By Pavel Dyatlenko

Mergers between former political rivals ahead of the autumn 2015 parliamentary ballot in Kyrgyzstan reflect the more competitive environment that smaller parties will face, especially if changes to electoral law go through.

Last month, the Ata Jurt party, whose main constituency is in southern Kyrgyzstan, merged with Respublika, led by Omurbek Babanov, a businessman from the north. Babanov and Ata Jurt leader Kamchybek Tashiev announced the move on October 20.

The marriage is a surprising one, and shows how diverse political parties are being forced into alliances that will give them a better chance of victory.

The two parties did well in the autumn 2010 parliamentary election despite both being relative newcomers. That election followed a popular revolt that removed President Kurmanbek Bakiev, and a short but extremely bloody outbreak of ethnic violence between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the summer. Ata Jurt’s success at the polls reflected a wave of Kyrgyz nationalism, especially in the south where the bloodshed took place.

Ata Jurt and Respublika, which came fourth in the polls, went into coalition with the Social Democrats. A year later – in October 2011 – the Social Democrats’ leader Almazbek Atambaev was elected president of Kyrgyzstan, giving them enough strength to ditch Ata Jurt and form a new governing bloc with Respublika and the stronger Ata Meken and Ar Namys parties.

As part of the deal, Babanov became prime minister, an arrangement that lasted until September 2012, when he was forced to resign. Support for his party – mainly from the business elite – dwindled as his star waned.

Worse was to come for Ata Jurt – Tashiev and two party colleagues were arrested and accused of trying to stage a coup after unrest outside parliament in October 2012. They were acquitted and released in June 2013.

The Respublika-Ata Jurt grouping appears to be born of pure pragmatism. Babanov’s group is likely to be bankrolling the venture while Ata Jurt brings to the table both political heavyweights from southern Kyrgyzstan and a large rural constituency.

Still, the mix is not an assured recipe for success. Ata Jurt’s nationalism could deter cautious businessmen, while its own supporters might be put off by Respublika’s association with the wealthy elite.

Next year’s parliamentary election could be run along different lines to the last one. Proposed changes to electoral legislation are designed to filter out the myriad smaller parties – more than 20 parties fielded candidates in the 2010 ballot.

Ata Meken leader Omurbek Tekebaev has asked parliament to raise the threshold for getting into parliament from five to seven per cent of the nationwide vote. Only the Social Democrats and Ata Meken can be wholly confident of making it over such a high barrier.

Tekebaev is also calling for a change to “party lists”, from which candidates’ names are ticked off for parliamentary seats according to how their parties fared in the proportional representation system. He wants them to present regional lists as well as a national one – a disadvantage for the likes of Ata Jurt, strongly identified with only one part of Kyrgyzstan.

Tekebaev’s proposed amendments have successfully passed a first reading in parliament, although not without debate. Some critics pointed out that there was no provision for specific social groups like the disabled as opposed to regional interests.

Whatever changes are passed, the Social Democrats will not have an easy ride. As the leading force in the governing coalition, they will be held to accountable for the continuing disastrous state of the economy. Electricity and imported natural gas remain in short supply, and food, petrol and coal are rising. Foreign assistance is also drying up.

Another challenge to the governing coalition, largely consisting of northerners, is the resurgence of the southern political elite. New political forces include Uluttar Birimdigi, the party founded by the former mayor of Osh, Melis Myrzakmatov; and Onuguu- Progress led by Bakyt Torobaev. The parties forged an alliance last December.

There have also been rumours that Myrzakmatov might switch allegiance and team up with Ata Meken, although this is based only on the fact that he met Tekebaev, and nothing more has been confirmed.

All this alliance-building shows how Kyrgyz parties see the need to talk to one another and enter into marriages of convenience, even when their different agendas and constituencies would seem to make that impossible, as in the case of Ata Jurt and Respublika.

Pavel Dyatlenko is a political analyst based in Bishkek.

The views expressed in this article are not necessarily those of IWPR, where this article was first published.

The post Kyrgyzstan: Strange Bedfellows Ahead Of Elections – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By D. S. Rajan

As of today (24 November, 2014), the current wave of Pro-Democracy protests in Hong Kong, one of the biggest   to be organized since the People’s Republic of China (PRC) attained its sovereignty over the former British Colony in 1997, is seven weeks old.

They began on 28 September 2014, when about 100,000 protestors  came out in streets to oppose the 31 August 2014 decision of the Chinese National People’s Congress (NPC) to appoint a Committee to select  Hong Kong Chief Executive candidates in the 2017 election; instead they made a three-point demand to   Hong Kong and central governments – (i) implement “universal suffrage” ( one person- one vote) principle for the 2017 Chief Executive election and for the 2020 Legislative Council (LEGCO) election, (ii)  stop civil liberty encroachments like curbing media freedom and (iii) remove mainland intrusions into Hong Kong’s economy which are resulting in adverse impact  like real estate price hike, loss of educational opportunities to local youth  etc .  The Police used tear gas to disperse the crowd. The protests which continue mark a civil disobedience movement; being called “Occupy Central with Love and Peace”, it is asking the demonstrators to block roads and paralyze Hong Kong’s financial and central district. “Umbrella movement “is its other name, derived from the yellow umbrellas carried by the protestors in 2012 while pressing for direct elections.  About 93 of the protestors have reportedly been arrested or detained so far.

According to latest reports, the Central government has refused to meet a delegation of protesting students from Hong Kong and the Hong Kong authorities have rejected proposals of protestors to hold by-election to or dissolve Legislative Council. There thus seems to be no meeting point as of now between the protestors and the authorities both in Hong Kong and Beijing. Also, a protest fatigue seems to have set in and the number of demonstrators is coming down day by day considerably. A University of Hong Kong poll has said that 8 out of ten Hong Kong residents want the protests to end.  Also, the protest movement appears to face a split with hardliners including violent action in their agenda and others opposing the same. In these circumstances, the demonstrations may end soon, but    whether the fundamental issues raised by the protesters can be resolved, will remain a question for a long time. Interestingly, this point is even being acknowledged by the state controlled media in Beijing (“Hong Kong Protest Takes a Twisted Turn”, Global Times, 20 November 2014).

Pro-Democracy movement in Hong Kong is rooted in the past. It  stands for autonomy of Hong Kong and one should not confuse it with the reported existence of groups favouring Hong Kong Independence, about which available information are scarce.  Pro-democracy demands have been appearing since later half of eithties.1000 activists protested in November 1986 asking for direct elections to the LEGCO. This led to introduction of 18 directly elected LEGCO seats in 1991. There was then a hunger strike outside Xinhua office in Hong Kong in 1988 against a government proposal to postpone direct Chief Executive Election until 2012. In 1996, there were two protests – one led by pro-democracy lawmakers   against Beijing’s appointment of a body to replace the partially elected LEGCO, and the other against the selection of Chief Executive Candidates done by a 400-member Committee chosen by Beijing. In July 2003, there was a demonstration against the government’s Anti-Sedition law and in July 2004, about 450,000 came out against Beijing’s April 2004 directive ruling out direct Chief Executive and LEGCO elections.  In 2012, protestors demonstrated against the government’s “moral and national education plan”, which introduced pro-China education syllabus in schools.

Factual data helpful to understand  the developing situation in Hong Kong, are provided below; they pertain to land  mark events,   prominent leaders, personalities and  organizations involved in the protests and  Beijing’s responses noticed so far.

Assessing the emerging situation on Hong Kong, the fact that protests have happened regularly signify  that Beijing’s efforts to assimilate Hong Kong with the national mainstream under the “One Country- Two Systems” principle are yet to succeed. Secondly, it is clear that Beijing has gone back from its assurance to introduce direct elections in Hong Kong in 2017 and shows no signs of any positional relaxation.  This could be due to Beijing realization now that conceding to democracy demands in Hong Kong will have repercussions on its already restive Xinjiang and Tibet provinces.  In the final count however, it is probable that Beijing may show some flexibility as   issues raised by protestors are popular in Hong Kong and will continue to be alive, increasing pressure on it in the run-up to the year 2017.   At the moment, the PRC appears to be confident of successfully dealing with the with the protest situation. It may in particular feel encouraged over lack of any real International pressure on China with respect to protests. The US State Department only made a reference to Hong Kong peoples’ aspirations for universal suffrage.  No outside power has so far mentioned about human rights situation in Hong Kong. It is true that Beijing has orchestrated well its campaign against the West’s alleged use of Hong Kong to interfere in its domestic affairs, but the same so far seems to be pro-forma in nature, similar  to what was seen at the time of past Chinese allegations against the West for involvement in Xinjiang and Tibet unrest.  Lastly, there seems to be no substance in speculative stories (Epoch Times) that Beijing’s 31 August 2014 hard line decision on Hong Kong may reflect a power struggle between the NPC Chairman Zhang Dejiang, a Jiang Zemin loyalist, and President Xi Jinping. According to them, the former through the decision liked to provoke a Tian A Men incident in Hong Kong warranting a heavy crackdown of protestors, which can make Xi unpopular, leading to his stepping down.

(The writer, D.S.Rajan, is Distinguished Fellow, Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai, India. This formed the basis of his talk at the Observer Research Foundation, Chennai Chapter, on 15 November 2014.Email:dsrajan@gmail.com).

Annexure

Land Mark Events

The land mark events relating to Hong Kong situation in chronological order are as follows:

1842:  Hong Kong ceded to Britain in perpetuity

1984:   Sino-British Joint Declaration issued. Britain agrees to return entire Hong Kong colony to China in 1997; China, in return, under “One Country-Two Systems” policy, pledges to maintain the     territory’s legal, political and economic autonomy for 50 years, i.e by 2047.

1997:   Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Constitution, known as Basic Law, with the stated ultimate aim of “Universal Suffrage” comes into effect.

2007:   China’s National People’s Congress rules that “Universal Suffrage” could be adopted in Hong Kong as early as the Year  2017 for Chief Executive election and the Year 2020 for Legislative   Council election.

2010:   Amendment to Hong Kong Basic Law comes into effect. It restricts the law making powers of the Legislative Council . Out of its 70 members, 30 are to be elected by a “ functional                         constituency”, representing business and social sectors and the rest by direct elections. For Chief Executive Election, an Election Committee with 1200 members is to be  formed out of whom 900  are to be elected by the “functional constituency” and 300 by Legislative Council members.

2013:   In September, Beijing’s Liaison Office in Hong Kong rejects open  nomination  of candidates for the 2017 Chief Executive Elections.

2014:  10^th session of 12^th National People’s Congress Standing Committee meets in Beijing on 31 August. It decides to form a “broadly representative nominating committee”, which “in accordance with democratic procedures”, would  nominate 2 or 3 candidates for the Chief Executive Election in 2017, out of whom one would be elected by all eligible electors of HKSAR. The Central People’s Government would finally appoint the Chief Executive to be elected in this way.

Responses from Beijing (in chronological order)

10 June 2014:  The PRC State Council Information Office issues a White Paper on “One Country-Two   Systems in Hong Kong”. The White Paper says that in implementation of “One Country- Two     Systems” principle in Hong Kong, ‘’ new circumstances and new problems” have  emerged. Wrong political views have come to prevail in Hong Kong. It adds that the “the   central government has the power of oversight over Hong Kong’s  high degree of autonomy , which is  not an inherent power but one that comes solely from the  authorization of the central  leadership. The HKSAR’s   high degree of autonomy is not full autonomy, nor a decentralized power”.  It accuses “outside forces as attempting to use HongKong to interfere in China’s domestic affairs”.

14 Aug 2014:  China Daily accuses Jimmy Lai, owner of the anti- Beijing Apple Daily in Hong Kong of making payment to democratic  law makers in Hong Kong.   ( Hong Kong Chief Executive           Leung identifies Mark Simon, a former submarine analyst  and  right hand man of Jimmy Lai, on the same day as an external force meddling in Hong Kong protests. Hong Kong’s pro-Beijing Ta Kung Pao highlights  the demonstration that took place in front of Jimmy Lai’s Next Media  Limited office. Other Hong Kong media report that Hong Kong’s anti-graft agency is investigating payment of US$ 1.3 million by Jimmy Lai to democratic law makers. They also reveal  that Jimmy Lai met Paul Wolfowitz, former US Deputy Defence Secretary on 14 May 2014 and   that Anson Chan, Chief Secretary during final phase of British Rule and Martin Lee, leader of Hong Kong Democratic Party met US Vice-President Joe Biden and were hosted by the US  Agency,  National Endowment for Democracy- NED).

31 Aug 2014: 10^th session of 12^th National People’s Congress Standing Committee meets  in Beijing on 31 August. It decides to form a  “broadly representative  nominating committee”, which “in     accordance with democratic   procedures”, would  nominate 2 or 3 candidates for the Chief Executive  Election in 2017, out of whom one would be elected by all eligible electors  of HKSAR. The Central  People’s Government would finally appoint the  Chief Executive to be elected in this way.

28 Sept 2014:  PRC President Xi Jinping issues order to Hong Kong government (leaked by the media in Hong Kong).  The order asks the Hong Kong authorities not to carry out violent crackdown   on protestors, not to open fire on the demonstrators, learn lessons from Tian An Men incident, win public support and negotiate with Hong Kong people.

1 Oct 2014    :   People’s Daily editorial entitled “Cherish Positive Growth, Defend  Hong Kong’s Prosperity and Stability” appears. It warns protestors of ‘unimaginable consequences’.

First week

Of Oct 2014 :   President Xi Jinping addresses National Security Commission Meeting in Beijing. Says that China will give no ground to pro- democracy  protests in Hong Kong  to avoid setting precedence for reforms  on the mainland (as reported in Hong Kong press ).

9 Oct 2014:      NPC Chairman Zhang Dejiang  and the PRC Vice-Premier Wang Yang tell Hong Kong law makers that protests in Hong Kong are a  “color revolution  manipulated by foreign powers”.

11 Oct 2014:    People’s Daily alleges that protest leaders met Louisa Greve, Vice-President, National Endowment for Democracy (NED) of the USA. Accuses the US of “color revolution “bid in Hong Kong . US State Department promptly rejects the allegation.

14 Oct 2014:    The theoretical organ of the Chinese Communist Party ‘Qiu Shi’ makes indirect reference to Hong Kong.Says that copying Westernstyle democracy can only bring disaster  and that     Western style democracy has no “ universal value”.

12 Nov 2014:   President Xi Jinping, says at a joint press conference with his US counterpart Obama, held in Beijing after the APEC  summit thatforeign governments should not meddle in the pro-     democracy movement in Hong Kong and that  foreign journalists should  obey the law. Adding that Hong Kong protests are “illegal”, he remarks that “we resolutely support the HKSAR to handle the crisis according to law so as to uphold social stability in Hong Kong”.

Leaders, Personalities and Organizations

The leaders of the protests in Hong Kong are (i) Benny Tai Yu Ting, Associate Professor of Law, University of Hong Kong, (ii) Jospeh Cheng, Convener, Alliance for True Democracy and (iii) Martin Lee, Founder of   Hong Kong Democratic Party. Organizations supporting the protests are (i) the Hong Kong Federation of Students (General Secretary- Yvonne Leung, Activists- Alex Chow Yong Kang, Nathan law and Eason Chung), (ii) “Scholarism”, a student body led by Joshua Wong who took part in the campaign against pro-Chinese education school syllabus in 2012 and Oscar Lai Man Lok and (iii) the radical “Civic Passion” group led by Wong Yeung Tat. Involved from the Hong Kong government side are (i) Chief Executive Leung Chun Ying and (ii) Chief Secretary –   Carrie Lam. Pro-Beijing    organizations in Hong Kong relevant to the protests are (i) Xinhua Liaison Office, (ii) the Democratic Alliance for Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong and media like Ta Kung Pao.

The post Making Sense Of Hong Kong Pro-Democracy Protests – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By D. S. Rajan

Given its pre-eminent position in South Asia and rising potential to become a global player, it is natural that for India, the external environment has become an important factor in its formulation of the country’s overall strategic vision. In that vision, occupying the main place is India’s domestic development; specifically, the ‘Vision 2022’ of the new Indian government has the aim of making housing available to all citizens by the Year 2022.

The domestic development is sought to be achieved by India through creation of a favorable international and neighborhood atmosphere. Undoubtedly, such a linkage forms the key element in determination of India’s foreign policy directions. Notably, the linkage is also prominent in the case of China.

Besides its serving of domestic development, India’s foreign policy has other objectives. Worth mentioning are the imperatives before India to respond to the behavior of outside powers which all conduct their foreign relations with their own national interests in mind; these interests have both cooperative and competitive elements. Conspicuously figuring in this regard are those of China and Pakistan. Other factors influencing India’s external approach are energy security requirements and the need being increasingly felt by it to react to effects of global issues like climate change, UN reforms, Cyber security, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, maritime piracy etc.

On the question as to how India has gone ahead in realizing its foreign policy objectives, worth mentioning are certain landmark initiatives taken. Since early 90s, it was becoming clear that India’s economic and strategic interests are becoming increasingly intertwined with the larger Asian hemisphere, much beyond the immediate South Asia neighborhood. This led to formulation of a ‘Look East “policy with aim to establish better economic engagement with eastern neighbors. The policy stands renamed “Act East “ of late, seeking India to play a pro-active role in the region; getting added to the policy’s economic engagement goal, are forging of strategic partnership and security cooperation with countries in the East. Concomitantly, another concept, known as “Extended Neighborhood”, driven by geo-economic and geo-strategic imperatives that emerged, was adopted by India; under it, India’s extended neighborhood stretches from the Suez Canal to the South China Sea, comprising the interconnected regions of West Asia/the Gulf, Central Asia, Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean Region. Specifically, it was a clear response to expansion of India’s interests with energy-rich countries in West Asia and Central Asia, necessitating a reassessment of its security and strategic capabilities. As a sign of such reassessment, appeared of late are the remarks of Indian Prime Minister Modi stressing the need for a “new thinking on economic, diplomatic and security policies” (speech at Combined Commanders Conference, New Delhi, 17 October 2014). Giving hints on contours of such ‘new thinking’, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) stresses the need for India to become self-reliant and enjoy strategic autonomy; of interest is that the BJP’s articulation avoids highlighting the principle of ‘non-alignment’, a theme prominent in the earlier era.

What should be India’s foreign policy priorities? Creating a favorable external environment helpful to domestic development, should naturally come first in this regard. Firm signs are available that the new Modi government in India is concentrating on this aspect. There is resurgence in the level of India’s contacts with its neighbors, Asia-Pacific nations, Australia and the US; the expectation is that deeper engagement with these countries will bring economic benefits to India. Especially attracting India are the limitless opportunities in getting investment and infrastructure assistance from countries like Japan, China and the US. Also, recognizing that development is closely connected to maintenance of national security, India is giving primacy to defence and security cooperation in its international dealings. The recent extension of India- US defence cooperation agreement for another 10 years, accomplished during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the US in September 2014, is a case in point.

At geo-strategic level, India’s foreign policy priority should be on its two neighbors- China and Pakistan. While dealing with latter, combating cross-border terrorism must get particular attention. India should carefully weigh the strategic intentions of these two nations and factor them in its policy making.

Taking the case of People’s Republic of China (PRC) first, what cannot be denied is its global power ambition; it is implementing a massive military modernization programme, which raises questions on its intentions to peacefully rise. It follows a “two-pillar “approach in its foreign policy; the first pillar is stated as securing “win-win cooperation “in international relations and the second as not making any compromise on territorial sovereignty issues. The second aspect is leading to China’s assertiveness about which all its neighbors which have territorial disputes are becoming increasingly concerned. They see a contradiction in the “two pillar” external approach of China; the PRC on its part denies the same. It is in any case clear that the Chinese foreign policy has become ‘core interest-based’ since middle of 2008; national security imperatives are now dominating making of Chinese foreign policy.

India’s foreign policy should match with the apparent dichotomy in the Chinese policy pronouncements. It should also be based on its own core-interests. Will China use force in settling its border dispute with India? India should note that the Chinese declared military strategy does not rule out ‘local wars under information conditions’ and such local wars, as many analysts believe, can happen in China’s periphery. India should not fail to see that in South China Sea and East China Sea, the PRC is resorting to a show of force to assert its territorial claims; it has challenged US naval ships in the former and sent its naval submarines to the latter, close to the disputed Senkakus islands, now under Japanese possession. India should anticipate China’s indulging in similar show of force to assert its border claims against it, at an opportune time.

China’s intention seems to be towards prolonging border negotiations with India, on the premise that a status quo would be in its favour. India should not expect China to drop its claim on Arunachal Pradesh and return Aksai Chin to it at any time. China’s primary interest appears to be in India’s market and the developing India-China economic and business ties deserve to be viewed in this context. India should realize that economic ties alone cannot be sufficient to bring stability in bilateral relations; instead there should be strategic trust between the two. The case of prevailing China- Japan tensions at a time when their economic ties remain robust should be a lesson for India.

The continuing China-Pakistan nexus and China’s strengthening its strategic presence in India’s neighborhood, will always act as a pressure points of Beijing against New Delhi. In essence, China, given its permanent status in the UN Security Council and the rapidly increasing economic and military potential globally, may not give importance to India as a challenger to its interests. The asymmetry between India and China in terms of national strengths is real and may persist for a long time; this factor will always influence China’s policy towards India. As such, India’s China policy should be pragmatic; it should continue to ‘engage’ China while at the same time ensuring that its national interests are not compromised. Why can’t India develop its own pressure points against China? Revisiting Taiwan and Tibet policies, strengthening strategic ties with China-wary nations in East Asia like Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines as well as with ASEAN nations , can be India’s options.

In geo-strategic terms, Pakistan’s intentions should be equally important and India’s foreign policy makers. The Vision 2025 document of Pakistan’s Planning Commission ( http://pakistan2025.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Pakistan-Vision-2025.pdf) describes the goal for the country- transforming Pakistan as a upper middle income country, to reach the position of one among twenty five world economies by the Year 2025 and as one of top ten economies in the world by the Year 2047. Notwithstanding the announcement of a vision, underscoring economic goals, regimes in Pakistan remain in obsession of the country’s military security, ignoring development imperatives. This situation is not likely to change in near future, given the country’s tradition which allows the military to play a decisive role in the country’s politics. Despite the presence of an elected government now in Pakistan, the military continues to dominate the state. Pakistan continues to treat Islam as a factor unifying the nation. It follows a foreign policy with the main goal of persisting in hostility towards India and depends on the alliance with the United States for its military expenditures. Pakistan considers relations with China as a counter-weight against India.

India should carefully select a strategy to deal with Pakistan. The former’s invitation to Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to attend the swearing in ceremony of the new government in New Delhi, was appropriate not only in SAARC context, but was also in bilateral context. The move reflected Prime Minister Modi’s belief that a peace process will persuade Pakistan to stop cross-border terrorism and begin moving towards good neighbourly ties. The new government in India however had to cancel the foreign-secretary level talks with Pakistan in August 2014. Prime Minister Modi’s remarks that India was disappointed that Pakistan sought to make a spectacle of foreign secretary level talks scheduled between the two countries and went ahead with talks with secessionist elements, marked a tough posture on Pakistan to be adopted by India. But India should still not give up hopes on negotiations with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. At the same time, it should take steps to isolate the separatists in Kashmir valley politically. Pakistan’s proxy-war in Kashmir can be tactically challenged by India by opening contacts with separatist movements in Pakistan, like the one run by Baluchis. In addition, India should adopt suitable measures for weakening the Pakistan-China nexus; for e.g, it can convince China that Pakistan cannot be trusted by it as terrorism in Xinjiang gets encouragement in Pakistan (some Chinese leaders actually believe so) and can even offer counter-terrorism cooperation with China on this count.

(The writer, D.S.Rajan, is Distinguished Fellow, Chennai Centre for China Studies, India. This formed the basis of his talk on the subject at the National Conference of Indian Strategic Thinkers on “India’s Foreign Policy and its Strategic Stance in Present Global Security Scenario”, held at New Delhi on 25 and 26 October 2014, under the sponsorship of Centre for Policy Analysis, Patna in association with the Ministry of External Affairs. Email:dsrajan@gmail.com)

The post China And Pakistan: India’s Strategic Choices – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Despite an early regional consensus on counter-terrorism, SAARC’s record in tackling terrorism remains dismal. With the widening network of terrorist groups in the subcontinent, it is imperative that India takes the lead in forging substantial counter-terrorism cooperation, particularly on the issue of financing.

By Sameer Patil

As South Asian leaders gather for the 18th Summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Kathmandu on November 26-27, the spectre of terrorism and the question of how to effectively counter it will be looming large.

Recent developments—the neutralisation of a module of the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) in Burdwan, West Bengal, the announcement of al-Qaeda’s intention to establish a South Asian branch, and the Islamic State’s plans to gain a foothold in the region—have aggravated fears of a larger jihadist presence in South Asia.

Yet, the subcontinent lacks a regional resolve and response to counter the activities of these groups. Ironically, SAARC evolved a consensus on the need for greater cooperation to counter terrorism, long before terrorism became a focal point of international politics. SAARC took several steps in this context:

• In 1987, just two years after the formation of SAARC, at a meeting in Kathmandu, member states signed the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism.[1] The convention made a political commitment to countering terrorism at the regional level and, more importantly, defined what constituted terrorist acts.
• Subsequently, a Terrorist Offences Monitoring Desk was established in 1995 in Colombo to collect, assess, and disseminate information on terrorist activities.[2]
• After the September 2001 attacks in the U.S. and United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373 in 2001, the 1987 convention was updated with an Additional Protocol, which criminalised the provision, collection, or acquisition of funds for terrorist activities.[3]
• In 2008, SAARC signed a Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters for investigating and prosecuting crimes linked to terrorism.[4]

These steps are impressive. But almost two-and-a-half decades later, cooperation on counter-terrorism among SAARC member countries remains largely symbolic. Instead, mutual suspicion and a trust deficit among the security agencies of the member states have become impediments to cooperation.

Critically, bilateral tensions between India and Pakistan, and the Pakistani establishment’s involvement in propping up groups such as the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Hizbul Mujahideen, and Jaish-e-Mohammed, have invalidated the prospects for substantial cooperation. These are the very groups that have spread their network wide—across India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives.

SAARC’s failure is even more obvious since other regional organisations in the neighbourhood have been able to, over time, effectively cooperate on this issue—the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has done it through its Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, and members of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations share information on maritime terrorism and piracy.

Instead of regional efforts, South Asian countries have found it easier to engage in extra-regional multilateral counter-terrorism initiatives. For instance, India and Pakistan are members of the multilateral Global Counterterrorism Forum started by the U.S. in 2011, where national counter-terrorism officials can interact, exchange experiences, and participate in capacity-building programmes.[5]

Bilaterally, India-Bangladesh and India-Nepal have evolved deep counter-terrorism partnerships to neutralise terrorist groups. However, bilateral cooperation is not enough, because terrorist activities take place across multiple jurisdictions. Regional cooperation through SAARC is therefore an absolute necessity.

Fortunately, South Asia already has the necessary regional framework in place—the 1987 Convention, and its Additional Protocol. What is needed is the political will among the member states to translate that vision into actual cooperation and pressurise countries like Pakistan to contribute substantially to these efforts.

With regional counter-terrorism efforts, it will be easier for India to push for the adoption of a global terrorism treaty—the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism—which Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke of during his speech at the UN General Assembly on September 27.[6]

India can also push for member countries to cooperate on the issue of the financiang of terrorism. This will be the least politically controversial and the most palatable step for member states—SAARC countries have already accepted their obligations under the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 1999 and UNSCR 1267, which freeze the financial assets of al-Qaeda-linked individuals and entities.

To comply with these international measures, SAARC countries have taken steps domestically by enacting legislations against money-laundering and terrorist financing, and establishing Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) to report on suspicious transactions.

These measures have largely been targeted at the use of the formal financial system by terrorist groups. However, South Asian terrorist groups have been particularly adept in using traditional methods and informal financial channels to raise and transfer funds. These include prayer donations and religious charities, widely prevalent informal systems of remittances like hawala and hundi, as well as other criminal activities such as smuggling, extortion, kidnapping, drug trafficking, and counterfeit currency.

An important step forward to complement these efforts will be the creation of a regional electronic database. Using the mechanism of the dormant Terrorist Offences Monitoring Desk in Colombo, member states can create such a database to share information related to terrorist financing, money-laundering and suspicious transactions.

The FIUs of the member states already share information on suspicious transactions with inter-governmental organisations such as the global Financial Action Task Force and the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering, as well as autonomous organisations such as the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering.

The regional database can be accompanied by a periodic review mechanism which will report at every SAARC summit on the data that has been gathered and discuss further measures to be taken. Member states can provide incentives to involve their respective finance sectors in this initiative and introduce punitive measures for non-compliance.

Modi has emphasised the need to deepen engagements within South Asia. A shared anti-terrorism network will be a beneficial first step for all, and the 18th SAARC Summit is an opportunity to take substantive steps in this direction.

Sameer Patil is Associate Fellow, National Security, Ethnic Conflict and Terrorism, at Gateway House.

This article was written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.

References

[1] South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, 4 November 1987, <http://www.saarc-sec.org/userfiles/Various%20Publications,%20Agreements,MOUs,%20%20 Conventions.%20Charters/PUBLICATIONS/Pdf/SAARC%20REGIONAL%20CONVENTION%20ON%20SUPPRESSION%20OF%20TERRORISM.pdf>

[2]South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, SAARC Terrorist Offences Monitoring Desk, <http://saarc-sec.org/areaofcooperation/detail.php?activity_id=24>

[3] South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and Its Additional Protocol, <http://saarc-sec.org/areaofcooperation/detail.php?activity_id=21>

[4] South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, SAARC Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 3 August 2008, <http://www.saarc-sec.org/userfiles/Various%20Publications,%20Agreements,MOUs,%20%20 Conventions.%20Charters/PUBLICATIONS/Pdf/Convention%20on%20MACM%2031%20July%202008.pdf>

[5] Global Counterterrorism Forum, About the GCTF, <https://www.thegctf.org/web/guest/mission>

[6] Pradhan, Karan, India must push anti-terror compact, Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations, 1 October 2014, <http://www.gatewayhouse.in/india-must-push-anti-terror-compact/>

The post Can SAARC Jointly Counter Terrorism? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

A soccer brawl in Israel’s politically most loaded derby and an alleged subsequent raid by the Israeli military on the offices the Palestine Football Association (PFA) reflects a hardening of the Israeli-Palestinian divide as Israel debates legislation that would emphasize the Jewish national rather than the democratic nature of the state – a move that would effectively deprive Israeli Palestinians of their identity as both Israelis and Palestinians as well as of their equal rights.

The Israeli military said the incident had not been a raid. It said a routine patrol had asked some Palestinians for their identification cards, and when they said the cards were in Bnei Sakhnin’s offices soldiers had entered the building to check their identities.

Statements in response to the PFA condemnation by world soccer body FIFA president Sepp Blatter and Asian Football Confederation (AFC) president Sheikh Salman Bin Ibrahim Al Khalifa also denouncing the Israel raid signalled that Israeli policy was likely to further isolate the Jewish state and strengthen growing calls for disinvestment from and sanctions against Israel. The Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign is one of the Israel government’s greatest concerns. Messrs. Blatter and Salman’s condemnation coincided with a statement by the US State Department warning Israel that it should “stick to its democratic principles.”

Sheikh Salman accused the Israelis of “breaking into the PFA headquarters … a dangerous precedent that requires the international sporting family to stand together and support the PFA.” He said the AFC would work with FIFA to “study ways and mechanisms to put an end to the suffering of Palestinian football, and send a tough message to the Israeli authorities to stop its attacks on various parts of the Palestinian footballing system.”

The raid on the PFA headquarters came a day after fighting broke out at the end of the club’s match against its arch rival Beitar Jerusalem, the bete noire of Israeli soccer and the only Israeli team that refuses to hire Palestinian players because of its racist fan base. Beitar counts multiple right-wing Israeli leaders among its supports. Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu’s recent attendance of a Beitar game was widely interpreted as a possible indication that he might contemplating early elections.

The brawl erupted after Bnei Sakhnin fans in violation of police orders smuggled Palestinian flags into the stadium and sported kaffiyahs, the chequered Palestinian scarf. Animosity between the fan bases of Bnei Sakhnin and Beitar runs deep. In recent months both fan groups have emphasized rival Palestinian and Israeli claims to Jerusalem against a backdrop of mounting tension in the city. Beitar fans sought to disrupt the match by throwing soccer balls onto the pitch as it was being played and subsequently ripped chairs out and destroyed bathrooms in the stadium, the only Israeli facility to have been funded by Qatar, an Arab state that has no diplomatic relations with Israel.

Mr. Blatter side lined in June on the eve of the Brazil World Cup Palestinian calls for sanctions against the IFA in the wake of this summer’s Gaza war and shielded FIFA from becoming the first international organization to take action against Israel by establishing a committee that would oversee efforts to address Palestinian grievances.

The Palestinians accused Israel in a 45-page report submitted to FIFA of persistently seeking to undermine Palestinian soccer activity and development. The committee is expected to report back to FIFA by the end of this year. Israel has cited security concerns as the reason for restrictions on the movement of players and officials charging that some of them intended to “harm the state of Israel and its citizens.” The FIFA committee is unlikely to be able to report significant progress in the current environment despite a planned meeting in Morocco between the IFA and PFA on the side lines of the FIFA World Cup.aa

Years of failed efforts by FIFA to ease Israeli restrictions on Palestinian soccer and establish a mechanism that would allow the Palestinian and Israeli federations to resolve problems are likely to strengthen the Palestinian efforts to persuade the soccer body to sanction Israel.

The post Israeli Raid On Palestinian Soccer Association Signals Dangerous Hardening Of Israeli-Palestinian Battle Lines – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Rupak Bhattacharjee

In a landmark judgment on Nov 13, the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT)-1 sentenced fugitive BNP leader and incumbent mayor of a municipality, M.A. Zahid Hossain, to death for his leading role in killing people and other heinous crimes during Bangladesh’s 1971 independence war against Pakistan.

A three-member judge panel headed by Justice M. Enayetur Rahim found Hossain guilty of 10 of the 11 charges he faced. A prosecutor pointed out that he was awarded capital punishment for six charges and various terms of rigorous imprisonment on four other charges. The verdict mentions that Hossain was directly involved in the killing of at least 50 people, injuring eight, raping two women, forcing religious conversion of nine and deportation of seven others in central Faridpur district between April 27 and July 17, in 1971.

It was the 13th war crimes case verdict and Hossain is the fourth war crimes convict to be given death sentence in absentia. So far, 23 people have been indicted on war crimes charges and 13 of them were convicted. Verdicts in three cases are pending while one accused died during trial. The trial of six accused is in progress.

The campaign for the trial of collaborators and war criminals grew stronger following the restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1991. Several pro-liberation socio-cultural organizations, including Ekattorer Ghatak Dalal Nirmul Committee led by Saheed Mata Jahanara Imam and others sustained their movement in the last 20 years. The Awami League (AL), which once championed the cause of independence under the charismatic leadership of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, vowed during the 2008 parliamentary elections that if voted to power, it would initiate the long-pending war crimes trial.

Following her assumption of office, Sheikh Hasina, eldest daughter of Bangabandhu, felt obliged to fulfil the historic responsibility of trying the people who committed one of the worst war crimes that mankind ever experienced in history. The ICT-1 was set up on March 25, 2010 after a specially constituted body identified nearly 1,775 collaborators and war criminals across Bangladesh. In its efforts to expedite the trial process, a second tribunal was instituted on March 22, 2012 by the AL government.

Hossain, better known as “Khokon Razakar”, is a notorious war criminal. Interestingly, he is a self-declared Razakar, or collaborator of the Pakistani troops, as he used to say “I was a Razakar, still I am, and I want to die as a Razakar”. Liberation War records and various reports suggest that he was a Jamaat activist in 1971. The fundamentalist party openly campaigned against East Pakistan’s secession from the west and indulged in large-scale atrocities on unarmed civilians who sympathised with the Bengali’s armed struggle for independence. The prosecution also said Hossain had campaigned for the party in the 1970 general election.

The tribunal’s investigation agency began probing the allegations of war crimes against Hossain on April 16, 2012. The ICT investigator recorded testimony of 78 people during the investigation. About 50 people were made state witnesses in the case. The investigator submitted his report on May 29, 2013.

Subsequently, the prosecution submitted to the tribunal formal war crimes charges against the opposition leader from Faridpur on June 23, 2013. The prosecutor brought eleven charges of heinous crimes including, murder, genocide, arson, rape, loot, abduction, torture, extortion, forcible religious conversion and deportation.

After taking cognizance of the charges, the tribunal issued an arrest warrant against him on July 18, 2013. The ICT-1 indicted him on Oct 9, 2013 and his trial ended on April 17 this year. Hossain, however, fled Bangladesh immediately after investigation was launched to unearth his dubious role in 1971.

According to the prosecution, Hossain was a member of Ansar (home guard) who used his training to organise Razakar Bahini in Nagarkanda. The Islamic militia unleashed a reign of terror in his locality targeting the Hindus and supporters of independence during the war period. The prosecutors said Hossain and his accomplices looted numerous homes and extorted money from the Hindus. Hossain was a close associate of another infamous war criminal, Abul Kalam Azad, who was also tried and sentenced to death in absentia.

Hossain went into hiding following the liberation of Bangladesh and surfaced only after Sheikh Mujib was killed in an abortive coup on Aug 15, 1975. He joined the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) when the country’s first military ruler Ziaur Rahman floated the party to expand his regime’s civilian support base. Later on, he became the vice president of Nagarkanda BNP unit. He was elected mayor to the Nagarkanda municipality in 2011 and had been absconding since taking oath.

Local reports suggest that the 70-year-old opposition leader had fled to Sweden which does not have an extradition treaty with Bangladesh. Dhaka’s legal experts observe that in the absence of such a treaty, it would not be an easy task to bring him back from the European country. Besides, Stockholm’s stand against deporting someone convicted to death is another major obstacle. Media reports say Hossain had sought political asylum there but he has not been granted citizenship by the Swedish government.

The people of Bangladesh have welcomed the conviction of Hossain. The former freedom fighters waiting outside the court on the judgment day lauded the verdict. Hossain’s state-appointed legal counsel said his client was deprived of justice but the legal interpreters maintain that he can not appeal against the verdict in the Supreme Court unless he first surrenders.

In the meantime, victims’ family members, pro-liberation organisation Gano Jagoron Mancha and some lawyers urged the government to execute the verdict immediately after bringing the fugitive back to the country. They have called upon the AL government to initiate diplomatic efforts towards this end.

Hossain is the third BNP leader to be convicted for war crimes. The two other former BNP ministers — Abdul Alim and Salauddin Quader Choudhury were convicted last year. The BNP says the ruling AL has been using the war crimes trial as a political tool to weaken the opposition. However, the party has not reacted after the latest judgment.

Though BNP is the only mainstream party that has accommodated the maximum number of collaborators and war criminals, it also tries to keep its pro-liberation image alive considering the popular anger towards the collaborators and war criminals.

(Rupak Bhattacharjee has worked as Senior Research Fellow at Kolkata’s Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies and New Delhi’s Institute for Conflict Management. He can be contacted at southasiamonitor1@gmail.com)

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By N Sathiya Moorthy

By quoting from an official Chinese statement on India’s purported interest in China’s Maritime Silk Route (MSR) without citing the source, Maldivian Foreign Minister Dunya Maumoon may have committed an avoidable political issue nearer home. However, the double-quick clarification by the Indian High Commisison – later ackowledged by the Maldivian Foreign Ministry, but in the reverse — have ensured that bilateral relations did not suffer in the process.

The issue arose after Minister Dunya, daughter of former President and founder of ruling Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM), Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, chose to clarify the Government’s position on foreign and security policy issues, to a parliamentary question on the perceived Indian concerns over the island-nation signing up for the Chinese MSR. The American-styled presidential form of Maldivian government does not require/provide for ministers being present in Parliament throughout the session. Their presence and interventions, hence, confirm the importance and the criticality that the Government attaches to the discussion.

In the present instance, Minister Dunya was answering a question in Parliament, if India had expressed concern over Maldives joining the Chinese MSR, signed during President Xi Jingping’s visit to the archipelago earlier in the year. According to media reports, the Minister said that the Indian Government too had welcomed the MSR initiative during President Xi’s visit to New Delhi (as the last leg of his three-nation South Asia trip, which included Sri Lanka).

The Indian High Commission in Male was quick to respond and clarify the position. Citing Syed Akbaruddin, the official spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), a High Commission statement said, “…As regards the new silk route? this matter was neither raised, nor discussed, nor is it reflected in any of the outcomes of the visit of President Xi Jinping to India.” Both the IHC statement and the spokesperson’s clarification clearly indicated that this was not the first time that the latter was commenting on the subject, and the very same way.

Clearly, there was some confusion on the Maldivian side, but the Foreign Ministry in Male has since reluctantly and belatedly clarified that their surmise was based on an official Chinese statement on President Xi’s India visit. As a section of the Maldivian media pointed out, the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s official statement had only said that “both sides” (China and India) “should accelerate?conduct and cooperation?within the frameworks such as?the Maritime Silk Route?”, etc. It did not claim that the subject was discussed in the first place, for any decision to be arrived at.

Not to lose a chance to target the Government wherever and whenever possible, the Opposition Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP), cited the IHC statement, and called Minister Dunya a ‘liar’ and her parliamentary statement, ‘shameful’. Though the Dunya’s PPM did join issue with the MDP, the Foreign Ministry at that stage had itself clarified that Minister Dunya had “noted her concern if her choice of words had led to any confusion”.

Coming as it did only days after Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj’s stop-over discussions with Minister Dunya at capital Male’s Huluhule airport island, the latter’s parliamentary statement had caused eyebrows to raise – both in terms of what she said – or, did not say — and also its very timing. That the Indian media, which went hyper over the ‘GMR issue’, did not have time for Maldives since has meant that avoidable criticism of the Government of President Abdulla Yameen in the larger neighbour remained avoided.

Locational advantage – or, disadvantage?

However, the possible proclivity for Maldives to read the India-China, or India-Pakistan relations wrong too needs to be noted. It seems to flow from the smaller Indian Ocean archipelago-nation’s inherent external security concerns in the midst of an indefensible geo-strategic locale, circumstances and directions, over which it could not aspire to have any control whatsoever.

To an outsider or another nation, near or far, nations like Maldives have as a ‘strategic locational advantage’ to hedge. From inside, that too when the sights are trained exclusively on safety and security, sovereignty and territorial integrity, it’s a ‘locational disadvantage’ – which it actually is. Standing ‘exposed’ in the lil’ games that small nations play after a time, they end up believing in playing with Paul and Peter together than playing Paul against Peter.

It was possibly thus that then MDP’s President Mohammed Nasheed inaugurated a Chinese mission in Male the very day Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was landing in the country for attending the SAARC Summit in 2011 along with a bilateral. President Nasheed is also reportedly credited with proposing for Maldives to play mediator of sorts between India and China on the one hand, and India and Pakistan on the other, in resolving what essentially have been bilateral issues of a historic nature and consequence.

Despite change of political leadership in New Delhi, the Government of India has consistently stood by the early decision to keep bilateral issues bilateral, and not involve third-nations or institutions in resolving the same. Primarily, the Indian position was tempered by the games global powers wanted to play in its backyard and neighbourhood. Given the wheels-within-wheels of geo-strategic diplomacy, India also seems wanting to keep smaller neighbours too out of the picture even while not suspecting the genuineness of their deep-seated concerns for their own security and sovereignty, flowing from any ‘clash of the titans’.

The re-injection of extra-regional power-play in their own immediate Indian Ocean neighbourhood does not make things easier for nations like Maldives. It’s true, in this case, of India’s neighbours, both on land and across the seas. The media-reported efforts of the Nepali host of the SAARC Summit now to have India-Pakistan leaders to meet on the sidelines to try and break the ice in their bilateral relations too may have been borne out of such shared concerns for the region, and of and for their own nations.

India respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of individual nations, near or afar, more than most nations of its standing. India would like neighbours to respect its sovereignty and territorial integrity likewise, and in ways their understanding of the Indian expectations become appreciated, without compulsions – overt or covet. That the genuineness of their national concerns and the consequences of their initiatives flowing from those concerns do not always match or balance is another matter that they too need to address in their own independent and sovereign ways.

‘Independent’ foreign policy

It is in this background that Minister Dunya’s parliamentary response on larger issues pertaining to Maldives’ ‘independent’ foreign policy needs to be appreciated – if not wholly understood. Like the rest of much of the world, Maldives too is still in the process of re-adjusting itself to the post-Cold War realities, where the alternate ‘super-power’ in China is not as far away as the erstwhile Soviet Union (in perception, if not distance). The unresolved India-China border dispute brings China closer to the Indian Ocean in every political and geo-strategic calculation of nations like Maldives and Sri Lanka, even though they are not as close to both the ‘Asian giants’ as the rest of India’s South Asian neighbours.

Media reports have not made any mention of Minister Dunya referring to Maldives’ new foreign policy, proclaimed by President Yameen in January 2014, in her response in the People’s Majlis, or Parliament. It was obviously on the works even before he assumed office. Among others, the document has for its ‘Vision & Mission’, “sovereign equality of States in accordance with international law”, “non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries” and “friendship with all countries based on mutual respect”.

Speaking on the occasion, President Yameen said that “bilateral collaborations must be lead through diplomatic dialogue, and that each country was entitled to sovereign equality”. Underlining that the main objective of his foreign policy was to increase opportunities for the economic advancement of Maldivians, the President said that in today’s world, an independent foreign policy could only be employed by becoming an economically sufficient, and resilient nation.

In context, Minister Dunya, in her Majlis’ response, referred to Article 2 of the Independence Declaration as a Protectorate of the UK in 1965, “which clearly states that Maldives does not need to consult with any other country, wait for their approval or say so in order to execute the country’s foreign policy”. She added: “It is in the interest of Maldives, to protect and defend the independence and sovereignty of the Maldivian nation. The present government would not allow interests of foreign groups being given priority over this.”

‘Regional strength from India’

If the reference was to India, it was not entirely missed by Minister Dunya’s audience, both inside and outside Parliament. Whether it would include – or, exempt – Chinese groups (whether owned by the government or otherwise) is a question that Maldivians should be asking themselves and their government(s). On the larger issue of the nation’s safety and security, the Minister said that they were “very much dependent on maintaining peace within the Indian Ocean, and that the Maldivian economy and lifestyle was strongly dependent on the Indian Ocean”.

In this context, Haveeru quoted Dunya as saying: “We will counsel with any country necessary in order to maintain peace and security within the region, to make Indian Ocean a region where peace is established. We are holding discussions and working together with any country it is necessary to collaborate with.” Nothing would explain, Maldives’ complex concerns involving economic security, nation’s safety and peace in the Indian Ocean, than what he said in New Delhi only weeks before releasing the new foreign policy in Male.

“We are looking at regional strength from India and also in global politics and international relations we look up to India’s leadership. India and Maldives common people, we have a common destiny. So, we believe it is under Indian leadership that we will be able to seek salvation from poverty and difficult situation we have in this part of the world,” President said on the occasion. “I hope to achieve substantive progress as far as India-Maldives relationship is concerned. Foreign policy, domestic policy, areas of interest like maritime security, we have very strong bond with India, and our understanding on international matters as far as these issues are concerned, we have common understanding,” he added.

In Parliament, however, Minister Dunya would not respond publicly on a specific parliamentary question from retired senior army officer, Ibrahim Didi (MDP), if increased Chinese naval activity in a Maldivian port would threaten India’s ‘geo-political interests’, and leading to deterioration in bilateral relations. She cited ‘national security concerns’ as the cause for not responding to the question, but suggested that the member take it up at parliamentary committees (with a smaller number of members, and without media presence).

President Yammen himself has been more direct in addressing ‘Indian concerns. On return from a China visit in August – dovetailed between the first-ever Japan visit by a Maldivian Head of State, and President Xi’s Maldives visit — he said, Sino-Maldives economic cooperation would not affect “the very friendly, close relations with India”. In this context, he also said that “all these (Chinese) projects are also open to India, and we are doing a lot of diplomatic work with India”.

President Yameen also specifically referred in public to his Government’s decision not to sign a ‘Status of Forces Agreement’ (SOFA) with the US. As may be recalled, the US had reportedly approached the predecessor Maldivian Government of President Mohammed Waheed Hassan Manik behidn the back of the Indian ‘friend and ally’ in ‘Indo-Pacific’. But whether Maldives would address similar Indian concerns equally forthright and effectively viz China is a question abegging a convincing answer, now or later. To that answer would also hinge the Maldivian desire and commitment for peace in the Indian Ocean, particularly in its immediate neighbourhood, which is also the tri-nation neighbouthood with India and Sri Lanka.

(The writer is a Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation), Chennai Chapter)

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By Ram Kumar Jha and Saurabh Kumar

The focal theme of the 18th SAARC Summit being hosted by Nepal in Kathmandu from Nov 26-27, 2014 is ‘Deeper Integration for Peace and Prosperity’.

This summit can take a hard look at infusing vigour and vitality into economic diplomacy, though it is commencing after a three-year gap. In its 29-year old history, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has been criticised for its failure to achieve tangible success, unlike other regional groupings. Thus the Kathmandu summit offers an opportunity to build on earlier initiatives that can potentially alter the current scenario of disheartening cooperation.

Since its inception in 1985, SAARC is working for development and economic welfare of the region. Over the years, the agenda of SAARC has expanded considerably, exhibiting the intent and capability to work collectively on issues of agriculture and rural development; health and population; women empowerment, youth and children; environment and forestry; human resource development; information and communications technology and energy security amongst others. The region is one of the least economically integrated in the world and that is why many member countries have become frustrated with the slow progress of SAARC and are looking for alternatives.

Apart from lack of trust, there are a number of constraining factors as well as other challenging issues in the SAARC framework. Some of these include: its inability to tackle inter-state conflicts that have often made it hostage to bilateral conflicts and the nationalistic interests of member countries and an India-centric strategic perception that exists both among India’s neighbours as well as among other countries. Moreover, SAARC follows the principle that all decisions have to be made unanimously and that no bilateral and contentious issue can be on the SAARC agenda. This clearly exhibits a weaker inter-state relationship toward equitable participation in policy making for South Asian people.

Apart from historical conflicts between member countries, there is also disagreement among them on the need for a South Asian conflict resolution mechanism to deal with bilateral disputes. India, Nepal and Sri Lanka are not in favour of conflict resolution mechanism as a domain of the SAARC.

At the same time many South Asian countries are not dependent on SAARC to achieve their economic objectives. They give priority to bilateral agreements because of their own self-interests instead of regional economic cooperation. Such a trend diminishes SAARC’s importance and future prospects to member countries. Despite these obstacles, SAARC can still play an important communicative role in South Asia. It can serve as a forum for South Asian leaders to discuss geo-economic issues for South Asia on a regular basis.

Deeper integration, in addition to the creation of a free trade area, entails liberalisation of services, investment, elimination of non-tariff barriers, and in general, going beyond traditional market access issues. There are overlapping trade agreements and unilateral policy announcements among member countries that undermine the regional agreement. There is need to focus on this factor which could facilitate trade and financial connectivity in South Asia. An aspect that has drawn relatively less attention but is of critical importance is the lack of financial connectivity in the region.

With a dominant economy and the largest country in the region, India should attempt to become the engine of economic development for the region. Greater Indian participation in SAARC activities is important to reduce two major suspicions: first, smaller countries want to use SAARC to gang up against India, and second, that their economy will suffer from Indian exports and marketing strategies.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi invited all the heads of South Asian countries to his oath-taking ceremony on May 26, 2014 at New Delhi. The move can also be viewed as a strategic change in India’s geo-economic dependence on the cooperation and support of its neighbours. Thus, there is reason to be optimistic about the future of SAARC.

Therefore, the role of India is pivotal in encouraging the South Asian countries to come together to resolve the above issues along with food, water and energy security. India can effectively stimulate the working potential of organizations like SAARC Food Bank, SAARC Seed Bank, and SAARC Energy Centre.

Furthermore, elimination of intra-regional non-tariff trade barriers such as recognising the mutual standards and certifications is essential for sustainable economic development and greater cooperation in the region.

India should also increase aid and technical assistance, particularly through the Indian Technical & Economic Cooperation Programme (ITEC) and Line of Credit (LOC) to its member countries.

India should also increase cooperation in knowledge transfer, research and development with neighbouring countries. Joint research projects for agricultural development particularly in input can lead to reduction in food insecurity.

India can also transfer and share technologies which are essential for promoting economic growth through industrialization in the region. This will also make India to reduce carbon emission and represent India one step ahead with positive collaborative approach in the region.

This is the right time that India must actively work for a region-wide acceptance of the vision of a South Asian community based on peaceful coexistence, economic cooperation, religious tolerance and cultural understanding. In such a scenario, it would be useful for India to consider several unilateral measures that would push the concept of SAARC into a more realistic mould.

(Ram Kumar Jha and Saurabh Kumar are working as Policy Analyst, CUTS International and can be contacted at southasiamonitor1@gmail.com)

The post Can India Resolve Conflicts In SAARC? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Four polio workers, three of them females, were killed and another injured in an attack in the eastern bypass of Quetta, capital of Balochistan, reports MISNA.

According to police, the group was traveling in the area as part of the ongoing child polio vaccination campaign when gunmen opened indiscriminate fire against their vehicle on the outskirts of the city and opened fire at them. A large police contingent was deployed to the area and an investigation has been opened.

Nearly 70 suspects have been detained so far, according to MISNA.

Other vaccination teams working as part of the campaign suspended their activities throughout Balochistan in protest against the attack, demanding major security.

According to local sources, nearly 700 police were deployed to protect the child polio vaccination teams in the province. The campaign, sponsored by the UN Child’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization (WHO), the eight-day emergency vaccination campaign in Balochistan had begun on Monday following the confirmation of 14 cases of polio this year. More than 200 skilled vaccinators, 418 team assistants and 418 social mobilizers are participating in the drive.

According to WHO, Pakistan accounted for approximately 85% of all polio cases recorded across the globe. Frequent attacks on healthcare teams are the main factor of such high ratio of polio cases in the country. More than 50 people, including health workers and police guarding them, have been killed across the country over the past 18 months. Most of the killings have been carried out in Karachi and the troubled northwest by Taliban, who see the vaccination campaigns as a cover for espionage and believe that the polio drops cause infertility.

The post Pakistan: Four Polio Campaign Workers Killed appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The sentencing hearing of Dr. Wouter Basson, who headed the South Africa apartheid regime’s germ warfare program, opened today before the Health Professions Council of SA (HPCSA) in Pretoria, reports MISNA.

Despite South Africa’s courts never being able to obtain a conviction, the HPCSA in December last year found Basson guilty of “unprofessional conduct”. The Council is seeking a harsher sentence and the suspension of his medical license.

Known as “Dr. Death”, Basson, a cardiologist, coordinated the production of drugs used for the elimination of anti-apartheid activists in South Africa and Namibia, as also of chemical weapons (including some supplied to Angola’s Unita rebel movement, backed by Pretoria against the Luanda government). He is also accused of producing cyanide capsules available for distribution to South African secret service operatives for use in committing suicide in case of losing their covers.

In 2005, the Constitutional Court definitively closed the criminal case against “Dr. Death” on 67 counts.

The post South Africa: ‘Dr. Death’ To Face New Sentencing appeared first on Eurasia Review.

After decades of irrelevance, are the air forces of the Arab world on the mend? Florence Gaub has no doubts. The strategic threat posed by Iran has prompted a number of Arab states to overhaul and expand their air arms.

By Florence Gaub

When pictures of Mariam Al Mansouri – the first female fighter pilot in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – traveled around the world in September, it symbolized the changing role of women in the Arab world and the collective fight against the Islamic state. But it also captured a new military phenomenon: after decades of strategic irrelevance, Arab air power is on the rise. In 2014, as Syria, Egypt, and Libya face strategic challenges for which their traditionally large air forces appear to be ill-suited, Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar have significantly expanded their aerial capabilities, largely as a means of balancing against Iran. Although building up air power makes sense, especially for small states like Qatar and the UAE, their task is now to ensure that it is deployed in tandem with other tools, rather than becoming a substitute for a broader strategy.

A new balance of power in the air

Until recently, Arab air forces played no role in the strategic landscape of the Middle East. Although Egypt and Syria had numerically strong fleets, neither had seen combat in three decades. Famously, both air forces were destroyed within a few hours by Israel during the Six Day War in 1967. Egypt, which was the strongest Arab air power at the time, lost 338 aircraft, most of which did not even have time to take off. Although both forces had recovered somewhat by 1973, air power was not decisive in retaking the Sinai (although one successful air battle, led by Hosni Mubarak, is still commemorated on October 14 every year). In 1982, a major air battle between Syria and Israel damaged Syria’s air defense system considerably, but Arab air forces have been largely grounded since then. Indeed, the Gulf War of 1991 and the Iraq War in 2003 showed that Arab airspace belonged to anyone but the Arabs. On the whole, American-led bombings contributed significantly to the liberation of Kuwait and later to the fall of Saddam Hussein. The American bombing of Libya in 1986, regular Israeli incursions into Lebanese air space, and the Israeli strike against a nuclear facility in Syria in 2007 confirmed the notion that Arab air forces were serving primarily ceremonial purposes. Before the Arab Spring, Egypt and Syria had strong air forces on paper, with 461 and 555 combat-capable aircraft respectively (in part the result of decades of rule by former air force officers in Mubarak and Hafez al-Assad), but neither had seen any meaningful action.

By 2014, the picture has changed dramatically. Nominally, Egypt remains the leading regional air power with 569 combat aircraft, while the Syrian air force has suffered significantly from a civil war conducted largely by air. The latest estimates report 295 combat aircraft, although many of those may no longer be operational. Both forces are involved in conflicts which cannot be won from the air alone. Not only have their antagonists acquired Surface-to-Air-Missiles (an Egyptian helicopter was downed in January in the Sinai), they can only be defeated on the ground. While air power is useful for achieving large-scale destruction (e.g., of ammunition storage, supply routes, or communication nodes) and has some impact on enemy morale, it obviously cannot engage in house-to-house combat. More importantly, air power relies crucially on intelligence, without which airstrikes are little more than guesswork. In both of these areas, Egypt and Syria are currently weak.

Libya is also in a challenging situation. Retired General Khalifa Haftar is conducting Operation Dignity mainly with the remains of the Libyan air force. The previous regime lost most of its 374 combat aircraft during the 2011 conflict as a result of a no-fly zone that deliberately targeted aircraft that were bombing civilians. In the summer of 2014, Haftar was reported to have 12 aircraft, but the latest reports claim that only three are left –mostly due to a lack of maintenance and spare parts. The current situation in Libya shows that air power will not solve the issue of localized violence.

Meanwhile, new air powers have emerged. Saudi Arabia, which had a relatively small air force until the early 2000s, now operates 305 fighter jets and ranks second in the region. It also has a de facto regional monopoly on Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), which provide an important advantage in aerial combat. The UAE, a country with a population of 5.6 million, now ranks fourth with 201 aircraft. It also hosts the Gulf Air Warfare Center, where Gulf and American air forces conduct training exercises.

These states are currently the leading regional air forces by far: while Iran roughly matches Saudi Arabia in numbers (though not in quality), the fifth largest Arab air force is Algeria’s, with a little more than half of the Emirati fleet. No other Arab country approaches this number. Iraq, which once had a powerful air force, now has three jets left, while Lebanon has nine. For its part, Oman uses its air force primarily as a job creator, launching a recruitment campaign in response to demonstrations in 2011. It now operates 52 fighter jets.

Crucially, the emerging air powers in the Gulf have not been reluctant to act against other Arab states. Qatar and the UAE both sent jets to assist NATO during its Libya operation in 2011; Doha’s air force, now at 18 combat aircraft, sent a third of its capabilities; the UAE sent twelve fighters. The active roles of these countries far exceeded the previous contributions of Arab military forces to Western-led operations. In the summer of this year, the UAE and Egypt were said to have bombed Islamist positions in Libya, although whether Egypt sent actual aircraft, or simply allowed the Emiratis to take off from their air bases, is unclear. More recently, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain (39 combat aircraft) and Jordan (85 combat aircraft) joined another coalition to fight the Islamic State, resulting in captain Al Mansouri’s fame. Although how many air strikes the UAE and Saudi Arabia have conducted is not clear, one thing is: the two states are building powerful air forces in more than numerical terms. What both lack is not equipment, but training and readiness – elements now being acquired by conducting actual air strikes.

Air power: one tool among many

In large part, Gulf air power is the result of the region’s antagonism with Iran. The implosion of Iraq, long considered a bulwark against potential aggression from Tehran, and the discovery of a nuclear program in Iran, certainly contributed to the perceived need for powerful air forces. The impressive expansion of Arab air forces is largely a message of power projection designed for Tehran: due to its geostrategic location, a potential military conflict with Iran would be conducted by air and water rather than by land (unless Iraq was used as a battleground).

In addition, air defense systems have proliferated throughout the region, making strategic bombing more difficult than it used to be. Syria’s system, revamped after the 2007 Israeli strike, is now considered strong enough to deter military action against the regime. The Gulf states are pursuing an integrated air defense system capable of countering missile threats, and Egypt has upgraded its system, too. Overall, Arab air space is being reclaimed by Arab states.

The problem with air power, however, is that its usefulness as a strategic tool is often overstated. Successful campaigns with important air power components, such as Serbia in 1999 and Libya in 2011, have created the impression that ground forces are no longer crucial to fighting, and winning, wars. But air power, and particularly aerial bombardment, is hardly a strategy in itself. Instead, these are simply tools that must always be used in tandem with other tools, including naval and ground forces, in support of a broader strategy. Especially for small states like the UAE or Qatar, building-up air power makes sense, but it will provide little protection, for instance, against a major ground invasion, which remains the norm in regional warfare.

Florence Gaub is a Senior Analyst at the EUISS.

The post The Rise Of Arab Air Power – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The spread of an exotic parasite that threatens the UK’s honey-bee population could be speeded up by global warming, according to researchers at Queen’s University Belfast.

The gut parasite Nosema ceranae – which originates in Asia but can now be found worldwide – is likely to cause increasing damage to UK bees as the Earth heats up through climate change, the researchers report in a new study.

The new finding that this parasite not only has a superior competitive ability, but that its numbers could rise with climate change, has been published in the journal Proceedings of the Royal Society B.

Co-author of the study and Adjunct Reader at Queen’s School of Biological Sciences, Professor Robert Paxton said: “This emerging parasite is more susceptible to cold than its original close relative, possibly reflecting its presumed origin in east Asia. In the face of rising global temperatures, our findings suggest that it will increase in prevalence and potentially lead to increased honey bee colony losses in Britain.”

Co-researcher Myrsini Natsopoulou, from the Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg in Germany added: “Our results reveal not only that the exotic parasite is a better competitor than its original close relative, but that its widespread distribution and patterns of prevalence in nature depend on climatic conditions too”.

The research compared pathogen growth in honey bees that were infected with both the exotic parasite, Nosema ceranae and its original native relative, Nosema apis.

Experiments showed that, while both parasites inhibit each other’s growth, the exotic Nosema ceranae has a much greater negative impact on the native Nosema apis than vice versa. By integrating the effects of competition and climate into a simple mathematical model, the researchers were better able to predict the relative occurrence of both parasite species in nature: Nosema ceranae is common in Southern Europe but rare in Northern Europe.

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With more than 11,200 sightings of cetaceans over the course of ten years, Spanish and Portuguese researchers have been able to identify, in detail, the presence of orcas in the Gulf of Cadiz, the Strait of Gibraltar and the Alboran Sea. According to the models that have been generated, the occurrence of these cetaceans is linked to the distribution of their main prey (red tuna) and their presence in Spanish, Portuguese and Moroccan waters is thus more limited than previously thought.

In 2011, the Spanish Ministry of the Environment considered the small population of orcas (Orcinus orca) that inhabits the waters in the south of Spain to be ‘vulnerable’, and included it in the Spanish Catalogue of Endangered Species. Its addition was justified: the orcas that live in this area belong to a reduced group of individuals that each year swims between the Strait of Gibraltar and the Gulf of Cadiz in search of tuna.

Despite efforts to demarcate the spatial distribution of this group of cetaceans, until now little was known about their movements during spring and summer in the Alboran Sea, the Strait of Gibraltar and the Gulf of Cadiz. The new study, published in the ‘Journal of the Marine Biological Association of the United Kingdom’, allows their location each year to be identified with greater precision.

“We have created two generalised models: the presence model (sightings of orcas) and the pseudo-absence model (sightings of other cetaceans), with the information gathered from the 11,276 sightings between 2002 and 2012,” Ruth Esteban, the main author of the study and a researcher for Conservation, Information and Research on Cetaceans (CIRCE), tells SINC.

The scientists created a model using data from spring, when red tuna (orcas’ main prey) enter into the Mediterranean Sea, and another model with data from summer, when red tuna leave for the Atlantic Ocean.

The results show that the presence of orcas is closely linked to the distribution of the tuna during their migration through the studied area. “This limits their distribution to the Gulf of Cadiz in spring and the Strait of Gibraltar in summer,” notes Esteban.

Furthermore, “any reduction in the abundance of tuna could endanger this population of orcas,” the researcher adds. She considers it important to demarcate an exclusive marine area where human activity, such as whale watching, military exercises or recreational fishing, does not interrupt their predation techniques.

A very limited habitat

According to the predictions of the model generated using 278 orca sightings and 7,206 of other cetaceans, it has been forecast that in summer there will be a large number of orcas in the most westerly part of the centre of the Strait of Gibraltar.

The 44 sightings of orcas from research vessels, whale watching companies and opportunist observations and the 3,746 sightings of other cetaceans have shown that the orcas remain in two specific areas in spring: in the most easterly area of the Gulf of Cadiz -in shallow waters around Spain and Morocco- and in southern Portugal, in particular close to Faro.

In the Alboran Sea, only four orca sightings have been registered in ten years. Scientists have therefore not been able to identify any important habitat area with the models used in the other areas.

During autumn and winter, orcas have barely been observed in the most regularly populated areas. “It is possible that this group of marine mammals travels in waters close to the migration route of the tuna,” the researchers have concluded.

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(EurActiv) — “I promised to present an ambitious Investment Plan before Christmas. One month later and Christmas has come early – I am here to deliver on my promise”, Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker told MEPs, presenting his €315 billion investment plan.

Juncker presented his €315 billion investment plan, which has indeed put together in record times. He pledged to present such a plan on 15 July, when MEPs confirmed him as next Commission President, but had time to work on it only after his team took office on 1 November.

As EurActiv already wrote, the plan is based on a fifteenfold leverage of a limited €21 billion of initial public money. As Juncker explained, the fund will be called European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), guaranteed with public money from the EU budget and the European Investment Bank (EIB). The Fund will be able to mobilise €315 billion over the next three years.

For the EFSI, the Commission has put up €8 billion from the EU budget. This backs up a €16 billion guarantee given to the Fund. Topped up by another €5 billion from the EIB, the sum totals €21 billion.

In addition, the European Investment Bank (EIB) can give out loans of €63 billion. But private investors will be pitching in the remaining €252 billion.

The money taken from the EU budget comes from the Horizon 2020 and Connecting Europe budget lines, but Juncker said this didn’t mean the money is lost.

“Every euro from these programmes paid into the Fund creates €15 euros for those very same research and infrastructure projects. We are not just moving money around. We are maximising its input,” he said.

Juncker also said that if member states step up to the plate and contribute to EFSI, then the knock-on effect of this significant amount will be even bigger. The €315 billion of total expected investment is not a ceiling, and if the plan is successful, its ceiling could be even higher, he said.

The projects to receive investment from the fund for the funds should be attractive to investors. Those who will choose them will not be politicians but technicians who have the experience and know-how to do so. A special Investment Committee made up of experts will validate every project from a commercial and societal perspective and based on what value-added they can have to the EU as a whole.

Public deficits will not be aggravated

As the Socialists and Democrats group had asked, Juncker said that the member states’ contributions to EFSI would be deducted from the calculation of public deficit and public debt under the Growth and Stability Pact.

Juncker warned about national wish-lists, and basically said there was no guarantee how much they would profit from the fund, if they contribute to it.

“Geographical silos will not serve anyone. France growing is good for Italy. Southern Europe growing is good for Germany. We are all in this together. Our fates are linked. We should stand shoulder to shoulder”, Juncker said.

Changing the paradigm

Commission Vice President Jyki Katainen, responsible for Jobs, Growth, Investment and Competitiveness said EFSI would increase the firepower of the EU budget by shifting the priority from grants and loans to investment support and investment guarantee.

EFSI will focus on long-term investments with higher risk profiles, he said. All projects will be moved into a single hub which will provide information and help in financing the projects for promoters., he said.

Katainen also called on member states to contribute to EFSI by providing capital, by using the structural funds allocated to them in the new financial instrument.

“Currently, 92% of structural funds go to grant schemes. This has to change. Once that money is granted, it is gone. We need to make better use of this financing so that it goes further and has a real effect on the economy,” Katainen said.

He also said that a Taskforce led by the Commission and the EIB, with member states, is currently identifying over 1000 projects which are ready to be assessed. “We want to give a European label for the most viable ones,” Katainen said.

This Plan is not a magic wand, Katainen said, adding however that if it is implemented, it would change the European investment landscape permanently and for the better.

EIB President Werner Hoyer, who was present alongside Juncker and Katainen in front of the MEPs, was asked about journalists if the fifteenfold multiplier for raising private money was a realistic one.

He said that the fifteenfold multiplier was in fact a conservative figure, and that liquidity was abundantly available in the EU. It is not used because of the lack of risk-bearing capacity, he said.

Hoyer said that the “horrifying story” was that Europe has been lagging behind on investment levels compared to the pre-crisis period by an average of 20%.

The centre-right EPP, the Socialists and Democrats and the liberal ALDE political groups made statements, largely supportive of the Juncker plan. Anti-EU political groups called the plan “Monopoly money”, “Hocus-Pocus” and “Abracadabra” (see Positions). Parliament President Martin Schulz called the Juncker plan a “a turning point”, adding that he was looking forward for its “big success”.

The post Juncker: Christmas Has Come Early, Here Is My Big Plan appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The US must rise to meet the high human rights standards it has set for itself and others around the world, a group of United Nations human rights experts urged Wednesday. The experts  called on President Obama to support “the fullest possible release” of a report detailing Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) interrogation practices, reports the UN News Centre.

In an open letter addressed to Obama, the six UN rights experts said that much depended on how the President would handle the stalemated issue of the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s CIA report, stressing that the stakes were “very high” as his decision would have “far-reaching consequences for victims of human rights violations everywhere and for the credibility of the United States.”

“As a nation that has publicly affirmed its belief that respect for truth advances respect for the rule of law, and as a nation that frequently calls for transparency and accountability in other countries, the United States must rise to meet the standards it has set both for itself and for others,” the experts declared.

“Victims of torture and human rights defenders around the world will be emboldened if you take a strong stand in support of transparency. On the contrary, if you yield to the CIA’s demands for continued secrecy on this issue, those resisting accountability will surely misuse this decision to bolster their own agenda in their countries.”

Launched in early 2009, the Senate Committee’s investigation lasted four years during which millions of pages of CIA documents and emails centring on the agency’s interrogation techniques were examined. The report was eventually approved in late 2012 with an official release date set for April 2014. However, it has yet to be released, purportedly due to demands by the CIA that material be redacted from the document, the Geneva-based UN rights experts said in a press release.

“The CIA is reportedly demanding that pseudonyms created by the Committee for specific CIA officials be deleted in favour of even more generic and vague language, which beyond obscuring names, obscure patterns that are a crucial element of the system of violations that needs to be fully understood and redressed,” they added.

As a result, the UN experts have urged Mr. Obama to release the report in what they say would be “meaningful form,” allowing the public to understand the facts and promoting the right to truth for victims and their families.

While they commended Mr. Obama on his wish to “look forward” on the torture issue and for his decision to shutter a CIA interrogation programme accused of torturing detainees, they recommended the US leader also push for the recognition of and redress for other violations that took place under the same CIA programmes, including secret and arbitrary detention, and enforced disappearances, among others.

In addition, they reminded Mr. Obama that every party to the UN Convention against Torture has an obligation to thoroughly and promptly investigate credible reports of torture, ensure accountability and provide adequate remedies to victims.

“Lasting security can only be achieved on the basis of truth and not secrecy,” the experts continued. “We hope that as President of a nation that helped draft the Convention Against Torture – and as a Nobel Peace Prize laureate – you will recognize the historic nature of your decision and side with those in the United States and around the world who are struggling to reveal the truth and to bring an end to the use of torture.”

The group of independent experts – part of what is known as Special Procedures, the largest body of independent experts in the UN Human Rights system – is composed of Mads Andenas, Chair-Rapporteur of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention; Pablo de Greiff, Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence; Ariel Dulitzky, Chair-Rapporteur of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances; Christof Heyns, Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions; David Kaye, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; Gabriela Knaul, Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers; and Juan E. Méndez, Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

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Indonesia’s recently-elected President Joko Widodo has captured the attention of the world media by his manner of dress and unassuming character. But this simple self-presentation has a long history in Southeast Asia, where assuming an ordinary character is also a form of cultural capital that carries huge symbolic power.

By Farish (Badrol Hisham) Ahmad-Noor

Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) made international headlines recently when he flew economy-class from Jakarta to Singapore with his wife to attend the graduation ceremony of their son. Jokowi’s aide pointed out during the trip that the “President was travelling as a father, and not in his official capacity as President”, and thus did not avail himself the use of the presidential aircraft normally used for official visits.

His quick and quiet trip however, was reported across Asia and the West, and it was noted by many media commentators that this marked an impressive and visible shift from the style of leadership of previous Indonesian presidents, whose visits, and official events were often characterised by the show of pomp and grandeur.

Two cultures of power

It is, however, important to note that President Jokowi’s plain and simple style does have long historical precedents in Southeast Asia, and that he is not the only leader who has opted to go down the path of simplicity and modesty, although he may well be the most manifest in recent years.

Asian societies have always had two very different cultures of power and wealth, each with its own register of meaning and symbols. While it is true that in the pre-modern precolonial era power and wealth were often understood and expressed in demonstrative ways – through the construction of vast temple and palace complexes, complicated and formalised codes of dress, and arcane rites and rituals of courtly behaviour; there has also been another equally long tradition of power-accumulation that rests upon the deliberate (and publicly-visible) rejection of the very same symbols of power and social status.

Southeast Asian epics and myths are full of examples of men (and women) of power and high social standing who deliberately cast aside the symbols of power and wealth: In the Jataka Buddhist tale of Prince Vesantara (Wetsandon), the Prince gives away all his belongings, including the sacred white elephant as well as his own children, on his path of self-realisation – before he is accepted as a truly noble man deserving of power.

In Java, where Jokowi hails from, there are plentiful tales of rulers and nobles (both real and fictional) who gave up their lives of luxury to meditate in caves and mountains – only to gain even more spiritual power and moral legitimacy.In these instances, the negation of the symbols of power and wealth do not make the individual weaker or poorer, but more powerful instead. It is a case of the ‘poverty of wealth’ being replaced by the ‘wealth of poverty’, where assuming a life of simplicity purifies the individual’s persona, adds to his social charisma and to his store of cultural capital as well.

From past to present examples

There have also been more contemporary examples of such deliberate, calculated efforts to re-invent one’s political persona in the region: After the victory of the Communist party in Vietnam, its leader Ho Chi Minh was elevated to the highest office in the state. Those who have paid a visit to Hanoi may have also visited Ho Chi Minh’s modest lodgings in the small house at the back of the monumentally impressive Presidential Palace, that was built during the French colonial era in beaux-arts style.

Ho Chi Minh’s decision never to reside in the palace was to make the point that he would not allow himself to be swayed by the culture and luxury of the French colonial era, and that he would remain ‘untainted’ by wealth and power. It was a political decision that was symbolic in meaning, and understood by millions of Vietnamese who revered him all the more for it.

In Malaysia and Singapore other leaders have also opted for a simpler life in the past: Malaysia’s first Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman lived in a government-owned bungalow at Kenny Hills, Kuala Lumpur; while in Singapore the country’s founder-leader Lee Kuan Yew set the tone for the government by living in his family bungalow instead of moving into the official residence of Sri Temasek in the Istana domain; while Singapore’s first President Yusof Ishak stayed in a small villa behind the Istana. Having no home in Jakarta after moving from Solo where he was mayor, President Jokowi is staying at his official residence at the Merdeka Palace.

‘Poor’ is not ‘weak’

President Jokowi’s ordinary style is thus in keeping with a long tradition of political self-representation that dates back to the premodern era in Asia. At a glance it gives the clear impression of being a style that is popular and resonates with the ordinary masses, but it also happens to be a statement of intent in many other respects: It signals a rejection of empty formality and ritualism while placing value on pragmatism and real work; it signals a detachment from petty concerns about social status and popular prejudice and entails a higher evaluation of performance and delivery. It has certainly boosted his image as a no-nonsense, get-straight-to-work leader who will manage things personally.

This approach is also in keeping with President Jokowi’s pledge to turn things around for Indonesia as fast as possible, in order to deal with real issues such as logistics, institutional inertia, supply and demand blocks, etc., all of which happen to be real issues of political-economy that can only be solved through methods and work-practice that are rational and programmatic, rather than rhetorical flourishes or nostalgia for the past.

By rejecting a presidential style that is overly formal and ritualistic, Jokowi has shown that he is the man in charge, and that appearing ‘poor’ does not mean that he is ‘weak’ in any way – but that he is ‘above’ such concerns and that he operates on the highest level of all, as President of the republic of Indonesia.

Farish A. Noor is an Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

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The fifth meeting of the energy ministers of SAARC countries which was held after a gap of three years in New Delhi last month finalized the SAARC framework agreement on energy cooperation, pending since past four years.

The agreement will facilitate development of a South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Market of Electricity (SAME) and now awaits ratification by respective governments. Concurrently the required financials and technical specifications regarding the grid will be worked out. At present within SAARC, India is importing around 1,500 Megawatt (MW) of power from Bhutan while exporting around 500 MW to Bangladesh and 150 MW to Nepal.

In October 2014, as a follow-up to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Nepal in August, the two countries inked a Power Trade Agreement (PTA) that reportedly allows for the exchange of electricity and the opening up of new areas of cooperation in the hydropower sector. This article looks at some of the issues related to the SAARC electricity grid.

SAME

The economic sustainability of the SAARC region demands energy security as it imports 30 percent of its energy requirements even when the household per capita consumption of electricity within SAARC is a mere 128 units (global average is 3,045 units). A common electricity grid to share power can be a part of the solution to the issue. During the 15th SAARC Summit held in Colombo Aug 2-3, 2008, the SAARC leaders had stressed the need to develop the regional hydroelectricity potential, grid connectivity and gas pipelines. Thereafter the Working Group on Energy in its meeting held at Thimphu, Bhutan, in 2009 rephrased this proposal as ‘Regional Inter-Governmental Framework Agreement’ and included other thermal energy sources within the ambit of energy sources.

Subsequently, India circulated a Draft Framework Agreement at a SAARC workshop held at Udaipur on Jan 19, 2011. The Working Group on Energy, in its seventh meeting held in Sri Lanka in March 2013, called upon the SAARC Secretariat to give the Draft Agreement a legal shape, which was then discussed during the third meeting of the Expert Group on Electricity held in New Delhi on Dec 19, 2013.

The cross-border power exchange trade would offer, besides enhanced energy security, numerous benefits to the stakeholders such as enabling hydro-thermal mix in generation, lesser dependence on fossil fuels, reduction in carbon emissions and carbon intensity, more grid efficiency, optimization of electricity resources on a large scale and greater economic benefits to the SAARC nations. For the grid operation, each country while treating electricity as a tradable commodity in real time, would provide necessary infrastructure for seamless flow of electricity from one grid to another and lay down procedures for electricity exchange and legal basis for inter-governmental framework agreements.

India-Bangladesh

Bangladesh is considered as one of the most energy-deficient nations, with one of the lowest per capita electricity consumption rates in the world. The country is often able to produce only a part of its 11,500 MW generation capacity. In addition to the on-going export of 500MW of electricity from India to Bangladesh, the two countries are discussing import of additional 500MW of electricity by Bangladesh through the Bheramara-Baharampur grid. The progress of importing of 100MW of electricity from Palatana (Phase-1), ONGC’s biggest ever 726 MW capacity commercial power project at Palatana (60km south of Agartala) in southern Tripura, is also being reviewed. Discussions are also on to assess the progress of the second grid inter-connector between Bangladesh and India (Rangia/Rowta-Jamalpur-Barapukuria-North Region/West Region India) and import of electricity by Bangladesh from the northeastern states of India through this grid inter-connector.

Nepal

Nepal is a country with an enormous hydropower potential of 43,000 MW; yet the installed power generation capacity is just 762 MW – insufficient to meet even domestic needs of Nepal, necessitating electricity import from India. Indo-Nepal, cooperation, at present, has been restricted to four micro projects of just 51 MW. However, at least three projects with a total capacity of 2,400 MW are being jointly developed. SJVN Limited, a joint venture of the Government of India and Himachal Pradesh, is developing the Arun-III 900 MW project in Nepal. The private sector GMR Energy and GMR Infra Limited together with Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) and a third partner, had signed an agreement in 2008 to develop the 900 MW Upper Karnali hydropower project. The GMR Group has also acquired 82% stake in the 600 MW Marsyangdi 2 power project which is expected to be complete by 2021.

Bilateral exchange of power between India and Nepal started in 1971 with exchange of about 5 MW of power aimed to cater to the power needs of isolated local areas on both sides of the border. The power exchange takes place between NEA and Indian utilities namely Bihar State Electricity Board (BSEB), Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited (UPPCL) and Uttaranchal Power Corporation Ltd. (UPCL).System requirements for additional supply of 75 MW in the short term have been reportedly finalized, system strengthening works for additional power supply of 125 MW to in the medium term have been firmed up and power sale agreement (PSA) between NEA and PTC (Power Trading Corporation) has been signed for import of 150 MW power from India for 25 years.

Bhutan

Hydropower is one of the main pillars of bilateral cooperation between India and Bhutan. The ongoing cooperation in the hydropower sector is covered under the 2006 agreement between the two countries and the protocol to the 2006 agreement signed in March, 2009. Under the protocol, India has agreed to develop 10,000 MW of hydropower in Bhutan for export of surplus power to India by 2020.The associated cross-border transmission systems for evacuation and transfer of power from these hydro-electric projects is operated in synchronism with the Indian grid. Power from these projects will be pooled at Alipurduar in India, for further transmission within India.

Three hydroelectric power projects totalling 1,416 MW (336 MW Chukha, the 60 MW Kurichu, and the 1,020 MW Tala) are already operational in Bhutan and supplying electricity to India. Three more HEPs totalling 2,940 MW, i.e., the 1,200 MW Punatsangchu-I, the 1,020 MW Punatsangchu-II and the 720 MW Mangdehchu, are under construction, and are scheduled to be commissioned by 2018.

Further, a framework inter-governmental agreement between Bhutan and India concerning development of joint venture HEPs through the public sector undertakings (PSUs) of the two governments was signed on April 22, 2014 in Thimphu for implementation of four HEPs totalling 2,120 MW, subject to completion of the due process of appraisal of their detailed project reports, including techno-economic viability, on a joint venture-model between PSUs of the two countries.

Sri Lanka

There is a proposal to link-up Anuradhapura in Sri Lanka with Madurai in India which is under study. Under this proposal, feasibility of establishing a high-voltage, direct current (HVDC) transmission system of 1,000 MW capacity using overhead lines and undersea cables is being evaluated.

Pakistan

Conspicuous by its absence at the fifth meeting of the energy ministers of SAARC countries was Pakistan. One of the likely reasons is that Pakistan feels its power requirements would be best met by CASA-1000 or the Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project.

A transit agreement for Central Asia South Asia Regional Electricity Market (CASAREM) 1000 project between the government of Pakistan and Afghanistan was signed on Oct 11, 2014 at a ceremony in Washington which was attended by World Bank President Jim Yong Kim and US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Dan Feldman. The government of Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to a 1.25 cent per kWh transit fee for supply of electricity to Pakistan through Afghan territory. The US welcomed the agreement as it marked an important step in bilateral relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and one of the first foreign policy achievements of the new national unity government in Kabul.

When completed, CASA-1000 will enable the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan to sell 1,300 MW of excess summer-time hydropower to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Initially, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan will export 1,300MW, of which Pakistan will get 1,000MW of power while Afghanistan will receive the remaining 300MW.

The Casa-1000 electricity transmission project comprising of 477 km line from Kyrgyz Republic to Tajikistan and another 750 km line from Tajikistan to Pakistan, can reach up to 4,000MW. Discussions are also underway to lay another line from Tajikistan to Pakistan for more power supply. CASA-1000 like the SAME forms an essential element of a regional energy market that connects suppliers with customers as a means to promote economic growth.

Sharing of Electricity

Nepal imported 1,072 million kilowatt-hours (kWh) of electricity from India in the last fiscal year, as against an export of only 3.32 million kWh to India. Nepal imports up to 200 MW of power from India during the dry season. Similarly Bhutan the major exporter of electricity, is looking to up its import of electricity from India during the winter months.

Hence electricity is a dynamic tradable commodity, with seasonal variations in trade flows within the region. SAME would serve as a vibrant mechanism of power sharing.

Yet, as the recent nationwide blackout in Bangladesh, country’s worst since 2007 which affected more than 150 million people for which Bangladesh initially blamed the grid connectivity with India, has indicated, trust amongst trading partners would be a fundamental requirement for an initiative such as SAME to realise its complete potential.

(Monish Gulati is a Senior Research Fellow with the Society for Policy Studies. He can be contactedatm_gulati_2001@yahoo.com)

This article appeared at South Asia Monitor.

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NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has criticized a new treaty between Russia and Abkhazia, the breakaway region of Georgia.

“NATO fully supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders,” said Stoltenberg in a statement, adding, “Therefore, we do not recognize the so-called treaty on alliance and strategic partnership signed between the Georgian region of Abkhazia and Russia on 24 November.”

On Monday, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin met Abkhaz leader Raul Khajimba in Sochi and signed a new “alliance and strategic partnership” treaty between the two countries. Prior to the talks between the nations, Putin said that Russia will “double” assistance to Abkhazia, which politically, economically and militarily already relies heavily on Moscow.

But according to Stoltenberg, “This so-called treaty does not contribute to a peaceful and lasting settlement of the situation in Georgia.”

Instead. Stoltenberg said the treaty “violates Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and blatantly contradicts the principles of international law, OSCE principles and Russia’s international commitments.”

Stoltenberg said that NATO is calling on Russia “to reverse its recognition of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia as independent states and to withdraw its forces from Georgia.”

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A high-level meeting between INTERPOL President Mireille Ballestrazzi, INTERPOL Secretary General Jürgen Stock and UN Chief Ban Ki-moon was held earlier this week, which was aimed at providing an opportunity for the two international organizations to advance their cooperation against a backdrop of evolving international security challenges.

With 2014 marking the centenary of international police cooperation, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said, “This meeting is another opportunity to deepen UN-INTERPOL cooperation on a number of global challenges including countering illicit trafficking and organized crime. It is particularly meaningful as we mark the 100th anniversary of international police cooperation. I look forward to continuing our work together to build a safer, more stable world for all.”

Underlining the strong partnership between INTERPOL and the UN, Secretary General Stock said, “INTERPOL’s strong partnership with the United Nations recognizes the inherent role of international policing in shaping and reinforcing sustainable security across the world. Nothing short of a global collaborative effort can bring us closer to realizing our common vision of a safer world for all citizens.

Earlier, Secretary General Stock outlined before a meeting of the United Nations Security Council on sanctions how INTERPOL assists countries with the technical implementation and monitoring of the Security Council’s sanctions regimes.

“As UN Sanctions have become more targeted, their implementation has become more complex for national authorities. INTERPOL can help countries to fulfil their implementation objectives, as well as enhance the effectiveness of targeted sanctions for countries as they transition out of conflict,” said Stock.

With more than 500 INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notices issued at the request of Sanctions Committees, Stock said INTERPOL’s capacity to communicate information on UN sanctions to police worldwide greatly increases their visibility.

The Security Council heard that the information from the UN Sanctions lists is accessible to the 25,000 authorized users in INTERPOL’s 190 member countries, including some immigration and border control services.

Stock further outlined how INTERPOL supports the implementation of UN sanctions by enhancing the quality of information available to the UN Sanctions Committees, by seeking additional details and identifiers such as identity documents, fingerprints and photographs to supplement the lists.

In addition to this support, INTERPOL assists in the effective implementation of specific types of UN sanctions, for example travel bans, asset freezing in the case of individuals, and arms embargoes.

The Head of INTERPOL also highlighted how INTERPOL’s assistance to UN sanctions could be bolstered, such as through increased use of INTERPOL’s global network and contacts, with meetings held for law enforcement officers to exchange information.

Other innovations could also include a compilation of national guidelines for implementing UN sanctions or the possibility of a new type of notice linked to asset freezing.

With INTERPOL having worked with the United nations since 1949, the opening in 2004 of the Office of the Special Representative of INTERPOL to the United Nations in New York has also strengthened the relationship and helped streamline the work between the two organizations.

The post Heads Of INTERPOL And UN Hold Global Security Challenges Meeting appeared first on Eurasia Review.

U.S. military forces continued to attack Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant terrorists in Syria yesterday and today using bomber and fighter aircraft to conduct 10 airstrikes, U.S. Central Command officials reported Wednesday.

Separately, U.S. and partner nation military forces conducted seven airstrikes in Iraq yesterday and today using attack, fighter and remotely-piloted aircraft against ISIL terrorists, officials said.

According to U.S. Central Command officials, In Syria, 10 airstrikes near Kobani struck an ISIL fighting position, a large ISIL unit, two tactical ISIL units, and destroyed four ISIL staging areas and six ISIL fighting positions.

Officials said that In Iraq, two airstrikes near Mosul destroyed an ISIL bulldozer, two ISIL vehicles, three ISIL-occupied buildings and an ISIL fighting position, and also struck a large ISIL unit. Near Kirkuk, two airstrikes destroyed an ISIL tank, an ISIL Humvee and another ISIL vehicle, and also struck two ISIL units. North of Sinjar, an airstrike destroyed an ISIL Humvee and an ISIL vehicle. Northwest of Ramadi, an airstrike damaged an ISIL checkpoint.

And, west of Bayji, an airstrike destroyed one ISIL vehicle and damaged another.

All aircraft returned to base safely, according to U.S. Central Command officials, adding that airstrike assessments are based on initial reports.

The strikes were conducted as part of Operation Inherent Resolve, the operation to eliminate the terrorist group ISIL and the threat they pose to Iraq, the region and the wider international community. The destruction of ISIL targets in Syria and Iraq further limits the terrorist group’s ability to project power and conduct operations. U.S. Central Command officials said.

Coalition nations conducting airstrikes in Iraq include the U.S., Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Coalition nations conducting airstrikes in Syria include the U.S., Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

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