consume less, but that less manifests as fewer items, rather than simply less money spent.

Food consumption can directly affect welfare, and is the focus of many studies on consumption reduction. Campos and Reggio examine food consumed both at and away from home and find significant drops in both. In fact, food consumption overall dropped 1.1 percent for every percentage point increase in unemployment.

Sometimes people can consume less and spend less money but eat better. This is often the case among retirees. The extra time gained by not working may be used to comparison shop for lower prices and also to prepare food at home — which is usually a much cheaper option than buying prepared foods.

This pattern can also be found in unemployed households, for the same reason: more time. But this seems not to be the case with the households studied here. No time is gained when members of a household remain employed, and the authors’ research does not support a fall in prices. Instead, they find, households are spending less and purchasing less.

“The absence of a fall in prices indicates a reduction in actual quantities purchased,” the authors explain, “and therefore a plausible effect on welfare.”

The correlation between a rising unemployment rate and a reduction in consumption are clear. The shadow of unemployment dampens spending — even spending by the fully employed. What remains to be seen is how quickly domestic demand may recover once job prospects look stronger.

The post Spain And The Shadow Of Unemployment appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Nohad Topalian

Lebanese Prime Minister Tammam Salam met with senior Emirati officials this week in Dubai to discuss ways to boost co-operation between the two countries.

The two-day visit with Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum — UAE vice president, prime minister and ruler of Dubai — and Emirati Foreign Affairs Minister Sheikh Anwar Gargash underscored the need for moderation and centrism in the face of groups such as the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) and al-Nusra Front, officials said.

The UAE also affirmed its continuing support for Lebanon in its “war against terrorism”, they said.

Salam’s visit to the UAE was one in a series he is making to Gulf states including Saudi Arabia , Kuwait and Qatar to affirm the historical relations between Lebanon and these countries and bolster counter-terrorism co-operation.

The results of his latest visit are expected to translate into discussions to be held by Lebanese Defence Minister Samir Moqbel during his visit to the UAE on November 26th.

Prime Minister Salam told Al-Shorfa his visit “aimed to solidify the historical relations between the two countries”.

The UAE has always stood by Lebanon during all its crises, he added.

Concerted efforts

Salam said the counter-terrorism issue was the most prominent dossier at the discussions table.

“Terrorism and the increase in violent and inhumane practices in the name of Islam are main topics of concern for all Arab leaders, and they concern every Arab official and every Arab citizen,” he said.

“No Arab individual or people, no matter how stable and safe their country is, are immune from terrorism seeping into their country, thus requiring everyone to join in standing up to and confronting it, and [calls for] concerted efforts to put an end to it by various means.”

Salam commended the UAE’s support of Lebanon.

This backing, he said, “will take different forms, starting with intensive communication and dialogue to address all the requirements for this confrontation, some of which pertain to supporting the army militarily and providing it with the equipment it needs, and others relate to strengthening the infrastructure to [help Lebanon] cope with the burden of hosting displaced Syrians”.

“The UAE was one of the first countries to send aid to Lebanon, and still does, to help meet its needs in responding to this humanitarian issue,” he added.

The UAE and other Gulf states have provided Lebanon with considerable co-operation and support, he said, urging readiness in “meeting the challenges of terrorist violence”.

Military aid to Lebanon

Lebanese Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, who accompanied Salam on his visit, said diplomacy between the two countries has already translated into aid, with military equipment at the forefront.

These talks were tantamount “to laying the foundation of a new phase”, he told Al-Shorfa, adding that the visit yielded results including support on several levels, starting with helping Lebanon combat terrorism.

“Lebanon made the right choice — given its capabilities and the international framework — in participating in the war on terrorism,” Bassil said.

“The UAE visit benefits Lebanon and solidifies its natural relationship with the Arab world,” he said. “We strive to have good relations with the world, particularly with countries that have tremendous capacity to help us, bearing in mind that the UAE and other countries have helped us and continue to do so.”

Analyst and journalist Walid Choucair said the UAE has supported Lebanon in the past and it will continue to do so.

Co-ordination and co-operation is currently taking place between Lebanon, the UAE and other Arab and Gulf countries in regard to tracking groups such as ISIL and al-Qaeda, he told Al-Shorfa.

The post Lebanon, UAE Pledge Moderation, Joint Efforts Against Terrorism appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Siham Ali in Rabat

Controversy has erupted in Morocco over the economic recommendations given by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to Moroccan authorities.

In parliament, MPs debating the draft 2015 Finance Law criticised the interference of international bodies in the Moroccan budget.

Constitutional Union MP Chaoui Belassel took issue specifically with the IMF directives to reform the Subsidies Fund and the Moroccan Pension Fund.

This view was shared by the leader of the Istiqlal group in the Chamber of Representatives, Noureddine Mediane, who said that the government was failing to consider the interests of the public and obeying the requirements of the IMF, leading the country into dependence in terms of its economic decision-making.

The government defended itself from these allegations.

Finance Minister Mohamed Boussaid said that the government was entirely independent in its decision-making and pointed out that Morocco had no debts to the IMF that would force it to comply with the organisation’s requirements.

The precautionary and liquidity line granted to Morocco by the IMF represents an insurance policy for the Moroccan economy and will not be used, he noted.

This line allows the country to take out international loans on advantageous terms, the minister said.

He underlined that contrary to the recommendations of international bodies, Morocco has focused on boosting industrialisation in 2015 in order to strengthen its economy.

IMF representative Jean-François Dauphin on Monday (November 17th) said in Rabat that his visit fell under the scope of article 4 of the IMF Articles of Agreement with regard to assessing the economic health of a country such as Morocco.

“The aim of this visit is not to impose anything,” he said.

Dauphin hailed the reform of the Subsidies Fund and called on the government to implement the pending changes to the Moroccan Pension Fund.

He also urged redoubled efforts to improve the situation of the most vulnerable members of society with regard to health, infrastructure, housing and employment.

For economist Mehdi El Hakim, the government is being criticised because it is seeking to achieve macroeconomic balance as recommended by the IMF at the expense of public welfare.

This criticism, he said, is being echoed at the international level, especially since the IMF has done nothing to improve the economy in several countries where it has intervened.

“During her visit to Morocco in May 2014, the Managing Director of the IMF, Christine Lagarde, called for the reforms to continue even though they are painful. It is this kind of recommendation that creates controversy,” he added.

Many Moroccans said they wanted the government to focus more on social welfare, instead of taking technical measures to satisfy international organisations.

The government’s economic management must be independent of international bodies whose guidelines do not prioritise the public’s interests, worker Karima Taki, 42, told Magharebia.

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By Roozbeh Aliabadi

In recent months markets have witnessed a more noticeable decline in oil prices, mainly due to a combination of oversupply and the weakening demand growth.

On the production side, oil supply to global markets is at all-time high. The United States alone produces the highest level in three decades – approximately 9 million barrels a day. And Libya, which has been recovering in recent months, has been adding over a million barrels a day to the global supply.

Oil demand that was once expected to see growth in countries like China, Russia and India has not met such growth expectations. Therefore, these two factors – oversupply with weakening demand growth – resulted in big fall in prices since June.

Historically OPEC, which views its role in the global oil market as a balancer, has acted in a way to try to balance the oil market. But in recent months some of the big heavyweights in OPEC seem more interested in defending their own markets than cutting productions to put a hold on the falling prices.

Traditionally, OPEC has agreed to cut supply but it is far from certain whether they will be able to do that now as next OPEC meeting in Vienna is underway on November 27th. The meeting will be very closely watched to see whether the members will agree to take some supply off the market to try to balance it again or whether there is going to be no agreement, which could lead to fall in prices even further.

The current environment, if continued, will pose a serious challenge for countries that depend heavily on oil to meet their budget requirements since many of them have implicitly high break-even numbers.

For instance, Russia and Iraq are faced particularly with difficult circumstances also partially because of broader geopolitical tensions that exist.

Russia, already squeezed by inflation and a drastic decline in its currency, has found its ability to borrow money severely curbed by the recent sanctions and its budget could fall into deficit next year if prices were to stay in the range they are in now.

Iraq is facing a costly and potentially open-ended military conflict against the Islamic State. The government in Baghdad is faced with skyrocketing public expenditure requirements, large public payroll, food and energy subsidies as well as a ramshackle armed forces.

Some other oil producing countries are also experiencing substantially more budgetary pain from the decline in prices.

Venezuela, because of economic problems with limited options in responding to the price decline, is forced to leave less money for social spending, government payrolls and subsidized imports of vital goods.

Nigeria, facing political uncertainty as preparing for its presidential election next year and falling oil prices is changing the political calculus.

In the world of politics some are suggesting that there might be a global oil war underway with the United States and Saudi Arabia on one side against Russia and Iran on the other.

Regardless of the dynamics of these alliances – coincidentally or intentionally – the net result has been to make life difficult for Russia and Iran at a time when the United States and Saudi Arabia are confronting both of them in a proxy war in Syria.

But neither Moscow nor Tehran will collapse tomorrow in this oil war. And if prices fall below $70 [we] will see a drop in US production, as some exploration won’t be cost effective and therefore prices could certainly firm up.

It is undoubtedly clear that price falloff serves US and Saudi strategic interests and it harms Russia and Iran. But in the near term, these big producers will probably face budget problems in varying degrees of severity, with an array of economic, strategic and political aftermaths.

It is also likely that Saudi Arabia may allow lower prices to continue, in part to squeeze its main rivals — Iran and Russia — and in part to put pressure on shale oil producers in the United States, whose higher production costs make it harder for them to compete when prices are lower abroad.

It is no secret that Saudi’s relatively low production cost and its domestic spending program allow for a balanced budget a price of roughly $95 a barrel, compared with $100 or more for Russia and even more for Iran. Saudi Arabia also has huge cash reserves to prop up its budget while prices remain low.

The real question for Saudi Kingdom is how much they are willing to eat into their cash reserves and for how long until they adjust production down.

In the case of Iran, the current descent in oil prices is not likely to drive the country to strike a nuclear deal with the West by Nov 24th deadline. Some would argue it might push Iran into greater compromise if the talks are extended and the low prices persist. It should be recognized that Iran has become more resilient to the oil prices — having one of the highest fiscal break-even price of all the oil exporting countries, the country has suffered from ‘under-priced’ oil for a while, and that hasn’t had a substantial impact on their behavior.

Therefore, it could be argued that oil prices are pretty far down the list of things that affect Iran’s calculation at the negotiating table on its nuclear energy program.

Another reason for Iran’s resilience is that the country does not actually feel much of the day-to-day storm of the markets because the sanctions require that most of its oil revenue accumulate in escrow accounts outside the country and used for bilateral trades.

Thus far, economic and political factors have added up to a very sloppy oil market, which has been driving prices lower. Normally, falling oil prices would boost global growth. One thing is certain, that the global economy is certainly weak today. Surely, global demand for oil is likely to increase again once the global economy picks up. But even an increase in demand might not drive up prices substantially if new production sources like shale oil, along with more fuel efficient technologies in industrialized countries, maintain an overabundance of oil on the market.

The post ‘Oil War’ And Next OPEC Meeting – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Besar Likmeta

A document obtained by BIRN shows that OLAF is investigating complaints against a tender held in May by the EU Delegation in Tirana.

“OLAF has reviewed the information received in accordance Regulation No 883/2013 and has opened an investigation,” the document reads.

The investigation centres on the tender for the EURALIUS IV project, which was held in May 2014 for a value of 4 million euro and which a German consulting company, IRZ, won.

Both the EU Delegation in Tirana and the German company have denied any wrongdoing.

“The allegation about irregularities with regard to the EURALIUS IV evaluation are wrong and are firmly rejected by the European Commission,” Clive Rumbold, head of the political and economic section at the EU Delegation, told BIRN in a statement.

‘The evaluation was done by a team of professional staff, which based their decision on technical criteria in line with the EU procedures,” he added.

IRZ described the allegations of corruption in the tender as “sour grapes” on the part of disappointed competitors in the procurement process.

EURALIUS is the European Assistance Mission to the Albanian justice system. The project aims is to “bring the Albanian Justice System closer to EU standards through technical assistance drawn from EU Member States”.

It supports the reform of the judicial system in Albania “in accordance with the priorities of the EU acquis in Judiciary and Fundamental Rights and European best practices and standards in the area”.

The first EURALIUS mission in Albania was first launched under the EU CARDS 2002 programme and was implanted by a consortium that included the ministries of justice of Germany and Italy. The project was extended from 2007 to 2010 and was renamed EURALIUS II.

The third EURALIUS mission was based on a grant funded by the Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance, IPA, and implemented by the Spanish Ministry of Justice in consortium with the Italian High Council of Magistrates.

Accusations about the EURALIUS tender first appeared in the semi-official blog of the EURALIUS III mission on May 14.

A post on the blog alleged that the EU Delegation’s decision to grant the EURALIUS IV contract to a consortium led by a German firm, with participation of Austria, was “purely political and obviously against EU laws and rules”.

The blog post, entitled “Corruption in the EU Delegation to Albania,” a copy of which was obtained by BIRN, was live only for five days. It was taken offline on May 19 under pressure from the EU Delegation in Tirana.

“In different conversations, experts and officers of EU Delegation have recognized that the other proposal (led by Spain, with participation of Italy and France) was technically much better and more convenient for reform of justice,” the posting on the website read.

“However, they justify the decision in political pressures received from the current Socialist Party Albanian government,” the blog post claimed.

Former members of the Spanish-Italian team who ran EURALIUS III and also bid in the tender for the new mission claim the decision to award the Germans the contract was politically motivated and accuse the EU Delegation in Albania of corruption.

In an interview with BIRN, the former head of the EURALIUS III mission, Joaquin Urias, backed the allegations posted in the blog and accused the EU Delegation of a lack of transparency and incompetence.

“Our proposal is accurate based on what is going on in the justice system in Albania, while the Germans do not even have a High Council of Justice,” Urias told BIRN.

He was referring to the fact that the High Council of Justice is one of the Albanian institutions that the EURALIUS IV is tasked with reforming.

Although Urias denied authoring the post of the EURALIUS blog, he said the allegations in the post were credible and he questioned the tender procedure.

“I cannot be sure it is corruption but the issue smells bad,” he added.

A former law professor at the University of Seville and Councilor in the Spanish Constitutional Court, Urias ran the EURALIUS III mission from 2010 to June 2013. After the mission ended, the EU Delegation in Tirana employed him until early 2014.

Urias accused the EU Delegation of a lack of transparency in the way it distributed assistance funds.

“You have 4 million euro for technical assistance, not 4 million euro to keep happy the government,” Urias underlined.  “The problem is when they use EU money like it is their money,” he added.

During his work for the EU Delegation in Tirana, he covered justice reforms for Albania’s annual progress report, drafted by the European Commission.

Urias claimed the politicians in Tirana were only playing lip-service to Brussels when it comes to reforms while the local EU Delegation was too weak and at times too incompetent to pressure them.

“Some of the EU staff are not good professionals,” Urias said.  “If, in our countries [like Spain], people knew how weak the EU is in negotiating with other countries [like Albania], it would be a big shock, a scandal,” he concluded.

The post EU’s Albania Delegation Probed Over Justice Tender appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has sparked anger and confusion by including several prominent Western Muslim charities and civil society groups in a new list of “terrorist organizations” together with Al Qaeda, Boko Haram and the so-called Islamic State.

Islamic Relief, a respected UK-based international aid agency; the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the largest Muslim civil rights and advocacy organization in the US; and the Muslim Association of Britain are among some of the international associations and foundations included on the list which is dominated by groups linked to the Muslim Brotherhood but also includes a number of Shia Muslim movements.

Representatives from the British groups have told IRIN of their shock at being named on the list and some say they are considering legal action. The governments of Norway and the UK also confirmed they are seeking official clarifications from the UAE.

It is not clear whether anyone associated with the named groups would be arrested if they were to travel through the UAE, a popular global air transit hub, especially for aid workers working in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

And likewise it is unclear whether UAE residents who provide financial or other support to the organizations – or even maintain contact with them – could be breaking the law or not.

No-one from the Emirati government was able to comment to IRIN on the list, and as of 17 November no information had been made public about criteria for inclusion on the list or what evidence the UAE authorities had to suspect or determine these alleged terrorist links. In some cases there is even confusion about exactly which organizations have been named.

Denials All Round

“Islamic Relief is a purely humanitarian organization. We abhor terrorism in all its forms, and we categorically refute any allegation of links to terrorism and any such accusations that have been made by the UAE,” said Martin Cottingham, spokesman for the charity, which partners with the UN and is a member of the UK’s Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) grouping.

“We assume that our inclusion on the UAE list can only be attributable to a mistake. We do not have a presence or any programmes in the UAE. Islamic Relief Worldwide will be seeking clarification from the UAE Embassy on this matter, with a view to having this wrongful listing removed.” he added.

A spokesman for the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), which in 2013 gave GB£3.2million (US$5million) to Islamic Relief, told IRIN: “All of our funding to UK charities is subject to strict controls to ensure it is used only as intended.

“The UK is seeking further clarity from the Emiratis on their rationale for some of these designations, and any practical implications,” he added.

Omer El-Hamdoon, president of the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), a community-focused advocacy organization, also hit out.

“It is an outrage that we have been named on this list,” he told IRIN. “Our organization works hard to counter extremism. we condemn all acts of terror. and we work from the grassroots up to promote a moderate understanding of Islam.”

“We will be contacting both the UAE authorities for clarification as well as our lawyers to explore our legal options,” he added.

This call for more information was echoed by CAIR, which in a statement described the list as “shocking and bizarre”, and by Anas Altikriti, of the UK-based Cordoba Foundation, who like the others said he was yet to be contacted by anyone from the UAE. ]

There has been some confusion over the translation of the names on the list, which appeared differently in Arabic and English. In one translation shared by the UAE state news agency, MAB was referred to in English as the Islamic Association in Britain.

Geneva-based rights group Al Karama Foundation, which in the past has been highly critical of the UAE, is unsure whether the “Al Karama Association” named on the list means its organization, or another one with a similar name.

Media coordinator Colombe Vergès said: “For now, and until we have been formally notified by the [UAE], we do not feel concerned about this grotesque listing.”

The UAE is not the first country to accuse aid and civil society groups of having terror links. Tough post 9/11 counter-terror legislation in a number of countries, especially the UK and the US, has put a new spotlight on many faith-based Muslim organizations. Britain’s Charity Commission is currently investigating four British groups over their aid work in Syria, IRIN has learned.

Islamic Relief, which has over 100 global branches and delivers aid in partnership with the UN agencies such as the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), has also faced accusations of association with the Palestinian militant group Hamas, which has links to the Muslim Brotherhood. Islamic Relief has repeatedly denied the claims.

“Every government has a right to investigate an organization if they suspect it has terrorist links, but there needs to be a clear and transparent process,” said Wendy Fenton, coordinator of the Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN) hosted by the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), which earlier this month published a paper called Counter-Terrorism Laws and Regulations – What Aid Agencies Need to Know.

“We need some transparency. What is their evidence for calling someone like Islamic Relief, which runs UK-government-funded programmes, a terror organization?” echoed Chris Doyle, director of the Council for Arab-British understanding (CAABU).

He said it was interesting that the UAE had followed Saudi Arabia’s lead to publish a list of terrorist organizations.

“What we can see is that the UAE is really trying to position itself in the vanguard of combating terror, to be seen as a country that is taking a tough line, while the US is regarded by many in the region to weak or vacillating,” he explained.

In September the UAE joined Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain and Qatar to support the US-led bombing campaign targeting the so-called Islamic State in Syria. It has also started a bombing campaign in Libya against Islamic militants.

Reputational Damage

Fenton declined to speculate on the reasons for the inclusion of a charity like Islamic Relief on the list, or the impact that would have, but said that terrorism allegations – even if later proven inaccurate – were a hard stain to shift.

“Once a group has been included on one of these lists, whether they are later removed or not, the negative label tends to stick and it can be very difficult to get rid of the stigma associated with that,” she explained.

“It can undermine donor confidence and an organization’s credibility and it can affect that group’s ability to operate and what sort of funding it can attract.”

Although it was only released late on 15 November, the UAE’s list was drafted in August, when the government also announced it had beefed up its anti-terror legislation.

The revised law defines a terrorist offence as “any action or inaction made a crime by this law and every action or inaction made a crime by any other law if they are carried out for a terrorist cause”.

Its penalties include fines of up to US$27million, life imprisonment and capital punishment.

Rights groups like Amnesty International have been highly critical of the UAE for imposing terror charges on political activists but the government strongly defends its get-tough approach.

Despite the controversy overseas about this list, its publication has been warmly praised by domestic commentators and national newspaper editorials.

The post UAE’s New Terror List Sparks Outrage appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Francis Wade

A heated debate broke out in Burma’s lower house Monday over efforts by the opposition to overhaul the constitution prior to the 2015 elections. As per previous debates, the military contingent – which takes up a quarter of seats and thereby wields effective veto over such matters – resisted the idea that charter reform, and allowing Aung San Suu Kyi to run for president, might benefit the country. “I would like you all to remember that the constitution is not written for just a person but for the future of everyone,” Colonel Htay Naing, one of the uniformed MPs, told parliament.

But he deployed another buzz phrase that illustrates very succinctly how the military perpetuates the myth that it is the only viable protector of a country beset by internal discord. The constitution shouldn’t be changed, Col. Htay Naing added, because ongoing fighting in the border regions threatened to destabilize Burma. Therefore “unity”, in the shape of fealty to a constitution the junta rushed through in 2008 amid the chaos of Cyclone Nargis, is required.

This raises several questions. One concerns the reasons as to why Burmese should wish to stand by a constitution that was passed amid conditions that make a mockery of democratic processes (it allegedly received 98% of the vote from a 92% turnout, despite the fact that several million people had been left destitute by the cyclone, on top of the several million more in conflict zones that were unable to vote). Suu Kyi’s party earlier this year collected signatures from 10% of the population wanting a referendum on the constitution, suggesting that not all are in agreement with Htay Naing’s vision of “the future of everyone”.

More pertinently, however, he exploited a situation in the border regions that the military plays a direct role in fueling. Despite some progress in ceasefire talks, bouts of heavy fighting are ongoing, with the army continuing to attack civilians. But Htay Naing’s logic follows that the instability resulting from the fighting, which the military is arguably the key driver of, is apparently reason enough for it to retain power. It’s a useful illustration of the circular strategy of the military – perpetuate instability, draw on it to justify dominance, and then refer back to it when that power is challenged.

Were this merely a case of one man pointing to one incident then it wouldn’t be means for great concern. But it’s a strategy the elite in Burma has used for decades to both rationalize its rule, and to cast those who challenge it as criminal saboteurs bent on destabilizing the union. It can be used to illuminate the more subtle ways in which the military, or those in government who share its resistance to democratic transition, has actively sought to foment unrest that it can then capitalize on – one example being the Buddhist-Muslim violence.

On top of the various suggestions that security forces played an active role in aiding Buddhist mobs (not to mention the decades of anti-Muslim government propaganda that has helped normalize the current-day attacks on Muslims), government ministers have been fingered for complicity – Aung Thaung, a powerful MP known to be close to former junta leader Than Shwe, was recently sanctioned by the US government reportedly for his role in provoking anti-Muslim sentiment (the US government isn’t the only one to share this suspicion).

Indeed when violence first broke out in Rakhine state in June 2012, prominent Rakhines called for troops to come in and “protect” them against the Rohingya. This is despite the fact that the Rakhine have a long history of quite vitriolic resentment towards the Burmese military and have continually resisted its efforts to influence the affairs of the state.

In this sense it’s plain to see how the military actively benefits from instability – Colonel Htay Naing spelled it out quite clearly. Why this is of particular concern with regards the constitution is that this document, were it revised, could be the one thing that dilutes the military’s power, and then codifies a new order in which the military doesn’t have veto over legislation in what should be a civilian parliament. Resisting this will have a serious impact on whether something approaching a genuine form of democracy ever emerges in Burma. At present, however, conflict clearly remains politically profitable, and because of that we may see the military continue to stoke it for some time.

The post How The Burmese Military Perpetuates Its Own Myth – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The interminable Israel-Palestine dispute is replete with paradoxes.

At the most basic level, there is no doubt that Arab opinion as a whole resents the presence of the state of Israel in its midst.

Palestinians regard Israel’s Declaration of Independence in 1948 as a disaster, and mark it annually with their own Nakba Day (“Day of Catastrophe”). Mahmoud Abbas, the President of the Palestinian Authority (the PA), leads a Fatah party whose charter states quite unequivocally that Palestine, with the boundaries that it had during the British Mandate – that is, before the existence of Israel – is an indivisible territorial unit and is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people. Each Palestinian, it declares, must be prepared for the armed struggle and be ready to sacrifice both wealth and life to win back his homeland.

A first glaring anomaly, therefore, is the fact that Abbas has spent the past ten years nominally supporting the “two-state solution”, and pressing for recognition of a sovereign Palestine within the boundaries that existed on 5 June 1967 – that is, on the day before the Six-Day War. Given the founding beliefs of his party, this tactic – inherited from his predecessor, Yassir Arafat – obviously represents only the first stage in a strategy ultimately designed to gain control of the whole of Mandate Palestine, an objective explicit in what he says in the Arabic media, but which he never expresses in his statements to the world.

This underlying reality of the Israel-Palestine dispute explains why every attempt to negotiate a resolution has failed. No Palestinian leader, whatever position he adopts to placate world opinion, dare sign up finally to a two-state solution, since to do so would be to concede that Israel has an acknowledged and legitimate place within Mandate Palestine – and that would instantly brand him a traitor to the Palestinian cause.

This is why the plethora of dates strewn across the recent history of the Middle East mark well-intentioned, but ultimately doomed, efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – the Madrid Conference in 1991, the Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995, the Wye River Memorandum in 1998, the Camp David Summit in 2000, the Road Map for Peace in 2003, the Annapolis process in 2007, the Obama administration’s direct peace talks of September 2010 followed by its second, intensive effort, led by US Secretary of State John Kerry, over 2013-2014.

However close the Palestinian leadership may have reached over the years in negotiating a two-state solution – and some deals offered them virtually all they asked for – in the final analysis they always baulk at signing on the dotted line, because to do so would be to acknowledge Israel’s place, as of right, in Mandate Palestine, thus betraying the core principle they have inculcated into the Palestinian narrative.

As a matter of historical fact, all those abortive initiatives might have been superfluous. A sovereign Palestine could have been up and running alongside Israel some twenty-five years ago, before the PLO gained control of Palestinian policy. For preceding them was the top-secret accord reached between Israel and Jordan in 1987, at a time when Jordan controlled the West Bank and East Jerusalem, having annexed them in 1950, and was in a position to negotiate a binding peace agreement.

Top-secret at the time, today the deal is a matter of public record. Shimon Peres, then Israel’s foreign affairs minister, negotiated with King Hussein of Jordan what became known as the “London Agreement” − signed on 11 April 1987 during a secret meeting held at the residence of Lord Mishcon, a leading UK lawyer and a prominent member of the Jewish community. Also present were Jordan’s prime minister, Zaid al-Rifai, and the director general of Israel’s foreign affairs ministry, Yossi Beilin. When it was signed on behalf of Jordan and Israel, it can confidently be assumed that the terms of a comprehensive peace deal had been virtually agreed between them.

The sting was in the tail of the document. “The above understanding is subject to the approval of the respective governments of Israel and Jordan.” With the king as signatory, the approval of the Jordanian government was a foregone conclusion. The problem was that in 1987 Israel was ruled by a fragile and uncertain “national unity government” in which ministers were attempting – often unsuccessfully – to suppress diametrically opposite political beliefs in the interests of providing the nation with effective government. The prime minister, Yitzhak Shamir, led the right-wing Likud party; Shimon Peres represented the left-wing Labor party in the cabinet. Chalk and cheese. Although Shamir permitted his foreign minister to undertake the secret negotiations and travel to London, he did not approve of the outcome, fearing that Israel would be forced into a solution that would be unacceptable to his party and prove divisive in the country.

Consequently he opposed the agreement, and Peres failed to get the cabinet’s endorsement. King Hussein, disappointed, disengaged from the peace process, and Yassir Arafat, then Chairman of the PLO, launched the first intifada in December 1987. In July 1988 Hussein withdrew Jordan’s claim to sovereignty over the West Bank, and the course of the next quarter-century was set – a course which saw the PA nominally engage in numerous attempts to reach a two-state solution, while ensuring that each and every attempt ended in failure.

It was before the conclusion of the latest futile attempt at peace negotiations, in April 2014, that Mahmoud Abbas decided on a new tactic. While never renouncing his nominal adherence to the two-state solution, he determined to by-pass peace negotiations in favor of seeking international recognition of the State of Palestine and international de-legitimization of the State of Israel. So far he has not been unsuccessful. During October 2014 not only was the State of Palestine formally recognized by 135 of the 193 UN member states, but Sweden became the first EU state officially to do so, while a non-binding vote in the British parliament recognized “the state of Palestine alongside the state of Israel, as a contribution to securing a negotiated two-state solution.” The Spanish government did something similar last week, and the French government plans to do the same later in November.

Ambiguities lie at the heart of this profusion of recognitions. First, do these well-meaning parliamentarians appreciate that a two-state solution cuts across core Palestinian beliefs? Then, with well over a million Palestinians living in the Gaza strip, the “Palestine” that is being recognized should include Gaza. Although Abbas is heading what is nominally a “national unity government”, in fact Fatah and Hamas are at daggers drawn and his writ does not run in Gaza.

Hamas, which governs Gaza and could well emerge victorious in any future Palestinian elections, rejects the two-state solution and is intent on defeating and eliminating Israel through terror and armed conflict. How do the well-meaning states intent on recognizing a State of Palestine “as a contribution to securing a negotiated two-state solution” square those particular circles?

The post Recognizing Palestine: Anomalies And Ambiguities – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

A 12-year-old boy, who was shot in the stomach by the police while playing with a toy gun “resembling” a real pistol, has died in a Cleveland hospital.

The youngster passed away on Sunday morning at the Metro Health Medical Center, the family’s attorney said.

The shooting occurred on Saturday around 3:30 pm at Cudell Rec Center located at 1910 West Boulevard, Cleveland, Ohio after police responded to a distress call about a male allegedly threatening people near the center with a gun.

Police Patrolman’s Association president Jeff Follmer said “the 12-year-old had a weapon,” according to Newsnet5 Cleveland, and he allegedly refused officer commands and reached into his waistband before being shot twice by an officer “relatively new” on the force.

According to Cleveland police statement, upon arrival on scene, officers located the suspect and advised him to raise his hands.

“The suspect did not comply with the officers’ orders and reached to his waistband for the gun. Shots were fired and the suspect was struck in the torso,” the statement reads.

Upon further investigation, the boy’s “weapon” turned out to be an air gun “resembling a semi-automatic pistol, with the orange safety indicator removed,” the statement adds.

One officer somehow managed to receive an injury to his ankle and was transported to Fairview Hospital for treatment, police said.

The post 12-Year-Old Boy Carrying Toy Gun Shot Dead By Cleveland Police appeared first on Eurasia Review.

It will not shock readers to hear that quite often legislation on Capitol Hill is not as advertised. When Congress wants to do something particularly objectionable, they tend give it a fine-sounding name. The PATRIOT Act is perhaps the best-known example. The legislation had been drafted well before 9/11 but was going nowhere. Then the 9/11 attacks gave it a new lease on life. Politicians exploited the surge in patriotism following the attack to reintroduce the bill and call it the PATRIOT Act. To oppose it at that time was, by design, to seem unpatriotic.

At the time, 62 Democrats voted against the Act. On the Republican side there were only three no votes: former Rep. Bob Ney (R-OH), former Rep. Butch Otter (R-ID), and myself.

The abuses of the Constitution in the PATRIOT Act do not need to be fully recounted here, but Presidents Bush and Obama both claimed authority based on it to gut the Fourth Amendment. The PATRIOT Act ushered in the era of warrantless wiretapping, monitoring of our Internet behavior, watering down of probable cause, and much more. After the revelations by whistleblower Edward Snowden, we know how the NSA viewed constitutional restraints on surveillance of American people during the PATRIOT Act period.

After several re-authorizations of the PATRIOT Act, including some cosmetic reforms, Congress last October unveiled the USA FREEDOM Act. This was advertised as the first wholesale PATRIOT Act Reform bill. In fact, the House version was watered down to the point of meaninglessness and the Senate version was not much better. The final straw was the bill’s extension of key elements of the PATRIOT Act until 2017.

Fortunately, last week the USA FREEDOM Act was blocked from further consideration in the US Senate. The procedural vote was significant and important, but it caused some confusion as well. While some well-meaning pro-privacy groups endorsed the FREEDOM Act as a first step to reform, some anti-liberty neoconservatives opposed the legislation because even its anemic reforms were unacceptable. The truth is, Americans should not accept one more extension of the PATRIOT Act and should not endorse its continued dismemberment of our constitutional liberties. If that means some Senators vote with anti-liberty colleagues to kill the extension, we should still consider it a victory.

As the PATRIOT Act first faced a sunset in 2005, I had this to say in the debate over whether it should be re-authorized:

“When Congress passed the Patriot Act in the emotional aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, a sunset provision was inserted in the bill that causes certain sections to expire at the end of 2005. But this begs the question: If these provisions are critical tools in the fight against terrorism, why revoke them after five years? Conversely, if these provisions violate civil liberties, why is it acceptable to suspend the Constitution for any amount of time?”

Reform is often meant to preserve, not repeal bad legislation. When the public is strongly opposed to a particular policy you will almost never hear politicians say “let’s repeal the law.” It is always a pledge to reform the policy or law. The USA FREEDOM Act was no different.

With the failure of the FREEDOM Act to move ahead in the Senate last week, several of the most egregious sections of the PATRIOT Act are set to sunset next June absent a new authorization. Congress will no doubt be under great pressure to extend these measures. We must do our very best to make sure they are unsuccessful!

This article was published by the RonPaul Institute.

The post Ron Paul: Defeat Of USA FREEDOM Act Is A Victory For Freedom – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

U.S. Vice President Joe Biden and his wife met Sunday with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, spiritual leader of the world’s Orthodox Christians, during the last day of his visit to Turkey.

The Bidens visited the Church of St. George, a Greek-Orthodox cathedral in Istanbul, known as Constantinople during the Byzantine era, before heading to the historic Suleymaniye Mosque, the largest in the city.

Biden arrived in Istanbul on Friday for talks with Turkish leaders on the crisis in Syria.

Biden said Saturday that he and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan discussed a Syrian transition of power away from the Bashar al-Assad regime during a four-hour meeting earlier in the day.

He said they also talked about denying Islamic State militants a safe haven in Iraq and Syria.

In the past, Erdogan has insisted if the U.S. wants Turkish help, it must focus less on fighting IS extremists and more on toppling the Assad regime. On Saturday, he said Turkey will continue working closely with the United States, and he called Biden’s visit “very meaningful.”

Biden said the United States will continue to help Turkey cope with the humanitarian crisis created by 1.6 million Syrian refugees flooding into Turkish refugee camps.

Meanwhile the White House announced the U.S. will give $135 million in additional humanitarian assistance to help Turkey and other nations care for refugees fleeing violence in Syria.

Most of that funding is slated for the World Food Program, to be used for household food rations and food vouchers for refugees. Nearly $11 million of the funds will go to support the World Food Program in Turkey.

The post Biden Wraps Up Visit To Turkey appeared first on Eurasia Review.

(RFE/RL) — The head of Germany’s domestic intelligence agency says that some 550 citizens of the country have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join the Islamic State (IS) militant group.

Hans-Georg Maassen told the newspaper “Welt am Sonntag” in an interview published on November 23 that the number of Germans fighting alongside IS militants had risen from 450, the number German officials have previously been using.

Maassen said about 60 of those German citizens were killed in fighting, with at least nine killing themselves in suicide attacks.

Maassen said German authorities believe some 180 jihadists have returned after fighting in Syria and Iraq and since Germany is part of the alliance fighting the Islamic State extremist group, the country is “naturally” a target for the militants.

Earlier this month, Germany conducted a large sweep of alleged Islamists, arresting nine men suspected of supporting militants in Syria and Iraq.

The post Germany’s Intelligence Chief Says At Least 550 Germans In IS Rank appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The cabinet voted in favor of the controversial “Jewish state bill,” with the preceding discussion descended into a shouting match between ministers on Sunday.

“People ask who needs this bill; we have managed 66 years without it,” Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said ahead of the meeting. “And I ask, who needs the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, we managed 45 years without it. We need both,” he said. “Israel is a Jewish democratic state. There are those who want democracy to take precedence over Judaism, and those who want Judaism to take precedence over democracy. In the law that I am bringing, both principles are equal and must be given equal consideration.”

Netanyahu said Israel is the national home of the Jewish people where there are equal rights for every citizen. “But there are national rights only for the Jewish people; a flag, anthem, the right of every Jew to immigrate to Israel, and other national symbols,” he said.

The prime minister said this law was needed at this time because many people are challenging the idea that Israel is the national homeland of the Jewish people.

“The Palestinians refuse to recognize this, and there is also opposition from within – there are those who want to establish autonomy in the Galilee and the Negev, and who deny our national rights,” he said. “I also don’t understand those who call for two states for two peoples, but at the same time oppose anchoring that in law. They are quick to recognize a Palestinian national home, but adamantly oppose a Jewish national home.”

The cabinet authorized three versions of the Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People with 15 votes in favor and six opposed – Netanyahu’s, as well as versions by coalition chairman Ze’ev Elkin (Likud) and by MKs Yariv Levin (Likud), Ayelet Shaked (Bayit Yehudi) and Robert Ilatov (Yisrael Beytenu), which will go to a preliminary vote in the Knesset Wednesday. Then, the bills will go to a Knesset committee, where they will be combined in accordance with Netanyahu’s draft.

“I brought the principles of the law in which I believe, the principles that appear in the Independence Scroll,” Netanyahu stated.

Netanyahu’s version of the legislation is very similar to the Elkin and Levin-Shaked-Ilatov initiatives, in that they focus on Israel as the site of self-determination for the Jewish people, but it avoids some of the more controversial articles of the private member bills, such as the status of Arabic or settlement construction.

Just as the Elkin and Levin- Shaked-Ilatov versions do, the prime minister’s proposal reinforces the “Hatikva” as the national anthem, the state symbols, use of the Hebrew calendar and the Law of Return, and to grant freedom of access to holy places and protect them.

Netanyahu addressed threats and ultimatums by his coalition partners to break up the government over this and other issues, saying “the country cannot be run in this manner.”

“We need to focus on strengthening security in the face of waves of Islamic extremism and the danger of a nuclear Iran, on strengthening Israel’s economy and the citizens’ welfare, and not with threats,” he said. “I hope the heads of the coalition parties will unite and act in this spirit.”

Despite Netanyahu’s warnings, the discussion before the vote was marked by shouting and raucous arguing that could be heard from outside the closed-door meeting.

Sources in the meeting said Netanyahu said this is not a time for weakness and hypocrisy, and Finance Minister Yair Lapid replied that not everyone who disagrees with the prime minister is weak.

“If you had behaved differently, then we would not have gotten to this situation,” Netanyahu said to Justice Minister Tzipi Livni. “You didn’t act like this when it came to other bills.”

Livni asked if he was “talking about the newspaper again,” meaning a bill she supported that was meant to shut down the pro-Netanyahu newspaper “Israel Hayom.”

Later in the meeting, Livni once again referred to the “Israel Hayom bill,” saying: “If all this nonsense is just for revenge, then you won. Now let’s talk about substance before you destroy the country.”

“Let’s talk about the elephant in the room. You want us” – Hatnua and Yesh Atid – “to vote against this so you can fire us,” Livni said.

Netanyahu banged on the table and said “it cannot be that Arabs can live in Jewish towns, but Jews can’t live in Arab towns. A country within a country is developing.”

Construction Minister Uri Ariel accused Livni of trying to sabotage the “Jewish state bill,” calling it a step in the right direction that will ensure the High Court doesn’t interpret the law differently than the lawmakers intended, as there is a continued erosion of Israel’s Jewish identity.

Science, Technology and Space Minister Ya’acov Peri, a vocal opponent of the bill, said it reminded him of Israel’s greatest enemies that have Sha’ria law, while Education Minister Shai Piron told the prime minister he does not decide who is nationalist and who is not.

After the ministers approved the bill, Economy Minister Naftali Bennett pointed out that the vote was in keeping with coalition agreements.

In addition, Bennett posited that the “Jewish state bill” will “save the residents of south Tel Aviv from infiltrators,” because the High Court will have to keep it in mind when ruling on the legality of laws to curb illegal migration and not only Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

Before the meeting, Lapid said while he is not against the concept of a “Jewish state bill,” Netanyahu’s version is “terrible and badly written, meant only for his needs in the Likud primary [in January].”

According to Lapid, first prime minister David Ben-Gurion, first Likud prime minister Menachem Begin and Likud ideological forebear Ze’ev Jabotinsky would have all opposed the measure.

Lapid recounted speaking with the family of Zidan Sayef, the Border Police officer who was killed defending Jewish worshippers in the Jerusalem synagogue massacre last week.

“What will we tell them, that [Sayef] is a second-rate citizen?” he asked.

Opposition leader Isaac Herzog (Labor) compared the “Jewish state bill” to holding a cabinet meeting on the Temple Mount, saying it is provocative, irresponsible and unnecessary at a sensitive time.

“If the Independence Scroll was enough when we were only 600,000 people, why is it not enough for Netanyahu today?” Herzog asked. “Only a prime minister lacking in self-confidence, without a vision and a plan, needs laws that deal with the obvious that will not improve any Israeli citizens’ lives.”

Knesset Immigration, Absorption and Diaspora Committee chairman Yoel Razbozov said the bill is discriminatory against those with Jewish ancestry who fell under the Law of Return, but are not Jewish.

“I will do everything so the current version of the bill does not pass,” he stated. “For years, the half-million non-Jewish immigrants and their families were discriminated against in the State of Israel, because they cannot get married like everyone else, be buried like everyone else and live in the Jewish State like everyone else. The Government of Israel should not ignore them and should not authorize the ‘Jewish state bill’ until an appropriate wording is found.”

MK Ahmed Tibi (UAL-Ta’al) said the bill continues the alienation of the Arab public and the rejection of their rights as a minority native to the land.

According to Tibi, Israel is now “officially an ethnocentric country that persecutes its minority and discriminates against it using a Basic Law. We will bring this to every international platform, including the UN.”

MK Dov Hanin (Hadash) said instead of fighting discrimination against Israeli-Arabs, he is passing a law perpetuating it.

“Instead of lending a hand in dialogue with Arab citizens of Israel, Netanyahu chose to provoke and add fuel to the fire. Instead of working toward historic reconciliation with the Palestinian people, Netanyahu is blocking any progress toward an agreement. Instead of building a future of life and equality, Netanyahu is leading to conflict and tragedy,” Hanin stated.

Original article

The post Netanyahu’s Cabinet Approves ‘Jewish State Bill’ appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Joel Lim

In his response to Graham Land’s earlier article, Mr KT Tan paints an interesting picture as he “analyses” the issue of shark finning through a cultural-imperialist lens (‘Western Hypocrisy In The Shark’s Fin Debate – Analysis’, Eurasia Review, 27 August 2014). While Tan’s argument is seemingly sound on principle, he may have stretched or misunderstood Land’s argument on multiple occasions. Most of Land’s evidence points towards Asian countries causing the high number of deaths, hence while there may be an underlying implication that only Asians are to blame, it is difficult to accept that Land is “demonizing Asians” or “dictating what Asians should or should not eat”. On a very fundamental level, Land is simply stating these points: (1) sharks are increasingly becoming more endangered, and (2) more needs to be done to prevent these numbers from rising.

Although Land’s article may lack much needed elaboration or further evidence in certain areas, it would be a misnomer to classify his claims as baseless or illogical. In fact, apart from misconstruing Land’s points, it was difficult to understand Tan’s proposition. Despite Tan’s response being well-researched, it is plagued by some of the same glaring problems he found in Land’s.

First, it is a huge leap to state that the “Global catches, exploitation rates and rebuilding options for sharks” report published in the “Marine Policy”, and in particular, the 100 million figure has no scientific basis. Anyone who has actually read the report would realize that the researchers have applied a rigorous and logical process to justify their figures. Put simply, they collated published fishing data which provided them the total yield or the weight of the sharks that are caught in a certain year and divided that total weight by the average weight of a single shark to get the 97 million figure.i

Admittedly, there were certain concessions for statistical and estimation variations, but the fact that it was not commissioned by the FAO should not detract from the integrity of the results. As Tan has highlighted, the National Science Foundation and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada funded the study – it would be imprudent to believe that these institutions would have done so if it lacked any credibility. Perhaps, all Tan read was the first two lines of the report’s abstract which he conveniently took out of context.

Secondly, shark species are increasingly at risk of extinction and becoming endangered. However, Tan would not agree since he relies on the data provided by the United Nations ‘Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora’ (CITES). CITES is a multilateral treaty “to ensure that international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants does not threaten their survival”ii. It is a political trade organization which is more concerned with trade restrictions. In a sense, CITES is arguably not the true scientific authority on this point. Using CITES to determine which species are endangered would be like using the Forbes Billionaires List to determine the world’s most profitable companies – it may be a good indicator, but it is not necessarily the most accurate or relevant source.

Hence, it would be preferable to rely on the figures provided by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). This union has “11,000 experts setting global standards in their fields, for example, the definitive international standard for species extinction risk.”iii Specifically, the IUCN Shark Specialist Group is the world’s foremost scientific authority on the status of shark populations, and applies “a scientifically rigorous approach to determine risks of extinction that is applicable to all species, has become a world standard”iv. A quick look on the IUCN red list would show that there are 74 species of sharks which are threatened.v

Lastly, Tan claims that demand reduction is ineffective since “one the biggest killers of sharks are the industrial-scale longline fisheries”. Again, if Tan had read the article published in the “Marine Policy”, he would realize that sharks caught by pelagic longlines only represent about 52% of all sharks caught, of which, about 25% are released back into the sea. Effectively, longline fishing only account for roughly 40% of all sharks caught and finned.vi

On the contrary, demand reduction is an effective tool because it sends the market a clear signal what consumers want. Since this is primarily a profit driven industry and all things being equal, a fall in demand will definitely lead to a fall in price. There is little reason to assume that the supply for shark fin is inelastic. Looking forward, the industry is less lucrative and operating on simple market economic principles, this will result in a decline in the number of sharks killed. To date, there is insufficient research to show what proportion of sharks is killed for their meat or fins. However, the 33.6 million lbs of shark meat used to make fish and chips would only account for 1% of all sharks caught, which is estimated to be 1.6 million tonnes.vii Wildlife activist are campaigning for the reduction of shark demand because it is the larger and more probable cause for the high mortality rate. If fish and chips were the larger main cause for the high number of sharks killed, then our consumption should likewise be curtailed.

Cutting back on eating shark fin is not imposing cultural imperialistic dominance, neither should it be mistaken for a residual form of colonial stigma. To say that Land was painting a strict either-or scenario is inaccurate. Rather, he was merely stating the fact that sharks are gradually becoming extinct and of all the available means of mitigating this issue, he posits his well-informed opinion that reducing demand would be the most effective method. Since Tan is familiar with fallacies, it is about time he puts his straw man away and look at the evidence objectively. Because right now, he just sounds like an angry man who has been told that he cannot have his soup.

Notes:
i. Global catches, exploitation rates, and rebuilding options for sharks’, Boris Worm et al. http://wormlab.biology.dal.ca/publication/view/worm-etal-2013-global-catches-exploitation-rates-and-rebuilding-options-for-sharks/
ii. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.php
iii. International Union for Conservation of Nature. http://www.iucn.org/about/
iv. Overview of IUCN Redlist. http://www.iucnredlist.org/about/overview
v. A quarter of sharks and rays threatened with extinction http://www.iucn.org/?14311/A-quarter-sharks-and-rays-threatened-with-extinction
vi. See n1 at Page 197
vii. Ibid

The post Shark Finning Debate: Not Losing Focus – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Tayebeh Mohammadikia

Iran’s nuclear negotiations have reached their sensitive stage. Now, the time is ripe to review future prospects of these negotiations more accurately and talk about the final outcome of the nuclear talks with more precision. However, the way ahead is still surrounded by ambiguity and problems. Under the present circumstances, analysts focusing on these negotiations are faced with three main assumptions: inability of the two sides to reach an agreement, achievement of a final agreement, and finally, further extension of the negotiations. Each of these possible scenarios is discussed in more detail below.

1. Achievement of a final agreement

Any analysis of conditions that may surface after “achievement of an agreement” will be a function of the arrangement of powers on the two main sides of the equation; that is, Iran and the United States, as well as the analysis of other forces that have their own influence at international, regional and global levels. Here, possible options available to powerful political forces within domestic political scene of these two countries will be explained first before turning to major influential powers in international arena.

1.1. Arrangement of powers in Iran and the US if an agreement is not achieved

A nuclear agreement has staunch supporters and proponents both in Iran and the United States. However, the other possibility, that is, inability to reach an agreement, has also its own important and influential proponents. There are specific sections in the power structures of both Iran and the United States that do not want an agreement to be reached. At least, part of the political structure in both countries is against an agreement which would be achieved by retreating from certain positions on the two sides. They only think of an agreement that would allow them to mention it as an effective success and triumph at international level. At any rate, it seems that there are numerous groups in both countries that will stand against an agreement and do all they can to challenge such an agreement. Such a challenge will start with sharp and hasty remarks and will go all the way to making decisions to put obstacles on the way of policymakers that are bent on reaching an agreement; namely the administrations of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and his American counterpart, Barack Obama. There is also a serious possibility that the new US Congress, which will open soon, would not accept an agreement with Iran. The new Congress is even possible to take an extreme measure and heighten unilateral sanctions against Iran. The power structure in the United States pivots around the president and this makes it possible for Obama administration to rely on its Democrat supporters at the Congress and reach an agreement with Iran and abide by its obligations without seeking the green light of the majority Republicans at the Congress. The US government, in most cases, is also able to veto decisions that may be taken by the Congress to create obstacles in this regard. Despite these facts, Obama and his colleagues will have to use sharper and more critical literature with regard to Iran in areas that have nothing to do with the Islamic Republic’s nuclear energy program. Also, in order to get the agreement, or at least to reduce the impact of the Congress’ critical approach to US agreement with Iran, they will have to pretend that the agreement has been a failure for Iran’s foreign policy and a victory of them. Under such circumstance, forces that are opposed to an agreement with the United States will see their chance to boost their activities in Iran.

Everybody is aware of the serious and fundamental sensitivity of Iranian decision-makers toward the political jargon used by the American politicians. This sensitivity has frequently come to the surface when Iranian authorities have used a sharp and critical language in the face of the United States verbal threats. Also, political forces opposed to an agreement in Iran are totally possible to take special measures. The measures taken by such forces may cover a wide spectrum, including providing more support for resistance groups in the region. In this way, if an agreement is reached, the political conditions governing relations between Iran and the United States will experience a positive development as there will be no more rhetoric about a possible US military attack. However, at the same time, verbal attacks will continue to rise as political forces on both sides of this equation will do what they can to scuttle such an agreement.

1.2. Power arrangement in the region if an agreement is not achieved

Through a thorough analysis, the regional states and entities located in Iran’s periphery can be divide into three major categories: hostile, relatively hostile, and relatively friendly. Israel should be put in the first category. The second category includes Arab countries led by Saudi Arabia (apart from Iraq, Syria and Oman), while the third category contains other countries in the region, including Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon and Iraq. The first category will not welcome an agreement with Iran both in reality and in its political remarks and will show its clear opposition to such an agreement. It even seems that Israel will lose no time to declare its lack of commitment to such an agreement. In this way, it is quite possible for Israel to continue to announce that it will not hesitate to attack Iran any time it deems necessary. Countries in the second category will take a two-tier policy toward Iran’s nuclear agreement. In their declared policies, they will hail the agreement. However, behind the scenes and in diplomatic conversations between Arab countries and the Americans, the former side will talk about imbalance in regional security arrangements as a result of the agreement. These Arab states will also not hide their consternation over increasing importance of Iran in both regional and international foreign policy. In fact, these countries will be more concerned about their own positon in the region; a position which has taken shape and become meaningful on the basis of hostility between Iran and the United States and their dependence on the United States. The third category is expected to give a genuine welcome to Iran’s nuclear agreement. Countries in the third category (such as Turkey and Pakistan) either follow independent policies in the region and, therefore, their national interests are intertwined with increased regional stability, or are relatively dependent on Iran and, therefore termination of tensions in relations between Iran and the United States will be to their benefit. In any case, improved relations between Iran and the United States would be to their benefit and would reduce the costs of having simultaneous relations with these two regional and global powers. Iraq is a good example in this regard.

If an agreement is not reached

Inability to achieve an agreement would be tantamount to a surge in all kinds of threats. In fact, each side of the negations has posed increasing threats to the other side and has been trying to blame the opposite side as the party responsible for inability to achieve an agreement and subsequent enforcement of its threats. Iran has been threatening to cut its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and go ahead with its nuclear energy program. On the other side, the United States has been boasting about the possibility of military strikes against Iran in order to prevent the country from building nuclear weapons. However, despite various threats posed by each side to the other, it is not likely that in practice, any one of them is willing or even able to realize its threats against the other side.

In fact, neither Iran is definitively expected to leave the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and shun its obligations, nor the United States military attack against Iran is considered a decisive and planned option. Therefore, everything that may happen in practice will most probably take place at two levels. At the firs level, we will see a high volume of the exchange of political and aggressive rhetoric. That rhetoric will, for its part, give a more serious quality to the existing hostile atmosphere than any time before, and will exacerbate bilateral distrust. However, it should not be ignored that Iran and the United States have always used such a rhetoric against each other and, therefore, more use of hostile words will not bring about a basic change in the political conditions that govern the two countries’ relations. At the second level, every one of these two players will do their best to make the most of all the possibilities at their disposal with the Americans trying to expand and extend their unilateral sanctions against Iran. Of course, it seems that their ability to realize the original goals of the sanctions has been worn off, but this does not mean that they are unable to further expand the sanctions against Iran. The Islamic Republic, in turn, will speed up expansion of its nuclear energy program, though it will to quit the NPT.

Further extension of negotiations

Further extension of negotiations will show relative success of the two sides, on the one hand, while on the other hand, it will be a sign of their lack of readiness to face the costs of inability to reach an agreement. More importantly, however, extension of the negotiations will send a clear message: reaching an agreement is difficult as a result of wide gaps between the two sides. The outcome of such a situation can be one of the following:

1. Reaching agreement at a later time: Achievement of an agreement at a later time is directly related to the negotiating parties’ strategy for extension of negotiations. This will represent a last-ditch effort by both sides, and they may be better able to explain it to domestic opponents of the negotiations. In fact, under these circumstances, the two sides will be in a better situation than today to explain the reasons why they withdrew from some of their positions.

2. Inability to reach an agreement at a later time: This scenario will not be necessarily worse than declaring the failure of the negotiations at the end of the ongoing round of talks. One may even claim that under such circumstances, both sides will be in a better position to explain why they failed to achieve an agreement. They will be able to blame lack of agreement on the intransigence of the other side, which in spite of their own goodwill throughout the negotiations, caused nuclear talks to hit a deadlock. In other words, even if the extension of the negotiations does not lead to an agreement, the two sides would not be facing tougher conditions than what they may have to face in case the current round of the nuclear talks end in failure.

Tayebeh Mohammadikia
PhD Candidate of International Relations in Allameh Tabatabai University, Tehran

The post Three Possible Scenarios For Iran’s Nuclear Talks – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Boko Haram’s expansion has meant murders, forced conversion, and forcible expulsion from homes, causing Catholics in Nigeria to pray and to reach out to help and console the militant Islamist group’s victims.

“Brothers and sisters, there is no better time to storm the heavens with prayers and petitions than now,” Archbishop Ignatius Kaigama of Jos said during a national prayer pilgrimage Nov. 13-14.

Thousands of people have recently lost their homes and their loved ones due to Boko Haram, he said.

“Our darling innocent school girls from Chibok are still being held over six months since their abduction. Only God knows the psychological and physical trauma they are going through,” the archbishop said, referring to the more than two hundred schoolgirls who were taken by Boko Haram from their school in the northeastern Nigerian town in April.

The radical Islamist group Boko Haram began its deadly insurgency in 2009, killing over 4,000 people in 2014 alone, according to Human Rights Watch.

“There are still ongoing terrorist activities that are not only causing the loss of lives and so much havoc but are enjoying territorial expansion,” the archbishop continued. “Bombings and slaughter of innocent Nigerians, especially in the northeast, have become regular.”

He said active security solutions have not been found. He questioned whether leading Nigerians were serious about bringing “sanity and order” to the country, rather than “using the unfortunate situation as a political weapon.”

Boko Haram has been threatening to cross into Cameroon, which shares a 300-mile border with Nigeria. The Nigerian government’s inability to contain the group has drawn heavy criticism.

The emir of Kano, Muhammad Sanusi, an influential Muslim leader, has called on Nigerians to arm themselves for protection against Boko Haram.

“These terrorists slaughter our boys and abduct our girls to force them into slavery,” he said, according to BBC News.

Boko Haram took the town of Chibok on Nov. 13, and the Nigerian army retook the town three days later.

Archbishop Kaigama said parishes in the Maiduguri diocese have been closed, with the people “scattered and killed.” Thousands have been displaced from their homes in the Diocese of Yola.

“They have sought refuge and turned to the Church for consolation and support.”

Father Gideon Obasogie, communications director of the Diocese of Maiduguri, said that Boko Haram’s expansion in Nigeria has resulted in the forcible conversion of many Catholics, while thousands more fled their homes.

“A good number of our youth are forcefully conscripted, while the aged, women and children are converted to Islam. A lot of Nigerians are trapped and are forced to practice strict sharia law,” the priest said in a Nov. 19 report made available to Aid to the Church in Need.

Fr. Obasogie said this is the case in at least six communities along the federal road that links Maiduguri and Yola, in the state of Adamawa.

“All of these captured towns by our estimation are no longer part of the Nigerian entity because no one can go in, but those who would luckily escape have got stories to tell,” Fr. Obasogie said.

“The terrorists have declared all the captured towns as Islamic Caliphate. The people trapped are forced to accept and practice the strict doctrines the militants are out to propagate.”

Boko Haram overran the predominantly Christian community of Mubi Oct. 29, forcing over 50,000 people to flee. The Nigerian army said it recaptured Mubi last week, but the damage has been done.

According to Fr. Obasogie, over 2,500 Catholics have been killed in the diocese, and another 100,000 Catholics forced to flee. The diocese is now working to care for all internally displaced people regardless of their religious beliefs.

He said 50 churches and parish rectories have been razed. Dozens of churches and schools have been deserted, as have two convents.

Despite all the horrors of war, Archbishop Kaigama thanked God for his mercy and faithfulness.

“We may not have received everything we prayed for, but by his grace most of us are still alive and we have remained one people and one nation. Today, gauging the general despair and disillusionment in the land, we converge here again to cry on to the Lord for enduring peace and for God to stir strongly in the hearts of Nigerians the spirit to transcend narrow ethnic, religious, and political boundaries so as to always pursue the common good.”

He also reminded Nigerians to do good and avoid “religious externalism devoid of godliness,” as when people wish harm to their neighbor or “engage in bitter, hostile, antagonistic political, religious or ethnic struggles that lead to loss of lives and the destruction of property.”

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Here is what we know: If people take medications prescribed to them, they usually get better. But only about half of all patients prescribed medication take it according to directions. Here is what we don’t know: We don’t know how to get patients to take their medications, despite many studies looking at the issue.

Researchers doing a review for the international Cochrane Library for health information reviewed 182 trials that were testing different approaches to increasing medication adherence and patient health. Even though the review included many of the best quality studies, there were no clear winning solutions. In fact, many of the studies had problems in their design.

“The studies varied so much in terms of their design and their results that it would have been misleading to try to come up with general conclusions,” said lead researcher Robby Nieuwlaat of the Department of Clinical Epidemiology and Biostatistics of the Michael G. DeGroote School of Medicine at McMaster University. “Based on this evidence, it is uncertain how adherence to medication can be consistently improved. We need to see larger and higher quality trials, which better take in account individual patient’s problems with adherence.”

Most trials were unreliable casting doubt on the validity of the results instead. Out of 182 trials, only 17 were of high quality and each of these tested combinations of several different approaches, such as support from family members or pharmacists, education and counseling. Still fewer, only five of these 17 showed improvements in health outcomes for patients, as well as in medication adherence.

“This review addresses one of the biggest challenges in health care,” said Dr. David Tovey, Editor in Chief of the Cochrane Library. “It’s a real surprise that the vast amount of research that has been done has not moved us further forward in our understanding of how to address this problem. With the costs of health care across the world increasing, we’ve never needed evidence to answer this question more than we do now.”

The authors have now decided to turn to the research community to help understand the issues. They have created a database of the relevant trials and made this available to other researchers in the field in order to encourage collaboration and more in-depth analyses on smaller groups of trials.

“By making our comprehensive database available for sharing we hope to contribute to the design of better trials and interventions for medication adherence,” said Nieuwlaat. “We need to avoid repeating the painful lessons of adherence research to date and begin with interventions that have shown some promise, or at least have not produced repeatedly negative results.”

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