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To Contain Ebola Outbreaks First Train Caregivers – Analysis

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The risks are high – Ebola diagnosis, treatment, care should be left to teams of well-trained providers.

By Manisha Juthani-Mehta

Ebola has spread terror because of the lethality of the disease, even more so as the caregivers and physicians on whom patients depend are frequently felled by the malady. To deal with Ebola and other highly contagious diseases that are bound to emerge, a global plan is needed to prepare the caregivers.

The Ebola virus can be easily transmitted when a patient is symptomatic and highly infectious. Infectiousness increases as the disease progresses, and one fifth of a teaspoon of blood from an actively infected Ebola patient is estimated to contain 10 billion particles of the virus. For healthcare workers, that means that slightly incorrect glove removal followed by a quick brush of one’s eye or wipe of the nose could be deadly.

Meanwhile, disparity in number of caregivers poses challenges: The United States has 2.5 physicians per 1000 people whereas countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone have essentially zero, reports the World Bank. The United States has 9.8 nurses and midwives per 1000 people, while Liberia and Sierra Leone have 0.3 and 0.2, respectively.

Yet, greater numbers of caregivers in the developed world do not provide society automatic protection if they are not well prepared. Two infected in the US were caregivers and not family members of patients, in close proximity during the disease’s early stages. Protection and prior training are essential. Even experienced clinicians do not have experience with the personal protective equipment needed to treat Ebola.

NGOs like Doctors Without Borders, Partners in Health and International Medical Corps send caregivers to infected areas. Safety training sessions, provided by such organizations and the US Centers for Disease Control, are usually three to five days long. As of mid-November, 584 healthcare workers have been infected with Ebola in Africa; 329 have died. Many of these infections have occurred outside of Ebola treatment units rather in other healthcare facilities, highlighting need for protective measures in all settings.

Many caregivers in the developed world are eager to learn and volunteer to care for patients. Such crises are the reason many entered the field, the sentiment expressed by young doctors and nurses as 10 patients with Ebola have been admitted to US hospitals since September.

Trainees fall into a unique category of hospital employees – service providers on the one hand, but learners on the other. A medical trainee is a medical student, resident or fellow. Residents have completed medical school but are not certified in their field, whether that’s internal medicine, surgery or other areas. Fellows have completed residency but are still in training in a subspecialty, such as infectious diseases, cardiology, gastroenterology and more. The dilemma is that trainees, except students, are doctors and therefore providers. But they are still learning, in training.

From 2011-2012, in the United States, there were 115,293 residents in training in 9,022 programs, and trainees constitute over 10 percent of the physician workforce.

Hospitals must look after caregivers’ best interests, take necessary precautions, institute appropriate training, and only allow them to participate in high-risk circumstances after such steps are taken. Physicians are not the only ones placing themselves at risk. Nursing staff, who provide the majority of care to critically ill patients, have realized the risks they face without appropriate training, some going so far as to strike to shed light on this issue. Blood tests are challenging since an entire laboratory could get contaminated. Point-of-care testing, lab tests that can be performed at the bedside, have reduced this risk. Even cleaning crews place themselves at risk in handling infected equipment, needles and bodily waste.

Even with appropriate training in the use of personal protective equipment, the Ebola virus can be easily transmitted when patients are symptomatic and highly infectious.

The ninth identified Ebola patient in the United States, Craig Spencer, a physician who received training and was working in Guinea with Doctors Without Borders, Médecins Sans Frontières, was discharged in good health. The 10th patient, Martin Salia, a surgeon working in his native Sierra Leone, was the second Ebola death in this country despite intensive medical care late in the course of his disease. Though fiancées of two Ebola patients remain healthy, two nurses in a Texas hospital contracted the disease while treating a patient in the advanced stages.

Such experiences show the ease with which Ebola can be transmitted to healthcare workers when patients are acutely ill. Hospitals must decide whether their trainees should participate in the care of such patients. Many hospitals, including Yale-New Haven Hospital, have decided to keep all students, residents, and fellows out of the evaluation process of a patient with suspected Ebola – a sensible protocol.

After a series of missteps, the CDC finally updated guidelines for the use of personal protective equipment in US hospitals, which takes advantage of the experience of aid organizations with Ebola patients. With this guidance, U.S. hospitals establish local patient care protocols and training modules. In many such institutions, small groups of individuals are being trained to care for these patients, thereby minimizing the number of those placed at risk. The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education also announced that trainees should receive such training.

All healthcare workers chose their professions, at some level, to help others. When they made the decision to be trained as doctors, nurses or other providers, they knew the potential risk of exposure to contagious infectious diseases. Healthcare providers have a moral and ethical obligation to care for the ill.

But before helping others, caregivers must help themselves. In healthcare settings, first responders and critical care providers must be prepared first, and then additional staff can be trained as time and resources permit. Supplies are on backorder, and hospitals are trying to optimize the use of their equipment.

MSF requires that physicians working in the field have completed a residency program, and it’s logical that the same requirement should hold true elsewhere for those providing care to suspected Ebola patients. Similarly, nurses must hold an appropriate degree with a valid license to volunteer with MSF. Trainers in U.S. hospitals are currently overloaded in efforts to get the front line ready and waiting.

As well intentioned as the desires of many trainees may be, their desires must come second. For trainees, especially those entering fields such as emergency medicine, critical care and infectious diseases, the first obligation is to keep them safe while they treat others. But the first priority for hospitals treating suspected Ebola patients is effective care for those affected by the disease.

In the next several months, hospitals around the country will train small teams of providers. Occasional cases of Ebola in the United States and other developed countries are likely until the outbreak is controlled in West Africa. Trainees who want to volunteer should be trained as well. But we aren’t there yet.

If Ebola were to hit a densely populated developing nation such as India or China, the consequences could be devastating. Although these countries are taking the necessary steps to prepare, NGOs and the US government should have teams of well-trained, experienced providers ready to deploy to these nations to help control the spread of this outbreak any further.

Manisha Juthani-Mehta is an associate professor and director of the Infectious Diseases Fellowship Program in the Section of Infectious Diseases at Yale School of Medicine. She is an OpEd Project Public Voices Fellow.

The post To Contain Ebola Outbreaks First Train Caregivers – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.


I’ll Take Market Forces Over Government Force Any Day – OpEd

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Responding to their customers’ increasing demand for privacy in the aftermath of revelations by whistle-blowers that the government is capturing and indefinitely storing every conversation, email, location, online transaction, and more, Apple, Google, WhattsApp, and others are developing new encrypted phones and services to thwart this now-universal warrantless spying.

Simultaneously, a bill that would have reined in the National Security Agency (NSA), was blocked in the Senate. The bill would have kept customers’ records securely with phone and internet companies, to be accessed by the government only when asked for, with cause.

Apple well knows that if it doesn’t produce a phone that will keep your conversations and transactions private, one of its competitors will take market share by developing and selling you one that will.

Your Senator, on the other hand? As has been pointed out by minds better than mine, the issues comprising a political platform are so many—a vast goulash of everything from foreign policy to hometown potholes—and your vote so insignificant, that the odds of your Senator knowing or having to care that you oppose NSA spying is negligible.

The government, needless to say, likes having all of our private information and communications in its hands, to be perused when and as it wishes, and it should be no surprise that its power to do so remains untouched by our “representatives” elected as its “check.”

In order to forestall encrypted phones actually making it into customers’ hands, Justice’s second-in-command is trying to play on stupid voters’ fears:

A child would die, he said, because police wouldn’t be able to scour a suspect’s phone,

Apple CEO Tim Cook responded:

Look, if law enforcement wants something, they should go to the user and get it. It’s not for me to do that.

Our Founders meant for our government to have to work to catch and prove suspected criminals guilty: it’s what keeps government on-task and relatively honest.

And, yes, the Founders meant this to apply to issues of national security, in which they, too, trusted market forces over government force.

Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides for Congress to issue Letters of Marque and Reprisal for the capture and bringing to justice suspected enemy combatants. Under this provision, “privateers,” essentially, entrepreneurs akin to bounty hunters, could at their own risk seek out, capture, and bring suspects to justice.

As Thomas Jefferson said:

“Every possible encouragement should be given to privateering in time of war.”

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, we and others proposed this as the best means of quickly restoring Americans’ security: privateers, bonded to ensure that they follow the accepted international law, including the humane treatment of those who were taken prisoner, would be set the task of capturing bin Laden.

Plausible? Recall, for example, Ross Perot’s successful use of private forces to retrieve his employees from the clutches of fundamentalist Muslims in Iran in 1979—as contrasted with the debacle of the U.S. military’s attempt to rescue its government employees.

How much sooner, then, would bin Laden have been apprehended, and at what tremendous show of American ingenuity, had privateers been allowed to operate? The decade that it took the U.S. military to find him—or days or weeks?

And at what savings of innocent lives, destroyed countries, “blow-back”?

So think about upon whom you would rather depend for your safety and security: private providers competing to create and market innovative new means of keeping you safe and secure; or political rulers who get more power and more money the less secure you feel—and invoke the specter of dead children as their favored marketing tool?

Are government functionaries right? Are we stupid? If not, let’s demonstrate it by wising up and withdrawing our consent. Ultimately, that’s all movements like the Fall of the Berlin Wall and today’s Hong Kong protests are. Speak out against NSA spying, opt out of TSA’s naked scanners, demand and buy encrypted phones, networks, and apps. Tell your friends and colleagues that the government is not here to help them, it’s here to help itself, and back it up with stories showing this to be so. We have plenty, and there is no lack of others, especially in our Information Age—at least as long as we resist “net neutrality“.

The post I’ll Take Market Forces Over Government Force Any Day – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The Case For Tactical Nuclear Weapons – Analysis

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Are tactical nuclear weapons outdated relics of the Cold War? Should they be phased out of the US’ and NATO’s arsenals? On the contrary, says John Klein. As he sees it, the deterrence value of these weapons remains as powerful as ever.

By John J. Klein

Nuclear weapons and deterrence continue to be topics of heated discussion among arms control advocates and policy makers within the United States and abroad, as exemplified by the ongoing diplomatic dialogue to limit Iran’s nuclear capability. Within the arms control community, some view nuclear deterrence as being an antiquated remnant of the Cold War, with no utility in today’s more multilateral security environment. Still others see tactical nuclear weapons as being especially counterproductive to peace and stability, and argue that they should be phased out of U.S. and NATO military strategies. Yet this view is incorrect. Because tactical nuclear weapons are at times a more credible response under the principles defined by customary international law, these weapons enhance deterrence and subsequently improve international peace and security.

Background

Tactical nuclear weapons are frequently defined as non-strategic nuclear weapons, or nuclear warheads not currently covered under the 2010New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. In particular, the U.S. B-61-aircraft-released gravity bomb is categorized as a tactical nuclear weapon, and this weapon is currently an integral part of U.S. and NATO military plans. U.S. tactical nuclear weapons typically have lower detonation yields—reportedly ranging from 0.3-300 kilotons—compared to strategic warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles or submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which reportedly have yields upwards of 1.2 megatons. While the United States forward deploys tactical nuclear weapons in Europe as part of a sharing agreement with NATO, their numbers have been reduced from a peak of 8,000 to about200 today. In contrast, Russia is estimated to have upwards of 6000 tactical nuclear weapons in its arsenal.

The most current U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) provides guidance related to both nuclear strategy and tactical nuclear weapons. Released in 2010, the NPR reaffirms existing strategic guidance that the primary role of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is to deter a nuclear attack on the United States, its allies, and partners. Accordingly, the United States will maintain the capability to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on tactical fighter-bombers and heavy bombers and will proceed with a full scope life extension program for the B-61 bomb. The United States will also continue and, where appropriate, expand consultations with allies and partners to address how to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. extended deterrent.

What the critics say

Despite their current role in support of extended deterrence to allies and partners, critics of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons argue for their reduction or elimination. In May 2012, the arms control group Global Zero called for eliminating all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons over the next ten years, stating that their strategic utility is practically nil. Global Zero believes that the extended deterrence commitment to partners or allies could be met by either U.S. strategic nuclear and conventional forces, instead of tactical nuclear weapons. Additionally, a 2013 report by the Stimson Center states that having tactical nuclear weapons will likely increase the proliferation of the weapons by other counties. The report concludes that tactical nuclear weapons add little to deterrence, complicate safety and security, and invite military preemption. Still other arms control advocates see tactical nuclear weapons as leading to conflict escalation through the eventual use of larger, strategic nuclear weapons. Hence, tactical nuclear weapons are said to never be a suitable response and should not be part of any deterrence strategy.

Despite the criticisms, tactical nuclear weapons still play a role in the U.S. extended deterrence promise to partners and allies, and this promise helps limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons in other countries around the globe. Without extended deterrence, U.S. partners or allies might feel compelled to develop their own nuclear weapons, in order to guarantee their security against future nuclear power aggressors. Moreover, tactical nuclear weapons actually enhance extended deterrence, when considered within the international norms of armed conflict.

The law of armed conflict

Deterrence works only if a credible threat of retaliatory force exists, and for the U.S. defense community, credibility is typically governed by what is known as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), which is an extension of that part of customary international law regulating the conduct of armed hostilities. When considering the utility of tactical nuclear weapons, two LOAC principles are most germane: the principles of military necessity and lawful targeting. The principle of military necessity calls for using only that degree and kind of force required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy, while taking into consideration the minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical resources. This principle is designed to limit the application of force to that required for carrying out lawful military purposes. Although the principle of military necessity recognizes that some collateral damage and incidental injury to civilians may occur when a legitimate military target is attacked, it does not excuse the wanton destruction of lives and property disproportionate to the military advantage to be gained. For the employment of nuclear weapons, therefore, the weapons used should not cause more destruction than necessary to achieve military objectives. Consequently, a smaller yield nuclear weapon may be preferred over a larger yield warhead, if the military objectives can still be achieved.

In contrast, the principle of lawful targeting requires that all reasonable precautions be taken to ensure the targeting of only military objectives, so that damage to civilian objects (collateral damage) or death and injury to civilians (incidental injury) is avoided as much as possible. When considering the size of nuclear yields under this principle, an excessively large nuclear warhead could be more difficult to successfully employ against a more localized target, with non-combatants located nearby.

Implications

In order to have a credible nuclear deterrent—one that is able to deter potential future threats—the United States must have a variety of nuclear weapons that are able to deliver from minor to severe military effects. The U.S. nuclear arsenal, therefore, should include an ample number of low-yield nuclear weapons, so that the president is provided with the best choice of potential response options following an adversary’s attack. The application of the principle of military necessity to any potential U.S. nuclear response following an act of aggression means that the response should not exceed the kind or degree of force needed to accomplish the military objective. Additionally, the application of the principle of lawful targeting means that a nuclear response should discriminate between military objectives and civilian objects to mitigate collateral damage and incidental injury. For these reasons, low-yield tactical nuclear weapons may prove to be the preferred nuclear response option vice larger and potentially more indiscriminate nuclear warheads.

If an adversary used a low-yield nuclear weapon against a NATO member and a commensurate low-yield nuclear weapon was not readily available for a response to the attack, NATO leadership would need to weigh other options, such as employing a higher-yield nuclear weapon or conventional weapons with a similar destructive effect. Both options pose challenges for policymakers. Using a significantly higher-yield, strategic nuclear weapon might greatly increase the possibility of conflict escalation, which is seldom a preferred outcome. The employment of a higher-yield nuclear response option might also exceed the degree of force needed to accomplish the military objective and, therefore, could violate the principle of military necessity under the LOAC. Additionally, because these strategic weapons are carried aboard ballistic missiles, employment of strategic nuclear weapons proves more problematic because of their potential overflight of other countries, which can miscommunicate the missile’s intent and target. As for planning for and relying on a conventional response to a nuclear strike, U.S. policymakers would be required to consider how this might undermine allied perceptions of Washington’s resolve, commitment to the idea of extended deterrence, and the credibility of the American nuclear arsenal.

Final thoughts

Nuclear weapons and deterrence are important topics that deserve to be debated among the international community. Such debate is especially meaningful because of the nuclear ambitions of Iran andNorth Korea, along with ongoing pressure to modernize the U.S. nuclear forces. Any reduction in the number of tactical nuclear weapons in either U.S. or NATO shared stockpiles, however, should be made with serious consideration of the risks posed by such an action. Tactical nuclear weapons—under some scenarios—provide a more credible threat of retaliatory force to a potential nuclear attack when compared to strategic nuclear weapons. As a result, these weapons improve the viability of extended deterrence and therefore help limit the proliferation of nuclear programs. Also, low-yield tactical nuclear weapons can help limit conflict escalation and avoid unnecessary civilian casualties. For all these reasons, tactical nuclear weapons still have a critical role to play in U.S. and NATO security measures.

John J. Klein is a Principal Analyst at Analytic Services in Falls Church, Virginia and writes frequently on national security, military strategy, and the Law of Armed Conflict. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Analytic Services or those of the United States Government.

The post The Case For Tactical Nuclear Weapons – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Follow The Sand To The Real Fracking Boom – Analysis

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By James Stafford

When it takes up to four million pounds of sand to frack a single well, it’s no wonder that demand is outpacing supply and frack sand producers are becoming the biggest behind-the-scenes beneficiaries of the American oil and gas boom.

Demand is exploding for “frac sand”–a durable, high-purity quartz sand used to help produce petroleum fluids and prop up man-made fractures in shale rock formations through which oil and gas flows—turning this segment into the top driver of value in the shale revolution.

“One of the major players in Eagle Ford is saying they’re short 6 million tons of 100 mesh alone in 2014 and they don’t know where to get it. And that’s just one player,” Rasool Mohammad, President and CEO of Select Sands Corporation told Oilprice.com.

Frack sand exponentially increases the return on investment for a well, and oil and gas companies are expected to use some 95 billion pounds of frack sand this year, up nearly 30% from 2013 and up 50% from forecasts made just last year.

Pushing demand up is the trend for wider, shorter fracs, which require twice as much sand. The practice of downspacing—or decreasing the space between wells—means a dramatic increase in the amount of frac sand used. The industry has gone from drilling four wells per square mile to up to 16 using shorter, wider fracs. In the process, they have found that the more tightly spaced wells do not reduce production from surrounding wells.

This all puts frac sand in the drivers’ seat of the next phase of the American oil boom, and it’s a commodity that has already seen its price increase up to 20% over the past year alone.

Frac sand is poised for even more significant gains over the immediate term, with long-term contracts locking in a lucrative future as exploration and production companies experiment with using even more sand per well.

Pioneer Natural Resources Inc. says the output of wells is up to 30% higher when they are blasted with more sand.

Citing RBC Capital Markets, The Wall Street Journal noted that approximately one-fifth of onshore wells are now being fracked with extra sand, while the trend could spread to 80% of all shale wells.

Oilfield services giants such as Halliburton Co. and Baker Hughes Inc. are stockpiling sand now, hoping to shield themselves from rising costs of the high-demand product, according to a recent Reuters report. They’re also buying more sand under contract—a trend that will lead to more long-term contracts and a longer-term boost for frac sand producers.

In this environment, the new game is about quality and location.

Frac sand extraction could spread to a dozen US states that have largely untapped sand deposits, but the biggest winners will be the biggest deposits that are positioned closest to major shale plays such as Eagle Ford, the Permian Basin, Barnett, Haynesville and the Tuscaloosa marine shale play.

The state of Wisconsin has been a major frac sand venue, with over 100 sand mines, loading and processing facilities permitted as of 2013, compared to only five sand mines and five processing plants in 2010.

But with the surge in demand for this product, companies are looking a bit closer to shale center to cut down on transportation costs and improve the bottom line.

One of the hottest new frac sand venues is in Arkansas’ Ozark Mountains, which is not only closer by half to the major shale plays, saving at least 25% per ton on transportation costs, but also allows for year-round production that will fill the gap in shortages when winter prevents mining in northern states.

“In the southern US, we can operate year round, so there is no fear of a polar vortex like that we saw last year with some other producers,” says Mohammad of Select Sands, which has two known producing frac sand mines in northeastern Arkansas, in the Ozark Mountains, and sells the bulk of its frac sand to producers in the Eagle Ford, Barnett and Haynesville shales, as well as in the new marine shale, Tuscaloosa.

Chicago-based consulting company Professional Logistics Group Inc. found in 2012 that transportation represented 58% of the cost of frac sand, while Select Sands estimates the costs between 66-75% today.

The competition is stiff, but this game is still unfolding, while increased demand is reshaping the playing field.

US Silica Holdings Inc. says demand for its own volumes of sand could double or triple in the next five years, and its three publicly-traded rivals—Emerge Energy Services Fairmount Santrol and Hi-Crush Partners have also made strong Wall Street debuts over the past two years.

Source: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Follow-The-Sand-To-The-Real-Fracking-Boom.html

The post Follow The Sand To The Real Fracking Boom – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Myanmar’s High Rice Price Volatility Increases Poverty Risk, Requires Careful Management

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A new study by the World Bank finds that rice price volatility in Myanmar is the highest among net rice exporting countries in Asia, preventing Myanmar’s rice farmers from earning high profits and keeping many families at or close to poverty income levels.

Rice prices have also risen by 40 percent between 2009-2013, increasing pressure on Myanmar’s overall food security and export competitiveness, according to the recent World Bank report “Myanmar: Rice Price Volatility and Poverty Reduction”.

“Agriculture is at the heart of poverty reduction in Myanmar. Changes in rice prices affect nearly 50% of the population whose livelihood depends on rice production,” said Abdoulaye Seck, the World Bank’s country manager in Myanmar. “A majority of rural population lives close to the poverty line and spends more than 60% of their incomes on food. Even temporary increase in rice prices reduces real income and households’ spending on health, education or more nutritious food. Rice price volatility, indeed, should concern everyone in Myanmar.”

Price volatility in Myanmar is mostly driven by heavy concentration of paddy production in just two months of a marketing year – November and December. Fragmented seed market, poor roads, weak phone coverage, unreliable market information, low export diversification, and high costs for rice mills to maintain rice stocks amplify these price fluctuations even further.

“Addressing price volatility requires a good assessment of the actual situation because rice production is seasonal and price volatility is inherent in agricultural markets,” said Sergiy Zorya, a Word Bank senior agricultural economist, a lead author of the report. “Stable prices per se do not generate long-term agricultural growth if it is achieved through shortsighted policies. Short-term measures such as export restrictions, minimum farm prices or government-owned stocks might reduce some volatility but rarely produce positive outcomes for food security and poverty reduction in the long term“.

Price volatility in Myanmar could be reduced by spreading rice production more evenly over the marketing year, according to the report. Lower costs of doing business and improved access to finance for rice mills and traders would reduce storage costs and increase private stocks, acting to smooth price fluctuations. Investments in rural roads and telecom infrastructure would increase market integration and help stabilize rice prices in a market-friendly manner.

“Any strategy for stabilizing rice price volatility has to address its structural causes,” said Ulrich Zachau, the World Bank’s country director for Myanmar. “International experience shows that there is a significant trade-off between lowering price volatility with short-term measures and maintaining price competitiveness. Long-term structural issues can be solved only through investments in agriculture and infrastructure, improved business environment, and social safety nets. Open trade policy should be the one and foremost policy goal for Myanmar”.

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Serbia Arrests Tycoon For Alleged Bank Fraud

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Miroslav Bogicevic, a Serbian businessman and former Democratic Party donor, was arrested on suspicion of defrauding the mainly state-owned Privredna Bank of 15 million euros.

Bogicevic, the owner of MB Farmakom Concern, was arrested alongside the president of the credit board of Privredna Banka on Monday on suspicion of abuse of office.

Police said in a statement that the two suspects allegedly defrauded Privredna Banka of 15 million euros by signing bad loan agreements.

According to the police, as a result of an agreement between Bogicevic and his alleged accomplice from the bank, Privredna Banka issued fraudulent loans to nine companies between October 2012 and March 2013.

All the loans were between one and two million euros and MB Farmakom Concern was a guarantor for all of them. According to the police, the same day the companies received the money from the bank, they would transfer the funds to MB Farmakom Concern as corporate loans.

The police also stated that Privredna Banka approved these loans without adequate guarantees, only with the bill of exchange as security.

None of the loans were repaid to Privredna Banka, which according to the police means that the bank lost 15 million euros, which MB Farmakom Concern gained through these transactions.

Privredna Banka, of which the state owns 64 per cent, went bust in October 2013 due to losses incurred by approving bad loans.

MB Farmakom Concern, founded in 1989, includes seven companies – the Dairy Sabac, Industrial Combine Guca, Battery Factory Sombor, Foundry Pozega, Mine Lece Medvedja, Agricultural Combine 7 Juli Debrec and the Zajaca mines and smelting plant.

Bogicevic helped finance the Democratic Party while it was in power. The Club of Economic Journalists declared him the businessman of the decade in 2011.

His decline started after the Democrats lost power following general elections in May 2012 and after he took part in the sale of the Politika newspaper.

In July 2012, Germany’s WAZ Media Group sold its 50 per cent share in Politika to the Moscow-based OOO East Media Group, headed by Miroslav Bogicevic.

In the summer of 2012, the ruling Progressive Party accused the Democrats of controlling and using the paper for their own promotion. BIRN has learned from Politika’s management that tensions eased after Bogicevic agreed not to interfere in editorial policy, following pressure from the Progressives. On June 17 last year, Ljiljana Smajlovic was appointed the new editor-in-chief of Politika.

Since then, media have been reporting that Bogicevic’s MB Farmakom Concern is highly in debt, owing money to the banks, his employees and suppliers.

Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic stated in October that Bogicevic’s company had one of Serbia’s largest tax problems.

The post Serbia Arrests Tycoon For Alleged Bank Fraud appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Bangladesh: Minister Arrested For Offense To Islam

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Abdul Latif Siddique, 77, an influential former minister, turned himself in to police after various extreme Muslim groups organized protests nationwide against the politician for criticizing the Hajj pilgrimage made by Muslims to Mecca, the fifh pillar of Islam.

Islamist groups issued a 24-hour deadline for the government to arrest him soon after his return Sunday to Bangladesh from a long trip to India and US. At a meeting in New York on September 28 before being removed as telecommunications minister, Siddique told a Bangladeshi expatriate audience that he opposed the Hajj, which he said was “a waste on manpower”. “Two million people have gone to Saudi Arabia to perform Hajj. It is a waste of manpower. Those who perform Hajj do not have any productivity. They deduct from the economy, spend a lot of money abroad”, he said. “Tabligh Jamaat brings together about 2 million people every year. It has no specific duties. It just clogs traffic across the country”, added the former minister.

After his comments, Siddique was removed as a minister and expelled from the Awami League party, accused of hurting the religious sentiments of Muslims of Bangladesh. When the party asked the former minister to explain why he should not be expelled permanently for violation of the actual party statute, he responded that the Awami League dropped the “Muslim” term from its name in 1955 to assume a more secular image. The party statue also establishes freedom of expression and opinion. “All members can express their own view on any matter”, Siddique had explained, however expressing regret for the “embarassment” to the party.

Siddique told the court he would not seek legal assistance for his deposition. The Awami League clarified that it does not assume responsibility for the former minister’s views. “He is alone”, said the party secretary Mahbubul Alam Hanif. In protest against the comments, various organizations yesterday threatened a hartal, a general strike, for Thursday if the government failed to arrest the former minister.

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Kenya: Hundreds Flee Mandera After Al Shabab Attack

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According to the Daily Nation online newspaper, the immigrant workers already spent a night at the airstrip of the base demanding to ber evacuated. They claim they fear for their lives following reports that al Shabab informers had “marked” their houses with the intention of attacking them any time.This follows an ambush by al Shabab militants over the weekend against a Nairobi-bound bus, in which they brutally killed 28 non Muslims.

All ground transport and three civilian flights that depart weekly from Mandera are completely booked, reports the Daily Nation. The various unions, including those of teachers and medical workers, were advised to leave the area. Those at the base are in fact mainly teachers, health workers, construction workers and other civil servants.

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Researchers Find Way To Turn Sawdust Into Gasoline

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Researchers at KU Leuven’s Centre for Surface Chemistry and Catalysis have successfully converted sawdust into building blocks for gasoline. Using a new chemical process, they were able to convert the cellulose in sawdust into hydrocarbon chains. These hydrocarbons can be used as an additive in gasoline, or as a component in plastics. The researchers reported their findings in the journal Energy & Environmental Science.

Cellulose is the main substance in plant matter and is present in all non-edible plant parts of wood, straw, grass, cotton and old paper. “At the molecular level, cellulose contains strong carbon chains. We sought to conserve these chains, but drop the oxygen bonded to them, which is undesirable in high-grade gasoline. Our researcher Beau Op de Beeck developed a new method to derive these hydrocarbon chains from cellulose,” explains Professor Bert Sels.

“This is a new type of bio-refining, and we currently have a patent pending for it. We have also built a chemical reactor in our lab: we feed sawdust collected from a sawmill into the reactor and add a catalyst – a substance that sets off and speeds the chemical reaction. With the right temperature and pressure, it takes about half a day to convert the cellulose in the wood shavings into saturated hydrocarbon chains, or alkanes,” says Dr. Bert Lagrain.

“Essentially, the method allows us to make a ‘petrochemical’ product using biomass – thus bridging the worlds of bio-economics and petro chemistry,” he adds.

The result is an intermediary product that requires one last simple step to become fully-distilled gasoline, explains Sels. “Our product offers an intermediate solution for as long as our automobiles run on liquid gasoline. It can be used as a green additive – a replacement for a portion of traditionally-refined gasoline.”

But the possible applications go beyond gasoline: “The green hydrocarbon can also be used in the production of ethylene, propylene and benzene – the building blocks for plastic, rubber, insulation foam, nylon, coatings and so forth.”

“From an economic standpoint, cellulose has much potential,” says Sels. “Cellulose is available everywhere; it is essentially plant waste, meaning it does not compete with food crops in the way that first generation energy crops – crops grown for bioethanol, for example – do. It also produces chains of 5 to 6 hydrocarbon atoms – ‘light nafta’ in the technical jargon. We are currently facing shortages in this because it is becoming quite difficult and more expensive to distil these specific hydrocarbon chains from crude oil or shale gas. In time, hydrocarbon derived from cellulose may provide an alternative,” says Sels.

“Our method could be especially useful in Europe, where we have little crude oil and cannot easily produce shale gas,” concluded Sels.

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Virtual Money: User’s Identity Easier To Be Revealed Than Thought

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Bitcoin is the new money: minted and exchanged on the Internet. Faster and cheaper than a bank, the service is attracting attention from all over the world. But a big question remains: are the transactions really anonymous? Several research groups worldwide have shown that it is possible to find out which transactions belong together, even if the client uses different pseudonyms. However it was not clear if it is also possible to reveal the IP address behind each transaction. This has changed: researchers at the University of Luxembourg have now demonstrated how this is feasible with only a few computers and about €1500.

“It’s hard to predict the future, but some people think that Bitcoin could do to finance what the Internet did to communications”, says Prof. Alex Biryukov, who leads digital currency research at the University. “So I think especially for Luxembourg it is important to watch what happens with Bitcoin”.

The Bitcoin system is not managed by a central authority, but relies on a peer-to-peer network on the Internet. Anyone can join the network as a user or provide computing capacity to process the transactions. In the network, the user’s identity is hidden behind a cryptographic pseudonym, which can be changed as often as is wanted. Transactions are signed with this pseudonym and broadcast to the public network to verify their authenticity and attribute the Bitcoins to the new owner.

In their new study, researchers at the Laboratory of Algorithmics, Cryptology and Security of the University of Luxembourg have shown that Bitcoin does not protect user’s IP address and that it can be linked to the user’s transactions in real-time. To find this out, a hacker would need only a few computers and about €1500 per month for server and traffic costs. Moreover, the popular anonymization network “Tor” can do little to guarantee Bitcoin user’s anonymity, since it can be blocked easily.

The basic idea behind these findings is that Bitcoin entry nodes, to which the user’s computer connects in order to make a transaction, form a unique identifier for the duration of user’s session. This unique pattern can be linked to a user’s IP address. Moreover, transactions made during one session, even those made via unrelated pseudonyms, can be linked together. With this method, hackers can reveal up to 60 percent of the IP addresses behind the transactions made over the Bitcoin network.

“This Bitcoin network analysis combined with previous research on transaction flows shows that the level of anonymity in the Bitcoin network is quite low”, explains Dr. Alex Biryukov. In the paper recently presented at the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security the team also described how to prevent such an attack on user’s privacy. Software patches written by the researchers are currently under discussion with the Bitcoin core developers.

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Claims That Secret Malware In European Network Traced To NSA And GCHQ

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Complex malware known as Regin is the suspected technology behind sophisticated cyberattacks conducted by U.S. and British intelligence agencies on the European Union and a Belgian telecommunications company, according to security industry sources and technical analysis conducted by The Intercept.

Regin was found on infected internal computer systems and email servers at Belgacom, a partly state-owned Belgian phone and internet provider, following reports last year that the company was targeted in a top-secret surveillance operation carried out by British spy agency Government Communications Headquarters, industry sources told The Intercept.

The malware, which steals data from infected systems and disguises itself as legitimate Microsoft software, has also been identified on the same European Union computer systems that were targeted for surveillance by the National Security Agency.

The hacking operations against Belgacom and the European Union were first revealed last year through documents leaked by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden. The specific malware used in the attacks has never been disclosed, however.

The Regin malware, whose existence was first reported by the security firm Symantec on Sunday, is among the most sophisticated ever discovered by researchers. Symantec compared Regin to Stuxnet, a state-sponsored malware program developed by the U.S. and Israel to sabotage computers at an Iranian nuclear facility. Sources familiar with internal investigations at Belgacom and the European Union have confirmed to The Intercept that the Regin malware was found on their systems after they were compromised, linking the spy tool to the secret GCHQ and NSA operations.

Ronald Prins, a security expert whose company Fox IT was hired to remove the malware from Belgacom’s networks, told The Intercept that it was “the most sophisticated malware” he had ever studied.

“Having analyzed this malware and looked at the [previously published] Snowden documents,” Prins said, “I’m convinced Regin is used by British and American intelligence services.”

A spokesman for Belgacom declined to comment specifically about the Regin revelations, but said that the company had shared “every element about the attack” with a federal prosecutor in Belgium who is conducting a criminal investigation into the intrusion. “It’s impossible for us to comment on this,” said Jan Margot, a spokesman for Belgacom. “It’s always been clear to us the malware was highly sophisticated, but ever since the clean-up this whole story belongs to the past for us.”

In a hacking mission codenamed Operation Socialist, GCHQ gained access to Belgacom’s internal systems in 2010 by targeting engineers at the company. The agency secretly installed so-called malware “implants” on the employees’ computers by sending their internet connection to a fake LinkedIn page. The malicious LinkedIn page launched a malware attack, infecting the employees’ computers and giving the spies total control of their systems, allowing GCHQ to get deep inside Belgacom’s networks to steal data.

The implants allowed GCHQ to conduct surveillance of internal Belgacom company communications and gave British spies the ability to gather data from the company’s network and customers, which include the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Council. The software implants used in this case were part of the suite of malware now known as Regin.

One of the keys to Regin is its stealth: To avoid detection and frustrate analysis, malware used in such operations frequently adhere to a modular design. This involves the deployment of the malware in stages, making it more difficult to analyze and mitigating certain risks of being caught.

Based on an analysis of the malware samples, Regin appears to have been developed over the course of more than a decade; The Intercept has identified traces of its components dating back as far as 2003. Regin was mentioned at a recent Hack.lu conference in Luxembourg, and Symantec’s report on Sunday said the firm had identified Regin on infected systems operated by private companies, government entities, and research institutes in countries such as Russia, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Ireland, Belgium, and Iran.

The use of hacking techniques and malware in state-sponsored espionage has been publicly documented over the last few years: China has been linked to extensive cyber espionage, and recently the Russian government was also alleged to have been behind a cyber attack on the White House. Regin further demonstrates that Western intelligence agencies are also involved in covert cyberespionage.

GCHQ declined to comment for this story. The agency issued its standard response to inquiries, saying that “it is longstanding policy that we do not comment on intelligence matters” and “all of GCHQ’s work is carried out in accordance with a strict legal and policy framework, which ensures that our activities are authorised, necessary and proportionate.”

The NSA said in a statement, “We are not going to comment on The Intercept’s speculation.”

The Intercept has obtained samples of the malware from sources in the security community and is making it available for public download in an effort to encourage further research and analysis. What follows is a brief technical analysis of Regin conducted by The Intercept’s computer security staff. Regin is an extremely complex, multi-faceted piece of work and this is by no means a definitive analysis.

In the coming weeks, The Intercept will publish more details about Regin and the infiltration of Belgacom as part of an investigation in partnership with Belgian and Dutch newspapers De Standaard and NRC Handelsblad.

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China’s ‘Dark Sword’ World’s First Supersonic Drone

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China’s mysterious “Dark Sword” combat drone could become the world’s first supersonic unmanned aviation vehicle, reports the website of the country’s national broadcaster CCTV.

The Dark Sword — known in Chinese as “Anjian” — made quite a stir in 2006 when a conceptual model of the unusually shaped triangular aircraft made its debut at the Zhuhai Airshow in southern China’s Guangdong province.

The model was subsequently exhibited at the Paris Air Show but has disappeared from future airshows, with no official word on the development of the UAV. Some claim the project has already been scrapped due to insufficient funding or other reasons, while others believe the development of the drone is now being kept secret as it is undergoing further research and testing.

Chinese aviation expert Fu Qianshao told CCTV that while he does not know the status of the Dark Sword project, the drone could become the world’s first supersonic UAV if it proves a success. He said he would not be surprised if the project is still ongoing in secret as a lack of transparency is nothing new for the aviation industry and is an approach commonly taken by the Americans.

Fu believes even conceptual models of aircraft can reveal something about a country’s technology and the quality of its research and development, adding that analyzing models at Zhuhai can allow experts to gauge the pulse of China’s aviation industry and pick up data that may be more valuable than what the developers are leaking out to the public.

Fu said he was excited by the appearance of the US Air Force’s C-17 Globemaster III large military transport aircraft at Zhuhai this year because it demonstrates that China’s aviation industry has reached a certain level.

There have been many arms manufacturers from Europe who want to exhibit their products at Zhuhai but have been unable due to arms embargoes, Fu said. These countries are desperate to show off their products in the hope that China or other countries will buy them because domestic demand alone is insufficient to sustain production, he added.

While air shows provide a platform to display new aviation products, the most advanced weapons and core technologies of other countries cannot be easily bought, Fu said, adding that if China wants to become one of the world leaders in the aviation industry it must develop its own technologies.

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Iran Nuclear Talks: Another Missed Opportunity – Analysis

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By Kaveh Afrasiabi

In historical retrospect, future historians may well regard the latest failure to reach a final-status nuclear deal between Iran and the world powers as a splendid though unfortunate example of ‘missed opportunity’.

While many of the crucial details of the intense week-long negotiation that ultimately fell short of a final deal have yet to be publicly revealed, still there is sufficient data to reach the conclusion that the description of a ‘missed golden opportunity’ is apt and can indeed shed some insight on the complexities of the issue at hand.

According to the latest reports from Vienna, the tenth round of talks since the ‘Joint Plan of Action” obtained last November has yielded only an intermediary resolution in the form of (a) a March deadline to reach a “political agreement” and (b) a July 2015 deadline to realize what has so far eluded the negotiators, namely, a final, comprehensive agreement. Both sides have commonly expressed partial satisfaction at concrete progress made in the marathon talks, with the Iranian negotiators hoping to achieve their set objectives “even sooner” than the above-mentioned new deadlines. One can certainly hope that it is not hope against hope and, somehow, the difficulties associated with the existing gaps can be resolved.

Optimism must not, however, ever become a substitute for political and diplomatic realism. In a certain sense, the extension of Geneva interim agreement serves the interests of both sides as a ‘lesser evil’ since the alternative of failed talks in the face of existing disagreements is unattractive and carries negative consequences in terms of escalation of the nuclear crisis, which is antithetical to the interests of all sides, as well as the broader international community. The 7 month extension can be conceivably used to build further confidence and to narrow the differences and thus yield the hitherto-elusive goal of a final agreement.

The question is, however, if the existing gaps, e.g., on the level and scope of enrichment, the sequence and timing of sanction’s removal, fate of Arak and Fordo facilities, and so on, reflect irreconcilable differences or can be abridged and if the latter is the case then why weren’t they successfully tackled in these intense rounds of substantive negotiations? In other words, what difference a few months will make vis-a-vis those divisive issues?

In answering this question, it may be said that the Obama administration requires time to sort out its relationship with the coming Republican-dominated Congress. True, but by the same token, wasn’t this a golden opportunity for Obama to bypass the Congress and ink a deal with Iran through an executive order?

In fact, looking ahead, Obama’s ability to muster a deal with Iran through the executive order will likely shrink in the coming months, not the other way around. The anti-Iran hawks in the US Senate probably have the will, determination, and certainly the numbers to push through new anti-Iran legislation in the months to come. Obama’s ability to veto such initiatives hinges on the Democratic minority, some of whom are known anti-Iran hawks. As a result, Obama faces the prospect of his veto overturned by a two thirds majority in the Senate and, at a minimum, this power has been theoretically much diminished.

In turn, the Dr. Rouhani administration should be careful not to fall in the trap of conveying absolute certainty that a final deal is in the offing and it is only a matter of a few months before it is materialized. A more guarded approach to this issue is called for by the dictates of diplomatic and political prudence and realism, in light of the complex and perhaps contradictory motives of the Americans.

One reason for a healthy skepticism is that compared to the Geneva agreement, when the White House kept the preceding secret bilateral talks with Iran in Oman out of the radars of Saudis and Israelis, this time it was the complete opposite, as US Secretary of State John Kerry closely kept in touch with Riyadth and Tel Aviv throughout the hectic week, going so far as meeting the Saudi foreign minister in his parked airplane in Vienna in the middle of Iran negotiations.

What role the negative Saudi influence played in neutralizing the potential for a final deal remains to be studied, pending further information. The Israelis too, who openly opted for the extension option, are publicly delighted and have a sigh of relief that no final deal with Iran was reached.

There is little doubt that a convergence of three inter-related factors played a crucial role in preventing a major breakthrough by the November deadline. These were: the coalescing of Arab-Israeli anti-agreement lobbying efforts into a formidable coalition; the lack of political will in Washington and Obama’s concerns about the political backlash at home; US and Western fears of losing their leverages in the region, which owe themselves partly to the nuclear crisis, which has been utilized to sustain their hegemony. Connected to these are, of course, Iran’s potential ability to cement its leadership role in the region in the aftermath of a final deal, which is antithetical to the hegemonic interests and aspirations of Washington and, to a lesser extent, other western powers engaged in nuclear negotiations with Iran.

Still, from Iran’s vantage point, there are several positive and even admirable components to the latest talks and their net result. First, time is running against the sanctions regime and the extension lends itself to the erosion of global unity on this subject matter. Already in the space of one year, the interim agreement has led to substantial increase in Iran’s trade relations with the Europeans and others and, therefore, it is almost guaranteed that this trend will continue in the proximate future, no matter how hard the US hawks try to stitch the sanctions coalition together. Second, the longer the powers consent to Iran’s enrichment activities, albeit within certain limits, the more entrenched this right and more problematic the Western attempt to dispossess Iran of this subtle concession. Finally, the talks have exposed the growing rifts among the “5+1″ countries and it is a matter of time before they become fully transparent and consequential.

Yet, irrespective of these positive aspects, the failure to reach a final agreement and sign a deal casts a gloomy sky that needs to be broken by the delivery of hopeful pledges to reach a final deal mentioned above. The missed opportunity is a cause for minor disappointment, but a healthy one that makes the Iranians more cognizant of the perils that lie ahead.

For now, however, it is patently clear that the talks’ promise of a rapprochement with the West has new hurdles to overcome and the cynicism of the will may have overtaken the optimism of intellect. In conclusion, one must ask about the coincidence of the November unfulfilled deadline and the forced resignation of US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, who was targeted by Washington’s hawks for his known pro-Iran sympathies and who was an advocate of a US-Iran geostrategic realignment. Chances are Hagel will be replaced with a more interventionist official who will push for the expansion of US operations in Syria, linking them more organically to ‘regime change’ objective that was reportedly opposed Hagel. If so, then more ominous clouds of US-Iran and US-Russia contradictions are on the horizon, which will inevitably affect the climate for nuclear negotiations.

*Kaveh Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of several books on Iran’s foreign policy. His writings have appeared on several online and print publications, including UN Chronicle, New York Times, Der Tagesspiegel, Middle East Journal, Harvard International Review, and Brown’s Journal of World Affairs, Guardian, Russia Today, Washington Post, San Francisco Chronicle, Boston Globe, Mediterranean Affairs, Nation, Telos, Der Tageszeit, Hamdard Islamicus, Iranian Journal of International Affairs, Global Dialogue.

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The South China Sea Disputes: Singapore As An ‘Honest Broker’? – Analysis

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Singapore has talked about being an honest broker between China and Southeast Asian claimants of the South China Sea. Can and should Singapore play such a role?

By Daniel Wei Boon Chua

During the recent ASEAN Summit in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, Singapore’s Foreign Minister Mr K Shanmugam spoke with the media regarding the South China Sea disputes involving China and ASEAN members. Because Singapore is not a claimant of the disputes, Shanmugam suggested that Singapore could be an “honest broker”. But is it even possible for Singapore to be an honest broker, and would playing such a role contribute to Singapore’s interests?

Although Singapore does not claim any part of the South China Sea, it has strong interests in the stability of the region. Singapore’s economy depends heavily on trade and is highly sensitive to hindrances to the freedom of navigation in all international sea lanes. Stability in the South China Sea, which is a maritime area close to Singapore, is therefore vital to Singapore’s economic interest.

Can Singapore be an “honest broker”?

As a small state, Singapore places great value in the collective voice of ASEAN in its engagement with major powers and international forums. Intra-ASEAN hostilities have the potential to split the Association. Furthermore, having developed close diplomatic relations with China, Singapore will inadvertently be affected if the disputes do not reach a peaceful settlement.

Singapore does not favour one claimant state over the other, but urges disputants to resolve their differences in a peaceful manner. In Mr Shanmugam’s words, “from Singapore’s perspective…, it doesn’t matter who owns which islands, but where there are disputes, we want it to be dealt with in a way that doesn’t lead to ships confronting each other, shots being fired, increasing kinetic conflict”.

It is important to emphasise that Mr Shanmugam’s remarks do not imply that an invitation has been extended to the disputants of the South China Sea. In the first place, he has not elaborated on what an honest broker role might look like. Across a spectrum of possibilities, an honest broker’s role could range from offering a venue for negotiations to arbitrating between opposite sides. There is, of course, a variety of possible measures such as joint economic projects and joint studies on resource extraction in the South China Sea. There have not been official statements made on this issue.

Qualities of an honest broker

Nevertheless, earlier this year, Mr Shanmugam briefly explained the qualities that make Singapore a suitable mediator between China and other claimants. Singapore is seen as both Asian and “westernised”. Singapore is small, not a threat to anyone and is able to “speak freely and frankly”. But do the claimants in the South China Sea disputes share the same view of Singapore?

Whether Singapore possesses the qualities of an honest broker depends on the interpretation and assessment by other countries. In a way, an invitation to mediate has been offered, and it is unsure whether China and the ASEAN claimants see Singapore as indeed a neutral mediator.

Although Singapore is a non-claimant state in the South China Sea disputes, its interests in the region already cast questions on its neutrality. The party that presents the best chance of stability and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea potentially influences the attitudes of Singapore. There are merits to the argument that a small state like Singapore does not threaten the larger claimants, and can bring them to the negotiating table. Yet being small limits Singapore’s ability to ensure that claimants do not stall the process once the outcome veers unfavourably for them.

To make matters worse, playing the role of an honest broker in the South China Sea may work against Singapore’s interests. Firstly, a result that favours any one side of the dispute will raise doubts about Singapore’s neutrality in the disputes – an accusation that Singapore will be happy to avoid. Secondly, mediating in a dispute involving ASEAN members puts the principle of non-interference to the test.

It will be an endeavour that depends on how the process is being interpreted by other ASEAN states, as well the domestic audience in the claimant states – a matter of how the message is being controlled.

Why Singapore should still attempt to mediate

Having close to 50 years of experience in active diplomacy, both in regional and international arenas, Singapore is known to often “punch above its weight”. To protect its vital interests, it has taken risks at appropriate times, and prevailed through sheer commitment and skillful diplomacy. To passively watch as the South China Sea disputes spiral into a full blown maritime conflict will severely damage Singapore’s economic development and diplomatic relations.

ASEAN’s ability to stay together in the event of conflict revolving around the disputes will also be greatly challenged. Singapore does not have to be the sole “honest broker” in the disputes; non-Asian countries have less or no interests in the South China Sea and will therefore fit into the role well.

Hence, Mr Shanmugam’s proposition for Singapore to be an “honest broker” should not be brushed aside as wishful, and even arrogant, thinking on the part of Singapore. It points towards a necessary step that reflects the continuity of Singapore pragmatic commitment to regional stability that benefits all Southeast Asian nations.

Daniel Wei Boon Chua is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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Missing Gene Linked To Autism

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Researchers at the University of Leeds have shed light on a gene mutation linked to autistic traits.

The team already knew that some people with autism were deficient in a gene called neurexin-II. To investigate whether the gene was associated with autism symptoms, the Leeds team studied mice with the same defect.

They found behavioural features that were similar to autism symptoms, including a lack of sociability or interest in other mice.

Dr Steven Clapcote, Lecturer in Pharmacology in the University’s Faculty of Biological Sciences, who led the study published in the journal Translational Psychiatry today, said: “In other respects, these mice were functioning normally. The gene deficiency mapped closely with certain autism symptoms.”

Dr Clapcote added: “This is exciting because we now have an animal model to investigate new treatments for autism.”

The researchers also looked at how the absence of neurexin-II was affecting the brain.

Co-author Dr James Dachtler, Wellcome Trust Junior Investigator Development Fellow in the Faculty of Biological Sciences at Leeds, said: “We found that the affected mice had lower levels of a protein called Munc18-1 in the brain. Munc18-1 usually helps to release neurotransmitter chemicals across synaptic connections in the brain, so neurotransmitter release could be impaired in the affected mice and possibly in some cases of autism.”

Research by Professor Thomas Südhof, a Nobel prize-winning biochemist at Stanford University, previously established a link between autism symptoms and neuroligin-1, another gene associated with synapse signalling. The Leeds-led study is the first to find a connection with neurexin-II.

Dr Clapcote said: “Not all people with autism will have the neurexin-II defect, just as not all will have the neuroligin defect, but we are starting to build up a picture of the important role of genes involved in these synapse communications in better understanding autism.”

The research was funded by the Medical Research Council and by the Wellcome Trust’s Institutional Strategic Support Fund.

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Discussing Democracy In USA – OpEd

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Democracy is the worse form of government, except for all the other forms that have been tried from time to time. — Winston Churchill

Churchill’s above statement provides a sweeping, and possibly one-sided picture, of democracy as a mixed blessing — a system with its boons and banes that just somehow works. Such a generic observation outlines, on one hand, that democracy is better than any other non-democratic system, and at the same time points out that it still is not the God-given mandate to all problems that this world is currently facing. Unfortunately, a good number of Americans tend to agree with the first interpretation of Churchill’s statement, but overlook the second one.

Much like any other form of governance, democracy too is vulnerable. However, one can find solace in the fact that a democratic setup offers us the chance to have second thoughts about mistakes of the past: replace one set of fools with a new set of fools, for instance. The elected leaders serve for a given time period — such a time limit can control the amount of damage that they can do to their country or, in the case of USA, to other countries as well.

The Recent Elections in USA

Results: Republicans fared way better than Democrats.

If one is looking to criticize the American implementation of democracy, the reasons are not too hard to find. In fact, you can get a dismal picture of US democracy simply by looking at the major themes and issues that surfaced during election campaigns: WMDs in Iran, barbarian Russians in Ukraine, Palestinians, the it-can-kill-us-anytime-somebody-save-us Ebola virus, and so on. Such issues illustrate just how ill-informed the average American is and as a result, media advertisements and publicity stunts are all that you need to win an election!

However, we can let all that rest for a while. My focus is on something else: these mid-term elections witnessed the poorest voter turnout in the last seven decades. Barely 36.4% of eligible voters bothered to cast their votes, according to NYT.

Quite obviously, such a poor turnout does not speak well of American democracy. When the voters are uninterested, ideological clashes and noble intentions do not matter. It all boils down to publicity and mobilization attempts, period. Such “sponsored deceit” as an election strategy leads to corruption, inefficiency and, at worst, creation of a system where elites and interest groups dominate the political fabric of the country.

Yes, this is precisely what is happening in USA.

A ‘Democratic’ Foreign Policy?

Once again, referring to Churchill’s observation: democracy might not be flawless, but it is, apparently, the best system at present.

However, as pointed out, USA’s implementation of this very system is far from being called the best. Therefore, when a democratically elected government in USA decides to indulge in military action, such decisions may not always be democratic.

In fact, USA does not have a good record when it comes to foreign policy vis a vis democracy. Some noteworthy examples:

  • 1953: USA tried to destroy democracy in Iran
  • 1954: Another attempt, this time in Guatemala
  • 1956: Opposed United Nations’ attempt to restore democracy in Viet Nam
  • 1958: Sent troops to support militants attempting to subvert democracy in Lebanon
  • 1973: Overthrew an elected government in Chile

Need more examples? You can find Venezuela, Palestine and various other countries on this list.

I will refrain from passing judgements at American intentions and/or criticizing US foreign policy — that is something citizens of USA should do. However, I have cited the above examples to show that the assumption of democratic countries being friendly with each other is plain wrong.

Appraisal

Recently, experts at Princeton University concluded that USA is no longer a democracy. Instead, it is:

“… an oligarchy of rich, well-connected individuals on the political scene [who] now steer the direction of the country, regardless of or even against the will of the majority of voters.”

While I do not find myself qualified enough to discuss the verdict of Princeton University’s scholars, I do feel that USA might still be a democracy, albeit the focus has shifted from the common populace and now, competing interest groups are in power, with parochial interests that are opposed to national interest as a whole.

Thus, US democracy is evolving into a form of pseudo-governmental structure, wherein authoritarianism is becoming the norm, with everyone in power having a personal agenda to push forward, be it the politicians or the mainstream press.

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Macchil Verdict: Reading Between The Lines – Analysis

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By Vivek Chadha

On November 13, 2014, the verdict on the Macchil fake encounter case was announced. Five of the accused, including the commanding officer of the battalion involved in the killing were sentenced to life imprisonment. The sentence is being seen as a landmark judgement by the General Court Martial (GCM), after the army took over the case for trial by a military court.

The verdict comes within days of the Northern Army Commander, Lt Gen D.S. Hooda, acknowledging a mistake, when two young Kashmiri boys were shot while they tried to rush past a vehicle check post, despite being challenged, in a commendable display of high moral standing. While the two incidents might be seen as distinct and without any linkage, yet a closer look indicates a pattern which needs to be discerned and analysed.

The exemplary punishment by the GCM, is a clear acknowledgement of the wrongdoing by a group of individuals, who took law into their hands and shed blood for personal benefit. The reprehensible crime is clearly an act of commission, which indicates the wilful desire of the officers and men to commit the crime. On the other hand, the action at the check post, according to available media reports, is an act of omission, as a result of the failure to follow laid down rules of engagement. However, there is a common thread, which binds these two incidents together. And that is the decision of the army to acknowledge the mistakes and simultaneously attempt to punish the guilty through a fair and expeditious judicial process.

This raises three issues which need to be placed in perspective in the backdrop of this differentiation. First, the role of honours and awards in such crimes, second, the impact of punishment on the morale of troops who undertake a challenging responsibility and last, its impact on the population of the disturbed area at large.

Honours and awards have always been a source of motivation, pride and contributor to morale. A small piece of ribbon achieves more than the combined wealth that a soldier earns in his service life. This works well against an external adversary, with a clear distinction between friend and foe. However, these lines tend to get blurred in operations fought on one’s own soil and amongst one’s own people. The dichotomy of the situation is further accentuated in the absence of clear victory and defeat. Despite this contradiction, there was a need to motivate men, under conditions which were often far worse than a short war over 14 or 21 days. This becomes all the more difficult, given the harsh and unfair judgement of a section of population, which remains sympathetic to the perpetuators of violence. The painted walls of Chennai railway station are a case in point, which read IPKF as “Innocent People Killing Force” and the posters in Kashmir which said, “Indian Dogs Go Home.” This led to adoption of innovative methods like unit citations, besides other individual gallantry awards to motivate soldiers, who saw themselves fight a thankless conflict. However, the system of honours and awards carried within its ambit the seeds of potential abuse, since it was linked with the killing of terrorists. The Macchil case is a dark example of this craving for individual and collective glory.

The easiest solution to the challenge of fake encounters for awards would be to abolish them. However, this would be a case of missing the woods for the trees. The strength of the army, amongst other factors, flows from the intimate understanding and knowledge of commanders of their men and units. Therefore, if officers up the chain of command are held equally accountable for such acts, there is little scope for recurrence of such incidents.

Holding the guilty to account is often confused as being detrimental to troop’s morale. Nothing can be further from reality. The morale of a soldier or a battalion is likely to be hit harder in case honours are bestowed upon perpetuators of crime, which incidentally is always known by word of mouth within the army. Therefore, the only reason for continuing to accept such cases is personal advancement, unlike the myth of morale which is often used as a red herring.

This also highlights the role of Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), which is seen as the legal shield for protecting the army. The law merely aims to achieve two objectives. First, protection of personnel against legal victimisation, which is often experienced through filing of false cases, thereby, affecting the ability of a force to operate. While doing so, its unwritten sentiment also differentiates between acts of omission and commission. Second, it provides operational flexibility to function under the peculiar conditions prevalent in disturbed areas. The law does not condone acts of commission, done in the pursuit of personal advancement, as is evident from the accompanying do’s and don’ts, as well as the rules of engagement in a given area. The speedy actions of the army in the two cases will go a long way negating the accusation that justice cannot be delivered by the men in uniform. Therefore, the focus of attention must remain on the implementation process of the law, which makes the difference between delivery and miscarriage of justice.

If the intended aim of deploying a force in a disturbed area is to defeat terrorism and not merely to kill terrorists, as is widely acknowledged, then it is the people of the region who must remain the centre of gravity. The two cases, may well have added to the sense of alienation in the valley. However, the moral courage of the highest military commander in the state to acknowledge the mistake and ensure that justice is delivered, has undoubtedly minimised it. These unfortunate incidents should therefore be minimised and whenever they do occur, justice must be delivered to limit its negative fallout.

These incidents have a larger lesson for not only the army, but all uniformed forces involved in counter terrorist operations under challenging and trying conditions. First, the force must differentiate between genuine mistakes and wilful crime. Second, delivery of justice in a fair and transparent manner is a major factor in winning over the alienated population. It is also important to simultaneously ensure that this information is widely disseminated through both traditional and new media. The psychological campaign that accompanies military operations has an important role to play. The two cases highlighted here, will go a long way in achieving these objectives.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/MacchilVerdictReadingBetweentheLines_vchadha_251114.html

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The Afghanistan National Railway: A Plan Of Opportunity – Analysis

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By Lawrence J. Pleis, Richard Lliteras, David A. Wood, Matthew D. Bain, and Steven J. Hendrickson

Steam railroading is important not because it represents some nostalgic past that, in truth, never was. Steam railroading is important because it was a human tool that radically transformed a continent, affecting everyone. — William L. (Bill) Withuhn, Curator Emeritus, Smithsonian Institution

In support of the State Department’s “New Silk Road” initiative, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) formed a planning team of subject matter experts spanning the Department of Defense (DOD), the interagency community, academia, and the U.S. railroad industry to provide recommendations that advance the development of a national railway system for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). The Afghanistan National Railway Plan (ANRP) was provided to the Afghanistan Railway Authority (ARA) in August 2013.

The ANRP was developed on the basis of Afghanistan’s urgent need for a national transportation system as a precursor of economic development and political stability. Expansion of the existing 75-kilometer rail line could ultimately allow Afghanistan to export minerals and agricultural products, significantly enhance its position as a regional trading partner, improve domestic commerce, and link products, consumers, and markets across Eurasia and beyond.

Assessing the economic viability and technical and financial feasibility of a national railway system for Afghanistan, as well as the regional connectivity imperatives, to develop recommendations for large capital-investment infrastructure projects was a nontraditional assignment for USCENTCOM. The railroad expertise formerly resident in the U.S. Army Reserve has been significantly reduced to tactical-level repair, operations, and advisory capability. Notwithstanding these planning challenges, USCENTCOM partnered closely with the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations, U.S. Transportation Command’s Joint Distribution Process Analysis Center, the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command’s Afghanistan Railway Assessment Team, the Center for Joint and Strategic Logistics at National Defense University (NDU), and United States Forces–Afghanistan to collectively plan, model, assess, and validate the recommendations in the ANRP. Invaluable to DOD planners was the voluntary technical assistance provided over the 18-month planning process by the Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Department of State, and Treasury Department, as well as the largely pro bono support from rail, mining industry, and cultural experts from Columbia University, George Mason University, and Michigan State University. While these organizations formed the core planning team, several other stakeholders, including other DOD organizations, were critical to reviewing and refining the ANRP.

The planning effort culminated in February 2013 at a stakeholder review workshop, co-hosted by the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at NDU and USCENTCOM, when 56 representatives from 24 organizations conducted a detailed assessment of the draft plan. Highlighting the workshop was the participation of the Afghanistan Railway Authority, established under the Afghan government’s Ministry of Public Works in September 2012, and the Ministry of Mines. Guidance, discussion, and buy-in from these key Afghan representatives were critical to reshaping the preliminary ANRP into an actionable plan reflecting the requirements and priorities most relevant for Afghanistan.

Why Rail?

Afghanistan is blessed with billions of dollars’ worth of accessible mineral wealth (primarily copper and iron ore) but does not currently have a railway capable of transporting high volumes of these lucrative exports. Similarly, the country relies on relatively inefficient trucking routes for vital imports such as wheat, cement, fertilizer, consumer goods, and petroleum. The absence of a railway system dampens trade and inhibits the landlocked nation’s economic growth and trade with its neighbors and global markets. A railway could facilitate commercial exchange and promote stability, serving as a regional hub for Central and South Asia. The potential for significant revenue enabled by rail could aid in reducing poverty and improving the standard of living of the Afghan people. A railway is also critical to the country’s security, with select rail corridors supporting national defense. The potential of these benefits has drawn railway development support from the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) program, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, and Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Region Prosperity Initiative, which was launched by the G-8.

Regional Support

Regional railway integration has drawn support from Afghanistan’s neighbors, including Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, and regional trading partners such as India and China. Long reliant on northern routes to the Baltic Sea for access to the global economy, the Central Asian Republics are developing the potential to transport goods through Afghanistan to Indian Ocean ports at lower costs and shorter distances. The economies of Afghanistan and regional partners could also benefit from trade borne by trains traversing Afghanistan since its neighbors Pakistan (26 percent), India (26 percent), and Tajikistan (10 percent) constitute the biggest export destinations. Rail transport is a key component of the reemerging Silk Road, a comprehensive concept to expand trade, transit, and supply route networks from the Indian Ocean to the Ural Mountains. As Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Yerzhan Kazykhanov explained in 2012, regional investment in Afghanistan will pay dividends: “We must look beyond 2014 and help Afghans help themselves.”

The Business Case

Sustainable growth is the best way for Afghanistan, a largely agrarian country, to reduce dependence on foreign aid. The country is eager to leverage its vast iron ore and copper deposits, mines that could generate a total of $78 billion in corporate taxes and royalties by 2040. Geological surveys also indicate the country possesses exploitable reserves of valuable elements such as lithium. In Afghanistan, rail and mining development are integrally linked; mining requires rail to transport ore efficiently to market, and rail is reliant on revenue generated by exporting ore. Competitive analysis indicates that current low-cost global producers of iron ore, including Brazil and Australia, are able to extract, rail, and ship to Asian markets for as little as $39 per metric ton (2012 equivalent). To successfully compete in the global iron ore market, Afghanistan must approach this level of efficiency. Delivering hundreds of millions of metric tons of minerals to market at competitive rates will require expeditious rail routes linking mines with seaports and Standard gauge track able to support heavy-haul loads. The ANRP forecasts 75 percent of the country’s estimated rail freight traffic between 2017 and 2040 will be mineral transport. The rest of the traffic will represent shipments of agricultural products, raw materials, and finished goods to and from the country, shipments that will grow as Afghanistan’s society modernizes and accumulates wealth.

A Wealth of Minerals

Afghanistan’s mineral abundance, widely dispersed throughout the country, could ultimately exceed $1 trillion. The country has been known since antiquity for gemstones such as lapis lazuli and emeralds, but the greatest potential for wealth generation consists of bulk quantities of copper and iron ore available close to the Earth’s surface. Seven iron and copper mining “areas of interest” would produce the majority of the country’s export earnings: Haji Gak, Syadara, and Zarkashan for iron and Aynak, Balkhab, Dusar-Shaida, Kundulan, and Zarkashan for copper. According to forecasts, mining operations would yield about 58 million metric tons of ore annually, almost all of it requiring rail transport. Production totals could approach 1.4 billion metric tons between 2017 and 2040. Minerals from Haji Gak, acclaimed as one of the world’s largest iron reserves, account for most of the anticipated freight demand for a proposed southern line. Haji Gak’s output is expected to be four times that of all the other mining areas combined. Afghanistan offers many advantages as a source for minerals to supply the teeming markets of fast-developing South Asia.

Emerging Rail Routes

Economic feasibility, including the need to negotiate Afghanistan’s challenging terrain, dictates the location of proposed rail routes. The national railway concept envisions a southern mineral freight line of Standard gauge that would approach Indian Ocean ports in Iran and Pakistan. The prohibitive cost of traversing the Hindu Kush, the mountainous interior of Afghanistan, suggests the southern rail line would initially function largely independently of the northern line. The northern commercial freight line consisting of the wider Russian gauge would link to the existing 75-kilometer line in the city of Mazar-e-Sharif and join a network serving the Central Asian states. Major Afghanistan commercial centers such as Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e-Sharif will serve as hubs of this transportation network. It is necessary to note that medium-term CAREC program priority projects through 2020 include supporting Afghan railway goals for a route from Tajikistan to Turkmenistan through Afghanistan:

  • Turkmenistan: construction of railway line Atamurat–Imamnazar–Aqina (estimated cost of construction $200 million; implementation period of the project 2012–2015)
  • Afghanistan: construction of railway line Aqina–Andkhoy–Sheberghan–Naibabad–Kholm–Kunduz–Sherkhan Bandar (estimated cost of construction $525 million; implementation period of the project 2012–2015)
  • Tajikistan: construction of railway line Kolkhozabad–Dusti–Panji Poyon–Afghanistan border (estimated cost of construction $90 million; implementation period of the project 2012–2015).

These projects would link northern Afghanistan rail lines, via Turkmenistan, to the Caspian Sea, which would expand Afghanistan’s commercial opportunities to a new part of the world.

The Plan

The ANRP is underpinned by the Commercial Market Feasibility Analysis (business case), Terrain and Freight Rail Corridor Feasibility Analysis (technical and financial feasibility and risk analysis), and Legal and Regulatory Framework (proper governance and facilitation of economic viability). The plan supports the achievement of Afghanistan’s strategic priorities, which are to enhance economic growth and economic development, facilitate regional cooperation and development, and better connect the people of Afghanistan. The ANRP supports these strategic priorities by providing analysis and recommendations for four sequential key decisions to effectively expand Afghanistan’s existing railway and identifies the critical path for timely and integrated railway development, operation, and sustainment to achieve the best possible, most financially viable national rail system over time.

The key decisions are to finalize the primary and supporting railway purposes, determine the preferred rail system design, determine the most suitable railway ownership model(s) and management structure, and determine regional connectivity requirements. These four decisions are foundational to ensuring successful railway development and implementation.

Key Decision 1

Finalize the Primary and Supporting Railway Purposes. Afghanistan railway development will be driven primarily by transport of iron ore and, to a much lesser degree, by copper cathode, merchandise, and transit traffic transport. Cumulative mineral, merchandise, and transit traffic shows potential for approximately 1.8 billion net metric tons of freight available for railway transport between 2017 and 2040. Mining is expected to generate approximately 76 percent of potential railway freight traffic demand. Merchandise traffic, including mine-driven imports required for mine development and commercial imports (grain, fertilizer, petroleum, cement, machinery, and other equipment), is expected to generate approximately 17 percent and transit traffic, 7 percent.

The greatest potential for wealth generation consists of bulk quantities of copper and iron ore. The best prospects for near-term revenue generation center on the seven mining areas of interest: Haji Gak, Syadara, and Zarkashan for iron and Aynak, Balkhab, Dusar-Shaida, Kundulan, and Zarkashan for copper. Estimated net tonnage of minerals from Afghanistan’s mining areas of interest exceeds 58 million metric tons per year, on par with some of the largest freight operations in the world. Output from the Haji Gak iron ore area of interest is estimated to account for 80 percent of all mineral traffic and 60 percent of all freight traffic. To successfully compete in the global iron ore market, Afghanistan will need to approach the level of efficiency achieved by low-cost producers in Australia and Brazil at $39 per metric ton (2012 equivalent). If ore is not moved competitively to market by utilizing the shortest and most efficient railway route to seaport, the railway will lack the revenue to expand and sustain itself. Enabling regional connectivity and establishing a regional transportation hub that facilitates trade, industry development, and commercial-based traffic, and eventually passenger transit to better connect the Afghan people, are important supporting purposes of expansion of the railway system.

Recommendations to GIRoA:

  • Finalize the primary and supporting purposes of the national rail system. The primary purpose is to enable self-sustainability and economic independence via mineral-based traffic to provide regional connectivity and serve as a regional transportation hub, with supporting purposes of trade facilitation, industry development, commercial-based traffic, and eventually passenger transit to better connect the Afghan people.
  • Support development of mining areas of interest to meet transport demand thresholds needed for profitable railway operations.
  • Prioritize and develop the Haji Gak mining area of interest first.

Key Decision 2

pleis-et-al-figure1Determine the Preferred Rail System Design. Economic feasibility, including the need to negotiate Afghanistan’s rugged terrain, inevitably dictates the length and location of proposed railway corridors. The Terrain and Freight Rail Corridor Feasibility Analysis evaluated the technical and financial feasibility of developing a national rail system. Employing a three-phased approach, seven assumption-driven construction and operating scenarios were examined to determine a preferred design. Results of the analysis indicate the cost to build rail lines over steep mountainous terrain, which significantly increases the number of bridges and tunnels, is approximately $9.3 million per kilometer, compared to $1.9 million per kilometer for flat and undulating terrain. Therefore, constructing and operating a rail line traversing the Hindu Kush in the immediate future is not cost effective. The recommended railway design consists of two separate, purpose-built rail lines with potential for future expansion to unify the two lines and support emerging economic sectors at some time in the future, as shown in figure 1.

pleis-et-al-table1The two lines consist of a southern, mineral freight–focused, Standard gauge line, which primarily supports transport of bulk mineral ore to seaports in Pakistan and/or Iran for onward shipment to global markets at the lowest possible overall (rail and sealift) transit cost; and a northern, commercial freight–focused, Russian gauge line, which expands the existing 75-kilometer line running between Hairatan and Mazar-e-Sharif, connects the Central Asian Republics and Iran via Afghanistan, and supports the recent memorandum of understanding for the establishment of railway transport infrastructure linking Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan.

pleis-et-al-figure2The financial metrics and risk score for the recommended national railway design are included in table 1. These financial metrics reflect railway operations exclusively and do not include the positive financial impacts estimated for potential mining operations.

The combined southern and northern rail lines of the recommended national railway design do not achieve a positive net present value (NPV) and 10 percent internal rate of return (IRR), though the calculated operating ratio of 52.3 percent reflects a generally favorable revenue-to-operating cost ratio once rail lines are operational.

To more fully analyze the two primary rail lines comprising the national railway design, the planning team considered both the southern and northern lines as independent railways. The southern mineral freight–focused line generates a positive $635.6 million NPV, an IRR exceeding 10 percent, and an operating ratio of 53.6 percent. The northern commercial freight–focused line is less economically viable with a negative $2.3 billion NPV, an IRR less than 10 percent, and an operating ratio of 47.6 percent. Table 2 presents the financial metrics associated with the recommended railway design of southern and northern lines.

Figure 2 reflects the cumulative cost, revenue, and profit projections for the recommended Afghanistan national railway design over the designated railway lifecycle, 2014 to 2040, and the southern and northern line break-even points, where cost is recovered by sufficient revenue generation.

pleis-et-al-table2The combination of the southern and northern rail lines is projected to reach the cost/revenue break-even point in 2026. Viewed independently, the southern line is projected to reach its break-even point in 2024, and the northern line is projected to reach this point 9 years later in 2033. The impact of these varying profitability profiles may drive GIRoA to leverage the potential revenue generation of the southern mineral freight–focused railway to offset construction and operations of the less profitable northern railway.

Recommendation to GIRoA: Develop and implement the preferred Afghanistan national railway design, the most financially feasible alternative with an acceptable level of risk. It is further recommended that GIRoA consider increasing the assumed mineral freight rate from $0.030 to $0.033 per net ton kilometer to potentially yield a positive NPV and IRR above 10 percent. Additional analysis is required to determine an appropriate mineral revenue rate once a railway operating plan has been developed.

Key Decision 3

Determine the Most Suitable Railway Ownership Model(s) and Management Structure. The ARA is responsible for developing and instituting policies, laws, and regulations needed for the safe, efficient, and reliable operation of a national railway. Four general railway ownership models and associated management structures were examined to determine the most suitable ownership model and associated management structure for the Afghanistan national railway:

  • Model 1: 100 Percent Public Ownership. The government owns railway assets, including land and infrastructure, and operates and maintains the railway with government employees or contractors.
  • Model 2: 100 Percent Private Ownership. A private, self-funded corporation owns, operates, and maintains railway assets. Operating decisions are based mainly on market demands and profitability. Two subcategories of this model exist:
  • Model 2a: General purpose (mixed freight)
  • Model 2b: Purpose-built (bulk mineral freight from mines)
  • Model 3: Mixed Public-Private Ownership. The government owns “below rail” assets, including land and infrastructure such as tracks, while a private entity owns, operates, and maintains “above rail” assets and infrastructure, including locomotives, rolling stock, and control systems.
  • Model 4: Hybrid Ownership. The hybrid model contains elements of the above models and accommodates dynamic railway ownership requirements. This model could provide the flexibility to focus government participation on some, but not all, rail lines.

The strengths and weakness of the four railway ownership models are shown in table 3.pleis-et-al-table3

Overall, the hybrid model is best suited for GIRoA adoption initially. This model best supports implementation of a southern rail line primarily focused on supporting mineral extractive industries and a northern rail line primarily focused on commercial transit traffic and regional trade. Given the flexibility of the hybrid ownership model, the model could evolve and adapt to dynamic political and economic situations, which may be more suitable for Afghanistan. To support implementation, management, and oversight of a hybrid ownership model, a detailed management structure was also developed for the ARA.

Recommendations to GIRoA:

  • Adopt a hybrid ownership model as the initial national railway model.
  • Refine and implement the initial hybrid ARA management structure. Furthermore, this recommendation includes formally approving a minimum 3-year operating budget.
  • Adopt relevant policies, laws, and regulations to support safe, efficient, reliable, and profitable railway operations within Afghanistan.

Key Decision 4

pleis-et-al-figure3Determine Regional Connectivity Requirements. A key driver of railway profitability is the avoidance of costly transloading operations due to track gauge changes. Because Afghanistan is surrounded by countries whose railways have three different track gauges, regional rail connectivity is a major challenge to operational efficiency. Potential Afghanistan rail freight would be required to traverse multiple Central and South Asian countries with differing track gauges including Standard (1435 millimeters [mm]), Russian (1520 mm), and Indian Broad (1676 mm). Details are shown in figure 3.

The gauge of new rail lines is best determined by the gauge of its connecting lines. Since Iran uses Standard gauge and the Central Asian Republics use Russian gauge, selection of the preferred rail system design establishes a separated system of a southern, mineral freight–focused Standard gauge line linking to Iran and Pakistan, and a northern, commercial freight–focused, Russian gauge line linking to Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.

Iran is a primary destination for mineral exports traversing the southern line, offering the most expeditious routing to port, with Pakistan providing an alternate route to mitigate the risk of only one outlet to port. Implementation of Standard gauge for the southern line mitigates the requirement for transloading operations for freight en route to Iran. To address potential requirements to export ore through Pakistan, implementation of a Standard gauge railway within Pakistan or a dual gauge railway should be considered.

Northern line operations are commercial, freight-focused, and depend heavily on trade with the Central Asian Republics, all of which operate Russian gauge lines. Implementation of Russian gauge leverages the existing rail line from Hairatan to Mazar-e-Sharif and minimizes the requirement for transloading operations and facilities, with the possible exception of Herat. A transload facility near Herat could support the transport of commercial goods through Afghanistan to Iran, assuming Iran adopts Standard gauge to connect with Herat.

Recommendations to GIRoA:

  • Implement Standard gauge for the southern rail line.
  • Implement Russian gauge for the northern rail line.

Risk Assessment

Though there is substantial support for expansion of Afghanistan’s current, single rail line, there are challenges in developing and operating a national rail system. The planning team evaluated risk associated with the preferred design scenario through a broad assessment that weighed 37 risk factors organized in 7 risk categories to account for these challenges and the assumptions used for planning (see table 4).

1. Investment and Funding. As GIRoA does not have the required resources to finance the construction of the national railway on its own, sufficient financing is essential from both the international financial community and private sector. To encourage investment by financiers, GIRoA must ensure that capital and operating cost estimates for projects are accurate; the appropriate laws, policies, and regulations are in place; and an overall project manager is appointed to plan and manage initial development. Land grants could also serve as a means to finance national railway construction.

2. Political (Internal to Afghanistan). GIRoA instability following the drawdown of North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in 2014 could halt the development of railway and mining operations. National, regional, and local governments are encouraged to work collectively to ensure a sufficient level of governance during and after foreign troop withdrawal.

3. Security. Insufficient security measures could lead to theft, vandalism, and/or terrorist attacks on railway and mining property, infrastructure, equipment, and personnel, resulting in schedule delays and loss of railway and mining revenues. GIRoA should work with regional and local governments and tribes to develop and implement a security plan that encourages regional and local governments and tribes to participate in, and support, security operations. Local employment for security forces, land grants, and revenue sharing could be leveraged as incentives.

4. Operations. Due to a lack of experience, industry experts must be recruited for the startup of operations and to train local labor. GIRoA should also consider sending some people to train on neighboring railways and explore opportunities in railway management education offered at the university level. Afghanistan rail operations must be coordinated closely with neighboring countries to ensure efficient interchange of operations and traffic. Safety and operating standards for equipment, track, and personnel must be developed and promulgated to ensure safe, reliable, and efficient operations.

5. Development. Failure to achieve sufficient project management, acquire and retain technical staff, receive building permits, maintain sufficient water and energy delivery to mining sites, and sustain an adequate labor force could jeopardize expansion of Afghanistan’s rail system. Professional project management and recruitment of the staff needed for construction and for railway and mining operations must be achieved for these mutually reliant sectors. Land use agreements, potential land grant arrangements, and building permits must be both properly negotiated and legally binding to enable railway construction to proceed. Customs arrangements with neighboring countries must also be expedited to ensure railway construction materials and equipment as well as rolling stock and control systems equipment can be imported in a timely manner.

6. Political (External to Afghanistan). Afghanistan’s relations with neighboring countries and their respective railways will have a major impact on the success of the Afghanistan railway. Relations with Iran and Pakistan are crucial to efficient transport of iron ore to port for onward sealift to South and East Asian markets. Negotiations with those countries and their railway programs are a high priority and are essential to revenue generation. Continued negotiations with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are encouraged to determine procedures for freight originating, terminating, and transiting between the countries.

7. Legal and Regulatory. Afghanistan will need a viable legal and regulatory framework for both the railway and mining sectors permitting and enforcing property rights and the contractual agreements. The ARA will also need sufficient resources and capabilities to develop appropriate economic and safety regulations for the railway. Establishment and enforcement of safety regulations should enable a safe environment for railway personnel and communities near the railway and encourage a more efficient railway, resulting in fewer accidents.

Overall, the preferred national railway design presents medium risk based on key ANRP stakeholder input and is consistent with other large-scale capital investment projects in Afghanistan.

Recommendations to GIRoA:

  • Develop and implement a comprehensive railway risk management process to identify and manage risk throughout development and operation of the railway.
  • Assign the ARA chief executive director as the risk management functional lead and provide sufficient resources to the ARA for execution of risk management responsibilities.
  • Require formal approval of project risk mitigation/avoidance plans prior to project funding approval.

Implementation Strategy

The ANRP provides a framework connecting Afghanistan’s outlying cities, industrial sites, and commercial interests with neighboring countries and new markets. The implementation strategy describes a macro-level plan for the expansion of Afghanistan’s existing rail line. The expanded railway will help Afghanistan resume its historically important place in international trade and figure prominently in the region’s future stability and progress. The overarching objectives of this implementation strategy are to 1) develop a combined rail-maritime logistics network capable of transporting Afghanistan iron ore, copper, and other minerals in a cost-efficient manner to yield competitively priced exports in the global market; 2) develop a multimodal network to promote development of industries and traffic identified in the Commercial Market Feasibility Analysis; and 3) develop the commercial, financial, and government structures needed to promote the preceding objectives.

Appealing to Regional Investors

Private investment backed by firm commitments from the GIRoA is a critical imperative for successful development and operation of the railway. International donors have already taken the initiative in Afghanistan’s transportation revival, but much more assistance is needed. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is currently the lead donor for advancing rail in Afghanistan. For example, ADB covered 97 percent of the $175 million cost of the Hairatan–Mazar-e-Sharif rail line. ADB has also funded a $2.86 million feasibility study to expand the existing rail line from Mazar-e-Sharif through Sheberghan and Andkhoy to Aqina. The Indian government has offered $1 billion to help build a line from the Haji Gak iron mining area of interest near Kabul. Ownership would likely be mixed, with GIRoA retaining the land and rail lines and private entities largely controlling locomotives and rolling stock. As he contemplated myriad rail projects in 2012, Afghanistan Deputy Public Works Minister Noor Gul Mangal emphasized that further railway development could be instrumental in ending Afghanistan’s economic and geographical isolation: “We would be able to import and export to Russia, Turkey, and even European countries.” That’s a good deal for Afghanistan—and the world at large.

Conclusion

Joint DOD and interagency planning, analysis, and collaboration, complemented by academic and private industry expertise, enabled development and delivery of comprehensive recommendations to Afghanistan that can facilitate sustainable revenue generation and regional connectivity. While many railway proposals have been provided to GIRoA, the uniqueness of the ANRP is twofold: the ANRP provides objective recommendations principally focused on best value for the Afghan people, and the ANRP is underpinned by a business case (the Commercial Market Feasibility Analysis) reflecting revenue potential by sector over a 25-year period.

Afghanistan and its neighbors face numerous tough challenges to realize the potential economic growth that could potentially result from development of a national railway system with regional connectivity. Interministerial competition, lack of cooperation and transparency, and rampant corruption must genuinely be fixed before the key decisions in the ANRP can be enacted. GIRoA must develop a reinvestment strategy for the revenue generated by a national rail system that supports continued railway expansion and funding for other national priorities. And the people of Afghanistan must tangibly benefit from a national rail system to ensure long-term security and economic success.

Time will tell how much of the ANRP comes to fruition, but the collective efforts of the ANRP stakeholders have significant potential to improve conditions for the people of Afghanistan.

Source:
This article was originally published in the Joint Force Quarterly 75, which is published by the National Defense University.

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The Price Of Inequality: The Dangerous Rural-Urban Divide In Afghanistan – Analysis

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By Tamim Asey*

In Afghanistan, coups and regime changes are often initiated from the countryside mountains by heavily indoctrinated and disgruntled barefoot rural boys, who are deep in poverty and without many economic prospects. These youth are often at the forefront of the fight for various ideologies and regional proxy powers, while the urban elites are living comfortably in their barricaded homes in urban centers and appear to forget that there is a broader Afghanistan.

This fact highlights one of the underlying causes of the successive regime changes in Afghanistan i.e. inequality and dangerous rural urban divide comes with a heavy cost for any regime in the country. The staggering and growing inequality in wealth, income, political status and socio-economic conditions of Afghans have the potential to bring regimes changes in the country. The exploitation of inequality under the banner of social equality by the then communist movements in Afghanistan overthrew King Zahir Shah (1933 -1973) and later his cousin the first President of Afghanistan, Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan (1973-1978), followed by the rise of Afghan Mujahiddin against the communist regime (1979-1989) for its fast-paced and invasive reforms and finally the Taliban movement (1996-2001) who were rural boys sick of the prevailing warlordism and insecurity overthrew the government of Mujahiddins (1992-1996) in the country. These are some daring examples of the dangers of the rural – urban divide and its deadly consequences for various regimes in the country.

Unfortunately, this phenomenon remains truer today than ever before because of the flow of cheap and easy foreign aid money and military contracts over the last one and half decade has created a rich urban elite often oblivious of the rural Afghanistan which in turn has widened the inequality gap in the country.

Today, there are two Afghanistans. The Afghanistan of haves and the have-nots, of urban elites and rural tribal chiefs, of conservative rural lifestyle and the liberal urban life style. According to the recent National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) survey – more than 70% of the Afghan population live in rural areas, its gini coefficient is 38.5%, almost 40% of the population live in poverty majority of whom live in rural areas, only 23.4% inhabit in urban areas, the rate of urbanization stands at 5.4% and income inequality between rural and urban Afghanistan stands at a staggering double digit and if history is any lesson to Afghan statesmen and politicians, the successive Afghan regimes have been toppled by a rebellion in the rural areas of Afghanistan because of neglect or rapid imposed reforms. And more often than not – Afghan politicians, policy makers and public officials along with their international allies forget this divide and think of Afghanistan in the narrow sense of the six major cities, which is a grave mistake.

The real Afghanistan is the remaining 28 provinces out of the 34 provinces that have been consistently neglected over the years by the successive Afghan regimes. In fact – many a times, the various regimes have come to power with the help of these rural boys of the countryside, but immediately or after sometime they forget their plight and become more concerned with the politics and relatively comfortable life of urban Afghanistan. These Afghan urban elite are at times so oblivious of the conditions of rural Afghanistan that they forget that the broader Afghan polity consists of not only the six major cities of Kabul, Mazar, Jalalabad, Herat and Kandahar, but the remaining 28 provinces of the country.

The rural population of Afghanistan, where consists the majority of the population, are conservative, traditional and live in or near absolute poverty with a vastly different lifestyle from the Afghan urbanites, whereas, the Afghan urban population are more liberal, connected to modern technology and world wide web and for the last couple of years, the aid dependent bubble economy has provided them with high rates of disposable income in cash and unaccounted wealth.

The Afghan government early on understood this issue and tried addressing it, but along the way it lost its focus on a rigorous rural development agenda – the interim administration of Afghanistan led by Hamid Karzai and under the initiative of the then Finance Minister and current President of Afghanistan, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, recognized this threat and designed several comprehensive national rural development programs such as the National Solidarity Program (NSP), National Rural Access Program (NRAP), National Area Based Development Program (NABDP), Micro finance Investment Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA) among others whose basic objectives was to provide block grants to self-organized, democratic and self-governed community councils around the country and fund the priorities identified by them for their own communities and improve their accessibility to urban centers by building rural roads and provide micro credits for their household and business needs. That said, none of these programs after almost a decade are sustainable and are heavily dependent on foreign aid and management. In addition – these programs were community development projects rather than fundamental productive and growth led projects to provide mass employment and serve as important drivers of the rural economy of Afghanistan. More often than not – they have been important elements of an only subsistence unsustainable rural economy in the country.

The Politics of Inequality: Access to public office, rampant poverty, collateral damage, discrimination and Ethnic Politics

Family politics is returning to Afghanistan whereas years of communist rule and later on war has weakened this institution that was thriving under the former King Zahir Shah. One of the main reasons why the people sympathized with the two communist factions of Khalq (The People) and Parcham (The Flat) was due to their growing frustration with the increasing monopoly of power and resources by some of these families who encircled the former Afghan King and his royal court. Today – by several estimates – the politics, economics and finance of the country is in the hands of the few families who enriched themselves by holding high public offices, receiving millions of dollars of foreign military contracts and through their tight grip over the Afghan private sector.

Furthermore, the entire wealth of the country is in the hands of around few hundred individuals who have strong political ties within the Afghan government. Today it is the 10% of the wealthiest who control the economy and politics of the country whereas the majority of the poverty stricken population of the country have problems meeting their basic daily needs. In addition, the social and economic upward and sideways mobility which is expected of a dynamic economy is absent in the Afghan economic context. The Afghan economic and political landscape is increasingly monopolized by the few families, individuals and few political parties through the connections of whom you can access or dream of reaching public office.

The Economics of Inequality: Foreign aid and the dilemma of balance development versus unbalanced development

A drastic inflow of foreign aid and cheap money through foreign military contracts have created a new economic and business elite in Afghanistan. This has concentrated the political and economic power in the hands of the few powerful individuals with substantial control over the Afghan private sector with links to the highest levels of the Afghan state. Meanwhile, the fixed geography of the war in the South and Eastern parts of the country has created huge income, wealth and economic disparities between the southern and northern part of Afghanistan. According to the world bank provincial briefs of Afghanistan – the poverty and inequality indicators i.e. poverty rate, depth of poverty, average consumption of the poor, per capita monthly total consumption and the gini coefficient of the southern Afghanistan is almost several times higher than the northern part of the country.

In addition – due to the persistent insecurity in the south and east of Afghanistan, the National Risk and vulnerability Assessment report (2012-3013) shows that the percentage of vulnerable population groups at high risk of poverty, malnutrition and diseases i.e. female headed households, children, women, addicts, elderly are almost double the number of the same in northern and western part of Afghanistan. This intra-regional and provincial inequality and the lack of access to basic services and economic opportunities is a serious cause for alarm.

Furthermore,the Afghan economy is increasingly moving towards a narco-mafia economy where a few families in the north, south, east and western parts of Afghanistan control the private sector and public offices both at the national and subnational level. According to a recent report by Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) the findings of which shows that almost all major contracts are taken by the few wealthy and well connected business with ties to the strongmen in the government i.e. ministers, governors, deputy ministers among others and when a strongman enters a line of business, small businesses tend to voluntarily opt out of the market, be intimidated, or forced to quit. The perception that competing against a strongman is a futile effort is quite common among businessmen who have smaller and medium‐sized businesses. Monopolization also indicates the exclusivity of markets. The market in Afghanistan is run by a limited number of actors, making the Afghan market an oligopoly wherein a few sellers or providers of services dominate the whole market. This clearly shows the extent of market failure and capture of the Afghan economy by criminal and mafia networks.

All this points to shrinking business opportunities for medium and small enterprises in the Afghan economy and the growing monopoly of a few powerful business players over the Afghan private sector.

The military consequences of inequality: The geography of war and the mafia economy

The monopoly of political power, financial resources and economic opportunities combined with the unbalanced development of the country provides a perfect recruitment ground for the insurgents from unemployed and disgruntled youth who believe the country is monopolized by the few corrupt in the top echelons of economic and political power in the country. Today, the majority of the Taliban foot soldiers are unemployed youth from the most impoverished and under developed parts of the country. Many of these youth are seasonal fighters who work during the cultivation season in the field and fight for the rest of the year precisely due to lack of descent employment opportunities and a grudge against overnight millionaires of the country who they consider as American collaborators and incredibly corrupt.

The concentration of power at the subnational level in the hands of rural elites and tribal chiefs with connections to the presidential palace has further marginalized and dissuaded people to distance themselves from the current government.

Inclusive Institutions, Politics and Balanced Development: The Difficult Road Ahead

Afghanistan is fast going towards an elite monopoly and extractive political and economic institutions where the rule of the few over its wealth, public office and politics is increasingly marginalizing the vast majority of its population which are inhabitants of the rural Afghanistan. This is a cause for alarm within the historical context of the country. Regimes changes have often come from the rural Afghanistan due to negligence of Afghan statesmen, policy makers and politicians who often lose touch with the realities of Afghan rural life in the comforts of their villas in the cities.

The new Afghan president should make the Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs) the driver of the Afghan economy and break the tight grip of the few families and individuals over its economy and business sector. Balanced development of the country and allocation of equal financial resources and business opportunities is essential for an inclusive Afghanistan.

*Tamim Asey is a fellow at Asia Society and a Fulbright scholar at Columbia University pursuing a degree in Economic Policy management. He was also a former Government of Afghanistan official and taught at the American University of Afghanistan (AUAF).

The post The Price Of Inequality: The Dangerous Rural-Urban Divide In Afghanistan – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Joint Statement By Catherine Ashton And Iran’s Mohammad Javad Zarif

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Joint Statement by Catherine Ashton and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif following the talks in Vienna, 24 November 2014

Since we agreed to the Joint Plan of Action one year ago in Geneva, we, together with the Foreign Ministers and Political Directors of the E3+3 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States), have been engaged in intensive diplomatic negotiations aimed at reaching a comprehensive solution.

We once again express our appreciation to the Austrian Government for their most generous support in hosting these negotiations in Vienna.

Based on the strong commitment by all sides to reach a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution, we have held ten rounds of negotiations and numerous meetings during the past months.

Some ideas have been developed, but given the technical nature of this effort and the decisions needed, more work is required to assess and finalize them as appropriate.

We would have preferred to finalize a comprehensive solution here in Vienna. But we remain convinced that, based on the progress made and on the new ideas which continue to be explored, there is a credible path through which a comprehensive solution can be reached.

We, together with the Foreign Ministers of the E3+3, have therefore agreed to continue our diplomatic efforts. We have decided to extend the measures of the Joint Plan of Action to allow for further negotiations until June 30th.

We intend to build on the current momentum in order to complete these negotiations within the shortest possible time, up to four months, and if necessary to use the remaining time until the end of June to finalize any possible remaining technical and drafting work.

Iran and the E3/EU+3 reaffirm that they will continue to implement all their commitments described in the Joint Plan of Action in an efficient and timely manner.

The IAEA will be asked to continue monitoring the voluntary measures under the Joint Plan of Action.

The next meeting to continue our work will happen in December.

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif also said Iran has the right to have an enrichment program under any deal with the P5+1 group.

“I do not believe that anybody any longer questions Iran’s enrichment program. We believe that right of Iran to the peaceful nuclear energy, including uranium enrichment, is enshrined in the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty), which does not require anybody’s recognition. The right is there. What is important is for Iran to be able to implement that right, to exercise that right without the threat of sanctions and pressure which are, in our view, illegal,” Zarif stated.

“I believe everybody has worked hard particularly over the last week… in order to overcome rather important differences” between Iran and P5+1, Zarif said, adding, that the discussions centered on two objectives — ensuring that Iran’s nuclear program remains peaceful and sanctions imposed on Iran are lifted.

“We have always said that Iran has no strategic interest in nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons don’t serve our strategic interests,” Zarif further said, adding, “Nuclear weapons are against every principle of our faith and our beliefs.”

“We seek to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,” Zarif noted.

The Iranian foreign minister further touched upon the issue of illegal sanctions imposed on Iran, saying, “The sanctions are not only misguided… but are totally ineffective.”

“Sanctions do not resolve the problem,” Zarif stated. “Only, and I stress, only a negotiated resolution” can lead to the termination of standoff between Iran and the West over Tehran’s nuclear energy program.

“We believe that a negotiated resolution is within reach,” he asserted.

A political agreement between Iran and the six countries is within reach with a positive-sum rather than zero-sum perspective, said the Iranian foreign minister, adding that four months are enough to resolve outstanding issues in the nuclear negotiations.

The top diplomat further said that the rest of a now extended seven-month deadline would be used to put complicated technical issues into a final agreement.

Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani also the Iranian nation will never bow to sanctions and pressures and will keep its nuclear facilities under any agreement.

“Today, the opposite negotiating sides have reached the conclusion that pressure and sanctions on Iran will not bear fruit,” Rouhani said.

He added that the Islamic Republic would never give up its nuclear rights, saying that the country’s nuclear facilities would certainly remain operational and Iran would never stop its centrifuges.

He noted that Iran pursues two main objectives in its talks with the P5+1 group, which include keeping its nuclear technology and lifting sanctions on Tehran.

“At present, no one in the world has any doubt that Iran must have nuclear technology, including enrichment on its soil, and no one has any doubt that sanctions must be lifted,” Rouhani added.

The Iranian president also pointed out that the Iranian nation will be the final winner in the negotiations with the P5+1 countries over Tehran’s nuclear program.

Rouhani emphasized that the path of nuclear negotiations would lead to a final agreement, noting that all the sides in the nuclear talks had consensus on the extension of the nuclear talks as an effort to reach a final goal.

“Iran’s logic is one of negotiations and dialog; and nuclear talks will be continued with seriousness until a final agreement is struck,” he said.

Stressing that the latest round of nuclear talks in Vienna was positive, Rouhani added that although the negotiating sides failed to reach a final agreement, they managed to take steps forward because the conditions now are “completely different from [what they were] three months and six months ago, logics have come closer together and may of gaps have been filled.”

The sides took steps to reach an understanding and a final agreement “but reaching a written and final agreement needs time,” he added.

Iran and the P5+1 group of world powers could reach a “general agreement” on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear energy program in a matter of days if there is enough political will, a top Iranian nuclear negotiator said.

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs Abbas Araqchi described the latest round of the nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 as “good” and expressed hope that Tehran and its negotiating partners could finalize a permanent deal if they continue their discussions.

“A political agreement or, in other words, a general deal could be reached within a few days if the necessary political will is there,” Araqchi said.

Araqchi said that things will continue based on the interim agreement, adding that Iran will receive USD 700 million of its frozen assets each month until next July.

The Iranian nuclear negotiator further hailed the progress made in the recent Vienna talks and said Iran and the other six states would resume their negotiations in a couple of weeks.

The post Joint Statement By Catherine Ashton And Iran’s Mohammad Javad Zarif appeared first on Eurasia Review.

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