A prominent Danish politician believes that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine over the sovereignty of the Crimean Peninsula is threatening the security of Europe and the whole international community.

According to the Speaker of Danish Parliament Mogens Lykketoft, Denmark is ready to comply with the European Union’s punitive measures against Russia and at the same time encourages the promotion of political and economic stability in the crisis-hit Ukraine.

Denmark has one of the world’s oldest democratic institutions. Its unicameral national parliament, Folketing, was established in 1849, although it was primarily the lower house of a bicameral parliament known as Rigsdag. The Scandinavian nation ranks first in the United Nations Development Program’s list of countries in terms of the Gini index, which means that economic inequality is a rarity in the country. In the Gallup World Poll’s 2009 list of the World’s Happiest Countries, it also came first out of 155 surveyed nations. The Danish people are among the world’s most optimistic people, and a study by the scholars of the University of Leicester shows that among 178 world nations, the Danes are most satisfied with their lives and career.

A respected politician, Mogens Lykketoft has been presiding over Folketing since 2011 and had previously served in the government of Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen as the Finance Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. In his capacity as an intellectual, Lykketoft has authored and co-edited several books on politics and society, including the 2006 book “The Danish Model: A European success.”

To discuss the economic and social developments of Denmark in the recent years, the rise of xenophobia in Europe, the global fight against the terrorist group ISIS and the tensions between the European Union and Russia over Ukraine, Fair Observer conducted an exclusive interview with Mr. Lykketoft. The following is the text of the interview.

Kourosh Ziabari: Sustainable development and the utilization of green, renewable sources of energy are the areas in which Denmark has made significant progress in the recent years. Figures show that Denmark produces around 30% of its electricity through wind power and the country is now seen as the world’s wind power hub, as Danish companies have installed more than 90% of the world’s offshore wind turbines. Some rankings also name Denmark as the world’s first producer of electricity through renewable sources. Why have you invested in the renewable and sustainable energies so extensively?

Mogens Lykketoft: We want to be in the forefront of a development which we think is absolutely necessary, if we want to secure the long-term survival of our planet without mass migration and conflict as consequences of dramatic climate change. And being in the forefront globally, we hope also commercially to profit by being able to deliver top-of-the-art products and technologies to the rest of the world.

Ziabari: In the recent years, Denmark has toughened the immigration rules and regulations for those foreign nationals who seek permanent residency in the country. Many MPs, especially from the Danish People’s Party, have advocated for imposing stricter measures on the foreign citizens trying to get asylum in Denmark or getting married to Danes. The Danish society especially seems to be unwilling to receive Muslims as new citizens. What’s your viewpoint on that? Are there certain reasons why Denmark has become so unwelcoming to the Arabs, Africans and Muslims?

Lykketoft: You are right [that] the tougher rules have been introduced, but the reasons for most Danes are not the ones you mention. Stronger regulations are answer to developments in other European countries as well, and aim to limit the number of immigrants from very different cultures to a size where also have reason to believe that we can manage a successful integration in Danish society and on the Danish labor market.

Ziabari: Pursuant to my previous question, I would like to ask you a question on the rise of xenophobia in Europe, especially in the Western and Northern Europe. You surely remember the fatal mass shootings of July 22, 2011 at the Workers’ Youth League (AUF) camp in Norway by Anders Breivik. Do you think that the peaceful co-existence of the followers of divine religions has been undermined in Europe? Is it true that the Muslims are facing difficulties in not only practicing their religious rituals in the European nations but in interacting with their European fellow citizens?

Lykketoft: I don’t think and I certainly don’t hope that there will be a general trend of animosity toward Muslims because of religion or a reaction against multiculturalism.

Of course we all know that this is the case in certain circles, but it is not the case in the general public. Breivik’s horrific massacre in Norway was the work of a madman and contributed to the understanding that all with a social responsibility have to argue and fight consistently against extreme expressions of xenophobia.

Ziabari: Copenhagen was the host of the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference. With the expiration of the mandate of Kyoto Protocol, do you see the firmness and resolve in the industrialized nations to continue working toward a serious and remarkable reduction in their emissions? Your climate and energy minister Rasmus Helveg Petersen has recently demanded that the EU nations get united to reduce CO2 emissions by 40 percents and increase the use of sustainable energy by 30 percents. Is it practically possible?

Lykketoft: I think that with [the] little outcomes in Copenhagen, we finally have reasons for some optimism after the latest decisions on reduction of emissions inside the European Union and the agreement signed by president Obama and Xi Jinping in Beijing this November. But it is still too optimistic to expect there will be enough progress to reach the goals presented by Rasmus Helved Petersen.

Ziabari: Your colleague at the Folketing, Margrethe Vestager, has just been elected as the European Commissioner for Competition by Jean-Claude Juncker. Do you think that she would be able to foster competition laws and preclude the growth of anti-competitive practices in the EU economies? Generally, what do you think about the arrangement of the newly-appointed Juncker Commission and its 27 members?

Lykketoft: I believe Ms. Vestager will be a strong Commissioner in order to enforce true competition inside the EU and lead the fight against tax evasion or tax havens through arrangements in Luxembourg. But there is a huge task to realize the good intentions of the Juncker Commission and create new and sustainable growth in employment. A new consensus has to be established.

Ziabari: According to the Legatum Institute’s 2014 Prosperity Index, Denmark is the world’s fourth most prosperous nation. The ranking is based on 8 indices, including economy, entrepreneurship, governance, education, personal freedoms and health. Denmark’s best performance was in the entrepreneurship and opportunity indices where it ranked second after the neighboring Sweden. This is while the financial crisis in the mid-2000s affected the majority of European nations, including Denmark. How has Denmark made such remarkable achievements and turned into an ideal place for living, working, business and education?

Lykketoft: Denmark has better conditions for both employees and companies in a well-organized labor market – playing good together with the Danish Welfare and Flexicurity Model. High tax revenues are used to strengthen free access to education, health services, kindergartens and old-aged care. The state supports and encourages cooperation with the Business Community on research and development. Business environment is favorable with little bureaucracy and rather low corporate tax. Flexicurity means that it is easy for companies to hire and fire, but that the state invests a lot in employment insurance and active labor market policy [through] training and further education for those that get unemployed.

Ziabari: During the 164th parliamentary session, Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt talked of her concerns about the rise of the militant group ISIS and the fact that some Danes are joining the terrorist organization. How do you think the crisis in Iraq and Syria should be addressed? Are you optimistic that the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State will succeed? Why do you think a growing number of European citizens are getting prepared to join ISIS?

Lykketoft: I think that civilized nations had no choice but in various ways to support the fight against ISIS. This terrorist group is destabilizing vast areas of Iraq and Syria and has shown [that] it is willing to commit genocide against groups with other religious beliefs. ISIS also has the potential to commit dangerous terrorist attacks outside the Middle East and thereby be a direct threat also on our own shores.

Ziabari: In a historic move, the British House of Commons overwhelmingly voted in favor of a resolution to recognize the independent Palestinian state. A few days later, the newly-inaugurated Swedish government also announced that it has recognized the Palestinian state, expressing hopes that the decision would be responded in Jerusalem in a constructive way. What do you think about the significance of the growing interest among the European states to recognize Palestine as an independent state? What the Danish government’s position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and what do you think has to be done in order to solve this conflict once for all?

Lykketoft: I think the movement in the European parliaments and from the government of Sweden to recognize the State of Palestine is a reaction to the observation that the present Israeli government has no intention to contribute to formation of a sovereign Palestinian state while this is expressed by the vast majority of member states in the United Nations though numerous resolutions. I understand that it is not right now the intention of the Danish Government to follow the example of Sweden.

Ziabari: Your foreign minister Mr. Martin Lidegaard traveled to Iran earlier in September and held meetings with the high-ranking Iranian officials. This was the first trip by a high-ranking Danish official to Iran in more than a decade. Does the trip indicate a new phase in Iran’s relations with Denmark? Following the election of Hassan Rouhani as the President of Iran, more than 10 EU foreign ministers traveled to Iran. Is this new U-turn in the Iran-EU relations a result of President Rouhani’s moderate foreign policy and his efforts to reach out to the West?

Lykketoft: I certainly hope that the visit of Mr. Lidegaard to Tehran is part of [a] successful movement towards normalizing relations between Iran and the Western world through an agreement that makes sure that the Iranian nuclear program is for peaceful purpose only. I think both Iran and us have strong interest in developing a genuine cooperation and a partnership in the fight against ISIS and other terrorist organizations. Ant it seems to me that President Rouhani has the same understanding.

Ziabari: The crisis in eastern Ukraine and the dispute over the sovereignty of Crimea continues to tarnish the relations between Russia and the European Union. What is the stance of Denmark on this growing conflict? Is your country willing to abide by the EU’s economic measures against Russia and restrict its trade with Moscow?

Lykketoft: The conflict over Crimea and Eastern Ukraine is extremely tragic and dangerous for peace and stability in Eastern Europe and globally. Denmark is part of the economic sanctions against Russia and is ready to take the economic consequences for its own industry. We support all efforts to contribute to democratic, institutional and economic stability in Ukraine. We hope that very soon an armistice in Eastern Ukraine can take effect, that Russia will stop bullying its neighbors and that it will be generally agreed that Ukraine needs better working relations both with the European Union and Russia.

This article was published in Fair Observer and submitted by the author.

The post Lykketoft: The Conflict Over Crimea Is Dangerous For Security Of Europe – Interview appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By C. Raja Mohan

As the American occupation of Afghanistan comes to an end, China is getting ready to play a significant role in a country that has seen many great powers bite the dust. In a meeting with the Afghan leader Abdullah Abdullah in Astana, Kazakhstan, this week, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said Beijing is ready to play a “constructive role” in promoting national reconciliation and economic development in Afghanistan.

Although China’s articulation of its Afghan policy is understated, India must come to terms with one important transformation unfolding in the northwestern subcontinent. Afghanistan, which has long been a contested zone among Euro-Atlantic powers, may now see an Asian power take the lead role in the Great Game. New Delhi must also recognise that there is widespread international and regional support for Beijing’s strategic entry into Afghanistan. Kabul has been urging China to take greater interest in Afghanistan for many years now. Former President Hamid Karzai travelled frequently to Beijing to press the Chinese leadership to launch big development projects and persuade its close ally Pakistan to stop destabilising Kabul. His successor, Ashraf Ghani, who has chosen Beijing as his first foreign destination after he took charge of Afghanistan, is betting on China to secure the nation’s future.

Exhausted by its longest war ever, America has ended its combat role in Afghanistan this month. Almost all of its remaining 10,000-odd troops in the country will go home by the end of 2016. The US and its Nato allies are now more than happy to see someone else pick up the pieces in Afghanistan. Russia, which is one of Beijing’s major political partners, supports a stronger role for China in Afghanistan.

China has good relations with most of Afghanistan’s neighbours, including Iran and the three Central Asian Republics – Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. But it is Beijing’s emerging partnership with the Pakistan army in Afghanistan that is the most interesting new element in the region.

Sino-Pak Alliance

Post-Partition geography has made Pakistan the most important regional actor in Afghanistan. Despite its best efforts, the Pakistan army could not gain a decisive say in Afghan affairs. Given its limited national resources, Rawalpindi’s reach always exceeded its grasp in Afghanistan. But in alignment with a great power, Pakistan has had great impact in Afghanistan.

After the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan at the end of 1979, the Pakistan army joined America in setting up the jihad against “godless” communists and ousting Russian troops by the end of the 1980s. But Pakistan found it hard to control the developments in Afghanistan after the US turned its back on the latter in the 1990s. America drafted Pakistan into the great war on terror after the 9/11 attacks on Washington and New York in 2011. This time, the US “alliance” with Pakistan was a forced one. It was based on America’s threat to bomb Pakistan to the stone-age rather than a convergence of interests.

Pakistan waited patiently to undermine American strategy in Afghanistan. As it sees off the Americans, Pakistan is drawing China in to achieve its long-term strategic goal of establishing a friendly regime in Afghanistan and a special say in Kabul’s internal affairs.

For its part, Beijing hopes that collaboration with the Pakistan army in Afghanistan will help weaken the negative forces of violent extremism, religious fundamentalism and separatism that threaten China’s internal security, especially in the restive Muslim majority province of Xinjiang.

China values the geographic centrality of Afghanistan in promoting transborder economic linkages between western China, Central Asia, the Persian Gulf and the subcontinent. A stable AfPak region, Beijing believes, can help consolidate China’s “Go West” strategy and strengthen its influence in inner Asia. Taliban Challenge In the last couple of years, China has stepped up its Afghan diplomacy.

While strengthening ties with Kabul, Beijing has established direct contacts with the Taliban with the help of the Pakistan army. Beijing is now ready to “facilitate” a conversation among all the Afghan factions. Beijing has plans to extend its ambitious silk road initiative to cover Afghanistan and integrate it with the project to develop the China-Pakistan corridor.

The biggest imponderable, however, remains the Taliban. It has set near-impossible conditions for the peace process – the withdrawal of all foreigners from the country, ending Kabul’s military partnerships with foreign powers and the imposition of Sharia law. In the past, development incentives offered by outsiders did not make a difference to the Taliban’s worldview.

Many in Pakistan say the Taliban has changed and is ready for pragmatic engagement with the world. For China, though, the proof of the pudding will be in the eating. Rawalpindi’s capacity to reorient the Taliban holds the key to a potentially successful Chinese role in Afghanistan.

(The writer is a distinguished fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and a contributing editor for ’The Indian Express’.)

Courtesy: The Indian Express, December 17, 2014

The post Beijing’s Afghan Role – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

In a Royal message, King Mohammed VI offered his condolences to the families of the victims and others impacted by the deadly attack in Pakistan.

At least 141 people, most of them children, were killed today at a school in the city of Peshawar, near the border with Afghanistan, after it was targeted by a group of Taliban militants wearing explosive vests.

Most of the victims of the siege were students ranging from Grade 1 through Grade 10. Another 121 students and three staff members were injured. Seven attackers, all wearing explosives vests, died in the assault. Morocco unequivocally condemns this heinous act. There is no more cowardly act than attacking innocent children, and nothing more sinister than brutally murdering them while at school.

King Mohammed emotionally said that, “I was appalled and deeply saddened by the news of the horrific terrorist attack on a school in Peshawar which caused a large number of casualties, most of them innocent children”, the Sovereign said in the message.

HM the King underlined that the Kingdom “strongly condemns this barbaric criminal act which was perpetrated against children inside their school”, expressing His full solidarity with the Pakistani people in these testing circumstances.

“In my capacity as Commander of the Faithful, and in keeping with my responsibilities at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, I strongly condemn all forms of terrorism, which is totally incompatible with our pristine Islamic faith, the revealed religions and human principles and democratic values which make the
right to life the foremost human right on earth”, the Sovereign added.

The King offered the Pakistani President, the bereaved families and the Pakistani people His most sincere condolences and deepest sympathy. “I wish the injured a speedy recovery and pray that Almighty God accept the victims of this horrendous act in His vast paradise and comfort their relatives”, the Sovereign added.

The massacre was the most intimate assault ever against Pakistan’s military, the nation’s most respected and powerful institution. The only comparable incident was in December 2009, when a small group of assailants penetrated army headquarters in the garrison city of Rawalpindi and killed more than 30 people praying at an army mosque.

The post Morocco Offers Condolences To Families In Pakistan – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

US-Myanmar bilateral relations are being influenced by upcoming major elections in the two countries. Short-term gains by either side risk undermining rapprochement and the US’ role in Myanmar.

By Kyaw San Wai and Christabelle He

After being frosty for two decades, United States-Myanmar bilateral relations have warmed significantly since 2011. President Obama has been instrumental in modifying US policy on Myanmar, balancing sanctions with engagement. He recognised the need for the US to work with the military, shifting American focus from the long-held goal of regime change to the more pragmatic approach of regime modification. The new approach has positioned the US to work more productively with regional organisations in encouraging reforms in Myanmar.

Obama would not have succeeded in mending bilateral ties without parallel moves by Myanmar’s President Thein Sein. Alongside pushing a reform agenda, the nominally civilian government also worked to restore Myanmar’s place on the international stage and revitalise ties with the West. The rapprochement had numerous breakthroughs since 2011: Hillary Clinton became the first Secretary of State to visit Myanmar since 1955; an American ambassador was posted after a 22-year absence; and Obama’s 2012 visit was the first by a serving American president.

Between two elections

Although the US’ role in Myanmar has expanded in recent years, it is now increasingly questioned by lawmakers and activists due to claims of stalled reforms, rights violations and regression of freedoms. This is more so in the run-up to major elections in the two countries.

In Myanmar, Opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi remarked in early November that reforms have stalled. She was de facto gatekeeper of Myanmar’s relations with the West in the past and her comments still carry weight. Constitutional changes – on whether Suu Kyi can run for president and on constitutional amendments – and an ever-elusive nation-wide ceasefire agreement – are seen as key reform milestones. Any of these appear increasingly unlikely to occur in time for general elections slated for late October or early November 2015.

On 18 November, Parliamentary speaker Shwe Mann told a press conference that a referendum will be held in May 2015 to canvass public opinion but any constitutional amendment will be enacted only after the elections. Given how things panned out since 2011, it is difficult to predict what is in store for Myanmar in 2015. Some observers have even cast doubt on the likelihood of elections taking place. Sectarian violence, increasingly seen as instigated by forces linked to high places, risks flaring up as a deadly distraction before elections.

In the US, lawmakers have increasingly questioned bilateral relations with arguments that the US lost its leverage by rolling back sanctions. Human rights activists have also called for the US to pressure Myanmar over the plight of Muslim communities and uncertain media freedoms. The continued dominance of the military, the Tatmadaw, has been a perpetual thorn. 72 bipartisan members of Congress wrote to Secretary of State John Kerry in August 2014, warning that Myanmar had “taken a sharp turn for the worse”.

Furthermore, efforts to undermine President Obama, who portrays Myanmar as a foreign policy victory, and Hilary Clinton who oversaw the rapprochement as Secretary of State and is the most likely Democratic presidential candidate in 2016, have made Republican lawmakers more critical of developments in Myanmar. These lawmakers risk sacrificing the bilateral relations of long-term importance for short term gains at the next presidential election.

And as the planned 2015 Myanmar election draws closer, there is increasing pressure to allow Suu Kyi to run for president. With the Senate in Republican hands led by long-time Suu Kyi supporter Mitch McConnell, the combination of hyper-partisanship and genuine concern in Washington along with deadlock and uncertainty in Naypyidaw might lead to a souring of bilateral relations.

Long-term view needed

The reform process will be a long-term enterprise as Myanmar tries to move on from 50 years of military rule. However, there is an increasingly vociferous chorus casting doubt on the reforms’ prospects. Even among the low hanging fruits of political prisoners and media freedoms, the government’s track record is increasingly seen as patchy. Furthermore, various issues such as constitutional reform and sectarian strife are not simple two-sided tug-of-wars but rather multi-sided contestations involving an unholy mix of entrenched interests, political ambitions, shifting battle lines and grassroots factors.

It is amidst this tangled web of interests and high-stakes poker in both nations’ capitals that the US has to calibrate its presence in Myanmar. The opprobrium and regime-change approach of the 1990s and 2000s failed to bring about change whereas the current approach of engagement with both carrot and stick offers a better chance for the US to help foster change in the country. As echoed by a number of veteran Myanmar watchers, the US needs to envision outcomes in the long run in order to remain relevant and exercise influence.

Naypyidaw should also not squander international goodwill. Myanmar now has the best chance to develop and address the needs of its inhabitants. Foot dragging, personal interests and out-dated notions of identity could reverse these gains. Although the Tatmadaw continues to be the gorilla in the room, the political landscape has evolved since 2011 with a redrawing of interests and differences. President Thein Sein, besieged by an assertive parliament, ambitious politicians, unconvinced critics and the Tatmadaw recalibrating its loyalties and interests, needs to demonstrate stronger political will and leadership to ensure that his reforms survive beyond his tenure. The Myanmar political movers also need to think long term or risk condemning their country to another round of isolation and misery.

2015 outlook

The coming year will be important for both Myanmar and US-Myanmar relations. The 1990 election and recent events in neighbouring Thailand cast long shadows on what 2015 holds for Myanmar. Bearing in the mind the decades of isolation, Myanmar’s progress and recent role in hosting the 27th Southeast Asian Games and 2014 ASEAN Summit demonstrated its capabilities for change. The US is a crucial partner in Myanmar’s reform attempt, and needs to continue being a constructive partner with the long-term view in mind. The future awaits as Myanmar turns the page.

Kyaw San Wai is a senior analyst and Christabelle He is a research analyst at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

The post Between Two Elections: Whither US-Myanmar Relations? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By US President Barack Obama,

(White House) — Good afternoon. Today, the United States of America is changing its relationship with the people of Cuba.

In the most significant changes in our policy in more than fifty years, we will end an outdated approach that, for decades, has failed to advance our interests, and instead we will begin to normalize relations between our two countries. Through these changes, we intend to create more opportunities for the American and Cuban people, and begin a new chapter among the nations of the Americas.

There’s a complicated history between the United States and Cuba. I was born in 1961 –- just over two years after Fidel Castro took power in Cuba, and just a few months after the Bay of Pigs invasion, which tried to overthrow his regime. Over the next several decades, the relationship between our countries played out against the backdrop of the Cold War, and America’s steadfast opposition to communism. We are separated by just over 90 miles. But year after year, an ideological and economic barrier hardened between our two countries.

Meanwhile, the Cuban exile community in the United States made enormous contributions to our country –- in politics and business, culture and sports. Like immigrants before, Cubans helped remake America, even as they felt a painful yearning for the land and families they left behind. All of this bound America and Cuba in a unique relationship, at once family and foe.

Proudly, the United States has supported democracy and human rights in Cuba through these five decades. We have done so primarily through policies that aimed to isolate the island, preventing the most basic travel and commerce that Americans can enjoy anyplace else. And though this policy has been rooted in the best of intentions, no other nation joins us in imposing these sanctions, and it has had little effect beyond providing the Cuban government with a rationale for restrictions on its people. Today, Cuba is still governed by the Castros and the Communist Party that came to power half a century ago.

Neither the American, nor Cuban people are well served by a rigid policy that is rooted in events that took place before most of us were born. Consider that for more than 35 years, we’ve had relations with China –- a far larger country also governed by a Communist Party. Nearly two decades ago, we reestablished relations with Vietnam, where we fought a war that claimed more Americans than any Cold War confrontation.

That’s why -– when I came into office -– I promised to re-examine our Cuba policy. As a start, we lifted restrictions for Cuban Americans to travel and send remittances to their families in Cuba. These changes, once controversial, now seem obvious. Cuban Americans have been reunited with their families, and are the best possible ambassadors for our values. And through these exchanges, a younger generation of Cuban Americans has increasingly questioned an approach that does more to keep Cuba closed off from an interconnected world.

While I have been prepared to take additional steps for some time, a major obstacle stood in our way –- the wrongful imprisonment, in Cuba, of a U.S. citizen and USAID sub-contractor Alan Gross for five years. Over many months, my administration has held discussions with the Cuban government about Alan’s case, and other aspects of our relationship. His Holiness Pope Francis issued a personal appeal to me, and to Cuba’s President Raul Castro, urging us to resolve Alan’s case, and to address Cuba’s interest in the release of three Cuban agents who have been jailed in the United States for over 15 years.

Today, Alan returned home –- reunited with his family at long last. Alan was released by the Cuban government on humanitarian grounds. Separately, in exchange for the three Cuban agents, Cuba today released one of the most important intelligence agents that the United States has ever had in Cuba, and who has been imprisoned for nearly two decades. This man, whose sacrifice has been known to only a few, provided America with the information that allowed us to arrest the network of Cuban agents that included the men transferred to Cuba today, as well as other spies in the United States. This man is now safely on our shores.

Having recovered these two men who sacrificed for our country, I’m now taking steps to place the interests of the people of both countries at the heart of our policy.

First, I’ve instructed Secretary Kerry to immediately begin discussions with Cuba to reestablish diplomatic relations that have been severed since January of 1961. Going forward, the United States will reestablish an embassy in Havana, and high-ranking officials will visit Cuba.

Where we can advance shared interests, we will -– on issues like health, migration, counterterrorism, drug trafficking and disaster response. Indeed, we’ve seen the benefits of cooperation between our countries before. It was a Cuban, Carlos Finlay, who discovered that mosquitoes carry yellow fever; his work helped Walter Reed fight it. Cuba has sent hundreds of health care workers to Africa to fight Ebola, and I believe American and Cuban health care workers should work side by side to stop the spread of this deadly disease.

Now, where we disagree, we will raise those differences directly -– as we will continue to do on issues related to democracy and human rights in Cuba. But I believe that we can do more to support the Cuban people and promote our values through engagement. After all, these 50 years have shown that isolation has not worked. It’s time for a new approach.

Second, I’ve instructed Secretary Kerry to review Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. This review will be guided by the facts and the law. Terrorism has changed in the last several decades. At a time when we are focused on threats from al Qaeda to ISIL, a nation that meets our conditions and renounces the use of terrorism should not face this sanction.

Third, we are taking steps to increase travel, commerce, and the flow of information to and from Cuba. This is fundamentally about freedom and openness, and also expresses my belief in the power of people-to-people engagement. With the changes I’m announcing today, it will be easier for Americans to travel to Cuba, and Americans will be able to use American credit and debit cards on the island. Nobody represents America’s values better than the American people, and I believe this contact will ultimately do more to empower the Cuban people.

I also believe that more resources should be able to reach the Cuban people. So we’re significantly increasing the amount of money that can be sent to Cuba, and removing limits on remittances that support humanitarian projects, the Cuban people, and the emerging Cuban private sector.

I believe that American businesses should not be put at a disadvantage, and that increased commerce is good for Americans and for Cubans. So we will facilitate authorized transactions between the United States and Cuba. U.S. financial institutions will be allowed to open accounts at Cuban financial institutions. And it will be easier for U.S. exporters to sell goods in Cuba.

I believe in the free flow of information. Unfortunately, our sanctions on Cuba have denied Cubans access to technology that has empowered individuals around the globe. So I’ve authorized increased telecommunications connections between the United States and Cuba. Businesses will be able to sell goods that enable Cubans to communicate with the United States and other countries.

These are the steps that I can take as President to change this policy. The embargo that’s been imposed for decades is now codified in legislation. As these changes unfold, I look forward to engaging Congress in an honest and serious debate about lifting the embargo.

Yesterday, I spoke with Raul Castro to finalize Alan Gross’s release and the exchange of prisoners, and to describe how we will move forward. I made clear my strong belief that Cuban society is constrained by restrictions on its citizens. In addition to the return of Alan Gross and the release of our intelligence agent, we welcome Cuba’s decision to release a substantial number of prisoners whose cases were directly raised with the Cuban government by my team. We welcome Cuba’s decision to provide more access to the Internet for its citizens, and to continue increasing engagement with international institutions like the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross that promote universal values.

But I’m under no illusion about the continued barriers to freedom that remain for ordinary Cubans. The United States believes that no Cubans should face harassment or arrest or beatings simply because they’re exercising a universal right to have their voices heard, and we will continue to support civil society there. While Cuba has made reforms to gradually open up its economy, we continue to believe that Cuban workers should be free to form unions, just as their citizens should be free to participate in the political process.

Moreover, given Cuba’s history, I expect it will continue to pursue foreign policies that will at times be sharply at odds with American interests. I do not expect the changes I am announcing today to bring about a transformation of Cuban society overnight. But I am convinced that through a policy of engagement, we can more effectively stand up for our values and help the Cuban people help themselves as they move into the 21st century.

To those who oppose the steps I’m announcing today, let me say that I respect your passion and share your commitment to liberty and democracy. The question is how we uphold that commitment. I do not believe we can keep doing the same thing for over five decades and expect a different result. Moreover, it does not serve America’s interests, or the Cuban people, to try to push Cuba toward collapse. Even if that worked -– and it hasn’t for 50 years –- we know from hard-earned experience that countries are more likely to enjoy lasting transformation if their people are not subjected to chaos. We are calling on Cuba to unleash the potential of 11 million Cubans by ending unnecessary restrictions on their political, social, and economic activities. In that spirit, we should not allow U.S. sanctions to add to the burden of Cuban citizens that we seek to help.

To the Cuban people, America extends a hand of friendship. Some of you have looked to us as a source of hope, and we will continue to shine a light of freedom. Others have seen us as a former colonizer intent on controlling your future. José Martí once said, “Liberty is the right of every man to be honest.” Today, I am being honest with you. We can never erase the history between us, but we believe that you should be empowered to live with dignity and self-determination. Cubans have a saying about daily life: “No es facil” –- it’s not easy. Today, the United States wants to be a partner in making the lives of ordinary Cubans a little bit easier, more free, more prosperous.

To those who have supported these measures, I thank you for being partners in our efforts. In particular, I want to thank His Holiness Pope Francis, whose moral example shows us the importance of pursuing the world as it should be, rather than simply settling for the world as it is; the government of Canada, which hosted our discussions with the Cuban government; and a bipartisan group of congressmen who have worked tirelessly for Alan Gross’s release, and for a new approach to advancing our interests and values in Cuba.

Finally, our shift in policy towards Cuba comes at a moment of renewed leadership in the Americas. This April, we are prepared to have Cuba join the other nations of the hemisphere at the Summit of the Americas. But we will insist that civil society join us so that citizens, not just leaders, are shaping our future. And I call on all of my fellow leaders to give meaning to the commitment to democracy and human rights at the heart of the Inter-American Charter. Let us leave behind the legacy of both colonization and communism, the tyranny of drug cartels, dictators and sham elections. A future of greater peace, security and democratic development is possible if we work together — not to maintain power, not to secure vested interest, but instead to advance the dreams of our citizens.

My fellow Americans, the city of Miami is only 200 miles or so from Havana. Countless thousands of Cubans have come to Miami — on planes and makeshift rafts; some with little but the shirt on their back and hope in their hearts. Today, Miami is often referred to as the capital of Latin America. But it is also a profoundly American city -– a place that reminds us that ideals matter more than the color of our skin, or the circumstances of our birth; a demonstration of what the Cuban people can achieve, and the openness of the United States to our family to the South. Todos somos Americanos.

Change is hard –- in our own lives, and in the lives of nations. And change is even harder when we carry the heavy weight of history on our shoulders. But today we are making these changes because it is the right thing to do. Today, America chooses to cut loose the shackles of the past so as to reach for a better future –- for the Cuban people, for the American people, for our entire hemisphere, and for the world.

Thank you. God bless you and God bless the United States of America.

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By Rishika Chauhan*

Addressing Russian President Vladimir Putin and the media last week, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said, “the character of global politics and international relations is changing. However, the importance of this relationship and its unique place in India’s foreign policy will not change.” Expressed on the sidelines of the 15th Annual India-Russia Summit in New Delhi, Modi’s statement conveyed his intention to enhance cooperation with Russia. Concurrently, it also implied India will not support western sanctions against Russia. The new government’s policy of engagement, rather than isolation of sanctioned countries, is very much in line with its predecessor, United Progressive Alliance’s (UPA) stance. However, like Manmohan Singh, Modi has refrained from speaking on the issue of sanctions. In the absence of official explanations, one can only wonder what explains India’s present and past positions on unilateral sanctions?

Over the years, New Delhi has maintained that it supports sanctions imposed by the United Nations (UN), but is against unilateral sanctions placed by individual countries. In 2010, the UPA opposed unilateral sanctions on Iran, citing its “extra-territorial nature,” though the Indian government agreed to support UN sanctions against Iran. Subsequently, in March this year, when Russia’s annexation of Crimea invited western sanctions, Singh’s UPA was quick to express its disregard for the “unilateral measures.” Though the prime minister chose not to speak on the issue, the official position maintained was that India has “never supported unilateral sanctions against any country…therefore, will also not support any unilateral measures by a country or a group of countries.”

The new Indian government is also toeing the line on cooperation with Russia in spite of sanctions. Since becoming Prime Minister, Modi has, time and again, underlined his intent to not only maintain ties with Russia but substantially enhance them. As the Russian episode unfolds and India maintains its stand on sanctions, it is worthwhile to study India’s position on unilateral sanctions over the years and examine its motivations for supporting or opposing unilateral sanctions. Specifically looking at India’s experience as a sanctionee, its national interest and salience of issues that spark sanctions, India’s stance toward unilateral sanctions can be explained.

The first factor is its experience as a sanctionee. India has been sanctioned or threatened by sanctions several times. Responding to India’s first nuclear test (Pokhran I) conducted in 1974, several western countries imposed nuclear equipment and material embargo on India. In the 1990s, sanctions were imposed on India’s civilian space program, given the potential for cryogenic rocket technology to contribute to India’s ballistic missile capability. The Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG) sanctioned the country in 1992, barring it from engaging in nuclear commerce. The most widely known and discussed unilateral sanctions against India were placed by the U.S. after India’s second nuclear tests (Pokhran II) in May 1998. The sanctions were imposed under section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and included prohibitions on foreign assistance, weapons sales and licenses, foreign military financing, government credit, guarantees and export of certain controlled goods and technology. Some non-statutory sanctions restricting high-level visits and military-to-military contacts were also imposed in accordance with President Clinton’s administration policy.

While the intended effect of sanctions was mostly meant to be material in nature, they also had a psychological impact. A generation of Indian leaders and bureaucrats began to perceive sanctions as a tool of deliberate denial rather than an instrument to change the behavior of the sanctioned entity. This perception towards sanctions is still observable in India’s policy-making circles and has contributed to New Delhi’s aversion to them.

India’s national interest is the second factor that has played a role in determining its reaction to unilateral sanctions. Supporting unilateral sanctions placed on countries with which it shares good relations or commercial ties has never been an easy decision for New Delhi. Considering that in the past few decades, many of the countries under international sanctions have been India’s trade partners, its leadership has often kept interests in mind while deciding on their stand on sanctions. Myanmar is an important case in this regard. While the U.S. imposed stringent sanctions on Myanmar throughout the late 1990s and 2000s, renewing them in 2010, the Indian government chose to maintain a safe distance from the U.S.-led sanctions regime. Although sanctions were imposed to promote democracy in Myanmar – a goal not averse to India – it was not about the salience of the issue for the country. As China rushed in to fill the void that the western sanctions had created, it was a matter of national interest.

The third factor is India’s willingness or unwillingness to support the cause of sanctions, i.e., the salience of the issue for India. While India’s bitter experience as a sanctionee and its interests in opposing sanctions considerably explains its behavior, salience of the issue that sparks sanctions also has a role to play. New Delhi has stood by sanctions that are imposed to support issues it believes in. Democracy, as C. Raja Mohan puts it, has not been a “political priority” in India’s foreign policy, consequently sanctions imposed to promote democracy have not managed to strike a chord with the Indian government. However, sanctions placed to protest discrimination, especially against the Indian diaspora, have garnered support from New Delhi.

In the 1940s, India became the first country to impose sanctions on South Africa to protest against apartheid. In addition to the action, it also supported unilateral sanctions on the South African government, convincing countries, as well as international organizations, to follow suit.

Subsequently, in the late 1980s, India followed a similar policy and imposed sanctions to protest against discrimination of people of Indian origin living in Fiji. Sri Lanka is a recent case where issue-salience has been recognized and a pro-sanctions public opinion seems to be emerging. In the last few years, the heads of various political parties have urged the government to support and impose sanctions on the southern neighbor as a punitive action for its alleged abuse of power during the twenty-six-year civil war. In 2013, the Tamil Nadu governor, K. Rosaiah asked the Indian government to not only place economic sanctions but also collaborate with other countries to design a sanction regime against the Sri Lankan government. He reasoned that it was maltreatment, discrimination, and displacement of Tamils in Sri Lanka that was making him demand sanctions.

Notably, sanctions were an important subject for Jawaharlal Nehru, the original architect of Indian foreign policy. He discussed this instrument of statecraft as early as in 1938 while explaining the Congress’s attitude towards collective security. He said that for any system of collective security to be successful, it had to be backed by sanctions. However, lately the Indian leadership has been reticent about the topic. Meanwhile, it cannot be ignored that on certain occasions, New Delhi has had to learn to adapt to unilateral sanctions. Iran is an important case in this regard. Though India was against unilateral sanctions placed on Iran, it could not overlook secondary sanctions which were a part of the U.S.-led sanctions regime. As the secondary sanctions threatened economic restrictions on non-U.S. citizens and companies, several Indian investors were deterred from investing and engaging with Iran. Though in principle, India supports UN sanctions and has wholeheartedly supported important UN sanctions like the ones placed on North Korea, there have been some departures. In 1990, India had opposed UN sanctions against Iraq and abstained from voting in 1992 when the UN Security Council wanted to sanction Libya.

Nevertheless, it can be said that domestic reasons as well as normative considerations have played a primary role in determining India’s response to unilateral sanctions. Domestically, India’s past experience with sanctions and national interests have been imperative. At the same time, normative concerns arising from sensitivity to particular issues have also determined India’s position on sanctions. However, it cannot be denied that in the past, India has, itself, used sanctions to forward its domestic and foreign policy objectives, though it remains to be seen what kind of considerations determine its stance on sanctions as the country gains influence in world politics.

*(Rishika Chauhan is a Junior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation and a Research Scholar in the Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament at Jawaharlal Nehru University)

Courtesy: Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania

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By Kerim Has

The main outcome of Putin’s visit to Turkey was the announcement that the $40 billion South Stream gas pipeline project would be cancelled. The effects of this cancellation on Russia and Turkey differ, even though the project was interpreted as a rapprochement of their strategic visions.

For Russia, under pressure from tough Western sanctions, the increasing financial cost of South Stream made the project hard to bring to fruition. The Russian economy, and especially joint energy projects, has suffered greatly during the last six months under the sanctions. Given this, saving the country’s image was made possible by way of a political explanation, despite the economic reasons.

Second, the proposal of a new project with Turkey, though all of the details are not yet known, would include almost the same amount of gas (63 bcm) to be delivered by Russia. This would pave the way for Russia to more or less maintain its influence on European energy security through the use of a more sovereign-oriented instrument on Turkey, a non-EU member that is not totally bound to the legislative proposals of the EU’s Third Energy Package.

Third, the Russia–West confrontation has pushed Moscow to differentiate its foreign policy partners, not only in security terms but also in the context of economic cooperation. Perhaps for the first time since 1991, the current isolation of Russia has become a strong motivation for the Kremlin to pursue a long-ignored agenda of cooperation with non-Western and non-ex-Soviet countries. Here, Russia has mostly been focusing on China, India, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey as regional actors and new or emerging markets. Taking into account Russia’s 2015 presidency of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the fact that some of these countries are interested in closely cooperating with or even joining SCO, Moscow’s termination of South Stream and its intention to start a new project with Turkey presents an opportunity for Russia to overcome, at least partly, its recent isolation.

Last, it should be noted that the discovery of new energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean region and the possible revocation of Western sanctions on Iran in the coming year, if resolution is reached on the country’s nuclear programme, hints at the possible development of new gas pipelines to Europe that could act to diversify its sources of energy. Yet, with Azeri gas to be pumped through TANAP, the Kremlin feels the need to accelerate more feasible and profitable projects and, at least, to attain the upper hand by taking preliminary moves in the new emerging geopolitics and geo-economics of the Wider Black Sea Region.

On the other hand, putting an end to South Stream brings both opportunities and challenges for Turkey. Ankara has two main aims with regard to the new project. First, Turkey hopes to change its one-way energy dependence on Russia into reciprocal energy interdependence. As Gazprom’s head Alexey Miller has said, the newly planned pipeline under the Black Sea is supposed to pump almost the same amount of gas (14 bcm)to Turkey as it currently receives via the West Line passing through Ukraine now. The approximate remainder of 49-50 bcm of gas will be transferred to Europe at the border between Turkey and Greece, where a delivery point would be arranged. According to Gazprom statistics, Russia sold 133 bcm of gas to EU member countries in 2013. This means that Turkey would like to seek privileges with regard to gas prices and transit fees while also benefiting from the geopolitical and geo-economic results that this energy interdependency with Russia could provide.

However, if Turkey increases the amount of gas it imports from Russia via this new pipeline, it would likely cause a boomerang effect for Ankara, especially considering the existing imbalance in trade volume between the two countries. Moreover, if an increase occurs, Russia could impede Turkey’s ability to take independent steps in various foreign policy issues from Central Asia and the Caucasus to the Balkans in general. This could be especially true for Turkish policies on the Syria and Ukraine crises, where it differs significantly with Russia’s.

The second hope for Ankara is that Russia’s proposal could offer Turkey the opportunity to assume the role of regional energy hub in Southeastern Europe, much like that of Germany in Northern Europe. From Ankara’s perspective, Europe’s increasing demand for gas not only makes it possible to implement the TANAP project and transfer more Caspian and Middle Eastern gas in the direction of the EU but also adds to the fact that the new project could amplify Turkey’s status in the region and strengthen its strategic relations with the EU in favour of the country’s membership in the near future. Nonetheless, building more robust relations with the West should be a priority for Ankara if it looks to play such a role while it also pursues in parallel rapprochement with Moscow. Whereas Ankara should focus more on the Western orientation of its foreign policy, both the U.S. and the EU should also beware of excluding Turkey from the ongoing integration processes in the Transatlantic region, such as the TTIP project, and instead welcome Ankara’s desire to join them. Ankara’s deteriorating relations with the West should not be supplanted by increasing its ties with Moscow.

As a result of these factors, it can be said that the short-term effects of South Stream’s termination and the fate of the new pipeline proposal will and should mostly be determined by the Ankara-West axis, not by the Russia-West confrontation.

Kerim Has, USAK Center for Eurasian Studies

Note: This article was first published in The Polish Institute of International Affairs

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By Chris Miller

December temperatures in Russia’s Siberian cities often reach 40 below zero, but the freeze that threatens Russia today has nothing to do with the winter cold. Russia’s economy is frozen. Western sanctions designed to punish Russia for invading Ukraine have deterred investment, while plummeting oil prices have substantially reduced Russia’s main source of export revenue. GDP growth will be basically flat this year, and will be no better in 2015. The rise in living standards, the foundation of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s popularity, has ground to a halt.

Source: Central Bank of Russia

At the trough of the 2008-2009 crisis, Russia’s economy performed worse, but it was clear that the financial crisis was caused by external factors. Today the opposite is true. Sanctions and a worsening business climate are direct consequences of Vladimir Putin’s policies. Even the shock created by declining oil export revenues, which is caused by global supply and demand factors, reflects poorly on Putin, because despite the advice of many economists he has declined to diversify Russia’s economy away from energy exports. That now looks foolish. The deep freeze gripping Russia is not simply an economic problem. The politics of austerity are restructuring the country’s politics, too, and Russians are beginning to ask how—and whether—Putin will manage.

Western Sanctions

Russia’s invasion of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine provoked a series of economic sanctions by the US, the EU, and allies such as Canada, Norway, and Japan. The first round of sanctions targeted individuals, but as Russia pushed further into Ukraine, Washington and Brussels levied sanctions on Russian businesses, too. The two most damaging restrictions have been the ban on transfers of oil drilling technology and on long-term lending to leading Russian firms.

Russia had been counting on Western technology to increase production in existing oil fields and to open new production sites in the Arctic. Sanctions put a halt to much of this work, and will stunt growth in Russian oil production over the medium term. The most pressing issue, however, is that many Russian firms, including energy giant Rosneft, state-owned bank Sberbank, and arms dealer Rostec, are now prohibited from raising funds abroad. These firms had come to depend on capital raised in London or New York, so sanctions will force them to find new sources of financing. Some will struggle to repay existing debts. In response, many Russian companies have turned to the government for assistance. The Kremlin is planning to use the $80 billion national pension fund to provide long-term funding to firms hit by sanctions. Judging by the Russian government’s investment record, many of these funds may never be recouped.

The Yevtushenkov Affair

One of the harshest blows to Russia’s economy this year has nothing at all to do with Ukraine or the international economy. Vladimir Yevtushenkov, one of Russia’s richest businessmen, was placed under house arrest on September 16 on charges of money laundering. Yevtushenkov controls a conglomerate called Sistema, which owns businesses ranging from toy stores to cell phones to—most recently—oil. In 2009, the company bought Bashneft, an oil firm in Russia’s Bashkortostan region.

The Bashneft deal is the source of Yevtushenkov’s legal problems. Few doubt that in the early 1990s, Bashneft was privatized by its previous owner in a dubious manner, as were many other Russian energy assets. Yevtushenkov is accused of money laundering in relation to the privatization, yet he bought the firm a decade after it was privatized. His real sin was his refusal to sell Bashneft to Rosneft, the state-owned oil giant run by Putin confidant Igor Sechin. In late October 2014, a court ordered Yevtushenkov to surrender Bashneft. In the first week of December, Yevtushenkov’s firm Sistema received more bad news, as a court ordered the company to repay dividends it had previously received from Bashneft. Sistema’s shares, which are traded in London, are down by 80 percent since September, and Yevtushenkov remains under house arrest.

Russia has seen high-profile expropriations before. Most famously, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who had become the country’s richest person through his ownership of energy giant Yukos, was jailed on fraud charges in 2003. Khodorkovsky had political ambitions that clashed with Putin’s, and his arrest was widely seen as setting out a new deal between Russia’s government and its oligarchs: businesses would be secure only if their owners stayed out of politics.

Unlike Khodorkovsky, Yevtushenkov was exceptionally loyal to Putin and was careful to avoid politics. His assets are being expropriated regardless of his loyalty, breaking the implicit deal Putin made with the Russian business community in 2003. Now, even loyal oligarchs are at risk of expropriation. Many of Russia’s top businesspeople had already begun protecting their fortunes by investing abroad, in assets ranging from British soccer clubs to European energy firms. Yevtushenkov’s arrest will accelerate this process, providing an additional reason for Russia’s rich to move money abroad, and for foreign investors to avoid Russia in the first place. Russia’s central bank is expecting capital flight of well over $100 billion in 2014.

Oil Prices

Source: Yahoo Finance

In mid-2014, oil sold for around $100 per barrel, but today it sells for around $70. Few analysts expected the sharp fall in oil prices, and the Russian government was no exception. Given Russia’s deep dependence on oil revenues, falling prices create serious economic problems. Hydrocarbons make up about a quarter of GDP as well as 60 percent of exports. Moreover, roughly a third of government revenue comes from taxes on energy exports.

As the price of oil declined in recent months, the value of Russia’s currency plummeted. The sharp decline in the ruble’s price vis-à-vis the dollar was interpreted by many analysts as evidence that Russia’s government was losing control of its ability to manage the economy. In fact, Russia’s central bank—led by former Putin aide Elvira Nabiullina—embraces the ruble’s decline because it acts as a shock absorber for government finances. In September a barrel of Russian oil sold abroad yielded about 3,700 rubles, because oil cost $100 per barrel, and a dollar bought about 37 rubles. Today, a barrel of oil sold abroad yields only slightly fewer rubles, around 3,600 at current prices ($70/barrel oil and 52 rubles per dollar). Most of the Russian government’s expenses—pensions, salaries, and the like—are in rubles, so government finances are not much worse off today than when oil was at $100 per barrel. The Kremlin deployed a similar strategy of devaluing the ruble in order to protect the government budget during the crisis in 2008-2009 and appears to be using a similar playbook this time.

Source: Central Bank of Russia

The ruble’s decline helps the government balance its books by shifting costs to individuals or institutions with expenses in foreign currency. Buying a foreign-made car, costs far more rubles today than a year ago, for example, which is one reason that car sales have slumped. The price of vacations in Europe have risen by two-thirds since the beginning of the year, leading to mass bankruptcies among Russian tour companies. Consumers who purchase many imported goods are now much worse off. The rich spend the most money on imports, though all Russians will feel the effect of the ruble’s declining value through rising prices on food and clothes.

Many Russian firms, especially the country’s banks, have large sums of debt in foreign currency. The ruble value of these debts has risen sharply, and many companies will need state help to survive. The Kremlin has no interest in seeing a state-owned firm default on its debt, and will take whatever steps are necessary to protect the banking system, even if it means raiding the country’s $80 billion pension pot.

Bailouts, but for whom?

Although the ruble’s devaluation has shielded the government from lower oil prices, the Russian people have been made worse off, as their wages buy fewer imported goods and as businesses hesitate to invest because of sanctions and the Yevtushenkov affair. The main question the Kremlin faces is not economic, but political. Who will pay the price? In the short term, Putin appears to have decided to make Russian consumers pay by lowering their living standards. Prices for food, electronics, and other imported goods will increase, so consumers will have to buy less of them. Inflation may hit double digits, but wages will not rise accordingly. Taxes are already being raised.

In the medium term, however, the Kremlin faces a dilemma. Putin is popular in large part because living standards rose so rapidly during his first two terms as president, from 2000 to 2008. “It’s the economy, stupid” was a concept that defined Putin’s early years in office, but he now finds himself presiding over an economy that will stagnate in the near term. In his annual address to the Federal Assembly on December 4, Putin concluded by noting that “This year, as has been the case many times during crucial historical moments, our people have demonstrated national enthusiasm, vital endurance and patriotism.” But Putin will struggle to convince Russians that he is a wartime president while denying that Russia is at war in Ukraine.

If national enthusiasm, patriotism, and the “Crimea is ours!” euphoria run out before growth resumes, Putin will face a perilous choice between squeezing the population and restructuring the Russia’s elite. The first option, continuing to tolerate a weak ruble, high inflation, and lower living standards, may require more repression—and perhaps more foreign and internal enemies. Imposing costs on Russia’s elite, such as the security service-linked businessmen who control much of Russia’s energy industry and other state-owned companies, risks threatening Putin’s personal power base. The Kremlin could save billions of dollars a year if it restructured Gazprom, for example, but the corruption that the company creates is the glue that holds Putinism together. The Kremlin cannot seriously reduce waste and corruption without compromising patronage networks and sparking a political crisis.

A rebound in the price of oil would resolve this dilemma by restoring the previous balance of resources between the populace and elite groups. So, too, would a burst of growth caused by reforms that encouraged investment. In his speech last week, Putin promised a series of measures to cut low-level corruption associated with bribe-seeking inspectors. Reducing corruption associated with health and safety checks is a fine idea, but the practical effect will be minuscule so long as the terrifying lessons of the Yevtushenkov affair haunt Russian businesses.

Indeed, Yevtushenkov’s fate sums up the dilemma facing Russia today. Evidence is murky, but it appears that Rosneft moved to seize control of Yevtushenkov’s oilfields in part because Western sanctions have imperiled the firm’s ability to service its debt. Seizing Yevtushenkov’s assets seemed an ideal solution, helping to resolve Rosneft’s financing woes without a government bailout. In fact, expropriating Yevtushenkov’s assets merely shifted the bill, onto Yevtushenkov personally, but also onto all Russians, who will suffer lower growth as businesses put off investment and shift funds abroad. Yet the poisonous cocktail of sanctions, expropriations, and low oil prices is not simply an economic problem. Stagnation degrades the social contract—mass prosperity plus elite corruption—that undergirds Putin’s hold on power.

About the author:
Chris Miller, Associate Scholar of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, is a Ph.D. candidate at Yale. In 2012-2014, he worked as a visiting researcher at the Carnegie Moscow Center while on an Alfa Fellowship and taught history at the New Economic School, a university in Moscow. He is currently completing a book manuscript on the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI here.

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Alan Gross, a US national jailed in Cuba for 6 years after being convicted of “acts against the independence or territorial integrity of the Cuban state”, was released and flown back to the US, reports MISNA.

According to MISNA, Washington has in exchange agreed to the release of three Cuban agents convicted of espionage.

Gross was sentenced to 15 years for bringing telecommunication devices into Cuba while working as a subcontractor for United State Agency for International Development, while the freed Cuban agents are apparently part of the so-called “Cuban five” detained since 1998 for spying anti-Castro groups, MISNA reported.

In related news, President Barack Obama announced Wednesday that the United States will establish diplomatic relations with Cuba and open an embassy in Havana as part of a plan to chart a new course in relations with the island state and to further engage and empower the Cuban people.

In a statement the White House noted that the two nations, “are separated by 90 miles of water, but brought together through the relationships between the two million Cubans and Americans of Cuban descent that live in the United States, and the 11 million Cubans who share similar hopes for a more positive future for Cuba.”

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By Tuva Julie Engebrethsen Smith

The Islamic State (IS) continues to expand its offensive operations, and is fast gaining support outside Iraq and Syria. Next on its agenda seems to be the North African region. However, is the ground fertile enough for the IS to find roots in Libya, Tunisia, or Egypt? And do African leaders have anything to worry about?

The IS seems unstoppable and is spreading into North Africa – a region marked by poor governance and a large number of violent extremist groups. In fact, research conducted by the Soufan Group estimates that North Africa is the region with the highest number of foreign fighters joining the IS, the reason being “incomplete political reforms that have failed to redress serious societal issues, persistent high unemployment, and a failure to cope with the apparent high levels of disaffection, despair, and anger.” The threat from the IS is not potential, it is already there.

The Libyan state has been rather weak after Muammar Gadhafi´s fall in 2011. This has given space for Gadhafi’s Islamist opponents, who had earlier gone to Syria to participate in the anti-Bashar Assad jihad, to return and secure a foothold in the Libyan city of Darnah. Several militias are presently ruling in Darnah, with the Islamic Youth Shura Council being the most important one. Furthermore, the militia group, Majlis Shura Shabab al-Islam (MSSI), also recently established in Darnah and pledged its support to the IS. Training camps with at least 200 militants have been established in the hills outside of Darnah, according to Davis Rodriguez, commander of AFRICOM.

According to Noman Benotman, President of Quilliam Foundation, the Libyan IS faction is now in total control of Darnah and is managing the administration of the city, its courts, education and local radio. It has also expanded westwards in the towns of al Bayda, Benghazi, Sirte, al-Khums and Tripoli. The ground in Libya is evidently fertile enough for an IS expansion, as these examples demonstrate. The militia are not different from the IS in Iraq and Syria, and if voices of criticism are raised, they can expect being hunted down and beheaded by these Islamic fighters.

As such, Darnah is the first city in the region to become an IS-controlled territory. This is however not surprising as Libya has become an important source of weapons in the post-Arab Spring setting, and provides perfect conditions for the IS to further augment its revenues from this oil-rich country.

Of the approximately 50 countries struggling to prevent people joining the IS, Tunisia is the largest source of foreign fighters joining the IS. The official estimate is that, as of April 2014, a total of 3,000 fighters have joined the IS. Post-Arab Spring Tunisia has found it rather difficult to establish a balance between freedom and public security. Social unrest and new religious freedom have enabled radical preachers to stoke the religious fire among disillusioned youth who are easy targets for jihadist training in Syria. According to Marwen Jedda, a human rights lawyer representing Islamist clients, “for many of these young men, death in Syria is a lot better option than staying here and going to prison, and being tortured and harassed”. Tunisian fighters are attracted by their possible liberation from poverty and the promise of a good life in the Islamic Caliphate as emphasized by the IS in its propaganda.

As for Egypt, its Interior Minister Major General Muhamed Ibrahim argues that the country is not likely to fall to the seductive IS ideology. However, the military has faced difficulties in containing Islamist extremists in the Sinai. For instance, the IS affiliate group, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM), allegedly swore allegiance to the IS in early November 2014. It has also led aggressive attacks against Egypt’s military and civil servants, and episodes of beheadings and the broadcasting of videos, though less professional in comparison with IS videos, have appeared. Additionally, a former Muslim Brotherhood member stated in an interview with Al-Monitor that there are many people with faith in the IS and that if the government were to attempt to restrict their travel to Syria, they will form IS units in Egypt itself.

The Sinai Peninsula is strategically important to the IS since it serves as a bridge between two continents. A firm foothold in Egypt is thus desirable as Sinai can serve as a launching pad for terrorist attacks against Western nationals in, for instance, Israel and at popular Egyptian tourist attractions like Sharm el-Sheikh and Mount Sinai. As pointed out by Der Spiegel, “Conditions in the Sinai are perfect for Islamic State: It is bitterly poor, largely lawless, a hub of drug, weapons and human trafficking, and it is populated by Bedouins, who oppose the government in Cairo. But moderate Islamists and regime critics across Egypt make for attractive IS targets: They are brutally oppressed by the Egyptian military and many of them are in prison.”

A concern worth highlighting is the problem of copycats. African rebel groups have been witnessing the “success” of the IS in expanding their hold over territories in Syria and Iraq and are thus trying to copy the IS. Further, the threat of the IS in Libya, Tunisia or Egypt has the potential to grow because there seems to be a generation gap between the older jihadists continuing to support the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the younger jihadists determined to break away from AQIM and pledging allegiance to the IS. The ‘jihad-generation’ seems highly determined and attracted to the brutality of fighting, as well as the wealth and way of life that the IS Caliphate has to offer. There is no worry about finance and education, as the Caliphate provides these. After all, the IS has proved rather capable of achieving its stated goals including the ability to gain control over substantial territories and build up a large army of domestic and foreign fighters.

Analysts like Thomas Joselyn, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, argue that there is little doubt that the IS will gain foothold in this region due to its “close” connections with the al-Qaeda movement. On the other hand, people joining the IS are generally younger and arguably with looser bonds to al-Qaeda affiliate leaders compared to the older generation. And it is this generation, the young social media adept generation that the IS strategically targets. In the eyes of this jihad-generation, already existing extremist groups in North Africa have failed to improve the situation, while the IS characterizes success, wealth, order, and the “perfect life”.

As such, the ground in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia is more fertile for the IS than what the leaders of these countries might wish it to be. The IS threat in North Africa is not a future possibility but a present reality

Tuva Julie Engebrethsen Smith is a Researcher (IReS) at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi. She can be contacted at tuva.engebretshen [at] gmail.com

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India

Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheIslamicStatesForaysinNorthAfrica_tjesmith_171212.html

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News that the Obama administration is “changing its relationship with the people of Cuba” is due to the leftward shift in Latin America that has increasingly isolated the United States politically in the region, Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) Co-Director Mark Weisbrot said today.

The Obama administration announced the changes following Cuba’s release of USAID contractor Alan Gross and an unnamed “intelligence asset,” and the U.S. release of the three remaining members of the “Cuban Five” who were imprisoned for espionage after working to disrupt plots by Cuban exile extremists based in the U.S. Cuba is also reportedly releasing 53 other political prisoners.

“This historic shift is a direct result of the United States’ increasing isolation in the region,” Weisbrot said in a statement. “Relations between Latin America and the Obama administration have been the worst probably of any U.S. administration in decades. This will help, but new sanctions against Venezuela will also raise questions in the hemisphere about whether this is a change in direction or merely a giving up on a strategy that has failed for more than 50 years.”

“Because of the historic transition in Latin America over the past 15 years, with left governments elected in most of the region, basically the rules and norms were changed for the whole hemisphere. Various Latin American governments – and not just those on the left – have been increasingly vocal in recent years that the status quo cannot stand, and that Cuba must be treated as an equal, and welcomed into fora such as the Summit of the Americas,” Weisbrot noted.

According to Weisbrot, “Washington’s Cuba policy is being pulled into the 21st Century thanks to this regional shift.”

Weisbrot added, however, “The U.S. has pumped tens of millions into efforts to undermine left-of-center governments in Latin America, including Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Brazil. The just-approved appropriations bill [PDF] includes increased funding for these purposes, and the White House fact sheet on the new Cuba policy makes clear that so-called ‘democracy promotion’ will continue to be a major component. So these activities will continue to harm relations with Latin America. The U.S. still does not have full diplomatic relations with Bolivia and Venezuela.”

Weisbrot noted that the move was also made possible by an apparent willingness by the Obama administration to no longer allow Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Robert Menendez take the lead on Cuba policy. Menendez has vocally opposed the reforms announced today, and is considered a hard-liner on U.S.-Latin America policy.

Weisbrot pointed to the formation of international groupings such as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) that include Cuba but exclude the United States, and the growing influence and pushback from regional organizations such as UNASUR (the Union of South American Nations), as more evidence of regional change that have made U.S. policy untenable. “Obama’s decision is also a clear defeat for the Cuban-exile extremists who have dominated U.S. policy toward the region for decades, more recently with their neo-conservative allies.”

Regarding the easing of the embargo, and Obama administration recommendations that it be reconsidered by Congress, Weisbrot said: “The U.S. can no longer ignore international law and the opinion of the entire world. This is a victory for the rule of law in the world of international relations.”

The post Obama’s Change Of Cuba Policy Is Welcome And Long Overdue, Says CEPR appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Dr. Sanchita Bhattacharya*

With the escalating inclination towards terrorism and lawlessness in Pakistan, the number of illegal weapons has also crossed the 60 million mark in the country.

According to a December 2014 report, the data collected from various sources reveals that the number of prohibited and non-prohibited weapons is about 65 million in Pakistan. The report reveals upsetting details: of these weapons, only 5 million weapons have licences while over 60 million are being carried by people without licences.

A huge number of illegal weapons is present in the suburbs of Peshawar, provincial capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and tribal areas. There are also factories making big and small weapons, including Mausers, pistols and Kalashnikovs. The sources say most of the weapons found in Pakistan are brought from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Peshawar and Afghanistan’s Kunar province via Bajaur and Mohmand Agencies. The illegal weapons are also smuggled to Punjab from Afghanistan’s Paktia province via North and South Waziristan.

The domestic situation in Pakistan is worsened due to easy availability of weapons and arms. An unknown quantity of weapons, likely in the thousands, diverted into the hands of Pakistani dealers eventually ended up in border arms bazaars, supplying militant sectarian groups, terrorists, drug cartels, criminals and those seeking protection from such groups. Although the Afghan situation exacerbated the problem, it is a known fact that ‘gun culture’ has long existed in the northern frontier and the adjacent tribal areas. Therefore, in addition to the enduring weapons from the Cold War, areas in KP have a long history of craft production of weapons. In addition, tribal disputes in the frontier province of Balochistan, and in Sindh and Punjab are perpetrated by the abundance of cheaply available firearms.

Directly, the most affected province by the growing availability of these weapons is Sindh, particularly state capital Karachi. Though the problems in Sindh have been more political than ideological, much division occurs along ethnic lines. Throughout the 1980s, the levels of violence in Karachi reached unprecedented and shocking levels prior to the Pakistan Army’s intervention in 1992. Although Sindh traces a streak of violence, it is agreed that dramatic increase in the violence and polarisation dates from 1985 to 1986, when weapons from the Afghan pipeline began to find their way into commercial channels.

According to the 1998 census, there were two million licensed and 18 million unlicensed weapons in the country. On the contrary, the present number is worrisome. The sources say that there are about 17 million legal and illegal weapons only in Karachi (Sindh), whereas their number is over four million in Lahore (Punjab). In Karachi, nearly 18,000 people fell victim to gun violence between 1992 and 1998.

Interestingly, in the month of November 2014 a report stated that Hyderabad in Sindh is the most weaponised city of the province. Karachi, however, is perceived to be the metropolis with heaviest weaponisation figure. According to S.M. Iqbal, spokesperson of the Sindh Home Department, the provincial government had so far issued some 10,57,456 arms licenses to people from across Sindh. Of most of the total licences issued, at least 3,76,401, were to the people of Hyderabad. Karachi, where politically-motivated violence is the order of the day, comes next with its residents having got at least 2,54,255 of their weapons licensed apparently for ‘self-defence’.

The people of Sukkur, which is regarded as relatively a peaceful city, stand at number three by obtaining some 1,50,923 arms licences from the Home Department. Official figures put Larkana at fourth position in terms of arms licences. The Home Department has licensed 1,50,553 weapons in Larkana. Mirpurkhas is the division where 1,24,771 weapons were allowed to be carried by the license holders.

It is a known fact that severe proliferation of weapons and arms in Pakistan began after the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In addition to the cross-border flow of weapons, an estimated 30 percent of the weapons funnelled by US and Pakistani intelligence services to the Afghan resistance during the conflict were diverted for other purposes. Gunsmithing was effectively a cottage industry with marginal profits, but was transformed during the Soviet invasion when demand for weapons from Mujahideen groups soared. The weapons, everything from a pen that doubles as a pistol to a copy of an AK-47, or even an anti-aircraft gun, are made by hand, carry no serial numbers and are often or poor quality.

Pakistan, according to anti-arms campaigners, has one of the greatest per capita rates of gun ownership in the world. Though there are no official figures, rough estimates put the total number of small arms at large in the country at more than 20 million, with about half of them illegal. KP alone is believed to have nearly half a million illegitimate small arms and light weapons.

Along with extensive smuggling of weapons mainly from Afghanistan, the small arms menace in Pakistan is also the result of both legal and illegal arms manufacturing units in various parts of KP and the neighbouring FATA bordering Afghanistan. While some arms workshops in KP are registered with the government, the infamous industry in the FATA, including the main hubs of Darra Adam Khel, Bara and Jamrud, are unregistered.

Apart from the illegal market, Pakistan is also an importer of ‘legal weapons’. Pakistan is the world’s third largest weapons importer, trailing behind India and China, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The country’s arms imports increased by 119 percent between 2004–2008 and 2009–13, with China providing 54 percent and the USA 27 percent of Pakistan’s imports.

Arms proliferation both legal and illegal is a major security challenge to Pakistan. The trafficking and wide availability of these weapons fuel militancy and communal conflict and threaten lives and the country’s development. Authorities are working to reduce the problem. In June, 2013 the prime minister stopped issuing firearm licences and ordered the Ministry of Interior (MoI) to investigate whether the previous federal government issued 35,000 permits to applicants who shouldn’t have been approved.

The impact of weaponisation and violence on the overall societal growth and human security of Pakistani society is extremely negative. It is not an easy task to stop either arms production or arms proliferation, but the solution lies within providing reliable means of earning income to these illegal manufacturers, proliferators and such promoters in order to put an end to extensive and harmful smuggling nationwide. Internal conflicts, disputes, disparities and deprivation must also be addressed and resolved. Attaining a certain level of education and civic sense, and ensuring a good standard of living for the citizens of the state can accomplish this change in priorities.

*(Sanchita Bhattacharya is Research Associate with Institute for Conflict Management. She can be contacted at southasiamonitor1@gmail.com)

The post Pakistan: Weaponisation Of A Nation – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Dr. S. Chandrasekharan

On December 15, President Yameen sacked the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Ahmed Faiz and another Judge Muthasim Adnan on the recommendation of the Judicial Commission and approved by the Majlis all within a space of five days.

Article 154 of the Constitution states that a judge can be removed only after the Judicial Service Commission finds the judge to be guilt of gross incompetence or misconduct.

What is curious is that the Judicial Commission’s report on the recommendation has not been made public and no specific reasons have been given for their removal. It is learnt from the dismissed judges themselves that they were not given a chance to defend themselves- an elementary procedure in law in any country other than in communist dictatorships!

Curiouser still is the fact that one judge who should have been removed on known misconduct ( I refer to the alleged sex tapes -see papers 5701 and 5805) not only remains in the Supreme Court Bench but was also given the honour of administering the oath of office to the new Chief Justice- Abdulla Saeed.

The two judges happened to be giving “inconvenient decisions.” They were the dissenting judges in the decision of the Supreme Court Bench to annul the first round of Presidential elections which allowed President Yameen sufficient time to recoup and win over his one time bete noire Gasim Ibrahim! .

There were also allegations that MPs were offered huge amounts of cash to stay out of the parliamentary sessions that gave two thirds majority to approve the removal and the appointment of a new Chief Justice.

The whole drama unfolded first on the 10th of December when the People’s Majlis amended the Judicature Act to reduce the seven member bench of the Supreme Court to that of five. Ironically, the motion was first proposed by the opposition member Ibrahim Shareef who himself voted against the resolution on a whip from the party chief of MDP.

Former President Nasheed had opposed the move to reduce the number of judges as he feared that it will allow the current President Yameen to stack the Supreme Court Bench in his favour. This is what happened finally.

On the 11th December within twenty-four hours of the amendment to the Judicature Act by the Majlis, the Judicial Service Commission recommended that the Chief Justice Ahmed Faiz and Justice Musthasim Adnan be dismissed from the bench. They were dismissed and not just retired though they have been promised a generous amount as retirement benefits! The alacrity with which the names were recommended showed that it was planned well in advance!

On 14th December, the opposition MDP filed for a stay order in the Civil Court on the amendment and the action that followed for the dismissal of the judges.

On the same day the Supreme Court struck again. It issued a “writ of prohibition” to consider the case and halt all proceedings. The court order directed the civil court “to hand over case files with all relevant documents to the Supreme Court before the 20.45 PM, 14-Dec 2014 and to immediately annul any action that may have been taken in the matter.”

The next morning, on 15th December, the Majlis approved the recommendation of the JSC by 53 votes in favour with 21 against. One Member of Parliament abstained and six of the Jumhooree party MP s voted in favour of the proposal though its leader Gasim Ibrahim himself voted against the recommendation. ( Gasim claims that no “whip” was issued and it looks that it was a deliberate omission.)

It was learnt that six members of the Parliament of opposition MDP did not attend the Majlis meeting that day. Obviously, they were won over by the ruling party.

The same night at 9.30 PM orders were issued appointing Abdulla Saeed as the new Chief Justice.

The whole issue from way the Judicature Act was restructured to the removal of two judges all done in a hurry and within a space of five days looks very suspicious. Rightly it has come in for criticism from many quarters.

The Maldivian Democracy Network (MDN) has described the removal of judges as a “travesty of justice”— a procedurally irregular decision.

Transparency Maldives said that the “decision to dismiss without publicising the criteria used to deem them of being guilty of gross misconduct or gross incompetence as required under article 154 of the Constitution raised question about the fairness of the process.”

The dismissed Chief Justice Faiz’s criticism was more subdued. He said “Today will be written down as a black day on the constitutional history of Maldives”. He called it as an action that is disrespectful of the Constitution.

Former President Nasheed alleged that the ruling party is trying to unify the judiciary with the executive power of the State.

With the way, President Yameen had manipulated the legislature (the Majlis), it looks that all the three pillars of democracy- the judiciary, the executive and the legislative are firmly under his control.

This to me is a dangerous development. In a hypothetical case where he finds it inconvenient to continue with his policy either because of the judiciary or the legislative I have no doubt in my mind that he would cross all limits and assume full powers.

At that time his efforts to get close to China- the silk maritime route or in the development of the Ibrahim Nasir Airport or in the building of a bridge to Male from Hulhulu island would come in handy and bring in results by way of “firm support” if other countries choose to condemn his actions. We know what happened in Myanmar.

The post Maldives: Removal Of Inconvenient Judges Another Set Back For Democracy – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Jim Redden and Catherine Grant Makokera

It is hoped that African countries will soon be signing a new free trade agreement that will take the continent one step closer to its goal of economic development.

The Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) spans from Cape Town to Cairo and it will bring together three existing regional groupings in Southern and Eastern Africa: the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC) and the Community for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Its aim is to open the markets of up to twenty-six member countries with a total of 530 million people whose current GDP is approximately 58% of Africa’s total by enabling the free movement of goods and eventually services.

The T-FTA is an important building block in the plans of the African Union to create a continent-wide free trade area. It is the first attempt to bring together existing regional arrangements and broaden integration that has already taken place through smaller groups of countries. Regional economic integration is a priority for Africa. Trade between African countries is currently relatively low by global standards at only around 10% of total trade. The AU has set out a plan to boost this level of trade by addressing a number of factors, such as lack of infrastructure, access to trade finance and improving trade facilitation – meaning the more efficient movement of goods across borders and to overseas markets.

The good news is that in 2014, Africa received almost $14 billion in aid for trade funding from the donor community, including from the World Trade Organisation (WTO), World Bank, EU, USA and a number of other donors. As such, aid for trade is a highly significant contribution to Africa’s development priorities and needs to be used as effectively and efficiently as possible. Aid for trade targets trade obstacles and challenges facing Africa so as to help build self-reliance and trade our way to increased jobs and wealth in the future.

Aid for trade resources are intended to increase investment in trade-related infrastructure, to address barriers to the development of productive industries that can trade, and therefore enable Africans to participate more actively and benefit from the global trading system.

No economy grows without opening up to trade, the most obvious examples being China, South Korea and Singapore. While it is always complex to deduce the exact impact of aid for trade, the WTO estimates that for every one dollar spent on aid for trade, there is a boost to a country’s overall trade output worth eight dollars. There is no doubt that aid for trade can make a significant contribution to African development and the volume of such aid is likely to continue grow as more donors increase their allocation to this area.

However, given the volume of this aid, it is equally vital that it is well spent on priorities that are owned by Africans and that are mutually agreed with donor countries.

So what should be the priorities for Africa’s future aid for trade strategy? A lively workshop was recently held in Johannesburg, sponsored by the Australian Government as part of its aid for trade programme, bringing together the private sector, government trade officials, academic trade expertsand donor representatives from across Africa. It focussed in on this very question and is therefore insightful in shedding light on African priorities.

Firstly, it was agreed that it is critical that aid for trade resources be guided by the plans already put in place by African countries themselves, at the national, regional and continental level.

Secondly, aid for trade needs to support the overarching economic development goals of Africa, especially the creation of jobs through growth.

Thirdly, aid for trade can and should be used to promote the greater engagement of women traders and small-medium sized enterprises in the trading system.

Fourthly, there is a role for aid for trade in promoting the addition of value to Africa’s natural resource wealth, including through the creation of regional value chains and industrialisation. Too often we hear of the hard work done in agriculture or resource extraction by Africans, only for the raw materials or food products to be exported to developed countries where all the value add occurs – to the benefit of foreign multinationals.

The price African coffee farmers receive for their labour compared to the price of a jar of processed coffee in developed country supermarkets is typical of this phenomena. To change this means hard work – hard work to ensure African economies have the technology and expertise to do the value add here and commitment from governments and the private sector to work together in achieving this. A great example of where this has been achieved has been the recent successful creation of a diamond cutting industry in Botswana, and active programmes to link this with small-scale Botswanan jewellery designers to further add value to these diamonds.

The private sector were outspoken at the workshop and strongly emphasised the importance of their involvement not just in setting priorities, but also in the design and implementation of aid for trade programmes. Development assistance has tended to be the preserve of governments but trade is very much the domain of the private sector. It is therefore critical to make efforts to involve business more actively in debates on regional integration and aid for trade. Through effective public-private dialogue mechanisms, it is possible to also develop solutions that draw upon the capacity and resources of different stakeholders.

That said, the private sector identified further specific activities that should be included in future aid for trade programmes. They included: support for private sector involvement in the drafting and negotiation of trade agreements; activities to thin the borders on the continent through the provision of soft infrastructure support; reduction of transport costs; improved infrastructure at the ports, along transport corridors and in the energy and ITC sectors; the creation of storage and standard testing facilities for agricultural products; facilitating innovate financing mechanisms to support trade and trade-related infrastructure; and creative solutions to encourage the free movement of business people and labour around the continent. A key ask was to deal with red tape – reducing the cost of doing business, for example, the time it takes to register a business or reducing duplication and corruption in licensing procedures.

If well harnessed, aid for trade can provide a significant boost to progress on regional integration and increased trade in Africa. To achieve this however will require greater levels of communication between governments and business so as to create trust and a better understanding of the real issues facing business and traders on a daily basis.

Jim Redden is a trade and development expert with the Institute for International Trade in Australia. Catherine Grant Makokera is a Research Associate of the South African Institute of International Affairs. This article was first published on AllAfrica.com.

Source: SAIIA

The post Aid For Trade Vital For Boosting Regional Integration And Development – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Amulya Ganguli*

The mistake which is generally made while analyzing Pakistan is to regard it as a normal country. Most people will feel, therefore, that the horror and revulsion felt by a vast majority over the massacre of children in an army school in Peshawar will finally persuade the authorities there, including the army, to crack down on all groups of terrorists. As much was said by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif when he gave the assurance that no distinction will be made from now on between the “good” terrorists and the “bad” ones.

The fact, however, that the promise is meaningless has been proved by the continuing apprehensions in India over intelligence reports that there will be a re-run of the 26/11-type terrorist attack on India on the eve of, or during, president Barack Obama’s visit. Moreover, both Hafiz Sayeed, the mastermind of 26/11, and former Pakistan president Pervez Musharraf, who was behind the Kargil incursions, have blamed India for the attack on the Peshawar school.

While Musharraf’s comments can be ignored as those of a frustrated exile whose attempts to re-enter Pakistan came to naught, Hafiz Sayeed’s observations are portentous, especially those claiming that the Indian forces will carry out the attacks in India and blame the ISI. The “good” terrorists, therefore, have already indicated their game plan and the subsequent explanations.

In this context, it is extremely unlikely that there will be any diminution of Pakistan’s overall terrorist infrastructure in the aftermath of the Peshawar tragedy. While the Pakistan army’s drive against the Tehreek-e-Taliban, the “bad” terrorists who have claimed responsibility for the Peshawar attack, may be intensified, there is little chance of their “good” counterparts being disturbed in any way or of even of their lying low for the time being.

They will continue, therefore, to plan their offensive against India by indoctrinating, training and arming the jihadis with the army’s and the ISI’s help while looking for an opportunity to carry out a murderous attack. It is possible that Hafiz Sayeed and his killers have been upset by the timing of the Tehreek-e-Taliban’s onslaught because Sayeed must have regarded Obama’s presence in the subcontinent as an excellent opportunity for unleashing his psychos wearing suicide vests against India because of the huge publicity which the attack will generate, radicalizing more Muslims across the world including India.

Not that the Peshawar massacre will deter Sayeed’s Jamaat-ud-Dawa, his ostensibly charitable outfit, or the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which currently heads the list of “good” terrorists in the eyes of the Pakistan army and the ISI. But, an assault on India at this time will expose Nawaz Sharif’s promise as bogus and confirm that nothing has changed in Pakistan. After all, there is no way that the Pakistan army and the ISI can dispense with the services of the LeT, which they regard as the country’s strategic assets against India.

Both the Pakistan army and the ISI know that the grief and anger over Peshawar will subside in a few months. But, that does not mean that the overall assessment of the geopolitical realities in the subcontinent, which guides the Pakistan army and the ISI, will be ignored because of a single incident, however sad. There is no way, therefore, for the ordinary people – no matter how much they mourn – and for the prime minister – who is basically a puppet in the army’s hands – to influence the main thrust of the army’s and the ISI’s policy, which is to bleed India with a thousand cuts, in the chilling phrase of a Pakistani warmonger.

After all, the bogey of a deadly and cunning India intent on dismembering Pakistan again, as it once did in 1971, has to be kept alive by the army and the ISI to ensure their continued dominance over the common people of Pakistan. Since there is no way that India can be defeated militarily, as was proved even earlier in 1965 and 1971, the only way is to harass it by throwing the suicide squads of the “strategic assets” against it.

The desperation of the army and the ISI may have increased all the more because the US and the rest of the Western world have become wise to their devious objectives. Earlier, the US used to think that all will be well if only India handed over Kashmir to Pakistan on a platter. But, now, the West has realized that the jihadi culture has become far too ingrained in the mindset of influential sections of the Pakistani establishment to be easily eradicated. Moreover, the militant virus has infected not only Pakistan, but large sections of the Muslims themselves, as the rise of the ISIS and the recent attacks in Canada and Australia show.

The world is unlikely to experience any respite, therefore, from the jihadis, either the organized groups or what is known as the lone wolf who has imbibed the deadly philosophy espousing the cause of the medieval Caliphate from the Internet. In the process, it is not only a country like Pakistan which will get a bad name; even Islam itself because of the senseless activities of men with a warped psyche.

*(Amulya Ganguli is a commentator on political and strategic affairs. He can be contacted at amulyaganguli@gmail.com)

The post Business As Usual For Pakistan’s Jihadis And Their Supporters – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

A definitive geological timeline shows that a series of massive volcanic explosions 66 million years ago spewed enormous amounts of climate-altering gases into the atmosphere immediately before and during the extinction event that claimed Earth’s non-avian dinosaurs, according to new research from Princeton University.

A primeval volcanic range in western India known as the Deccan Traps, which were once three times larger than France, began its main phase of eruptions roughly 250,000 years before the Cretaceous-Paleogene, or K-Pg, extinction event, the researchers report in the journal Science.

The researchers suggest that the Deccan Traps eruptions and the meteorite impact near present-day Chicxulub, Mexico, need to be considered together when studying and modeling the Cretaceous-Paleogene extinction event. The main eruption phases for the Deccan Traps (in brown), which were once three times larger than France, began roughly 250,000 years before the extinction event, the researchers found. For the next 750,000 years, the volcanoes unleashed more than 1.1 million cubic kilometers (264,000 cubic miles) of lava, which comprised about 80-90 percent of the total volume of the Deccan Traps’ lava flow. The amount of carbon dioxide and sulfur dioxide the volcanoes poured out would have caused severe ecological fallout.
Credit: Illustration by Matilda Luk, Office of Communications

For the next 750,000 years, the volcanoes unleashed more than 1.1 million cubic kilometers (264,000 cubic miles) of lava. The main phase of eruptions comprised about 80-90 percent of the total volume of the Deccan Traps’ lava flow and followed a substantially weaker first phase that began about 1 million years earlier.

The results support the idea that the Deccan Traps played a role in the K-Pg extinction, and challenge the dominant theory that a meteorite impact near present-day Chicxulub, Mexico, was the sole cause of the extinction. The researchers suggest that the Deccan Traps eruptions and the Chicxulub impact need to be considered together when studying and modeling the K-Pg extinction event.

The Deccan Traps’ part in the K-Pg extinction is consistent with the rest of Earth history, explained lead author Blair Schoene, a Princeton assistant professor of geosciences who specializes in geochronology. Four of the five largest extinction events in the last 500 million years coincided with large volcanic eruptions similar to the Deccan Traps. The K-Pg extinction is the only one that coincides with an asteroid impact, he said.

“The precedent is there in Earth history that significant climate change and biotic turnover can result from massive volcanic eruptions, and therefore the effect of the Deccan Traps on late-Cretaceous ecosystems should be considered,” Schoene said.

The researchers used a precise rock-dating technique to narrow significantly the timeline for the start of the main eruption, which until now was only known to have occurred within 1 million years of the K-Pg extinction, Schoene said. The Princeton group will return to India in January to collect more samples with the purpose of further constraining eruption rates during the 750,000-year volcanic episode.

Schoene and his co-authors gauged the age of petrified lava flows known as basalt by comparing the existing ratio of uranium to lead given the known rate at which uranium decays over time. The uranium and lead were found in tiny grains — less than a half-millimeter in size — of the mineral zircon. Zircon is widely considered Earth’s best “time capsule” because it contains a lot of uranium and no lead when it crystallizes, but it is scarce in basalts that cooled quickly. The researchers took the unusual approach of looking for zircon in volcanic ash that had been trapped between lava flows, as well as within thick basalt flows where lava would have cooled more slowly.

The zircon dated from these layers showed that 80-90 percent of the Deccan Traps eruptions occurred in less than a million years, and began very shortly — in geological terms — before the K-Pg extinction. To produce useful models for events such as the K-Pg extinction, scientists want to know the sequence of events to within tens of thousands of years or better, not millions, Schoene said. Margins of millions of years are akin to “a history book with events that have no dates and are not written in chronological order,” he said.

“We need to know which events happened first and how long before other events, such as when did the Deccan eruptions happen in relation to the K-Pg extinction,” Schoene said. “We’re now able to place a higher resolution timeframe on these eruptions and are one step closer to finding out what the individual effects of the Deccan Traps eruptions were relative to the Chicxulub meteorite.”

Vincent Courtillot, a geophysicist and professor at Paris University Diderot, said that the paper is important and “provides a significant improvement on the absolute dating of the Deccan Traps.” Courtillot, who is familiar with the Princeton work but had no role in it, led a team that reported in the Journal of Geophysical Research in 2009 that Deccan volcanism occurred in three phases, the second and largest of which coincides with the K-Pg mass extinction. Numerous other papers from his research groups are considered essential to the development of the Deccan Traps hypothesis. (The Princeton researchers also plan to test the three-phases hypothesis, Schoene said. Their data already suggests that the second and third phase might be a single period of eruptions bridged by smaller, “pulse” eruptions, he said.)

The latest work builds on the long-time work by co-author Gerta Keller, a Princeton professor of geosciences, to establish the Deccan Traps as a main cause of the K-Pg extinction. Virginia Tech geologist Dewey McLean first championed the theory 30 years ago and Keller has since become a prominent voice among a large group of scientists who advocate the idea. In 2011, Keller published two papers that together proposed a one-two punch of Deccan volcanism and meteorite strikes that ended life for more than half of Earth’s plants and animals.

Existing models of the environmental effects of the Deccan eruptions used timelines two to three times longer than what the researchers found, which underestimated the eruptions’ ecological fallout, Keller explained. The amount of carbon dioxide and sulfur dioxide the volcanoes poured out would have produced, respectively, a long-term warming and short-term cooling of the oceans and land, and resulted in highly acidic bodies of water, she said.

Because these gases dissipate somewhat quickly, however, a timeline of millions of years understates the volcanoes’ environmental repercussions, while a timeframe of hundreds of thousands of years — particularly if the eruptions never truly stopped — provides a stronger correlation. The new work confirms past work by placing the largest Deccan eruptions nearer the K-Pg extinction, but shows a much shorter time frame of just 250,000 years, Keller said.

“These results have significantly strengthened the case for volcanism as the primary cause for the mass extinction, as well as for the observed rapid climate changes and ocean acidification,” Keller said.

“The Deccan Traps mass extinction hypothesis has already enjoyed wide acceptance based on our earlier work and a number of studies have independently confirmed the global effects of Deccan volcanism just prior to the mass extinction,” she said. “The current results will go a long way to strengthen the earlier results as well as further challenge the dominance of the Chicxulub hypothesis.”

The post New Timeline Confirms Ancient Volcanism Aligned With Dinosaurs’ Extinction appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Internet addiction is an impulse-control problem marked by an inability to inhibit Internet use, which can adversely affect a person’s life, including their health and interpersonal relationships.

The prevalence of Internet addiction varies among regions around the world, as shown by data from more than 89,000 individuals in 31 countries analyzed for a study published in Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, a peer-reviewed journal from Mary Ann Liebert, Inc., publishers.

In the article “Internet Addiction Prevalence and Quality of (Real) Life: A Meta-Analysis of 31 Nations Across Seven World Regions,” Cecelia Cheng and Angel Yee-lam Li of  the University of Hong Kong, present 164 Internet addiction prevalence figures, with an overall global prevalence estimate of 6.0%.

Prevalence ranged from a low of 2.6% in Northern and Western Europe to a high of 10.9% in the Middle East. The authors describe factors associated with higher Internet addiction prevalence and how it relates to individuals’ quality of life.

“This study provides initial support for the inverse relationship between quality of life and Internet Addiction (IA). It, however, finds no support for the hypothesis that high Internet accessibility (such as the high penetration rates in northern and western Europe), promote IA,” said Editor-in-Chief Brenda K. Wiederhold, PhD, MBA, BCB, BCN, Interactive Media Institute of San Diego, California and Virtual Reality Medical Institute in Brussels, Belgium.

The post Internet Addiction Affects 6 Percent Of People Worldwide appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The number of foreign citizens registered with the Spanish Social Security System stood at 1,549,398 in November, a decline of 0.27% on the previous month.

The highest figures for foreign workers correspond to Romania, Morocco, China and Ecuador, with 268,351, 187,575, 92,029 and 72,200, respectively, followed by Italy (64,407), Bolivia (59,893), the United Kingdom (54,799) and Colombia (53,390).

Autonomous regions

The Region of Murcia, the Region of Valencia and Andalusia are the autonomous regions posting the highest month-on-month increases (5.11%, 4.21% and 3.14% respectively). In contrast, the Balearic Islands (-23.52%), La Rioja (-15.19%), Castile Leon (-11.97%) and Extremadura (-10.79%) posted the largest declines.

The figures recorded for November show that 924,295 of the total foreign citizens registered with the Spanish Social Security system are from countries outside of the European Union, with the remaining 625,103 from EU countries.

The majority of foreign citizens are registered under the General Regime: 1,304,225, a figure that includes the Special System for Agricultural Workers (189,977) and the Special System for Domestic Workers (209,475). This is followed by the Special Regime for Self-Employed Workers (240,701), the Special Regime for Seamen (4,212) and the Special Regime for Coal Workers (260).

Catalonia is the autonomous region with the highest average number of foreign citizens registered with the system; 350,175 (22.6%). This is followed by the Region of Madrid, with 328,422 (21.2%); Andalusia, with 194,333 (12.54%); and the Region of Valencia, with 177,033 (11.43%).

By gender, of the total foreign citizens in the system, 839,161 are men and 710,239 are women.

The post Spain: Around 1.5 Million Foreign Citizens Registered With Social Security System In November appeared first on Eurasia Review.

As more EU countries recognize a “State of Palestine” and PA President Mahmoud Abbas appeals for UN recognition, and the government of Israel is under pressure to acquiesce, attention has turned to prime minister Yitzhak Rabin’s speech (October 5, 1995) when, seeking Knesset approval for the Interim Agreement (known as Oslo II), he said that he envisioned an independent, autonomous “Palestinian entity, not a state.”

What Rabin had in mind, however, is not clear and explicit in the documents he signed. Ambiguity about what was meant and how it was to work has created much confusion and misunderstanding.

Understandably, both sides feel betrayed; assumptions and expectations remain unfulfilled. The Oslo Agreements were the beginning of a slippery slide into ever-increasing, perhaps inevitable frustration.

According to an authoritative source, Rabin did not speak about or support a Palestinian state; neither he, nor Shimon Peres, both of whom were intimately involved in writing the Oslo Agreements, intended them to be the foundation for a sovereign Palestinian state.

That idea was first presented in the road map (2003) to which prime minister Ariel Sharon agreed: “Israeli leadership issues unequivocal statement affirming its commitment to the two-state vision of an independent, viable, sovereign Palestinian state.”

The subtle but all-important insertion of a single word changed the course of the Oslo Agreement and the “peace process.”

A year later, Sharon announced his disengagement plan from Gaza and part of Northern Samaria, and in 2005 he implemented it, destroying 25 thriving Jewish communities.

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert pledged to complete the process of withdrawal from Judea and Samaria. The Oslo Agreements had set the course for Palestinian statehood; Sharon sealed it.

Although the Oslo Agreements suggest “Palestinian autonomy” and “an entity, not a state,” these concepts were deliberately kept vague until Sharon made them explicit and entrenched.

According to the Interim Agreement, the government agreed to redeploy in “the West Bank” in two stages; first, from Areas A and B, which include nearly all Arabs in Judea, Samaria and Gaza; and second, from portions of Area C, in which all Jewish communities (“settlements”) are located and which, most important, is vital for Israel’s security.

Article 11, #3/3 of the Agreement was specific: “Area C means areas of the West Bank outside of Areas A and B which will be… gradually transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction…,” implying that the Palestinian Authority would extend its control over Area C, except for security areas (e.g. along the 1949 Armistice Lines and the Jordan Valley) and Jewish communities, which would be determined later as part of a final-status agreement. These communities and their infrastructure (roads, etc.) comprise less than 10 percent of Area C.

Israel alone would determine the timing and scope of its redeployment and would exercise powers and responsibilities which were not transferred, such as security and foreign affairs, not only in Area C, but in A and B as well. Palestinians were given autonomy, not sovereignty.

Regardless of what Rabin and Peres had in mind, therefore, the Interim Agreement is the only international agreement defining the PA ’s and the government of Israel’s commitments.

Unfortunately, that agreement does not condition an Israeli withdrawal, or redeployment, on Palestinians fulfilling their commitments – e.g. ending hostilities, incitement and support for terrorism.

The framers of Agreement hoped that by giving Palestinians autonomy while retaining exclusive control over redeployment and security, and retaining sovereignty, Israel could restrict Palestinian violence and eventually modify Palestinian behavior.

They believed that if the Palestinians do not take effective security control in Area A – to prevent attacks against Israelis and Israel – Israel would not give them more authority over additional areas in Area C.

Significantly, neither the Declaration of Principles (Oslo I), signed by foreign minister Shimon Peres, Mahmoud Abbas and secretary of state Warren Christopher, nor the Interim Agreement, signed by Rabin, Yasser Arafat and president Bill Clinton, mention the area as Judea and Samaria, its original and authentic name. By referring to the area only as “the West Bank,” the term used by Jordan during its occupation, the government of Israel signaled its abandonment of legal and historical claims to the area.

Unwittingly, Rabin and Peres painted Israel into a corner. This flaw was exacerbated by subsequent agreements, such as the road map, which touted a “two-state” model, undercutting the Oslo Agreements and encouraging Arab and Palestinian leaders to reject any recognition of Israel’s right to exist, and to continue incitement and terrorism, and move unilaterally toward recognition of sovereign statehood.

Although Abbas’s demand for statehood is an abrogation of the Oslo Agreements, thus releasing Israel from its contractual obligations, the government of Israel seems unwilling to take a more realistic view of its alternatives.

A revaluation of Israeli policy is imperative. Israel’s ambiguity about the status of Judea and Samaria and the Oslo Agreements has led to confusion and has eroded its diplomatic position. There is no logical or legal reason why Israel is obligated to commitments in the Oslo Agreements and the road map while the Palestinian side violates its undertakings.

This offers a golden opportunity to preserve the structure of the Oslo Agreements and benefit Israelis and Arab Palestinians.

Several years ago, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appointed a commission headed by the late High Court justice Edmund Levy and judicial and legal experts, to evaluate issues concerning Area C in Judea and Samaria. The commission issued a report with specific recommendations that would enhance the Oslo Agreements and advance our national interests.

Inexplicably, the prime minister has refused to allow this report to be discussed by the cabinet.

The report can be read here: http://regavim.org.il/en/ levy-report-translated-into- english I would like to thank Joel Singer, architect of the Oslo Agreements, for his assistance.

This article appeared at The Jerusalem Post and is reprinted with permission.

The post From Autonomy To Sovereignty: The Oslo Agreements And Palestinian Statehood – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Dusica Tomovic

Police in Montenegro arrested three international arms traffickers, suspected of trying to supply rebels in Colombia with weapons intended to kill Americans.

Police in Podgorica on Thursday confirmed the arrest of three international arms traffickers suspected of conspiring to sell large weaponry to FARC rebels in Colombia, a movement designated as a terrorist organization.

The two Romanians, Cristian Vintila, 44, and Virgil Flaviu Georgescu, 42, and an Italian, Massimo Romagnoli, 43, were arrested on Monday and Tuesday.

The three have been charged with terrorism offences in the State of New York. If extradited to the United States, put on trial and convicted, they would life sentences.

All three, who are now in custody in Podgorica, were charged in New York with conspiracy to kill Americans and provide “material support to a terrorist organization”.

The men allegedly conspired to sell pistols, machine guns and anti-aircraft cannons between May and October, “knowing they could be used by the FARC against US personnel”.

The head of the National Bureau of Interpol Podgorica, Dejan Djurovic, said Montenegrin police collaborated with the Romanian police as well as the US authorities in the operation.

FARC has an estimated 8,000 fighters and is the largest guerrilla group in Latin America. It has been locked in conflict with the Colombian government for five decades.

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